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Post-9/11 Transnational Threats in Colombia: The Risk to National and Regional Security and Stability

Introduction

Colombia's geography and location in the Southern Hemisphere greatly enables the illegal drug industry. Colombia is located on the equator between latitudes 12°N and 4°S. It is the only South American country with coastlines stretching between two oceans: the Atlantic and the Pacific. Although Colombia's climate is described as tropical, 33% of the territory lies in the Andean mountains and as a result, the climate is also defined as isothermal.¹ Colombia also has vast amounts of freshwater and ranks third in the world in this regard. The combination of plentiful freshwater and fluctuating temperatures create in Colombia conditions which are conducive to growing almost any kind of crop all year long.² Colombian farmers can yield four harvests per year.

The purpose of this essay is to examine the consequences of 9/11 for the Colombian state through two different perspectives. First, the government's response

¹ Isothermal means that 0-1000 MASL (meters above sea level) the average temperature is 36°: from 1000 to 2000 MASL 23° – 18°C, from 2000 to 3000 MASL 18°C to 7°C, from 3000 to 4000 MASL 7°C to 4°C, and finally from 4000 to 5000 MASL 4°C to -5°C. Colombia.co, FAQ: *The Climate and Weather in Colombia*, 2020, <https://www.colombia.co/en/colombia-travel/faq-climate-weather-colombia> [accessed: 10.11.2020].

² United Nations, *Executive Summary Conclusions and Policy Implications: 2018 World Drug Report*, 2018, https://www.unodc.org/wdr2018/prelaunch/WDR18_Booklet_1_EXSUM.pdf [accessed: 12.11.2020].

to neutralize terrorism; and second, from the perspective of illegally armed groups who, as a result of 9/11, were labelled as terrorists. This research effort will also examine how terrorism is intertwined with other illegal activities in Colombia and the associated security and stability implications for Latin America. Finally, this analysis demonstrates how organized crime turned into a transnational threat and one of the greatest security challenges in the region.

Over the past 5 decades, the government of Colombia and the vast majority of its citizens have considered the FARC, ELN, M-19, EPL, and their surrogates to be terrorists. However, at the international level, these organizations were recognized as guerrilla or insurgent organizations. Whether guerrillas or terrorists, these groups caused significant security problems for the government. Unfortunately, ambiguity in defining and classifying these groups caused challenges in developing policies and regulations to address the problem of insecurity stemming from violence perpetrated by these groups.

During the 1980s and 1990s, terrorism carried out by drug cartels was so significant that it caused the government of Colombia to lose focus on groups like the FARC, ELN, M-19, and EPL. However, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the confusion and widespread fear these attacks caused, the focus on terrorism expanded and encompassed much of the global environment. On September 28, 2001, the United Nations (UN) resolution 1373 condemned the attacks,³ and the UN Security Council established a solid political base against terrorism.

In this international context, former Colombian president Andrés Pastrana (1998–2002), and Álvaro Uribe Vélez, who at that time was a presidential candidate, emerged as solid leaders. In fact, Uribe redefined the conflict in Colombia as terrorism in contrast with internal armed conflict and named the operation against these groups ‘Plan Patriota’. Because the plan centred on terrorism⁴, it was financed by the US and included a military offensive directed against the FARC. Labelling the FARC and other armed groups as terrorists allowed Uribe to garner support from the international community, and he became president for two terms from 2002 to 2010. This labelling also resulted in the FARC being included on the UN list of terrorist organizations, after Colombia petitioned the European Union and the US to ratify the inclusion of that group on the list of terrorist groups. During Uribe’s two terms as president, the FARC was significantly degraded and witnessed a decline in their membership. This success provided Uribe with the impetus to negotiate a solution to the conflict.

³ Naciones Unidas Biblioteca Digital, Resolution 1373 (2001) / adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting, on 28 September 2001, 2001, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/449020?ln=es> [accessed: 12.11.2020].

⁴ *Plan Patriota: It was a Colombia Army's plan for joint conduction of irregular warfare 2003–2008 developed by the Chairman Joint Chief of Staff General Mora Rangel Jorge Eduardo*, https://publicacionesejercito.mil.co/recurso_user/revista_ejercito/Revista_191/el-plan-patriota-plan-para-la-conduccion-conjunta-de-la-guerra-irregular.html [accessed: 1.11.2020].

Government Response after 9/11

From the point of view of the Colombian government, prior to 9/11, the civilian population had a certain soft spot for Colombian guerrillas, even though they engaged in criminal activity such as kidnapping, extortion and other terrible practices. Many Colombians and civilian population outside the country viewed these illegal groups as altruistic because they sought to rebuild social order. As such, the FARC actually managed to establish international ties in countries which were friends of Colombia, and who viewed FARC officers as goodwill ambassadors.

According to an investigation by the Colombian Attorney General, following the combat death of one of FARC's top leaders in Ecuador, the International Commission of the FARC was expanded to European countries⁵ such as Sweden, Germany, Norway, Russia, Denmark, Switzerland, Italy, France, Greece, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom. In North and South America, the FARC garnered support from citizens and groups in the US, Mexico, Canada, Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Brazil, Ecuador, Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. In Europe, some NGOs also funded the war in Colombia with financial resources for the FARC. In Denmark, a private company⁶ sold T-shirts with the FARC logo for 23 euros and donated 5 of the 23 euros to promote radio stations favouring the FARC. It is also important to note that prior to the events of 9/11, the FARC had had the ability, nationally and internationally, to produce a romantic image of a guerrilla group that sought to restore equality by removing wealth from the rich and distributing it to the poor, like the Robin Hood of Colombia. However, 9/11 made terrorism visible as a real threat to nation states across the globe, and governments immediately reacted to combat terrorist groups. Colombia was no exception.

On May 2, 2002, the European Union included the FARC on the list of terrorist organizations, with the AUC (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia), Sendero Luminoso of Peru, the Kurdistan PKK Workers' Party, the Iranian group MKO Organization of the Mujahideen, and ETA of Spain among others. However, on the occasion of the signing of the peace process in December 2016, the European Council decided to remove the FARC from the list of terrorist organizations.

To better understand what has happened in Colombia in the aftermath of 9/11, it is necessary to briefly recount events dating back to 1994–1998 which took place under the leadership of the then-President Ernesto Samper Pizano. First of all, Samper was under the authorities' scrutiny due to connections with drug trafficking.⁷ Furthermore, there was pessimism among Colombian citizens because the US

⁵ L. Trejos, *FARC-EP in Europe and Central America. A view from the Non-State Actor Perspective*, 2013, <https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/opera/article/view/3767/4143> [accessed: 18.11.2020].

⁶ One-Minute World News, *Danish T-shirts, to fund rebels*, 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4632578.stm> [accessed: 5.12.2020].

⁷ L. Sogamoso, *Proceso 8000, verdad inconclusa*, 1995, <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-463046> [accessed: 10.12.2020].

decertified the Colombian government,⁸ and according to the 1998 world security index, Colombia was a failed state. Likewise, according to Stephen Johnson of the conservative *Heritage Foundation* magazine, Colombia was very close to becoming 'the first drug-state' in the world; just three hours from the United States. In short, the situation was quite critical.

The FARC alliance and other actors who generated violence through drug trafficking provided financial muscle to support other operations, and grew to become a formidable force, gaining in excess of 27,000 combatants in 1998⁹ alone. Therefore, the country's outlook was very gloomy and pessimistic when Andrés Pastrana took office and initiated his 'Change to Build Peace' National Development Plan 1998–2002. The main axis of the plan was aimed to rebuild trust within the country and with the international community.

Supported by the US, a modernization plan for Colombia's military forces began before peace talks with the FARC were initiated in a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) known as the 'Zona de Distensión' which lasted for 3 years. Following the kidnapping of a plane crew which was crashed by the FARC, the government stopped dialogue with the FARC and re-established control of the DMZ on February 21, 2002. By that time, 9/11 had already materialized, the security environment in the region had already transformed due to terrorist acts, and acts perpetrated by the FARC became visible to the eyes of all those who thought that these events were isolated cases.

By the early 2002, terrorism was already present in cities and was a latent and terrifying threat. When the new president of Colombia Álvaro Uribe Velez took office, he initiated his National Development Plan called 'Towards a Community State'. The strategy of the government was to re-establish governance of the territory and ensure security for all Colombians. From a diplomatic point of view, Uribe was able to include the FARC and other illegally armed groups on the list of terrorist groups. From the point of view of information operations, there was an aggressive campaign to regain the confidence of Colombian citizens through television and the radio with the slogan 'Live Colombia, travel for it', which managed to make citizens feel comfortable again, recover local economies and, above all, cause criminal actors to move away from populated areas into the jungles, isolating themselves from the civilian population. The latter was made possible through a strong military effort.

For the military, the 'Plan Colombia' war plan was implemented, which basically sought through special operations to attack the FARC leadership and their strategy using special operations forces and counter-guerrilla units to attack the FARC'S Eastern Bloc, the strategic centre of gravity of their criminal organization. From a macro standpoint, the inclusion of the FARC as a terrorist group by the international community, populace support for the government and military forces, and economic-military support from the US through 'Plan Colombia' brought about the

⁸ D. Farah, *US – Bogota: what went wrong? This is a decertification not of Colombia, but of President Samper*, 1996, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/03/03/us-bogota-what-went-wrong-this-is-a-decertification-not-of-colombia-but-of-president-samper/d46219cd-2c84-4eef-b041-632121cddab0> [accessed: 22.12.2020].

⁹ M. Aguilera, *Las FARC: auge y quiebre de su modelo de guerra. FARC: Rise and decline of a war model*, 2012, <https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/anpol/article/view/44005/45253> [accessed: 6.01.2021].

creation perfect harmony between the trinity of Clausewitz's variables: 'the government, the population, and the military.' Finally, there were many actions implemented by the Colombian government to counter terrorist organizations. For example, 12 groups of Urban Counterterrorism Special Forces units were created, and the Office of the Attorney General established the National Counterterrorism Office. By 2010, in the final years of the Uribe presidency, these types of efforts resulted in the FARC losing its military capacity to control land and being degraded to just 3,000 combatants.

Post-9/11 Implications: Guerrilla Forces

From the point of view of terrorist groups operating in Colombia in the aftermath of 9/11, the attacks on the Twin Towers led to many different consequences, especially moral ones. The moral order, as Clausewitz suggests, is the foundation of war. Clausewitz also places great value on moral forces in their traditional sense. The interaction of moral forces with other physical forces is fundamental in the development of war but regulating them in a scientific way when considering them together with other factors is very difficult. In the case of Colombia, there were three salient consequences.

Firstly, in the eyes of terrorist groups, 9/11 legitimized their armed actions against the government of Colombia. Although most Colombians rejected this assertion, members of terrorist insurgent groups, especially the FARC, viewed their actions against the state as legitimate. In this context, legitimization can be identified with solidarity, and despite some cultural differences, revolution is a common cause that seeks the same objectives and attacks the same enemies. Hence, whoever attacks what is considered the greatest enemy, has the solidarity, support and sympathy of all those who are engaged in a similar struggle. This type of feeling is precisely what constitutes the legitimization of the action, since it implies that it is accepted and supported by all terrorist insurgent groups in Colombia. In turn, this feeling generated a kind of obligation to fight for power and to be faithful to Marxist-Leninist guiding principles, just as Al-Qaeda launched its attacks by following the guidelines of their interpretation of Islam or 'violent extremism'. It is interesting to note that despite this legitimization of terrorism within the FARC and other groups of lesser importance in Colombia and in South America in general, there was no substantial increase in the recruitment or incorporation of new militants into their ranks.

Secondly, in the modern times, the idea of a nation state being defeated, despite all the electronic and cyber capabilities at its disposal, became credible. The way Al-Qaeda carried out the attacks by infiltrating into the US became an inspiring model particularly for small groups with great capacity for infiltration. In fact, on November 7, 2003, the FARC carried out an attack of lesser proportions in comparison to 9/11, but used similar methods to attack El Nogal¹⁰, a social club located in the northern part of Bogotá, the capital of the Republic, which caters to prestigious clients. The FARC decided to carry out an attack against the club, on the one

¹⁰ El Nogal (Spanish word that means Walnut Tree Club).

hand, to punish the elites, and on the other, to intimidate the government. Similarly to the methods used by Al-Qaeda, the FARC managed to place one of its members disguised as a tennis teacher who gradually became known and was appreciated by both managers and clients of the club. This allowed the FARC the means to smuggle explosives into the club in the tennis teacher's vehicle thanks to the confidence he had earned. On the day of the attack, the tennis teacher calmly entered the premises in his vehicle, in plain view of the security guards, he parked it in his normal parking space, activated the explosive device, and continued towards his office. Minutes later, there was a terrible explosion that not only destroyed most of the club's facilities but also killed 36 people and injured more than 200. Among those who died was the perpetrator of the attack and one of his accomplices.

Initially, the FARC did not claim responsibility for the attack but soon after, they were identified as being responsible for it. Although they did not achieve the political aims they wanted to because the attitude of the President of the Republic was so firm, the FARC realized they could overcome a technological disadvantage to inflict serious damage on the government's security apparatus credibility.

Thirdly, the Foquismo revolution theory (FOCO)¹¹ applied by Ernesto Che Guevara said that just a small group of people is necessary to start a revolution and in this modern world the recent technological advances in the information domain (environment) have significantly intensified globalization and have increased the interconnected nature of the world today.¹² Not only can information be shared between people across the globe in just a few seconds, but also many commerce barriers have fallen and international agreements between many nations have further created an international environment where collaboration, cooperation, and competition combine to describe and characterize relationships between nation states, non-state actors, and other entities, including Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs). For example, Al-Qaeda has links with insurgent groups in Venezuela,¹³ the Gulf Clan (Clan del Golfo – the biggest TCO in Colombia) has links with Los Zetas in Mexico,¹⁴ and the ELN in Colombia has connections with Hezbollah. While these varied organizations are driven by different ideologies, religious beliefs, and political motives, the need to generate finance encourages interactions between these groups. Criminal organizations across the world operate within a complex web (system) of communication, funds and cooperation, which is not easy to follow or deter. Deeply entrenched in this complex system is the illegal drug industry, which

¹¹ The French intellectual and government official Régis Debray proposed a theory in which a very small group of people can start a revolution. This theory is known as Foquismo (Spanish word that means a starting point) and it inspired the Marxist revolution in Cuba by Ernesto Che Guevara in 1959. R. Borja, *Revolutionary FOCO theory*, 2018, <https://www.enciclopediadelapolitica.org/foquismo> [accessed: 10.01.2021].

¹² E. Ortiz, *What's the impact of globalization on wages, jobs and the cost of living?*, 2018, <https://our-worldindata.org/trade-wages-cost-living> [accessed: 10.01.2021].

¹³ V. Neumann, *The New Nexus of Narco Terrorism Hezbollah and Venezuela*, 2011, <https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/publications/publication.html/150634> [accessed: 12.01.2021].

¹⁴ C. Woody, *Mexico's Cartels Appear to Be Shaking up the Cocaine Trade*, 2019, <https://www.businessinsider.com/mexican-cartels-shipping-cocaine-out-of-colombia-refining-in-mexico-2019-6> [accessed: 20.01.2021].

provides an array of TCOs and other illegal organizations with financial means to conduct their operations.

In Latin America, and particularly in Colombia, terrorism and transnational threats are now fuelled by the Venezuelan crisis. For example, massive violent protest took place last year in different countries like Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador and Colombia, in which thousands of Venezuelans participated. This have leveraged and enabled the illegal drug industry, which centres on cocaine production and trafficking involving many different criminal organizations. Cocaine trafficking alone provides enough economic resources to support illicit groups which have control over different phases of cocaine production. These illicit groups use their power and influence in undeveloped and underdeveloped regions of Colombia by taking advantage of remote locations which are difficult to access for governmental agencies, including military and police forces. These criminal groups also exploit marginalized groups, such as indigenous displaced populations and displaced immigrants. TCOs force indigenous populations to work in support of illegal mining activities, and they use displaced immigrants to serve as drug mules to transport illegal drugs across the border.¹⁵

In addition to undeveloped and underdeveloped regions of Colombia, TCOs also take advantage of porous national borders with limited governmental presence and other resources available to monitor and control the flow of people and goods. Colombia shares land borders with five countries: Panama, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, and Venezuela. Among these bordering nations, Venezuela is unique due to the ongoing civil and political unrest, which compounds the challenges of an extensive porous border.

According to the 2019 Colombia migration report, the Venezuelan crisis has forced thousands of families to flee to other South American countries, mainly to Brazil and Colombia.¹⁶ Colombia has hosted more than 1,102,000 Venezuelans, and at least 250,000 Venezuelans remain on the Colombian territory working illegally. Portions of these illegal immigrants work for and with TCOs and are involved in drug trafficking, smuggling, and human trafficking.¹⁷ One of the primary factors associated with the influx of Venezuelans into Colombia is that nation's desperate economic situation.

The crisis has also brought Venezuelan illegal groups to Colombia. These illegal organizations have developed reciprocal relationships with TCOs in Colombia, and exploit displaced Venezuelans by using them to support illicit activity. Many of these displaced persons serve as mules to transport cocaine through the Darien Mountains to Central America using the technique known as 'hormigueo' (resembling an ant trail).

¹⁵ *Global Illegal Aliens Trek Panama Jungle to Reach America*, Limits to Growth, 2015, <https://www.limitstogrowth.org/articles/2015/05/29/global-illegal-aliens-trek-panama-jungle-to-reach-america> [accessed: 22.01.2021].

¹⁶ Lorenzo Morales, *Border Closures Strand Migrants in Colombia*, 2016, <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/256254> [accessed: 3.02.2021].

¹⁷ *Todo lo que Quiere Saber Sobre la Migración Venezolana y No Se lo Han Contado*, Migración Colombia, 2019, <https://www.migracioncolombia.gov.co/infografias/todo-lo-que-tiene-que-saber-sobre-la-migracion-venezolana> [accessed: 20.02.2021].

Recently, the Colombian and Venezuelan border has witnessed an increase in TCOs crossings between the two countries under the protection of illegal groups in Venezuela. Traditionally, Venezuelan authorities have been hesitant to engage in armed conflict with TCOs and some military units and personnel even co-ordinate and partner criminal organizations as is the case with the well-known 'Soles Cartel'. This term refers to a group of individuals inside the Venezuelan military that functions as drug trafficking organization.¹⁸

Conclusion

Terrorism became visible worldwide with the attack on the Twin Towers. This unprecedented terrorist act caused the world to wake up, and nation states began to implement comprehensive counterterrorism efforts. In countries like Colombia terrorism has always been present, sometimes justified by political tendencies from both the right and the left. Criminal organizations in Colombia have used terrorist tactics in attempts to control certain population groups that otherwise would have resisted their presence. To achieve this, financing is needed, and those funds come from other criminal activities such as illegal mining, drug trafficking, money laundering, smuggling, and irregular migration. The challenge for the state and the region is to integrate and synchronize their efforts and capabilities to counter each of the methods used by terrorist groups, and now TCOs.

For the government of Colombia, the need to implement a whole-of-government approach to counter illegally armed groups is paramount. Equally important is the need to partner and coordinate efforts with regional partners, as these groups are not constrained by national borders. Through a whole-of-government approach and in partnership with other like-minded regional nations, the government of Colombia can comprehensively defeat the criminal systems that enable illegally armed groups.

There is no government agency in the world which desires to be controlled by another agency, particularly the military. At times, this dynamic is an impediment preventing governments from achieving the type of unity of effort and synergy needed to exploit the unique capabilities that each agency possesses. When governments fail to address this challenge, criminal groups exploit this weakness by attacking gaps in coordination between governmental agencies.

Finally, in the modern context where certain minorities seek to change the ethics of what they perceive as correct, such as gender ideologies and progressivism, illegal immigration and even terrorism become acceptable. As a result, the state response must be to act in coordination with neighbours and allies. This anonymous thought frames the strongest challenge that all countries currently face; no one is so strong that they can do it alone, and no one is so weak that they cannot help.

¹⁸ *Cartel of the Suns*, InSight Crime, 2016, <https://www.insightcrime.org/venezuela-organized-crime-news/cartel-de-los-soles-profile> [accessed: 10.03.2021].

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Zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa w Kolumbii po zamachach na World Trade Center: ryzyko dla narodowego i regionalnego bezpieczeństwa i stabilności

Streszczenie

Kolumbia w okresie ostatnich pięćdziesięciu lat doświadczyła długiej i krwawej walki politycznej, w ramach tzw. pełzającej wojny domowej. W tym okresie komunistyczna partyzantka reprezentowana przez różne ugrupowania – Ruch 19 kwietnia (M-19), Narodowa Armia Wyzwolenia (ELN) czy wreszcie Rewolucyjne Siły Zbrojne Kolumbii (FARC), wielokrotnie próbowały obalić demokratycznie wybrany rząd, stosując brutalne metody walki, takie jak porwania dla okupu czy wymuszenia. Zamach terrorystyczny na Centrum Handlu Światowego we wrześniu 2001 roku był dodatkowym wzmocnieniem dla tych organizacji w ich krwawej walce z rządem. Autor charakteryzuje związane z atakiem na WTC konsekwencje dla bezpieczeństwa Kolumbii, wykorzystując dorobek Clausweitz'a czy Che Guevary. W zakończeniu wskazuje na współpracę regionalną w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa jako jedną z metod walki z terroryzmem.

Słowa kluczowe: przestępczość zorganizowana, terroryzm, partyzantka, FARC, organizacje kryminalne, Kolumbia

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Abstract

Colombia has experienced a long and difficult political struggle for over 50 years. During this time, communist guerrillas such as the 19th April movement (M-19), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) have sought to overthrow the government of Colombia and have engaged in illicit activities such as kidnappings and extortion to finance their operations. During the 1990s, these groups became involved in the cocaine trade, and engaged in drug trafficking which significantly increased their financial revenue, access to weapons, and the overall size in terms of membership. As these organizations witnessed the tragic events of September 11, 2001 take place in New York City and in other locations in the United States, they became emboldened and began to envision themselves overthrowing and defeating the government of Colombia. Through Al-Qaeda's example, armed

groups in Colombia imagined themselves as the biblical character David, who defeated the giant Goliath with a sling and a stone. After 9/11, Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) operating in Colombia began to extend their reach beyond national borders and became a major threat to national and regional security. For decades, these groups were embedded and nested with insurgent groups, right wing paramilitary groups, and other illegally armed groups involved in the nation's armed conflict. However, after the 2016 signing of the peace accord between the Colombian government and the political arm of the FARC, transnational criminal organizations now work in concert with each other, or opposing each other for control of the illegal drug industry in Colombia.¹⁹ This new criminal paradigm in Colombia is, in many ways, far more complex than the construct in place prior to 2016, and has created new security challenges for the government.

Key words: Transnational Crime Organizations, transnational crime, Communist Guerrillas, Paramilitary Groups, FARC Peace Agreement

Transnationale Gefahren in Kolumbien nach dem 11. September: Risiko für nationale und regionale Sicherheit und Stabilität Zusammenfassung

Kolumbien ist seit mehr als 50 Jahren in einen langen und schwierigen politischen Kampf verwickelt. Seitdem haben kommunistische Guerillagruppen, wie die Bewegung des 19. April (M-19), die Revolutionären Streitkräfte Kolumbiens (FARC), die nationale Befreiungsarmee (ELN) und die Volksarmee der Befreiung (EPL) versucht, die kolumbianische Regierung zu stürzen und sich zur Finanzierung ihrer Operationen illegaler Aktivitäten bedient, wie Geiselnahmen und Erpressungsversuche. In den 1990er Jahren begannen die o.g. Gruppen, sich im Kokain- und Rauschgifthandel zu betätigen, was die finanziellen Einnahmen, den Zugang zu Waffen und ihre Mitgliedszahlen stark erhöhte. Als die Guerilla-Formationen Zeuge der tragischen Ereignisse am 11. September 2001 in New York City und andernorts in den Vereinigten Staaten wurden, fühlten sie sich ermutigt und malten sich aus, die kolumbianische Regierung zu stürzen und zu besiegen. Nach dem Vorbild von Al-Quaida sahen sich die bewaffneten Aufständischen in Kolumbien in der Rolle des biblischen David, der den Riesen Goliath alleine mit einer Schleuder und einem Stein besiegt hatte. Nach dem 11. September begannen transnationale kriminelle Vereinigungen in Kolumbien, ihren Einflussbereich über die Staatsgrenzen hinweg auszuweiten und wurden zu einer ernsthaften Gefahr für die nationale und regionale Sicherheit. Jahrzehntlang waren diese Gruppen in Vereinigungen Aufständischer, rechte paramilitärische Gruppierungen und andere illegale bewaffnete Gruppen eingebettet, die in den bewaffneten Konflikt der Nation verwickelt waren. Nach der Unterzeichnung des Friedensabkommens im Jahr 2016 zwischen der kolumbianischen Regierung und dem politischen Arm der FARC arbeiten transnationale kriminelle Vereinigungen aktuell jedoch entweder Seite an Seite oder kämpfen um die Kontrolle über die illegale Drogenindustrie im Land. Dieses neue kriminelle Paradigma in Kolumbien ist in vielerlei Hinsicht weitaus komplizierter als das Konstrukt vor 2016 und hat neue sicherheitspolitische Herausforderungen für die Regierung zur Folge.

¹⁹ J. Abrams, *Colombia's fragile peace deal threatened by the return of mass killings*, 2021, <https://theconversation.com/colombias-fragile-peace-deal-threatened-by-the-return-of-mass-killings-154315> [accessed: 5.10.2020].

Schlüsselwörter: transnationale kriminelle Vereinigungen, transnationale Kriminalität, kommunistische Guerillakämpfer, paramilitärische Gruppierungen, FARC-Friedensabkommen

*Угрозы безопасности после 11 сентября в Колумбии:
риск для национальной и региональной безопасности
и стабильности*

Резюме

В течение последних пятидесяти лет Колумбия пережила долгую и кровопролитную политическую борьбу вызванную длительной гражданской войной. В течение этого периода коммунистические партизаны, представленные различными группировками, такими как Движение 19 апреля (М-19), Армия национального освобождения (ELN), или Революционные вооружённые силы Колумбии (FARC) неоднократно пытались свергнуть демократически избранное правительство, используя насильственные методы борьбы, такие как похищение людей с целью получения выкупа или вымогательства. Атака террористов на здания Всемирного торгового центра (ВТЦ) в сентябре 2001 года стала дополнительным толчком для этих организаций в их кровавой борьбе с правительством. В статье дана характеристика последствий нападения на ВТЦ для безопасности Колумбии. В заключении рассмотрен один из методов борьбы с терроризмом, каким является региональное сотрудничество в области безопасности.

Ключевые слова: организованная преступность, терроризм, партизаны, FARC, преступные организации, Колумбия