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# SELECTED SLOVAK AND EUROPEAN SECURITY CONTEXTS

## INTRODUCTION

Security is a broad concept. The aspect of security is linked with its opposites: the semantic concept of risk (or threat), accident, dangerous occurrence, victim, loss, damage, level of damage. Related concepts are those of risk, the level of risk, defense, protection from threats, prevention, etc. Both the term 'security' and the term 'threat' have a wide range of meanings. Security is associated with the relevant data, information, knowledge, experience, training, procedures,, and strategies for the prevention and minimization of threats and the losses incurred. Security is linked to measures, costs, and expenditure, which depend on the size and scale of the threat. Security, threat assessment, prevention, the costs have a logical relation. The level, structure, and dynamics of threats in space and time should be adequately responded to by methods of security strategy, and the nature of their applications.

### THE ISSUE OF SECURITY

The individual aspects of security from a structural point of view can be assessed in different ways. The security of mankind but also the individual can be generally subdivided as follows:

• Against threats from space — for example, comets or asteroids. In the period from 16 July to 22 July 1994 the core of the Comet Shoemaker-Levy 9 broke into more than 20 parts and hit the southern hemisphere of Jupiter, which allowed the first direct observation of a collision of two celestial bodies in the solar system.<sup>1</sup> In the following years, astrononomers noted the impact of this celestial body on Jupiter, one of the craters was the size of the Earth.<sup>2</sup> Up to 900 asteroids have a diameter greater than 1 km, while a potentially dangerous one is 990 m (data according to the statistics of the Minor Planet Center in Cambridge, MA, USA).<sup>3</sup>

"In particular, asteroids near the planet are in themselves a big potential for science. But they are not only for science but also for the normal life of people. Although it may seem that they still are the greatest threat to the existence of mankind and all life on Earth. And maybe sometime in the future they will become a rich source of minerals and the launch pad for exploring the universe."

- Against threats of natural forces on the planet Earth. The earthquake and tsunami in March 2011 in Japan killed thousands of people and damaged the nuclear reactors in Fukushima, with the result that hydrogen escaped into the atmosphere and dangerous radioactive substances polluted the sea. After the reactor explosion four Japanese prefectures were contaminated by radioacticity. Many people were evacuated. Several countries halted imports of foodstuffs from Northern Japan. Japan, according to the experts of the IAEA, underestimated the threat posed by earthquakes and tsunamis for nuclear installations in the country. In reply, the Government of Japan stressed that it would propose a special independent authority, which would in the future, oversee the crisis measures and prevention, and was not under the control of the Ministry of the Economy, as its predecessor had been, which is not a suitable situation.<sup>5</sup>
- Against human behavior:
- Against the violence and destruction that can result from the use of nuclear, biological, chemical,<sup>6</sup> seismic and other weapons in possible future conflicts.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> ZEM, MARS A JUPITER. [online]. (Cited 31.5.2011). Available on the Internet: http://www.wesmir.weblahko.sk/ZEM- -MARSA-JUPITER.html.

ŠKREKA, M. 2009. Zrážka s Jupiterom. [online]. 22.7.2009. (Cited 3.6.2011). Available on the Internet: http://astrin.planetarium.sk/zobraz.php?id=64.

HUSÁRIK, M. 2008. ASTEROIDY. Astronomický ústav SAV, Tatranská Lomnica. [online]. 2008. (Cited 3.6.2011). Available on the Internet: http://www.astro.sk/~choc/08\_casu/zbornik/husarik/husarik.pdf.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

MAAE: Japonsko podcenilo hrozbu tsunami. In 24hod.sk. [online]. 1. júna 2011. (Cited 3.6.2011). Available on the Internet: http://www.24hod.sk/maae-japonsko-podcenilo-hrozbu-tsunami-cl162801.html.

DURDIAK, J. – GÁFRIK, A. – PULIŠ, P. – SUŠKO, M. 2005. Zbrane hromadného ničenia – aktuálna bezpečnostná hrozba. MO SR, Inštitút bezpečnostných a obranných štúdií MO SR. Bratislava. 2005. [online]. (Cited 3.6.2011). Available on the Internet: http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=67.

The nuclear powers are: the USA, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, the People's Republic of China, Israel, India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (it is possible that atomic weapons are owned by the South African Republic and Taiwan). It is known that intercontinental ballistic missiles are owned by the USA, Russia, France and the United Kingdom, and probably by the People's Republic of China. The military atomic programs of other States are unclear. North Korea has an advanced nuclear program as does Iran.

- Against reckless mismanagement of resources, whether human, financial, material, energy, food, water, soil, forests, etc.
- Against unforeseen consequences of human activities. An example of this was an accident involving two submarines. In February the French submarine Le Triomphant and the British submarine Vanguard collided with each other. They are responsible for the national security of their respective countries. Le Triomphant is capable of carrying 16 nuclear missiles, and Vanguard may have in its inventory 48 of them.<sup>8</sup> Submarines have sunk. The Russian submarine Kursk sank on the bottom of the of Barents sea on 12 August 2000; all sailors of the crew perished.<sup>9</sup> On April 9, 1963, the nuclear submarine Thresher sank also. This military submarine crashed to the bottom of the Wilkenson Trench in Atlantic Ocean during its training. All 129 US Navy sailors on board perished.<sup>10</sup>
- Harm to the natural planet, causing an increase in the greenhouse effect, the
  loss of biodiversity, pollution of the environment, etc.) before the genetic capabilities of man, restrictions, limits, mutations and genetic modification of
  products, environmental impacts caused by man (chemical, agricultural, energy, industrial production, e.g. processing of waste, etc.).
- Against accidents, whether due to improper or hazardous work practices (falling under the remit of Health and Safety) or accidents at home or while travelling.

According to the results of our survey,<sup>11</sup> respondents assume the biggest threats to be waste (20.5%), industry (20.2%), mining (19.9%), energy supply (15.6%), transport (15.3%) and finally agricultural production (8.5%).

ŠIPEKY, M. 2004. Definovanie asymetrie. 2.11.2004. [online]. (Cited 3.6.2011) Available on the Internet: http://www.valka.cz/clanek 10821.html.

SZALAI, P. 2009. Francúzi a Briti tajili atómovú nehodu v Atlantiku. 16.2.2009. [online]. (Cited 3. 6. 2011). The article was published in the newspaper SME daily. Available on the Internet: http://www.sme.sk/c/4311923/francuzi-a-briti-tajili-atomovu-nehodu-v-atlantiku.html.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> BÉZA, M. 2000. Ruské ponorky. K-141 Kursk. [online]. (Cited 3.6.2011). Available on the Internet: http://www.military.cz/russia/navy/submarin/oscarclass/kursk/kursk. htm.

Námorné katastrofy. 9.10.2008. [online]. (Cited 4.6.2011). Available on the Internet: http://www.priestor.estranky.sk/clanky/tragedie-zeme/namorne-katastrofy.

VARHOĽÁK, P. 2010. Vybrané environmentálne hodnotenia pre 21. storočie. In: Týždeň vedy a umenia na Pedagogickej fakulte Katolíckej univerzity v Ružomberku. Zborník prednášok z týždňa európskej vedy. Ružomberok 29.11.–3.12. Ružomberok: VERBUM, 2011. pp. 156–166.

From the perspective of the threats caused by human in our survey (the differences are not so great)<sup>12</sup> our respondents viewed the largest: pollution of world drinking water and ozone depletion (9.95%), air pollution (9.83%), the threat of the disappearance of organisms and biocenoses (9.66%), the greenhouse effect (9.53%), radioactive contamination of the natural environment (9.21%), acid rain (9,19%), destruction of natural ecosystems (9.11%), pollution and erosion of the soil (8.83%), over salting (7.53) and wetness, soil, and finally weathering (6.87%). Respondents considered the greatest natural threats to be floods (20%), followed by avalanches (18%), wind (17%), earthquake (16%), tsunami (15%) and finally volcanic activity (14%).<sup>13</sup> It has been asked whether it is possible to ensure the safety of countries and national institutions, by accepting a measure of outsourcing and privatization. The extreme case of privatization is that of national defense, and is a controversial proposal in the light of future developments, threats, turmoil, and the effectiveness of security needed to counteract this. The privatization of security at the level of individual countries and alliances on the one hand, and, on the other hand, organizations with a global scope, for example, terrorist groups, have led to the privatization of wars and military conflicts.

"The role of private security and military organizations as a tool of intervention in conflict scenarios increased constantly and exponentially after the Cold War, in many cases, a return to order and stability in conflict zones and [a means of carrying out] peacekeeping operations and [distributing] humanitarian aids. Nevertheless, its real contribution to ensuring peace is questionable".<sup>14</sup>

The phenomenon of the privatization of war has historic precedents and once again is becoming popular

"Privatization of war was the objective reality of political developments. Globalization, information technology, democracy and devolution of power were the cause of the privatization of war. The trend towards the privatization of war should be a cause of concern for global, national and personal security". 15

Decentralization of power in the 21st century shows the Table 1.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid

MACIAS, A. 2011. Privatization of Security: a Strategy for Peace or War? [online]. (Cited 4.6.2011) Available on the Internet: http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/maciaswpaper.pdf.

YUZHI, Zhang – HUIPING, Liu 2010. On the Basic Reasons of Private War. In Canadian Center of Science and Education. Journal of Politics and Law, vol. 3, no. 2; September 2010. pp. 134–138. (Cited 4.6.2011) [online]. Available on the Internet: http://ccsenet. org/journal/index.php/jpl/article/view/7195/5542

**Privacy** Members of the Public The third sector Transnational Intergovernmental Non-governmental Super State Corporation organizations organizations Domestic The Central Government National Country in 21st century corporations oganizations Sub-national Local business Local Government Local groups organization

Table 1 Devolution of power in the 21st century

Source: YUZHI, Zhang – HUIPING, Liu 2010. On the Basic Reasons of Private War. In *Canadian Center of Science and Education. Journal of Politics and Law, vol. 3, no. 2; September 2010.* pp. 134 – 138. (Cited 4. 6. 2011) [online]. Available on the Internet: http://ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/jpl/article/view/7195/5542.

Possible approaches to the view of the relationship and the focus of safety-related systems in response to a post in aggregate form<sup>16</sup> are illustrated in figure 1.

### EUROPEAN SECURITY

In terms of European security strategy from 2003 threats to European security include: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental degradation, climate change, limited access to energy resources, the threat of European energy crisis, failure or collapse of computer technologies, technological accidents, natural disasters, epidemics, or pandemics and humanitarian crisis, terrorism, regional conflicts, the collapse of state authority, organized crime, an ageing population in the countries of the EU, illegal migration, the threat to the European social model due to the influence of the unforeseen consequences of globalization, the radicalization of society from ethnic and social causes, corruption and money laundering.<sup>17</sup>

Table 2 shows the threat to European security.

VEBER, J. a kol. 2010. Management kvality, environmentu a bezpečnosti práce. Legislativa, systémy, metody, praxe. 2. aktualizované vydání. Praha: Management Press, 2010. BALABÁN, M. 2009. Vize evropské bezpečnosti v globálním kontextu (reflexe bezpečnostních analýz a prognóz ve světě, v EU a v ČR 2003 – 2009). In Bezpečnost a obrana v evropském kontextu. Univerzita obrany. Ústav strategických a obranných studií. Sborník z mezinárodní konference. Brno: IDET, 6.–7. května 2009. Libor FRANK, Petr HLAVÁČEK (eds.), 2009.

<sup>17</sup> BALABÁN, M. 2009.




Figure 1 Relations, and the focus of safety-related systems

Source: custom processing

Table 2 Threats of European security

Threats <sup>18</sup>	Trends and evaluation <sup>19</sup>	Evaluation by the results of questionnaire survey <sup>20</sup>
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	Slowing their spread, continuation of the persistence of threats from Iran, terrorist organizations and their smuggling	15.4%
Degradation of the envi- ronment climate change	Global limits are exceeded, particularly in climate change, harm to the nitrogen cycle and loss of biodiversity, degradation continues,	14.2%
Limited access to energy resources, the threat of European energy crisis	The situation after the shutting-down of nuclear power plants; this is complicated by by the possible knock-on effect of German plans to phase out nuclear energy by 2022; this may lead to an increase in prices and higher dependency on Russia	13.6%
The failure or collapse of computer technologies	Cyber-attacks create difficult situations, they are beginning to be seen as an act of war,, the case of Wikileaks; virtual network as a Trojan horse, problems affecting national security.	13.5%
Extensive projects with aggressive investigation of financial resources from the calculation of damages resulting from accidents.		13.4%
Natural disasters	Nature is more powerful than man	12.5%
The epidemic, or pan- demic	The case of E-coli is a warning, showing possible multidimensional threats (terrorism, mutations, hygiene)	10.1%
Humanitarian crisis	The world reacts too late, often ineffectively, and sometimes not at all, there are many victims; sometimes humanitarian crises are man-made.	7.3%

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Selected from: BALABÁN, M. 2009.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Own project of authors (see below).

The first eight items are sorted in descending order according to the percentage of respondents of survey of 58 Master degree students in eight teams (see: VARHOĽÁK, P.: Vybrané environmentálne hodnotenia pre 21. storočie. In: Týždeň vedy a umenia na Pedagogickej fakulte Katolíckej univerzity v Ružomberku. Zborník prednášok z týždňa európskej vedy. Ružomberok 29.11.–3. 12. Ružomberok: VERBUM, 2011. S. 156–166).

Terrorism	Despite countermeasures by gover- ments, the problem of terrorism does not lessen, the asymmetries persist	
Regional conflicts	Persist, without any decease in the intensity of the threat	
The collapse of State authority	The huge deficit results in popular pro- tests in countries such as Greece and wars in African countries	
Organized crime	Dealing with organized crime some- times may be beyond the capabilities of state bodies.	
An ageing population in the countries of the EU	There is a definite trend, which may be limited by immigration; this, however, can have other negative effects.	
Illegal migration	The trend is increasing, challenging the Schengen principles	
The threat to the European social model (social security)	The trend reinforces social inequality, there no reduction in unemployment but rather a deepening of the problem; competition is intensifying, and the mission of non-governmental organizations is more socially questionable.	
Radicalization of part of society from ethnic and social causes	The Trend is increasing, and the situation is deteriorating; measures to counteract this trend are inadequate and solutions are inefficient.	

Processed according to the: BALABÁN, M. 2009. Vize evropské bezpečnosti v globálním kontextu (reflexe bezpečnostních analýz a prognóz ve světě, v EU a v ČR 2003–2009). In Bezpečnost a obrana v evropském kontextu. Univerzita obrany. Ústav strategických a obranných studií. Sborník z mezinárodní konference. Brno: IDET, 6.–7. května 2009. Libor FRANK, Petr HLAVÁČEK (eds.), 2009.

Source of authors: VARHOĽÁK, P. 2010. Vybrané environmentálne hodnotenia pre 21. storočie. In: *Týždeň vedy a umenia na Pedagogickej fakulte Katolíckej univerzity v Ružomberku. Zborník prednášok z týždňa európskej vedy.* Ružomberok 29. 11. – 3. 12. Ružomberok: VERBUM, 2011. ISBN 978-80-8084-682-4. pp. 156 – 166.

From the point of view of energy security issues in the security strategies for low energy sources can be considered as a global challenge to mankind this century. The earthquake and tsunami in March 2011 in Japan caused a nuclear disaster in Fukushima, which greatly affected the nuclear energy situation all over the world, but in particular in Japan itself. Germany will close all of its 17 nuclear power plants at the latest by the year 2022, as agreed by the coalition of Chancellor

Angela Merkel.<sup>21</sup> This can cause a knock-on effect, followed by problems in the procurement of energy for existing prices. The industrial sector has reservations regarding this policy. According to the President of the Federal Association of German industry, Hans-Peter Keitela, it risks weakening Germany as an industrial nation; car manufacturer and head of Daimler Dieter Zetsche has evoked the possibility of financial risk; energy group RWE is considering a legal defense. The coalition has also agreed to speed up the construction of new power plants using fossil fuels, energy storage and transmission networks. According to news agency Reuters the country intends to reduce the consumption of electricity by by about 10% by 2020, and double the percentage of renewable energy in the energy use of the country from 17 percent (the approximate current figure) to 35 percent.<sup>22</sup> According to Reuters Agency, the Slovak Prime Minister stated that extensive decommissioning of nuclear power stations in Europe on the basis of a possible EU decision would lead to a huge increase in gas prices.<sup>23</sup>

In table 3 are some of the characteristics of possible strategies. Various combinations of privatization are possible. It is emblematic that most countries in war conflicts now have often due to oil and natural gas, but also water and other scarce or valuable raw materials.

Table 3 Matrix of strate	gic approaches to th	ne source of energy
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Combined strategies	Resource strategies	Priority	Shortcom- ings	Threats To	Opportunities
Slovak Republic, EU ecological trends	Combustion of wood	Avail- ability depends on the quality of the soil	The geo- graphical restriction	Felling forests, erosion	Sustainability, expansion
Slovak Republic, EU, People's Republic of China, replacing kernel	The combustion of coal, etc	A global view of the availabil- ity	The geo- graphical restriction	Greenhouse effect, the breakdown in hundreds of years	Use in chemistry

Nemecko končí s jadrom, zatvorí v šetky jadrové elektrárne? ČTK. 30. mája 2011. [online]. (Cited 30.5.2011) Available on the Internet: http://spravy.pravda.sk/nemecko-konci-s-jadrom-zatvori-vsetky-jadrove-elektrarne-pmi-/sk\_svet.asp?c=A110530\_083222\_sk\_svet\_p23.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Grékom miliardové injekcie nepomôžu, tvrdí Radičová. 30.5.2011. [online]. (Cited 30.5.2011) SITA, TASR. Available on the Internet: http://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/5915446/grekom-miliardove-injekcie-nepomozu-tvrdi-radicova.html.

States of the EU, in the fu- ture People's Republic of China, North America	Combus- tion of petroleum products, natural gas, shale oil.	High usability, high rate of indis- pens- ability (for avia- tion)	The geo- graphical restriction	Greenhouse effect, limited availability, pol- lution of surface water, the seas,	Use in chemistry, more efficient combined technologies (cars)
Slovak Repub- lic, France, USA, Russia, Iran, Japan	"Burning" of break- down products	Avail- ability, declared effi- ciency	High intensity produc- tion	The danger of leakage of radioactivity, pollution, waste disposal, an attractive terrorist target, tsunami, earthquakes, technological and space requirements	More efficient and safer technologies, solve energy storage
People's Republic Of China, Austria	The combustion of biogas	Availabil- ity, geo- graphic distribu- tion	Initial in- vestment	Technology and space requirements	Sustainability, usability
Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, EU, Austria, People's Republic of China	Hydro power	Availabil- ity varies with the weather	The geo- graphical restric- tion, in- vestment	Technology and space requirements	Sustainability, maintenance of water
Austria, Maritime States	Wind energy	Avail- ability is depen- dent on the wind	The geo- graphical restric- tion, in- vestment	Technology and space requirements	Sustainability, resolving to save energy
Austria, eco- logical trends	Solar energy on Earth	Avail- ability is depen- dent on the weather	Invest- ments	Technology and space requirements	Sustainability, resolving to save energy
Scientific trends and visions, satel- lites	Solar energy from the cosmos	Univer- sal avail- ability	The geo- graphical restric- tion, in- vestment	Technology and space requirements	Sustainability, resolving to save energy

Scientific trends and ideas	Thermo- nuclear energy	Energy bomb, potential availabil- ity	Dozens of years of invest- ment	Unknown	Unknown
Unknown	Other	Un- known	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown

Source: custom processing.

### SLOVAK SECURITY IN THE EURO-ATLANTIC FRAMEWORK

The issue of the security of the Slovak Republic is conditional on a historical dimension, experience and knowledge of the elites, public opinion, moral and ethical orientation, the strength of their own State, economy, law, morality, etc. In the State administration and territorial self-government the following general shortcomings were identified:<sup>24</sup>

- the system of state administration and territorial self government is insufficiently effective and transparent,
- the heads of staff are have inadequate managerial ability and other skills that are necessary for executive management,
- the lack of cooperation of the ministries,
- the low level of communication and cooperation between the central authorities of State administration and territorial self-government,
- the misunderstanding of procedural control (procedural control = the focus on the causes that lead to the result; functional management = focus on results),
- lack of financial motivation of human resources,
- Insufficient education and training of human resources.

  Problems in improving the quality of institutional capacities can be seen in:
- 1. lack of financial motivation of human resources,
- 2. lack of education and training of human resources,
- 3. lack of optimization of the activities carried out by human resources.

Slovak Prime Minister Iveta Radičová, during her visit to Slovenia pointed to the fact that the economic crisis is far from over, and that the Eurozone and other EU member countries are looking for the appropriate tools and resources to spur economic growth and address its implications. In interviews with the Slovenian

Národný strategický referenčný rámec Slovenskej republiky na roky 2007–2013. Ministerstvo výstavby a regionálneho rozvoja Slovenskej republiky. Bratislava, 29. jún 2007. [online]. (Cited 30. 5. 2011) Available on the Internet: http://www.bing.com/search?q=N%C3%A1rodn%C3%BD+strategick%C3%BD+referen%C4%8Dn%C3%BD+r%C3%A1mec+Slovenskej+republiky+na+roky+2007+%E2%80%93+2013.+Ministerstvo+v%C3%BDstavby+a+region%C3%A1lneho+rozvoja+Slovenskej+republiky.&src=IE-SearchBox&FORM=IE8SRC. p. 27.

press she indicated that citizens did not realize the gravity of the problems facing the EU and the Eurozone. She further stated:

"Pushing the expectations, which I'm afraid, in the coming years simply will not be able to be fulfilled."

It is therefore necessary to consolidate public finances, or implement painful reforms for the citizens

"If we do, the crisis will have a much more serious impact. It is our duty, despite the misunderstanding and often times the resistance of the public to promote these measures seriously." <sup>25</sup>

In view of the defense of the State, the concept of Defense (EU, NATO), which alone has the power to defend the sovereignty, the nature of the State Constitution, and the lives and property of people, the situation is not simple, while the importance of security in the current turbulent environment is growing:

"...under the pressure of current security threats, in the event of future large-scale crises and conflicts, it will be just the armed forces, which, as the military tool of crisis management, in the case of the failure of diplomatic efforts, will represent the most effective means to deal with the external security problems, as well as the prevention and elimination of security crises and conflicts in today's world. And even though the security risks and threats by State or non-State actors can never be removed or at least eliminated completely, the adoption of effective and efficient measures with as much funding as possible reduces the negative effects of possible security crises, including armed conflicts, for the developed States of the world, including the Slovak Republic."<sup>26</sup>

Questions and problems relating to our defense should be assessed by experts in this domain, taking ino account the analysis of domestic and foreign relations.

It is necessary to refuse further "reforms", which basically almost always meant a reduction in military numbers of the area without any concept, only in order to meet political orders<sup>27</sup>:

- Various, diverse, fast and expensive reorganization Models of the Armed Force 2010, 2015, 2020, as the new minister (12) and three in one parliamentary term, it is faster and better "redeployment", but can be incomplete.<sup>28</sup>
- None of the existing text of the "models" Model of the Armed Forces 2010, 2015 and 2020 - are realistic from the financial point of view, as ther resources allotted were significantly lower than originally planned, creating

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Grékom miliardové injekcie nepomôžu, tvrdí Radičová. 30. 5. 2011.

IVANČÍK, R. 2011. Financovanie obrany v kríze. [online]. (Cited 2. 6. 2011) Available on the Internet: http://cenaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Transatlanticke-listy-1 2011.pdf.

ONDREJCSÁK, R. 2011. Strategické hodnotenie obrany: Kde sme a kam smerujeme? [online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the Internet: http://cenaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Transatlanticke-listy-1 2011.pdf

MIKLUŠ, M. 2011. Armáda je v ?! 24.04.2011. [online]. (Cited 2. 6. 2011) Available on the Internet: http://www.despiteborders.com/clanky/data/upimages/miklus2.pdf

- a huge gap between the resources invested in defense and what had been planned.  $^{29}$
- It has been known since 2005 that the army will have problems, only for this fact to be kept 'under the lid'. 30
- So far, the biggest problems in addition to the frequent lack of systematization were just unrealistic financial projections and, consequently, unrealistic planning.<sup>31</sup>
- In addition to the progressive reduction of budgets for the army, there was a very rapid and extremely massive staff release of the most experienced soldiers (often even against their will), and the freezing of resources to the armament of troops, including its modernization.<sup>32</sup>
- It is not the first time that such a process has been implemented by the Slovak Republic (preparation of strategy documents, preparation of Model of the Armed Forces of the SR 2010 and 2015), but is this current model acceptable?<sup>33</sup>
- The Army Joint-Chiefs of Staff lost the competence particularly in the area of actual (not paper) decision-making on financing and procurement of equipment necessary for the performance of its tasks.<sup>34</sup>
- These competencies were taken over by the officials of the Ministry of Defense transferred to the Minister of Defense, and the head of the Ministry Staff, which means that decisions are often made without the consent of the army.
- It is also necessary to state that defense cuts result in resources for the army being spread too thin.<sup>35</sup>
- The first impression given is of a relaxed and sometimes unprofessional approach on the part of those politicians responsible for national defense, and of lack of understanding on the part of citizens as to the the desirability of the existence of a national army and its membership of NATO, the EU and the fulfillment of its commitments.
- As the system does not function, the integrated Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, bears the main responsibility for solving the long-term crisis in the military.
- It is also necessary to ask what responsibility the Security Council (the former Council of Defense of the State), Committee on Defense and the Security

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> ONDREJCSÁK, R. 2011.

<sup>30</sup> MIKLUŠ, M. 2011.

ONDREJCSÁK, R. 2011.

<sup>32</sup> MIKLUŠ, M. 2011.

BARTKO, F. 2011. Strategické hodnotenie obrany: prostriedok na vyriešenie problémov OS SR? [online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the Internet: http://cenaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Transatlanticke-listy-1 2011.pdf.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> MIKLUŠ, M. 2011.

<sup>35</sup> MIKLUŠ, M. 2011.

- Council of the SR, but also of the Government of the Slovak Republic have in this domain.
- Defense is not only a matter of the Armed Forces (as is often simplified and wrongly understood, and as has also been presented within the objectives and procedures of the SHO (Strategic Defense Review)), but is the responsibility of the State and all its components.<sup>36</sup> Thus, this will be a real means of addressing the SHO (strategic defense review) of the current situation, when not only are the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic in a critical situation, but the question of the security system of the State and the credibility of the Slovak Republic within the framework of NATO and the EU has not yet been answered, and it is this credibility which is rapidly decreasing due to the failure of the commitments undertaken by the State.
- It is perhaps also worth examining the level of preparedness and the ability
  of the competent representatives of the State (legislative and executive), who
  bear responsibility for defense and security.<sup>37</sup>
- We agree that the security policy and defense of the Slovak Republic was psychologically perceived as isolated from the rest of the world, and the country was perceived as a "small state".<sup>38</sup>
- It would be of benefit to inform the public of the exact purpose of the armed forces.
- After more than 18 years, we have reached a critical point and that cannot be overcome in the short term and in this and other extreme deficit years.
- Defense (the Army) in the Slovak Republic is not sufficiently important, not even from the perspective of the National Government the Security Council and the Ministry of Defense), despite international commitments and promises made to NATO and the EU.
- A huge issue is crisis communication in the framework of solutions of non-military threats (System of warnings to the population, communication between the stakeholders of the integrated rescue system (IZS), Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic and crisis staffs at all levels, technical equipment), the coordination of the deployment and management of the forces and means of IZS and Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, the ability of the Government authorities to analyze in particular, threats to the population, to prepare contingency plans, and respond properly to the management of crises after their the emergence.<sup>39</sup>
- The immediate cause was the economic crisis, which forced severe restrictions and drastic cuts in public spending, affecting defense and requiring reforms to the structure of the armed forces.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>36</sup> BARTKO, F. 2011.

<sup>37</sup> MIKLUŠ, M. 2011.

<sup>38</sup> ONDREJCSÁK, R. 2011.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> BARTKO, F. 2011.

VALÁŠEK, T. 2011. Obranné reformy v NATO. [online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the Internet: http://cenaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Transatlanticke-listy-1 2011.pdf.

- There is also a lack of coordination between individual member states of NATO. With a few exceptions, each country examines its situation in isolation.
- There is no guarantee that NATO virtually disappear from some important types of experience or technology.
- Over 80% of all military equipment purchased (the allies) from domestic firms, only 13% of the orders is not open to foreign suppliers and 95% of all military equipment is owned by the States, not the common property.
- Even though military operations take place today mostly under the control of NATO, the EU or the United Nations, each country educates soldiers virtually on its own.
- Among 1.6 million troops in the European countries of NATO, only a few thousand serve in integrated international units. The remaining armed forces are formed by the government in a way that has essentially remained unaffected for centuries: the emphasis is on maximum autonomy.
- War is fought today virtually only on the basis of coalitions or alliances.
- After the whole of the successful reforms in the years 2000–2005, since 2006 the Armed Forces have not received support from successive Prime Ministers. For the first time in the history of the independence of the Slovak Republic, not only was there a reduction in defense spending, but also a gradual change in perception of the armed forces on the part of the public. The comment by the then Prime Minister, that the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic are costly and unnecessary, contributed to this.<sup>41</sup>
- Frank Boland "Status of the Slovak army is especially critical," NATO membership is not free and therefore the Alliance continues to set aside its request for the defense of the resources to the amount of 2% of GDP.
- Lack of courage of the leaders, and managers, unjustified secrecy, lobbying pressures, and lack of vision. Contributed greatly to the current state.
- Military education been affected by the liquidation of several academies.
- A significant part of research & development, testing and repair was eliminated.

A search for a plan for the development of the security of Slovakia in the Alliance framework is on the agenda. The following issues have been raised:

- An analysis of the current situation and a summit of Nato officials and states
  would certainly provide a necessary and positive input into the issue of neglected security. Detailed comprehensive professional unbiased and non-political analysis across departments is very necessary. The question is whether
  it is even feasible. If not, the situation, in principle, cannot be changed for the
  better. Despite this risk, the analysis must be made.
- On the basis of the analyses, which should not last long, because the Act is
  to be as soon as possible, it is necessary to adopt clear strategic decisions on
  the highest level and convince senior management of the State, ministries

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> IVANČÍK, R. 2011.

(including the Ministry of Finance), public administration and self-government, and of course the population, because they will pay, that they should pay the cost of this.

- While political marketing thinks about short-term goals, marketing concerning the security of the state and prevention is a recent phenomenon,
- For the above reasons it is necessary to substantially improve the system of communication in all relevant levels and areas.
- Of all changes that need to be made, the most crucial is to introduce transparency regarding the flow of money and information.
- Substantial conclusions deriving from the strategic decisions should be enshrined in the management documents (Constitution, laws, a statement of the Government, etc.). The performance of related tasks should be controllable by citizens on the basis of deductions of relevant structures.
- One of the main components of the solution should be a binding intention of the Executive to commit in justifiable terms a necessary financial budget. The remedy does not only lie in the earmarking of larger funds for security. This is a necessary condition, but is not in itself sufficient.
- How much money should be spent and for what purpose should not depend on dictates, business plans or political marketing but rather on honest analysis and a minimum of consent across the relevant political and professional markets.

"In the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance funding at the level of 2% of the GDP of the country is regarded as sufficient. This means that the more resources the Government and Parliament set aside in favor of the Ministry of Defense, and thus also for the benefit of the armed forces, thus providing an improved defense, the more State can ensure that its armed forces achieve the highest possible level of capabilities. Of course, this is true if the allocated resources are used economically, efficiently and effectively, in accordance with the set tasks, objectives and priorities of the sector, country, group and in accordance with the applicable legislation".<sup>42</sup>

• Yet the state managed to build a professional army, however tiny and weak. The need for sufficient financial security stems from the following argument: "In the case of the Slovak Republik the economics of defence are a challenge not only because of the defense of its territory and security assistance to the civilian population in the event of natural disasters or industrial disasters, but also due to the implementation of international commitments and efforts to continue the reconstruction of the armed forces of the Slovak Republic towards relatively small, but professional and modernly equipped armed forces with sufficient combat potential, which are able to meet the requirements for compatibility and interoperability with the armed forces of the allies". 43

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

• It is questionable whether the entire breadth of the issues of security, defense and protection in conditions of modern threats and contexts has been taken into account, namely that this issue combines factors of supranational and national defense. The question is whether the new streamlined and efficient authority, with sufficient competence, connected to the sources of scientific and scientific-technical intelligence information, could be formed, which would with time coordinate the issues comprehensively and ensure adequate, uniform and secure communication between the individual departments, public administration and Government.

"The white paper, in so far as it is to fulfill its purpose, cannot be "only" a document of the MOD, it must be a document with which go along the whole (or majority) of the political spectrum of the State, and which will have a binding character for shaping and implementing not only the security policy of the State against the outside world, but especially for all the components of the State, which by law (or by common consent) entails obligations and tasks in the field of security and defense of the Slovak Republic. This means the document is approved by the National Council of the Slovak Republic and then it is valid for the entire Slovak Republic. The white paper must be a document also for ordinary citizens, who also have their obligations and responsibilities towards the defense of the State".44

To respect the status of security and defense and the related financing and funding science and research.

Table 4 illustrates the relationship between GDP (gross domestic product) of Slovakia, and expenditure on defense and expenditure on science and research. In theory and in practice there is a known link between the costs and investments for defense and security, on the one hand, and the costs and investments for science and research in general (and defense and security in particular). The connection is confirmed well in our case.

Chart 1 shows the relations between the GDP, expenditure on defense and security, science and research, as indicated in table 4. It is obvious that GDP has increased but expenditure on defense and security and science and research as a percentage of GDP shows a constantly decreasing trend. Correlation (by Excel function of Corel) between GDP growth for the defense spending shows this decrease. The decline in defense spending as a percentage of GDP for the years 1993 to 2011 represents a value of -0.8658, which is a very high negative value (the maximum should not exceed -1).

<sup>44</sup> BARTKO, F. 2011.

Table 4 cost of GDP (gross domestic product) of Slovakia, and expenditure on defense and expenditure on science and research


Year	GDP in the	Defense in%	Science and research	Expenditure on defense	Expenditure on Science and research
	Dill. LOK	GDP <sup>46</sup>	in% GDP <sup>47</sup>	in the Bill. EUR	in the Bill. EUR
1993	17.022	2.34	1.45	0.398315	0.246819
1994	18.081	2.31	0.96	0.417671	0.173578
1995	26.11	2.51	0.98	0.655361	0.255878
1996	28.205	2.31	0.97	0.651536	0.273589
1997	29.393	2.13	1.13	0.626071	0.332141
1998	30.698	1.93	0.82	0.592471	0.251724
1999	30.704	1.7	0.68	0.521968	0.208787
2000	31.136	1.62	0.65	0.504403	0.202384
2001	32.191	1.61	0.64	0.518275	0.206022
2002	33.725	1.8	0.57	0.60705	0.192233
2003	35.332	1.77	0.58	0.625376	0.204926
2004	37.173	1.79	0.51	0.665397	0.189582
2005	39.614	1.7	0.51	0.673438	0.202031
2006	47.451	1.62	0.49	0.768706	0.23251
2007	47.451	1.51	0.46	0.71651	0.218275
2008	50.481	1.49	0.47	0.752167	0.237261
2009	48,068	1.49	0.48	0.716213	0.230726
2010	49.19	1.26		0.619794	
2011	51.885	1.08		0.560358	
2012		0.99			
2013		0.91			

Source: Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, Institute of Financial Policy of the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. And the sources of the footnotes seen from table 4 and calculated in the last two columns.

Ekonomika Slovenska 2011. REÁLNA EKONOMIKA. Vývoj ukazovateľov reálnej ekonomiky Slovenskej republiky v období od roku 2005 do roku 2011. EuroEkonóm.sk ekonomická príručka moderného ekonóma. [online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the Internet: http://www.euroekonom.sk/ekonomika/ekonomika-sr/ekonomika-slovenska-2011; Ekonomické indikátory. Hrubý domáci produkt (HDP) v rokoch 1993–2011 (mil. EUR). [online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the Internet: http://openiazoch.zoznam.sk/zivot/makro/ukazovatele.asp?iid=HDP&year=ALL.

<sup>46</sup> IVANČÍK, R. 2011.

<sup>47</sup> VINCÚR, P. 2009. Základné determinanty sociálno-ekonomického rozvoja v dlhodobom horizonte. Podiel výdavkov na vedu a výskum za HDP v SR za roky 1993. – Zdroj: ŠÚSR 1994-2008. [online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the Internet: http://www.prog.sav.sk/subory/konf20/Vincur.pdf; Národný program reforiem Slovenskej republiky 2011–2014. apríl 2011. PRÍLOHA č. 1 – Národné ciele stratégie Európa 2020. [online]. (Cited 2.6.2011) Available on the Internet: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nrp/nrp\_slovakia\_sk.pdf.



Graph 1 GDP in multiples of 10  $^{\text{Bill.}}$  EUROS, expenditure on defense and security, science and research in % (for the years 2012, 2013, the preliminary plans for the Defense)

Source: Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, Institute of Financial Policy of the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. And the sources of the footnotes seen from table 4.

Chart 2 shows the relationship between expenditure on defense and security, science and research, as indicated in table 4. It is clear that the expenditure on defense and security, science and research has demonstrated a constantly decreasing trend. Correlation (Excel function of Corel) as a percentage of GDP on defense and science and research for the years 1993 to 2009 represents the value of 0.860018, which is a very high positive value (the maximum can reach 1).




Chart 2 the comparison of expenditure on defense and science and research as % of GDP,

Source: the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, Institute of Financial Policy the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. And the sources of the footnotes seen from table 4.




Chart 3 the comparison of expenditure on defense and security, and science and research in billions of Euros

Source: Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, Institute of Financial Policy of the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. And the sources of the footnotes seen from table 4

### CONCLUSION

A high level of security and defense may be a guarantee for the long life of the citizens of the State. The departments are safe when they work properly. However, the realization of this aim requires many things. The level of 2% of GDP in financing defense and security was a reality in the 1997-1998 and the level of 1.5% of GDP in 2007-2008 (table 4). Today it is likely that this will decrease further. Under the influence of the crisis and the lack of financial resources, as well as the dominance of the requirements for funding in the sectors of Slovakia but also in Europe, hopes for an increase in funding are optimistic. Growth of 1.5% in this electoral term would be a positive achievement. The elite should recognize the relationship between defense and security, and science and research in the private sector, because the argument from the period of the formation of the Slovak Republic is true only in so far as available resources and the willingness of the seller to sell military techniques and technologies. And it is not, nor has never been understood.

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