BEZPIECZEŃSTWO
TEORIA I PRAKTYKA

SECURITY
THEORY AND PRACTICE

THE TOTAL DEFENCE 21ST CENTURY.COM –
BUILDING A RESILIENT SOCIETY

edited by
Marcin Lasoń, Maciej Klisz, Leszek Elak

KRAKOWSKA AKADEMIA IM. ANDRZEJA FRYCZA MODRZEWSKIEGO

ANDRZEJ FRYCZ MODRZEWSKI KRAKOW UNIVERSITY

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The Total Defence 21st century.COM – building a resilient society: Introduction

When we started working on the issue entitled "The Total Defence 21st century. COM – building a resilient society", we did not know then how topical this issue would become. We were aware of its importance, especially since 2014, which was the beginning of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. However, we did not think that the need to build an effective concept of total/comprehensive defence, and then its implementation, would become so pressing in February 2022.

Two of the three general regularities in the history of international relations have also become extremely topical. We are talking about the clash between imperial and polyarchic tendencies, and nations' desire to express their independence and identity, and as a result, to have their own state. It can be assumed that in order to achieve this goal, as well as for small and medium-sized states to be able to defend themselves against the forces of empires and effectively deter them, they must use the concept of total/comprehensive defence, in its improved, 21st century version.

Security and defence guarantees based on international law are not sufficient, as international practice proves once again.

Totality/comprehensiveness assumes an entire state's and society's, both military and civilian institutions', participation in defence. Therefore, the content of this issue also needed to adopt this view. Hence, the articles presented here come from joint efforts of civilian and military scientific institutions and the type of armed forces which are particularly responsible for building universal defence readiness throughout a state's territory. Only such an approach allows a comprehensive description of the subject discussed in the issue.

The Russian annexation of Crimea and the eastern part of Ukraine in February 2014 initiated discussion not only on the readiness and capabilities of the armed forces but also on society's resilience and civilian preparedness to withstand a conventional military conflict. The last two areas quickly became crucial for European nations. The last thirty years have significantly weakened their armed forces, limiting their size and operational capabilities. They have become unable to provide the necessary security level to their societies. Contrary to the classical Clausewitz's approach, society members have become major targets of military operations, and their need to be resilient and survive the adversary's attacks have turned out to be of crucial importance.

The joint declaration after the Warsaw NATO Summit in July 2016 brought much greater attention to these capabilities. The declaration on the so-called NATO Baseline for National Resilience clearly showed that only tightly coordinated efforts between civilians and the military ensure effective resilience.

The approach to national defence and strengthening national resilience presented by Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Sweden, Finland, and even Singapore was named a total/comprehensive defence concept. Immediately, total/comprehensive defence became a buzzword during experts' discussions and a universal solution to current security challenges. Naturally, the concept is not ground-breaking in military studies. It has been present in military books for many years. However, it has been forgotten due to the peace dividend period.

In 2020, the NATO Special Operations Headquarters published the *Comprehensive Defence Handbook*, the effect of an exceptionally thorough and time-consuming analytical approach to total/comprehensive defence. Subsequently, the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept, the primary document of NATO's Allied Command Transformation for the upcoming years, identified resilience as a Warfare Development Imperative for the NATO Alliance. Furthermore, resilience analyses were aligned with the newly established NATO Resilience Committee. That makes resilience one of the major security challenge for NATO.

In order to approach the problem appropriately, the editors invited outstanding experts from all over the world to contribute to this publication. They represent

the entire spectrum of the security environment: military members (active and retired), civilians, and academics, both theorists and practitioners. They carefully studied and analysed the total/comprehensive defence concept from many different perspectives to ensure complete understanding of the phenomenon. The editors strongly believe that "The Total Defence 21st century.COM – building a resilient society" will significantly broaden the knowledge of total/comprehensive defence and make it more understandable for members of society.

Interview with Lt. Gen. Wiesław Kukuła, Commanding General of the Polish Territorial Defence Forces, and Col. Konrad Korpowski, Director of the Government Centre for Security

Marcin Lasoń, Maciej Klisz, Leszek Elak: What, in your opinion, is the most productive approach to developing an effective resilience of the state and society in the current security environment?

Wiesław Kukuła: Developing a state's resilience is a highly positivist task that cannot be completed overnight. From my point of view, the most effective approach to developing effective state's and society's resilience should focus on the processes related to shaping individual and collective perception of resilience. Today, the most significant threats to shaping the state's resilience properly come from the minimal knowledge about the development of an individual, local communities, and state resilience. Thus, the most critical current challenges are awareness and education. These activities must identify citizens with the system and allow them to determine their roles in the state's resilience system consciously.

Konrad Korpowski: The claims that the whole of society determines the national defence potential remain valid. The recipe for creating effective resistance of the state and its society to various types of threats, including hostile hybrid activities and those carried out below the threshold of war, is full implementation of the provisions of the National Security Strategy. However, such implementation requires numerous recommendations resulting from the strategy and the development of standardising documents, which should specify the powers and responsibilities of individual state bodies. Effective resilience of the state and society should be built on the competencies and responsibilities of state entities, both military and civilian. What is extremely important, it should be done in well-designed cooperation, among others,

with non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the scientific and academic communities, and broadly understood volunteering. Currently, particular elements of government administration and other institutions within their competencies are responsible for the state immunity divisions assigned to them. On the other hand, there is noticeably insufficient coordination of these dispersed ministerial responsibilities at the state level. The current situation imposes the need to integrate the security system components' tasks to strengthen Poland's resilience and society.

M.L., M.K., L.E.: What are the opportunities and threats in preparing the state and society for comprehensive defence in the digital world where even essential information is often limited to a single image or tweet?
W.K.: In the digital world, communication remains an essential leadership attribute. Appropriate communication, including developing resilient and trusted communication channels, is an excellent opportunity that enables the state's information to be cohesive and create a coherent picture of the current situation. Proper communication enables building interagency (inter-institutional) trust which influences the speed of action critical in contemporary times. Obviously, the "digital world", democratic systems of governance, and the freedom of speech inseparable from them make us susceptible to "external control" which is supposed to weaken the processes that binding and strengthening the state. Nevertheless, I see more opportunities than threats. Again, threats awareness and risk management are critical.
K.K.: Information management, strategic communication, and fake news are, in my opinion, the most critical areas for building the entire common defence system. The key to success is to develop and maintain an efficient system for analysing threats resulting from hostile activities in cyberspace, including in the media space, and preparation of counter-campaigns, as well as supervision and control of a "coordinated state response" to such attacks. An essential element of this system must be conducting "modern" education of society about potential threats and ways to recognise and counter them. "Modernity" should be understood as "attractive," informative, educational, and practical activities aimed at the target groups of society.

M.L., M.K., L.E.: What are the armed forces' responsibilities in the development of operational capabilities for comprehensive defence? How should the armed forces be integrated with the civilian component?
W.K.: The armed forces play a critical role in building the capacity for comprehensive defence. Directly, their capabilities are an essential part of the national defence system, and in turn, they indirectly shape and support the operation of many civilian systems that make up the overall resilience of the state, which enables long-term defence of the state and helps survive economic crises or natural disasters. Thus, the armed forces are a source of fundamental capabilities and competencies for civilian communities and

institutions that use and develop them according to their role in the system. In Finland, I have often heard that the armed forces are a catalyst for these processes and that through widespread military training of reservists, they are building dual-use social awareness and competence. It is interesting because "the way to a warrior can lead through a rescuer."

K.K.: I believe the armed forces are essential in common defence, but not the most important. Therefore, cooperation between the military and the civilian area will determine the state's ability and effectiveness of common defence (comprehensive defence).

M.L., M.K., L.E.: What are the civilian institutions' responsibilities in the development of capabilities for comprehensive defence? How should the civilian component be integrated with the armed forces?

K.K.: A comprehensive defence system requires the involvement of all citizens, civilian institutions, and the armed forces. Comprehensive defence is much more than just the armed forces. If the armed forces are to carry out their basic tasks for which they are maintained, they must be supported by the entire state apparatus, together with enterprises (not only subordinate to the state treasury but also commercial ones) and, what is important, the support of the society. It is purposeful to draw attention to the critical role played by Polish society and entrepreneurs in the matters of personal and equipment protection of units performing tasks for the security of the Republic of Poland. What I mean is the imposition of defence benefits, more specifically personal, material, or unique benefits. Currently, the organization of a common (comprehensive) defence is a complex responsibility, covering all spheres of state life. It also includes the economic and human potentials which affect the possibilities in the area of state defence preparations, including, among other things, increasing the mobilisation base of the Polish Armed Forces.

M.L., M.K., L.E.: Many countries have adopted the comprehensive defence approach to enhance national defence capabilities. Which of them, in your opinion, are the most effective and recommended to be implemented in Poland?

W.K.: Comprehensive defence as a model of state security strategies is common in states with a mature strategic culture that enhances the state's operational capabilities pragmatically and rationally. It is primarily developed in countries facing the asymmetry of threats (e.g., a potential adversary significantly exceeds them in terms of demographic or military potential). I like several models implemented and functioning well all over the world. I consider Israel and Norway to be the most mature and comprehensive systems. But it is also worth getting acquainted with the universal defence system implemented in Singapore, which numerous experts consider a reference model for many countries that choose this type of strategy. In my

opinion, we are not far from the implementation of the Norwegian model of universal defence. One of the most significant differences is the compulsory military service for men and women in Norway. However, there is no need to copy the selected model. The system must be adjusted to a number of legal, cultural, and demographic conditions. Thus, drawing on solutions from other countries may be selective. That is how the Polish Territorial Defence Forces (POL TDF) were designed, deriving from the solutions implemented in other countries that best suited the Polish conditions.

K.K.: I am against direct implementation (copying) of comprehensive defence regulations from other countries. Each country has different conditions which must be carefully analysed before making a decision. Observation of the international security environment shows that indiscriminate imitation of the adopted solutions may even be harmful and ineffective. Nevertheless, the solutions applied in the United States, the Nordic countries, or Israel are worth considering. From each of the aforementioned "systems," we should select those elements which may be best suited to Polish realities and requirements or expectations. Based on such a set, it is necessary to "define the optimal" functional model of the comprehensive defence of Poland. However, while developing the essential elements of comprehensive defence model, it is crucial to conduct series of tests and simulations before its final implementation. And then, after some time (e.g., achieving the Initial Operational Capability), carry out verification exercise and implement necessary amendments based on their conclusions.

M.L., M.K., L.E.: How can we enhance efficient cooperation of the Territorial Defence formations with Special Operations Forces in planning and conducting state defence?

W.K.: Special Operations Forces are a relatively small resource intended to execute strategic tasks for the state. The POL TDF possess extensive resources designed for tactical operations throughout the country's territory. Both formations operate in the land domain, where the population and its critical resources are common characteristics. Due to the POL TDF development, defence and support from the Polish Armed Forces are available everywhere in a short notice. In such an environment, the SOF are designed to execute the most challenging missions with the highest priorities. They are highly specialised and require unique competencies. High-quality leadership and awareness of Special Operations Forces personnel are factors that integrate effort in joint operations. It is also not without significance that former POL SOF officers are at the head of many territorial defence formations. Both formations (POL SOF and POL TDF) share some similarities: joint missions, "sensitivity to the population," and the highly aware personnel constitute an excellent foundation for joint operations. An excellent historical example of this

type of cooperation came from World War II: The Silent Unseen (*Cichociemni*) – elite special-operations paratroopers parachuted to Poland, and the Home Army (*Armia Krajowa*) soldiers active in their local area of operations.

K.K.: Both formations have common methods of conducting operations, operational goals, and tasks in certain areas. In these areas, we should strive to bring these two formations closer – obviously not forgetting the differences resulting from the degree of professionalisation of soldiers serving in these formations. At this point, it is worth carrying out a series of training experiments, e.g., delegating the command over the Polish Territorial Defence Forces elements to the Polish Special Operations Forces (POL SOF) operators during operations, e.g., unconventional warfare on a temporarily lost territory. The key to the future remains the implementation of joint exercises so that the soldiers of both formations could get to know their own "skills." The Territorial Defence Forces soldiers know their area of territorial responsibility, their "little homeland," like no others. And POL SOF operators know the best methods of "unconventional warfare" in the Polish Armed Forces. It would be advisable to combine these two "highly specialised" skills to implement the common task of defending our homeland.

Articles

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Resilience and Resistance 2.0: initial lessons of Ukraine and the implications of resilience and resistance efforts to deter and respond to invasion and occupation by revisionist powers

Introduction

Given the challenges today, many nations are building national resilience – the ability of a nation to withstand and recover from natural or man-made disasters or disruptions.[1] National resilience strategies are based on the range of potential threats, likelihood of occurrence, impact, and resource constraints. Many nations are also concerned about man-made threats including international and domestic terrorism,

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[1] Resilience is defined as "the will and ability to withstand external pressures and influences and/or recover from the effects of those pressures or influences." O.C. Fiala, *Resistance Operating Concept (ROC)*, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2020, https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=54216464 [accessed: 10 January 2022], p. 236.

below-the-threshold-of-conflict grey-zone operations – covert actions and disinformation operations – and military conflicts.[2] To address these, nations are developing civil defence resilience – the combination of select civil and military defence capabilities developed and pre-positioned before and mobilised during a man-made national security crisis. Following 9/11, threatened nations focused their resilience efforts on civil defence measures to counter international and domestic terrorism. Similarly, nations within the spheres of influence of the revisionist powers[3] – Russia and China – increased their civil defence resilience against grey-zone operations and conflict following Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea. The events of 2014 brought another aspect of civil defence resilience out of the shadows and into the mainstream – the necessity for countries bordering or within the sphere of influence of these revisionist states to prepare for invasion and occupation.[4]

Building upon other national resilience and civil defence efforts, nations are not only preparing to survive invasion and occupation, the worst-case man-made disasters, but also resisting both.[5] Resilience and Resistance (R&R) is the fundamental realisation that a nation can increase its resilience and resistance capacities against invasion and occupation in peacetime to deter threats. If deterrents fail, they have the capacity to respond.[6] While the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 reinforced the need and value of R&R, it also signalled a strategic inflection point with respect to the R&R demonstrating the modern real-world need for R&R against revisionist nations. It is time to reimagine R&R based on the lessons learned from Ukraine to achieve R&R's full potential, or R&R 2.0. R&R 2.0 is a whole-of-nation, but government-led, large-scale underground resistance organisation (URO) authorised in legislation for full development in peacetime to conduct

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[2]   *"Little Green Men": A primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013–2014*, Assessing Revolution and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) Studies, United States Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/14-02984_LittleGreenMen-UNCLASS-hi-res.pdf [accessed: 24 January 2022].

[3]   T. Wright, "China and Russia vs. America: Great-power revisionism is back", Brookings Institute: Opinions, 17 April 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/china-and-russia-vs-america-great-power-revisionism-is-back/ [accessed: 12 April 2022].

[4]   Per Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulation, "(t)erritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of a hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised." *Law of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV); October 18, 1907*, The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, New Haven, CT, 2008, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague04.asp#art42 [accessed: 24 January 2022].

[5]   Resistance is defined as "a nation's organized, whole-of-society effort, encompassing the full range of activities from nonviolent to violent, led by a legally established government (potentially exiled/displaced or shadow) to reestablish independence and autonomy within its sovereign territory that has been wholly or partially occupied by a foreign power." O.C. Fiala, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

[6]   *Ibidem*, pp. 8–14.

resistance to occupation and coerce, disrupt, or defeat an occupier in wartime. R&R 2.0 is not only a response option to an invasion but needs to be a fully recognised and accepted irregular deterrence option, co-equal to conventional and nuclear deterrents.[7]

The research questions this study sets out to answer are: what are the initial lessons learned from the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine?; what do they tell us about resilience and resistance doctrine and theories largely based on resistance efforts against the German occupations of World War II?; and most importantly, what next – what adaptations need to be made to make R&R more effective? To answer these questions, this study builds upon a large body of qualitative research on resilience, resistance, insurgency, and counterinsurgency conducted by the authors over the last decade via secondary sources, with direct exposure to the applications of theories developed through this research. The main theoretical sources upon which this study derives its findings include two published by the Joint Special Operations University: the *Resistance Operating Concept* (ROC) and *Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic of Clandestine Insurgent and Terrorist Networks*, as well as the *Comprehensive Defence Handbook* published by the NATO Special Operations Headquarters.[8]

Resilience and Resistance 2.0

The Ukrainian irregular defence against the Russian invasion provides a modern example of the value of whole-of-nation resistance. However, the Ukrainian resistance was largely organised *in-extremis* right before and during the invasion to resist the invasion, not necessarily an occupation.[9] Despite the admirable efforts of the Ukrainian government and people given the suddenness of the 2022 invasion, there are several

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[7] NATO additionally considers missile defence a third type of deterrent to conventional and nuclear. *Deterrence and defence*, NATO, 14 March 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_133127.htm [accessed: 22 January 2022].

[8] O.C. Fiala, *op. cit.*; D. Jones, *Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic of Clandestine Insurgent and Terrorist Networks: The First Step in Effective Counternetwork Operations*, JSOU Report 12-3, MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, April 2012, https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=51792142 [accessed: 15 January 2022]; NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ), *Comprehensive Defence Handbook*, vol. I, edition A, December 2020 [hereinafter: NSHQ CDH, vol. I], https://www.nshq.nato.int/nshq/library/nshq-comprehensive-defence-handbook-volume-1/ [accessed: 15 December 2021].

[9] B.S. Petit, "Ukraine and the Threat of Citizen Resistance", *Small Wars Journal*, 21 January 2022, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/ukraine-and-threat-citizen-resistance [accessed: 23 January 2022]; and S. Sheth, "Ordinary Ukrainian citizens are taking up arms to fend off Russian forces as they close on Kyiv", *Business Insider*, 25 February 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/ordinary-ukrainians-take-up-arms-defend-kyiv-from-russia-2022-2 [accessed: 27 February 2022].

lessons learned that will inform R&R 2.0. At the heart of R&R 2.0 is the need to develop a viable URO at the right scale prior to a crisis during the resilience phase that can quickly respond to an invasion and occupation with legitimacy and purpose. This same concept should guide the development or transition of current efforts by countries building R&R capabilities into R&R 2.0. Countries developing R&R capacity should assess their current efforts and ensure that they have considered or implemented the correct lessons from Ukraine to increase the effectiveness of their R&R efforts. The goal of R&R 2.0 is to present revisionist powers with the toughest tactical, operational, and strategic irregular problems possible to complicate their calculus when they consider invasion and occupation as an option, and ideally, deter action. Creating intrinsic and extrinsic dilemmas – perceived or real – would re-establish deterrence based on the power of whole-of-nation R&R 2.0 capacity and mutually support conventional and nuclear deterrents.[10] If deterrents fail, R&R 2.0 would provide resistance to the invasion and occupation, imparting cost on the aggressor by depleting its political will and domestic support and setting conditions for outside intervention or withdrawal in defeat. Even at scale, developing and maintaining R&R 2.0 is likely cheaper and more resilient than conventional weapon systems and capabilities.

The government-led R&R 2.0 efforts provide legitimacy, legal authorities, direction, control, and integrated capabilities to maximise the resistance potential of the nation's government, business, and civil sectors.[11] Additionally, organising R&R prior to a crisis allows other nations to provide all types of external support at scale to these efforts in place of supporting them directly during an occupation. The pre-crisis external support alleviates the need and risk associated with boots-on-the-ground advisors conducting unconventional warfare in support of the resistance which has proven politically untenable in recent crises, as the Ukraine crisis has again demonstrated.[12]

The centre of gravity for R&R 2.0 is a large-scale, resilient URO which leads and conducts the protracted campaign of armed and non-violent resistance against

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[10]   The authors envision "dilemma making" as a process similar to the military deception concept of "see-know-do" but modified to "know-see-do" planning for "see-know-do" execution. Joint Staff, *Military Deception*, Joint Publication 3-13.4, Washington, DC, 26 January 2012, https://jfsc.ndu.edu/Portals/72/Documents/JC2IOS/Additional_Reading/1C3-JP_3-13-4_MILDEC.pdf [accessed: 10 February 2022], p. xi.

[11]   The key to organising these efforts prior to a crisis is protecting the designated resistance members in much the same way a nation protects its intelligence and specialised military personnel from detection while also ensuring the organisation cannot be used for domestic political purposes.

[12]   Unconventional warfare is defined as "activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area." O.C. Fiala, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

occupation.[13] Scale is critical. Historically, the underground – the hidden clandestine human and physical infrastructure – made up the largest portion of a resistance movement.[14] For example, one of the largest UROs in history was the Polish Underground State of WWII which had over 300,000 clandestine members.[15] The underground members have roles in the resistance requiring full-time clandestine lifestyles.[16] This includes members of the shadow government (SG) – those elements of the government that stay behind during an occupation to lead and govern the nation's day-to-day resistance.[17] The auxiliary is the second component consisting of individuals from all walks of life who provide active, but clandestine support for the resistance, including collecting intelligence and providing logistics, while living their normal lives as cover for their activities.[18]

Lastly, the armed element, traditionally called the guerrillas or partisans, are led by specially designated military personnel and may include a nation's territorial defence forces (TDF) or home guards who provide the military capacity and expertise to the underground.[19] The armed elements tailor their operations, operational tempo, and operational signatures based on the occupier and terrain.[20] The armed elements may play a particularly active role in resisting invasion in support of conventional defence forces. However, in doing so, there is a danger that they will likely be exposed and unable to transition to clandestine operations during the occupation, negatively impacting the *resistance to occupation*. They may also operate as clandestine action cells

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[13]   D. Jones, *op. cit*., pp. 4–10.

[14]   A. Molnar, W. Lybrand, L. Hahn, J. Kirkman, P. Riddleberger, *Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare,* Washington, DC: Special Operations Research Office, November 1963, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD0436353.pdf [accessed: 15 January 2022], pp.14–15; D. Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 5–6, 30–31.

[15]   T. Bór-Komorowski, *The Secret Army: The Memoirs of General Bór-Komorowski*, Barnsley: Front Line Books, 2011, pp. 142–143; S. Korbonski, *Fighting Warsaw: The Story of the Polish Underground State 1939–1945*, transl. by F.B. Czarnomski, New York, NY: Hippocrene Books, Inc., 2004, pp. 37–39; K. Utracka, "The Phenomenon of the Polish Underground State", *The Warsaw Institute Review*, 4 December 2019, https://warsawinstitute.org/phenomenon-polish-underground-state/ [21 December 2022].

[16]   D. Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 13–14, 20–24.

[17]   O.C. Fiala, *op. cit*., pp. 11–13.

[18]   D. Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 14–16.

[19]   *Ibidem.*, pp. 16–17; NSHQ CDH, vol. I, pp. 33–42; P. Stibbe, "When did Guerrilla Warfare Become Truly Revolutionary?", E-International Relations, 28 March 2013, https://www.e-ir.info/2013/03/28/when-did-guerrilla-warfare-become-truly-revolutionary/ [accessed: 15 February 2022]; A.J. Joes, *Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical, Biographical, and Bibliographical Sourcebook*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996; R.B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History*, New York, NY: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1994; Mao Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, transl. by S. Griffith, New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1961; [E.] Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1998.

[20]   D. Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

in urban terrain or when under pressure from the occupier. In rural areas or under less pressure, they may take on more traditional military organisational structures and operations against the occupier.[21] From the start, the organisational development, recruitment of members, training, and preparations should be bounded by a legal framework approved by elected officials and legislators who also provide oversight.[22] Ultimately, scaling the three elements of the resistance to effectively counter the occupier is critical to the resistance's success.[23]

One key aspect of organised resistance is the continuity of governance to ensure continued sovereignty and legitimacy for the resistance upon occupation.[24] Much like the legal frameworks for the overall resistance, legislative efforts should clearly describe the continuity of government process and organisational structure that articulates the roles and responsibilities of each element leading up to a crisis and under occupation.[25] This should be integral to any R&R 2.0 legal construct and include the government-in-exile (GIE), shadow government (SG), and what could be termed a collaborative or cooperative government (CG).[26] The GIE is responsible for carrying on the national identity to the outside world, gaining external support, and providing the overall legitimacy for the resistance effort against the occupying country.[27] The GIE process for continuity of government is legislated, its members are pre-designated and trained, and the location is established during peacetime to ensure its viability and rapid transition in a crisis. The SG is the civilian-led underground organisation that provides day-to-day in-country leadership of the resistance as described above as part of the underground. The SG leads and directs all aspects of the effort and the employment of the tools of resistance, both violent and non-violent, through centralised strategy execution, but decentralised tactical implementation. The last element of governmental continuity is the CG which is given strict legal guidance by the GIE as to what it can and cannot do in collaboration or cooperation with the occupier to ensure the civilian population under occupation receives basic support such

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[21] *Ibidem*., pp. 18–19; M. Grdovic, *A Leader's Handbook to Unconventional Warfare*, Publication 09-1, Fort Bragg, NC: The US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, November 2009, https://info.publicintelligence.net/USArmy-LeadersUW.pdf [accessed: 13 January 2022], pp. 13–14.

[22] Authors' experience with similar efforts from 2010 to 2016; NSHQ CDH, vol. I, pp. 89–92.

[23] D. Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 30–31.

[24] As an example, see White House, *Continuity of Government*, https://whitehouse.gov1.info/continuity-plan/ [accessed: 5 February 2022].

[25] NSHQ CDH, vol. I, pp. 76–78, 89–92.

[26] O.C. Fiala, *op. cit.*, pp. 11–13; W. Rings, *Life with the Enemy: Collaboration and Resistance in Hitler's Europe 1939-1945*, transl. by J.M. Brownjohn, London, UK: Weidenfeld and Nicolson Limited, 1982, part II and III; *The Impossible Resistance: Latvia Between Two Totalitarian Regimes 1940–1991*, eds. V. Nollendorf, V. Ščerbinskis, Symposium of the Commission of the Historians of Latvia, vol. 29, Rīga: Zinātne, 2021, pp. 25–29.

[27] O.C. Fiala, *op. cit.*, pp. 11–13.

as food, water, sanitation, medical, electricity, and public safety.[28] The members of the CG should be explicitly directed via legislative action not to conduct any resistance activities to ensure they are not targeted by the occupier.[29]

While the goal of building *resiliency to invasion* and *occupation* is to deter aggression, if these resiliency efforts fail, the organised *resistance to invasion* and *occupation* provides immediate response options for the nation being invaded. Ideally, this response buys time for the nation's bilateral or multilateral partners or allies to mount a counteroffensive, such as a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Article 5 response to re-establish the nation and NATO's territorial integrity. For nations without bilateral or multilateral defence agreements, such as Ukraine, then *resistance to invasion* and *occupation* supplements conventional military capabilities with the goal of decreasing the invader and occupier's political will and domestic support and ultimately forcing them to withdraw. Attempting to build these capabilities immediately before an invasion, or even worse, during an invasion or occupation, is a strategically poor option. Countries can avoid this issue by organising per the principles of R&R 2.0 long before a crisis to ensure a viable capability. While organising a resistance is not a new concept, organising prior to a conflict as part of a nation's resilience efforts is new.[30] Logically, organising prior to a conflict and not under the pressure of occupation is a better option if time, resources, political support, and expertise to do so are available.

Prior to and in the opening years of WWII, *resistance to occupation* traditionally started as grassroot efforts of the population to organise against the occupier, such as the French Resistance.[31] WWII ushered in efforts by external powers to develop

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[28]   While the idea of having any portion of the government work with the occupier may be anathema to some, this provides a way for the government to continue to support the population if the occupier does not. W. Rings, *op. cit.*, part II and III; *The Impossible Resistance...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 25–29.

[29]   If the CG falls out of favor, is stymied, or stopped from carrying out its GIE-designated role, a backup system can be established to provide services via grey and black markets. A phased, *in-extremis* plan can be developed and driven by decision points to expand or contract economic, medical, and critical infrastructure (e.g., electric, sewage, etc.) to support the population. Hezbollah used a similar system as a source of power. J. Love, *Hezbollah: Social Services as Source of Power*, Joint Special Operations University, Tampa, FL, June 2012, https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=2876933 [accessed: 10 February 2022], p. 21.

[30]   Prior to the invasion, the Ukrainian president only called up reservists aged 18–60, ruling out a larger mobilisation, per M. Beals, "Ukraine president orders reservists to be drafted", The Hill, 23 February 2022, https://thehill.com/policy/international/595435-ukraine-president-orders-reservists-to-be-drafted-urges-ukrainians-to [accessed: 24 February 2022]. Compared to the immediate post-invasion mobilisation, Jerusalem Post Staff, "Zelensky calls for general mobilization as Russian force advance", *The Jerusalem Post*, 24 February 2022, https://www.jpost.com/international/article-698525 [accessed: 24 February 2022].

[31]   G. de Benouville, *The Unknown Warriors: A Personal Account of the French Resistance*, New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1949; E.H. Cookridge, *Set Europe Ablaze*, New York, NY: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1966; F.O. Miksche, *Secret Forces: The Technique of*

and operationalise combined civil-military units specifically organised, trained, and equipped to in turn organise, train, equip, and unify resistance forces at scale in occupied territories. The goal of these efforts was to impart greater costs on the occupiers as an integrated element of the Allied campaign plan and the overall war effort.[32] Specifically, the British conceived of and established the Special Operations Executive (SOE), quickly followed by the American version called the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). After some fits and starts, both organisations ultimately succeeded in harnessing the power of the people's resistance against German occupation throughout Europe. The disorganised nature of resistance at the time caused operational issues among clandestine groups, routinely unaware of other cells operating in their areas. Uncoordinated resistance efforts also resulted in security compromises, in-fighting – especially among groups with different political leanings – hostile penetrations of groups by the occupier, retaliation against civilians, and a lack of coherent tactical or operational-level resistance campaigns. Overall, the SOE and OSS efforts to organise disparate groups were remarkably successful and set the stage for the Cold War era and present-day intelligence organisations and military special operations forces (SOF) which developed units and doctrinal concepts specifically to support and organise these types of efforts behind enemy lines.

The Cold War efforts by external powers, such as the US, were focused on building "stay-behind networks" in Europe against Soviet invasion. These networks were designed to stay in place during an invasion, and then conduct sabotage, subversion, and guerrilla warfare against the occupier. Most programmes failed to achieve the desired goals or fell victim to controversy due to concerns the efforts were used for domestic political action, such as Operation Gladio in Italy.[33] However, there are successful examples of Cold War development of pre-crisis resistance capacities such as the Swiss, who developed resistance cadres to conduct guerrilla and non-violent resistance if their neutrality was violated and they were occupied.[34] They envisioned cadres building the rest of the URO through clandestine recruitment efforts once under occupation. It is unknown if this cadre-centric option would have

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      Underground Movements, London: Faber and Faber Unlimited, 1950; R. Seth, *How the Resistance Worked*, London: Butler & Tanner LTD, 1961; *Resistance in Western Europe*, ed. B. Moore, New York, NY: Berg, 2000.

[32] E.H. Cookridge, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–6, 14–17; R.H. Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*, Guilford, CT: First Lyons Press, 2005, pp. 24–31.

[33] T. Sinai, "Eyes on target: 'Stay-behind' forces during the Cold War", *War in History*, vol. 28, no. 3, 2021, pp. 681–700; D. Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe*, New York, NY: Frank Cass, 2005.

[34] K.D. Stringer, "Building a Stay-Behind Resistance Organization: The Case for Cold War Switzerland Against the Soviet Union", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 2nd Quarter 2017, https://ndupress. ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-86/jfq-86_109-114_Stringer.pdf [accessed: 12 December 2021], pp. 109–114.

been successful.[35] From the end of the Cold War to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, various nations attempted to develop or maintain R&R capacities, in some cases working quietly with external partners via bilateral agreements with various levels of success.[36] The events in Ukraine in 2014 caused a shift in acceptance of R&R and willingness for multi-lateral discussions on the topic.

As a result, over the next six years, two efforts focused on establishing baseline doctrine for R&R. Both were heavily based on the European experiences and lessons learned from organised resistance experiences of WWII, the Cold War, and the resurgence of efforts in the Baltics before 2014. The first effort was led by Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR), partnered with the University of Sweden, and included several countries from the region who participated and provided their unique R&R experiences and expertise. This effort ultimately resulted in the 2020 publication of the *Resistance Operating Concept* (ROC), the first to capture historical examples and theory of R&R in a single document. The ROC framed R&R efforts as part of a whole-of-nation effort called *Total Defence*, recommended the ministry of defence (MOD) lead, and standardised the language and some basic principles and doctrine among nations that participated in its development.[37] The second effort, led by the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ), followed suit with the 2020 publication of the two-volume *Comprehensive Defence Handbook* (CDH).[38] While similar to the ROC, it moved away from some of the historically-bound ROC language which used terms like resistance and guerrillas, to the more politically acceptable language of asymmetric defence component and the adapted force, respectively.[39] Additionally, the CDH attempted to focus on application over theory, especially in the second volume, which is more of an actionable checklist. In place of the ROC's *Total Defence*, the NSHQ doctrine coined the term *Comprehensive Defence*, a similar concept consisting of a whole-of-society R&R.[40] Even though both are valuable references and provide foundational concepts for developing pre-crisis R&R, the implementation of these concepts has understandably proven difficult due to constraints such as political will (culture, resources, and time), competing defence priorities, actual versus desired R&R capacity, and the availability of R&R subject matter expertise.

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[35] *Ibidem*, pp. 111–112.

[36] Author's SOCEUR experiences from 2010 to 2012.

[37] O.C. Fiala, *op. cit.*

[38] NSHQ CDH, vol. I; NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ), *Comprehensive Defence Handbook*, vol. II, edition A, December 2020, https://www.nshq.nato.int/nshq/library/comprehensive-defence-handbook-volume-2/ [accessed: 15 December 2021].

[39] NSHQ CDH, vol. I, pp. 43–50.

[40] NSHQ CDH, vol. I, pp. 15–20; O.C. Fiala, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

One issue the ROC and CDH inadvertently contributed to is the proclivity for the military to take the lead, which has militarised many of the R&R efforts today.[41] There are two additional reasons for this militarisation – having the MOD or SOF in the lead and relying on territorial defence forces or home guards to serve as the "armed resistance" elements within the country's R&R.[42] The MOD in the lead is problematic for the reasons already mentioned – civilian control of R&R is the same as civilian control of the military – it ensures legitimacy and oversight. This is especially important in an organisation like a national resistance where government and private citizens are the largest portions of a properly balanced resistance organisation. SOF in the lead is an issue because few SOF are trained as R&R experts above the tactical level.[43] Leveraging TDF or home guards to lead R&R further fuels the militarisation of these efforts. Lastly, R&R efforts tend to get accepted by the Ministry of Defence elements long before the government's civilian leaders and other ministries and agencies accept and participate.[44] Without proper civilian oversight, R&R efforts lack critical senior civilian sponsorship to lead R&R nationally and top-down to ensure the required legitimacy in peacetime or war. Lastly, political sensitivities constrain or degrade R&R and limit preparedness prior to a crisis.[45] The Ukraine crisis has exposed the impacts of pre-crisis political constraints and should be instructive to R&R efforts.

Ukraine 2022 R&R review

Reviewing the 2022 R&R efforts in Ukraine provides numerous strengths and weaknesses for other countries to consider in developing and implementing R&R 2.0. Four strengths stand out:
1) establishing the legal framework for R&R,
2) mobilising the population and world opinion to resist the invasion,
3) providing "how to resist" information to the society, and
4) leading as the wartime leadership of the government.

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[41]   O.C. Fiala, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
[42]   The fact that both the ROC and CDH development and publication were SOF-led efforts is indicative of this trend.
[43]   For example, the US Army SOF are trained in supporting resistance during the various qualifications courses – Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations. However, the development of subject matter expertise in R&R above the tactical level is largely dependent on individual operational experiences, advanced institutional education, and personal study of the subject.
[44]   Authors' experiences. This is further increased by either unengaged or untrained civilian oversight of these efforts. For success, civilian oversight requires the requisite understanding of R&R theory, application, tradecraft, and planning.
[45]   The language changes between the ROC and CDH are a good example of attempting to make a tough topic politically acceptable.

First, Ukraine implemented an R&R law prior to the conflict known as the "On the foundations of national resistance" law providing the legal authorities for resistance, roles, and responsibilities across the government and society.[46] The law designates the President of Ukraine as the overall leader of the national resistance, delegated through the Minister of Defence, who further delegates the leadership of the territorial defence to the Commander of the Ukrainian TDF, the leadership of the resistance movement to the Commander of the Ukrainian SOF, and the management of the citizens of Ukraine participating in the national defence to the cabinet ministers.[47] Second, the Ukrainian population answered their President's call to arms with Ukrainians from all walks of life taking up arms to resist the invasion.[48] Additionally, the Ukrainian efforts on the battlefield and via information operations successfully mobilised global popular support.[49] Third, the Ukrainian SOF successfully established a "how to resist" website, called the National Resistance Centre, with a variety of tips and tricks for members of the population to use to conduct active, non-violent, and passive resistance, as well as reduce their digital signature.[50] Lastly, the Ukrainian government and the President showed superb wartime leadership, staying in the fight with their people and inspiring the admiration of the world.[51]

Despite the significant strengths, there are five major weaknesses that must be considered:

1) missing elements of the legal framework and time to implement it,
2) lack of a continuity of government plan,

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[46] *Law of Ukraine: On the Foundation of National Resistance*, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 19 February 2022, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1702-IX?lang=en#Text [accessed: 6 March 2022].

[47] *Ibidem*, Article 1, paragraph 1 (President); Article 7, paragraph 2 (Territorial Defence Forces); Article 7, paragraph 3 (Special Operations Forces); and Article 7, paragraph 4 (Cabinet Ministers).

[48] G. Wood, "How the Finns Deter Russian Invasion", The Atlantic, 2 March 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/03/finlands-model-resisting-russian-aggression/623334/ [accessed: 3 March 2022].

[49] A. Åslund, "Why Vladimir Putin is losing the information war to Ukraine", Atlantic Council, 6 March 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/why-vladimir-putin-is-losing-the-information-war-to-ukraine/ [accessed: 7 March 2022].

[50] While this website is exceptionally well-produced, it is unclear if it was effective in arming the population with basic resistance information or if they could even access the site from within Ukraine. Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, National Resistance Center, Ukrainian Government, 2022, https://sprotyv.mod.gov.ua/ [accessed: 7 March 2022].

[51] E. Segal, "As Ukraine Resists Russian Invasion, Zelensky Demonstrates These Leadership Lessons", *Forbes*, 1 March 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/edwardsegal/2022/03/01/as-ukraine-resists-russian-invasion-zelenskyy-demonstrates-these-leadership-lessons/?sh=5d97b6e93837 [accessed: 2 March 2022]; D. Remnick, "Volodymyr Zelensky Leads the Defense of Ukraine with His Voice", *The New Yorker*, 14 March 2022, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/03/14/volodymyr-zelensky-leads-the-defense-of-ukraine-with-his-voice [accessed: 14 March 2022].

3) lack of overall civilian leadership of the R&R effort,

4) focus on overt and armed *resistance to invasion* over clandestine *resistance to occupation*, and

5) the failure of R&R to deter Russia from invading.

First, the legal framework did not clearly explain the integration of the designated elements – the territorial defence, the resistance movement, and the citizens for national resilience. Each is overseen by different elements of the military and government, with no clear overarching structure. Additionally, while it is apparent that the *resistance to invasion* – developed *in-extremis* – was effective, it is unclear if the law was passed and implemented in enough time for *resistance to occupation* to be developed.[52]

Second, there was no published continuity-of-government plan, no succession of leadership if the President of Ukraine is killed or captured, no GIE plan, or an explanation of the timing or when the SG elements within occupied territories would begin to operate or under what authorities to ensure the SG's legitimacy. The lack of a plan had the western powers scrambling to set conditions for a government-in-exile.[53] Having a published plan ensures the government, population, international community, and the adversary understand sovereignty will be retained, the government will continue through the GIE, the SG will run the day-to-day *resistance to occupation*, and the CG will ensure the population has basic services.

Third, the Ukrainian national resistance law does not have a clear overarching civilian control. Although it identifies the President as Commander in Chief followed by the Minister of Defence, this does not equate to civilian oversight, which should rest on legislators, or non-MOD civilian leaders to ensure legitimacy. Like all defence efforts, having civilian oversight is key, and in many ways, even more important when establishing a national resistance to ensure it is legitimate and cannot become a political tool in domestic politics.

Fourth, the resistance to date has been heavily focused on armed *resistance to invasion*, consisting primarily of overt civil-military militias, with few indicators of a parallel organised clandestine *resistance to occupation*. This may have been

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[52] Although the Ukrainian territorial defence forces (TDF) and non-TDF civil resistance should be more easily organised, even at scale, due to its inherent overtness, it was still developed *in-extremis*. Developing clandestine networks and infrastructure securely at scale takes significant time and effort. One can assume that unless there was already some of this done prior to the publication of the law, then it did not have time to develop. This will result in the Ukrainian underground developing along the lines of most historic *resistance to occupation* examples – under the pressure of the occupier.

[53] S. Harris, M. Birnbaum, J. Hudson, D. Lomothe, D. Stern, "U.S. and allies quietly prepare for Ukrainian government-in-exile and a long insurgency", *The Washington Post*, 5 March 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/03/05/russia-ukraine-insurgency/ [accessed: 5 February 2022].

impacted by the structure mentioned above that militarised the *resistance to invasion* at the cost of developing a viable and organized *resistance to occupation*. While the *resistance to invasion* is rightly focused on defeating the invasion, the *resistance to occupation* is critical should the first fail, especially for a country with no bilateral agreements. The focus on resisting the invasion presents three issues. The first, in a high-intensity fight, especially in urban areas, the overt resistance members, with very little tactical training, have a short life expectancy. The second issue, overt forces, which will also include remnants of the armed forces, will find it difficult to transition to clandestine resistance once the occupation is complete and the occupier begins a counter-resistance campaign.[54] The third issue is the loss of any legal protections for armed civilians. This is problematic in that it provides the invader an exploitable grey area to legally target civilian areas potentially if there are armed civilians "resisting" or mixed in with civilians.[55] Alternatively, developing an effective long-term *resistance to occupation* rests on the ability to develop and organise the URO at scale while ensuring the ambiguity of its members and their connections through clandestine form and function to make them hard to find, kill, or capture by the occupier.[56] Ambiguity is critical to protractedness – the ability of the *resistance to occupation* to survive for the period of the occupation, which could be years to decades.[57] If developed correctly, at the right scale, and with redundancy to survive counter-resistance operations, the URO can effectively wage a protracted resistance to maintain national will, impart costs on the occupier, degrade the political will of the occupier's population and government, and ideally set conditions for a large-scale conventional response to defeat the occupier and re-establish territorial integrity. In other words, win by not losing.[58] Lastly, despite all the efforts by the government of Ukraine and the West to increase Ukraine's capacity to resist

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[54] This is the harsh reality that many *resistance to invasion* members face due to the fatal mistake of the media writ large using full names and showing faces in open-source reporting leading up to the invasion and after. Additionally, one must assume that the military members, including SOF, were likely known to the Russians prior to the invasion and will be on target lists. The size and impact of these lists will be much greater than the names of key Ukrainian officials who were reportedly part of a Russian strategic target list that caused an uproar in the media. These types of target lists should be expected. The US and coalition had high-value individual list after the fall of Saddam's regime in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan which drove the initial counterinsurgency campaigns.

[55] R. Alcala, S. Szymanski, "Legal Status of Ukraine's Resistance Forces", Articles of War, Lieber Institute, West Point, 28 February 2022, https://lieber.westpoint.edu/legal-status-ukraines-resistance-forces/ [accesssed: 29 February 2022].

[56] D. Jones, *op. cit*., pp. 1–11.

[57] S. Metz, R. Millen, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21ˢᵗ Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2004, https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/1691.pdf [accessed: 12 January 2022], p. 15.

[58] D. Jones, *op. cit*., pp. 61–67.

an invasion, Russia was not deterred. Therefore, reimagining deterrence using R&R 2.0 requires reframing.[59]

R&R 2.0 as a deterrent

Developing and maintaining a pre-crisis URO at a scale is time- and resource-intensive, but much cheaper than other types of deterrence. However, like all deterrents, irregular deterrents must be viable and, in fact, deter action. Achieving deterrence through R&R by denial is feasible.[60] Knowing that a country has spent time and effort establishing these capabilities should cause a potential adversary to pause before invading. Why? Because occupiers rarely succeed against organised and determined populations as recent history has proven. Even major powers, like the US and the Soviet Union, learned hard lessons over the last 60 years as perceived or real invaders and occupiers respectively, against organised resistance.[61] The US failed to win in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The Soviet Union failed in Afghanistan and in the former Soviet states leading to the fall of the Soviet Union. In each case, the *resistance to occupation* developed ground-up, over time, and under pressure. The success of resistance against these major powers begs the question – would their strategic calculus have been different if the countries they occupied had organised R&R 2.0 at scale?

Given that there are no concrete real-world examples of an invader facing a URO established before an invasion, the closest modern historical comparisons are countries with inherent "high-clandestine" or "high-resistance" potential – a societal or cultural predisposition for organising resistance – in which the governments were overthrown, and the nations occupied.[62] Two recent examples stand out, Iraq and Afghanistan after 9/11, providing two case studies that challenge conventional characterisations

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[59] Reframing in this case requires the ability to cognitively transition from strategic, operational, to tactical levels in the same instance to develop novel approaches based on each nations' R&R requirements. Planners and policymakers alike need to think critically, holistically, and apply design thinking. This includes designing not just courses of action but alternative futures and then contingencies to address those futures. T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph*, New York, NY: First Anchors Book Edition, 1991, chapter 33.

[60] "Deterrence by denial strategies seek to deter an action by making it infeasible or unlikely to succeed, thus denying a potential aggressor confidence in attaining its objectives – deploying sufficient local military forces to defeat an invasion, for example." M. Mazarr, "Understanding Deterrence", *Perspectives*, RAND Corporation, 2018, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE295/RAND_PE295.pdf [accessed: 19 January 2022], pp. 2–3; NSHQ CDH, vol. I, p. 59.

[61] For clarification, Russia and China are the "revisionist powers" of the article title. The term "major powers" is used here to specifically describe the US and Soviets and to separate this lessons learned section from the overall focus on R&R 2.0 against revisionist powers.

[62] D. Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 89–91, footnote 125.

of occupiers and resistance.[63] First, prior to 2003, the Iraqi government and population were predisposed to operate clandestinely because Saddam Hussein had built a surveillance state using clandestine human intelligence networks – snitch networks at scale – down to the family level.[64] This clandestinely-skilled population, combined with a large number of former regime elements, quickly coalesced into a resistance organisation in which the clandestine nature was so good that experts were fooled into thinking it was a disorganised resistance in the early days of the insurgency.[65] This conflict lasted a decade, but by 2011, the US no longer had the political will and domestic support to continue. While not a clean example since the Iraqi government was theoretically functioning, the Iraqi resistance did cause the withdrawal of the "occupier" and set conditions for the rise of the Islamic State.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban lacked clandestine capacity at their fall in December of 2001 but had a cultural proclivity for guerrilla warfare from the start. While the US and coalition overthrew the Taliban, they were hardly defeated. Instead, they waged a protracted war. The Taliban realised that guerrilla warfare against the coalition was difficult at best, and due to the continued counterinsurgency pressure, began to organise clandestinely.[66] This included establishing a SG throughout Afghanistan with a GIE in Pakistan in preparation for their planned resurgence.[67] With battlefield suc-

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[63] Some readers may question the authors' labeling the US and the coalition in Iraq and Afghanistan as occupiers due to the characteristics of the enemy and our own biases. While the US and the coalition attempted to message that they were anything but occupiers, elements of the population and the enemy clearly perceived that the US and coalition were occupiers, and those the West would consider insurgents or terrorists believed they were the resistance. One does not have to agree with the characterisation, but the case studies are important because they provide useful lessons learned for R&R 2.0 and reestablishing deterrents given the resistance potential, size, tenacity, and longevity of both insurgencies despite intense counterinsurgency pressures, and the political outcomes in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The authors recognise that to understand the old cliché, "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" requires the reader to acknowledge, not necessarily agree, with the other's point of view.

[64] P. Kenyon, "Saddam's Spy Files: Key to Healing Or More Hurting", National Public Radio (NPR), 24 June 2010, https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127986894 [accessed: 21 January 2022]; I. al-Marashi, "Iraq's Security and Intelligence Network: A Guide and Analysis," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* (MERIA), vol. 6, no. 3, 2002, https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/meria/ali02_01.pdf [accessed: 21 January 2022], pp. 5–7; D. Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 89–91, footnote 125.

[65] B. Hoffman, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq", *Occasional Papers*, RAND Corporation, 2004, https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP127.html [accessed: 21 January 2022], pp. 16–18.

[66] G. Dorronsoro, *The Taliban's Winning Strategy in Afghanistan*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/taliban_winning_strategy.pdf [accessed: 12 February 2022], pp. 9–11, 27.

[67] M. Osman Tariq Elias, *The resurgence of the Taliban in Kabul: Logar and Wardak*, [in:] *Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field*, ed. A. Giustozzi, New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2009, pp. 50–54; D. Kilcullen, *Taliban and counter-insurgency in Kunar*, [in:] *ibidem*, p. 236; T. Farrell, "Unbeatable: Social Resources, Military Adaptation, and

cesses, the Taliban gained space to operate in larger formations they transitioned to a war of movement across Afghanistan and forced the West to withdraw. Once again, they succeeded over two decades simply winning by not losing, causing the coalition's domestic support to wane and resulting in political pressure to end the conflict. Given the outcomes from Iraq and Afghanistan, would an occupier be dissuaded from invading if faced with an established R&R 2.0 URO? Most likely. Realising this opportunity requires strategic reframing and strategic messaging to effectively establish R&R 2.0 as a recognised irregular deterrent[68].

Conclusion

The initial resistance lessons from Ukraine have highlighted the need for continued R&R assessment and improvements. This study proposed the next generation of R&R efforts, R&R 2.0. R&R 2.0 is a whole-of-nation, but government-led, large-scale URO authorised in legislation for full development in peacetime to conduct resistance to occupation and coerce, disrupt, or defeat an occupier in wartime. Strong R&R 2.0 programmes that are civilian-led, legitimate, understood fully by the population and participants, and strategically messaged to the revisionist powers help to establish or re-establish the power of deterrence of these irregular capabilities in conjunction with conventional and nuclear deterrents. Ideally, if all the above lessons are applied correctly, these programmes will be part of the resilience efforts of the nation, deterring aggression, and never being needed to resist an invasion or occupation.

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the Afghan Taliban",*Texas National Security Review*, vol. 1, issue 3, 2018, https://doi.org/10.15781/T22B8VW1N [accessed: 26 February 2022], pp. 58–75.

[68]   As the CDH states, "[i]f the [pre-crisis developed resistance organization] does not exist, it cannot deter [...]. [It] should be organized, trained and equipped before a crisis begins." NSHQ CDH, vol. I, p. 45.

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Resilience and Resistance 2.0: initial lessons of Ukraine and the implications of resilience and resistance efforts to deter and respond to invasion and occupation by revisionist powers
Abstract

Civil-defence resilience capacities focus on man-made threats to national security. While terror attacks like 9/11 drove civil-defence efforts throughout the 2000s, the Russian invasion of portions of Ukraine in 2014 forced nations to build resilience against new threats.

These included covert grey-zone and disinformation operations. Additionally, the 2014 events forced nations bordering or within the sphere of influence of revisionist nations to begin to prepare for possible invasion and occupation. Recognition of these threats resulted in two multinational doctrinal concepts that set the stage for what is collectively referred to as resilience and resistance (R&R). Resilience is the efforts by a nation prior to a conflict to build pre-crisis capacity to resist a host of threats, including invasion and occupation, in hopes of deterring threat actions. If deterrence fails, then the efforts transition into resistance to invasion and occupation. The Russian 2022 invasion of Ukraine demonstrated the need for R&R and the strengths and weaknesses of national resistance in action. This event is a strategic R&R inflection point. Nations developing R&R should reflect on and apply the lessons learned from Ukraine's efforts and ultimately establish R&R 2.0 as an irregular deterrent on par and mutually supporting conventional and nuclear deterrents.

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The resilience theorem as a new way to conceptualise security and defence

Introduction

The concept of resilience (Latin *rê-siliō* – jump back, bounce, pull back, contract) is particularly known in psychology, where it was adopted to denote special adaptive abilities.[1] It means the ability to adapt to time-varying conditions, and to the environment, as well as resistance to threats and the ability to regenerate. In psychology, the concept of resilience appeared in the 1970s. Initially, the lack of symptoms of psychopathology was considered resilience, and a little later, in the 1990s, this phenomenon began to be identified with adaptive behaviour and competence. It is a process involving effective human adaptation to environmental conditions unfavourable for human development. Thus, it is an adaptation profile or, in other words, a trajectory of the adaptation process.

The aim of this article is to present the meaning of the notional resilience category, to indicate the theoretical concepts that underlie attempts to formulate the resilience theory on the basis of social sciences, and to reflect on the need to develop the

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[1] See: P. Clough, D. Strycharczyk, *Developing Mental Toughness: Coaching Strategies to Improve Performance, Resilience and Wellbeing*, 2nd edition, London: Kogan Page, 2016 and S. Lewandowska-Akhvlediani, *Rezyliencja. Siła psychiczna lidera/liderki*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Alegoria, 2020.

concept of resilience in the field of security and defence. Thus, the article is of a contributory nature and refers mainly to current considerations in sociology and urban studies; and to a lesser extent – to the issue of defence and security of entire societies. Although, given the potential of the resilience theorem, there is an apparent need to develop studies in this area.

Resilience – etymology and meaning

The considered notional category of resilience has been present in the English language for a long time, as evidenced by the presence of this term in the old dictionaries of the English language. In the Oxford dictionary, resilience (as resilience as well as resiliency) is related to medicine and is defined as "the property of quick recovery" or as the property of materials and objects "quick recovery after being drawn out, squeezed or crushed."[2] Another dictionary defines resilience as "rebound action, flexibility."[3] On the other hand, in Roget's Thesaurus, which does not contain definitions of terms, resilience is related to such terms as "flexibility," "elasticity," "extensibility," but also renitence, that is the ability to resist.[4] In the Polish dictionary of the English language, resilience is defined, firstly, as a set of physical characteristics such as elasticity, bounce, and secondly, as medical properties, such as the ability to heal and resile.[5] From these brief etymological considerations, it is apparent that initially the term resilience referred to mechanics and medicine. However, it would be futile to look for this concept in the Polish universal encyclopaedia or even in dictionaries of foreign words, not to mention specialist dictionaries of defence, military, or national security terms. The concept of resilience is of the Anglo-Saxon origin, and in the context of Polish social sciences, it is only at an early stage of developing its theoretical foundations.

The conceptual category of resilience was later also applied to the functioning of entire systems, such as cities (urban resilience), societies (society resilience) and entire states (state resilience), as their response to various phenomena.[6] The concept of resilience has also appeared in management and business science in relation to an organisation's flexibility and adaptability. At the core of this new theoretical conceptualisation in science there are attempts to formulate a new approach to both the very

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2   Resilience [headword], [in:] A.S. Hornby, *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English*, with the assistance of A.P. Cowie, J. Windsor Lewis, 3rd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974.
3   Resilience [headword], [in:] *Home Study Dictionary,* London: Blackie Publisher, 1990.
4   P.M. Roget, *Thesaurus of English Words and Phrase*, Bridlington: Peter Haddock Ltd., 1966.
5   Resilience [headword], [in:] M. Szkutnik, *Podręczny słownik angielsko-polski*, Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna, 2001.
6   See more: B. Walker, D. Salt, *Resilience Thinking: Sustaining Ecosystems and People in a Changing World,* foreword by W.V. Reid, Washington: Island Press, 2006.

perception of threats and the ways of counteracting them. The new conceptualisation is based on various theoretical ideas, including complexity theory and chaos theory,[7] as well as the Los Angeles School of Urbanism.[8] The latter was established at the University of Southern California (USC). The discourse within this new trend in urban sociology and geography concerns three main topics, namely the spatial structure of cities, new industrialisation-urbanisation relations, and changes in social stratification in cities. Due to the specific urban development of Los Angeles, different from other American cities, in the last two decades of the previous century, systematic research into the process of transforming the spatial and social structure of the Californian metropolis was developed, which led to the conclusion that the processes initiated there were becoming precursors of the entire United States' urban transformation. The different spatial structures from the previous ones also constitute different challenges in the field of security and defence.

The rapid changes in the world that are taking place nowadays as a result of the digital revolution, globalisation processes, and others have resulted in criticism of the classical approach in social sciences, including the primacy of quantitative methods over qualitative methods, the domination of statistical analyses, and omnipresent reductionism. In the last decades of the previous century, there was a marked breakthrough with the development of anti-reductionist research approaches. Among other things, the concept of synergy, complexity theory, and chaos theory emerged. Any threats analysis allows to formulate a conclusion that crisis situations do not proceed in the same way every time. The general framework of the processes is similar, but the details and dynamics of their course differ significantly. Hence the use of the concept of complexity to define various phenomena, as Maciej Dombrowski states by asking the question whether it is a problem resulting only from human cognitive limitations, or whether complexity itself is characterized by a specific complexity, which by its very nature limits it or even prevents it from being adequately presented.[9]

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[7]   See: E.N. Lorenz, *The Essence of Chaos*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995; M. Tempczyk, *Teoria chaosu a filozofia*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo CiS in cooperation with Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii PAN, 1998; S.H. Strogatz, *Nonlinear Dynamics and Chaos: with application to physics, biology, chemistry, and engineering*, Cambridge, Mass.: Westview, [post 2006], 2002; *Chaos Theory in the Social Sciences: Foundations and Aplications*, eds. L.D. Kiel, E.W. Elliott, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2004.

[8]   See: M. Dear, *The Postmodern Urban Condition*, Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell Publisher, 2000; *From Chicago to L.A.: Making Sense of Urban Theory*, ed. *idem*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc., 2002; *idem*, "The Los Angeles School of Urbanism: An Intellectual History", *Urban Geography*, vol. 24, issue 6, 2003, pp. 493–509, https://doi.org/10.2747/0272-3638.24.6.493; E. Mertens, *Resilient City: Landscape Architecture for Climate Change*, Berlin – Boston: Birkhäuser, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1515/9783035622652.

[9]   M. Dombrowski, "Złożona natura złożoności", *Diametros*, no. 36, 2013, pp. 47–61; see also *Chaos and Complexity Theory in the Social Sciences*, eds. Ş.Ş. Erçetin, H. Bağcı, Hershey: IGI Global, 2016.

The turn of the 21st century resulted in the development of the complex systems concept, which is reflected, among others, in the creation of the Santa Fe Institute. In turn, the chaos theory was developed on the basis of exact sciences. The foundations for the theory were created by Edward Lorenz, who analysed weather forecasting models and introduced the term "butterfly effect" to describe a small change on the microscale of a given system in the initial phase and which, over time, results in huge and previously unforeseen changes on the macroscale.[10] Chaotic phenomena and processes are ubiquitous and common, while deterministic processes are exceptions or only our conceptualisations resulting from the need to simplify real processes. The above-mentioned emergence of new concepts within various disciplines of science expresses the global trend of searching for a new paradigm of describing a complex and rapidly changing world, which becomes in fact incomprehensible and unpredictable if old concepts are still used for describing, explaining, and forecasting it. Hence emerged the attempt to use the category of resilience instead of, or rather in addition to the category of city security. However, the very concept of resilience cannot yet be called a scientific theory in social sciences, including security sciences. It seems that at the present stage of conceptualisation and attempts to formulate the theory, one should rather adopt the definition of the resilience theorem.[11] The concept of theorem means an organised set of commonly accepted theorems that will appear in various concepts of resilience and in various sciences. Attempts at creating a uniform theoretical approach and finding common theoretical foundations for various concepts based on various scientific disciplines may lead to cognitively and methodologically interesting results.

Security and resilience

With the development of civilisation, and especially with the development of urbanisation and the intensity of globalisation processes, the scale of various threats has changed, because – which appears to be a truism – quantitative changes entail qualitative changes, and some phenomena are emergent in nature. Contemporary social processes seem to be governed by the laws of large numbers, and as Stanisław Lem expressed it in one of his books: "we live in such a [...] randomly dense world. In the molecular human gas, chaotic and astonishingly unbelievable [...] this is a world where yesterday's extraordinary becomes today's banality and today's extreme – tomorrow's norm."[12] In the era of globalisation that poses new challenges

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[10]   E.N. Lorenz, *op. cit.*

[11]   See: R. Borkowski, Definiowanie demokracji, [in:] *Demokracja. Teoria. Idee. Instytucje*, eds. T. Biernat, A. Siwik, Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2000, pp. 11–30.

[12]   S. Lem, *Katar*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1978, pp. 102–103; see also I. Stewart, *Czy Bóg gra w Kości? Nowa matematyka chaosu*, transl. M. Tempczyk, W. Komar, Warszawa: WN PWN, 1994; R. Borkowski, Świat aleatoryczny (rozważania o terroryzmie w perspektywie

for governments; views which so far have been beyond the mainstream of security sciences may gain considerable significance for the implementation of an effective security and defence policy. Michał Snopek emphasises that in order to ensure security, both internal and international, the authorities are forced to depart from the previously used paradigms.[13] The pre-existing ones often turn out to be in fact dysfunctional, leading to making decisions that result in spending huge financial outlays while achieving little significant effects.[14] An increase in outlays, for example on rescue or combating crime, brings an increase in effects only up to a certain point. It is known from both the theory of systems and ecology that after a period of dynamic growth there is stagnation or only a slight increase in the effects, achieved with disproportionate efforts and costs. Only persistent action according to well-established patterns turns out to be fruitless, ineffective, costly, and obtains a negative image in society.

Today's threats of war, terrorism, or riots, as well as the ongoing climate change, concern cities to the greatest extent. Metropolitan safety is a complex issue of managing public, anti-terrorist, sanitary, and environmental safety. Population density makes cities particularly vulnerable to the effects of military attacks, catastrophes, and climate change. Examples of city damage resulting from earthquakes (Japan), hurricanes (United States) or hostilities (Ukraine) illustrate this clearly. Increasing urbanisation causes the Earth to transform into a "globalopolis", i.e., a city-planet from the end of the 20th century.[15] At the beginning of the last century, cities were inhabited by 10% of humanity; currently – by about 60%; and in 2050, the urbanisation rate of the world is expected to be 80%. The network of big cities continues to expand with the simultaneous process of rural decline in many countries and the increasing contrasts between rural areas and monstrously large cities (Shanghai, Jakarta, Lagos, Mexico, Cairo, Sao Paulo). The space of great metropolises is divided into enclaves of wealth and luxury as well as ghettos of poverty and crime. Armed conflicts, organised crime and criminal terrorism, terrorism, and street riots are still present in urban space in many parts of the globe. The necessity to ensure protection and defence against these threats causes the spatial structures of cities to evolve towards ensuring the safety of their inhabitants, which was already defined

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analizy ryzyka), [in:] *Terroryzm. Anatomia zjawiska*, ed. K. Liedel, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar/Collegium Civitas Press, 2006, pp. 129–145.

[13] M. Snopek, "Teoria chaosu jako narzędzie badawcze w naukach o bezpieczeństwie / Chaos Theory as a Research Tool in Security Studies", *Bezpieczeństwo i Technika Pożarnicza*, vol. 47, issue 3, 2017, pp. 78–89, https://doi.org/10.12845/bitp.47.3.2017.6.

[14] M. Mazurek, *Zarządzanie bezpieczeństwem jako dysfunkcja systemu władzy*, Warszawa: Difin, 2014.

[15] R. Borkowski, Globalizacja, cywilizacja, ponowoczesność, [in:] *Globalopolis Kosmiczna wioska: szanse i zagrożenia*, ed. *idem*, Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy PAX, 2003, pp. 7–28.

by Oscar Newman as "defensible space" half a century ago.[16] Today, the terms "urbanisation sensitised to security", and even "urbanisation of fear" and "military urbanisation" are also used. In the area of metropolitan security policy, appropriate urban and architectural planning (Crime Prevention Through Environment Design, CPTED) has been used for a long time, especially in Israel, and video surveillance is being developed in conjunction with biometric identification techniques, especially in China. Projects of this type are primarily intended to counteract terrorist threats and street crime.

The change in the nature of threats in the 21st century means that instead of the term "city security" ("urban safety" and "urban security"), the term "urban resilience" is increasingly used in the sociology of the city and in security sciences, which can be defined as regenerative ability or responsiveness.[17] In one of the latest Polish monographs in the field of urban studies, the authors define a resilient city as characterized by stability, the ability to quickly and effectively adapt as well as to rebuild in an emergency and after experiencing the effects of a threat. Thus, the new conceptual model of the city is therefore to be characterized by sustainability, intelligence and resilience.[18]

Moreover, in relation to the development of defence concepts, the military theorists of NATO have used this conceptual category for some time.[19] The introduction of the conceptual resilience category is in fact a recognition that it is not possible to provide full security in the way understood so far. The resilience category has been included in the city safety index in the global metropolis ranking since 2019.[20] The consequence of coming to terms with the threatening situation is the awareness that it is only possible to respond more or less effectively to disasters, catastrophes, and crises, and therefore to direct anti-crisis measures to minimising the number of victims. Resilience, understood essentially as city resilience, can be defined as the measurable ability of any city system to maintain business continuity against all shocks, crises, and stresses, while positively adjusting and transforming towards sustainable development. The city is treated as a self-adapting network

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[16] O. Newman, *Defensible Space. Crime Prevention through Urban Design*, New York: Macmillan, 1972.

[17] See more: *Urban Resilience in a Global Context. Actors, Narratives, and Temporalities*, eds. D. Brantz, A. Sharma, Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2020; J. Coaffee, P. Lee, *Urban Resilience. Planning for Risk, Crisis and Uncertainty*, London: Red Globe PR, 2016.

[18] A. Wojewnik-Filipkowska, A. Gierusz, P. Krauze-Maślanka, *Fundamentalna siła miasta. Synteza koncepcji zrównoważonego, inteligentnego i odpornego miasta*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo CeDeWu 2021, s. 64–76.

[19] T. Prior, "NATO: Pushing Boundaries for Resilience", *CSS Analysis in Security Policy*, no. 213, 2017.

[20] P. Kielstra, *Safe cities index 2021. New Expectations Demand a New Coherence. A Report*, The Economist Intelligence Unit, London 2021.

system. The academic discourse on urban resilience focuses on three main types of threats: climate change, natural disasters, and terrorist threats. Resilience can be considered as the ability of a system or organisation to adapt to the consequences of a catastrophic event of various origins. The conceptualisation of resilience can be illustrated by the following triad:

RESILIENCE	RESISTANCE	RECONSTRUCTION

or as:

RESILIENCE	DEFENCE	RESTORATION
RESILIENCE	RESCUE	RECOVERY

Conclusions

1. New challenges related to the rapidly occurring civilisation changes require new theoretical concepts which should be the basis for developing the concept of defence and security. The purpose of the new doctrines is to prepare the state, the armed forces, and society in an adequate and effective manner to the changing challenges and threats.

2. The concept of resilience is, in fact, a departure from the modernist security paradigm based on centralisation, hierarchisation, and cost-maximisation. It expresses new trends in breaking old paradigms of thinking about security, stability, and crisis management.

3. The current state of development of the resilience conceptualisation in social sciences in relation to defence allows us to conclude that for the time being it is a theorem, and therefore a beginning of the creation of a theoretical concept. The concept of society and state resilience should be developed on the basis of American sociology achievements and city geography, since it was developed on the basis of these sciences as an expression of new way of thinking about metropolitan security.

4. Finally, resilience can be considered as the ability of a system or organisation (society, city, state) to adapt to the consequences of a catastrophic event of various origins. This is, however, nothing more than the concept of a self-adaptive system. Adaptation, known in sociology and management science, is the process of adapting (individuals, groups, societies) to functioning in a changed environment (natural, social, military, etc.), including a transformation of the internal structure and methods of operation. Societies that show adaptability can survive and thrive. On the other hand, societies that have not developed such abilities are doomed to failure, regression, and even destruction. History has provided numerous examples of both types of society.

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The resilience theorem as a new way to conceptualise security and defence
Abstract

Resilience is a relatively new conceptual category used when considering security and defence. It means adaptability, resistance to threats, flexibility of response, and the ability to regenerate. The term resilience has been present in English for a long time, as evidenced by the presence of this term in old dictionaries of the English language. Originally, its meaning related to medicine and mechanics, a bit later – to human psychology, and today it has extended to the issues of resilience of cities, societies, and entire countries. An attempt at applying this new conceptualisation is associated with the recognition that the current security paradigm is losing its relevance in a rapidly changing and complex world. The changing scale of threats makes it necessary to search for new theoretical foundations for creating an effective defence policy. However, the theory of resilience has not yet been fully formulated, at best, only its theorem has. The aim of this article is to present the significance of this conceptual category, to indicate the theoretical concepts underlying this conceptualisation in social sciences, and to reflect on the value of the concept of resilience for security and defence.

Key words: resilience, resistance, security, theorem, complexity, catastrophes

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Cognitive Warfare: what is our actual knowledge and how to build state resilience?

> If you know the enemy and know yourself,
> you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.
> *Sun Tzu*

Introduction

The findings from the Polish Armed Forces project of strategic analysis NUP 2X35 indicate that "the contemporary security environment is becoming more and more volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous. At the same time, there is a deficit of understanding of the security environment, which results, among others, from the interpenetration of military and civilian aspects, the development of new technologies and globalisation processes and their multi-faceted consequences."[1] What is more, nowadays, the emergence of the new multipolar world order and increasing

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[1]   J. Mokrzycki, R. Reczkowski, S. Cieśla, Foreward, [in:] *Security Environment Out To 2035 – NUP 2X35: The Polish Perspective*, eds. *eidem*, Bydgoszcz: Doctrine and Training Centre of the Polish Armed Forces, 2020, p. 5.

competition among nations for their strategic positions in this new order are being observed. Besides traditional diplomatic and economic competition, this rivalry is more and more often conducted within the political and military dimensions of the security environment, where not only physical domains but also human cognition become an arena of rivalry.

According to the NATO official categorisation, there are five operational domains, i.e., land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. For these officially recognised domains, strategic assumptions and operational concepts, as well as doctrines and tactical procedures have been developed. Nevertheless, none of these domains covers the battle space responsible for winning "hearts and minds." As noticed by Todd Schmidt, already "Chinese strategist and philosopher Sun Tzu[2] believed that wars are won through intelligence, information, and deception; attacking enemies where they are least prepared; and breaking resistance and subduing adversaries indirectly without fighting."[3] In consequence, cognitive studies and the cognitive domain of the operational environment become a focal point of contemporary warfare.

According to Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Vincent R. Stewart, former chief of the U.S. Defence Intelligence Agency, cognitive operations have become reality and will be the fifth-generation warfare.[4] Cognitive operations are of particular importance for countries, which conduct ideological penetration for strengthening morale and unity and for developing operational capabilities of their own forces, or for hampering morale, unity and operational capabilities of opposing parties. As confirmed by the studies conducted, among others, by Doctrine and Training Centre of the Polish Armed Forces, acquiring information and shaping decisional space before and during a conflict is a key success factor in contemporary conflicts. That is why it is predicted that in future war the struggle "for hearts and minds" may be won or lost without firing a single shot, even before a losing party realises that its interests are endangered – see the case of the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Consequently, subject matter experts (SMEs) indicate that cognitive warfare is first and foremost focused on changing perception which triggers human behaviours. What is important, perception is an outcome of cognition, which makes a kind of a "mechanism" being a target for a potential aggressor.

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[2]   Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 12 November 2018.

[3]   T. Schmidt, "The Missing Domain of War: Achieving Cognitive Overmatch on Tomorrow's Battlefield", Modern War Institute, 4 July 2020, https://mwi.usma.edu/missing-domain-war-achieving-cognitive-overmatch-tomorrows-battlefield [accessed: 13 January 2022].

[4]   K. Underwood, "Cognitive Warfare Will Be Deciding Factor in Battle", *SIGNAL*, 15 August 2017, https://www.afcea.org/content/cognitive-warfare-will-be-deciding-factor-battle [accessed: 19 December 2021]; "For the Greater Good: Reflections on Legacy with Vincent Stewart", DIA Public Affairs, 24 February 2022, https://www.dia.mil/News-Features/Articles/Article-View/Article/2945317/for-the-greater-good-reflections-on-legacy-with-vincent-stewart [accessed: 27 February 2022].

The aim of the paper is to identify and explore the key assumptions of cognitive warfare. The research process is focused on the following study questions: (1) What are the characteristics of cognitive warfare? (2) How can cognitive operations build an advantage over a competitor? (3) How to build resilience to cognitive operations?

The analysis is based on the data collected with the use of the method of narrative literature review. The authors are aware of the limitations resulting from the methodological shortcomings of this method.[5] Nevertheless, due to a very limited number of sources, a systematic literature review[6] was not possible. The search for publications indexed in the Scopus database and including the phrase "cognitive warfare" in their titles, conducted as of 19 April 2022, resulted in finding only one publication.[7] Extending the scope of the search to titles, keywords, and abstracts brought about one more item; however, irrelevant for the purpose of the study. Thus, narrative literature review, which is considered to be very relevant for studying scant and emerging research fields, was chosen as a method of collecting data for analysis. Moreover, the authors' participatory observations and lessons from national and international military research projects contributed to understanding and discussing the gist of cognitive warfare.

Results

Defining cognitive warfare

The outcomes of cognitive studies indicate numerous attempts to define cognitive warfare both in the civilian academia and in the military. Nevertheless, there is still no commonly accepted definition which could become the foundation of doctrinal assumptions or procedures for the entities of the national security system.

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[5]   D. Tranfield, D. Denyer, P. Smart, "Towards a Methodology for Developing Evidence-informed Management Knowledge by Means of Systematic Review", *British Journal of Management*, vol. 14, issue 3, 2003, pp. 207–222, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8551.00375; W. Czakon, "Metodyka systematycznego przeglądu literatury", *Przegląd Organizacji*, no. 3, 2011, pp. 57–61, https://doi.org/10.33141/po.2011.03.13.

[6]   D.J. Cook, C.D. Mulrow, R.B. Haynes, "Systematic Reviews: Synthesis of Best Evidence for Clinical Decisions", *Annals of Internal Medicine*, vol. 126, issue 5, 1997, pp. 376–380, https://doi.org/10.7326/0003-4819-126-5-199703010-00006; A. Booth, D. Papaioannou, A. Sutton, *Systematic Approaches to a Successful Literature Review*, London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2012; Z. Mazur, A. Orłowska, "Jak zaplanować i przeprowadzić systematyczny przegląd literatury", *Polskie Forum Psychologiczne*, vol. 23, no. 2, 2018, pp. 235–251, https://doi.org/10.14656/PFP20180202.

[7]   R.A. Landes, Orientalism as Caliphator Cognitive Warfare: Consequences of Edward Saïd's Defense of the Orient, [in:] *Handbook of Research on Contemporary Approaches to Orientalism in Media and Beyond*, vol. 1, eds. I. Tombul, G. Sari, Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 2021, pp. 33–52, https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-7180-4ch003.

In order to understand cognitive warfare, it is first necessary to define the term "cognition" which is associated with human mind. Human brain operates all the time as it incessantly absorbs, transforms, plans, orders and remembers data, information, and knowledge. As noticed by an established cognitive researcher Daniel Kahneman, in a day-to-day routine, this activity is not recognised. This is only one aspect of complex cognitive processes. Cognition is thinking, which encompasses processes connected with perception, knowledge, problem solving, assessment, language, and memory. Cognitive researchers try to understand the way in which humans integrate, organise, and use conscious cognitive experiences without recognising subconscious operations of the brain.[8] Thus, the area where cognitive warfare is conducted (in some documents defined as a "cognitive domain") consists of "perception and reasoning in which manoeuvre is achieved by exploiting the information environment to influence interconnected beliefs, values, and culture of individuals, groups, and/or populations."[9]

The aforementioned characteristics of cognition and a cognitive domain constitute the foundation for defining cognitive warfare. For instance, Richard A. Landes describes cognitive warfare as "warfare undertaken by the weak side in an asymmetrical conflict, manipulation of information and ideas designed to convince the stronger side not to use its superior strength, to make patriots of one's own and pacifists of the enemy, to redeploy in order to better fight the kinetic (military) war."[10] In a similar way, Zac Rogers points out that "cognitive warfare is not only an attack on what we think. It is an attack on our way of thinking."[11] Paul Ottewell defines cognitive warfare as "manoeuvres in the cognitive domain to establish a predetermined perception among a target audience in order to gain advantage over another party."[12] In turn, Oliver Backes and Andrew Swab understand cognitive warfare as "a strategy that focuses on altering [through information means,] how a target population thinks – and through that how it acts."[13] Analysing the context of the Russian influence on elections in the Baltic states, they indicate that the main aim of cognitive warfare is "[...] to undermine or shape domestic political processes by changing mindsets," and that "cognitive warfare weaponizes information

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[8]   D. Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, [cop. 2011], pp. 18–20.

[9]   P. Ottewell, "Defining the Cognitive Domain", *Over The Horizon*, 7 December 2020, https://othjournal.com/2020/12/07/defining-the-cognitive-domain [accessed: 11 January 2022].

[10]   R.A. Landes, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

[11]   Z. Rogers, "In the Cognitive War – The Weapon is You!", The Mad Scientist Laboratory blog, 1 July 2019, https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/158-in-the-cognitive-war-the-weapon-is-you [accessed: 27 December 2021].

[12]   P. Ottewell, *op. cit*.

[13]   O. Backes, A. Swab, *Cognitive Warfare. The Russian Threat to Election Integrity in the Baltic States*, Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2019, p. 8.

to persuade or confuse populations and shift public opinion, often tapping into real divisions in Baltic societies to drive wedges between the state and potentially sympathetic populations."[14]

The aforementioned definitions and opinions point out that the objective of cognitive warfare is to influence and/or destabilise a competitor through a change in human thinking and behaviours. However, it is highlighted that the ultimate aim is to achieve some advantage (e.g. mental, psychological, or informational advantage) over another party. Summing up, the aim of cognitive warfare is to achieve a change in behaviours of the target audience through a cognitive process favourable to an attacking state (or a non-state actor). Therefore, as rightly observed by a Norwegian researcher Lea Kristina Bjørgul, the aim of cognitive warfare is the same as in other types of warfare, i.e., to impose the will on the other state. As stated by Bjørgul "this is in line with one of the main elements of Clausewitz's definition of war: '...an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will' [...]. According to Clausewitz, war is conducted for some second-order purpose. States do not go to war simply to commit violence, but to impose their will upon other states."[15]

Gaining advantage through cognitive warfare

As noticed by military experts, in spite of some similarities, there are significant differences between operations in a cognitive domain and other physical operational domains, such as land, sea, air, and space. Firstly, cognitive warfare is non-kinetic warfare. Thus, in a cognitive domain it is possible to win without using conventional power. Such an effect may be achieved, e.g., by informational influence on a potential adversary changing perception before the opposing party realises that its interests are endangered. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that cases of changes in human perception resulting from the use of micro-wave weapons, which cause damages to the brain and hamper cognitive processes, have already been noted.[16]

Therefore, it should be highlighted that human minds become the battlefield in cognitive warfare and the consequence of this struggle is a change in what humans think and how they think and act. This struggle is taken up in order to shape and influence individual and team beliefs and behaviours, and consequently, contribute to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical aims and objectives of an aggressor. In its extreme form, cognitive warfare shows potential to polarise and divide the whole society, resulting in hampering or even destroying collective will of the society to resist

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[14]   *Ibidem.*

[15]   L.K. Bjørgul, "Cognitive Warfare and the Use of Force", *Stratagem*, 3 November 2021, https:// www.stratagem.no/cognitive-warfare-and-the-use-of-force [accessed: 15 December 2021].

[16]   S.L. Myers, J. Perlez, "U.S. Diplomats Evacuated in China as Medical Mystery Grows", *New York Times*, 6 June 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/06/world/asia/china-guangzhou-consulate-sonic-attack.html [accessed: 12 February 2022].

the aggressor's intention. In such a case, an attacking party may take control over the society without using force or coercion.

The objectives of cognitive warfare may be both limited to short periods of time and long-term and strategic with campaigns conducted for several years or even decades. A single campaign may be concentrated on a particular objective, e.g., preventing the conduct of a strategic manoeuvre in accordance with a plan or enforcing a change in social behaviours. Other campaigns may be conducted in order to disrupt the functioning of societies or allies in the long-term perspective, e.g., by sowing doubts about legitimacy and effectiveness of governments, hampering democratic processes, triggering social unrest, or inciting separatist movements.

As observed by researchers from John Hopkins University and Imperial College London conducting their studies under the supervision of Lawrence Aronhime and Alexander Cocron, "today, cognitive warfare integrates cyber, information, psychological, and social engineering capabilities to achieve its ends. It takes advantage of the internet and social media to target influential individuals, specific groups, and large numbers of citizens selectively and serially in a society. It seeks to sow doubt, to introduce conflicting narratives, to polarise opinion, to radicalise groups, and to motivate them to acts that can disrupt or fragment an otherwise cohesive society. And the widespread use of social media and smart device technologies in Alliance member countries may make them particularly vulnerable to this kind of attack."[17]

How to build resilience?

Cognitive warfare may influence any aspect of the functioning of societies. What is more, operations in the cognitive domain are usually associated with long-lasting, unlimited war in the "grey zone" (i.e., below the threshold of an armed conflict). In this context, such operations attack the social capital of a nation, which results in questioning defensive actions and influences attitudes and reactions to the aggressor's provocations. It should be highlighted that cognitive warfare cannot be limited to information operations, social engineering, or a struggle for "hearts and minds," but it should be extended to all areas of activity of individuals and societies, where ideological attacks are possible.

In order to build state resilience, it should first and foremost be taken into account that nowadays cognitive operations are of particular interest to some non-democratic states which may use them as an element of rivalry against Western societies. Their operations will usually be conducted below the threshold of NATO's Article 5 and below the violence level necessary to convince the United Nations Security Council

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17   K. Cao, S. Glaister, A. Pena, D. Rhee, W. Rong, A. Rovalino, S. Bishop, R. Khanna, J.S. Saini, "Countering Cognitive Warfare: Awareness and Resilience", *NATO Review*, 20 May 2021, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/05/20/countering-cognitive-warfare-awareness-and-resilience/index.html [accessed: 16 December 2021].

to enact the resolution (unless new "red lines" for those countries are drawn, crossing of which will result in an open conflict). Consequently, in the contemporary era of rivalry of powers, cognitive operations will be permanently employed by these powers (and also by some other nations) to achieve their own objectives. Thus, Poland may expect some challenges and threats to its security, originating from cognitive warfare operations of potential competitors. In order to mitigate the effects of these challenges and threats, and to increase a state's resilience in the cognitive domain, the following actions are worth considering:

- conducting analytical studies in order to develop situational (operational) awareness, recognise risks and their consequences for the national security, as well as to be able to differentiate facts from opinions, the truth from falsity, and evidence from presumptions;
- changing perception of threats to the state security because numerous threats will originate from adversary's actions below the threshold of an open armed conflict ("grey zone") and will be connected with its influence on society;
- increasing effectiveness of strategic communications (StratCom) through combining all activities of Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, InfoOps, and PsyOps, and coordinating them at the political-strategic level;
- making efforts to understand the desired end state of adversary's operation in the context of ambiguity of conflicts in the "grey zone";
- impeding cognitive warfare of an adversary to prevent achieving the expected reaction of the target audience;
- avoiding mistakes in setting the limits of accepted risks ("red lines") for a potential competitor;
- conducting continuous assessment of own susceptibility in all dimensions of PMESII, as well as assessing advancement and advantages of a potential competitor in these dimensions;
- employing new technologies (e.g., AI, Big Data) in order to gain advantage in cognitive operations, including capability to counteract this type of attacks.

Discussion and Conclusions

As noticed by Marie-Pierre Raymond from Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC), the processes of digitalisation have opened new opportunities for a potential adversary to conduct operations in the "grey zone," below the threshold of an armed conflict. Cognitive operations employing "social media, social networking, social messaging, and mobile device technologies" show high potential to influence "information, beliefs, values, and cultures." Thus, narrative wars, which focus on manipulating and controlling human reactions to information, in

some circumstances may replace conventional wars.[18] Cognitive warfare may be conducted with the use of a variety of methods and means. Nowadays, a widespread use of social media platforms enables state and non-state rivals to attack individuals, selected groups, or even whole societies through messaging, influencing social media, selective sharing of documents and video files, etc. Moreover, cyber operations capabilities enable them to hack and track individuals or social networks. Analyses point out that advantage in cognitive warfare, at least in the first stage of confrontation, will be most likely achieved by the first mover, i.e., a party choosing the time, location, and means of cognitive operations.

Taking into account the use of the aforementioned methods and means, building resilience to cognitive warfare starts with understanding its gist and recognising its characteristics. Next steps include discovering when a cognitive campaign is conducted as well as identifying its origins, aims, and the parties engaged.[19] Nevertheless, it is necessary to be aware that:

- cognitive operations are usually covert operations, which closely relate to the so-called war of ideology, but they are rarely connected with a direct confrontation or kinetic actions;
- failure in counteracting cognitive warfare attacks and building sustainable and proactive capability to act in a cognitive domain may result in inevitability of engaging in a kinetic conflict;
- kinetic capabilities may be a decisive factor in rivalry; however, long-term outcomes are greatly dependent on the capability to influence the cognitive domain.

Summing up, the study has identified and explored the key assumptions of cognitive warfare. In response to the first study question concerning the characteristics of cognitive warfare and having analysed a variety of definitions and opinions, we assume that the objective of cognitive warfare is to influence and/or destabilise a competitor through a change in human thinking and behaviours in order to achieve advantage (including mental, psychological or informational advantage) over another party. In response to the second study question, we realise that cognitive operations build an advantage over a competitor by changing what humans think and how they think and act, shaping and influencing individual and team beliefs and behaviours, and consequently, contributing to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical aims and objectives of an attacking party. Cognitive warfare integrates a variety of means including cyber, information, psychological, and social engineering capabilities. Cognitive operations may be targeted at individuals, specific groups, and whole societies. They range from short-term tactical operations

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[18]   Government of Canada, "Defending Canada Against Cognitive Warfare", 22 November 2021, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/defence/2021/11/defending-canada-cognitive-warfare.html [accessed: 11 January 2022].

[19]   K. Cao, S. Glaister, A. Pena, D. Rhee, W. Rong, A. Rovalino, S. Bishop, R. Khanna, J.S. Saini, *op. cit.*

to long-term strategic campaigns. In response to the third study question, we identify a catalogue of recommended actions aimed at building and strengthening resilience to cognitive operations. They include conducting analytical studies in order to develop situational awareness, changing perception of threats to state security, increasing effectiveness of strategic communications (StratCom), recognising real end state of an adversary's operations, developing capabilities to impede potential cognitive operations of an adversary, analysing own vulnerabilities on a continuous basis, and employing emerging and disruptive technologies to strengthen own capabilities.

When discussing the findings of the study, its methodological limitations should be taken into account. Firstly, due to the theoretical character of the article, the method of literature review was the means to achieve the aim of the study. Nevertheless, there was no triangulation with any other method of study, which should be considered as a weakness of the adopted methodology. Secondly, as already mentioned, cognitive warfare is still an emerging stream of research, and very scant literature is available. Consequently, the employment of a systematic literature review as a method of study was not possible and the method of narrative literature review, showing a lower level of scientific rigor, was used.

Taking into account the findings of our analysis, cognitive warfare seems to be an interesting and emerging research stream in security studies. Therefore, some lines of further research are worth mentioning. Firstly, a growing number of theoretical publications discussing the assumptions and characteristics of cognitive warfare and cognitive operations lays foundations for studies employing heuristic methods (known in NATO as alternative analysis or ALTA methods) in order to identify and categorise manifestations of cognitive operations, their techniques and instruments as well as relationships with operations conducted in other operational domains. Secondly, developing possible models of an escalation ladder or an escalation matrix in the cognitive domain and later testing them, e.g., with the use of wargaming methodology, open new opportunities for operationalising the cognitive domain. Thirdly, analysing case studies and lessons from the conduct of cognitive operations in military exercises and their employment in real-life competition below the threshold of an armed conflict constitutes the next recommended line of prospective research on cognitive warfare.

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Cognitive Warfare: what is our actual knowledge and how to build state resilience?

Abstract

Contemporary national security systems face many challenges related to the changes taking place in the security and operating environments. Cognitive warfare, listed as one of such challenges, is often described as "the struggle for hearts and minds" because in cognitive warfare it is the human mind that becomes the battlefield. The aim of the paper is to identify and explore the key assumptions of cognitive warfare. The research process is focused on the following study questions: (1) What are the characteristics of cognitive warfare? (2) How can cognitive operations build an advantage over a competitor? (3) How to build resilience to cognitive operations? The analysis is based on the data collected with the use of the method of narrative literature review. Moreover, the authors' participatory observations and lessons from national and international military research projects contributed to understanding and discussing the gist of cognitive warfare.

Key words: cognitive warfare, cognitive domain, security environment, awareness, resilience

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Total Defence in a consumer society: a real possibility or wishful thinking? The case study of Sweden

Introduction

The general feeling that emerged after the end of the Cold War in the broadly under-stood West can be described as euphoria. The collapse of the Soviet Union encour-aged the belief that history had come to an end. The essay of an American political scientist of Japanese origin entitled *The End of History and the Last Man*[1] was thus perfectly consistent with the expectations of both the ruling elites and the broader public. There was very strong pressure to quickly consume the dividends of peace and victory. This should be understood not only as the allocation of the resources so far consumed by the defence and security sector to other purposes, but above all, as the emergence of a conviction about the need of a significant reduction or even elimination of the risk of a nuclear war. Generations brought up in the shadow of

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[1]   F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York – Toronto: Free Press – Maxwell Macmillan Canada, [cop. 1992].

MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) wanted to enjoy a very high standard of living without the spectre of the nuclear threat. The above issue needs to be clearly emphasised as a large group of researchers seem not to notice it and evaluate the decisions made in many countries after the end of the Cold War only in terms of short-sightedness, naivety, or even stupidity combined with a cynical desire to monetise peace. They are trying to play the same music also after 24 February 2022, i.e., after the outbreak of war in Ukraine.

This paper deals with two main scholarly areas: social sciences and security sciences. The main aim is to present short the fundamental dilemma of modern society, i.e. the impossibility to simultaneously maintain a high standard of living and a high level of defence readiness. Moreover, such threats to the defence system as an increase in the average age of the population and the breakdown of the ethnic and cultural cohesion of societies have not been sufficiently defined. The authors present these issues as research problems in the field of security sciences, which need to be addressed urgently. In Polish conditions, their rank is determined both by the war in the East and, above all, by the influx of over 2 million refugees. The above-mentioned problems have ceased to have a purely academic dimension and have gained key utilitarian significance. When preparing the article, selected methods in the field of social sciences were used, subordinated to the analysis of a case study (specifically, the civil defence component of the Swedish defence system). The historical method, institutional and legal analyses as well as the study of demographic data were employed here.

The return of history

The radical change in the situation brought about by the return of the Russian Federation to its imperial policy has dramatically altered this situation. The Kingdom of Sweden is also included among the countries threatened to a varying degree. Sweden does not border directly with Russia, but in Stockholm there is a deep conviction that the danger is real. It is interesting to note that in the Swedish case, the peace cure was relatively short-lived because as late as at the turn of 2012, the then-Chief of Defence, General Sverker Göranson, initiated a broad public discussion about the country's ability to deal with the new threats.[2] This was one of the steps leading to a fundamental reorientation of the defence policy, which found its clearest expression in the

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[2]   Quoted after: "Szwedzka armia nie jest przygotowana na obronę. 'Nie utrzymałaby się nawet przez tydzień'", Onet.pl, 5 February 2013, http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/swiat/szwedzka-armia-nie-jest-przygotowana-na-obrone-nie-utrzymalaby-sie-nawet-przez/ep9yx   [accessed: 18 May 2022]. One gets the impression that this was a carefully prepared social engineering ploy aimed at arousing certain social emotions and preparing the ground for other actions. It should be noted that despite the unprecedented nature of his statement and the enunciation of the then-Attorney General Tomas Lindstrand that the General could reveal state secrets and harm Sweden, Göranson remained in office until the end of his term and only handed over his duties to Air Force General Per Micael Bydén on 11 September 2015.

state's spending. In April 2015, a non-partisan agreement was signed to increase the military (or more broadly – defence) budget. The so-called Big Five, or the strongest, historically stable parties on the Swedish political scene: Swedish Social Democratic Party (Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti), the Green Party (Miljöpartiet de gröna), the Moderate Party (Moderata samlingspartiet), the Centre Party (Centerpartiet), and the Christian Democratic Party (Kristdemokraterna) decided to raise spending in this area by 10.2 billion kronor between 2016 and 2020 (or by 11% on a 2.2% annual basis compared to the original plans).[3] At the same time, the amount of about 1.3 billion kronor was allocated to the reactivation of structures and restoration of civil defence stocks.[4] At that time, in Swedish documents and in public discussion, there appeared the concept of a holistic, systemic approach to civil defence, understood broadly and socially supported state defence. It eventually took on the form of total defence (*Totalförsvar*).[5]

This concept includes the reintroduction of conscription. Sweden has opted for a rather special solution. All conscripts (men and women) born in a certain year are subject to registration. Compared to the Cold War period, the requirements concerning health status have been radically tightened. As recently as the mid-1990s, about 40,000 men of each birth year were considered fit for service. In 2017, 13,000 young people of both sexes were considered fit to serve. In reality, the armed forces call up about 4,000 to serve for 12 months. Compulsory military service is thus effectively voluntary in nature. This solution, according to Swedish officers, makes it possible to maintain an organised reserve adequate to the needs of the armed forces. It should also be emphasised that the reintroduction of conscription has been done in accordance with the Swedish understanding of strengthening gender equality. This should be seen first and foremost as an expression of the Scandinavian social culture, and only later as a demographic necessity.[6]

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[3] Statista, Expected defence budget for Sweden from 2016 to 2020 (in million SEK), https://www.statista.com/statistics/695937/expected-defense-budget-for-sweden [accessed: 11 February 2021].

[4] Regeringskansliets, Försvarsuppgörelse stärker försvaret med 2.7 miljarder per år, 16 August 2017, https://www.regeringen.se/pressmeddelanden/2017/08/forsvarsuppgorelse-starker-forsvaret-med-27-miljarder-per-ar/ [accessed: 17 February 2022].

[5] The process of Sweden reaching the concept of total defence and the first phase of its implementation is synthetically presented in J. Gotkowska, *Sweden's Security. The Long Way Towards Total Defence*, Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, 2021. Detailed formal and legal solutions planned for implementation in 2021–2025 were outlined in the Total Defence Act (Totalförsvaret 2021–2025), adopted in early February 2021. Cf. Totalförsvaret 2021–2025, Regeringens proposition 2020/21:30, https://www.regeringen.se/4a965d/globalassets/regeringen/dokument/forsvarsdepartementet/forsvarsproposition-2021-2025/totalforsvaret-2021-2025-prop.-20202130.pdf [accessed: 3 February 2022].

[6] A. Persson, F. Sundevall, "Conscripting women: gender, soldiering, and military service in Sweden 1965–2018", *Women's History Review*, vol. 28, issue 7, 2019, pp. 1039–1056, https://doi.org/10.1080/09612025.2019.1596542.

Total defence – as understood in Sweden

The notion of total defence adopted by Swedes has caused some confusion in Polish literature, especially since the literal translation has been used. This was because it naturally led to references to the concept of "total war", a term which in Polish literature (and not only) evokes the worst possible associations. After all, quoting from *Encyklopedia wojskowa* [Encyclopaedia of Military Science], total war is "a war, in which all means and methods are used to achieve the aims; the supporters of total war do not recognise legal or moral restrictions, they reject international agreements and conventions which make achieving the aims difficult; in total war one affects not only the enemy's armed forces, but the whole nation."[7] The entire concept is attributed to the German general Erich Ludendorff, who was an apologist of war, calling it the highest expression of a nation's will.[8] Meanwhile, the Swedish solutions have very little in common with the thoughts of the Kaiser general born at Kruszewnia near Poznań. The potential ambiguity of the term "total defence" was noticed in Finland and Estonia. The term translated to "comprehensive security"[9] was instead introduced into the public discourse in both countries.

What then is Swedish total defence? It seems that the first thing to consider is the way the issue has been presented to the Swedish society. Massively circulated materials state: "The term 'total defence' denotes all of the activities needed to prepare Sweden for war, and comprises both military and civil defence. Civil defence refers to society as a whole's resilience in the event of the threat of war and actual war."[10] The two components of total defence are defined as:[11]

– military defence: "Sweden's military defence comprises the Swedish Armed Forces and the Home Guard,[12] together with a number of other authorities. The Armed Forces defend our territory and our borders";
– civil defence: "Civil defence refers to the work carried out by central government agencies, local authorities, regions, private companies, and voluntary organisations to protect the civilian population and to ensure that health care services and transport systems, for example, work. Sweden's civil defence is also tasked with supporting Sweden's Armed Forces."

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7   Wojna totalna [headword], [in:] *Encyclopedia wojskowa: dowódcy i ich armie, historia wojen i bitew, technika wojskowa. N–Ż*, ed. A. Krupa, Warszawa: WN PWN – Bellona, 2007, p. 494.

8   E. Ludendorff, *Wojna totalna*, transl. by F. Schoener, foreword S. Zielicz, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1959, p. 27.

9   P. Szymański, *New Ideas for Total Defence. Comprehensive Security in Finland and Estonia*, Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, 2020.

10   Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, Total defense – all of us together, p. 1, https://www.msb.se/siteassets/dokument/amnesomraden/krisberedskap-och-civilt-forsvar/stod-till-kommuner/krisberedskapsveckan/kampanjmaterial/material-2021/faktablad-totalforsvar/faktablad_totalforsvar_engelska.pdf [accessed: 4 February 2022].

11   *Ibidem.*

12   In Sweden, the formation is called Hemvärnet – Nationella skyddsstyrkorna.

While the question of the military component of total defence is not in much doubt, as its scope can be defined as "conventional defence against conventional attack," its civilian component requires a few sentences of commentary of a geographical, demographic, and social nature. Without an understanding of the Swedish specifics, one might easily be tempted to absolutise the Scandinavian solutions.

Thus, the civilian component of total defence is the overall effort made by the state understood as the central administration, specialised services and agencies, state local administration and bodies of local self-government and social defence organisations,[13] as well as economic entities, in order to provide the civilian population with basic services and benefits during a crisis situation, war threat and war.[14] In essence, this is a return to the solutions developed and institutionalised in the years 1939–1945, and then successively developed and improved during the Cold War.[15] The civil

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[13] The following organisations with this status operate in Sweden: Volunteer Air Corps (Frivilliga Flygkåren, FFK), Volunteer Motorcycle Club (Frivilliga motorcykelkåren, FMCK), Volunteer Radio Organization (Frivilliga radioorganisationen, FRO), Swedish Defence Training Union (Försvarsutbildarna, FBU), Swedish Service Dog Guide Association (Svenska Brukshundklubben, SBK), the Swedish Drivers Association (Sveriges Bilkårers Riksförbund, SBR), the Association of Swedish Women Volunteers in Lotta Traffic (Riksförbundet Sveriges lottakårer, SLK), the Sea Volunteer Service (Sjövärnskåren, SVK), and the Volunteer Aviation Association (Flygvapenfrivilliga, FVRF). In addition, there are various historical and hobbyist associations operating under separate regulations, cooperating with military authorities, the central and local governments, and often having at their disposal substantial resources in terms of personnel, and premises (for example, maintaining facilities from which the military withdrew after the Cold War). An illustration of this phenomenon may be Swedish Air Force Historic Flight (interestingly, appearing in public space only under its English name and using the acronym SwAFHF), whose mission is to preserve and maintain historical aircraft in an airworthy condition. Currently in possession of 13 aircraft (including 7 jets), it is humorously called "the reserve fleet of the Air Force." It operates in tandem with the infrastructural parts used by the disbanded 7th Flotilla.

[14] P. Larsson, *Civilbefälhavare – en övergripande historisk belysning*, Rapportnr FOI-R--4795--SE, FOI, August 2019, https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--4795--SE; B. Johansson, K.D. Mattsson, E. Mittermaier, N.H. Rossbach, *Det civila försvarets utgångspunkt i krisberedskapen. En övergripande analys av förutsättningar och utmaningar*, Rapportnr FOI-R--4431--SE, FOI, June 2017, https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--4431--SE [accessed: 16 February 2022].

[15] It was a very elaborate structure with significant capabilities for the dispersal and protection of the population (managing a network of shelters and hiding places), rescue and firefighting operations, including those aimed at eliminating the effects of weapons of mass destruction, defense against propaganda-psychological influence, and communication and transportation system. Civil defense managed a system of depots and warehouses housing non-military supplies, a prearranged system of rationing food and other scarce goods (along with coupon-cards and war currency prepared by the Sveriges Riksbank). Civil defense also took care of mass burial sites. Membership in civil defense structures was compulsory for numerous groups of state and local governments employees. Cf. G. Andersson, *Civilförsvarsförbundets Historia*, Civilförsvarsförbundet, 2018, https://civil.se/medlemmar/wp-content/uploads/sites/320/2018/05/Civil f%C3%B6rsvarsf%C3%B6rbundets-historia.pdf [accessed: 24 May 2022].

defence system was deactivated at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, accompanied by the sale or function change of about 70% of its infrastructure. Restoration began in 2016 under the reactivated concept of total defence.[16]

The civilian component of total defence: geographical and social conditions

Compared to Polish realities, one of the primary factors determining the organisation of the civilian component of total defence in Sweden is the vastness of the territory and density of population. The country stretches meridionally in a belt of about 1560 km (from the Smygehuk lighthouse in the south to the "tri-junction" of the Norwegian, Swedish, and Finnish borders in the north), while latitudinally it is about 410 km long (from the border crossing with Norway, located between Orje and Töcksfors in the west, to the eastern shore of the island of Gisslingö). The area of Sweden is 449,964 square kilometres, i.e., 144.2% of Poland's territory. The Swedish population is 10.45 million people (February 2022), distributed unevenly; however, as you move north, the population density decreases. The largest population centres are the agglomerations of Stockholm, Greater Malmö, and Greater Gothenburg.

Relatively high population density is also found in the south of the country and in the coastal lowlands. The interior of the country is in many areas virtually uninhabited, with the exception of the Strömsund-Östersund area in the central interior, from where the route to Trondheim in Norway leads. In the same areas, most of the authority (political and administrative centres), various services and production are concentrated. Thus, the above situation justifies considering the polygon defined by the cities of Gothenburg, Karlstad, Uppsala, Stockholm, Kalmar, Karlskrona, Ystad and Malmö as the "strategic core." The length of the perimeter thus defined is about 1300 km. It is a compact area of about 90,000 square kilometres. It should be noted that outside this "strategic core" there are only smaller centres such as Umeå, Piteå, Sundsvall and Östresund, Luleå, Boden, and Kiruna.

Sweden is thus characterised by a concentration of population in the south and southeast, but at the same time, there is only one city with a population of about 1.5 million (2 million in the metropolitan area). Moreover, it is the large cities that have the highest per centage of elderly people (a result of the cumulative influx of people into the cities and the accelerated pace of various social changes), which places additional demands on the welfare system, which must, by necessity, also

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[16]   O. Jovanovic, *Möjlighet till implementering av det nya totalförsvaret. En studie gällande möjlighet till implementering av totalförsvaret för Sveriges kommuner*, Handledare: E. Deverell, Försvarshögskolan, 2020, https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1528260/FULLTEXT01. pdf [accessed: 10 February 2022], (civil defense training material).

include total defence solutions. In contrast, the 25 municipalities in the north of Sweden have the most favourable ratio of those economically active to the total population.[17]

In the south and centre, the population outside the large cities is distributed fairly evenly within the "strategic core," while towards the north, the population density decreases and is therefore naturally dispersed. This reduces the scale of organisational and technical challenges associated with the need to ensure the functioning of large concentrations of people in times of crisis and war. In smaller towns, there are also stronger and much more developed interpersonal relations than in agglomerations, which adds up to a social dimension of "defence capital" which is difficult to assess. At the same time, apart from the "strategic core," it is necessary to build a dispersed civil defence system, in which the most serious complicating factors, apart from the intentional actions of the enemy, are distance, terrain and weather. The realisation of related tasks with the use of forces of the military sector only, taking into account its size, even including Hemvärnet – Nationella skyddsstyrkorna, is impossible. This implies broad participation of local administration in the implementation of tasks aimed at protecting the population and local administration.

In estimating the defence resilience of Swedish society, at least three more factors need to be taken into account: population growth in relation to median age and migration processes, standard of living, and the quality of institutions. The first issue is relatively simple to capture and synthesise. With the overall population growing from 7.04 million in 1950 to 10.32 million in 2020, the median age increased by 9,6 years during this period from 34.2 to 43.8 years[18] (in Poland the average age in 2020 was 41.7). This results in a lowering of the proportion between those able to serve in military combat and the rest of the population, which naturally forces the search for ways to rationally use the older population in the defence system, as is clear from the assumptions of the civilian segment of Sweden's total defence.

It should further be noted that the relatively rapid population growth was largely the result of migration. After World War II, Sweden saw several waves of inflows of foreigners, among them there were those who came after World War II, refugees from the Baltic States, economic migrants from Norway and Finland, and in the late 1960s and early 1970s foreign workers attracted by the opening labour market as well as

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[17]   P.T. Finnsson, "Sweden: Inequality in Sweden grows much faster than in the Nordics overall", *Nordregio Magazine*, https://nordregio.org/nordregio-magazine/issues/state-of-the-nordic-region-2020/sweden-inequality-in-sweden-grows-much-faster-than-in-the-nordics-overall [accessed: 21 February 2022].

[18]   Cf. Statista, Sweden: Average age of the population from 1950 to 2050 (median age in years), https://www.statista.com/statistics/375459/average-age-of-the-population-in-sweden; *EU population in 2020: almost 448 million more deaths than births*, Eurostat, 10 July 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/11081093/3-10072020-AP-EN.pdf/d2f799bf-4412-05cc-a357-7b49b93615f1 [accessed: 14 February 2022].

political refugees from various parts of the world.[19] As a result, about 2 million citizens (19%[20] according to public data) originate (first generation) from outside their country of residence. For decades, this has not been a major problem and integration issues have rarely arisen and have been effectively addressed. However, in the critical year 2015, Sweden admitted 163,000 migrants. This *de facto* led to an exhaustion of the absorption capacity of the state and a drastic change in immigration and social policy towards newcomers.[21] In 2020, only 13,000 migrants were admitted, mostly political refugees. And this is still happening, even though the role of migrants in the labour market is difficult to overestimate.[22]

The factor outlined above is compounded by a progressive income disparity. While in the early 2000s Sweden had the lowest income and standard of living disparities among the OECD countries, it is now behind the other countries in the Nordic region. Moreover, a vast majority of those recording the lowest incomes are unsurprisingly immigrants from recent waves, but it also includes second-generation immigrants from culturally different areas. The relationship between the influx of migrants and income stratification is, of course, practically inevitable.[23] This has negative social consequences on a scale that is difficult to diagnose unequivocally, regardless of the fact that the phenomenon is taking place in a very wealthy country, which has one of the highest incomes per capita in the world at the level of 55 thousand dollars a year and invariably ranks among the top ten countries with the highest standard of living.[24]

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[19]   The problem of emigration from Poland to Sweden has been the subject of abundant literature, but it is also worth mentioning that Sweden is home to the third largest Chilean diaspora in the world, after Argentina and the United States, with about 45,000 people. It was formed during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990).

[20]   For Iceland and Norway, it is 16%, for Denmark – 12%, and Finland – 7%. Cf. P.T. Finnsson, *op. cit.*

[21]   This was manifested, among other things, in a speech by the chairwoman of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, Magdalena Andersson, after taking office as Minister of Finance for the second time in January 2019 (she became Prime Minister on 30 November 2021). Addressing migrants, she delivered a statement that only a few months earlier had been described as "racist.": "'If you are young, [...] you must obtain a high school diploma and go on to get a job or higher education.' If you receive financial aid from the state, 'you must learn Swedish and work a certain number of hours a week.' [...] 'here in Sweden, both men and women work and contribute to welfare.' [...] [This] applies 'no matter what fathers, mothers, spouses, or brothers think and feel.'" Cf. J. Traub, "Even Sweden Doesn't Want Migrants Anymore", *Foreign Policy*, 17 November 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/17/even-sweden-doesnt-want-migrants-anymore-syria-iraq-belarus [accessed: 19 February 2022].

[22]   Of the 166,000 jobs generated by the Swedish economy between 2008 and 2016, most were filled by migrants. P. Nilsson, "Swedish society's big divisions – in 6 charts", *Financial Times*, 29 August 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/3b9566e4-941a-11e8-b747-fb1e803ee64e [accessed: 20 February 2022].

[23]   *Ibidem.*

[24]   The World Bank, GDP per capita, PPP (current international $), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD [accessed: 16 February 2022].

The frustration of individuals and social groups results from their own situation, opportunities and the "here and now" attitude, while global indicators tend to be unconvincing. Meanwhile, numerous groups of migrants settled in Sweden, partly due to the value system brought from their country of origin shaping their customs and behaviour, including educational engagement and activity in the labour market, encounter a socio-economic "glass ceiling," invisible at first glance, but nevertheless very hard and persistent. It should be emphasised that in the official Swedish discourse, the problem of coincidence between the phenomena outlined above and defence issues is not addressed – at least not directly.[25] Meanwhile, it is difficult to assume that they will not have an impact on social cohesion, which is a factor difficult to quantify and whose importance is manifested primarily in situations of threat and instability of both institutions and intergroup ties.

However, it should also be remembered that Sweden (as well as other Scandinavian countries) is characterised by a very high level of political consensus on defence issues. It has become a tradition, a custom and a norm that the main parties work out a long-standing agreement on the matter before elections, and defence issues, procurement policy and the like are not usually raised in the then-current political competition. This is a value in itself which most European countries are unable to achieve. It also has a direct bearing on the coherence of the defence system *en bloc*, and that includes the coherence of the civil defence subsystem.

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[25]   The problem of internal security crisis, after all, is recognised, and the phenomenon is counted among the most serious threats? At the same time, the non-discriminatory policy of state agencies has not, quite reasonably, allowed the phenomenon to be explicitly and simplistically associated with a particular group or groups. Therefore, the The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brottsförebyggande rådet) stopped short of stating that the increase in homicides in Sweden since 2005 is not related to trends in the country's international environment but has been generated internally. Cf. K. Hradilova Selin, *Gun homicide in Sweden and other European countries. A comparative study of levels, trends, and homicide by other means. English summary of Brå report 2021:8*, Stockholm: Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, 2021, https://bra.se/download/18.1f8c9903175f8b2aa70ca53/1621930415477/2021_8_Gun_homicide_in_Sweden_and_other_European_countries.pdf [accessed: 7 January 2022]. Analyses of investigative documents and prosecutions show that 50% of serious crimes are committed by migrants. In the case of homicides, murders, and attempted murders they account for 73% of the perpetrators, and in the case of robberies and burglaries for 70%. G. Adamson, "Migrants and Crime in Sweden in the Twenty-First Century", *Society*, vol. 57, 2020, pp. 9–21, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-019-00436-8. Migrants, in turn, account for 58% of prisoners with long sentences and 58% of the unemployed; benefits for migrants consume 65% of the welfare budget, 77% of children living below the poverty line are from migrant families, migrants account for 90% of those suspected of using firearms in public places. Cf. T. Sanandaji, *Mass Challenge. The Socioeconomic Impact of Migration to a Scandinavian Welfare State*, transl. by J. Vesterberg, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, s. 63–65, 67–69, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46808-8. The situation is so serious that Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson announced an increase in the number of police officers by 7,000 within three years.

Conclusions

The above considerations are not an attempt at disavowing the solutions adopted in Sweden while building the civilian component of "total defence". The intention of the authors was, on the one hand, to broaden the perception of this problem with a segment related to very dynamic social processes, including migration; and on the other hand, to show what dangers are involved in a mechanical implementation of solutions borrowed from the past, be it only two decades away. Generally speaking, the described solution is a very interesting attempt at finding some answers to two fundamental questions: how to ensure effective defence of a vast country with a weak population and how to minimise the destructive impact of crisis situations (including conflict and war) on the functioning of a wealthy yet aging society. The Swedish solutions are deeply rooted in an organisational culture shaped both under the distant influence of historical experience and the one provided by nearly a century-long and still ongoing building of a welfare state. They are specific to Sweden and very difficult to implement in other political, economic, and social reality. This does not mean, however, that they are not worth studying or even adopting, because so many of them are truly interesting and original.

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Total Defence in a consumer society: a real possibility or wishful thinking? The case study of Sweden
Abstract

The article presents the demographic and social conditions of the Swedish civil defence subsystem known as total defence (*Totalförsvar*). The authors explain the original meaning of the term and its role in the national defence system. They draw attention to the existing threats related mainly to the uneven distribution of the population and the aging of the population The issue of the progressive ethnic and cultural differentiation of the Swedish society has been treated separately.

Key words: war, defence, total defence, society, Sweden

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Common defence – the past or the future?

Introduction

Is common defence a thing of the past or future? Just a few months ago, this question would have been considered anachronic by some military theorists. They would explain it by saying the fact that in the era of war with precise means of destruction, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), fights for carefully chosen military targets, there is no place for clashes of mass armies or general involvement of society in the fight, and the very notion of "common war" should go into oblivion.

Doctrinal solutions at the operational and tactical level concentrate on the ways of using troops and cooperation between various armed forces and various of troops (also in the international environment). The element of using the "social potential" in documents has been marginalised or even ignored.

In Poland, three types of the armed forces are planned for use in the land environment. These are: land forces, territorial defence forces, and special forces. Of these mentioned above, land forces and territorial defence forces, whose total number in Poland oscillates around 120,000–150,000 soldiers, will have a major impact on shaping operations in the zone of deep, direct, and rear operations. From the point of view of the state's defence needs, this number seems too low; nevertheless, in countries with a similar economic and social potential, the number of soldiers is at a comparable level. In view of the above, the way in which these armies are used in a state's specific socio-economic environment begins to gain fundamental importance in theoretical

considerations. Reflections should be based on conclusions from completed and on-going armed conflicts, taking into account the situation and limitations existing in Poland. The question to be addressed is whether the components of various types of the armed forces are able to "defend" the state by themselves, or whether their success depends on the society's attitude.

Analysing conflicts, we can see that, on the one hand, we have the second Iraqi war (2003), on the other, the current war in Ukraine, and somewhere between them the conflicts in Afghanistan, Georgia, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh. What makes these conflicts different? What determines achieving the final success by forces which had no qualitative or quantitative advantage? What makes success possible?

The aim of the article is to present information and conclusions, which would ultimately generate knowledge on the contemporary conditions for conducting operations in an armed conflict.

The above contents constitute the origin of the problem, the solution of which may be the answer to the question of what the influence of society's popular involvement on the final outcome of an armed clash is. In order to answer this question and reach conclusions, it is necessary to address the specific problems summed up in the following questions:

1. How should "common defence" be defined today?
2. Has "common defence" been a determinant of the settlement of selected armed conflicts in the 21st century, and if so, to what extent?
3. How should a country's population be used during an armed conflict, taking into account the multifaceted nature of the impact on the adversary?

Answering the above questions will provide a broad perspective on the issue of defence and state security, without limitation to the use of the armed forces in this regard.

The presented content is based on the results of both theoretical and empirical research and conclusions reached by the author during the development of tactical-operational background for command-and-control exercises and solving tactical problems in various types of operations. One of the limitations of the presented publication is the author's focus on warfare with the omission of activities carried out during a crisis.

Common defence – contemporary relevance

The general duty to defend the Republic of Poland stems directly from the provisions of the Constitution and the Act on General Duty to Defend (ustawa o powszechnym obowiązku obrony), in particular from the provisions contained in:

- Article. 1: "The defence of the Fatherland is the concern and duty of all citizens of the Republic of Poland."

- Article 2: "Strengthening the defence of the Republic of Poland, preparing the population and national property in case of war, and performing other tasks under the general duty to defend belongs to all authorities, government administration, and other state bodies and institutions, bodies of local self-government, entrepreneurs, and other organisational units, social organisations, as well as to every citizen within the scope defined in the acts."[1]

Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego [The Dictionary of National Security Terms] defines the "common defense of the state," which it describes as a "type of defense of the state, in which all human and material resources are prepared and used in military and non-military defensive actions in a manner ensuring effective repulse of the enemy's aggression."[2] According to the definition provided by this dictionary, common defence of the state is a part of the military system of the state, which includes the territorial defence.[3]

Taking into account the above considerations, it should be stated that common defence is the involvement of the state's forces and all resources, in undertaking activities in the scope of defending the country against threats. This includes activities of military and non-military character, and both offensive and defensive actions in various, also non-military, areas of influence. The subjects of its activity are both specialised state bodies, including the armed forces, and the civilian population.

The definition of common defence presented above is consistent with basic legal documents. The common defence engages and obliges the whole society to take action. Importantly, these actions are not limited exclusively to military actions, which would have to take into account legal and international issues, including the fulfilment of the conditions for a given person (or persons) to be qualified for the group of veterans and to receive legal protection.

The multifaceted nature of is in the character of contemporary armed conflicts, which are not only conducted between the enemy's force and own troops, but also take place in the information sphere, cyberspace, and in the economic sphere. They have a significant impact on the final outcome of military operations.

Common defence and lessons learnt from armed conflicts

The 21st century has seen several full-scale and asymmetric armed conflicts. Their final outcome did not always depend on the quantitative and qualitative superiority

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[1] Ustawa z dnia 21 listopada 1967 r. o powszechnym obowiązku obrony Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, tj. Dz.U. [Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland] 2021, item 372.

[2] Obrona powszechna państwa [headword], [in:] *Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, eds. J. Kaczmarek, W. Łepkowski, B. Zdrodowski, 6th edition, Warszawa: AON, 2008, p. 79.

[3] Cf. *ibidem*.

of one of the parties. By analysing various conflicts, it is possible to assess the degree of achievement of objectives at different levels, ranging from the strategic-political to the tactical. It is also possible to identify the variables that influence achieving these objectives.

The first conflicts to be compared are the wars in Iraq (2003) and Ukraine (2022).[4] Comparing the potentials of the parties in both conflicts, many similarities can be found.[5] However, the outcome of each clash was different.

The plan for subjugating Ukraine to the Russian Federation initially envisaged selective strikes against military facilities, the entry operations by combat groups in various areas of the country, and the seizure of most towns. The attitude of the population was assessed as favourable to Russia (in areas east of the Dnieper) or neutral. In the following period, it was predicted that the central authorities, friendly towards Russia, would be constitutionalised, and that political and economic control over the whole territory of Ukraine would be taken over. However, this plan was not implemented. This was due to the strong and indivisible defence of the Ukrainian army and the widespread population's support for the central authorities. The full support of world opinion (with a few exceptions) was not without significance.

From a military point of view, the Russian forces had an overall advantage of the number of troops and a significant advantage of the amount of essential armaments, especially aircraft, helicopters, tanks, combat vehicles, artillery, and missiles. Russia also had the initiative in choosing the objects and directions of attack and where to focus the main effort. After the first month of fighting, it could be assessed that the first operational thrust did not accomplish the task set for it. The Ukrainian army was not destroyed, nor did it lose its potential to undertake active combat operations. The Ukrainian grouping was not divided, and the main cities of the country in the border areas (including the capital Kiev) were not occupied.[6]

Military operations of a similar nature took place during the Second Iraqi War (USA–Iraq) in 2003. There, however, after three weeks of fighting, the main Iraqi forces were smashed and the capital city was occupied by Americans practically without fight. After four weeks, all of Iraq's major cities were captured and the Iraqi army's active resistance was broken. Iraq had a force of between 360,000 and 470,000 soldiers and fighters, while the coalition had about 250,000 troops. The Americans had considerable technological superiority and control of the air.

From the analyses made, several determinants affecting the course and outcome of the war can be identified (table 1). These include:

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[4]   For the period February–March 2022.
[5]   Of course, these are not fully identical conflicts. The similarities concern mainly the general nature of the actions (the so-called full-scale actions) and the potential involved.
[6]   As of 23 March 2022.

- the attitude of international opinion towards the conflict (favourable/unfavourable to the party concerned);
- isolation of the conflicting parties (yes/no);
- attitude of the civilian population – support for the central authorities in matters of military operations and the aggressor's country (yes/no);
- involvement of the population (public) in broad defence undertakings (yes/no).

Table 1. Comparison of the ratio of selected environment elements between the parties to armed conflicts in Iraq and Ukraine

	Iraq 2003		Ukraine 2022	
	Defensive action Iraq	Offensive actions USA	Defensive action Ukraine	Offensive actions Russia
Attitude of international opinion	• lack of general support • lack of active support from world powers • a negative assessment of the Iraqi government's actions in internal and external policies in the years prior to the conflict	• the active support of certain countries, including the United Kingdom • favourable or neutral position • no active denial of US actions	• positive, supporting the defence efforts taken	• negative (in some cases neutral outside Europe)
Isolation of conflicting parties	• almost complete isolation from neighbouring countries	• support of certain bordering countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait)	• active and passive support • supply of defensive arms and cash (western border)	• isolation with few exceptions (Belarus) or neutral attitude (China) • isolation in Europe, economic sanctions
Attitude of the civilian population (support of the central government)	• lack of strong support • more support only for a selected religious group (Sunni – less) • conflict between religious groups (Sunnis and Shiites) and on national grounds (Kurds)	• support of the American public • no visible anti-war movement in the USA • lack of popular protests by the Iraqi population against the US; in some areas, active support for the actions of	• the unification of society, unity, preservation, and support of a single decision-making centre	• society in Russia isolated in terms of access to information and the actual course of action; in official communications, support for the Special Military Operation • no civilian support in the occupied areas except for the declared Russian minority
Public involvement in defence projects	• limited to Fedayeen units • lack of grassroots activities	• military support to the Kurds (Northern Iraq)	• creation of voluntary military formations • direct attacks on Russians • defence work	• very limited support from the Russian minority mainly in the immediate neighbourhood of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk republics

Source: Author's own compilation.

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As can be seen from the above analyses, two basic determinants – lying outside the organisational armed forces – affecting the achievement of objectives in a defence operation can be delineated. They include:

a) international assistance – no isolation of the country, ability to provide arms and other means of warfare, protection and assistance to the population;
b) full and active support of its people in the struggle.

The actual focus on defensive operations, with maximum use of the terrain characteristics (built-up areas, forests), and emphasis on combating the logistical elements of the advancing troops made it possible to slow down and stop the actions of the Russian strike groupings in Ukraine (2022). Extremely positive in this respect was the receipt before the outbreak of the war and the maintenance during the war of supplies of weapons in the form of hand-held anti-tank and anti-aircraft launchers. This strengthened the Ukrainian potential by saturating it with means of combat, the operation of which could be quickly mastered by soldiers and civilians.

Influencing the rear area – supply lines, tying up with fighting based in towns not captured by the Russians – made it possible to tie up Russian forces in a relatively deep area of operations. Over the long term, such operations would have been impossible to carry out without maintaining international support and combat supply lines crossing the borders of Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. In fact, Ukrainian troops (operational and territorial defence) would not be able to carry out this operations do on their own because, just like Russian troops, there would not be enough of them.[7] The Ukrainian situation, especially in urban centres, was improved by the mass involvement of civilians in the fight (by grassroots joining of territorial defence forces and volunteer units).

In a way, these conclusions are confirmed by an analogical comparison of the actions conducted during Poland's defensive war in 1939. There is no doubt that one of the main reasons for Poland's defeat was its direct isolation from its neighbours, and basically the necessity to engage in a two-front war (with Germany and the USSR).

The influence of society's involvement on the outcome of operations can also be seen at the lowest level of the art of war – the tactical level. Here, we can compare the course of combat operations in Georgia (2008) with the contemporary ones in Ukraine. The way in which the offensive actions of the Russian groups were conducted

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[7] The number of troops planned for effective defence of a city constitutes 5 to 10% of the inhabitants (the author's assumption based on the results of episodic exercises carried out in War Studies University and the analysis of selected actions in urban areas). In the case of a city with e.g. 300,000 inhabitants – it would constitute 15,000 to 30,000 soldiers. In fact, the role of defenders was played by separated forces of operational forces, reinforced by the efforts of territorial defence troops and "civilians" joining them en masse during the war. Thus, part of the forces of operational armies and territorial defence were able to carry out extremely important extra-urban activities, concentrating on attacks from the outside on Russian rings of isolation and encirclement of towns and on their supply lines.

was similar. The assault was conducted by mixed reinforced battalion tactical groups capturing one object after another. While maneuvering, they cut across the enemy's defensive groupings, reaching their wings and rear. In the area of the separatist republics in Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia), the Russians achieved successes in this way, just as they did in the area administered by Georgia. In Ukraine, such actions fell through. The conquest of larger cities failed, and Russians sought to isolate them by triggering movement to the next object (usually a town). This time, this course of action did not bring tangible results, as the lines of communication were broken by relatively small Ukrainian groups. In this case, the prevalence of armed resistance was crucial to stopping the effective advance of the Russian forces. In the Georgian conflict, the failure of the Georgian troops can be explained by the fact that combat operations were conducted with full-time military forces, without real support from the civilian population.

An analogy can be found in the course of the first war in Chechnya (1994–1996) and in Afghanistan. After the occupation of Grozny and of nearly the entire country by the Russians, it seemed that the war was basically over. However, in 1996, the Chechens mobilised the population from rural and mountainous areas to fight, isolated Russian bases, and broke the links between them. Within days, they regained the capital, Grozny, and vast areas of their country within weeks, forcing the Russian Federation into a humiliating truce.[8]

The course of action in Afghanistan in the 21st century is well known. The US-led coalition captured major population centres. Using several hundred thousand military and security forces from the coalition and the Afghan government, the US sought to hold the lines of communication and non-urban areas. However, it failed to destroy Afghan fundamentalists – mainly the Taliban – and to cut off the insurgents from neighbouring Pakistan's support. Consequently, after the withdrawal of the main forces of the United States and the Western coalition, the Taliban overran Kabul within a dozen days, and the government forces, which were several thousands strong, practically ceased to exist without a fight.

Both conflicts clearly shows that an attacking force without the support or neutral attitude of the local population is not capable of permanently controlling the country's territory. In the above cases, this could indeed be done but only by isolating the country in question and using widespread terror. However, it would then be necessary to commit substantial forces (in relation to the area and population), which is problematic in the long term.

In conclusion, it should be stressed that the achievement of objectives in the conducted defensive operation, in addition to the general condition of the armed forces, is significantly influenced by the involvement of society in pro-defence activities and the support it provides to the central authorities. Disruption and

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8   See: Z. Czarnotta, Z. Moszumański, *Czeczenia 94–95*, Warszawa: Altair, [cop. 1995].

disorganisation of this support is one of the basic determinants of the success with an offensive operation.

It would seem that this is a relatively banal conclusion which the state authorities should always bear in mind (the policy of security and state defence), however, practice shows that in the majority of states it is not the case. The use of simple solutions, such as "arming the masses," is not an antidote to the needs of the so-called "common defence" either because even if a significant part of society was merely equipped with weapons and directed to the fight, it would not prove the successful implementation of the "common defence" approach.

Common defence – current and future needs

In accordance with the conclusions presented above, it must be emphasised that the condition for the success of a defence operation, in addition to having well-trained armed forces, is the involvement a vast majority of society in defence activities. In the case of Poland, as well as other countries bordering the Russian Federation, this is of key importance because our country, for economic and demographic reasons, is not able to maintain in peacetime several hundred thousand professional troops or conscripts, or to ensure the training to a similar number of reservists. To a certain extent, this necessity is alleviated by membership in the North Atlantic Alliance, but this must not obscure the country's need for self-sufficiency in defence.

Indeed, the primary role of armed forces is to maintain a deterrent capability against a potential, defined adversary. For years, the prevailing view has been that deterrence is to be achieved by armed forces – in terms of numbers and quality. In the context of the historical examples given earlier, this statement appears to be unjustified. The role of deterrence is to be performed by the entire state, both in subject and object terms, i.e. the armed forces, the security apparatus, society, the authorities, as well as the international aid system, which is kept operational, etc.

So the important question seems to be: how to ensure the "fulfilment" of common defence? Being a "Western society", living a peaceful existence for several generations, should we have in mind only the population's participation in universal military actions? In the light of current events, and especially in times of rapid development and changes in the environment, is this the only way to use common defence?

In the first place, it seems important to define the possible and widest areas of influence on the opponent in a defence operation. The condition for successful defence of a country at the tactical level is to beat the opponent's forces. At higher levels, in addition to the military factor, it is still necessary to influence the political will of the opponent. Achieving objectives at various levels of the art of war does not take place today only at their "respective" levels. These levels depend on each other and often intermingle. Sometimes a small tactical success can be the cause of a big operational or

even strategic success. The multidimensionality of the impact gives rise to a wide spectrum of combat areas (kinetic and non-kinetic). This, in turn, leads to the need to find an impact factor.

Common defence, as defined at the beginning of the article, generates certain determinants of its use. A national defence operation should involve the entire society which should participate in the full spectrum of influencing the enemy. It must be stressed at all times that such involvement should not only be based on military action. A general, social military effort may to a small extent compensate for the weakness of the army (mainly its size and the lack of offensive weapons), but even so, with a generally weak army, this effort will be insufficient.

In this respect, one has to wonder if we are able, already at peacetime, to prepare the "human masses" (different professions, skills, social constraints) "to shoot." Or is it better to use these "human masses" in different areas (spaces) of influence, in which they normally function and act professionally (cyberspace activities, information, disinformation, etc.)? If we consider the adversary's actions against our country, then, in a nutshell, his actors will be military (armed forces) and non-military (information, cyber, economic, etc.). These actors will be based in the political authorities of their country, and in its society, which will exert a certain influence on these authorities, both in democratic and authoritarian states.[9]

Consequently, the impact on the adversary is exerted on two aspects: kinetic (on the adversary's armed forces) and non-kinetic (on the adversary's society). Common defence must interact on both aspects, using the maximum range of its capabilities.

First (direct) – it must strengthen the capabilities of the armed forces by strengthening their potential (accession to the military), as well as through their direct and indirect support (information about the enemy's movements, the effects on him, and hampering his maneuvers – destruction of road infrastructure, etc.).

Second (informational) – it should carry out activities of an informational nature, aimed at the opponent's armed forces and its society, and also at countries supporting the opponent and countries supporting "us." Contrary to appearances, this is crucial for achieving the strategic goals of the state, especially in terms of breaking the political will to wage war by the adversary. Here, too, there should be full documentation of the adversary's actions, the crimes committed and their dissemination, striving to rid the adversary of the feeling of impunity.

Third (protection-defence) – a scope of activities and actions aimed at protection of the population and public and private property, also for mutual assistance and self-assistance. These actions have crucial importance at the local level, in areas of direct action and in an area occupied by the enemy.

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[9] In fact, the difference in social pressure in democratic and authoritarian countries will be manifested by the "speed" of social influence on the authorities to force change and the way the authorities counteract this pressure (information isolation, further terror, etc.).

Fourth (in cyberspace) – offensive cyber operations. It is relatively easy to organise, especially by IT professional groups. Involves attacks on the adversary's information systems, especially in his country, disrupts its economy and, most importantly, indirectly transfers the "war" to the aggressor's country, hence its population's sense of security is reduced.

Only a few (four) areas of influence have been presented above.[10] Each can be made more specific with additional details, and new areas can be specified, not forgetting large diasporas in exile, which can put pressure on governments in other countries, and which can also influence the adversary indirectly.

The real effect is to increase the overall ability to influence the adversary, but with maximum effectiveness of taking social action. This is also underlined by the experience of armed conflicts in which an actively and widely opposing society was the cause of the aggressor's final defeat.

It seems that the implementation of common defence will not have a fundamental impact on making changes in the theory of the art of war and in tactics themselves. The existing types of tactical operations, aims, and ways of fighting will remain unchanged. However, the influence of society, both in the military and non-military aspect, should be taken into account.

Conclusions

The experience of ended armed conflicts and the current operations of the Russian army in Ukraine highlight the fact that the lack of widespread involvement of society in defence activities significantly facilitates achieving political-military goals by the adversary.

An increase in common defence undertakings is directly proportional to an increase in the opponent's forces involved in the conflict, an increase in his losses, and the duration of the war. At the same time, terror used against the civilian population will increase. In fact, this leads to an information advantage in influencing the adversary and his society.

Common defence is not a new concept. Nevertheless, it is overlooked in existing doctrines and publications. Most often, the armed forces remain the subject of considerations. It is absolutely necessary to raise public awareness in this respect. Even in peacetime, it is necessary to prepare a system of functioning and including management of general defence. Organisationally, this system must be centrally directed, but the execution of tasks must be decentralised.

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[10]   Due to the editorial requirements of the article.

Common defence cannot be equated with civil defence. They are two different categories existing side by side; they can sometimes intermingle, but have different objectives.[11]

Common defence cannot be seen as an antidote to the general weakness of the army and the state, nor is it a substitute for armies. It is a kind of broadly understood actor whose presence, capabilities, and limitations must be taken into account during the preparation and conduct of warfare.

The essential function of the armed forces is to deter an adversary from launching aggression against a country. The state with all its entities has the same function. In this aspect, the preparation in peacetime of an efficiently and effectively functioning common defence is an important factor in deterring an adversary. The armed forces must be able to accept reinforcement with "common defence."

The current conflict in Ukraine has clearly illustrated the Russians' mistakes in assessing the attitude of Ukrainian society. It cannot be expected that countries (especially the Russian Federation) will not learn from this, and that in the future a potential adversary will make this same mistake. However, it should be expected that in the future a potential armed confrontation will be preceded by extensive measures aimed at a society's unity and the general will to fight, centred around the political leader of the state. In this respect, one should anticipate taking counter-measures, which may already occur in peacetime, as part of hybrid actions taken by the adversary and aimed at disrupting the factors conditioning good functioning of common defence.

Common defence cannot be attributed solely to military action as an element of personnel reinforcement of armies (the so-called voluntary enlistment). The diversity of the population's skills should be used to the greatest possible extent. In the reinforcement of troops itself, the focus should be not only on direct action (combat), but also on deep action (e.g., information gathering) as well as rear area action (e.g., protection and defence).

Answering the problem question contained in the introductory part of the article, it should be emphasised that the involvement of the general public in the defence effort of the state and the armed forces has a real impact on the final outcome of an armed clash. Nowadays, the question is not whether to use the forces contained in society, but how to use and exploit them to ensure the security of the state.

The author realizes that in this article he has not presented all aspects concerning the so-called "common defence." This is due to the limitations of publishing and the fact that the important results of research into a broader problem concerning transformations in the modern art of war are outlined here briefly.

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[11] The fundamental objective of "civil defence" is to minimise by passive means, the effects of hostile actions against the functioning of civilian life, cf. *AAP-6. Słownik terminów i definicji NATO zawierający wojskowe terminy i ich definicje stosowane w NATO*, 2014, p. 88.

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Common defence – the past or the future?
Abstract

The contents of the doctrines at the operational and tactical levels focus primarily on the ways in which the components of the types of armed forces are used and the for cooperation between them. Documents of a higher level (e.g. strategies) indicate a number of threats, including non-military ones, affecting the state directly or indirectly. The issue of using social potential in these documents is marginalised. Lessons from the Russian-Ukrainian war emphasise how important the role of common defence is for the defence of the country against aggression. Nowadays, however, common defence cannot be "limited" to military action alone. A potential opponent is not only its army, but also its society, economy, culture, etc. The research conducted and its results point to opportunities to increase the defence impact of the state through effective and full use of its actors, including the military.

Key words: war, art of war, common defence, security, governance

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What role can Stability Policing play in total defence and building resilience?[3]

Nature and characteristics of modern threats to peace, security, and stability

Usually, when total defence and resilience are approached, there is a tendency to examine and consider only the military and economic aspects, neglecting an existing and

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[3] Disclaimer: this paper is a product of the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence and its content does not reflect NATO policies or positions, nor represent NATO in any way, but only the NATO SP COE or author(s), depending on the circumstances.

tried instrument that can greatly impact and improve the chances of success, namely NATO Stability Policing. Our analysis is based on first-hand professional experiences garnered during numerous deployments overseas since 1998, through desk research and institutional analysis, and through the participation, since 2014, in a number of research and development, conceptual and doctrinal, as well as education and training events. We will draw from this background and expertise to demonstrate how Stability Policing is a perfectly suitable tool for integrating the military and the civilian worlds in a total defence perspective, being furthermore capable of supporting and facilitating social resilience. Although Stability Policing has been a NATO-agreed term with a dedicated Allied Joint Doctrine since 2016 and has been applied since 1998 by NATO and other international organisations (albeit with different taxonomy and different approaches), this instrument is still not widely known, hence applied with delay, discontinuity, and insufficient resources, unduly limiting the achievement of the best possible results. The significance of law enforcement through Stability Policing as a unique military capability within military operations, enlarging the reach of the Alliance and contributing to countering hybrid threats as well as to improving total defence and to supporting resilience will be explained throughout the paper and will form a fundamental basis for final conclusions.

Indeed, to showcase how Stability Policing can contribute to total defence and to building resilience, an introduction to modern threats and their actors is required. Menaces to stability and to safety, to public order and security, to societal cohesion, to the Rule of Law, but also to human rights have inter-connected and severe implications not only for the physical and structural security of a nation, but also for its peace, internal stability, its civil society and may extend to a wider region and globally.

With the end of the Cold War, the dimension and perception of security threats has shifted from the previous focus directed mainly towards military might and politics to the frequent use of non-military instruments, practices, and approaches. Indeed, historical analysis, study of current crises, and projections into future scenarios indicate that means (tools) and ways (conduct) put in place to threaten the security, stability and integrity of a state have mutated and are morphing, often favouring those of a non-military nature. In effect, an increasing tendency of resorting to a diversified panoply involves economic and social phenomena amongst others, and related shocks are weaponised. As an example, a single piece of fake news by the Syrian Electronic Army acting as Associated Press falsely reported attacks on the White House with injuries to the then President Obama. This caused a 100-point drop at the New York Stock Exchange, and the Standard & Poor's 500 to lose $136.5 billion.[4]

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4   "Syrian Electronic Army linked hack attack AP Twitter feed 'broke news' Obama injured White House blast sent Dow Jones plunging", *Daily Mail Reporter*, 24 April 2013, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2314001/Syrian-Electronic-Army-linked-hack-attack-AP-Twitter-feed-broke-news-Obama-injured-White-House-blast-sent-Dow-Jones-plunging.html [accessed: 1 March 2022].

Current crises and the new approach to waging war introduce us to a multi-sourced, multi-faceted, multiple-level, and multi-domain reality providing simultaneous and concurrent use of leveraged tools, and which has simultaneity as its focal point. The latter is the ability to create effects across the military and civil sectors at the same time by implementing different actions, which can be carried out gradually or randomly. The effectiveness of this approach lays in the effects that triggering different actions in a complex system of systems with extremely interconnected domains produces way greater results than approaches confined to a single one.

Threat Actors

Proxies, state-sponsored terrorism, organised and trans-national crime, and even ethnic or linguistic minorities are among the actors in current, indiscriminate wars and elements through which foreign powers may conduct a vast range of attacks. All can lead to the degradation of a state and its structures to the point of rendering it unable to function.

An external actor could initiate putting pressure on a state fostering such a conflict by conducting disinformation campaigns, instigating separatism, supporting secessionists, staging provocations, or exploiting an ethnic group and its cultural background.[5]

Unstable or fragile states, in which law enforcement and the rule of law are weakened, will inevitably attract criminal enterprises, often of transnational reach. Also, terrorists and insurgents may target the values, institutions, and interests of a country through acts aimed at causing maximum disruptive impacts. National institutions, military, security and law enforcement personnel, and the population may therefore be hit with spectacular, and indiscriminate or, conversely, very focused and extremely brutal assaults, seeking to generate fear, a sense of helplessness and to break the social pact by blatantly demonstrating the state's inability to fulfil its first and main task, namely protecting its citizens.

While terrorists are ideologically motivated (politics, religion, ethnic motives, etc.), criminals are driven mainly by economic reasons and monetary gains. Corruption, coercion, including of judges, local police, and politicians, as well as fights with competitors, and their actions to shape the environment aim to enhance the generation of their revenue. Terrorists, insurgents, and criminals, i.e., who in NATO are called irregular actors, exploit and flourish in environments in which governmental control is absent or weakened, law enforcement and border controls are lax,

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5   Adapted from: P. Szymański, in co-operation with J. Gotkowska, "The Baltic states' Territorial Defence Forces in the face of hybrid threats", *OSW Commentary*, no. 165, 2015, http://aei.pitt.edu/63158/1/commentary_165.pdf [accessed: 30 May 2022].

regulatory systems are feeble, contracts go un-enforced, where public services are un-reliable, corruption is rife, and the state itself may be subject to capture.[6]

Why Total Defence

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western, particularly European nations re-duced military and defence spending as well as their defence apparatuses considerably. Crisis response operations became a prevalent approach that did not require large standing and conscription-based armies, but most significantly changed the relation between different actors within the defence arena. The more recent increasing threat posed by peer and near-peer opponents, not to mention the recent Ukraine–Russia war, often employing hybrid means, requires revisiting previously consolidated, ho-listic approaches in which the state and its institutions, the armed forces, private en-terprises and law enforcement, the media and civilian defence entities all seek to col-laborate towards a common goal, namely improving the overall defence performance. Since most, if not all, branches of a society and nation are and need to be involved to have a chance of success, the term total defence is particularly fitting. As hybrid threats and unconventional means of war cover all major societal functions, the de-fence against them must be comprehensive, including areas that are not traditionally associated with warfare.[7]

Why resilience

The essence of the modern way to conduct a war is "total,"[8] which implies that the above-mentioned threats may materialise at a very short notice, propagate rapidly also due to increased connectedness, and that they cannot entirely be prevented. Wishing to resist, to prepare against all possible sources of harm would prove an impossible task, resulting in wasting resources and, consequently, in lesser protection.

Therefore, a practicable approach may seek to devise coping mechanisms to lessen harmful effects on the state and its population, an approach creating cohesiveness, fostering synergies, championing common values, and garnering all possible contri-butions to focus them on innovative and unforeseen menaces: building resilience. NATO's Warfighting Capstone Concept[9] suggests that success in addressing modern

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[6]   Adapted from: P. Stewart, "Weak States and Global Threats: Assessing Evidence of Spillovers", *Center for Global Development Working Paper*, no. 73, 2006.

[7]   A. Cederberg, P. Eronen, "How can Societies be Defended against Hybrid Threats?", *Geneva Center for Security Policy, Strategic Security Analysis*, vol. 9, 2015, pp. 1–10.

[8]   Adapted from: E.F.W. Ludendorff, "Totalnaya voina [Total Warfare]", *Moskva: Izdatelstvo "Э"*, 2015.

[9]   NATO ACT, https://www.act.nato.int/activities/nwcc [accessed: 10 March 2022].

challenges to security and peace requires, amongst others, anticipating such threats, operating within domains but also across domains, and defending in a multi-domain approach as well as utilising a layered resilience. The NATO-agreed definition of resilience is "the ability of an entity to continue to perform specified functions during and after an attack or an incident."[10] Applying another perspective, resilience may be the amount of disturbance a state can absorb and still remain the same, how much the state is capable of self-organisation, and the degree to which the state can build and increase the capacity for learning and adaptation.[11] The principle of resilience is anchored in Article 3 of the Alliance's founding treaty: "In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."[12]

In this view, people, institutions, and societies need to become faster in identifying, adapting, and reacting to unconventional attacks including with means and ways of a non-military nature.

Capable, resilient states with strong, legitimate structures of governance will better prevent the collapse into conflict, facilitate sustainable recovery from violence, and reduce the level of uncertainty.

The definition of Stability Policing, its two missions and the "blue lens"

Stability Policing[13] consist of activities aimed at improving capacity and capabilities of the law enforcement agencies within a host nation and/or to police its population temporarily until they or a follow-on force can take over that responsibility. Doing so, Stability Policing expands the reach of the Alliance as a complementary tool within the combat and warfighting instrument of power in all three core tasks, namely collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. It supports the re-/establishment of a safe and secure environment, thus being pivotal in the restoration of public order and security. Stability Policing can be conducted in all operations- themes,[14]

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[10]   NATO Terminology Database, NATO Term, https://nso.nato.int/natoterm/content/nato/pages/home.html?lg=en [accessed: 30 May 2022].

[11]   B. Obrist, C. Pfeiffer, R. Henley, "Multi-layered social resilience: A new approach in mitigation research", *Progress in Development Studies*, no. 10, 2010, pp. 283–293.

[12]   The Washington Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949, established the North Atlantic Alliance, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm [accessed: 30 May 2022].

[13]   Police related activities intended to reinforce or temporarily replace indigenous police in order to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of the public order and security, rule of law, and the protection of human rights. NATO-agreed term, NATO Terminology Database..., *op. cit*.

[14]   Across the full spectrum of operation themes, from peacetime military engagement to warfighting.

before, during and after (armed) conflicts and manmade or natural disasters as well as in all domains, land, sea, air, cyber, and space. As a military capability focused on the policing of civilians, it can concur to deter, identify, locate, target, and engage adversaries and enemies also through "legal targeting."[15] Thus, it applies a deployable policing approach or "blue lens" to emerging military problems and can help attain tactical, operational, and strategic objectives in a military campaign as well as contribute to creating the conditions for meeting longer-term needs with respect to governance and development. It is a multi-pronged, innovative, and cutting-edge instrument which fosters a reshaped military strategy that focuses also on providing basic security to local communities preyed upon by criminals, terrorists, and insurgents (typically financed by illegal revenues). This, in turn, improves governance, empowers the host nation, and provides alternative and legal livelihoods, thus contributing to winning public support in the battle of narratives.

How Stability Policing contributes to total defence and to building resilience

A state's strength can be measured in its ability to respond to the defence, police, and justice-related needs of its populace, including physical security, legitimacy of its political institutions, management of its economy, and the provision of social welfare. Clearly not all these elements can be guaranteed and protected by the military instrument alone. Indeed, "military problems cannot be solved by military means alone", to paraphrase US President J.F. Kennedy.[16]

Stability Policing roles are manifold and include expanding the reach of the Alliance beyond the combat-only approach, using policing means and tools, thereby enlarging the range of capabilities to counter an extended range of threats. It is no wonder that it was a Gendarmerie-Type Force,[17] the Italian Carabinieri, that generated and championed the Stability Policing concept,[18] since it could draw from its own historically established traditions and background, as well as from its consolidated centrality as an entity concurrently serving and connecting the populace, the state and its government, the armed forces, and law enforcement agencies, bringing together

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[15]   Legal targeting, "creating effects on adversaries by enforcing international and applicable Host Nation law."

[16]   J.F. Kennedy, remarks at Annapolis to the graduating class of the US Naval Academy, 7 June 1961.

[17]   Gendarmerie-Type Force (GTF) is a NATO-agreed term: "An armed force established for enforcing the laws and that, on its national territory, permanently and primarily conducts its activities for the benefit of the civilian population."; NATO Terminology Database…, *op. cit*.

[18]   The first Multinational Specialized Unit, the Stability Policing' forefather, was deployed in 1998 to Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR).

the military, civil and civilian sectors. This unifying domestic role of the Carabinieri can be well applied abroad by Stability Policing forces, focusing on rooting out the causes of instability, and advancing people-centred solutions that are locally driven, comprehensive, and sustainable. Stability Policing acknowledges that, as a result of downturns such as conflicts, economic and financial crises, people are faced with sudden insecurities and deprivations. These not only undo years of development but also generate conditions within which grievances can lead to growing tensions that can be exploited by malign actors. Therefore, in addition to its emphasis on human well-being, Stability Policing is driven by values relating to security, stability, and sustainability of development gains.[19]

Stability Policing champions how modern societies can be and become more resilient by playing this unifying role to improve defence performances in countering threats. By the use of lawfare[20] and legal targeting[21], in fact, by aggregating legal rules, actions, processes, and institutions, including both their normative and physical manifestation, it is utilised to achieve effects against enemies and/or adversaries also within the context of a hybrid campaign.

Rather than viewing the law as a method of rational order-making, lawfare looks for ways to use legal advantages to influence targets by delivering the effects of defeat, deterrence, or defence via legal means.

Stability Policing allows national defence to add an arrow to its quiver: legal targeting. This may be described as the technique of manoeuvring to gain legal superiority by using domestic and international laws to gain the political initiative or even military advantages.

The presence on the international scene of states acting through third parties to influence and employ hostile measures against others is not a new phenomenon and it encompasses several benefits, including non-attribution, plausible deniability, and keeping actions below the threshold of war (i.e., armed conflict).

An external actor who wants to interfere without resorting to the military tool may choose from a broad range of legal tools to support a hybrid threat campaign, including exploiting legal thresholds, normative gaps, complexity and uncertainty, circumventing own legal obligations, avoiding accountability, leveraging rule-compliance by the targeted state, exploiting the lack of legal inter-operability among targeted nations, using own regulatory powers under domestic law, and utilising the law and

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[19]   Adapted from: *Human Security in Theory and Practice, Application of the Human Security Concept and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security*, New York: Human Security Unit, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations, 2009.

[20]   Use of law in warfare. See: A.B. Muñoz Mosquera, S.-D. Bachmann, "Understanding Lawfare in a Hybrid Warfare Context", *NATO Legal Gazette*, Issue 37, 2016, pp. 5–23.

[21]   Legal targeting: the enforcement of international and applicable Host Nation law to create effects on the adversary. It is not a NATO-agreed term.

legal processes to create narratives and counter-narratives.[22] All these tactics lead the external aggressor to influence the life of a state; while traditional military means can hardly compete, the use of Stability Policing ways and means allows to counter the aggressor with instruments of the same nature.

Although apparently unrelated to an attack, even criminal organisations with operations and networks in the target state are a very useful entity for foreign state activities in an asymmetric context. Exploiting criminal organisations could include utilising established smuggling networks, the ability to provide forged documents, financial crime schemes, or simply their ability to threaten, intimidate, pressure or harm strategically important corrupt individuals or groups in a specific situation for political purposes. If viewed through this "blue lens", external aggressions in non-traditional contexts can be dealt with more effectively with the use of policing tools and means, of which Stability Policing is the spearhead and military version, the latter being a particularly useful aspect in degraded, non-permissive environments.

Stability Policing does not only deter, stop, and counter the illegal actions of attackers, which could hardly be stopped only with military instruments, but at the same time delegitimises them in the eyes of the public opinion.

In fact, Stability Policing and the use of police tools in total defence are also useful and effective in the field of STRATCOM, both to convey the image of a strong and efficient state and to demonstrate the wickedness of the actions of opponents. The effects are magnified by the size of the audiences to whom they are disseminated to.

This "war of narratives" is particularly relevant and aims at influencing audiences to support one's cause to the detriment of the adversarial one. A targeted Stability Policing activity can easily support messaging that highlights the positive results in the remits of public order, security, and social peace, also boosting the perception of the host nation. Showcasing the greater efficiency of a nation in protecting its civilian population and in ensuring a quiet and safe daily life can be a powerful psychological tool that contributes to strengthening social resilience and undermines the security of the enemy.

Stability Policing personnel habitually operate throughout the host nation's territory keeping close contact with the civilian population and "feeling its pulse" by gathering information that can be used both for legal targeting and for military purposes, feeding the intelligence cycle of the Allied Force. Although police units usually report directly to the Ministry of Interior and are responsible for preventing, countering, and investigating criminal acts, Stability Policing assets can also use and address those investigations to counter non-state actors or proxies, and to collaborate effectively with defence forces. This may include anti-terror operations, countering

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[22]   G. Giannopoulos, H. Smith, M. Theocharidou, "The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A conceptual model", *European Commission, Ispra*, PUBSY no. 123305, 2020, http://dx.doi.org/10.2760/44985.

political extremism, radicalisation, recruitment by irregular actors, but also counter-intelligence, measures against all sorts of illicit trafficking and assisting in the implementation of preventive security measures.

When investigating corruption phenomena, Stability Policing can contribute to total defence by fostering accountability and, therefore, the trust in institutions by unmasking any infiltrators or adversarial supporters who aim to weaken the democratic structures of a country or to guide and influence its political choices. Embedded Stability Policing personnel in partnering activities within indigenous police forces' assets seek to demonstrate correct and reduce corrupt or predatory behaviours.

Conclusions

Drawing on both their military background and the ability to police civilians lays the foundation for the special nature of Stability Policing forces allowing them to be a unique bridge between government, civil law enforcement, military institutions, and the populace. If properly considered from the very first planning steps of military operations and adequately resourced, these police units who possess the know-how to operate among the host nation population by answering to its needs, are at the same time military entities apt to inter-operate within and jointly with conventional military units. This endows them with unique flexibility, robustness, and a set of skills no other military asset or civil entity can muster. In a nutshell, "their troops may be described as having policemen's minds in the bodies of soldiers,"[23] solving military problems like no other unit may, in particular, utilising law enforcement means and ways for total defence ends and contributing to improving societal resilience. Some aspects of threats to security and stability may in fact be better answered by non-combat and non-kinetic means, preferring instead Stability Policing solutions. First and foremost, this will require more thorough awareness about Stability Policing within NATO Nations and a revision of the security and total defence concepts aiming at wider and more thorough inclusion and use of Stability Policing, both as a concept and as an instrument to open up new perspectives and possibilities in countering actions of malign actors. Robust, deployable Stability Policing elements, bringing together the military, civil and civilian sectors, if properly employed and resourced, can greatly expand the response capacity of nations. They can contribute to improving their resilience in a strengthened and more redundant total defence approach. Acting within or reacting to hybrid campaigns requires solutions beyond "traditional combat means," and Stability Policing can operate in the policing remit. Stability Policing contributes to deterring, stopping, and countering illegal actions of attackers through legal targeting, with the added benefit of utilising non-lethal and non-kinetic means, thereby

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[23]   Statement by Lt. Gen. (UK Army) Sir Michael Jackson, the then KFOR Commander.

limiting collateral damage and improving the standing of the force with audiences from local to international levels, also within the battle of narratives. This and the continuous, intense interaction with the host nation government, security actors, and the populace are conducive to ameliorated resilience and therefore to enhanced chances for success in the remit of total defence.

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The Washington Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm [accessed: 30 May 2022].

What role can Stability Policing play in total defence and building resilience? Abstract

Threats to peace, stability and human rights of states and civil societies are increasingly of a non-military nature and fending them off requires adopting innovative approaches. These encompass, first and foremost, veering from the strictly military- and security-centred focus applied hitherto and looking at more comprehensive and holistic responses.

Furthermore, they seek to include all stakeholders within a state, including its military, the civil apparatus, the civilian populace, and private enterprises in a common defensive effort, namely the concept of total defence. Creating and improving positive interaction amongst relevant stakeholders and increasing their chances of successfully absorbing and surviving external shocks and attacks showcases another significant notion, namely resilience, not only in its acceptation within the Alliance, but in a wider understanding of the term. Stability Policing as a spearheading concept expanding the reach of NATO into the policing remit and as a cutting-edge deployable military capability is defined as suggesting, describing, and highlighting possible roles and contributions to both endeavours. Stability Policing offers innovative avenues of approach and a policing mindset by applying relevant police-related ways and means, and its "blue lens", and thus contributes to achieving the overarching goal of identifying, deterring, stopping, and countering threats, including those of a hybrid nature and in grey zones, also below the threshold of war.

Key words: Stability Policing, total defence, resilience, blue lens, unity, legal targeting, reinforcement of Host Nation Police Forces

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Economic defence as one of the pillars of total defence – the case of RTAs as an instrument of strengthening the EU's competitiveness on foreign markets[1]

Introduction

The modern world economy has been experiencing significant changes in recent decades. They result mainly from progressive globalisation accompanied by intensified competition on the international market and regional economic integration processes. The entanglement of the world's two largest economies (the USA and China) in a trade war, increasing protectionism, as well as a substantial weakening of the position of the organisation that globally manages international trade – the World Trade Organisation (WTO) – are not without significance. These trends represent a major challenge for the EU trade policy in terms of strengthening its competitive position in the global economy. Striving to improve this position is one of the drivers of economic integration, and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) are an increasingly important part of EU trade policy.

Building the right relationship with the actors on the international arena and, in particular, the appropriate formation of trade contacts is undoubtedly a key element in reinforcing the competitiveness and building the resilience of economies, especially in the context of economic defence. This is particularly important in a situation of dynamic changes in economic conditions and periodic regional and global crises, as it has been well exemplified by the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine.

The choice of the research problem is closely related to the key changes taking place in the global economy. The topicality and significance of the problem necessitate in-depth analysis and evaluation of these phenomena, which have not yet been subjected to in-depth analysis in the literature on the subject, therefore the article is also an attempt at filling this gap.

The aim of this article is to present EU trade agreements in the context of their importance for the economic defence of the trade bloc, as well as to analyse the changes that have been introduced in the EU trade policy in the last two decades in relation to this issue. The main thesis of the paper is the assertion that the diversification of trade partners,[2] taking place especially through the conclusion of RTAs with countries with different levels of economic development, is vital for strengthening the competitive position of the EU in the global economy.

The analysis carried out in this paper is based mainly on original materials and scientific studies on the EU trade policy. Data from the resources of the European Commission and the WTO has also been used in the paper. In order to achieve the objectives of the article, mainly the analytical and descriptive methods were used. Due to the extent and complexity of the subject matter, the author focused on selected aspects of the problem at hand.

Economic defence as an element of total defence – international competitiveness as a tool for increasing the resilience of the economy

The concept of total defence emerged in Sweden in the early 1950s. During the Cold War, it meant extensive military-civilian preparations for national defence, which required cooperation and coordinated action between the armed forces, other public institutions, and society. After the end of the Cold War, the concept of total defence was gradually extended to include crisis management, non-military threats, and challenges to the state and society in peacetime.[3]

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[2]   The importance of this issue is particularly evident in the context of diversifying the directions of energy supplies, which is clearly visible during the crisis related to the war in Ukraine.

[3]   P. Szymański, *New ideas for total defence. Comprehensive security in Finland and Estonia*, Warszawa: OSW, 2020, p. 11.

The six pillars[4] of total defence currently identified are: military, civil, social, digital, psychological, and economic defence. Their interaction is crucial in the face of a wide range of complex and multifaceted challenges and threats experienced by the economies of individual countries. However, taking into account the dynamic changes that the world economy has undergone in recent decades, the key aspects now seem to be those related to economic defence, which is associated with reinforcing the competitiveness and attractiveness of individual economies. It allows taking quick action in case of challenges or crises, such as a global slowdown or an economic crisis. Increasing the level of competitiveness which strengthens economic resilience allows for overcoming a crisis situation faster.[5]

Recent years have shown that economies operate in a complex and unstable economic environment to which they must constantly adapt. International competitiveness, understood as the ability to adapt to changing conditions, allowing the economy to maintain and improve its market position in global conditions,[6] or the ability to maintain leadership in trade[7] depends not only on internal resources, but also on many external factors that shape its position in the world economy. The most important of these include such aspects as the prevailing market situation, access to information,[8] and access to necessary resources.[9] International

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[4] Military: it consists in building a strong and powerful defense force and the ability to defend itself in the event of an attack; civil: actions to protect the population, workplaces, and public utility facilities, as well as cultural goods, rescuing and helping war victims, and cooperation in combating natural disasters and environmental threats and removing their effects; social: building mutual trust and strengthening ties between different ethnic groups; digital: the ability to respond to cyberattacks targeting networks and infrastructure, as well as threats such as fake news and deliberate online forgery; psychological: the will and determination to defend lifestyle and interests, and a fighting spirit to overcome challenges and threats together. See: Total Defence, https://www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/mindef/defence-matters/defence-topic/defence-topic-detail/total-defence [accessed: 19 April 2022].

[5] *Ibidem.*

[6] K. Żukrowska, Konkurencyjność systemowa w procesie transformacji. Przykład Polski, [in:] *Konkurencyjność gospodarki Polski w dobie integracji z Unią Europejską i globalizacji*, eds. J. Bossak, W. Bieńkowski, vol. I, Warszawa: Szkoła Główna Handlowa, 2001, p. 83.

[7] Definition by N. Tunzelmann [as cited in:] J. Borowski, "Koncepcje teoretyczne konkurencyjności międzynarodowej", *Optimum. Studia Ekonomiczne*, no. 4 (76), 2015, p. 30.

[8] Providing timely and accurate information is critical to dealing with crises. An informed public is better equipped to make sound decisions, including on trade-related issues. Noteworthy in this context is a dedicated section on the WTO website that provides up-to-date trade information; COVID-19 and world trade, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/covid19_e.htm [accessed: 12 February 2022].

[9] D. Bargłowska, Metodologiczne aspekty oceny konkurencyjności firm, [in:] *Strategie konkurencji przedsiębiorstw. Wybrane zagadnienia*, ed. J. Szabłowski, Białystok: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Finansów i Zarządzania, 2004, pp. 49–52.

competitiveness is also related to ensuring economic security which, as an element of overall security, has its roots in the concept of total defence.[10]

As a key category of international relations, security has been subject to significant transformations, especially since the early 1990s. Globalisation processes and the growing interconnectedness of actors in the world economy contribute to the emergence of new threats, which causes the analysis to include non-military aspects, especially those of an economic nature. This is related to the fact that the position of a country in the world economy is now largely determined by its economic potential. In this context, the foreign economic policy pursued by a given country/group is of particular importance, with trade policy being at its core.[11]

Among numerous definitions of economic security in the literature,[12] from the perspective of the issues of this paper, it is particularly relevant to point out that the term involves maintaining economic cooperation with other actors so that the benefits of exchange can be obtained.[13] A key element of economic security policy, on the other hand, is the appropriate "formation of relations with other entities in the international arena and entering into commercial relations with both states and other actors on the international scene."[14] Therefore, building an ever-widening network of economic ties with multiple partners enables access to new markets and expands the cooperation that has already been undertaken.

Current changes in the global economic order are of great importance for the modern world economy. The acceleration of economic integration processes driven by increased trade flows, leads to new opportunities for economic growth and development, but also puts pressure on natural resources. The result of these processes is a change in the nature of world trade, so trade policy and the EU's overall approach

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[10] A holistic approach to security is considered to be a way of increasing a country's resilience to external pressures. The importance of the holistic security concept will grow, also due to the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic and the negative effects of climate change. See: P. Szymański, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

[11] Cf.: M. Czermińska, *Wspólna polityka handlowa Unii Europejskiej. Znaczenie dla ochrony jednolitego rynku wewnętrznego i międzynarodowego bezpieczeństwa ekonomicznego*, Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2019, p. 125.

[12] See: J. Czaputowicz, *System czy nieład? Bezpieczeństwo europejskie u progu XXI wieku*, Warszawa: WN PWN, 1998, p. 23; E. Frejtag-Mika, Z. Kołodziejak, W. Putkiewicz, *Bezpieczeństwo ekonomiczne we współczesnym świecie*, Radom: Politechnika Radomska, 1996, p. 10; K.M. Księżopolski, *Ekonomiczne zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa państwa. Metody i środki przeciwdziałania*, Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, 2004, p. 51; T. Szubrycht, "Współczesne aspekty bezpieczeństwa państwa", *Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Marynarki Wojennej*, R. XLVII, no. 4 (167), 2006, http://yadda.icm.edu.pl/baztech/element/bwmeta1.element.baztech-article-BWM9-0001-0016 [accessed: 6 June 2022].

[13] Z. Nowakowski, *Bezpieczeństwo państwa w koncepcjach programowych partii parlamentarnych w Polsce po 1989 roku*, Warszawa: Towarzystwo Naukowe Powszechne, 2009, p. 121.

[14] J. Sojka, E. Waloszczyk, *Bezpieczeństwo ekonomiczne państwa w procesie globalizacji gospodarki*, Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2008, pp. 82–83.

to international competitiveness need to be adapted to this situation. Eliminating restrictions on access to resources is becoming a priority, as measures taken by some trading partners to limit the availability of raw materials can threaten EU industry.[15] As mentioned before, this is especially important in crisis situations such as the war in Ukraine.

Restrictions on access to resources, unless justified on security or environmental grounds, should therefore be removed using the opportunities offered by trade agreements, which will contribute to improving the competitive position and building the resilience of the EU economy, which also means the position of all national economies will be reinforced indirectly.

RTAs as part of EU trade policy in the context of strengthening the EU's competitiveness on foreign markets

Regional trade agreements are defined as international agreements to create a free trade area or customs union that deal primarily with issues involving aspects of trade policy.[16] Goode identifies trade regionalism with the set of actions that governments take to liberalise or facilitate trade in a region, taking the form of trade agreements in the nature of regional trade agreements (RTAs) or preferential trade agreements (PTAs).[17] Referring, in turn, to the definition used by the WTO, RTAs[18] are reciprocal trade agreements between two or more partners.[19] On the other hand, they do not have to be regional partners from a geographical point of view, thus, it is possible to conclude trade agreements between countries/trade blocs from distant regions of the world. These agreements are now an important part of the EU's trade policy, which should be viewed through the prism of two key factors. The first is the position of the EU as an economic power and key

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[15]   An important element determining security and stability is the diversification of raw material supplies, thanks to which the state is able to ensure an appropriate level of resources for its functioning. See: Global Europe. Competing in the world. A Contribution to the EU's Growth and Jobs Strategy, Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 4.10.2006, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0567:FIN:en:PDF, pp. 3–4 [accessed: 15 February 2022].

[16]   A. Budnikowski, *Ekonomia międzynarodowa*, Warszawa: PWE, 2017, p. 269.

[17]   W. Goode, *Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 302.

[18]   The terms regional trade agreements (RTAs) and preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are sometimes used interchangeably in the literature on the subject. According to the WTO, PTAs refer to unilateral preferences. In the present paper, the author relies on the WTO definition and thus applies the indicated distinction. See: Regional trade agreements and the WTO, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/scope_rta_e.htm [accessed: 2 February 2022].

[19]   *Ibidem*.

trading partner of many countries, the second is the already mentioned dynamics of change in the global economy, which requires entities such as the European Union to constantly review their approach to foreign policy.

The lack of progress in WTO negotiations, observed for more than a decade and leading the organisation towards an inevitable reform of its activities, and the significant involvement in the construction of new RTAs by other actors[20] in different regions of the world, have influenced a change in the approach to EU trade policy.[21] Thus, the main instrument for implementing this policy is precisely the trade agreements concluded with third countries,[22] which leads to the reinforcement of existing economic ties and the identification of new areas of cooperation.[23]

Therefore, the EU is taking concrete steps to implement regional agreements safeguarding its trade interests, filling a gap in an increasingly ineffective multilateral system, and thus moving away, at least to some extent, from liberalisation of a multilateral nature, since this approach, although promoted by the EU, has not contributed sufficiently to deepening liberalisation and strengthening the competitive position of the member states.[24] Hence, the moratorium on new FTA negotiations[25] was suspended, and the official documents emphasised the significance of RTAs for EU trade policy as a complement to the solutions applied in the multilateral forum of the WTO. The initiative undertaken on the EU forum in 2000, called the Lisbon Strategy, which was supposed to make the EU the most competitive

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[20] This includes not only countries but also economic groups that are crucial for the EU in terms of their importance for its trade flows, but also for strengthening the EU's position in the global economy and building resilience to economic crises.

[21] Several reasons are identified for changes in the approach to the EU's policy on RTAs. In addition to those mentioned above, there have been changes in US trade policy, the booming economic growth in Asia and the accompanying conclusion of a number of FTAs, but also changes within the EU – for instance, the replacement of Pascal Lamy as the EU's Commissioner for Trade, who had a moratorium on new FTA negotiations, by Peter Mendelson, who has been more willing to consider FTAs. See: S. Woolcock, "European Union Policy towards Free Trade Agreements", *ECIPE Working Paper*, no. 3, 2007, p. 2, https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/174818/1/ecipe-wp-2007-03.pdf [accessed: 6 June 2022].

[22] The steps taken are also a response to the current changes in world trade, including, among others, the intensification of protectionist tendencies in US trade policy. Hence, the conclusion of agreements with Japan and Vietnam is a signal of support for the principles of free trade.

[23] B. Michalski, *Porozumienia regionalne w świetle zasad WTO*, https://www.ism.uni.wroc.pl/sites/ism/art/michalski_porozumienia_regionalne_w_swietle_zasad_wto.pdf [accessed: 22 January 2022].

[24] See: A.M. El-Agraa, *The European Union. Economics and Policies*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 4–15.

[25] The moratorium was based on a consensus among member states and the EC during preparations for a comprehensive multilateral round of negotiations in the late 1990s; S. Woolcock, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

economy in the world within a decade, did not bring the expected results.[26] That is why, in 2006, it was decided that it was necessary to take action to strengthen bilateral trade policy, which would lead to an increase in the EU's competitiveness through the signing of new trade agreements (competitiveness-driven free-trade agreements).[27] The 2006 strategy marked a turning point in EU efforts, as the important role assigned to RTAs has been noted ever since. It is also important that the strategy sets out the main economic criteria for new FTA partners. These criteria included market potential (economic size and growth) and the level of protection against EU export interests (tariff and non-tariff barriers). Great importance was also attached to the issue of negotiating trade agreements with EU competitors in specific regions.[28]

Among the subsequent documents emphasizing bilateral actions, the following are particularly noteworthy:

- EUROPE 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth – it emphasised the fact that Europe's development should be driven by its external policy instruments through the activity in the WTO and the maintenance of bilateral contacts providing better access to markets and a level playing field with external competitors;[29]
- Trade for all. Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy – a 2015 strategy aimed at enabling the effective implementation of bilateral trade agreements, which also underlined the complementary nature of these agreements in relation to actions taken at the WTO. It was stressed that the multilateral system, as a set of rules underpinning the world trade order, should remain the foundation of EU trade policy;[30]
- Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy – the EU's new 2021 trade strategy which highlighted how trade policy can contribute to the resilience of the EU economy by ensuring a stable, rules-based trade framework, opening new markets to diversify sources of supply, and developing a cooperative

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[26]   J. Piotrowski, "Strategia Lizbońska – przyczyny niepowodzenia", *Unia Europejska.pl*, no. 1 (212) 2012, p. 39 ff, http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-60a830f3-390d-4d87-94ea-7ec6db187d01/c/UE.pl_1_2012.39-50.pdf [accessed: 6 June 2022].

[27]   Global Europe…, *op. cit.*

[28]   *Ibidem.*

[29]   EUROPE 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth, Brussels: European Commission, 2.03.2010, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:2020:FIN:EN:PDF [accessed: 10 February 2021].

[30]   It is not only a set of rules in the form of international standards and procedures governing trade, but also a system of dispute settlement that has helped to limit unilateral retaliation and effectively counteract the growing protectionist tendencies in the global economy; Trade for all. Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy, Luxembourg: European Union, 2015, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf [accessed: 15 February 2021].

framework for fair and equitable access to key supplies. The paper stressed the significance of reforming the WTO, but particular emphasis was placed on the implementation and enforcement of bilateral trade agreements.[31]

Consequently, the strategies adopted emphasise the growing prominence of concluded and negotiated RTAs while stressing the role that the WTO plays or should play, which is justified by the share of preferential partners in total EU trade, discussed below. Importantly, bilateral agreements have also been described as a "testing ground for global trade liberalisation," meaning that their implementation can also contribute to supporting multilateral liberalisation and restoring the WTO's role as the main forum for global trade negotiations.[32]

The EU enters into trade agreements[33] of varying levels of sophistication, and the motives behind these actions vary. However, the economic reasons are particularly important and include the search for new markets, which is crucial in the context of the problem of increasing competitiveness and building resilience of the EU economy analysed here. Thus, the goal of the EU's trade agreement negotiations is mainly to bolster its competitive position in the global economy, which strengthens its economic defences. Trade agreements contribute to this in two ways: they allow European enterprises to gain access to the raw materials and supplies they need more easily and at lower prices, which helps them to remain competitive. On the other hand, they allow them to compete more effectively abroad and export more to countries and regions outside the EU, which is also important for building competitive trade agreements, especially in regions of high importance to the EU's economic interests.[34]

It is also worth noting that the EU is the most active participant in RTAs in the global economy, and the range of trade agreements concluded by the EU is expanding every year. This is definitely an upward trend, especially because of the many RTAs that are under negotiation. In 2020, the EU implemented 45 trade agreements with

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[31]   Trade Policy Review – An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy, Brussels: European Commission, 18.02.2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:5bf4e9d0-71d2-11eb-9ac9-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF [accessed: 10 January 2021].

[32]   Trade for all…, op. cit.

[33]   The European Commission, on behalf of the EU, negotiates trade agreements with third countries. The Council of the EU, on the other hand, gives a negotiating mandate to the Commission and signs agreements on behalf of the EU. At the final stage of the procedure, once the European Parliament gives its consent, the Council adopts a decision concluding the agreement and implementing it into EU law; EU trade agreements, European Council – Council of the European Union, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/trade-policy/trade-agreements/ [accessed: 19 April 2022].

[34]   The Asia-Pacific is such a region, with two regional agreements of particular importance to EU interests: Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

77 partners.[35] Trade with these partners amounts to €1,300 billion, representing almost 35% of the EU's external trade.[36]

Figure 1. EU merchandise trade by preferential partners (2020)

Source: Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Implementation and Enforcement of EU Trade Agreements, Brussels: European Commission, 27.10.2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021SC0297&from=EN [accessed: 11 January 2022].

Building resilience to crises in the context of economic defence through a network of bilateral agreements is particularly evident in the case of the current COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. Negative impacts on trade are inevitable, but available evidence suggests that the EU's extensive network of trade agreements can nevertheless effectively contribute to counteracting or at least mitigating these negative impacts, also through diversification of supply chains.[37] This is confirmed by the fact that, as far as annual trade growth by partner (2019–2020) is concerned, trade under preferential agreements registered a lower decline than with non-preferential partners. Trade with the EU's preferential partners declined by 9.1% during the period under review, compared to a decline of 11.1%

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[35]   The Vietnam agreement is not included here since it came into force on 1 August 2020. Similarly, the EU-UK TCA, which entered into force on 1 January 2021, is not included here since it was not applied in 2020.

[36]   Given the EU's success in negotiating trade agreements, it should be borne in mind that almost two-thirds of the EU's trade with the rest of the world, including trade with the United States, China, Russia and India, is now taking place on the basis of rules guaranteed by the WTO (MFN), which also demonstrates the need for a well-functioning global organisation to govern international trade.

[37]   It is also important from the point of view of the need to minimise the risks resulting from actions taken by other key EU economies which, by participating in the network of trade agreements, gain better conditions for trade. On the other hand, one should also bear in mind the problem of trade dependence, mainly on China.

with non-preferential partners. The same trend was reflected in preferential ex-
ports of goods, with declines of about 2 percentage points less than in non-prefe-
rential trade.[38] Just as in 2018, when there was a slowdown in global trade and an
increase in protectionist tendencies, EU preferential agreements resulted in trade
facilitation, so now, despite the COVID-19 pandemic having a major negative im-
pact on trade in 2020, EU agreements continued to facilitate trade significantly and
strengthen the EU's position in the global economy in this regard.

Conclusions

Dynamic changes occurring in the global economy make it necessary to operate
in a complex and unstable economic environment to which economies must con-
stantly adapt. This requires entities such as the European Union to continually reas-
sess their approach to foreign policy, which involves taking steps to build resilience
to crises and secure commercial interests. Filling a gap in an increasingly ineffective
multilateral system, but also responding to actions taken by other actors, the EU
is focusing on implementing bilateral trade agreements, an increasingly important
component of EU trade policy that aims to bolster the EU's competitive position in
the global economy, which strengthens its economic defence.

   Therefore, a stronger and more resilient EU requires the use of trade instru-
ments to pursue its policy objectives. The implemented trade agreements allow Eu-
ropean companies to gain an easier and cheaper access to the raw materials and
supplies they need, helping them to remain competitive. By opening up foreign mar-
kets, such as those of South Korea, Canada and Japan, trade agreements make EU
products more competitive and improve the export competitiveness of the member
states, which is also important for the development of other economic powers and
their participation in a network of trade agreements, especially in regions of great
importance for the EU's economic interests. By taking these actions, the EU is seen
as a pillar of economic security for member states, because by strengthening the
EU economy as a whole and building its resilience in general, the position of all its
members is reinforced indirectly.

   The results of the analysis carried out lead to the confirmation of the thesis
adopted in the introduction – in the light of the current problems occurring in the
world economy, including the war in Ukraine, it turns out that the diversification
of trade partners, especially through concluding RTAs with countries with different

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[38]   Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Eco-
       nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Implementation and En-
       forcement of EU Trade Agreements, Brussels: European Commission, 27.10.2021, https://
       eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021SC0297&from=EN
       [accessed: 11 January 2022].

levels of economic development, is of key importance for building the EU's competitive position in the global economy and thus allows to become independent of a single supplier, especially as far as strategically important raw materials are concerned.

As in the aftermath of the 2008+ global economic crisis, trade will be crucial to the EU's economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. Particularly as the global organisation that governs international trade weakens, trade liberalisation through bilateral agreements can contribute to a significant reinvigoration of trade relations and the strengthening and expansion of cooperation, especially in difficult (post)pandemic times. The effective implementation of EU trade agreements would therefore strongly support the long-term competitiveness and resilience of the European economy and thus strengthen economic defence, increasing the EU's prospects for leadership and competitive advantage in the global market.

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Economic defence as one of the pillars of total defence – the case of RTAs as an instrument of strengthening the EU's competitiveness on foreign markets
Abstract

Dynamic changes taking place in the global economy make it necessary to function in a complex and unstable economic environment, to which economies must constantly adapt. This compels entities such as the European Union to systematically review and appropriately shape its foreign policy, which involves taking actions to build resilience to crises and secure commercial interests. Particularly in view of the weakening position

of the organisation globally managing international trade, the EU focuses on the imple-mentation of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), which are an increasingly important el-ement of EU trade policy and are aimed at strengthening the EU's competitive position in the global economy and building resilience to crises, which bolsters its economic de-fence. These aspects constitute an important and current research problem, especially in the context of current events in the global economy.

The aim of this article is to present EU trade agreements in the context of their im-portance for the economic defence of the trade bloc, as well as to analyse the changes that have been introduced in the EU trade policy in the last two decades in relation to this issue.

The analysis is based mainly on original materials and scientific studies on EU trade policy, as well as data from the European Commission and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The analytical and descriptive methods were mainly used.
The results of the analysis carried out in the article showed that the implemented trade agreements lead to the strengthening of the competitive position of the EU and the strengthening of economic defence. By taking these actions, the EU is perceived as a pillar of the economic security of the Member States.

Key words: economic competitiveness, economic defence, trade policy, RTA, UE

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The idea of synergic quality management as a key pillar of building social resilience

Objectives, context, and methodology

The aim of this article is to discuss the idea of synergistic management through quality in the context of the role it plays in building social resilience, present definition problems, concepts, methods, and techniques, as well as the role of leadership and the evolution of management principles through quality.

The research methods used in this work include content and background data analysis, comparative analysis, a case study, conceptual analysis and synthesis used to draw key conclusions after a literature review on various concepts and methods of quality management. The use of the above-mentioned methods allowed the identification of common characteristics and, at the same time, the elimination of irrelevant features and finding specific dependencies in the studied phenomena.

Quality management,[1] the role of competences, and building social resilience[2] are currently key topics that have been very popular for several decades and are analysed by representatives of various scientific disciplines. They are interesting because they concern almost every area of our lives – their development as well as problems to be solved, implementing innovations, constantly taking into account the context of

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[1] See J. Dahlgaard, K. Kristensen, G.K. Kanji, *Fundamentals of Total Quality Management*, London: Routledge, 1997.

[2] See A. Lipka, "Rezyliencja organizacji w warunkach cyberdyskredytacji – definicja i determinanty", *Zarządzanie i Finanse/ Journal of Management and Finance*, vol. 14, no. 2, part 2, 2016, pp. 193–204.

socio-cultural, economic and technological changes, the security environment, and other key spheres. Therefore, the security environment is "[...] a universal method of improving the efficiency of human teams. This method, although today still the most frequently used in enterprise management, has a much wider range, as it is also used in the management of public and local administration institutions, education, health care, and even the police and the army."[3]

Social resilience and management through quality

The resilience of a society[4] is most often defined as the endurance and/or vulnerability of social groups of various ranges to the influence of environmental, social, infosphere/cyber, and biological factors, as well as military and non-military threats that may affect the acceptable standard of living and functioning of these groups. The current *Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* (National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland) of 12 May 2020 contains a statement about the need to "increase the state's resistance to threats by creating a universal defence system based on the efforts of the entire nation and by building understanding for the development of the resistance and defence capabilities of the Republic of Poland."[5]

Management through quality[6] (Total Quality Management, TQM) is defined differently. The most popular approach is comprehensive or total quality management. The idea concerns a pro-quality approach to life and work based on cooperation (with particular emphasis on the sense of teamwork), commitment, mindfulness, self-control, and the need to develop and improve one's own qualifications and competences. Ultimately, that affects the long-term development and well-being of employees and institutions as well as potential applicants, customers, etc., Additionally, a wide range of institutions and people using the services of a company/institution or cooperating within various areas (e.g., social, cultural, economic, educational) understood it in various aspects.

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[3] See A. Blikle, *Doktryna jakości. Rzecz o turkusowej samoorganizacji*, II ed., Gliwice: Helion, 2017, p. 346.

[4] See Benedikter R., Fathi K. "What is a Resilient Society?", *International Policy Digest*, 17 September 2017, https://intpolicydigest.org/2017/09/17/what-is-a-resilient-society/ [accessed: 8 February 2022]. Chenoweth E., Stephan M.J. *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, New York 2011.

[5] *Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2020*, https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dokumenty/Strategia_Bezpieczenstwa_Narodowego_RP_2020.pdf [accessed: 14 February 2022].

[6] See A. Hamrol, W. Mantura, *Zarządzanie jakością. Teoria i praktyka*, Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2002; M. Urbaniak, *Zarządzanie jakością. Teoria i praktyka*, Warszawa: Difin, 2004.

An important starting point is the analysis of what quality is all about and whether quality and value can be used interchangeably. Unfortunately, this happens quite often. The concept of quality emerges mainly in connection with a service or product. It could be also both, because these two issues are often interrelated.[7] However, while we believe that a product or service should be good or very good, it is more difficult to determine how these issues should be measured in order to assess them in the context of whether they meet or they do not meet (or meet only partially, and if so, to what extend) certain criteria that a product or service to be considered at least good. Looking at various solutions, various institutions differently motivate people to work in order to develop good-quality products and services. So, it is clearly visible that the end result invariably depends firstly on the will (not so much external as internal motivation), and secondly, on the competence (knowledge, skills, and qualifications) of employees. Naturally, it is desired situation when willingness and competence go hand in hand, but this is not always the case nor does it depend only on the person/employee, but also on a number of external conditions. Sometimes there is a will, but lack of skills (the reasons lie not only with the employee, but also with the company), other times there is a know-how package, but a lack of motivation. Often because the employer settles employees not for quality, but according to purely quantitative criteria, i.e., for exceeding the standard or not meeting it.

Concepts and methods of management through quality

The beginnings of the concept of management through quality date back to the second half of the 20th century in the United States and are a continuation of the success of the Japanese economy in the mid-20th century. The trend of comprehensive quality management by TQM found many enthusiasts. Unfortunately, it was not always understood correctly, hence its effectiveness varied greatly. This process continues to this day. Its sources, however, can be found in the 1920s in Walter Shewhart's[8] research on the development of the principles of statistical process control, which provided the basis for statistical quality control, already used during World War II in the American defence industry. In the 1940s, engineers from Japan became interested in these solutions. Walter Shewhart's student William Edwards Deming introduced them as part of a series of lectures given in Japan. In the 1950s, the knowledge of quality and statistics was promoted in Japan by Joseph Juran.

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[7]   See chapter "Jakość a wartość", [in:] A. Blikle, *op. cit.*, pp. 356–357.
[8]   See W.A. Shewhart , *Economic control of quality of manufactured product*, New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1931; W.E. Deming, "Walter A. Shewhart, 1891–1967", *The American Statistician*, vol. 21 no. 2, 1967, pp. 39–40; Bayart D., "Walter Andrew Shewhart", [in:] *Statisticians of the Centuries*, eds. C.C. Heyde, E. Seneta , New York: Springer 2001, pp. 398–401.

At the beginning of the 1960s, the concept of TQC (Total Quality Control)[9] was formulated as comprehensive quality control combining a system of methods of developing, ensuring, and improving quality, and over time it expanded into the concept of Total Quality Commitment, also known in the 1970s as Company-Wide Quality Commitment (CWQC). Contemporary Japanese solutions in English-language texts often use the term Total Quality Control (TQC) instead of Total Quality Management (TQM). The key Total Quality Control (TQC) methods include: 5xS, Just in Time (JIT), *kaizen*, *hostin kanri*, Quality Function Deployment (QFD), and the so-called quality circles or 7 techniques for identifying and describing quality management problems.[10]

The 5xS method and *kaizen* are the most interesting and, at the same time, the main tools in the quality improvement process, especially at the operational level. As for the 5xS method, any improvement starts with it. Its basic assumption is to change the behaviour and existing habits of employees, and to activate them in their participation in the process of change. It consists of five elements: *seiri* (sorting – selection), *seiton* (setting in order), *seiso* (sweeping – cleaning/tidying up), *seiketsu* (standardising/neatness), and *shitsuke* (self-discipline). The method is quite simple and effective. All these elements create one synergistic whole.[11]

Another interesting concept is the *kaizen* management philosophy derived from Japanese culture,[12] on the basis popular among concerns as Toyota, Honda or Sony. The term *kaizen* means continuous improvement by small steps. Only in this way, according to this concept, you can progress towards perfection. In the work environment, it means, inter alia, mobilising the entire team towards analysing processes, rules, and implementations in order to eliminate errors and improve work in various sectors of the company/institution. It is a people-driven strategy that pays a lot of attention to the work environment and organisational culture. This philosophy is often presented in relation to the Western system of managing an institution, which takes into account two functions: firstly, maintaining the status quo (maintaining the current state of procedures, technology, organisational culture, and rules) and secondly, innovation, i.e., all actions and initiatives mainly from the management staff), which are of pivotal importance for the functioning of the organisation. The Japanese

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9   *Difference Between TQM and TQC*, 21 August 2014, https://www.differencebetween.com/difference-between-tqm-and-vs-tqc/ [accessed: 22 March 2022].

10   M. Krasiński, *Kulturowe uwarunkowania wykorzystywania japońskich koncepcji, metod i technik zarządzania*, Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, 2014.

11   J. Michalska D. Szewieczek. "The 5S methodology as a tool for improving the organization", *Journal of Achievements in Materials and Manufacturing Engineering*, vol. 24, no. 2, 2007, pp. 211–214.

12   See J. Miller, M. Wróblewski, J. Villafuerte, *Creating a Kaizen Culture: Align the Organization, Achieve Breakthrough Results, and Sustain the Gains*, New York: McGraw Hill Professional 2013.

management system includes, apart from these two, another function – *kaizen*, small steps of improvement of the company, implemented by employees inspired by the management.[13]

There is a fundamental difference between *kaizen* (improvement) and innovation (spectacular innovation). In the first case, there are small steps, conventional know-how steps, effort, process orientation, and a free growth policy. In the case of innovation, there are big steps, discoveries, investments, focus on results, and a policy of rapid growth. Both of the described 5xS methods and the *kaizen* philosophy are used together with the other mentioned methods.

Management through quality in terms of William Edwards Deming's concept

In the 1980s, a real revolution in the context of quality was made by Deming, the aforementioned American specialist in the field of management (with a doctorate in physical sciences). He belonged to a group of US experts whose task was to support Japan in restoring its industry after World War II. He had significant achievements in the development of shipbuilding and optical and armaments industry after introducing the principles of quality management and statistical quality control methods. The beginning of the 1950s was a very difficult period for Japan – the lost war, the emotionally broken society in need of support, and the industry associated with low-quality products, presented an excellent area for Deming to provide effective support and build an industry which would in the future become competitive in the world markets. The implementation of his plan was designed for 25 years, and the assumptions were fulfilled. In the mid-1970s, the Japanese electronics and optical industries became competitive for the European and American markets. After these spectacular achievements, American interest in Deming grew in the 1980s, when he returned to the United States and NBC broadcast his short lecture entitled "If Japan can, why can't we?"[14] It was then that he became the subject of special interest to corporations, so he began to conduct training cycles based on the principles that he implemented on the Japanese market, leading the economy of The Land of Cherry Blossoms to spectacular prosperity.

Over the past four decades, more and more companies around the world have been introducing the method (often referred to as the Japanese-American method) to improve the efficiency and quality of organisations with different statutes, goals, and functions. These are hospitals, banks, public and local government institutions, schools, military structures, and services. Amongst them are General Motors, Ford,

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[13] See E. Czech, P. Czech "Kaizen – japoński system zarządzania jakością", *Zeszyty Naukowe Politechniki Śląskiej*, no. 1675, *Seria Transport*, no. 57, 2005, pp. 44–45.

[14] A. Blikle, *op. cit.*, p. 349.

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Royal Dutch Shell, US Navy, and public administration. Qualitative management in the workplace is associated with a change in attitudes towards the private sphere, intelligent use of free time and the need to have it, so that it has an effective impact on work, development, and general condition of a workforce, their ability to act and effectively work in a group to create reality.[15]

The development of the idea of management through quality shows where on the horizontal axis we have successively placed the stages of pro-quality management development from the lowest to the most advanced level. These stages are quality control, quality control, quality assurance, quality management and comprehensive quality management (TQM, lean). On the vertical axis, looking from the lowest to the most advanced level, are final control, statistical tools, design, prevention, process and system approach, management orientation towards quality in correlation with comprehensive quality management.[16] This process has been presented in detail in professional literature merging economics, management and social sciences.[17]

The implementation of the Total Quality Commitment (TQC) methods developed in the Japanese market was named as a Total Quality Management (TQM) on the American market, often referred to as a philosophy that used a set of pro-quality methods. Not all of them came from Japan. Some of them, such as Failure Mode, Effects Analysis or Six Sigma, were developed by American corporations. The implementation of the rules taken literally from the Japanese market to the US or European market did not always bring results comparable to those in Japan. The reason for this was mainly due to the different organisational culture and socio-cultural conditions of various countries where the principles developed on the Japanese market were to be implemented. As it turned out, one of the key factors was the pace of changes and the implementation of tasks. Unfortunately, the focus on shortening the work-time conflicted with the strategy of gradual improvement distributed over a long-term process.

In the last decade of the 20th century, a kind of antidote to improve the work, quality was to be the implementation of the Business Process Reengineering method, which consisted in a rapid (revolutionary) implementation of changes in the company. Unfortunately, the method turned out to be very cost-consuming and ineffective, so its originators quickly withdrew from using it, especially in large projects, focusing only on key processes and their implementation. The quality management philosophy is popularised by national quality awards, including established in 1951 by the Union of Japanese Scientists and Engineers JUSE Deming, the annual (since 1992) European Quality Award organized by the European Quality Management

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[15]   *Ibidem.*

[16]   "Quality management development", Encyklopedia Zarządzania, https://mfiles.pl/pl/index.php/Plik:Quality_management_development.jpg [accessed: 24 January 2022].

[17]   A. Hamrol, W. Mantura, *op. cit.*; K. Lisiecka, *Kreowanie jakości: uwarunkowania, strategie, techniki*, Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uczelniane AE, 2002; H. Drummond, *The Quality Movement: What Total Quality Management is Really All About!*, London: Kogan Page, 1992.

Foundation (EFQM)[18] or the Polish Quality Award (PJN). Based on the latter there is a distinction award presented to outstanding enterprises since 1995 by the National Chamber of Commerce, Polish Research Centre and the Now Poland Foundation. All of these awards are based on criteria formulated under Total Quality Management.[19]

Principles, role of leadership, institution

When looking at the evolution of quality management principles, it is worth paying attention to a few concepts, which are the starting points for creating one's own concepts adapted to the type of organisation/institution, country, organisational culture, motivational preferences and other factors. At first, it is worth starting this review with the 14 principles formulated by W.E. Deming. He highlighted several processes, including planning, design, personnel management, and monitoring. In his opinion, over 90% of all problems related to the quality of operations of a company, organisation, or institution lie with managers.[20] They are responsible not only for quality management, but also ensure it through joint decision-making in cooperation with employees. He was not a supporter of management by objectives, results, pressure, or control; he often criticised these solutions. The theses formulated by him circulate in the professional literature in various versions. There are 14 of them in total. They are treated as the key to the efficient functioning of modern institutions based on interpersonal relations, statistical thinking (applying its methods and drawing conclusions based on them), and modern leadership.

The first principle concerns persistence in intentions (clearly defined long-term goals constructed not only with today's but future needs in mind, achieving quality based on fixed goals); the second – applying a new management philosophy (drawing conclusions from mistakes, avoiding waste, conscious and effective leadership); the third – resignation from mass control methods in order to ensure quality (buying on statistics in order to estimate errors/defects in the process and preventing/exclude errors); the fourth – ending the common practices of selecting co-operators (not guided by the lowest price but the quality of products and building long-term cooperation based on mutual trust and loyalty); the fifth – constant improvement of the quality of production/services (this will ultimately allow to permanently reduce costs and reduce errors); the sixth – introducing modern methods of employee development (all levels of staff, especially in the area of methodology and psychology of managing an

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[18] The Foundation has over 750 organisations representing European countries.
[19] "Polska Nagroda Jakości", Encyklopedia Zarządzania, https://mfiles.pl/pl/index.php/Polska_Nagroda_Jakości [accessed: 22 March 2022].
[20] See T. Skierniewski, *Diagnoza modelu zarządzania jakością w administracji rządowej. Raport z I etapu badania*, Warszawa: Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów, 2008.

institution and people); the seventh – building leadership (a leader who is a mentor, supports rather than controls and holds his employees accountable, builds relationships with subordinates); the eighth – removing fear in order to improve work efficiency (building quality relationship, it is not only the achievement of the goal and the numerical results that are important, but their quality); the ninth – removing barriers between departments (cooperation, joint problem-solving, understanding the company/institution as one organism, flattening the hierarchy, resignation from divisions, care for cooperation between departments); the tenth – elimination of the use of platitudes such as "zero defects" or "a new level of efficiency" (the core of low efficiency and quality is mainly on the side of management and the system); the eleventh – elimination of substitutes for leadership and management by objectives (using statistical methods); the twelfth – the elimination of barriers between positions (tasks) in an institution (work is a team, each employee and the activity performed by them is important and worth appreciating); the thirteenth – creating a solid programme of education and self-improvement; and lastly, the fourteenth principle – all employees should be involved in the transformation of the company/institution.[21] According to Deming, it is key for a leader to: understand the importance of team cooperation for the quality of the company's/institution's functioning, constantly analyse the subsequent phases of this process, create friendly working conditions, inspire trust, be an advisor/mentor, and constantly work on improving the quality of the company's functioning.[22]

The European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) has developed its own model of excellence, which encompasses nine areas.[23] The first of them is leadership (focus on values, commitment, employee institution improvement, clear communication of the vision, cooperation with the environment), which has a direct impact on the next three areas. The second are employees (selection, cooperation, competence development, communication, and motivation). The third are policy and strategy (methods of building a strategy, taking into account current and future needs, decision-making and implementation activities). The fourth are partnership and resources (management of information, relations with the environment, information, knowledge, and technology). All of these have an impact on the fifth area: processes (designing and improving processes and relations between team members/institutions and the environment, building a positive brand image). And they, in turn, affect the next areas: employees behaviours (motivation, commitment, effectiveness, quality, performed work), customer satisfaction (perception

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[21]   See A. Blikle, *op. cit.*, pp. 366–367; „Dr. Deming's 14 Points For Management", The Deming Institute, https://deming.org/explore/fourteen-points [accessed: 21 February 2022].
[22]   *Ibidem.*
[23]   See *EFQM Excellence Model*, European Foundation for Quality Management, Brussels 2004, pp. 13–24.

of the organisation by the environment), environment (image, social responsibility, relations with the environment) and key performance results (final effects/results of activities and processes depending on the institution's profile).[24] All of these areas illustrate the EFQM Excellence Model.[25]

Although the presented concept of measuring the institution's excellence (quality) in the EFQM model shares many areas with the 14 principles formulated by Deming, which are the basis for the implementation of TQM, many analyses indicate the lack of correlation between the two proposals and are critical to measuring the level of advancement of quality management in a given institution/company/organisation using this model.[26] The analyses concern, inter alia, failure to define "quality" in the principles proposed in the EFQM model,[27] a lack of dependencies (defining relationships) between individual elements, too much approach of the institution to achieve the configuration of the presented model, regardless of the nature of the institution, the current market situation, and adopted methods and goals. The criticism also concerns a very superficial approach to the need for continuous improvement of the institution/company, taking into account the current conditions and trends, and focusing almost exclusively on meeting the EFQM model criteria and economic objectives.[28]

Deming's 14 principles and the concept of the "Quality Doctrine"

In addition to Deming's 14 principles and the concept of the European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM), the approach of Andrzej Blikle and his concept of the quality doctrine, which the Japanese-American method of W.E. Deming, in cooperation with the concepts of Peter Druckner and W. Shewhart, reduced to three basic principles which together constitute the "Doctrine of Quality". Blikle presented them in the form of a triangle, based on the "principle of rationality" (systemic thinking) and the "principle of cooperation" (building relationships), and at its top "the principle of continuous improvement" (comprehensives, continuous, improvements). Later Blikle described this concept in detail in his book *Doktryna jakości. Rzecz*

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[24] *Ibidem*.

[25] *Ibidem*, p. 12; See also „Europejska nagroda jakości", Encyklopedia Zarządzania, www//mfiles.pl/pl/index.php/Europejska_nagroda_jakości [accessed: 21 February 2022].

[26] See A. Hughes, D.N. Halsall, "Comparison of the 14 deadly diseases and the business excellence model", *Total Quality Management*, vol. 13, no. 2, 2002, pp. 255–263; *Criteria for Performance Excellence*, Baldrige National Quality Program, Milwaukee: American Society for Quality, 2005.

[27] See L.A. Wilson, R.F. Durant, "Evaluating TQM: The Case for a Theory Driven Approach", *Public Administration Review*, vol. 54, no. 2, 1994, pp. 137–146.

[28] See A. Sims, "Debate: Does the Baldrige Award really work?", *Harvard Business Review*, vol. 70, no. 4, 1992, pp. 126–147.

o turkusowej samoorganizacji (*The Doctrine of Quality: A thing about turquoise self-organization*).[29] The foundations of "The Doctrine of Quality" are the "principle of cooperation" and a slightly different system of motivating employees in the pursuit of excellence, aimed not only at individual striving/encouraging employees to do their best (with the least number of mistakes possible), but motivating them to regularly measure progress, analyse the causes of mistakes, sharing this knowledge with colleagues, jointly working out solutions to errors, aiming at quality improvement not alone, but as a team. The second foundation of the doctrine of quality is the "principle of rationality" which says, "If you want to change the course of a phenomenon, first make sure you have a good and comprehensive understanding of its mechanism."[30] This is the assumption that we may be dealing with in "don't know, don't know" situation. It is a sensible starting point for assessing our knowledge of the possibility of solving a given problem alone or in cooperation with people with specific competences. A professional approach to work, problem solving, and quality improvement is assumed to be present (a key principle) in all areas. And the last is a "principle of continuous improvement". The author begins with the thought that you can always remain average. But what is the perspective?[31] At the same time, he presented three recommendations necessary for the implementation of this principle. First of all, working on improving a specific product should not only focus on the product itself, but on all accompanying activities, tools, knowledge resources, and skills. All this constitutes the so-called "quality chain". Secondly, not only the so-called "specialists in maintaining quality," but all employees should be involved in the process of maintaining and improving it. And thirdly, working on improving quality is a continuous process.[32]

Conclusions, starting points for further development of the idea of management through quality

The concepts presented in this article, formulated on the basis of Total Quality Management (TQM), clearly show how comprehensive and continuous care for quality translates into excellent form of management and the profits resulting from it at subsequent stages, and the general well-being of employees and company managers – the basis for creativity and resistance to various factors disturbing this conjuncture. This is very vividly shown in the Deming Chain Reaction.[33] The approach to organisa-

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[29] A. Blikle, *op. cit.*

[30] *Ibidem*, p. 353.

[31] *Ibidem*, p. 352.

[32] *Ibidem*, pp. 252–253.

[33] See "Deming Chain Reaction", The Deming Institute, 15 October 2012, https://deming.org/deming-chain-reaction [accessed: 23 March 2022].

tional culture, work, employees, structure, motivation system and value orientation, and not just achieving ad hoc goals, is worth not only recalling, but also applying the concepts and methods formulated on the basis of Deming's 14 principles, the TQM philosophy, and methods of application in different areas of life. The above-mentioned principles and the concepts presented in this article are also an excellent basis for the ethical shaping of recipients' needs, the creation and improvement of principles focused around the idea of sustainable development,[34] building and continuously improving the quality of mental and social resilience of people, continuous improvement of quality standards, and many other issues in accordance with the principle of a constant process of quality development within various spheres of social, economic, cultural, scientific and many other? Social resilience should not be treated as a state, it is a process that, along with changes and accompanying problems to be solved, should be constantly updated, developed, and taken care of in terms of quality. This article is an attempt to draw attention to the importance of this need.

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[34]   See J. Kordos, W kierunku systemu informacji do sterowania rozwojem zrównoważonym, [in:] *Innowacyjność w zarządzaniu: jakością, produkcją, logistyką, personelem i organizacją – nauka i praktyka*, eds. S. Dawidziuk, M. Lewandowski, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Menedżerskiej, 2012; M. Bugdol, P. Jedynak, *Współczesne systemy zarządzania. Jakość, bezpieczeństwo, ryzyko*, Gliwice: Helion, 2012.

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The idea of synergic quality management as a key pillar of building social resilience
Abstract

The issues related to management, quality competences and social resilience for at least several decades have been very popular and are the subject of analyzes by representatives of various scientific disciplines. They are interesting because they concern almost every area of our life – their development and, at the same time, problems to be solved, implementing innovations, constantly taking into account the context of socio-cultural, economic, technological and other changes. Total Quality Management refers to a pro-quality approach to life and work based on cooperation, commitment, mindfulness, self-control, the need to develop and improve own qualifications and competences. Ultimately, this is to affect the long-term development and well-being of employees, institutions as well as potential applicants, customers, etc. and a wide range of institutions and people using the services of a company/institution or cooperating with it (within various spaces of social, cultural, economic, educational reality, etc.) and society understood in its various dimensions. The article deals with the key dimensions and contexts of the concept of comprehensive quality management, which is one of the key pillars of social resilience.

Key words: quality management, human teams, society, cooperation, development, competences, Total Quality Management, social resilience

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Just/unjust securitisation and social mobilisation

Introduction

Securitisation is defined as an intersubjective process of construing new categories or subcategories of security by identifying existential threats, the alleviation of which requires extraordinary measures and social acceptance.[1] Developed by The Copenhagen School in the 1990s, it responded to the collapse of the bipolar world, which had coincided with the expansion of security category. Terrorism, organized crime, hunger, and environmental degradation were named the new global threats, while security studies found a space for the perspective claiming that collective security was a sum of subjectively construed human securities, which has not only a military or political dimension, but also an economic, social, and ecological one. The combination of the Cold War optimism and the lack of a permanent military threat thus created a space for taking into consideration non-military problems that posed a threat to security.[2]

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[1]   B. Buzan, "Peace, Power, and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 21, issue 2, 1984, p. 111, https://doi.org/10.1177/002234338402100203.

[2]   P. Polko, "Securitisation of communication in public space during Covid 19 pandemic", *Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues*, vol. 10, no. 2, 2020, p. 15, http://doi.org/10.9770/jssi.2020.10.2(2).

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That is how security has become one of the keywords of modern communica-tion, sometimes used instrumentally as value,[3] mostly to justify various kinds of re-forms, restrictions, or expenditures for security reasons.[4] Thus, security should be regarded as a meta-operator with great impact, and as such, it offers great power – it can help solve problems which are theoretically far removed from the issue of se-curity (as in the case of securitisation of the AIDS threat and the need to combat the spread of HIV in Africa),[5] as well as exhibit its destructive power (securitisation of migration issues).[6] Securitisation theorists argue that a subject that has been suc-cessfully securitised will receive disproportionate attention and resources in com-parison with subjects that have not been securitised, even when the actually cause more harm. If a subject is successfully securitised, it is possible to legitimise extraor-dinary means to solve a perceived problem. This could include declaring a state of emergency or martial law, mobilizing the military, or attacking another country. However, it might undermine democratic processes and diminish necessary scru-tiny which should be focused on the political elites.[7]

Securitisation theory (ST) is based on three key elements – existential threat, ex-traordinary measures needed to combat the threat, and the acceptance of the "audi-ence" (mostly the elites or society). In order for threats to be considered security is-sues, they must meet a certain set of criteria "which distinguish them from the normal course of purely political issues."[8] The existential threat needs to be treated as the sub-ject of exceptional policies implemented outside the standard democratic processes.[9]

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3   K. Booth, Critical explorations, [in:] *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, ed. *eadem*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005, p. 22; M. Chehabeddine, M. Tvaronavičienė, "Securing regional development", *Insights into Regional Development*, vol. 2, no. 1, 2020, p. 439, http://doi.org/10.9770/IRD.2020.2.1(3).

4   K. Booth, Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist, [in:] *Critical Security Studies: Con-cepts and Cases*, eds. K. Krause, M.C. Williams, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, [cop. 1997], p. 106.

5   S. Elbe, "Should HIV/AIDS Be Securitised? The Ethical Dilemmas of Linking HIV/AIDS and Security", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 50, issue 1, 2006, pp. 119–144, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00395.x; C. McInnes, S. Rushton, "HIV/AIDS and securiti-zation theory", *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 19, issue 1, 2013, pp. 115–138, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066111425258.

6   J. Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*, London – New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 57.

7   P. Roe, "Is securitization a 'negative' concept? Revisiting the normative debate over normal ver-sus extraordinary politics", *Security Dialogue*, vol. 43, issue 3, 2012, pp. 249–266, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010612443723.

8   P. Hough, *Environmental Security: An Introduction*, London – New York: Routledge, 2014, p. 23.

9   A. Oels, From 'Securitization' of Climate Change to 'Climatization' of the Security Field: Comparing Three Theoretical Perspectives, [in:] *Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict*, eds. J. Scheffran, M. Brzoska, H.G. Brauch, P.M. Link, J. Schilling, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2012, p. 185, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28626-1_9.

The process of creating a security threat takes place through the "acts of speech" which highlight the danger associated with the issue, raise its political profile and justify the need for exceptional measures. In the first phase (identification), the issue is identified as a threat; in the subsequent phase (mobilisation), a request for emergency action is made.[10] This act involves two key players: the elite, who handle the securitisation and who are responsible for presenting the issue at hand through the lens of securitised conditions, and the general public, which justifies securitisation of the threat and the need for exceptional measures.

In the 21st century, securitisation processes have been intensified. The approach of analysing such areas as health care, finance, economy, or the environment through the prism of security is becoming common, and risk management practices are regularly used to manage vulnerability in such areas as epidemic threat, stock market volatility control, registration, control and profiling the behaviour of individuals as part of ensuring public safety and migration, as well as managing climate change scenarios.[11]

The popularity of the ST resulted in its multidimensional criticism. Among numerous examples of critics and modifications, one of the most interesting critics of the Copenhagen School is Rita Floyd,[12] who not only pointed out the gaps in the classical theory of securitisation, but also proposed her own normative approach, which over time resulted in the just securitisation theory (JST). Her last monograph significantly titled: *The Morality of Security* organises existing considerations about the shortcomings of the classic ST and proposes its own normative approach included in the theory of morally justified securitisation. The basic difference between this approach and her theory proposed by the Copenhagen School is, first of all, the existential threat itself, which – according to Floyd – should be objective (recognised as such, among others, thanks to research on the sincerity of potential aggressors). Therry Balzacq – who noticed that while it is difficult to identify objective threats to security, objective existential threats can already be successfully enumerated.[13] Secondly, according to Floyd, it

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[10] P. Roe, "Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK's Decision to Invade Iraq", *Security Dialogue*, vol. 39, issue 6, 2008, pp. 615–635, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010608098212.

[11] C. Hardy, S. Maguire, "Organizing risk: Discourse, power, and 'riskification'", *Academy of Management Review*, vol. 41, no. 1, 2016, p. 83, https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2013.0106.

[12] R. Floyd, "Can securitization theory be used in normative analysis? Towards a just securitization theory", *Security Dialogue*, vol. 42, issue 4–5, 2011, pp. 427–439, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010611418712; *eadem*, "Extraordinary or ordinary emergency measures: what, and who, defines the 'success' of securitization?", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol. 29, issue 2, 2016, pp. 677–694, https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2015.1077651; *eadem*, *Security and the environment: Securitisation theory and US environmental security policy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511730146.

[13] T. Balzacq, "The three faces of securitization: Political, agency, audience, and context", *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 11, issue 2, 2005, pp. 171–201, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066105052960.

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does not matter whether the recipients of the speech act accept it or not (which was crucial for the Copenhagen School) because the essence is the practice of security, the implementation of specific policies and not just accepting their description.[14] This can be illustrated by the following equation:

$$\text{ST: SECURITISATION} = \text{SECURITISATION MOVEMENT} + \text{AUDIENCE ACCEPTANCE}$$

where the securitisation movement can be understood as a justification for an existential threat

$$\text{JST: SECURITISATION} = \text{SECURITISATION MOVEMENT} + \text{SECURITY PRACTICE.}$$

According to Floyd, securitisation occurs not "'when' the audience accepts an existential risk justification, but when there is a change in the entity's behaviour that is justified by using a reference to the claimed threat. [...] Securitisation becomes effective through the fact that it took place without the need to break the normal rules or impose emergency measures" (it was enough that the existential threat was justified and "practice" was introduced).[15] Securitisation is successful only when the identification of the threat justifying the securitisation movement is followed by a change in the behaviour (action) of the securitisation actor (or someone else on their behalf), and when the action taken is justified by the securitisation actor by reference to the risk that has been identified and declared in the securitisation movement. The ultimate reference object is the human being, and security is not so much (not only) survival as the possibility of development (well-being).

Finally, according to Floyd, it is not necessary to use extraordinary methods to solve securitised issues. "Standard emergency measures" enshrined in the constitutions of liberal democracies will suffice, i.e., introducing new legal provisions in line with existing procedures; introducing new powers to manage a crisis situation within the existing legal order, approved by the relevant courts; and finally, the use of the existing security apparatus and legislation on states of emergency to deal with issues that have not been discussed before.

The aim of the research presented in this article was to analyse how the migration-security nexus has influenced social mobilisation in Poland after 1989. The presented research problem is contained in the question whether social mobilisation in Poland after 1989 was caused by the combination of migration issues with security issues and in what forms.

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[14]   R. Floyd, *Security and the environment...*, *op. cit*.
[15]   *Eadem*, "Extraordinary or ordinary...", *op. cit*., p. 691.

Materials and Methods

Migration as a matter of security

"Migration is more and more often interpreted as a security problem", Didier Bigo wrote in 2006. He noted that "the popularity of adopting this prism of security is not an expression of traditional responses to the increase in uncertainty, crime, terrorism, and the negative effects of globalisation, as is often believed, but a result of the continuity of threats and general anxiety in which many different actors place their fears and beliefs in the process of creating a risky and dangerous society."[16]

While presenting migration issues as a security issue has a long tradition, the turning point was undoubtedly the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which reminded global community of the role that migrants can play in the security sphere. When it became clear that the perpetrators of the attacks were migrants staying in the USA temporarily or illegally, the US migration services began to act with multiplied force, looking at migrants from the perspective of state security. The Patriot Act, the control of migration by the Department of Homeland Security, and the stricter procedures of the new migration policy completed the matter. Soon, many of the American solutions were implemented in Europe, after the terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004), London (2005), Paris (2015), Nice (2016), Brussels (2016), and Berlin (2016). The consensus on linking migration policy with security issues was only strengthened by events such as the 2015 migration crisis in Europe. Securitisation, and even "crimmigration", seems to be a trend that in recent years has covered the humanitarian perspective of looking at migrants through the prism of human rights, which, in their case, are violated or limited.

Hence, the securitisation of migration is perceived by some researchers as groundless, and sometimes also harmful. Many assessments of the securitisation processes point out their "irrationality" and "exaggeration".[17] As Jef Huysmans notes, "[...] in political debates about immigration and asylum, and about the regulation of the free movement of people in the European Union, migration has easily emerged as an existential threat to the state, society, and/or the completion of the internal market."[18] According to Will Kymlicka, in Central and Eastern Europe most state authorities believe that any minority autonomy constitutes an existential threat and

[16] D. Bigo, "Internal and External Aspects of Security", *European Security*, vol. 15, issue 4, 2006, p. 385, https://doi.org/10.1080/09662830701305831.

[17] B. Mcsweeney, "Identity and security: Buzan and the Copenhagen school", *Review of International Studies*, vol. 22, issue 1, 1996, pp. 81–93, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210500118467.

[18] J. Huysmans, "The Question of the Limit: Desecuritisation and the Aesthetics of Horror in Political Realism", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 27, issue 3, 1998, p. 569, https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298980270031301.

presents it as such to their societies.[19] This exaggeration – according to Paul Roe – requires that the situation regarding migration should be desecuritised and transferred to "ordinary politics," at least in part. Roe points out that the occurrence of the securitisation process of the indigenous minorities problem mainly concerns the Central and Eastern Europe. In the west of the Old Continent, this appears on a relatively small scale. In this part of Europe, there is a tendency to treat the issue of national and ethnic minorities and their rights rather in the context of justice, while in Central and Eastern Europe it is precisely through the prism of security.[20] In this respect, despite the desecuritisation of the issue of minority rights, postulated by Will Kymlicka or Matti Jutila,[21] for which there are no grounds for treating it as an existential threat for the whole society.

Migration in the Polish discourse and practice.
Five case studies of social mobilisation

The migration issues in the Polish discourse were presented and interpreted differently in the 20th and 21st centuries. After 1989, 5 different phases and 5 different attitudes can be distinguished, reflected in public discourse or decisions made by decision-makers, and in the directions of social mobilisation. In each of these periods, migration issues were related to security, at times through a very strong securitisation process.

1. The 1989–2001 period was devoted to the issues of the Polish diaspora around the world, the repatriation of Poles, especially from beyond the eastern border, and redressing the wrongs committed against them. At that time, problems such as ensuring their safety, including the right to keep their identity, and their safe return to the homeland were the most important in public discourse and practice. The rhetoric of moral obligation and the practice of repatriation and providing financial support were dominant.

2. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the USA and subsequent attacks in Europe, carried out by migrants or their descendants, were the beginning of the connotation: a migrant, especially from a Muslim country, is a terrorist. However, the rhetoric of a distant threat dominated public discourse. It had to be fought through the participation of the Polish Armed Forces in operations abroad. The situation lasted until 2014/2015. The rhetoric of distant

[19]   W. Kymlicka, Justice and Security in the Accommodation of Minority Nationalism: Comparing East and West, [in:] *The Politics of Belonging: Nationalism, Liberalism and Pluralism*, ed. A. Dieckhoff, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004, p. 128.

[20]   P. Roe, "Securitization and minority rights: Conditions of desecuritization", *Security Dialogue*, vol. 35, issue 3, 2004, pp. 279–280, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010604047527.

[21]   M. Jutila, "Desecuritizing Minority Rights: Against Determinism", *Security Dialogue*, vol. 37, issue 2, 2006, pp. 167–185, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010606066169.

threats and the practice of combating threats outside the Republic of Poland dominated.

3. The 2015 migration crisis in Europe introduced near-threatening rhetoric of a multi-dimensional nature. The migrant might not only be a potential terrorist, but most of all, posed a threat to economic security (employment, social benefits) and cultural security (domination of Islam). Near-threatening rhetoric and the practice of stopping the influx of migrants from the Middle East and Africa to Poland dominated.

4. The migration crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border, triggered by Alexander Lukashenka in the summer of 2021 by pushing out economic migrants brought to Belarus from the Middle East and North Africa and defined as a direct threat to the security of the Republic of Poland, was stopped by the available regular and emergency measures. The rhetoric of the country's defence and the practice of protecting the state border dominated.

5. The war in Ukraine, which began with the invasion of the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022, resulted in the arrival of almost 1.5 million refugees (children, women, older adults) in Poland in the first two weeks of the invasion. They were widely recognised as requiring systemic and individual humanitarian aid. The rhetoric of moral obligation and the practice of organising extensive support for the refugees arriving in Poland dominated.

This is graphically represented in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Five phases/attitudes to migration-security nexus in Poland

Source: Author's own study. The indicated phases and attitudes were analysed using the theoretical framework of the securitisation theory and just securitisation theory.

Results

Table 1 presents an analysis of the provided phases/attitudes towards the issue of migration presented in Poland after 1989. In the case of ST, the following elements of the securitisation process were examined: (1) identification of existential threat; (2) recommendation emergency measures; (3) the audience's acceptance; and (4) desecuritisation. In the case of JST, in accordance with the assumptions of this theory, the following were examined: (1) intentions of the securitising actor; (2) the objectivity of existential threat; (3) security practice, i.e., extraordinary measures taken; and (4) desecuritisation.

This study allowed to identify situations in which securitisation was just or unjust. Moreover, the comparison of the results of the analysis regarding the proposed emergency measures (ST) and the security practice (JST) allowed to indicate that:

1) in the case of the repatriation issue and support for the Polish diaspora, the social mobilisation consisted in providing them with multidimensional support;
2) as regards the issue of deterring potential migrant terrorists, the public mobilisation consisted in support for participating in the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan;
3) in the case of the policy towards migrants within the territory of the EU, the public mobilisation consisted in expressing opposition to the relocation of migrants to Poland;
4) in the case of the migration crisis triggered on the border with Belarus by the Lukashenka regime, the public mobilisation consisted in the physical stopping of migration;
5) in the case of war refugees from Ukraine, the public mobilisation consisted in the provision of safe shelter and humanitarian aid.

Discussion

As the presented results show, the processes of securitisation in Poland after 1989 took place at least five times in relation to various aspects of the migration issues. In two cases, they dealt with just securitisation – the intentions of securitisation actors could be considered fair, the threat – objectively existential, and the security practice occurred. These situations relate to cases from the recent past: the migration crisis caused on the Polish-Belarusian border by Alekander Lukashenka and the humanitarian crisis caused by Vladimir Putin and the war in Ukraine.

In the next three cases, the securitisation processes were carried out in accordance with the ST: the existential threat and extraordinary measures to combat it were indicated, and the audience's opinion was also taken into consideration. These threats: the situation of the Polish diaspora in the East, potential migrant terrorists

Table 1. Analysis of five attitudes towards migration in terms of securitisation theory and just securitisation theory

Phase / attitude	SECURITISATION THEORY (Copenhagen School (Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, Jaap de Wilde))				JUST SECURITISATION THEORY (Rita Floyd)			
	Existential threat	Emergency measures	Audience acceptance	Desecuritisation (as of March 2022)	The intentions of the securitising actor	Objectivity of existential threat	Security practice	Desecuritisation / re-securitisation
Repatriation and support of the Polish community	Poles abroad, especially in the East, do not have the conditions to live a normal life and maintain contact with their native culture	Special rules of repatriation, the Pole's Card for people with Polish roots	By accepting the election postulates	UNJUST SECURITISATION — Completed – care for the Polish diaspora has been institutionalised and transferred to the category of ordinary politics	Difficult to unambiguously assess	The threat did not have the existential dimension – it was possible to solve it through "normal politics"	Extraordinary assistance solutions and special repatriation rules were introduced	Completed – care for the Polish diaspora has been institutionalized and transferred to the category of ordinary politics
Stop potential migrant terrorists	Terrorist attacks in the USA were carried out by terrorists-migrants. They can also do it in Poland	Participation of the Polish Armed Forces in the operation in Afghanistan	Acceptance through the formula of a debate over all political options	UNJUST SECURITISATION — Completed in 2014, when threats considered to be more probable appeared (a direct military attack on the territory of the Republic of Poland)	The main intention of the securitisation actor was to obtain "audience" approval for the foreign operations of the Polish Armed Forces, important from the point of view of NATO membership and allied relations	The threat was not existential for Poland due to the insignificant number of migrants	The Polish Armed Forces took part in operations and were deployed to Afghanistan in 2001–2014	Completed in 2014, when threats considered to be more probable appeared (a direct military attack on the territory of the Republic of Poland)
Opposition to the relocation of migrants to Poland within the EU	Relocated from camps in other EU countries, migrants in Poland may commit terrorist attacks and cause other threats, as is the case in other European countries	Blockade of the EU relocation mechanism	Political debate during the election campaign and the victory of the parties proposing to stop the mechanism	UNJUST SECURITISATION — Not completed, but the problem was solved by suspending the relocation mechanism by the EU Commission	The main intention of the securitising actor was to gain more electoral support	The small number of migrants proposed for relocation did not constitute an existential threat	Yes, relocation has been stopped	Not completed, but the problem was solved by suspending the relocation mechanism by the EU Commission

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Phase / attitude	SECURITISATION THEORY Copenhagen School (Barry Buzan, Ole Weover, Jaap de Wilde)				JUST SECURITISATION THEORY (Rita Floyd)			
	Existential threat	Emergency measures	Audience acceptance	Desecuritisation (as of March 2022)	The intentions of the securitising actor	Objectivity of existential threat	Security practice	Desecuritisation / re-securitisation
				JUST SECURITISATION				
To stop the illegal migration generated by Lukashenka	Illegal aggressive migrants steered by the Lukashenka regime to destabilise Poland and other EU countries	A state of emergency, building a wall at the border, sending troops and other formations there to strengthen the border guard	Acceptance through appeal to society – public opinion polls	Not completed	The intentions can be considered fair due to the scale of the threat (the number of mass illegal border crossing attempts and the aggressive behaviour of some illegal migrants)	The threat should be considered existential due to the scale of the problem	Yes, the containment process continues	Not completed
				JUST SECURITISATION				
Aid for war refugees from Ukraine	The humanitarian crisis triggered by the migration of refugees caused by the war in Ukraine	Extensive and systemic aid from the state, non-governmental organisations and a great spurt of citizens, a special act defining the status of Ukrainian refugees in Poland	By consent of all political forces in Parliament to a special act	Not completed	The intentions can be considered fair due to the scale of the problem (1.5 million refugees in Poland within the first two weeks of the war)	The threat should be considered existential due to the scale of the problem	Yes, the humanitarian aid process is ongoing	Not completed

Source: Author's own study.

from Afghanistan, and potential migrants who came to Poland under the EU relocation mechanism did not constitute an objective existential threat due to the small scale of the problem or a low probability of its occurrence. Thus, these securitisation processes cannot be considered just, according to the JST.

In the described processes, political and social mobilisation were used both to protect the host country from the threat posed or constituted by migrants and to protect the migrants' security – whether it was people who often remain outside their homeland or war refugees. In both situations, whose importance was significant, and the influence was powerful: this is evidenced, for example, by security practices and implemented emergency measures, elections won by parties securitising migrations, or, finally, the constant presence of migration issues in political discourse.

Conclusions

Migrations, especially of groups of people with different cultural and religious identities than the host country, will remain one of the principal threats in social perception, which will probably maintain their strong securitisation (contrary to the postulates of Rita Floyd and her JST). Different identities, combined with radicalism or nationalism (sometimes in a separatist version), but also poverty and demographic changes, will shape the society's view of potential and present newcomers and national migration policies. On the self-stranger dichotomy, in Europe alone, many political parties will capitalise on the neighbour/stranger discrimination and win more regardless of emerging security challenges.

The conducted analysis shows, however, that nexus migration-security cannot be viewed solely from the perspective of the host country's security. Equally important is the perspective of migrants' security, not only war refugees but also, for example, own emigrants or people staying outside the state not voluntarily, which necessitates a sustainable approach in research on migration securitisation processes.

The presented results indicate that in the process of extending the security category, it is important to study the intentions of securitising actors and the existential dimension of the reported threats due to the power of influence and the effects of securitisation measures.

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Just/unjust securitisation and social mobilisation
Abstract

As a process of broadening the security category, securitisation is used to draw attention to urgent and existential threats that cannot be resolved through ordinary political decisions. It presupposes the authorisation of extraordinary measures as long as they are accepted by the "audience" (the elite or society as a whole). Due to the growing importance of these processes, more and more objections and doubts have been formulated towards the theory of securitisation regarding, inter alia, the morality of these processes, including the intentions of securitising actors (just or unjust securitisation). This article presents case studies on the Poland's migration policy, in which securitisation movements reinforced social mobilisation by referring to the category of security. The methodological framework of the securitisation theory and the just securitisation theory have been implemented. The presented results indicate that in the process of extending the security category, it is important to study the intentions of securitising actors and the existential dimension of the reported threats due to the power of influence and the effects of securitisation measures.

Key words: securitisation, social mobilisation, migration policy, illegal migration, unauthorized migration, Poland

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Stronger together: the integration of a nation's special operations forces and voluntary-based formations in comprehensive and total defence

Introduction

Throughout the last twenty years of the war on terror, special operations forces (SOF) used their specialised skills and powers to conduct what North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) doctrine calls military assistance (MA) with and through partners. While in some cases MA was conducted with the uniformed service members or law enforcement of other nations, some of the more interesting partners were voluntary-based formations (VBF) made up of local civilian volunteers who simply wanted to protect their families, their land, and ultimately, their countries. SOF-VBF efforts are nothing new. VBF programs like the SOF-led village stability operations (VSO) in Afghanistan helped to develop pockets of resistance against the Taliban.[1] In Iraq, SOF-led efforts with VBFs against al-Qaeda

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[1]   D.R. Green, "It Takes a Village to Raze an Insurgency", *Defense One*, 31 August 2017, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/08/it-takes-village-raze-insurgency/140663/

in Iraq included the Awakening movement in Al Anbar and the turning of the Sunni 1920 Revolutionary Brigade insurgents in Diyala, the latter of which filled the ranks of the Sons of Iraq Civil Defence Programme, successfully changed the dynamics of the insurgency, and gave the governments and coalitions a chance to succeed.[2] In each case, SOF demonstrated its unique ability to harness grassroots "people power" to degrade, disrupt, and defeat threats.

These programmes were reminiscent of past indigenous VBF programmes, such as the Civilian Irregular Defence Group (CIDG) programmes in Vietnam. SOF-led efforts to organise these indigenous groups later transitioned into programmes such as the helicopter-supported mobile strike forces and the mobile guerrilla forces which raided behind enemy lines for extended periods of time.[3] In some cases, as few as one or two SOF non-commissioned officers led company or even battalion-sized units of irregulars and successfully took the fight to the North Vietnamese guerrilla and regular forces in their sanctuary areas.[4] These, combined SOF-VBF irregulars, successfully achieved their task and purpose, "[SOF] and irregulars assume an offensive role with the mission of becoming hunters and finding and destroying the enemy."[5]

Ultimately, modern SOF-VBF integration can trace its lineage back to World War II. The British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursors to modern SOF, developed the foundational doctrinal concepts for organising, training, equipping, and advising, and in some cases leading VBF irregulars resisting German occupation throughout Europe. In doing so, the combined efforts were integrated into the Allied campaign plans, providing valuable intelligence, subversion, sabotage, and guerrilla actions causing the occupier to expend manpower and resources to counter these efforts instead of using them against Allied conventional fronts.[6]

Given the rich history of foreign SOF and local VBF integration and successes both against irregular and conventional threats, it is not surprising that the same

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[accessed: 15 February 2022]; W. Knarr, M. Nutsch, *Village Stability Operations and the Evolution of SOF Command and Control in Afghanistan: Implications for the Future of Irregular Warfare*, JSOU Report 20-2, MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operation University Press, 2020, https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=53882;70 [accessed: 15 February 2022].

2   Authors' personal experiences participating in or leading these efforts.

3   S. Stanton, *Green Berets at War: US Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia, 1956–1975*, New York, NY: Ivy Books, 1985, pp. 242–265.

4   J.L. Plaster, *Secret Commandos: Behind Enemy Lines with the Elite Warriors of SOG*, New York, NY: NAL Caliber, 2004, p. 21.

5   E.G. Piasecki, "Civilian Irregular Defense Group: The First Years: 1961–1967", *Veritas*, vol. 5, no. 4, 2009, https://arsof-history.org/articles/v5n4_cidg_page_2.html [accessed: 21 February 2022], p. 2.

6   E.H. Cookridge, *Set Europe Ablaze,* New York, NY: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1966; B.F. Smith, *The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A*, New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc., 1983.

concept is now gaining traction as an irregular internal defence component of national comprehensive defence (CD) or total defence (TD) efforts. CD and TD are synonymous, focusing on whole-of-society military and civil defence measures. The NATO *Comprehensive Defence Handbook* (CDH) defines CD as "an official Government strategy, which encompasses a whole-of-society approach to protecting the nation against potential threats."[7]

Applying the integrated SOF-VBF capacities and capabilities defensively at home as part of CD or TD and not in a foreign country, allows the nation to harness the expertise and experience of its own SOF to train, advise, equip, support, or lead its own VBF formations to increase irregular combat power. This combination ideally serves as a deterrent by complicating the threat's strategic calculus and decision making. If it fails to deter, SOF-VBF integration can play a crucial role against the threat's military actions, including grey-zone operations, invasion, and occupation. SOF-VBF integration also allows conventional and civil defence forces to focus where they are most needed during a crisis.

Currently, NATO doctrine, specifically military assistance (MA) doctrine, does not provide options for integration of SOF with a partner, let alone for a nation's SOF and VBF integration for internal defence.[8] The CDH does provide general considerations for SOF's role in CD, but with little applicable detail.[9] NATO doctrine does not explicitly differentiate between internal versus external support to resistance as a tactical task either. Some nations have addressed this issue individually, defining this more specifically as unconventional warfare (UW), similar to the United States Department of Defense (DoD) UW definition.[10] The Special Operations Command – Europe-sponsored *Resistance Operating Concept* (ROC) provides only a general overview of UW in support of resistance.[11] However, both the CDH and ROC address the concept of *resilience*, the civil defence efforts to strengthen society against natural or man-made disasters, which includes developing the resistance capacity.[12]

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[7] NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ 80-010), *Comprehensive Defence Handbook*, April 2016 [hereinafter: NSHQ CDH], https://www.nshq.nato.int/nshq/library/nshq-comprehensive-defence-handbook-volume-1/ [accessed: 15 December 2021], p. 15.

[8] North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ 80-010), *Military Assistance Handbook*, April 2016 [hereinafter: NSHQ MAH].

[9] NSHQ CDH, pp. 86–88.

[10] For example, the DoD UW definition is "activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area." Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, November 2021, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf [accessed: 29 January 2022], p. 223.

[11] O.C. Fiala, *Resistance Operating Concept (ROC)*, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2020, https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=54216464 [accessed: 10 January 2022], pp. 5–6.

[12] NSHQ CDH, pp. 17–19; O.C. Fiala, *op. cit.*, pp. 3–4, 7–15.

Upon actual invasion and occupation, the CDH and ROC both use the term *resistance* – the whole-of-society organised armed and non-violent actions to disrupt, coerce, or defeat an occupier. Although SOF-VBF integration is indicated in the CDH and ROC, neither sufficiently explains the options across the levels of war from the tactical to strategic levels.

This study aims to fill these doctrinal gaps by conceptualising a SOF-VBF integration framework for internal defence as part of CD and TD at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.[13] Using a mixture of qualitative and comparative research methodologies, based on secondary historical resistance sources, this study will achieve four goals: defining the purpose behind SOF-VBF integration during resilience and resistance; establishing a seven-option SOF-VBF integration framework at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels; assessing these options based on strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and risks of each to inform the implementation; and finally, addressing overarching risks common to all options to inform broader risk mitigation measures.[14] Lastly, this study focuses only on SOF-VBF integration as part of resilience and resistance and will not address SOF-VBF integration to counter grey-zone operations.[15]

Defining the purpose

Defining the purpose starts with one question: is the purpose of the SOF-VBF integration to resist an invasion, an occupation, or both? The answer to this question frames the requisite skills, range of operations, operational signatures, and the preferred integration option for SOF-VBF.

The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine highlighted the power of a nation resisting an invasion and included legislatively directed SOF-VBF integration.[16] If resisting an invasion is the goal of the SOF-VBF integration, then it defines the requirements more clearly. In this case, the VBF skills required to counter an invasion span the entire range from tactical to strategic levels. At the tactical level, it could

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[13]　This answers the primary research question: what are the various SOF-VBF integration options at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels?

[14]　The four "goals" are the resultant answers to the secondary research questions: what is the purpose of SOF-VBF integrations for internal defence?; what are the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and risks of each integration option?; and what are the risks common to all of the SOF-VBF and require special consideration?

[15]　Grey-zone analysis is beyond the scope of this study due to the inherent complexities of nation-specific legal issues related to countering this threat in peacetime or short of war, however, the same framework would likely apply.

[16]　*Law of Ukraine: On the Foundation of National Resistance*, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 19 February 2022, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1702-IX?lang=en#Text [accessed: 6 March 2022].

focus on shoot, move, communicate, and medicate skills, and the employment of a range of weapons systems from personal defence to anti-tank. At the strategic level, it might be the employment of large-scale VBF forces as part of the territorial defence force or home guard in support of the nation's conventional defence to counter an invasion. One key consideration is that resistance to invasion forces are overt elements and will be targeted throughout the conflict. VBF will inherently lose the civilian protections afforded them by the laws of armed conflict (LOAC) after taking up arms and will have a much more difficult time blending back into the population. The increased signature also means they would be targeted as active belligerents. They could receive prisoner-of-war status if they follow the four requirements outlined in Article 1 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, including being part of a chain of command, wearing a fixed symbol recognisable at a distance, openly carrying arms, and following the laws and customs of war.[17] However, they will have difficulty transitioning from the overt resistance to invasion where they use physical terrain to mask their operations to the clandestine resistance to occupation which leverages the human terrain to conceal the resistance.

Because of the inherent need to hide among the population using clandestine tradecraft, resistance to occupation is a much different problem set for both SOF and VBF. To be successful in this unique operational environment, SOF and VBF need to possess the specialised skills, expertise, and experience to effectively hide among the human terrain while continuing to resist an occupying force. Unlike SOF, VBF have everyday lives that would permit them to blend into the population and carry out their clandestine missions if they remained undiscovered by the occupier. While the VBF would operate as armed resistance to invasion, in resistance to occupation, they would serve as members of the underground resistance organisation (URO). The URO includes the underground – the core members of the resistance that live a completely clandestine life and execute the main efforts of the resistance, and the auxiliary which provides logistical and intelligence support to the underground under the cover of their daily lives. Additionally, the URO can include clandestine armed resistance elements, such as urban guerrillas who operate largely in urban areas using clandestine tradecraft to minimise their signature.[18] Historically, the largest part of the resistance has been made up

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[17] See R. Alcala, S. Szymanski, "Legal Status of Ukraine's Resistance Forces", Articles of War, Lieber Institute, West Point, 28 February 2022, https://lieber.westpoint.edu/legal-status-ukraines-resistance-forces/ [accesssed: 29 February 2022]. The final requirement of following the laws and customs of war adds a further requirement to provide LOAC training to the VBF in a similar fashion to the rest of the nation's armed forces.

[18] T. Bór-Komorowski, *The Secret Army: The Memoirs of General Bór-Komorowski*, Barnsley: Front Line Books, 2011, pp. 142–143; A. Richie, *Warsaw 1944: Hitler, Himmler, and the Warsaw Uprising*, New York: NY: Picador, 2019, p. 155.

of non-military elements, highlighting the vast potential of the VBF with regard to resistance to occupation.[19]

Finally, if the national leaders desire both resistance to invasion and resistance to occupation, then they will have to make key strategic decisions early on, ideally before the conflict. Specifically, they will need to allocate their SOF and VBF appropriately to ensure both types of resistance efforts are adequately trained and supported. Given sufficient lead time, VBF focused on resistance to occupation can be established long before the crisis and can "go to ground" or stay hidden during the invasion in preparation for occupation.

Seven options for integration

Based on the purpose, there are seven SOF-VBF integration options, each with its own associated set of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and risks. In all seven cases, the purpose will impact how the option is applied. The seven integration options focused specifically on resilience and resistance to invasion and occupation are 1) tactical integration with SOF in the lead; 2) tactical integration with VBF in the lead; 3) operational integration with SOF in the lead; 4) operational integration with VBF in the lead; 5) strategic integration with SOF in the lead; 6) strategic integration with VBF in the lead; and 7) tactical, operational, and strategic integration at all echelons.

It should be noted that "in the lead" means the supported element has the lead for operational decision-making, the other is the supporting element.[20] It should also be noted that the assumption for the seven framing options is that the SOF-VBF are sponsored by the government, which also provides the appropriate oversight. The VBFs are true volunteers, even if they are already government servants due to the enormous risk they are taking to be part of an organised resistance effort.

1) Tactical-level integration with SOF in the lead
The first option is SOF in the lead at the tactical level.[21] The task organisation for SOF in this option depends greatly on the size of the nation's SOF and the number

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[19]   D. Jones, *Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic of Clandestine Insurgent and Terrorist Networks: The First Step in Effective Counternetwork Operations*, JSOU Report 12-3, MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, April 2012, https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=51792142 [accessed: 15 January 2022], pp. 5–6.

[20]   NSHQ MAH, p. 12.

[21]   Office of the Command Historian, "Jedburghs: D-Day 1944 and Beyond", OSS: Office of Strategic Services Primer, US Army Special Operations Command, https://arsof-history.org/oss/7_jed.html [accessed: 24 January 2022]; Office of the Command Historian, "Operational Groups", OSS: Office of Strategic Services Primer, US Army Special Operations Command, https://arsof-history.org/oss/2_op.html [accessed: 24 January 2022].

of Special Operations Task Units (SOTU).[22] The size of SOF would dictate the task organisation of SOF supporting VBF, including split team and even singleton operations. Due to the tactical focus of most SOF units, this is where they are most comfortable operating, especially in support of VBF tasked with overt resistance to occupation. While in the lead, SOF can also provide training, equipment, and leadership for their tactical VBF forces. The SOF leaders serve as sector commanders to borrow from US unconventional warfare doctrine.[23] At this level, the SOF leader would largely be responsible for ensuring the execution of tactical operations, including picking out targets for subversion, sabotage, and direct attack that achieve their mission per their superior's guidance. While this option would empower young SOF leaders to take on significant responsibilities, like the Vietnam-era mobile strike and guerrilla units, it would also require time and dedicated training, especially to lead and conduct resistance to occupation clandestinely.[24]

The strength of this concept is the provision of experienced and trained leaders to harness the power of the VBFs at the tactical edge. This leverages the SOF leader's tactical guerrilla warfare prowess during the resistance to invasion, and ideally, their expertise in clandestine operations for resistance to occupation. The weaknesses, however, are tied directly to the type of training SOF are receiving on resistance, both resistance to invasion and the more difficult resistance to occupation. Being SOF does not automatically confer the requisite knowledge of resistance theory and applications onto the SOF operator to successfully execute resistance. They need training and experience to include above their level of responsibility so they can understand higher-level missions and requirements and provide the leadership required. This task is made more difficult in a clandestine organisation where leaders may be separated from their direct reports by compartmentalisation meant to keep both levels safe.[25] Regarding opportunities, this option is best where tactical-level formations have numerous experienced SOF leaders that can train, equip, and inspire their VBF partner. There is also the need to ensure tactical-level SOF fully understand resistance theory and the overall resistance plans well enough that their tactical actions support the nation's strategic outcomes. There are significant risks at the tactical level. Even with compartmentalisation and good clandestine

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22 NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5)*, NATO Standardization Office, Edition B, Version 1, August 2019 [hereinafter: NATO AJP-3.5], pp. 17–20.

23 M. Grdovic, *A Leader's Handbook to Unconventional Warfare*, Publication 09-1, Fort Bragg, NC: The US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, November 2009, https://info.publicintelligence.net/USArmy-LeadersUW.pdf [accessed: 13 January 2022], p. 13.

24 For example, US Special Forces officers and noncommissioned officers spend up to two years in the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) to learn these skills, and in most cases, they are more experienced and mature due to previous conventional military experience.

25 Office of the Command Historian, "Jedburghs: D-Day 1944 and Beyond", *op. cit.*

practices, the proximity to the tactical action and the subsequent detection could lead to the SOF leader being killed or captured.

2) Tactical-level integration with VBF in the lead

VBF in the lead at this level happens for three reasons – to ensure civilian oversight of local tactical efforts, the VBF leader has more experience and expertise in resistance than the SOF advisor, or there is a lack of dedicated SOF, so they must rotate to the units. Civilian oversight, just as in other aspects of the government, ensures that there are checks and balances on military actions, unless the military action, such as during resistance to invasion, is the primary task, in which case option 1 is better. This option, most likely applied in resistance to occupation, would require the VBF leader to have a significant amount of experience or natural ability to lead and excel in a clandestine environment. SOF in this case would provide the military expertise for this portion of the underground movement, including training, organising supplies, conducting detailed tactical planning for various missions, and potentially leading the execution of tactical missions against the occupier due to their advanced training compared to a local civilian leader. Additionally, this option would allow multiple tactical task organisation options if SOF or VBF could take the lead depending on the mission and experience.

The strength of this option is primarily related to resistance to an occupation where the VBF leaders and members have better cover for their clandestine actions, maybe even more experience operating clandestinely, than the SOF member. Their ability to blend in among the population and their familiarity with an area, especially if they are local, would provide a significant bonus. The weaknesses of this option really rest on the abilities of the VBF leader. If they are natural leaders or leaders that inspire confidence, then they will be followed regardless. If, however, they are poor leaders or clandestine practitioners, the SOF members can provide coaching and lead from behind as needed to help the leader and organisation.

3) Operational-level integration with SOF in the lead

SOF in the lead at the operational level would likely include a larger operational or region area and thus a larger organisation, such as Special Operations Task Groups (SOTG) or Component Commands (SOCC), where the SOF leader would serve as the area or regional commander with several subordinate tactical units.[26] For countries with limited SOF capacity, their support may start at the operational level, not the tactical one. SOF Leaders operating at this level require significantly more organisational leadership experience, comfort with ambiguity, and decentralised

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[26]   NATO AJP-3.5, pp. 17–20; Office of the Command Historian, "OSS Detachment 101: 1942–1945", OSS: Office of Strategic Services Primer, US Army Special Operations Command, https://arsof-history.org/oss/10_101.html [accessed: 24 January 2022].

command and control, as well as the ability to execute resistance campaign plans as part of a broader resistance strategy.

One of the major strengths of this option is that it ensures the SOF leaders are positioned at the operational level, away from direct action, and thus, able to operate much more clandestinely and protected from interdiction, than tactical level leaders. While there are several strengths to this option if the individual SOF leader has the capabilities to lead at this level, there are some weaknesses. Firstly, military leadership at the operational level may not be desired, especially if the political members of the shadow government – the designated government representatives leading the day-to-day resistance activities – are capable and willing to lead. This is akin to civilian oversight of the organisation.[27] Additionally, the SOF leader would ostensibly need to be an expert in leading a URO at this level with the right theoretical underpinnings. This would require a specialised leader development pipeline and career management to ensure the leaders were fully prepared for this task. The risk at this level is the fact that military leaders who have spent their lives in action would now have to take on the challenges of clandestine organisational leadership and allow subordinates to develop the situation. Additionally, their previous overt positions at the operational level would likely mean that these leaders were high on the occupier's target list.

4) Operational-level integration with VBF in the lead

On the other hand, when VBF is in the lead at the operational level, civilian oversight is in place at a critical position within the organisation. From this position, the operational level VBF leader would be able to effectively control armed and non-violent resistance efforts as part of a regional campaign plan. The ability to integrate capabilities to modulate activities based on the enemy's operational tempo, the needs of the organisation to achieve effects, and understanding of how long the resistance must stay viable, provide a significant challenge for the VBF leader.

Per the previous section, one of the major strengths of this option is the civilian in the lead. SOF elements in support can focus on several tasks in support of the operational-level leaders. They can advise the leader, provide specialised training to organisational members, support detailed campaign planning, and lead the military component under the civilian leadership. They can also provide specialised support, training, direct-action attacks, sabotage, and close protection for the civilian leader. Lastly, they can serve as liaison officers to external support networks or with the shadow government or government-in-exile. The weaknesses with this option are minimal, as are the risks. The biggest weakness and its resultant risks reside with the leadership ability of the VBF leader, their comfort with decentralised

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[27]   S. Korbonski, *Fighting Warsaw: The Story of the Polish Underground State 1939–1945*, transl. by F.B. Czarnomski, New York, NY: Hippocrene Books, Inc., 2004, pp. 286–289.

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operations, and the slowed communications and resultant lack of awareness due to compartmentalisation.

5) Strategic-level integration with SOF in the lead

In this option, SOF is responsible for the entire resistance effort.[28] Ukraine's legal construct prior to the Russian invasion put SOF in the lead of the entire resistance effort.[29] How this works out is still to be determined, but one of the main concerns of this option is the lack of civilian oversight, which can lead to a heavily militarised resistance movement, and a question of how well-prepared SOF senior leaders are for leading a national resistance effort. The lack of civilian oversight also potentially impacts the legitimacy of the effort. Managing an organisation at this level also impacts SOF's actual contributions to the fight since the SOF leaders will be focused on leading this strategic organisation with little focus on SOF-specific efforts. One opportunity is that if there is an uprising planned, the SOF strategic leader would likely lead the effort as a predominantly military operation. This was the case in the WWII Polish Underground in 1944 when the Warsaw Uprising began.[30] A similar option would happen if the resistance had success and was able to transition to a more direct challenge of the occupier, in which case the SOF strategic lead may make sense. There is also a risk of running afoul with the civilian leadership if the SOF strategic leader takes over prior to an uprising or shifts to more military-centric options.[31]

6) Strategic-level integration with VBF in the lead

Ideally, at the strategic level, VBF is optimised for legitimacy where the VBF formations include the government-in-exile and the shadow government.[32] The shadow government which manages the daily resistance effort, both violent and non-violent, should be the largest portion of the clandestine underground. Additionally, for legitimacy, all the above would be designated legislatively in the continuity of government plans to ensure there is no disruption or ability of the occupier to delegitimise the government regardless of its form. Historically, the gold-standard example of this strategic integration is the WWII Polish Underground State. This organisation was an all-volunteer formation, led by civilians, with the military subordinated until the Warsaw Uprising in 1944. Above this organisation was the Polish Government-in-Exile in London, providing the overarching guidance and legitimacy to the shadow government. It was also simultaneously working with partners and

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[28]   Office of the Command Historian, "OSS Detachment 101: 1942–1945", *op. cit.*

[29]   Law of Ukraine: On the Foundation of National Resistance, *op. cit.*

[30]   S. Korbonski, *op. cit.*, pp. 286–289.

[31]   *Ibidem.*

[32]   For information on shadow governments and governments in exile see O.C. Fiala, *op. cit.*, pp. 11–15.

allies and seeking international support for the cause. The underground itself had upwards of 300,000 members, including schools, clandestine printing presses, and even a court system with representation for collaborators to be fairly tried. The integration of armed and non-violent resistance rested with the civilian leadership, but in close coordination with the military commander.[33]

SOF can play a significant role at this level as strategic advisors to the strategic VBF leaders. Additionally, this frees up SOF to focus on what only SOF can do – lead a SOF campaign of subversion, sabotage, direct actions, and conduct liaison with foreign SOF members infiltrated into the country to provide support. The special operations command leadership of the country can either be co-located with the government-in-exile coordinating foreign SOF support or with the shadow government providing expertise on resistance. Additionally, at the strategic level, all SOF capacities can be integrated into the overall campaign plan, or in support of bilateral or multilateral planning with external powers. This can include the integration of air, maritime, and ground SOF capacities in support of the larger war effort. There are few weaknesses for this option unless the country is unable to prepare the resistance and train the senior leaders of the underground in their own security. Lack of key personnel training will likely result in a larger failure. However, there are many historical examples, like WWII Poland, where without any training they developed the largest, most organised underground and resistance organisation in history while under occupation.[34] A better option at this level is to build the strategic organisation prior to conflict when not under the pressure of the occupation.[35]

7) Tactical, operational, and strategic integration at all echelons
This option would take the best of options 1–6 and ensure nested integration of all capabilities to empower an entire organisation. At each echelon, the best options can be chosen to optimise the organisation for success, adapting to the integration based on the mission, threat, or needs, including special skills. This would allow the entire organisation to flourish. The weakness of this option is the need for a large SOF force to cover an entire organisation. It can be done if the force is fully capable at all levels, especially if they can operate at the singleton or small team level. This also offers an additional opportunity, which is the dispersion of the SOF forces across the nation, hidden, which significantly increases their resilience under occupation. Similarly, for resistance to invasion, this option allows SOF to impact the defence of the nation considerably regardless of whether VBF or SOF is in the lead.

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[33]   S. Korbonski, *op. cit.*, pp. 166–199.
[34]   K. Utracka, "The Phenomenon of the Polish Underground State", *The Warsaw Institute Review*, 4 December 2019, https://warsawinstitute.org/phenomenon-polish-underground-state/ [21 December 2022].
[35]   O.C. Fiala, *op. cit.*, pp. 22–27.

The dangers of SOF-VBF integration

By their nature and completely unintentionally, the SOF and VBF present operational risks to each other, which must be understood by all involved to mitigate those risks. Firstly, SOF will likely be known to the occupier long before the invasion as part of normal intelligence collection on these types of specialised forces. Therefore, SOF will be high-value targets from the beginning of an invasion, especially if they are known participants in the URO. The occupier will expend maximum time and resources to find and finish SOF, which therefore puts their VBF partners at risk. Risk mitigation includes three options – SOF identity protection, new identities, and clandestine tradecraft. Firstly, a nation can establish ways to protect the identity and records of SOF from the start of their career to deny this information applying similar methods used with sensitive intelligence personnel. Secondly, the nation may opt to provide SOF with new identities at a decision point prior to the start of the conflict to disassociate them from their real identity making them harder to track. Lastly, SOF can practice clandestine tradecraft to mask their connection to the VBF, as well as other SOF and family associates.

Secondly, competing SOF operational requirements must be accounted for, particularly out of the country, forward deployments of SOF personnel – both routine and crisis. For example, if the nation has an external support requirement, such as expeditionary operations in support of a bilateral or multilateral partnership, there is still a chance a crisis could start with little to no notice, and deployed forces might be unable to return in time. Therefore, SOF forces must have enough capacity to ensure they can continually support the chosen option for SOF-VBF integration or ensure the integration plan accounts for expected and unexpected SOF deployments for continuity.

On the other hand, VBF presents two risks to SOF. First, VBF leaders or members who are former government employees, especially military, police, diplomatic, or thought leaders will be targeted like the SOF members. In this case, the same risk mitigation measures can be applied based on the individual's unique risk factor. Second, due to the VBF's likely being employed locally, their familial and friends' linkages become a liability, especially if those same family and friends are providing clandestine support to them or their VBF unit. Families and friends will be leveraged to either find, fix, or finish the hunted VBF member, either held as hostages, detained, or killed as part of retribution to try to force the VBF members to expose themselves.[36]

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[36] T. Bór-Komorowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 36–39.

Conclusion

Integrating foreign SOF with a local VBF has historically been successful against various types of threats within the VBF's country. This study applies the concept to a single nation, leveraging its own SOF and VBF to counter threats to its sovereignty from foreign invasion and occupation. The deliberate and planned integration of SOF and VBF provides a unique opportunity for the development of precrisis resilience and resistance capacity to increase the nation's ability to deter, or if this fails, respond to invasion and occupation. The first step in using the framework is to understand the purpose of the SOF-VBF integration related to resilience and resistance answering the questions: is the integration for resistance to invasion, occupation, or both? Once the purpose is clear, the SOF and VBF capacities and capabilities can be analysed to frame the most viable options. Based on the analysis of various historic examples, this study has identified seven integration options across the three levels of war – tactical, operational, and strategic – each with its own associated set of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and risks. The seven integration options are 1) tactical integration with SOF in the lead; 2) tactical integration with VBF in the lead; 3) operational integration with SOF in the lead; 4) operational integration with VBF in the lead; 5) strategic integration with SOF in the lead; 6) strategic integration with VBF in the lead; and 7) tactical, operational, and strategic integration at all echelons. The study has also noted risks for nations to consider that apply to all the options. Ultimately, the viability of the seven options is wholly dependent on the SOF and VBF capacity of the nation, and their most likely threats. However, regardless of the option chosen, the pre-crisis development of the URO to resist occupation provides the best overall chance of success but is also the most labour and resource-intensive and takes the longest to establish due to its clandestine nature.

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Stronger together: the integration of a nation's special operations forces and voluntary-based formations in comprehensive and total defence
Abstract

Special operations forces (SOF) have a history of integrating with voluntary-based formations (VBF) overseas against a wide variety of threats. Despite the historical record, the current doctrine does not provide any applicable concepts to inform SOF-VBF integration. This study aims to fill this doctrinal gap and explores the concepts of a nation applying its SOF-VBF to its own comprehensive defence or total defence to make any territorial incursion or occupation too costly for an adversary. Using a mixture of qualitative and comparative research methodologies, based on secondary historical resistance sources, this study achieves four goals: defining the purpose behind SOF-VBF integration during resilience and resistance; establishing a seven-option SOF-VBF integration framework at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels; assessing these options based on strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and risks of each to inform the implementation; and finally addressing overarching risks common to all options to inform broader risk mitigation measures. The result is seven integration options focused specifically on resilience and resistance to invasion and occupation. This paper will assess the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and risks of each. This study sets the stage for future analysis and additional research on this important topic.

Key words: voluntary-based formations (VBF), special operations forces, total defence, comprehensive defence, command and control

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Communicating the resistance

The basics

What is resistance warfare? It is a nation's organised, whole-of-society effort, encompassing activities from nonviolent to violent, led by the legally established government, even if exiled, to re-establish independence and autonomy within its sovereign territory wholly or partially occupied by a foreign power.[1] Nations have resisted more powerful foreign occupiers throughout history.[2] It is also a type of warfare for which a state can prepare in order to broaden its national defence strategy.

What is resilience? "The will and ability to withstand external pressures and influences and/or recover from the effects of those pressures or influences."[3] A nation's resilience encompasses its whole society. It ranges from the individual person to government and non-government organisations. It is the full range of civil and military preparedness from the local to the national level. Resilience is the critical foundation of resistance, the confident belief in the nation and preparation for survival.

Why focus on resistance warfare? Over the past several years, the US and its allies and partners have awakened to the reality of potential conflict against the increased

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[1]   O. Fiala, *Resistance Operating Concept*, Stockholm: Swedish Defense University, 2019. p. 15.

[2]   *Ibidem*.

[3]   *Ibidem*. The same definition is also used in NATO's Special Operations Headquarters' *Comprehensive Defence Handbook*, vol. 1, December 2020, https://www.nshq.nato.int/nshq/library/nshq-comprehensive-defence-handbook-volume-1/ [accessed: 15 October 2021].

capabilities of Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The threats from those two powers come at the geographical periphery of American military power. Within these same recent years, realizing the lack of conventional military capability to defeat potential incursions from Russia or the PRC, the concept of resistance warfare has come to the fore among several nations threatened by Russia and the PRC. Which nations would conduct resistance? The nations most concerned with conducting this type of warfare are those under the most direct physical threats by Russia and the PRC due to proximity to those two nations, coupled with their comparative lack of conventional military capability against those two nations, e.g., Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Taiwan, and Ukraine.

Which nations would support resistance? Although some threatened nations have partner states to assist them, none of those partner states have the deterrent capacity of US forces or the capability to re-take infringed or invaded territory from Russia or the PRC without US assistance.

Critical to conducting a successful resistance is communication. In today's interconnected world, with nearly instantaneous worldwide communication in words and pictures, and the interpretation of those words and pictures by individuals and governments receiving them, effective communication is critical to success. Such communication reaches voting citizens of a democracy, which is translated into polling data and then becomes a factor in the decision-making process of that country's leadership.

Communication encompasses both words and actions. Previously, the US military referred to this as strategic communication, but after confusion due to its failure to clearly explain and effect the concept, it no longer uses the term.[4] However, the term survives in NATO, and is a clear concept promulgated by NATO's Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga, Latvia.[5] The Centre explains it as a holistic approach to communication, encompassing everything an actor does to achieve objectives in a contested environment. It encompasses public diplomacy, public affairs, military public affairs, information operations, and psychological communications.[6] This holistic approach will form the basis of our understanding when discussing communication, the de-conflicted integration, and mutual support of words and actions. The government must have the ability to create a narrative, themes and messages, and be able to effectively synchronize and communicate them.

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[4]　"Pentagon drops 'strategic communication,'" USA Today, 3 December 2012, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/03/pentagon-trims-strategic-communication/1743485/ [accessed: 12 March 2022].

[5]　NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, https://stratcomcoe.org [accessed: 19 February 2022].

[6]　Definitions are available at the Centre's website, https://stratcomcoe.org/about_us/about-strategic-communications/1 [accessed: 19 February 2022]. The term is also used in NATO's Special Operations Headquarters' *Comprehensive Defence Handbook*, *op. cit.*

Established well before a crisis, a nation's strategy to address national security threats provides the foundation for its narrative by outlining how a government builds resiliency and prepares for contingencies. The narrative is the overarching expression of the context, reason, and desired results associated with the resistance campaign. A psychologically unifying, crafted narrative, meeting strategic and operational objectives, should also resonate with the population to enable control, unity of purpose, and encourage ethical behaviour. Themes are formed at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The themes at each level (each level should have several themes) must be nested under the themes of the higher level. Messages are subordinate to themes and support the themes and narrative. They deliver precise information to a specific target audience to create desired effects while supporting a specific theme. Messages are tailored for a specific time, place, delivery mechanism, and target audience.[7]

Timeline

Communicating resistance must occur during four points in time: pre-crisis, crisis (includes warfare), occupation, and resumption of sovereignty. Understanding communication as holistic or all-inclusive of words and deeds, this understanding must also be integrated in a linear fashion, i.e., through time. The communication messages (words and actions) in each of these phases in time must be consistent (not in conflict) not only during that particular phase, but with the prior phase and the phases yet to come and must not conflict with the communication in those phases.

Audiences

As with most communications, there are several audiences to consider. Although messages can be tailored to target each audience, the messages must be mutually supporting and must not conflict. They must be understood and presented as part of a strategic narrative. Broadly, the audiences are: domestic citizens, allied and partner governments and citizenry, adversary governments and citizenry.

The domestic citizenry is the most important audience because its resilience is critical to success. Its support must be harnessed throughout all phases. This is best accomplished through open, honest, and clear communication to them in all phases regarding organised resistance.[8] This communication of words and deeds throughout

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[7]   O. Fiala, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

[8]   During the Cold War, several NATO nations maintained "stay-behind" organisations, intended to remain in place during a Soviet invasion. They were to conduct guerrilla activities and sabotage against Soviet forces and send intelligence to non-occupied NATO states. The Italian plan was code-named "Gladio" and its revelation when the USSR began disintegrating came as a shock to most Italians. It was blamed for criminal and terrorist acts. It was not

all phases is integral to strengthening and maintaining national resilience and resistance. The government must also communicate to allied and partner governments and citizens. This is necessary to garner and maintain the support of those governments and their citizenry throughout all phases. The support of these citizens is necessary for those populations to understand and support the actions of their government in supporting the resistance as necessary, through each phase.

The adversary government and its citizenry must also receive messages. The populations within Russia and the PRC have access to many modes of communication, with some restrictions, especially in the PRC.[9] Although they are autocratic regimes and not very responsive to the will of their people, they each maintain a system of governmental control that has an element of public support. This support is based on internal government messaging, often false. Concurrently, these states restrict accurate information from abroad from entering the information environment, but there is the possibility of breaking through some restrictions and targeting messages directly to the people.[10]

Pre-crisis

A nation considering developing a resistance capability, must decide to authorise, organise, and prepare that capability prior to conflict. In this phase, the government decides to authorise, organise, man, equip, and train a resistance. In so doing, the message to a potential adversary is that the nation will not surrender its identity and sovereignty. It will fight for its sovereignty and to maintain its identity as a nation, even if occupied, until it is free again. Authorizing this capability is done through the nation's legal or legislative process. Doing this through a regular democratic process, ensures both domestic and international legitimacy. If it is not accomplished by such method, it risks being an illegitimate organisation in the minds of many citizens and support for it during a crisis may be weak. Its existence need not be secret. In fact, the knowledge of its existence, and the fact that it came about as a decision of the people's

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organised under an authorized legal framework and legitimised for its citizens. Several other nations soon revealed and disbanded similar networks. The existence of such an organisation must be authorised through a legal framework and clearly communicated in order to legitimise it to its citizenry and allies and partners to avoid the "Gladio" problem. See: D. Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe*, New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2005.

9   H. Moynihan, C. Patel, *Restrictions on online freedom of expression in China: The domestic, regional and international implications of China's policies and practices*, London: Chatham House, 2021, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-03/2021-03-17-restrictions-online-freedom-expression-china-moynihan-patel.pdf [accessed: 21 March 2022].

10   G. Faulconbridge, "More than 4,300 detained at anti-war protests in Russia", Reuters, 7 March 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/more-than-64-people-detained-anti-war-protests-russia-protest-monitor-2022-03-06/ [accessed: 21 March 2022].

elected representatives, enhances national confidence and resiliency. Prior to it being invaded, the Ukrainian government prepared a website entitled "National Resistance Center." Then, during the invasion crisis , the government used it to offer tips and ideas for "would-be resistance fighters" regarding sabotage, field medicine, countering disinformation, etc.[11]

Domestic

The domestic citizenry must be assured of the legitimacy and capability of the government-sponsored resistance.[12] Legitimacy is in the minds of people, and the people must know that this organisation came about through the regular authorized governmental legal or legislative processes. Further, prior to a crisis, the government must ensure that its people are aware of how they can contribute to a resistance against an occupation.[13] This can involve informing and educating the populace regarding personal and family resilience, such as stocking up on canned food, first aid supplies, communication alternatives and knowing transportation options. They can also be informed of peaceful and passive methods of resistance, and even informed of how to coordinate such activities.

Allied and partner governments and citizenry

The domestic democratic process which authorises the organisation and associates it with the government, gives it international legitimacy with its fellow allied and partner democracies. This allows a nation such as the US to assist this organisation in the pre-crisis stage with training exchanges and equipment, in the same way that the US conducts such mutual training and equipment sales and compatibility assurance with the nation's conventional military forces. Allied and partner governments must be assured that the resistance organisation is a legitimate part of the threatened

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[11] The Ukrainians launched a website entitled as the "Center for National Resistance", https://sprotyv.mod.gov.ua/?fbclid=IwAR0ztryuxEYvrpZHdAs7lAkif8XPuAo95-ZTIWcq2lLb6TC-nzA2IZZE4Mk [accessed: 14 March 2022], created by their Special Operations Forces to support and coordinate the fight for liberation from the Russian invaders.

[12] The Swiss government communicated its Cold War resistance capability to its citizens and the rest of the world: J. Osburg, *Unconventional Options for the Defense of the Baltic States: The Swiss Approach*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE179.html [accessed: 21 March 2022]. See also: K. Stringer, "Building a Stay-Behind Resistance Organization: The Case of Cold War Switzerland Against the Soviet Union", *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 86, 2017, pp. 109–114, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Article/1220620/building-a-stay-behind-resistance-organization-the-case-of-cold-war-switzerland/ [accessed: 3 March 2022].

[13] M. Chernov, L. Hinnant, D. Litvinova, "Ukrainians building up resistance in case Russia attacks", *Military Times*, 1 February 2022, https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/ukraine/2022/02/01/ukrainians-building-up-resistance-in-case-russia-attacks/ [accessed: 23 March 2022].

nation's defence structure. With this affirmation of an authorized legitimate organisation, allies and partners can support it.[14] A government such as the US has strict and specific laws regarding foreign militaries and what type of training events and material support can be made available through its Department of Defence.[15] Additionally, the citizens of allies and partners must understand that they are supporting an organisation adhering to democratic procedural norms as well as international law, designed to defend a free people, who are citizens of an allied or partner nation.

Adversary government and citizenry

The adversary government must understand that even if its military forces are successful in the conventional fight, national resistance will continue against their aggression, and they will not be able to politically consolidate the invaded territory. Their people must know that their government is threatening a free and peaceful people who will fight for their national identity and territorial integrity.

Crisis

Once indications and warnings have reached the point that invasion by the adversary is imminent, the government must begin activating its plan for resistance simultaneously with its conventional defence capability. Readying its conventional forces is itself a public act of defiance against the invader. In the same manner, its resistance plan, not only involving a specific authorized organisation, but involving the whole society, must be put into effect. Once hostilities begin and open warfare occurs, the government's message must be one of defiance against the enemy and confidence in ultimate victory. The message can be broadcast via television, radio, cell phone, print and internet. It must demonstrate a resilience that will give the population strength and confidence. The defending nation must communicate its will to resist.

Domestic

The domestic message to its citizens is that the government will fight for the nation's sovereignty and that any territorial loss to enemy forces will only be temporary. The government must maintain that the enemy be pushed out of the nation's sovereign territory so that the nation and its institutions can resume. This is also intended to deny political space to a new form of government or to a faction seeking to take control of the government and collaborate with the enemy. An invasion by foreign military

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[14] D. Winkie, "How the US and Europe helped Ukraine prep for insurgency", *Military Times*, 7 March 2022, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-army/2022/03/07/how-the-us-and-europe-helped-ukraine-prep-for-insurgency/ [accessed: 15 March 2022].

[15] A good starting point to understand this process is: United States Department of Defense, *Security Cooperation*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, Washington, D.C. 2017.

forces is a man-made disaster. As such, the nation's emergency services must not only respond to fires and injuries but must also be seen to respond to those events. The unstated message is one of resilience and competence demonstrated by the local emergency services. Broadcasting damage to residential areas evidences the adversary's willingness to destroy non-military targets and kill and injure non-combatant civilians, in violation of international law. Here, the population also has the ability to message defiance and strength. In Ukraine, in March 2022, an older couple whose courtyard was intruded upon by Russian soldiers insisted that they leave and closed the gate behind them.[16] In other examples in Ukraine, local citizens engaged in public protests against Russian occupiers. A woman of grandparent age gave a Russian soldier a handful of seeds so that flowers would grow once his body was buried.[17] These were acts of defiance and resilience communicated to fellow citizens and the outside world. As the crisis unfolds, the government must also ensure that external messages of support from other nations are made available to the population. This will help affirm their resilience by knowing they have significant foreign supporters who will assist them. The message to the population is that this struggle is a whole-of-society defensive effort against the invader, supported by allies and partners.

Allied and partner governments and citizenry

The government must communicate to the governments and citizens of its allies and partners that it is willing to continue the fight for its sovereignty. The above-mentioned acts of Ukrainian citizens and the ready response of their emergency services were broadcast to world audiences. Those positive images of Ukrainian resistance and resilience in the face of overwhelming odds motivated governments, with the support of their citizenry, to assist the Ukrainian fight against the Russians. These audiences must also see the emergency response of local police, firefighters and ambulance personnel respond to the physical wreckage and fires in this man-made disaster. They must see these "first responders" fighting fires, aiding the injured, and helping people move to safety. Allied and partner audiences can immediately relate to these emergency responders, helping as they do in peacetime, and staying in places of danger to assist the populace. The goal of this communication to allies and partners, and even

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[16] A. Guzman, "Get off my lawn! Moment fearless elderly couple in Ukraine confront four heavily armed Russians soldiers who broke into their property – before escorting them out and locking the gate behind them", Daily Mail.com, 12 March 2022, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10605823/Elderly-couple-Ukraine-tells-three-Russians-soldiers-leave-property-broke-in.html [accessed: 22 March 2022].

[17] N. Craven, "'Put sunflower seeds in your pockets so they grow on Ukraine soil when you DIE': Moment defiant woman bravely confronts heavily armed Russian troops", *Daily Mail.com*, 24 February 2022, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10548649/Put-sunflower-seeds-pockets-grow-Ukraine-soil-Woman-confronts-Russian-troops.html [accessed: 22 March 2022].

the general international community is to facilitate diplomatic, economic, political, and moral pressure against the aggressor nation. Additionally, this communication lays the groundwork for justification of military support, which may be the provision of weapons and material and later possibly even more significant military support.

Adversary government and citizenry

The government's actions of violent defiance against the invader are the palpable message sent to the enemy government. The actions of the military and immediate resistance by the populace informs the enemy government that the invaded nation is resilient and will fight for its sovereignty. Violent resistance is also a message to the invading soldiers that they are not liberators, though their own government may have told them otherwise. This communication must be combined with specifically tailored psychological operations against the invading troops to negatively affect their morale, aggressiveness, and willingness to obey orders. The citizenry of the adversary government can receive messaging similar to that sent to partner nations. Images of popular defiance as described above in Ukraine, and competent emergency services responding to the man-made disaster caused by their own government can help counter that government's internal messaging. Their own captured soldiers, speaking openly about their confusion regarding the war while informing their families that they are being treated well, can also have an anti-war effect on the citizens of the aggressor nation. This messaging is intended to directly affect the citizenry of the aggressor nation by evoking commonality and sympathy with the invaded nation and weaken the domestic political support for the invading state's government.

Occupation

If during the invasion, the capital city is about to be occupied, then the defending government should internally displace to another city, or it must exile to a foreign state to continue the fight.[18] Exiling is an extremely difficult choice to make. If the most senior members of the government and their families depart the country, then they can be seen as abandoning their people. However, if they remain, they run the risk of capture, ending the sovereign government. An exiled government can represent the people and the sovereignty of the state, reduce the risk of an adversary-installed government gaining international recognition, and can advocate for its people among its partners. The leadership must decide when and who will become the exiled government. This decision criteria, location, and means are best prepared for in the pre-crisis phase. A significant additional value of such an exiled government is to provide

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[18]	S. Talmon, *Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference to Governments in Exile*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 115–116.

a lawfully valid chain of command under international law (the Geneva Conventions) for its organised resistance. The message to all audiences is that the sovereign government representing the nation is extant, represents the people and is continuing the fight. During occupation is when the government-sponsored organised resistance is active against the adversary. The core of this effort is a small organisation which has been trained and equipped to conduct operations on behalf of the government in occupied territory. However, resistance writ-large is a whole-of-society effort. The government's messaging must maintain the morale of its domestic population.

Domestic

The core resistance organisation communicates with the displaced or exiled government and partakes in actions to maintain the morale and resilience of the populace. It partakes in activity (e.g., sabotage or violence) to communicate its existence and resistance to the occupier, on behalf of the sovereign government. Its actions must comply with international law governing combatants. This gives it the moral high ground among its people and in the international community. This effort at legitimisation is important to maintain not only domestic support but also external partner support. Its actions complying with the law of land warfare, give it the ability to argue that its fighters (members of the organised resistance) possess combatant's privilege, and that if any of its members are captured by the enemy, then they should be treated as prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions.[19] However, the enemy will likely not abide and agree that it is a legitimate organisation, because doing so would damage its own claim to legitimacy to rule over the territory. This battle for legitimacy of the resistance can be fought and won amongst all audiences, excepting the adversary government. That itself is a form of isolation of that government and shaping the continuing struggle. Civil society can also partake concurrently in both peaceful and passive resistance activities against the occupier.[20] Through these activities, the citizens communicate their resilience to each other and to all other audiences while setting the example for how their fellow citizens should behave.[21] Peaceful resistance

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[19] Y. Dinstein, *War, Aggression and Self-Defence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011; idem, *The International Law of Belligerent Occupation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009.

[20] Recently, Ukraine issued a pamphlet containing methods of violent, peaceful and passive resistance in which citizens could partake, guided through the document by the popular character of Vault Boy, https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.militarytimes.com/assets/pdfs/1646691281.pdf [accessed: 14 March 2022].

[21] E. Chenoweth, M.J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, New York: Columbia University Press 2011; R.L. Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking About the Fundamentals*, Boston: The Albert Einstein Institution, 2004; G. Sharp, *Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapons System*, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990.

can be organised protests, marches, blocking roads and bridges, work stoppages such as general strikes, messaging via posters, banners, graffiti, leaflets, and social media. Songs (singing revolution),[22] music, humour, and even theatre plays, as well as economic and political non-cooperation are all aspects of popular domestic resistance. These efforts by the domestic populace are intended to prevent the enemy's political consolidation over occupied territory.

There are many historical examples of successful resistance. Within our context of resistance to a foreign occupier, two of the most successful examples of resistance are: Lech Wałęsa in Poland,[23] and Mahatma Gandhi in India. Additionally, a successful campaign of civilian resistance was the Ruhrkampf of 1923, when French and Belgian soldiers occupied the German Ruhr in an attempt to extract reparations from WWI.[24] In terms of additional tactics, but outside the context of national resistance to a foreign occupier, one of the most effective recent examples was Otpor (Resistance), which was the successful internal Serbian movement to oust Slobodan Milošević.[25] However, the more coercion, particularly violent coercion, that the occupier is willing to apply, the less effective the open and public methods will be. In that case, most resistance will become passive.

Passive resistance encompasses such things as not obeying all laws, not paying all taxes, slow work performance, ignoring certain procedures or rules while claiming to be unaware, miscounting or not accounting for goods required by the occupier, and many other activities. It is also a lack of activity that can be excused or disguised as acting out of ignorance, fear, or incorrect information. Citizens employed in administrative government services under occupation can engage in extreme inefficiency to make the occupier appear incompetent. Such resistance can also make the population seem un-governable.

Allied and partner governments and citizenry

The actions by the government's organised resistance, combined with the actions of the general populace, must be transmitted to allied and partner nations. The transmission can be through foreign journalists and social media, messaging eyewitness accounts by the population, and other organisations (e.g., non-government). The resistance activities as messages must support the words spoken by the displaced or exiled

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22   S. Zunes, "Estonia's Singing Revolution (1986–1991)", International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC), April 2009, https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/estonias-singing-revolution-1986-1991/ [accessed: 5 March 2022].

23   There is little doubt that the Polish government of the time, communist and aligned with the Soviet Union, survived only due to the presence of Soviet military and security forces.

24   R.J. Schmidt, *Versailles and the Ruhr: Seedbed of World War II*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968.

25   United States Institute of Peace, *Nonviolent Civic Action: A Study Guide Series on Peace and Conflict*, Washington, D.C. 2009, pp. 8–9.

government. These audiences must see a broad-based legitimate resistance by a sovereign people struggling to restore their territorial integrity.

Adversary government and citizenry

All of the actions above are designed to refuse political consolidation to the occupier. The sovereign government's mere existence messages the fact of the occupier's violation of another nation's sovereignty. The resistance organisation fighting the occupier while complying with the law of armed conflict lets the adversary government, its soldiers, and its people know that a legitimate organised resistance against it exists. International sanctions against the occupier isolates the adversary government and its people. The message to the adversary is that the occupied nation is resilient, has support, and is fighting back, while the invader commits lives and treasure to attempt to rule a free people. The intent is to weaken adversarial resolve in its government and within its population.

Resumption of sovereignty

For our purposes of examining the limited aspect of communicating the resistance, we will assume that the resumption of sovereignty occurs either through external assistance, such as can be relied upon by NATO nations, by other external aid, or by the nation's own resilience and resistance to the occupier. This last phase is the withdrawal of the occupier, which is simultaneous with the nation's regaining self-rule. During this last phase, the displaced or exiled government prepares to return to its sovereign national territory. This return is internally facilitated by its organised resistance and the general will of the populace. Critical to success is that a competing internal resistance group with goals other than the return of the previously mandated government, is not allowed political or physical space. If non-government resistance groups develop while under occupation, the legitimate government must have a process by which they can be legitimised as part of the government's resistance effort. They must be given a chain of command leading to the legitimate government, rules to obey, including compliance with the law of armed conflict, and must support the government's political goal to return. If a group cannot adhere to such requirements, then the government must protect itself from potential wrongdoings committed by such a group by letting it be known that the group operates outside the purview of the government and does not have the government's material support.

Domestic

The message to the domestic population is that their lawfully elected representative government is returning, even if some of its members have changed by a legal process

during displacement or exile. The returning government must assure its people that the previous legal and constitutional regime will return to govern. The returning government should also inform the people as to when the next elections will be held to return normal elective processes to the people. The government must also assure the people that if any foreign support comes into the country, that it is with the permission of the government. This legitimises partner and allied presence and assistance in stabilisation. The message to the people is that the occupier has been defeated and is departing because of the people's resilience and resistance and that the nation will resume its self-determination.

Allied and partner governments and citizenry

Friends and allies must be given messages of thanks and appreciation of support. This is an opportune time to form long-lasting bonds with the people of those nations through political visits, ceremonies, erections of physical memorials and non-governmental exchanges to solidify long-term bonds of friendship.

Adversary government and citizenry

The adversary government must receive the message of utter defeat due to its decision to invade a sovereign and independent neighbour, and that the resilience and resistance of that neighbour, based on its national desire for self-determination, brought about the defeat of its objectives. In today's interconnected world facilitated by communications on the World Wide Web, even an authoritarian government will find it difficult to control the spread of this message. The population of the adversary must know that their government undertook a fatefully poor and illegal decision to invade a neighbour for no reason other than the selfish motives of its leadership. This is intended to attempt to maximise the distance between the people and their government and to avoid a repetition. The additional message is the resilience of their democratic neighbours, the resiliency of their system of government and their resistance to those who would attempt to take it from them.

Conclusion

As in many things involving people, communication is critical to success. Governments must be prepared to effectively communicate a narrative with themes and messages to their populations, their allies, and partners, and even the adversary's government and citizens. This must be done prior to conflict or pre-crisis, crisis, during occupation, and as sovereignty is resumed. The government's overall narrative must dominate the information environment to keep and maintain support, while using this communication to deny as much support as possible to the adversary government. The necessity

and criticality of a national legal framework to support the organisation, development, and authorised use of this form of warfare cannot be overemphasised. A legal framework communicates internal legitimacy to the actions of the threatened nation. Communication of this legitimate framework under international law and the law of armed conflict facilitates maintenance of allied and partner support to restore sovereignty. From beginning to end, resistance must be clearly, credibly, and competently communicated.

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Communicating the resistance
Abstract

The article is an expansion and elaboration of the vital concept of communication or strategic communication, as originally expressed in the Resistance Operating Concept. It examines how a state that chooses to authorise a resistance organisation as part of its national defence plan communicates the existence of that organisation through the four phases: pre-conflict, crisis, occupation, and resumption of sovereignty. It also covers communication directed at specific target audiences (domestic, allied and partner governments and citizenry, and the adversary government and citizenry) during the lifespan of resistance. It broadly examines the actions and messages, or communication intended for each audience in each phase and the intended effects of such communication. Additionally, it focuses on the concept of legitimacy of resistance. This legitimacy is granted by authorising a resistance organisation through an established legal framework and by adherence to the law of armed conflict during wartime. A government establishing such an organisation must also consider the option of a displaced or exiled government in extremis, accounted for under international law, and its effect on communicating and continuing resistance. The article also references concurrent examples of effective communication from Ukraine during the 2022 Russian war on Ukraine.

Key words: resistance, resilience, warfare, strategic communication, communication, narrative, legitimacy, exiled government

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The voluntary forces' role within the security systems of the Baltic countries: dissimilar but cohesive[1]

Introduction

The war in Georgia in 2008 triggered discussions among the Baltic nations with respect to their national security and the need for closer cooperation. Already during the annual Baltic Defence Ministers' meetings in May 2011 and June 2012, the ministers agreed upon a new Baltic Defence Cooperation Framework.[2] As the threat assessment was similar in some respects, security cooperation under development and the war in Ukraine (2014) speeded-up processes such as raising military budgets, mainly in Lithuania and Latvia. Since 2014, the word "deterrence" has become more commonly applied in the political and military narrative along with "resilience" as an "integral part of NATO's deterrence and defence posture."[3] The three essential elements

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[1]   The opinions expressed in the paper are the Authors' personal stance and do not reflect the official position of the Baltic Defence College and its Framework Nations.

[2]   R. Kaljurand *et al.*, *Developments in the Security Environment of the Baltic Sea Region up to 2020*, Tallinn: International Centre for Defence and Security, September 2012, p. 58.

[3]   "Deterrence and defence", NATO, 26 April 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_133127.htm [accessed: 15 November 2021].

of cohesion, capability and communication are implemented among nations to achieve desired long-term effects.[4] These concepts have been linked with investments in territorial defence forces along with other initiatives such as the Baltic Combined Joint Staff Element (B-CJSE),[5] the Headquarters Multinational Division North,[6] the NATO Air Policing mission, enhanced Forward Presence, and NATO Forces Integration Units, to support the regional security framework.

The purpose of the paper is to analyse the territorial defence forces of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as an integral component of regional security and defence, closely linked with society, national armed forces, and government. The focus is to present respective nations' approaches to building territorial forces and highlight similarities and differences. The assumption is that although the approaches differ in a few domains, all territorial defence forces are well embedded into national defence concepts. Therefore, last decade has brought about better cooperation among territorial defence forces, including cross-boundary operations and coordination, but still more needs to be done. The research is based on publicly available information, government documents, analytical studies of think tanks, and academic research works. The scope of considerations is limited to sources not covered by any confidentiality clauses and it covers the timeframe from the Baltic states' re-independence until 2021. Qualitative research applies analysis, critical synthesis, desk research and comparative studies methods. Quantitative data is utilized concerning Baltic countries voluntary forces as the cases studies of the research. The paper consists of an introduction and four sections discussing respective nations' territorial defence forces.

Estonia

The Estonian Defence League (EDL) (Est.: *Kaitseliit*) was created as a self-defence organisation in November 1918, disbanded after the Soviet occupation in 1940, and reactivated in 1990. It is an organisation deeply rooted in society and historical traditions, enjoying wide support, and encouraging membership and participation. The Estonian Defence League Act[7] regulates the legal status of the EDL in defending the independence of Estonia and its constitutional order and ensuring the

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4   K. Paulauskas, "On Deterrence", *NATO Review*, 5 August 2016, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2016/08/05/on-deterrence/index.html [accessed: 15 November 2021].

5   "Baltics sign joint military command agreement", 19 February 2015, Eng.LSM.lv – Public broadcasting of Latvia, https://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/society/baltics-sign-joint-military-command-agreement.a118475/ [accessed: 17 November 2021].

6   "Headquarters Multinational Division North inaugurated in Latvia", Republic of Estonia, Ministry of Defence, 11 March 2019, https://kaitseministeerium.ee/en/news/headquarters-multinational-division-north-inaugurated-latvia [accessed: 14 December 2021].

7   The Estonian Defence League Act, Riigikogu, Tallinn, passed 28 February 2013, Riigi Teataja, https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/525112013006/consolide [accessed: 14 December 2021].

safety of citizens. Membership is voluntary, but it is a matter of pride and honour to be among the ranks. Becoming a member requires recommendations from two active EDL members and a small financial contribution. The organisation has its collegial bodies to manage and control the personnel, budget, and resources. The EDL Commander reports to the Estonian Chief of Defence, who has authority to command EDL units assigned to the Estonian Defence Forces (EDF) in wartime, and the command structure includes all non-combatant units. The EDL incorporates voluntary associations, such as the Women's Voluntary Defence Organisation, the girl scout organisation Home Daughters, and the scout-type youth organisation Young Eagles. The first delivers medical training, field catering, and basic military training and others are non-combatant entities oriented towards developing patriotic and national spirit to promote later joining the EDL and the EDF. The total number of EDL members is estimated to be 16,000 and with the supporting associations, the League consists of some 26,000 personnel organised in 15 district commands (*malevs*), which are organised in four regional commands contributing to the Estonian wartime structure (25,000 troops) and reserve pool (60,000 troops).[8] Regionalisation is a factor allowing operations in well-known terrain during peace, crisis, and war. The advantage of this is that the natural environment and urban terrain support unconventional operations by trained and properly equipped troops. The estimated EDL budget amounts to 8% of the military budget and funds for personnel, peacetime operations, maintenance, infrastructure, and training have been growing over the past several years. However, major investments (weapon, ammunition, and equipment) are within the EDF budget. The range of tasks for the EDL includes the following: Host Nation Support (HNS), irregular warfare, partisan type operations, sabotage, counter mobility, creation of pro-defence and patriotic attitude of society, crisis management, protection of public order and security of the key infrastructure.[9] An important characteristic of the EDL is the fact that its members are permitted to possess weapons at home, but only after completing training and medical check-ups. Furthermore, membership requires participation in military-type exercises with regular armed forces. The EDL units certify with "snap mobilizations," which are currently at an 85% success rate.[10]

The 2017 *National Security Concept of Estonia* highlighted collective defence, where deterrence and defence factors receive support from civil society within

[8]   Estonian Defence League, 2019, http://www.kaitseliit.ee/en/edl [accessed: 20 November 2021].

[9]   T. Małysa, "Wojska obrony terytorialnej w państwach bałtyckich", *Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka*, no. 3, 2017, pp. 225–236.

[10] „WOT: zacieśniamy współpracę z Estonią" [interview with Col. Marek Oliwkowski, Polish territorial defence forces headquarters], 18 July 2018, Polska Zbrojna, http://www.polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/25900?t=WOT-zaciesniamy-wspolprace-z-Estonia- [accessed: 15 November 2021].

a comprehensive approach to national defence.[11] The *National Defence Development Plan 2017–2026* emphasised comprehensive defence, again mentioning the importance of the EDL.[12] The *National Defence Action Plan 2019–2022*[13] confirmed the EDL's role and a need for patriotic education, promotion of research and development activity, and investment into the national defence industry.[14] Therefore, the importance of the EDL, as a wartime actor, has been increased.[15] The total number of EDL is to reach 30,000 members by 2022, who will be trained during extensive exercises program hand-in-hand with the Estonian Defence Forces.[16] Current funding allows "equipping six new Defence League territorial defence companies," and by 2022, "six light infantry companies will have been added to significantly more mobile four battalions of the territorial defence structure of the Defence League."[17] Financial resources enhance patriotic education, provide additional recruiting capabilities, and increase the number of instructors at EDL schools for training and education. Such complex decisions are to equalize the potential of the armed forces and the EDL, to extend membership and to limit mobilisation time. In February 2019, the Ministry of Defence approved the 2020–2023 development plan aiming to increase the EDL budget up to 43 million Euro annually and to invest "in the equipment of Kaitseliit-based territorial defence units" by 2023.[18] According to the EDF Commander (2021), the "state's confidence is in its reservists, the majority of whom have their service weapons at home, with which they will be able to report immediately in case of danger" as it "is important already from the point of view of the formation of our units, but also in the case of doctrinally different possible scenarios."[19] The new initiative is the organisation of a national defence education programme to increase the

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[11] Ministry of Defence, *The National Security Concept of Estonia*, Tallinn 2017, p. 3, https://kaitseministeerium.ee/sites/default/files/elfinder/article_files/national_security_concept_2017_0.pdf [accessed: 20 November 2021].

[12] Ministry of Defence, *Estonian Military Defence 2026*, Tallinn, June 2017, https://kaitseministeerium.ee/sites/default/files/sisulehed/eesmargid_tegevused/rkak2026-a6-spreads_eng-v6.pdf [accessed: 17 November 2021].

[13] Ministry of Defence, *National Defence Action Plan 2019–2022*, updated 22 February 2018, http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/en/objectives-activities/defence-planning/national-defence-action-plan-2019-2022 [accessed: 29 November 2021].

[14] Ministry of Defence, Estonian defence budget 2021, last updated 26 April 2021, https://kaitseministeerium.ee/en/objectives-activities/defence-budget [accessed: 20 November 2021].

[15] Estonian Defence League, *op. cit.*

[16] S. Flanagan *et al.*, *Deterring Russian Aggression in the Baltic States through Resilience and Resistance*, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2019, p. 8.

[17] Ministry of Defence, *National Defence Action Plan 2019–2022*, *op. cit.*

[18] A. Vahtla, "Ministry of Defence approves 2020–2023 development plan", ERR News, 2 February 2019, https://news.err.ee/906911/ministry-of-defence-approves-2020-2023-development-plan [accessed: 22 December 2021].

[19] Baltic News Service, "Herem: Estonia, Switzerland complement each other in field of reserve army", Tallinn, 26 April 2021.

society's readiness to protect Estonia's independence and to promote patriotic spirit.[20] The EDL continues to play a significant role within the Estonian defence concept to defend the country and facilitate the deployment of Allied forces during crisis periods to fight together. In the case of occupation, the EDL has the potential to conduct robust resistance as it was in the past.

Latvia

The Latvian National Guard (LNG) (Lat.: *Zemessardze*) was created on 23 August 1991 and the legal status was approved on 6 April 1993 by On the National Guard of the Republic of Latvia Act.[21] The LNG reports to the Latvian Chief of Defence as one of the services, supporting integration with regular units and inclusion into the national defence plan. Legally, the LNG "is a component of the National Armed Forces, the objective of which is to involve the citizens of Latvia in the defence of the state territory and society, and which participates in the planning and execution of the state defence tasks in accordance with the tasks determined in the Law."[22] The tasks of the LNG are: training of citizens for service; executing state defence tasks; participating in international operations and rapid reaction forces; delivering HNS; participating in emergency, fire-fighting and rescue work during emergencies; supporting government institutions in crime prevention, ensuring public order and security; supporting information technology security incidents; and finally, supporting the Recruitment and Youth Guard Centre in implementing its educational programme.[23] The LNG has established its military training areas such as exercise facilities and firing ranges in immediate vicinity to units. Moreover, the LNG has its own training centre, which works in close coordination with the Latvian National Armed Forces Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). *The State Defence Concept 2020* considers the LNG to be part of the state defence system with a crucial role in territorial defence enhancing the links between the society and the armed forces. Its major role is to defend Latvia on the basis of autonomous decisions without awaiting special orders from a higher level if a threatening situation is perceived and interpreted by LNG commanders as imminent and requiring action. Therefore, according to Article 25 of the National Security Law, "unit commanders need to be adequately trained and ready to get engaged in state defence based on the State Defence Operational Plan without in-

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[20]   Baltic News Service, "Estonia: national defense camps will be organised by the Defense League", the Press release of the Estonian Defence Ministry, Tallinn, 26 April 2021.

[21]   The Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia, On the National Guard of the Republic of Latvia, 1993, with amendments from 1994, 1996, 1997, 2000, 2002, and 2003, https://www.vvc.gov.lv/export/sites/default/docs/LRTA/Citi/On_the_National_Guard_of_the_Republic_of_Latvia_.doc [accessed: 22 December 2021].

[22]   Saeima, The National Guard of the Republic of Latvia Law, Riga, 26 May 2010, section 2.

[23]   *Ibidem*, section 3.

structions from the top."[24] It requires qualified and knowledgeable leaders, so professional soldiers man LNG leadership positions. LNG members may keep weapons at home based on carefully established procedures, personnel self-awareness and individual proficiencies.

The LNG is made up of four regional brigades, composed of infantry battalions, in addition to a cyber-defence unit and a psychological support platoon, which are all subordinate to the LNG Commander. Some brigades possess Combat Service and Combat Service Support battalions and air defence companies to ensure independence and survivability on the battlefield. Operations link with the terrain from which volunteers originate, making a close link between the local population and respective units. Volunteers sign a contract which demands a mandatory minimum of twenty-one days of basic training during the first year, and additional service the following years. One specific characteristic is the formation of quick reaction platoons and companies being ready to react especially in the case of "hybrid" threats e.g., the so-called "little green men,"[25] and to support local administration in the case of social unrest. Each LNG battalion maintains company-size high readiness units with all necessary support elements, such as indirect fire support, anti-armour, and air defence units to respond to any threat including a direct attack. Moreover, there are enhanced rapid response capabilities of the Vidzeme and the Latgale National Guard units, which operate closely with professional land forces units.[26] The Latvian *State Defence Concept 2016* recognised the changes in the security environment and the Russian threat requiring investments in security, enhancing cooperation with partners, and strengthening self-defence capabilities within the collective defence.[27] In the *State Defence Concept 2020*, the LNG was seen as crucial in defending territorial integrity, requiring 10,000 LNG troops by 2024 and 12,000 by 2027.[28]

The *State Defence Concept 2020* highlighted the role of youth education[29] to reinforce societal resilience by integrating state defence subjects into curricula to underpin comprehensive defence systems, enhance patriotic spirit and civic awareness, boost

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[24]   Saeima, *The State Defence Concept*, Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia, Riga, 24 September 2020, p. 9.

[25]   Little green men – the term first appeared during the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation (2014), refers to soldiers in unmarked army uniforms, with Russian military weapons and equipment. The Russian Federation initially denied that these were troops of Russian soldiers, claiming that they were „spontaneous self-defence groups who may have acquired their Russian-looking uniforms from local [military surplus] shops", but later admitted these were Russian special forces.

[26]   *Ibidem*, p. 8.

[27]   M. Andžāns, V. Veebel, "Deterrence Dilemma in Latvia and Estonia: Finding the Balance between External Military Solidarity and Territorial Defense", *Journal on Baltic Security*, vol. 3, no. 2, 2017, pp. 29–41.

[28]   Saeima, *The State Defence Concept*, *op. cit.*, pp. 25–26.

[29]   *Ibidem*, p. 17–19.

the society's cohesion, and invest in leadership skills and physical training. An important time will be the academic year of 2024/2025, as state defence lessons will be mandatory in all Latvian secondary schools; and it is estimated that 30,000 young people (aged 15–17) will be taught and some 2000 will join summer camps annually.[30] Some students will be eager to join the LNG and the armed forces, and as a result, overall societal resilience will significantly rise in parallel with the number of citizens receiving training, specific knowledge, and skills. Furthermore, the Latvian Ministry of Defence has created its professional secondary school, or Cadets school, with a focus on leadership qualities, a sense of responsibility, and skills enhancing physical and mental strengths.[31]

Lithuania

The Lithuanian Voluntary National Defence Service (Lit.: *Savanoriškoji Krašto apsaugos tarnyba*), later the National Defence Volunteer Forces (NDVF) (Lit.: *Krašto apsaugos savanorių pajėgos*), was activated on 17 January 1991. The Republic of Lithuania Law on the Organisation of the National Defence System and Military Service formalized the NDVF, including the foundation of leadership and units.[32] Initially independent, the NDVF reported to the Lithuanian Land Forces in 2003. The range of tasks expanded and after joining NATO in 2004, besides national defence duties, the force became accountable for the Host Nation Support, high-level combat readiness, participation in missions abroad, and support for local administration during peace and crisis. Enhancement of the society resilience includes the organisation of seminars and educational campaigns to cultivate patriotic consciousness and to strengthen military-society relations.

The total number of NDVF members is approximately 6000, expanding the current 4500 volunteers (called riflemen) and 500 active-duty officers and non-commissioned officers, who are assigned to major leadership and staff positions. To maintain specific skills, volunteers perform a three-week "boot camp," or basic military training, to continue later with 20–50 days of military training per year.[33] The whole training period lasts around three months. The NDVF organisation consists of six territorial units, mainly light infantry sections covering the entire territory of Lithuania, which are ready to act in occupied territory and behind enemy lines.[34] Officially, the country

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[30] *Ibidem*, p. 18.

[31] *Ibidem*, p. 19.

[32] Seimas, The Republic of Lithuania Law on the Organisation of the National Defence System and Military Service, Vilnius, 5 May 1998, as amended in 1999.

[33] The National Defence Volunteer Forces, Karys.lt, 1 June 2020, https://www.karys.lt/en/military-service/ndvf/402 [accessed: 21 January 2022].

[34] S. Flanagan *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

has passed the law regulating Rules of the Engagement (ROEs) and sanctioning of use of weapons during peacetime; the new law is based on experiences coming from the Ukraine war (2014) and the invasion of the so-called "little green men." Such a pro-active approach to facing non-military threats was important in speeding up the reaction time of military and voluntary forces in cases of provocations, attacks from armed groups, border crossing by armed people, and unconventional threats.[35]

The NDVF plans further investment in pro-defence education, including mandatory classes in schools to strengthen the NDVF link to the society and to increase patriotic spirit. Motivating citizens to defend the state, increasing resilience, including non-violent and armed resistance skills, are of great importance. Therefore, the Mobilisation and Civil Resistance Department under the MOD regularly visit schools and other institutions to provide lectures "combining both traditions and innovations."[36] This is an integral part of patriotic education including also military unit visits, observing exercises, and joining summer camps. The NDVF cooperates with a paramilitary organisation, the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union (LRU) (Lit.: *Lietuvos Šaulių Sąjunga*), a significant force of estimated 11,000 volunteers, who, as trained reserves, could join the armed forces or the NDVF and contribute to the national defence or resistance in the case of occupation. The LRU structure includes ten regions with light infantry-type companies cooperating with local communities, based on members coming from different social groups. The NDVF and Riflemen Union are not competing, as both have a niche in national defence. Therefore, both are supplementary organisations marked by good cooperation and relationship. The advantage of the LRU and the NDVF is their readiness to react quickly to crises or military conflict. Societal preparations are multidimensional, and one example is the development of the *Guide to Active Resistance* prepared in 2016 in cooperation with the armed forces and the LRU.[37]

Similarities and differences in a collective drive towards cohesion

The perception of a threat is similar in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and the main threat towards their independence and territorial integrity is Russia. New situation

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[35]   Ministry of National Defence, "New Statute on Use of Military Force will allow to immediately use Armed Forces in response to non-conventional threats in peacetime", 16 December 2014, http://kam.lt/en/news_1098/news_archives/news_archive_2014/news_archive_2014_-_12/new_statute_on_use_of_military_force_will_allow_to_immediately_use_armed_forces_in_response_to_non-conventional_threats_in_peacetime [accessed: 21 January 2022].

[36]   See: Lithuanian Centre of Non-formal Youth Education, https://www.lmnsc.lt/en/ [accessed: 23 December 2021].

[37]   *Lithuanian Guerrilla Warfare Manual – Translated to English*, Breach Bang Clear, 2 November 2016, https://www.breachbangclear.com/lithuanian-guerrilla-warfare-manual-translated-to-english [accessed: 23 November 2021].

supports familiarisation with one another, information exchange (although there are some national limitations), assistance in crisis, and mutual support during war. Therefore, the three nations continue to intensify cooperation due to common operational space and historical memories of resistance. One important goal of this cooperation is to strengthen against and counter constant pressure, and alone they are too weak to face a complex threat, especially as combined military budgets of the Baltic countries are approximately 2.5 billion Euro. This amount is not enough to develop armed forces able to face the Russian threat. Building up a military domain and resilience within the territorial defence forces becomes the most effective when complemented by a common voice within foreign and security policy, enhanced defence cooperation, and efforts to unify initiatives regarding energy and transport sectors. The uniting factor for the three Baltic states is the strategic partnership with the United States (US). This includes direct relations within the US Army National Guard State Partnership Programme: Estonia – Maryland, Lithuania – Pennsylvania, Latvia – Michigan, to maintain relations and exchange experiences. Following the success of the cooperation between the Baltic states' territorial defence forces, there is a new cooperation between the Lithuanian NDVF and the Polish Territorial Defence Forces (TDF; Pol.: *Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej*), allowing cross-boundary engagement. The TDF's Commander lieutenant general Wiesław Kukuła highlighted that Poland has created its territorial defence forces "based on Lithuanian experiences."[38]

However, there are differences among the three Baltic nations related to the concepts of the TDF including subordination, command and control, structure, capabilities, and some tasks. When considering the ratio between the civilian population and TDF members, the best example comes from Estonia. Nevertheless, all nations are investing in TDF units and there is growing recognition of the need for closer cooperation, especially in a wartime scenario when the aggressor does not respect national borders. In 2016, one of the best examples of regional cooperation occurred when the Estonian Defence League, the Lithuanian National Defence Volunteer Force and the Latvian National Guard all signed a cooperation agreement facilitating yearly "staff consultations where chiefs of staffs of the Baltic States' volunteer forces discuss combat training, sports and cultural cooperation for the following year."[39] This agreement included partnership of selected TDF units and decisions about extending exercises, especially cross-border ones. Another example of effective cooperation between

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[38]   B. Łapszewicz, "Obchody 28. rocznicy utworzenia Ochotniczych Sił Obrony Kraju", *Kurier Wileński*, 17 January 2019, https://kurierwilenski.lt/2019/01/17/obchody-28-rocznicy-utworzenia-ochotniczych-sil-obrony-kraju [accessed: 24 November 2021].

[39]   J. Martinaitienė, "Lithuanian National Defence Volunteer Force strengthens cooperation with Latvian and Estonian counterparts", Lithuanian Armed Forces, 17 January 2018, https://kariuomene.lt/en/lithuanian-national-defence-volunteer-force-strengthens-cooperation-with-latvian-and-estonian-counterparts/14479 [accessed: 24 November 2021].

the TDFs is the constant interaction between the EDL Regional Command "South" and the Latvian 2nd *Zemessardze* Brigade, enhanced from the combined battalion and brigade level planning and execution of exercises and operations. Territorial defence forces are an important capability of all Baltic countries, based on the assessment of security threats and regarding NATO's Article 3 obligations.[40] Furthermore, role in shaping patriotic spirit among citizens is key in creating resilience and resistance spirit. There is also multinational cross-boundary cooperation, like the 2nd Estonian Brigade training together with the Latvian 2nd *Zemessardze* Brigade during the annual exercise "Siil [Hedgehog] 2018,"[41] but it is not yet a permanent annual exercise.

Another similarity between the Baltic nations is the necessity to face non-military or paramilitary threats, therefore there are established laws allowing a quick and independent reaction at the lower levels of the chain of command (in all nations, especially Latvia and Lithuania). Additionally, TDFs support mobilization during war, but the challenge is the response time, thus, constant readiness is critical, as the time for reaction in the case of military aggression will be limited. In general, reaction time is not a major challenge for TDFs because members and volunteers already live or work in the operational area. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania use TDFs to build reserve capacity based on constant training regulated by national laws allowing workers to be released for such duties by private businesses. As volunteers come from all groups of society and possess a variety of personal and professional skills, their roles can expand beyond regular training based on initiative, out-of-the-box thinking, and creativity. As TDFs are voluntary, the motivation and readiness to dedicate one's fate to national defence is very high in the three Baltic countries. To sustain it, they all invest in defence education and forming patriotic spirit. This idea is the most important for Latvia and Estonia, as they aim to significantly raise the number of members.

The Baltic nations have recognized modern changes in the operational environment; therefore, training not only occurs in typical wooded military bases, but also in urbanized areas. These concepts come from recently learned lessons, unconventional warfare principles, the reality of contemporary battlefield, and technological development. Recently, some new capabilities, such as cyber units in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania or psychological support detachments, have emerged. One common characteristic are planned investments to enhance combat power, more intensive exercises with regular armed forces units, and the procurement of more sophisticated weapon systems, especially anti-tank and air defence capabilities to mitigate the Russian advantage presented by armour units and air force. A limitation

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[40]   "Resilience and Article 3", NATO, 25 June 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm [accessed: 24 November 2021].

[41]   "Exercise Siil 2018 – Allies Defending Estonia", Joint Forces – News, 18 July 2018, https://www.joint-forces.com/exercise-news/15960-exercise-siil-2018-allies-defending-estonia [accessed: 17 February 2022].

is the voluntary character of TDFs, resulting in limited capability and readiness at basic levels,[42] as those are not comparable with professional soldiers. This is an outcome of the specific training and limitations to facing hostile forces' regular armour and mechanized forces and blocking them. Additionally, more advanced systems require more training to operate and use them in joint organisations. Therefore, TDFs employ specific tactics using terrain to their advantage in support of national armed forces. The nations acknowledge their abilities to conduct delaying actions, ambushes, and attacks on combat service and combat service support units. One of the desired goals is to gain time for regular forces mobilization, which is critical because of the limited operational depth of the Baltics. Regarding payments and reimbursements, Latvia and Lithuania pay their volunteers for participation in training or exercises, but Estonia does not. Lithuania and Estonia include defence education in schools' curricula recognizing the value of such an approach. Latvia is comprehensively designing a new concept of mandatory education for young generation acknowledging that such an approach is critical. The demography as a challenge for Baltic countries in further development of their voluntary forces will persist regardless of growing interest among population to join them. Next, especially in the case of Estonia and Latvia, the process of the further integration of Russian-speaking populations into the society and territorial defence forces must be taken seriously, also with respect to mitigating the effects of Russian propaganda on their solidarity with respective nations.

Conclusion

Although conceptually the models of the three Baltic nations differ, their roles are similar regarding the ability to conduct operations in well-known terrain and in support of local communities. Growing cross-border cooperation among Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian TDFs create a unified operational area, undivided by borders. The support of regular units must be enhanced in planning and executing operations. This is another key aspect which must be properly addressed and constantly maintained. As of ongoing investments, they will play a more significant role in facing "hybrid" challenges first, and although they will not be able to stop powerful conventional aggression or offensive operations quickly, they will be able to disrupt, delay and restrict any advance and movement of the enemy. TDFs will have limited combat potential and psychological preparation due to less training than the national armed forces, however, TDFs are best suited to build and preserve resilience deep within society. This type of force is very important for small nations as part of deterrence to

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[42]   P. Szymański, J. Gotkowska, "The Baltic states' Territorial Defence Forces in the face of hybrid threats", *OSW Commentary*, no. 165, 19 March 2015.

discourage aggression against their territory and independence. Looking outside the Baltics, it is about assuring allies and partners of readiness and capabilities to fight for the countries' sovereignty. Therefore, the evolution of TDFs will continue and their role will increase and they will prove to be a credible constituent of the national defence capabilities of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

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The voluntary forces' role within the security systems of the Baltic countries: dissimilar but cohesive

Abstract

The three Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, gained independence for the second time in the late 20th century, and are now investing in the whole society's approach to defence, recognizing the threat from Russia, especially after the wars in Georgia (2007/8) and Ukraine (2014, 2022). Voluntary territorial defence forces are an important constituent of their national defence strategies. This paper aims to analyse these forces as an integral component of national security, based on a close connection with society, armed forces, and government. The similarities and differences between the three different volunteer forces will be highlighted and ultimately proven how they are strongly embedded in national and regional security setup, while also enhancing cross-border cooperation.

Key words: territorial defence forces, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, security

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Professional resistance forces as a defence framework for small countries

Introduction

After decades of expeditionary counterinsurgency operations alongside their American allies, Eastern and Northern European countries were suddenly forced to refocus their attention to their own front yards following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its follow-on aggression against Ukraine. Just like after the end of Cold War, these countries were once again incentivised to take a hard look at their defence enterprise and assess whether their existing defence strategies and military organisations are ready to meet the threat they are facing. After numerous simulations, wargames, and tabletop exercises,[1] these countries have realised that their defence capabilities have significant gaps, and they need to implement major changes in their current system to protect their sovereignty and ensure their national survival. However, instead of developing strategies and designing defence organisations that reflect their available resources and fit the challenges they are facing, Eastern and Northern European states once again implemented solutions that reflect the dominant western conventional military norms more than their actual necessities. Although through the implementation of the so-called "Total

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[1] D.A. Shlapak, M.W. Johnson , *Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics*, RAND Report, 2016, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1253/RAND_RR1253.pdf [accessed: 10 February 2022].

Defence Strategies"[2] some of these countries have augmented their conventional approach with some paramilitary, unconventional formations such as home guards or territorial defence forces, their solutions still reflect how the West thinks professional military organisations should act and be organised.

This article argues that given the significant asymmetry between the conventional military capabilities of Russia and these countries, such approaches can only lead to suboptimal results and ultimately to the loss of national sovereignty. Furthermore, this analysis suggest that the maintenance of national sovereignty requires Eastern and Northern European countries to completely abandon traditional military norms, dismantle their existing military formations, and redesign their national defence approaches. It suggests that these new solutions should rather reflect a professional, state-controlled combination of the principles, characteristics, and organisational features of modern insurgents, terrorist groups, and organised crime organisations than conventional military formations.

The article is divided into six parts. First, it reviews the origins of the conventional warfare norm and how it became universally accepted over time. Second, the article discusses how such a norm is still reflected in small countries' defence approaches even with all recent changes towards total defence concepts. Third, the paper argues that the primacy of the conventional warfare norm prevents total defence concepts to achieve best outcome, and recommends the introduction of a new professional resistance force-based defence framework. Next, to identify necessary and sufficient principles and characteristics of such organisations, the paper uses case study methodology and presents an in-depth analysis of the First Russo-Chechen War and the Second Lebanese War. Finally, the paper concludes with a summary of the findings and discussion of possible implications.

The norm of conventional warfare

Norms are beliefs about both the natural and social world that define the situation and behaviour of actors. They are produced and reproduced through social interactions.[3] Norms also define what is acceptable and what is effective in social interactions.[4] Conventional warfare can be defined as warfare that is prosecuted by standing, standardised, state owned and directed military organisations.

2   M. Kepe, J. Osburg, "Total Defence: How the Baltic States Are Integrating Citizenry into Their National Security Strategies", *Small Wars Journal*, 24 September 2017, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/total-defense-how-the-baltic-states-are-integrating-citizenry-into-their-national-security- [accessed: 30 May 2022].

3   A. Wendt, "Constructing International Politics", *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 1, 1995, pp. 71–81.

4   J. Golinski, *Making Natural Knowledge: Constructivism and the History of Science*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 11–13.

Conventional warfare is capital-intensive and technologically dependent. The norm of conventional warfare refers to the shared beliefs of military professionals, codified in military doctrine, taught in military educational institutions, and embodied in military practices about how modern militaries should be organised and how they should operate.[5] The existence of such a norm is obvious, based on the fact that today most countries maintain a standing, technologically dependent capital-intensive military structure, while the alternative labour-intensive defence approaches are almost none-existent.[6] The current norm of conventional warfare was devised over several centuries, starting with the introduction of the first standing militaries in the 17th century, the professionalisation of war, and long-term capital investment from the state.[7] Over the upcoming centuries, the Western military model diffused and expanded around the world – either imposed or imported – and was even codified in international law.[8] First, following the 1863 Lieber Code, international law prohibited the conduct of unconventional warfare by state organisations,[9] while the 1907 Hague Regulations of Land Warfare required militaries to wear uniforms and carry their weapons openly.[10] These laws institutionalised already existing universal conventional military norms defining military identity and possible actions.

Small countries and the norm of conventional warfare

International relations literature has paid much attention to the explanation of states' military behaviour over the years. Related literature has been mostly dominated by rationalist and neorealist arguments suggesting that all countries' primary goal is survival, which requires them to balance power both externally, through alliances,[11] and internally, through standing militaries and national mobilisation.[12] Neorealist arguments suggest that in the competitive international environment,

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5   T. Farrell, "Transnational norms and military development: Constructing Ireland's professional army", *European Journal of International Relations*", vol. 7, no. 1, 2001, pp. 63–102.

6   A. Wendt, M. Barnett, "Dependent State Formation and Third World Militarization", *Review of International Studies*, vol. 19, no. 4, 1993, pp. 321–347.

7   G. Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800*, 2nd edn., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 163–169.

8   D.B. Ralston, *Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions in the Extra-European World, 1600–1914*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996, pp. 25–27.

9   R.S. Hartigan, *Lieber's Code and the Law of War*, Chicago: Precedent, 1983, pp. 38–41.

10   G. Best, *Humanity in warfare*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1980, pp. 101–113.

11   S.M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987, pp. 28–31.

12   T.J. Christensen, *Useful adversaries: Grand strategy, domestic mobilization, and Sino-American conflict, 1947–1958* (Princeton Studies in International History and Politics series, vol. 179), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. 5–17.

the primary goal of all states is survival, which requires them to organise for war in the most effective way possible.

Small countries' historical solutions to such a problem have been the emulation of major powers' military norms and practices, in this case – the norms and related organisations of conventional warfare.[13] However, other arguments suggest that such emulation happens not because these norms best serve the survival needs of small countries or their impeccable successes, but rather for their historical familiarity, international recognition, and pressure from major allies.[14] Additionally, small countries lack both the time and expertise to develop their own defence approaches.[15] All these factors lead to a situation where small countries are not at all efficiently organised for war, ultimately jeopardising their own survival.

The fear of a potential war with Russia forced both political and military leaders in several Eastern and Northern European countries to take a critical look at their defence approaches. These countries have seemingly realised that they need a different approach to ensure their survival in case of Russian aggression but have not been able to free themselves from the trap of the conventional warfare norm. While these countries have started to develop a force multiplier, an asymmetric defence component consisting of unconventional warfare formations such as home guards or territorial defence forces, this component is only designed to support the conventional military formations' operations. The overall strategic approaches of these countries still overwhelmingly reflect the norms and practices of traditional conventional warfare, and with that, they cannot achieve the most ideal outcomes. This article argues that if small states want to organise for war most efficiently, they need to redesign their defence enterprise and create a purpose built organisation for their new strategic approach.[16]

Small countries' professional resistance forces

Several studies argue that existential level external shocks are needed for fundamental changes to take place.[17] The fear of an impending war finally might just created such a shock for many European countries, and it might undermine the existing military orthodoxy and generate new, more appropriate orthodoxy in these countries. Since none of the Eastern and Northern European countries can contend

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[13] T. Farrell, *op. cit.*

[14] E.O. Goldman, The Spread of Western Military Models to Ottoman Turkey and Meiji Japan, [in:] *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology*, eds. T. Farrell, T. Terriff, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, pp. 36–47.

[15] T. Farrell, *op. cit.*

[16] Unconventional warfare refers to non-traditional ways of conducting military operations.

[17] J.W. Legro, "Whence American Internationalism", *International Organization*, vol. 54, no. 2, 2000, pp. 253–289.

in war with Russia on anything like equal terms, their only chance is to develop and implement a strategy and military formations that take away the advantages of Russia's military or make them irrelevant.[18] The foundations of such an unorthodox approach can be found in many historical examples, both at the state and non-state level. China, Algeria, Vietnam, and Cuba successfully implemented unconventional warfare at the state level, while non-state actors like the Afghan insurgents, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, and Yugoslav partisans, just to name a few, also fought successfully against numerically and technologically superior conventional militaries. If European countries want to successfully meet the challenges posed by the Russian aggression, they need to completely redesign their defence approaches based on unconventional warfare foundations and build a new version of state-owned, standardised, and professional military that is organised, equipped, and trained to fight based on norms that are different from our current ones.[19]

New defence establishments must be created for new types of conflict, and they should be radically different from military organisations as we understand them today. Universally accepted principles that have long shaped conventional militaries should be fundamentally reimagined, if not abandoned entirely.[20] European countries should be ready to abandon traditional services, formations, unit designs, training and education structures, and military rank systems, and replace them with purpose-built solutions that specifically address the requirements of unconventional warfare. To help identifying such ground-breaking changes, these countries must conduct a rigorous study of historical cases of unconventional warfare, especially resistance[21] examples. While they can find some useful examples within their own history, it is important that the Eastern and Northern European countries do not only draw lessons from their own romanticised Western models from the World War II and Cold War eras, but to also study contemporary examples such as the Chechen resistance against Russia, Hezbollah's operations against Israel during the 2006 War, and the Iraqi, Afghan, and Syrian insurgencies. To support the overall argument of this article and to help the initial development of new military orthodoxy – given the space limitations of this publication – this article explores only two such examples. Next, using in-depth case study research methodology this

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18   S. Fabian, *Professional Irregular Defence Forces: The Other Side of COIN*, master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2012, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/7338/12Jun_Fabian.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [accessed: 30 May 2022].

19   *Ibidem*.

20   M. van Creveld, *Transformation of war*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009, p. 234.

21   Resistance is "the natural response of a sovereign government and its people when faced with a threat to their sovereignty and independence. In its objective of seeking the restoration of the pre conflict status quo, resistance (unarmed or armed, nonviolent, or violent) is distinguishable from terrorism, insurgency, or revolution". O.C. Fiala, *Resistance Operating Concept (ROC)*, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2020, p. 5.

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article explores the First Russo-Chechen War and the Second Lebanese War. These cases were selected as the subjects of this analysis due to their relevance to the topic, their timeliness (quite recent cases), the availability of detailed information about the organisations and activities of all participants, the conflicts' different geographical locations, and the fact that in these cases there are four different parties, which helps mitigating some potential biases.

The First Russo-Chechen War

Although "Russia had fallen from superpower status and however much Russian military power was degraded, the Russian forces that invaded Chechnya still exhibited the military strategic preferences of a great power."[22] Russia sent a numerically and technologically superior conventional force into the small Chechen republic in December 1994, but after almost two years of fierce fighting this force was defeated and forced to withdraw. This remarkable success was the result of the Chechens understanding that no conventional strategy would have given them any chance of success against the Russians and choosing to follow an unorthodox, unconventional strategy. Several key factors led to the success of this approach.

First, the Chechen leadership was successful in creating a strong, single, and sustained national will to resist the Russian invasion.[23] Such a will ensured continuous popular support for the resistance forces, information superiority over the enemy, and human and material resupply to the resistance forces.

Second, the Chechens used non-traditional, network-type organisations designed to best fit the requirements of resistance operations. Chechen forces were organised into hundreds of small units which had the ability to conduct operations individually or as part of a larger, joint formation. Their organisational flexibility, swarming tactics,[24] the combined use of different weapon systems, and their careful target selection made these units extremely effective against predictable and slow conventional Russian formations.[25] While the Chechen force frequently used traditional guerrilla hit-and-run tactics, they also further developed their concepts through the integration (in time and space) of psychological operations, improvised

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[22] R.M. Cassidy, *Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: military strategic culture and the paradoxes of asymmetric conflict*, Diane Publishing, 2003, p. 37.

[23] O. Oliker, *Russia's Chechen wars 1994–2000: lessons from urban combat*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001, p. 18.

[24] Swarming is the systematic pulsing of force and/or fire by dispersed units so as to strike the adversary from all directions simultaneously. J. Arquilla, D. Ronfeldt, *Swarming and the Future of Conflict*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000, p. 24.

[25] T. Karasik, "Chechen Clan Military Tactics and Russian Warfare", *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, 2000, https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/7250-analytical-articles-caci-analyst-2000-3-15-art-7250.html [accessed: 30 May 2022].

explosive devices, and terrorist acts. Such combinations created complex challenges with which the conventional Russian military were not able to deal effectively.

Additionally, since the success of the Chechen approach was mostly based on the effective actions of small units, capable leadership at this level was also a critical element of it. Chechen leaders could take the initiative, make quick decisions, adapt and tailor their activities to the changing operational situation, and coordinate among themselves even without a centralised command structure.[26]

Next, the Chechen side had a much deeper understanding of how physical features of the battlespace can be utilised in support of their own strategy than the Russian. While the Chechens exploited all supporting features of their country's natural terrain features, they also utilised the advantages of man-made urban area. They even conducted large-scale pre-conflict infrastructural preparations in urban areas to turn their towns and villages into "man-made jungles" to enhance the effectiveness of their own operations while mitigating the effectiveness of conventional Russian formations and weapon-systems. "The Chechens simply applied their mastery at the art of forest warfare, so evident in the 18th and 19th centuries, to the urban forests in Grozny and other cities."[27]

Finally, the Chechen fighters had extensive pre-conflict military training and many of them also had combat experience. The majority of the Chechen soldiers received their training in the Russian military which provided them with intimate knowledge of the enemy's organisations, manoeuvres, tactics, techniques, procedures, and the strength and weaknesses of the Russian weapon system. In addition, most of the Chechen fighters spoke Russian, which allowed them to understand intercepted Russian communications and to broadcast conflicting orders, thus creating confusion and chaos among Russian units and often leading them into prepared Chechen ambushes.

The Second Lebanese War

After driving Israel out of Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah slowly became a state within a state in Southern Lebanon. By the start of the Second Lebanese War in 2006, Hezbollah functioned as a political, social, and most importantly, a military entity. It had spent years preparing for a potential Israeli invasion, and when it finally came, Hezbollah was much more prepared than anyone would have thought. Over the years, Hezbollah carefully designed a unique strategy that did not emulate contemporary western military norms, but best fitted the realities of Hezbollah and its enemy the Israeli military ultimately leading to success. Just like the Chechen

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[26]   S. Knezys, R. Sedlickas, *The war in Chechnya*, College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1999, pp. 127–131.

[27]   O. Oliker, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

strategy, Hezbollah`s strategy had several key elements that were arguably critical to the favourable outcome.

First, Hezbollah's strategy was based on the idea that modern, post-military societies cannot endure wars anymore due to their intolerance of a large number of casualties.[28] Based on this assumption, Hezbollah aimed to quickly raise the cost of an Israeli invasion to an unacceptable level through tactics that resulted in mass casualties. To augment these tactics, Hezbollah also used extensive information operations to exaggerate their own battlefield successes, show the casualties suffered by the Israeli forces, blame the Israeli forces for collateral damage and suffering of the Lebanese civilians, and try to sway international support away from Israel.

The next critical factor in Hezbollah`s success was its organisational design. "Hezbollah acted as a 'distributed network' of small cells and units acting with considerable independence, and capable of rapidly adapting to local conditions rather than having to react faster than the IDF's decision cycle, they could largely ignore it, waiting out Israeli attacks, staying in positions, reinfiltrating or re-emerging from cover, and choosing the time to attack or ambush."[29] Hezbollah fighters' high level of pre-conflict training and combat experience in unconventional warfare was another critical part of Hezbollah's success. Such training included day and night small unit operations, placement of mines, construction and placement of improvised explosive devices, and integration of the effects of different weapon systems both in rural and urban environment.[30]

Furthermore, similarly to the Chechens, Hezbollah conducted major infrastructural preparations before the war, and extensively and effectively used well-concealed strong points, fortified defensive positions, and a sophisticated tunnel system. Hezbollah also used deception through dummy fighting positions and fake bunkers. The usefulness of such infrastructure was further supported by extreme operational security measures. No single Hezbollah commander knew the location of other bunkers beyond his assigned three bunkers (one primary and two reserve), and almost nobody had knowledge about the entire bunker structure.[31]

Finally, extensive knowledge of the Israeli military doctrine, the organisation of the Israeli Defence Forces and their way of fighting also contributed to the success of Hezbollah`s unconventional strategy.

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[28]   S.C. Farquhar, *Back to basics: a study of the second Lebanon war and operation Cast Lead*, Diane Publishing, 2010, pp. 78–81.

[29]   *Ibidem*, p. 66.

[30]   R. Bergman, *The Secret War with Iran: The 30-year Clandestine Struggle Against the World's Most Dangerous Terrorist Power*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008, pp. 173–191.

[31]   A. Crooke, M. Perry, „How Hezbollah Defeated Israel, Part 2: Winning the Ground War", *Asia Times Online*, 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJ13Ak01.html [accessed: 30 May 2022].

Conclusion

Eastern and Northern European countries are at a historical turning point. The re-emergence of an aggressive Russia and the fear of a potential war have sent shock waves through the capitals of these countries and galvanised them to take a critical look at their defence capabilities. Recognising the shortcomings of their current approaches, most of these countries have augmented their conventional military organisations with some unconventional formations, such as home guards or territorial defence forces, but the foundations of these solutions still mostly reflect how the West thinks about war and the military. This is a mistake. If these countries want to maintain their sovereignty and independence, they should abandon their military orthodoxy and completely redesign their defence strategy and military formations. They should develop concepts that reflect their own realities and are designed to mitigate (or make irrelevant) the capabilities of the numerically and technologically superior Russian military. History suggests that there is only one approach that these countries can take and that is to build a new version of state-owned, standardised, and professional military that is organised, equipped, and trained to fight resistance warfare. It cannot be done without the rigorous study of history, especially recent unconventional wars. Undoubtedly, the suggestions put forward in this analysis require seismic changes in the Eastern and Northern European countries' defence enterprise, but without such ground-breaking changes these countries will never stand a chance when the worst happens.

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Professional resistance forces as a defence framework for small countries
Abstract

Due to Russia's aggressive actions in their neighbourhood, Eastern and Northern European countries were forced to take a critical look at their homeland defence capabilities and realised that their defence capabilities have significant gaps. However, instead of developing strategies and designing defence organisations that reflect their available resources and fit the challenges they are facing, these countries once again implemented solutions that reflect the dominant Western conventional military norms. Although through the implementation of the so-called "total defence" strategies some of these countries have augmented their conventional approach with some paramilitary, unconventional formations, their solutions still reflect how the West thinks wars should be waged and professional military organisations should act and be organised. This article suggests that these countries need to abandon their military orthodoxy and completely redesign their defence approaches based on unconventional warfare foundations and build a new version of state-owned, standardised, and professional military that is organised, equipped, and trained to fight based on different norms than our current ones. To propose some ideas to such changes, the article draws lessons from the case studies of the First Russo-Chechen War and the Second Lebanese War.

Key words: strategy, norm of conventional warfare, Russia, asymmetry, unconventional warfare, total defence, resistance

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Differing concepts of total defence in small states: comparing the cases of New Zealand and Poland

Introduction

Ieva Bērziņa proposes that the meaning of the concept total defence has changed its focus since the end of the Cold War. Within the context of the Cold War, the total defence concept centred specifically on territorial defence with standing military forces largely defensive in nature and was reliant upon the rapid mobilisation of civil society into armed resistance forces.[1] She asserts that since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the term *total* or *comprehensive defence* describes the broader focus of military forces in response to the diminished likelihood of interstate conventional warfare and the blurring of the boundaries between civilian and military contributions to state defence. However, the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine demonstrates the continued need for states to be resilient in the face of external aggression. The conflict also demonstrates the necessity for a smaller power to be able to orchestrate a whole-of-society approach in defending the sovereignty of their state from a direct military threat. The problem highlighted by the situation between Russia and the Baltic states is that within the contemporary defence environment both definitions of total defence presented above remain equally valid. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to demonstrate that small states' application

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[1] I. Bērziņa, "From 'total' to 'comprehensive' national defence: the development of the concept in Europe", *Journal on Baltic Security*, vol. 6, no. 2, 2020, pp. 7–15.

of the total defence concept can differ depending upon the context of their strategic environment, and that both approaches are equally effective when aligned to the state's specific security demands. Understanding the fluid nature of the total defence concept is important for small states in focusing their defence policies on the specific context and security risks of their strategic environment in order to optimise the capabilities and response options for their military forces. To examine this proposition, a comparison between the Polish Ministry of National Defence's 2017 *Koncepcja Obronna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej / The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland* and New Zealand Ministry of Defence's *Defence Assessment 2021: He Moana Pukepuke e Ekengia e te Waka / A Rough Sea Can Still Be Navigated* publications will demonstrate that small state approaches to the total defence concept are largely influenced by the context of their strategic environment.[2]

For the purposes of this article, a state is defined as small if they are unable to significantly change the nature and/or structure of their immediate strategic environment.[3] Under this definition, small states are the weaker side of their relationship with a dominant regional actor, or actors. For example, Poland must navigate relationships with both the Russian Federation and NATO, and New Zealand must balance between the US (its largest defence partner) and China (their largest trade partner).[4] Despite their common position as small states, Poland and New Zealand have quite different approaches in their defence policies due to the distinct defence challenges of their strategic environments.

A qualitative document analysis of Poland's and New Zealand's most recent defence policy publications was used to make sense of each country's defence approach. The analysis applied an inductive approach to compare and contrast the total defence concept adopted by each state. Both documents describe the nature and challenges of their strategic environment and the expectations of their military forces in supporting national security operations. The document analysis sought to explore four main questions:

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[2]   [Poland] Ministry of National Defence, *Koncepcja Obronna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej / The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland*, 2017, https://www.gov.pl/attachment/78e14510-253a-4b48-bc31-fd11db898ab7; New Zealand Ministry of Defence, *Defence Assessment 2021: He Moana Pukepuke e Ekengia e te Waka / A Rough Sea Can Still Be Navigated*, 2021, https://www.defence.govt.nz/assets/publication/file/Defence-Assessment-2021.pdf [accessed: 18 March 2022].

[3]   T. Long, "Small states, great power? Gaining influence through intrinsic, derivative, and collective power", *International Studies Review*, vol. 19, no. 2, 2017, pp. 185–205.; M. Maass, *Small States in World Politics: The Story of Small State Survival, 1648–2016*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017.

[4]   T. McClure, "'A matter of time': New Zealand's foreign minister warn China 'storm' could be coming", *The Guardian*, 24 May 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/25/a-matter-of-time-new-zealands-foreign-minister-warns-china-storm-could-be-coming [accessed: 18 March 2022].

1. How does each state perceive and describe their strategic environment?
2. What threats and challenges does each country identify to determine the likely tasks for military contributions to national security operations?
3. What are the linkages between the challenges identified above and the directed tasks for military contributions to national security operations?
4. Do the proposed changes to military capabilities and structures align with anticipated changes in their strategic environment?

Total, territorial, and comprehensive defence

Ieva Bērziņa shows that the concept of total defence has its origins in the experiences of *total war* during the Second World War. During the second global conflict, warfare was no longer conducted separately from civilian populations and all segments of society were affected regardless of their proximity to major combat.[5] Erich Ludendorff proposed that the essence of *total war* was that the armed forces and civilian population operated as one because the entire territory of the warring states was encompassed in the theatre of military operations.[6] Thus, the concepts of *total war* and total defence were largely the same and required states to be able to respond to military threats to their national interests, both at home and abroad.

In the bipolar international environment of the Cold War, total defence was used by small, non-aligned states, such as Switzerland or Finland, to maintain neutrality and avoid being drawn into the broader global conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.[7] Through non-alignment, these states avoided collective security options and were self-sufficient in their defence. This approach was a deterrence strategy whereby the small state aimed to present a cost of aggression by potential adversaries that was much greater than any benefits that could be gained. This total defence approach centred on focussing specifically on territorial defence. The standing military forces' capabilities, planning, and training under this strategy were defensive in nature and relied upon the rapid mobilisation of civil society into armed resistance forces.[8] Compulsory military service was a key component of total defence to ensure all citizens had a basic level of military training that could be augmented upon mobilisation in the face of a threat to the state.[9]

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[5]   I. Bērziņa, "From 'total' to 'comprehensive' national defence...", p. 7.

[6]   *Ibidem.*

[7]   *Ibidem*, p. 8.

[8]   *Ibidem.*

[9]   Eadem, Total defence as a comprehensive approach to national security, [in:] *Deterring Russia in Europe: defence strategies for neighbouring states*, eds. N. Vanaga, T. Rostoks, New York: Routledge, 2019, pp. 71–89.

The 2022 Ukrainian defence against the Russian invasion is a clear example of this approach.[10] However, the 21st century has seen the term of total defence be used to describe a very different concept.

The name *total* or *comprehensive defence* is now being used to describe a collective defence concept emphasising civil contributions to national security and societal resilience within states.[11] NATO identifies "civil preparedness" as a foundation of resilience and a critical component of collective defence.[12] The changes in the concept of total defence are largely due to the greater connectivity and complexity of the contemporary international system. The emergence of hybrid threats, both military and non-military, and the increasing importance of how information is perceived, have broadened the dimensions through which a state's security can be undermined. The increased risk space has created demands on military forces in areas outside of their traditional sphere of operations which, in turn, necessitates the development of new capabilities and skillsets. The expansion of the military role presents a challenge for small states, already resource-constrained by virtue of their limited human and financial capital. In the past, a small state could choose to remain neutral, and thereby focus its resources on territorial defence; however, as Rickli suggests, in the post-Cold War period this approach is viewed as security "free riding" by active members of the global community.[13] The questions raised by this dilemma are: what options do small states have for achieving total defence in the contemporary international system, and is the total defence concept perceived the same by small states in the contemporary defence environment?

Poland's Defence Concept

The 2017 Polish Ministry of National Defence's *Koncepcja Obronna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej / The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland* document identifies

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10   J. Aliyev, T Yavuz, "Ukraine's 'territorial defense' trains civilians against possible hitches amid tensions", Anadolu Agency, 6 February 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/ukraines-territorial-defense-trains-civilians-against-possible-hitches-amid-tensions/2495184# [accessed: 22 February 2022]; S.J. Flanagan, M. Kepe, "What kind of resistance can Ukraine mount?", DefenseNews, 27 February 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/02/26/what-kind-of-resistance-can-ukraine-mount/ [accessed: 4 March 2022]; O. Bizot, "Thousands of Ukrainians sign up to fight for their country as Russian invasion continues", The Observers, 25 February 2022, https://observers.france24.com/en/europe/20220225-thousands-of-ukrainians-sign-up-to-fight-for-their-country-as-russia-invasion-continues [accessed: 4 March 2022].

11   I. Bērziņa, "From 'total' to 'comprehensive' national defence…", p. 12.

12   J. Shea, "Resilience: a core element of collective defence", NATO Review, 30 March 2016, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2016/03/30/resilience-a-core-element-of-collective-defence/index.html [accessed: 4 March 2022].

13   J.-M. Rickli, "European small states' military policies after the Cold War: from territorial to niche strategies", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol. 21, no. 3, 2008, pp. 307–325

"[...] the necessity of adequately preparing Poland to defend its own territory [...]" as the "number one priority" for Polish defence policy.[14] Poland's prioritisation of territorial defence is reflective of the key threats and challenges present in their immediate strategic environment. The defence concept presents Poland's main defence challenges in an order that may be interpreted as a priority of importance. They are:

- Aggressive Policy of the Russian Federation,
- Unstable Neighbourhood on NATO's Eastern Flank,
- Unstable Neighbourhood of Southern Flank,
- Terrorism,
- Evolution of the Western Integration Structures,
- Economic and Social Environment, and
- Technological Progress and the Future Battlespace.[15]

The first three items are clear and present threats to Poland's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and given Russia's invasion of Ukraine, appear well founded and require immediate attention. Russia's aggressive policy has manifested into violent conflict, and Poland's concerns about Ukraine's vulnerability to attack and Belarus' subservience to Moscow have proven correct.[16] In addition, the instability of their Southern Flank, encompassing the Middle East and North Africa, leads Polish defence planners to continue to contribute to international collective security operations to prevent escalation in these areas.[17] The nature of the threats and challenges presented in the Defence Concept document become less specific as the list progresses down. This generality of issues is indicative of the origins and complexity of these challenges and Poland's ability to directly impact its root cause and effects. Therefore, Poland's prioritisation of territorial defence, despite being the smaller partner in an adversarial relationship with the Russian Federation, is entirely rational, given the threat-based context of their strategic environment. Under this context, Poland has chosen to focus its resources on protecting its territory and sovereignty and has adopted a deterrence approach consistent with the traditional concept of total defence. New Zealand, however, envisions a different approach in its defence assessment of their strategic environment.

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14   [Poland] Ministry of National Defence, *Koncepcja Obronna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej / The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland*, p. 6.

15   *Ibidem*, pp. 23–35.

16   *Ibidem*; P. Tchoubar, P. Young, O. Bizot, A. Bamas, "Ukraine residents recount Russian attacks: 'We realised we had nowhere to go'", *The Observers,* 24 February 2022, https://observers.france24.com/en/europe/20220224-ukraine-russia-crisis-invasion-residents-recount-evacuation-shellings [accessed: 18 March 2022]; M. Mirovalev, "Ukraine crisis: What does Belarus have to gain, and lose?", Al Jazeera, 23 February 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/23/what-is-the-role-of-belarus-in-the-ukraine-russia-crisis [accessed: 18 March 2022].

17   [Poland] Ministry of National Defence, *Koncepcja Obronna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej / The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland*, pp. 23–35

New Zealand's Defence Assessment

The New Zealand Government's Ministry of Defence states that the "[…] fundamental role of New Zealand Defence is the generation and application of military capabilities to defence New Zealand and advance its national security interests."[18] The *Defence Assessment 2021: He Moana Pukepuke e Ekengia e te Waka / A Rough Sea Can Still Be Navigated* document presents that "[…] New Zealand does not yet face a direct military threat to the territory of New Zealand itself […]" and that in the event of such a threat emerging, "New Zealand would very likely require substantial assistance from partner nations […]."[19] For New Zealand's Ministry of Defence this means that "[…] the independent territorial defence of New Zealand should not therefore be the principal driver for New Zealand's defence policy."[20] Given New Zealand's available human and financial resources and its inability to rapidly increase its military power to independently defeat external military aggression, this conclusion appears logical. Unlike Poland, the most important challenges to New Zealand's national security come from outside of its immediate proximity, so it is the impacts of these challenges that its defence policy seeks to mitigate. New Zealand's Defence Assessment identifies "strategic competition" and the "impacts of climate change" as the two principal challenges to New Zealand's defence interests.[21] The defence interests identified in the New Zealand Defence Assessment are:

- a secure, sovereign, and resilient New Zealand;
- a stable and secure region in which New Zealand has the freedom to act in support of shared interests and values;
- a strong international rules-based system, centred on multilateralism and liberal democratic values; and
- a strong network of international security relationships, partnerships, and alliances.[22]

New Zealand's interests are not presented in the order of importance, suggested by the quotation above, but appear categorised by geographical theatre.

The New Zealand Defence Assessment considers "promoting and protecting New Zealand's interests in the Pacific" as the "highest priority for New Zealand's defence policy."[23] This Pacific focus may be due to New Zealand's assessment that the most significant threats to its national security may arise from regional instability. Currently, New Zealand supports Pacific security by responding to:

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[18]   New Zealand Ministry of Defence, *Defence Assessment 2021: He Moana Pukepuke e Ekengia e te Waka / A Rough Sea Can Still Be Navigated*, p. 10.
[19]   *Ibidem*, p. 30.
[20]   *Ibidem*.
[21]   *Ibidem*, p. 4.
[22]   *Ibidem*, pp. 10–12.
[23]   *Ibidem*, p. 31.

- the increasing impacts of climate change leading to increased demands in pre-paring for and responding to natural disasters,
- COVID-19 disruption of industries Pacific states rely on for economic wellbeing,
- exacerbation of existing and emerging stresses due to impacts of COVID-19 and climate change, and
- challenges to Pacific regional security architecture by external actors.[24]

However, New Zealand proposes that increased strategic competition could drive dramatic changes in the Pacific security environment.[25] The potential developments identified in their defence assessment as most threatening are:

- establishment of a military base or dual-use facility in the Pacific by a state that does not share New Zealand's values and security interests,
- extra-regional military-backed resource exploitation,
- military confrontation, and
- contested responses to security events.[26]

These developments are viewed as more important to New Zealand's national security as any direct military threat to its territory is likely to "[...] come from or through [...]" the Pacific, less those originating from cyber and outer space.[27] China, the US, and Russia are identified as the major actors increasing strategic competition in the Pacific region.[28] The New Zealand defence assessment suggests that these large powers will pursue this competition in the "grey zone" below the threshold of armed conflict and use activities designed to exploit uncertainty and influence perceptions to support their objectives.[29] The conclusions from the New Zealand Defence Assessment, presented above, reinforce the limited military threat to New Zealand's national security and the security of the Pacific. However, the impacts of climate change will require New Zealand defence contributions to prevent destabilisation of Pacific Island governance and economic structures in the wake of natural disasters, and to mitigate against negative influences of increased strategic competition in the Pacific region. Contributions to impacts of climate change will be the most likely use of New Zealand defence forces in its strategic environment, whereas the appearance of military conflict in the region is certainly the most dangerous to New Zealand's defence approach. The approach proposed by New Zealand's defence assessment can be described as more of a forward defence strategy whereby it seeks to prevent potential security issues and threats manifesting in its immediate strategic environment. By focussing on supporting the Pacific Island states in maintaining political and economic stability in the face of challenges from

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[24] *Ibidem*, p. 24.
[25] *Ibidem*, p. 23.
[26] *Ibidem*.
[27] *Ibidem*, p. 11.
[28] *Ibidem*, p. 16
[29] *Ibidem*.

climate change, natural disasters, or external influence and actively contributing to broader global security operations, New Zealand defence forces act when issues are within their capacity to respond effectively.

The articulation of New Zealand's defence interests is less specific than the threats and challenges presented in the Polish defence concept. These differences in describing defence interests are reflective of the contrasting strategic contexts of these states and indicate the rationale for their dissimilar defence policy approaches. Poland's defence concept is consistent with the Cold War application of the total defence model.[30] Adopting this threat-based approach is in response to the presence of the aggressive Russia in their immediate strategic environment, and instability emanating from the neighbouring former Soviet states, the Middle East, and North Africa. In the absence of an existential military threat and greater potential risk from non-traditional defence issues, New Zealand's defence policy, however, aligns more with the risk management approach of the concept of *comprehensive defence.*[31] New Zealand's greatest security risks come from outside their immediate territory, therefore, they take actions at the global and regional levels across a broader range of issues to prevent them from developing beyond their defence force's ability to resolve.

Small state defence options

As indicated above, Poland and New Zealand can be identified as small states within their strategic environment. It can also be concluded that the different natures of their respective strategic contexts have a major influence on the defence policies these actors have chosen. When an actor has little ability to change the nature and structure of their environment, they must identify options for successfully achieving their objectives within the parameters of the current environment. The two options are proposed here for small state defence planning, which have been adopted from Hannan and Freeman's theory of the Population Ecology of Organisations. This theory asserts that organisations within a system will act in one of two ways.[32] The first approach is for an organisation to seek to respond adequately to every potential contingency anticipated to occur due to changes in the system's dynamics. This approach is identified as the "adaptation perspective" and is consistent with the current methodology for defence planning in most states.[33] The alterna-

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[30]   I. Bērziņa, "From 'total' to 'comprehensive' national defence...", p. 8.

[31]   *Ibidem*, p. 12.

[32]   M.T. Hannan, J. Freeman, "The Population Ecology of Organisations", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 82, no. 5, 1977, p. 929.

[33]   *Ibidem*; T. Farrell, *The norms of war: cultural beliefs and modern conflict*, Boulder, CO: L. Rienner Publishers, 2005, pp. 37–39.

tive option is "selection" where an organisation develops expertise in a narrow band of contingencies that most directly impact their position within the system. These "specialist" organisations will "select" a relevant niche within a system and focus their resources on being highly proficient in this area.[34] Selection of a specialised niche is seen by these organisations as a means for increasing their importance to more influential actors, thereby strengthening their position within the system and mitigating vulnerabilities of size.[35]

Within the context of the post-Cold War international environment, this means that states can choose to either maintain an adaptive approach to defence planning and develop capabilities able to conduct all mission types across the spectrum of conflict, or select a specialist niche based upon the operational contingencies that most directly impact their national security. For large influential states, such the US, China and the Russian Federation, an adaptive strategy may be necessary due to their strategic ambition and global span of interest. Resource availability in these large powers affords them the luxury of incorporating new capabilities and specialisations, such as cyber and information warfare, into their existing military architecture. Additionally, small states which perceive the presence of an existential military threat, such as Singapore or Israel, may dedicate significant resources towards the development of military organisations able to defend their territory and sovereignty from external aggression, and this decision will be largely supported by their civil populations.[36] The threat-based context of Poland's strategic environment necessitates the state maintains military capabilities able to respond to issues across the spectrum of conflict. Poland requires forces not only sufficient to deter external aggression from Russia, but also conduct operations in response to emerging non-traditional threats. Therefore, a generalist approach is the appropriate one, given Poland's strategic environment.

For small states that lack a clear military threat to their sovereignty, however, more evident social issues may be prioritised higher than defence expenditure by their government and public.[37] Spreading their limited resources across multiple military response options may lead to diminished effectiveness across all capabilities, therefore, focussing on a narrower band of core operations may better serve the defence interests of these states. The New Zealand defence assessment acknowledges the lack of a direct military threat to its sovereignty and territory, and its focus towards Pacific Island security may indicate the desire to apply a specialist defence model.

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[34] M.T. Hannan, J. Freeman, *op. cit.*, p. 948.

[35] *Ibidem.*

[36] J.K. Wither, "Back to the future? Nordic total defence concepts", *Defence Studies*, vol. 20, no. 1, 2020, p. 62.

[37] T. Edmunds, "The defence dilemma in Britain", *International Affairs*, vol. 86, no. 2, 2010, pp. 377–394.

Conclusion

The comparison between the defence approaches of Poland and New Zealand demonstrates the post-Cold War period has a place for different perceptions of total defence. The traditional Cold War concept of territorial defence enabled through deterrence and mass mobilisation of civil society in response to external aggression has been validated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the threat-based nature of Poland's strategic environment. However, the *comprehensive defence* approach articulated in New Zealand's defence assessment, which focuses on military contributions in support of non-traditional defence roles and missions, is equally valid, given a strategic environment absent of a direct military threat. Moreover, New Zealand's greatest defence challenges originate from the impacts of climate change and the strategic competition between external actors. Therefore, it follows that the concept of total defence, like many relating to the military profession, should be understood relative to the context in which it is being applied.

At the base level, the difference between the two small state approaches to total defence discussed here, is a reflection of the security contexts in which these states exist. In a threat-based context, such as Poland's, the primary responsibility for defeating an identifiable threat of external aggression is, naturally, the military and they are supported by civil society in this role. Conversely, in the absence of a direct military threat, a state's military capabilities are subordinated to other government agencies who lead the responses to non-traditional security threats such as humanitarian crises, natural disasters, and resource depletion. For small states, in particular, closely aligning their defence approach with the specific challenges of their strategic environment enables greater effectiveness in resource apportionment which, in turn, more directly meets the defence interests of their people. Therefore, total defence will mean different things in different circumstances, any attempt at a fixed definition of this concept implies that all state defence contexts are the same and disregard the everchanging character of military operations and the societies, forces, and governments that influence them.

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Differing concepts of total defence in small states: comparing the cases
of New Zealand and Poland
Abstract

This article proposes that a small state's approach to total defence will be strong influenced by the nature of its strategic environment. It compares the defence approaches of Poland and New Zealand to identify whether the different contexts of their strategic environments necessitate divergent strategies for defending their state. The theory of population ecology of organisations will be used to frame the different options available to small states in their strategic environments and applied to the cases in order to explain their different approaches to total defence.

Key words: total defence, New Zealand Defence Assessment, defence policy

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Finland's readiness for comprehensive national defence

Introduction

Finland has long been following the comprehensive security strategy creating a network of cooperation between authorities, businesses, organisations, and citizens. Finland's defence, which constitutes a vital element of a broader concept of security, integrates the military instrument, civil authorities, and national capabilities. The security environment in Finland has deteriorated in the recent years. The main destabilising factor is Russia's policy of power and military activity. Moreover, the cyber environment and hybrid threats have grown and therefore, the preparedness of the whole society is required to maintain and develop the state's defence ability.

The following article aims to present the concept of national preparedness for comprehensive national defence and to study practical steps of achieving comprehensive security in Finland. The research problem is how preparedness for comprehensive national defence is conceptually understood and institutionally organised in Finland. In relation to the main research problem, the following research hypothesis was formulated: in Finland, comprehensive security results from the activity of different institutions, involving not only the authorities, but also the armed forces, non-governmental organisations, and local communities. In practice, it means that relevant actors cooperate so as to be prepared in case of threats. This requires taking into account a wide spectrum of military and non-military aspects of the state's security and the principles of crisis management. Solve the research problem was possible thanks to the following research methods: historical, system and comparative analysis as well

as the interpretation of the results of analytical and synthesising works, which brought closer the relationship between the results of the author's research and analyses with theoretical assumptions, allowing for the verification of the research problem and the hypothesis.

The background of Finland's preparedness and resilience

Finland is a small state with the population of 5.3 million, a modern welfare system and a high standard of living, and whose economy is based on advanced technologies. Finns are proud of their highly developed system of healthcare, schools, and the level of education. Finland is a stable and well-functioning state. It is highly ranked for its democracy, freedom of speech, the rule of law, transparency, the level of education, and socio-economic equality. For the last four years, it has been positioned as the happiest nation in the world.[1] In the Fragile State Index (compiled annually by the Fund for Peace), Finland has been year by year recognized as the most sustainable country.[2]

The economic prosperity and the perception of social equality helped to instil trust among Finns. In international surveys comparing the level of people's trust in institutions such as the police, legal system, government and the media, Finland consistently takes top or near top positions. The high level of trust may result from the model of social care based on equality and the universal right to main services, which prevents the society from being separated into "we" and "you". This gives Finland's leaders a solid foundation for building foreign and security policies based on cooperation and dialogue.

Finland forms a symbolic political, religious, cultural, and economic border between Eastern and Western Europe. Despite its peripheral location, it has always been in the centre of events which have defined contemporary Europe. The strategic choices of Finland's authorities concerning foreign and security policies have depended on its geographical location and historical experiences.[3] Security is the most important of all Finnish national interests, which in practice means the protection of the country, its citizens, and public institutions. Sharing a 1300-kilometre border with Russia, Finland has always been closely tied with its eastern neighbour. Due to both geography and history, Finnish relations with Russia are exceptional in Europe. At the same time, the Finnish perception of Russia as a threat dominates in the security policy of this Nordic country.

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[1]   Happiest Countries in the World 2022, https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/happiest-countries-in-the-world [accessed: 22 February 2022].

[2]   Fragile States Index, https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data [accessed: 21 February 2022].

[3]   M. Grzybowski, *Finlandia. Zarys systemu ustrojowego*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2007, *passim*.

To understand Finland's concept of security and its citizens' approach to national preparedness, one needs to understand the idea of *sisu*.[4] For Finns, *sisu* has a mystical, almost magical meaning. This Finnish term can be translated as strong will, determination, perseverance, and rational acting in the face of adversity (or in tasks which might seem daring or hopeless). *Sisu* is not momentary courage, but the ability to sustain courage. This word defines the Finnish character. It is a way of thinking that what needs to be done, will be done, regardless of the costs. For Finns, *sisu* is the backbone, readiness, courage, resilience, and endurance. It has the power which overcomes difficulties and leads to the goal, which allows them to stand up and move forward. *Sisu* reflects determination and tenacity. The term has existed for centuries, but it became most popular after the Winter War of 1939, when the Soviet Union invaded Finland.[5] Finns faced a powerful enemy then, and won against all odds, preserving their independence.[6] After the war, Finland honourably paid its reparations to the USSR, avoiding further threats to its independence.[7] This war experience strengthened Finland's resilience and helped to prepare for the hybrid war characteristic for the Cold War and the post-Cold War era.

During World War II, when the entire society was forced to defend their existence, the foundations of the doctrine of total defence were established. After the war it was thought that together with the development of modern and more powerful weapons, future armed conflicts would have a wider scale. By the government's decision of March 1957, the Defence Council was appointed, which was to serve as a planning and advisory body to the president in the matters of national defence. The decision of the Council initiated courses of national defence run at the War College in Helsinki and local courses in provinces. The trainings had a huge impact on the

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[4]   The term derives from the word *sisus*, which in Finnish means "bowels", "intestines", "viscera". In 1745, Finnish Bishop Daniel Juslenius (a well-known Finnophile and an enthusiastic advocate of Finnishness) defined *sisucunda* as a place in human body from which all strong emotions come.

[5]   The story of Finland's victory over the Soviet Union in the Winter War of 1939 talks about numerous Finnish soldiers who showed tirelessness, creativity, ability to attack on skis, and even to carry bicycles on their backs if they were forced to operate in diverse terrain.

[6]   Lt. Col. Rainer Kuosmanen, Deputy Commander of the Guard Jaeger Regiment, warned: "we are strong enough to make sure that whatever happens around us, the possible enemy has to think very deeply, would they like to take all those casualties, starting an operation against us?". Quoted in: T. Schultz, "Finland wins admirers with all-inclusive approach to defense", 4 October 2017, DW.com, https://www.dw.com/en/finland-wins-admirers-with-all-inclusive-approach-to-defense/a-40806163 [accessed: 19 February 2022].

[7]   J. Nylund, *Sisu: The Finnish Art of Courage*, London: Octopus Publishing Group, 2018, *passim*; K. Pantzar, *Odnaleźć sisu. Fiński sposób na szczęście przez hartowanie ciała i ducha*, transl. by M. Rabsztyn-Anioł, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2018; J. Adamczewski, M. Obrębska, "Sisu – emocja kulturowa, schemat poznawczy czy słowo klucz do tożsamości Finów?", *Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska*, vol. 31, no. 4, 2018, pp. 51–63.

development of the defence doctrine, mainly through educating the society. Planning and defence trainings gained a new foundation based on a new concept of war and total national defence. It was assumed that the comprehensive concept of national defence should encompass political, administrative, military, psychological, economic, and civil defence tasks. On 26 June 1967, the Defence Council approved the document titled *Maan puolustuksemme tienviitat* (Guidelines for National Defence), which can be considered the first official declaration of Finland's defence doctrine. It postulated that the civilians (citizens, private enterprises, and non-governmental organisations) should be included in the national defence system, and all sectors of the economy and the government should be involved in the process of defence planning. By merging military and civilian functions, Finland's sovereignty, living conditions, and the security of its citizens were comprehensively protected against internal threats as well as threats from other nations.[8] National defence was based on the territorial system. The basis of the Finnish concept of defence was compulsory conscription. In the 1970s, it provided approximately 700,000 trained reservists. The drawback of the system was that suitable weapons and equipment were sufficient only for a small part of the mobilised army. The majority had at their disposal only used weapons of war and the Finnish economy was too weak to provide good equipment for the armed forces.[9]

From the total defence doctrine to comprehensive security strategy

After the end of the Cold War, Finland failed to initiate a defensive transformation. Although it started to build interoperability with NATO and participated in crisis management operations, the main goal of the Finnish Defence Forces had always been the defence of its own territory. Finland consistently maintained the basic postulates of the defence doctrine formed in the 1950s and 1960s, based on the concept of total defence whose main aim was to establish and maintain a military force capable of deterring any potential aggressor from attacking the Finnish territory or exerting military pressure on Finland. Its main principles are as follows: military non-alliance, general conscription, territorial defence, training the conscripts for the needs of military units, dispersed mobilisation, and readiness to respond to military threats.

At the beginning of the 21st century, unlike other European countries, Finland decided to maintain a sizeable army. While the Nordic neighbours switched to lighter, voluntary military forces, adjusted to expeditionary peacekeeping, the Finnish Army held large reserve forces. The command and administration system of the armed

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[8] P. Visuri, *Evolution of The Finnish Military Doctrine 1945–1985*, Finnish Defence Studies Series no. 1, Helsinki: War College, 1990, pp. 41–45.

[9] P. Salminen, *The Impact of Arms Technology on Military Doctrines*, Finnish Defence Studies Series no. 5, Helsinki: War College, 1992, p. 46.

forces corresponded to the altered security environment. The troops were divided into regional and operational, of which the former were to include around 250,000 personnel, and the latter – 100,000. The purpose of national defence was to eliminate security threats from the territory of Finland. The emphasis was placed on the security of electronic communication and information systems, preventing infectious diseases, radiation, and chemical hazards. In 2007, the tasks of national defence were defined. The first and fundamental task was military defence of the country's territory and independence. Maintaining reliable ability of defence was a priority in order to prevent and repel a military attack on Finland. The second task was to support other authorities in their tasks related to security. The third one was participation in international crisis management.

Currently, Finland is one of the few European countries in which a military conflict has been considered a potential threat (with varying degrees of intensity). For that reason, territorial defence is a permanent solution, and the country maintains relevant defence capability. Finland constantly develops its forces and adequate military potential. It has one of the largest armies in Europe (the Finnish Defence Forces have 280,000 personnel. The reserve personnel comprise 900,000 citizens). After mobilization, the forces consist of three levels: operational forces (32,000 personnel), regional units being the fundament of territorial defence (96,000 personnel) and local soldiers (32,000), whose task is to protect military objects and critical infrastructure. The Finnish doctrine of total defence means that every entity must train regularly and is assigned a combination of ordinary and extraordinary powers needed to function in every situation. As Finland is not a member of any military alliance, it must be ready to defend the territory on its own. The Finnish conscription generates sufficient resources for the army, navy, and air forces to operate effectively in critical situations or at war. Under the Constitution of Finland every citizen is obliged to participate in national defence. Men aged 18–60 are subject to compulsory military service (women can apply voluntarily). They must undergo armed or unarmed military or non-military (civil) service.[10] The military service includes conscription service, supplementary training, additional services, and service during mobilisation. Having completed the training, the conscripts are transferred to the Finnish Defence Forces reserve (during that time each reservist is liable to participate in refresher exercise for 80–150 days, while officers and non-commissioned officers – for 200 days).[11] The message addressed to the conscripts reads: "You are the best person to defend our country." The Finnish Defence Forces develop this slogan as follows: "Finland needs your effort because you

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[10] Depending on the type of training military service lasts 165, 255 or 347 days. "Conscription – a Finnish choice", The Finnish Defence Forces, https://puolustusvoimat.fi/en/finnish-conscription-system [accessed: 13 February 2022].

[11] J. Grzela, *Polityka bezpieczeństwa państw nordyckich*, Kielce: Uniwersytet Jana Kochanowskiego, 2019, pp. 244–245.

are the best person to defend our country, our independence, and our territorial integrity."[12] In effect, approximately 80% of men complete the military service and this is one of the highest conscription rates in the world. The aim of such model of conscription is to "produce troops with good combat efficiency and skilled and capable personnel for placement in the wartime units of the Defence Forces." Moreover, it helps to "maintain basic readiness and the capability to raise readiness when necessary."[13]

Conscription is an important part of Finnish defence, but there is more and more emphasis placed on increased preparedness. That means shifting the emphasis from the conscript training to gaining better combat readiness from the mobilization forces. Therefore, the competences of the Finnish Defence Forces are raised through complementary training. The training system (which is divided into basic, further, and continuing) consists of trainings for conscripts, reservists, and salaried workers, and is then developed as part of a general system of social education and training. Every year, the Finnish Defence Forces train 21,000 conscripts and approximately 18,000 reservists. The Border Guard (whose active personnel constitute 3800 males and females) also participate in national defence and are an important part of Finland's defence system. The border units or a part of them can be incorporated into the defence forces by the President's decision if required by defence readiness.

An essential part is played by voluntary organisations of defence training. Their active role in maintaining combat readiness and the will to defend the country are important for the country's defence capability.

The security strategy for society as a tool to harmonise national preparedness

In 2017, Finland's government announced the Security Strategy for Society, which extends the concept of total defence to include the civilian aspect. Its aim is to harmonise the principles of preparedness across various administrative branches. The principles form the concept of comprehensive security, in which all the vital functions of society are jointly safeguarded by authorities, businesses, organisations, and citizens. They refer to the readiness of response and effective crisis management in various incidents and emergency situations at the central, regional, and individual level. Although the country's authorities emphasise that the Finnish society is safeguarded, there can be circumstances which may disrupt the life of many citizens. From this perspective, security and preparedness are not only the state authorities' tasks. Comprehensive security is everyone's responsibility: decision makers',

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[12]   "Conscription – a Finnish choice", *op. cit.*
[13]   *Conscript 2022: A guide for getting prepared for military service*, The Finnish Defence Forces, 2022.

authorities', non-profit organisations', business operators' and, above all, individuals'. The society's security depends on everyone. Regardless of the cause of the crisis, the authorities, private sector, civil society, and individuals must collectively ensure the continuity of certain functions. Individuals play an important role, as individual crisis planning is part of the resilience of society as a whole. Each person ought to be prepared for all types of emergency situations such as power or telecommunication failures. Individual crisis planning helps the authorities in emergency situations since the means are often insufficient to help all those in need and must be allocated to the most urgent matters.

Cooperation between various actors is thorough and permanent. The Finnish strategy presents a model of cooperation in which all relevant actors share their knowledge and analyse information concerning security, prepare joint plans and trainings. The authorities, organisations, and companies plan their preparedness, adapting emergency scenarios to their operational environment. Moreover, close cooperation between the Police, Customs Service, Border Guard, and Defence Forces means that all areas which could be taken advantage of by potential aggressors are merged. The efficiency of this is tested and developed through preparedness training organised by ministries, regional administration, municipalities, and various organisations.

Trainings held by National Defence Courses are an important element of comprehensive security. Both military and civilian leaders have the opportunity to be trained at national and regional defence courses. Their purpose is to provide an overview of Finnish foreign, security and defence policies, to improve cross-sector cooperation in critical situations, and to create the network of contacts between people working in different fields of comprehensive security. Resilience trainings prepare the country's military and civilians for severe frost conditions and deadly enemies.

Functioning of the system and the efficiency of the strategy implementation are monitored by the Security Committee (which has a secretariat in the Ministry of Defence), which is also responsible for monitoring the training.

The Security Strategy was drafted jointly by the authorities, organisations, and representatives of business community. Moreover, citizens also had an opportunity to propose their ideas and contribute to its final shape.

The Strategy identifies seven basic functions of society which underlie the wide, cross-sector character of preparedness which must be protected under all circumstances. These functions are as follows:

- leadership (i.e., ensuring effective cooperation between the central government and the local authorities, business operators, non-governmental organisations, research institutions, universities and society as well as civil-military cooperation; adequate legal solutions, clear division of responsibilities, duties and powers, transparent decision-making processes, situational awareness and the mechanism of crisis management);

- psychological resilience (it is the ability of individuals and society to survive and recover from a crisis. Psychological resilience is expressed in the citizens' will to defend their country's independence, and their determination to maintain livelihood and security in all situations. Resilience can be defined as the ability to resist and survive a hostile attack thanks to society's defence readiness, inaccessibility of the territory to the enemy, and the support of the armed forces by various state structures. Building resilience is a tedious, yet a necessary task to achieve the nation's ability to defend itself in many areas. This resilience must be integrated with everyday life of the society before it is put to the test. Finland's resilience derives from its experiences and history. It has developed naturally as a matter of national survival. Living in the shadow of the Soviet Union and forming the relations with the difficult neighbour while guarding its own independence and national identity has never been easy. However, it would not be possible without a thriving society, proud of its identity and the position in Europe and the world);
- functional capacity of the population and services (comprehensive security system is designed to maintain basic functions of the welfare state in exceptional situations, in cases when e.g., electricity and water supplies are needed. Moreover, it refers to the well-functioning system of patient database, blood banks, social services, continuity of education for children and young people);
- economy, infrastructure, and security of supply (refers to the safety of airports and seaports, the supply chain of construction and industrial materials. It covers two types of tasks related to the security of critical infrastructure and the security of key branches of production and services. The former refers to the energy sector (production, transmission, and distribution), communication systems, financial services, transport and logistics, water supplies, maintaining and building infrastructure and waste management. The latter refers to food supplies, medical care, industrial production and the production and services for the armed forces. The hallmark of Finland's concept of comprehensive security and national defence is the focus on the security of supplies.[14] This results from the fact that most of the country's imports and exports are (approximately 90%) by sea. In this context, Finland can be compared to an island. The continuity of ship traffic is essential for the society to function properly. Finnish passenger ships are an important complement to cargo traffic in terms of security of supplies);
- internal security (it is a complex component of the comprehensive security strategy, covering various tasks: from countering organised crime, carrying out

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[14] Ch. Salonius-Pasternak, "An effective antidote: The four components that make Finland more resilient to hybrid campaigns", *FIIA Comment*, no. 19, 2017, https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/comment19_finland.pdf [accessed: 11 February 2022]; P. Szymański, "New ideas for total defence: comprehensive security in Finland and Estonia", *OSW Report*, no. 3, 2020.

maritime rescue operations, maintaining public order and security, civil defence, to preventing proliferation of mass destruction weapons);

- defence capability (which aims to maintain the ability to deter the use of any military force against Finland. It includes military capabilities, the nation's will to defend their country, involvement of public administration and international military cooperation);
- international and EU activities (from the perspective of Finland's comprehensive security system, the ability to obtain international support in case of a natural disaster, crisis or military conflict is of key importance. Cooperation with international organisations also strengthens the country's preparedness. The aim of networking international defence policy is to build broader defence capabilities. Building a network within the structures of the European Union, the OSCE, the Nordic defence cooperation, partnership with NATO and in bi- and multilateral formats ensures both international political assistance and military compliance required to provide and receive aid. International networks facilitate sourcing of materials and the security of supplies and provide opportunities for cooperation in the field of industry, research, and technology).[15]

Conclusion

Finland's comprehensive approach to providing security of the population is viewed as a model for Europe. The Security Strategy for Society is an important building element of this approach. It covers all levels and social entities, significantly extending the meaning of security. By implementing the Strategy, Finland has become the leader in building national preparedness for contemporary challenges and threats. President Sauli Niinistö emphasises that Finland has spent the century of its independence mastering the art of self-reliance. In Finland, preparedness is more than an approach, it is also an ability fostered and, most importantly, supported by the whole society. In this context, it is worth noticing that Finns' outstanding characteristic is a strong will to defend their country against threats. About 70% of Finns regularly respond "yes" (and 30% say "no") to the question: "If Finland were attacked, should Finns, in your opinion, take up arms to defend themselves in all situations, even if the outcome seemed uncertain?"[16]

The clearly defined process of preparedness and management structure ensure that all activities at each organisational and administrative level are closely coordinated. The model of a comprehensive view of integrated responses to emerging threats, in

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[15] The Security Strategy for Society, Government Resolution, 2 November 2017, The Security Committee, Ministry of Defence, https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/YTS_2017_english.pdf [accessed: 11 February 2022].

[16] Willingness to defend the country, https://findikaattori.fi/en/77 [accessed: 11 February 2022].

which authorities, enterprises, non-governmental organisations and citizens work to-gether to protect functions essential to society, is exceptional. It is a laboratory of best practices aimed at strengthening national resilience to contemporary threats. The complex approach to security makes it possible to maintain social functions, promote the well-being and security of citizens and protect national independence.

The Finnish concept of comprehensive security is part of the philosophy of a modern functional model of a country's management, based on political and social consensus. The key to maintaining this process lies in a pragmatic approach to the re-lationship between the state and its residents, and in well-functioning public admin-istration, based on values such as equality and transparency. Finland takes pride in its government's integrity and transparency. Citizens pay taxes honestly and abide by the commonly accepted rules. The authorities' decisions are undisputed and followed. Trust is an important asset which gives the government a mandate to act. To build it, the governmental structures and practices must be known and understandable for the citizens. This may, in turn, help to reach an agreement on how to deal with many challenges and threats.

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Finland's readiness for comprehensive national defence
Abstract

Finland has long been following the comprehensive security strategy creating a network of cooperation between authorities, businesses, organisations, and citizens. Its comprehensive approach to providing the population's security is viewed as a model for Europe. Finland has become the leader in building national preparedness for contemporary challenges and threats. This preparedness is more than an approach, it is also an ability fostered by the whole society. Most importantly, such an approach is widely supported in society. This comprehensive approach to security makes it possible to maintain social functions, promote the well-being and security of citizens, and protect the nation's independence. The aim of the article is to present the concept of national preparedness and to analyse practical ways of achieving comprehensive security in Finland.

Key words: Finland, national preparedness, security, comprehensive strategy

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Latvia's comprehensive defence approach

Introduction

After Russia's actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, many think-tankers, policy-makers, and scholars became convinced that the next Russian military action would happen in the Baltics. The underlying presupposition is that, first, the Russian President Vladimir Putin wants to recreate the Soviet Union; second, that invading and annexing the Baltic states is one of the necessary steps for achieving this objective; third, that the Russian speaking population could be easily used to support subversive operations in a Crimea-like scenario. At the operational level, this was to be done by employing what became known as Russian Hybrid Warfare tactics, which would be based on the alleged Gerasimov Doctrine.

A serious problem with this assumption is that it projects falsified strategic objectives and military instruments to be employed by Russia based on a narrative created by the West. The Russian strategic considerations and military concepts differ from the Western conceptualisation. The Russians have their own concepts based on their own military thought. They use the term Hybrid Warfare to refer to the allegedly American and NATO strategy of creating colour revolutions to promote social and political destabilisation in targeted countries. The Russians refer to their own way of warfare as "New Generation Warfare."[1]

Within this strategic framework, the Baltic countries are constantly under non-kinetic attack by non-military and military instruments. Among these are psychological,

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[1] J. Bērziņš, "The Theory and Practice of New Generation Warfare: The Case of Ukraine and Syria", *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, vol. 33, no. 3, 2020, pp. 355–380.

information, and influence operations, including financing pseudo-non-governmental organisations for achieving political goals, disinformation campaigns, and strong military posturing near the Baltic countries' borders. The Russian strategy for the Baltic states is multi-layered and chiefly determined by Russia considering them part of the West. As a result, since the threat is multi-layered and presents a comprehensive challenge, Latvia has developed its own comprehensive defence strategy.

The objective of this article is to analyse the evolution of Latvia's defence strategy from the 1990's until its current form of comprehensive defence. To this end, the main defence and security documents were analysed and structured to establish the process of evolution of Latvia's security policy as a reflection of the evolution of the threat perception by Latvian policy makers and experts on the matter.

From total to comprehensive defence

The idea that war and defence should go beyond the armed forces and involve the whole of society appeared for the first time in General Ludendorff's book *Der Totale Krieg* (The Total War), published in 1935. According to him, the military should have complete power over the political realm, while the role of the civilian component was to serve military needs. At the same time, Ludendorff considered war to be a multi-layered phenomenon going beyond the military since it was directly aimed against the constituent factors of the nation, including its people. Therefore, the survival of the nation would depend on the total annihilation of other states by offensive means with total national mobilisation. In other words, war does not end with a military defeat of the enemy, but with the elimination of all its citizens, and the whole society should take part in defence and war efforts.[2]

Today, especially in the West, Ludendorff's ideas are an absurd relic. They go against the very basic principles of the Western society. However, with the development of new technologies and the rise of what the West calls "hybrid warfare," the fabrics of the nation are becoming increasingly targeted by hostile actors to achieve the ultimate objectives of warfare in the political realm as postulated by Clausewitz.[3] Since nowadays warfare targets a nation in its totality, defence must go beyond the traditional military realm. It must include the people, information system, culture, politics, economics, and infrastructure increasing the nation's resilience. Although NATO has its concept of comprehensive defence,[4] Latvia's defence strategy reflects

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[2]   E. Ludendorff, *Der Totale Krieg*, München: Ludendorffs Verlag, 1935, https://archive.org/details/erich-ludendorff-der-totale-krieg-1935-130-s.-scan-fraktur/page/n1/mode/2up [accessed: 26 June 2022].

[3]   C. von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by M.E. Howard, P. Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

[4]   For NATO's concept of comprehensive defence see *Comprehensive Defence Handbook*, Edition A, Version 1, Mons: NATO Special Operations Headquarters, December 2020.

specific challenges posed by its size, population, economic structure, and shared history with Russia.

The main document defining Latvia's defence strategy and providing guidelines to the defence and security agencies is the National Defence Concept (NDC). By article 29 of the National Security Law, the Ministry of Defence prepares the National Defence Concept. It is a planning and policy document based on the analysis of current military threats. It defines the strategic objectives, basic principles, priorities, and measures to be taken during peacetime, escalation, and war. According to the National Security Law, the Cabinet of Ministers discusses the National Defence Concept, and the Saeima, the Latvian Parliament, for the national defence policy. It specifies the operational measures, planned resources, the resources needed for the implementation and development of the National Defence Forces, the necessary preparedness of government bodies, agencies, and other public authorities, including at the local level, and private and legal persons during peace, escalation, and war. Its implementation is dependent on the National Armed Forces' available resources and capabilities as defined by law. The national authorities shall ensure the NDC implementation according to their competencies. In other words, until now, its implementation has been decentralised.[5]

The first version of the NDC was published in 1995, one year after the Russian troops withdrew from Latvia. It was a superficial document defining the security of Latvia as an integral part of the Baltic region and providing some guidelines for the development of the Armed Forces. It was more of a bureaucratic document than a security and defence assessment.[6] The second version was approved in 2001. It was a significant evolution since it linked the country's strategic assessment with the possible threats and the Armed Forces' and other security structures' development. Still, the threat assessment was limited to two paragraphs. It considered the main issues for Latvia's security, including the overall geopolitical conditions, the level of economic development, the historical relations with foreign states, the potential of the Latvian society's education and culture, the capabilities of the military and civilian defence apparatus, the environmental situation, and other important factors.

The document stressed that after the end of the Cold War, the global security environment changed dramatically. Although the threat of a global war has considerably reduced, the risk of regional and local crises resulting from ethnic conflict, massive migration, environmental disasters, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction,

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5   Saeima, *Nacionālās drošības likums* (National Security Law), Latvijas Vēstnesis, 473/476, 29.12.2000, with amendments, https://www.vestnesis.lv/ta/id/14011-nacionalas-drosibas-likums [accessed: 26 June 2022]; Ministry of Defence of Latvia, *Valsts aizsardzības koncepcija* (National Defence Concept), 2020, https://www.mod.gov.lv/lv/nozares-politika [accessed: 26 June 2022].

6   Ministry of Defence of Latvia, *Valsts aizsardzības koncepcija* (National Defence Concept), Ministry of Defence, 1995, https://www.mod.gov.lv/lv/nozares-politika [accessed: 26 June 2022].

and organised crime has increased. The document did not mention the global war on terrorism. Latvia's security is closely related with international processes, especially with the development of the Estonian and Lithuanian defence systems.

The integration into the European defence system and joining NATO are important pillars for Latvia's defence. Nevertheless, the document made it clear that the main partner for guaranteeing Latvia's security was the United States, since it was also the main actor determining the European security development and Latvia's independence. The document did not mention Russia as a direct threat to Latvia or the Baltic states' security. The main issue was the instability of internal and foreign policy. On a positive note, the document emphasised that Russia was developing a market economy, a democratic society, and the Russian military presence in the Baltic region has been significantly reduced.

Latvia's defence was to be based on the idea of total defence. Latvia's population is small and material resources are limited because of the country's level of economic development. Therefore, the idea of total defence had to be based on developing professional society had to be ready to defend the country by all means and using all available resources. The military forces were to consist of a small professional contingent complemented by conscripts, who would later become part of the active reserve. The rest of the document did not provide concrete guidelines but made it clear that the Armed Forces development was to follow all standards and procedures to join NATO as soon as possible.[7] The third version of the NDC was approved by the Parliament in 2003. At the time, it was already clear that the country would join NATO in 2004.

The threat assessment was slightly rephrased. It included an explicit reference to NATO being the main guarantor of Latvia's security, while Russia was not mentioned. Since Latvia was to become a NATO member soon, the idea of total defence gave place to the notion of collective defence, the guidelines of the Armed Forces' integration in the NATO structures were defined, and conscription was to be abolished by 2006 to develop the Armed Forces as fully professional service. The National Guard and the Youth Guard were to be auxiliary forces which would help recruit future professional military personnel.[8]

The fourth version of the document was published in 2008. It reinforced the idea of Latvian security being determined by its membership in NATO. In other words, the Latvian National Armed Forces were to protect Latvia's territory and be ready for integrating with NATO troops when they arrived. At the same time, the Latvian military was to take part in NATO missions within the principle of

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[7]   Ministry of Defence of Latvia, *Valsts aizsardzības koncepcija* (National Defence Concept), Ministry of Defence, 2001, https://www.mod.gov.lv/lv/nozares-politika [accessed: 26 June 2022].

[8]   Ministry of Defence of Latvia, *Valsts aizsardzības koncepcija* (National Defence Concept), Ministry of Defence, 2003, https://www.mod.gov.lv/lv/nozares-politika [accessed: 26 June 2022].

collective defence and transatlantic solidarity. The rest of the document presented deeper analysis of the challenges for increasing the effectiveness and capabilities of the Armed Forces, at the same time providing more nuanced guidance for achieving these objectives. Nevertheless, the threat analysis was quite superficial. Russia and China were not explicitly mentioned, although the 2001 NDC version mentioned "specific countries with unstable internal and foreign policies" or Russia, and the "probable change in the equilibrium of international politics as a result of some specific countries' rapid economic development, military power increase, and competition for natural resources and influence in world politics" – a very clear reference to Beijing.[9]

In 2012, a new version of the NDC was approved by the Parliament. The biggest challenge was the result of the defence budget shrinking from 452 million in 2008 to 223 million in 2012 in 2020 prices. The threat assessment stressed Latvia's dependence on NATO and the European Union, and the world's increasing interconnectedness affecting Latvia's security. In this version, the idea of total defence and society's active participation gave place to the notion of collective defence based on NATO and the European Union.[10]

Figure 1. Latvia's Defence Budget (2008–2020) (euros, in 2020 prices)

Source: own's calculations with data from Latvia's Ministry of Finance, State Treasury, and Central Statistical Bureau.

9   Ministry of Defence of Latvia, *Valsts aizsardzības koncepcija* (National Defence Concept), Ministry of Defence, 2008. Available at https://www.mod.gov.lv/lv/nozares-politika [accessed: 26 June 2022].

10   Ministry of Defence of Latvia, *Valsts aizsardzības koncepcija* (National Defence Concept), Ministry of Defence, 2012, https://www.mod.gov.lv/lv/nozares-politika [accessed: 26 June 2022].

With the election of a new Parliament in 2016, a new version of the NDC was approved. For the first time, Russia and what the West called Hybrid Warfare were clearly mentioned as the main threat to Latvia's security. This was a natural consequence of Russia's actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. It also mentioned terrorism and migration as significant threats. There were three defence principles: the country's capacity and will to defend its sovereignty, deterrence policy as instrument to reduce external threats, and the operationalisation of the national defence principles to overcome external threats within the framework of collective defence based on NATO. The role of society was considered important, but as non-organised resistance and as the base for the National and the Youth Guard.[11] At that time, internal discussions about the necessity to develop a system of comprehensive defence in Latvia as complementary measures for the Transatlantic collective defence arrangement were already taking place at the Ministry of Defence and in the National Armed Forces. Thus, although the concept of Comprehensive Defence was not an explicit part of this NDC version, it was the basis for the amendments of the National Security Law in 2018 and the 2020 NDC.

The current version of the NDC was approved by the Parliament in 2020. It is a comprehensive document providing solid guidance for the development of Latvia's defence system. The threat assessment emphasises the understanding that the post-Cold War unipolar moment gave place to international competition, where some countries ignore the international legal system and the sovereignty of other countries to achieve their strategic ambitions. The fragmentation of the global system in combination with the development of new technologies, private military companies, climate change, and pandemics has made the international security system increasing uncertain. As a result, economic and diplomatic instruments have lost their effectiveness to maintain peace and stability, and it is necessary to go beyond the model of collective defence based on transatlantic alliance. Therefore, the current version of the NDC determines four pillars for Latvia's defence: the Armed Forces, a comprehensive defence system, NATO's collective defence, and international cooperation.[12]

The comprehensive defence system in Latvia has two objectives: societal resilience in peacetime and the protection of the state in case of a conflict. The system is based on the idea of the society supporting the National Armed Forces and, together with the national economic structure, guaranteeing the vital functions of the state, including material support for the Armed Forces. The Latvian society is expected to:[13]

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[11]   Ministry of Defence of Latvia, *Valsts aizsardzības koncepcija* (National Defence Concept), Ministry of Defence, 2016, https://www.mod.gov.lv/lv/nozares-politika [accessed: 26 June 2022].

[12]   Ministry of Defence of Latvia, *Valsts aizsardzības koncepcija* (National Defence Concept), Ministry of Defence, 2020, https://www.mod.gov.lv/lv/nozares-politika [accessed: 26 June 2022].

[13]   Ministry of Defence of Latvia, *Informatīvais ziņojums "Par visaptverošas valsts aizsardzības sistēmas ieviešanu Latvijā"* (Informative Report "About the Implementation of the Comprehensive Defence System in Latvia"), 2018, https://www.mod.gov.lv/sites/mod/files/document/

- get involved in the National Armed Forces and to organise armed resistance;
- support the incoming allied forces;
- implement anti-mobility measures;
- provide any kind of support for the National Armed Forces and the allied forces, including information exchange, supply of goods and services, and other activities and measures;
- take part in resistance movements and to establish support networks;
- engage in passive resistance, for example, by not cooperating with the aggressor structures and by civil non-compliance.

The ability of society and the economy to provide vital functions and to overcome any shocks, including a military conflict, has the following objectives:

- maintaining the capacity and the efficient functioning and continuity of the state structures;
- defining clear tasks and roles of institutions and municipalities, including personnel and activities;
- the continuity of vital activities (electricity, communications, financial services, ensuring food, critical infrastructure, and personnel safety) in any way and under any circumstances;
- timely building and storing vital resource and raw material reserves;
- being prepared to act in crisis and war situations across various societal levels, including individual civic preparedness.

The Latvian system of comprehensive defence is based on eight pillars. According to the 2020 NDC, they are:[14]

Maintaining the vital functions of the state

In order to guarantee the basic functions of the state during periods of crises and war, it is necessary to implement pre-established mechanisms at all institutional levels. Each structure must have well-defined strategies and objectives, and staff to ensure its operationality. Given the dependence of public administration and society on technology, it is important to maintain backup copies of database systems abroad to restore important national data in case of disruption in the national systems.

Society's resilience

Comprehensive defence is possible only with the involvement of the entire society. Thus, the civic activity of the Latvian population with a greater responsibility for the processes taking place in the country, including national defence, are of fundamental importance. It is necessary to create a culture of readiness, where every private and public organisation is prepared to deal with potential crises. This results

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Informativais%20zinojums_VVA%20ieviesana_2018.pdf [accessed: 26 June 2022].

[14] Ministry of Defence of Latvia, *Valsts aizsardzības koncepcija* (National Defence Concept), 2020, https://www.mod.gov.lv/lv/nozares-politika [accessed: 26 June 2022].

from education and training, including increasing the society's ability to survive and sustain itself for at least 72 hours. This shall be done by disseminating information, regular seminars and lectures, and by providing training to different groups of Latvian society. The society's participation may take the form of supporting the national defence structures with knowledge, skills, and material means, or providing psychological support, just to cite a few.

Protection of the information space

Latvia's population must be aware that it is necessary to protect the society against influence operations and attacks in the information space. It is a constant and permanent activity. It is necessary to increase the society's media literacy, critical thinking, and psychological resilience against influence operations by including this subject in school curricula and by providing educational opportunities to different groups of the society. A clear strategy of communication needs to be developed in the defence sector to enhance the state's ability to respond to information and psychological operations.

Sustainability of the national economy

Providers of basic services and companies with more than 250 employees must ensure the continuity of their operations during times of crisis and war. Therefore, business planning must include provisions for guaranteeing supply security and economic and technological dependence on non-NATO and non-European Union countries. The state has to establish a reserve system and prepare for the restriction of the exports of food, medicines, and essential raw materials. It is necessary to assign mobilisation tasks for companies during peacetime, including by promoting the participation of employees in the National Guard and the National Armed Forces reserve forces, and forming National Guard subunits to guarantee the physical security of strategic facilities.

Non-governmental organisations and the church

Non-governmental organisations are expected to take part in the process of defence planning by organising exercises and training and informing the society. The church has a significant role in strengthening the psychological resilience of its members, helping and motivating them to overcome difficulties and to support society, providing reliable information, assisting victims, and strengthening those individuals who have experienced trauma.

Civil resistance

In case of a conflict, the civilian population must evacuate as far as possible within the territory controlled by the National Armed Forces and the Allied troops. At the same time, it has to passively resist by not cooperating with the adversary's armed units and established administrative institutions. This is to be done by isolating oneself from the decisions and actions of the occupiers, such as not taking part in public events organised by the occupying forces and structures, not providing information,

and not participating in elections and referendums organised by the occupiers. The success of the resistance movement depends on the covert support of the population (such as security, medical care, information, finance, communications, training, recruitment, and intelligence) to members of civil resistance, armed resistance, the National Armed Forces, and the Allied forces.

Cyber security

To reduce the vulnerabilities of state institutions, society, and companies, it is necessary to guarantee the implementation of minimum security standards and a reduction of technological dependence on countries that are not members of NATO or the European Union. Cyber security issues are to be included in the curricula of educational institutions as part of the national defence subject, and in the annual training of state and local institutions. In addition, subdivisions of the Cyber Youth Guard and the National Guard Cyber Defence Unit are to be established. It is very important to ensure storage of important data in Latvia to guarantee the continuity of critical services.

Youth education

The Youth Guard and the introduction of national defence education in schools have a key role in strengthening Latvian society's resilience. This is to be done by educating the youth about national defence, developing their sense of patriotism, civic consciousness, cohesion, leadership, and physical skills. The Ministry of Defence will establish a vocational secondary education institution where general education will be combined with the acquisition of skills and values to develop students' intellectual capacity, including developing a strong sense of responsibility and improving the necessary competencies to withstand increased physical and psychological challenges. The general secondary school curriculum will focus on mathematics, physics, chemistry, and technologies to develop the students' competencies to use modern combat equipment The subject of national defence is to be introduced in the national curricula for secondary schools (10th and 11th grades) by 2024. The objective is to develop competencies associated with national defence, crisis management, critical thinking, and civic patriotism. In addition, students will have an opportunity to take part in voluntary national defence summer camps, where the knowledge acquired at school will be practiced. It is expected that around 30,000 students aged 15–17 will take the course each year, amounting to almost a third of Latvia's population in ten years.

Implementation

The implementation of the system of comprehensive defence is an ongoing process with many challenges. Following the 2016 version of the NDC, the National

Security Law was amended to reflect the necessities of implementing the system of comprehensive defence and civil resistance. Although both ideas were broadly supported support by many significant stakeholders in the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence, they were considered to be politically sensitive. With different threat assessment, it became viable to include the two ideas among the amendments of the National Security Law. The next step was to prepare the strategy for implementing the system of comprehensive defence, which was defined in the *Informatīvais ziņojums "Par visaptverošas valsts aizsardzības sistēmas ieviešanu Latvijā"* (About the Implementation of the Comprehensive Defence System in Latvia). This document defines seven key strategic objectives, the institutions responsible for the implementation, and their main tasks.[15]

Table 1. Latvia's comprehensive defence strategic objectives, stakeholders, and tasks

Strategic objective	Stakeholders	Tasks
Developing military capabilities and defining defence strategies	Ministry of Defence National Armed Forces	Developing military capabilities Developing a defence strategy Increasing the individuals' willingness to engage in national defence and resist occupation
Establishing closer cooperation between private and public sectors	All government	Cross-governmental threat identification and reduction measures Cooperation with NGOs and their involvement in national defence Developing national and local volunteer networks Organising annual defence training for professionals and experts from various fields Developing the national defence industry and increasing its role in national defence
Introducing the course of National Defence in schools and increasing public awareness of defence issues	Ministry of Education and Science Ministry of Defence Other government agencies and bodies	Implementing the National Defence curriculum Introducing national defence subjects in the higher education and science system Strengthening the relationship between the state and the society
Civil defence and disaster management	Ministry of Internal Affairs State and local government agencies and bodies Juridical and private persons	Implementing NATO's seven baseline requirements for civil resilience. Closer civil-military relations Population readiness to withstand initial stages of disaster or war

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[15]   Ministry of Defence of Latvia, *Informatīvais ziņojums "Par visaptverošas valsts aizsardzības sistēmas ieviešanu Latvijā", op. cit.*

Strategic objective	Stakeholders	Tasks
Psychological defence	State Chancellery Ministry of Defence Ministry of Education and Science Ministry of Culture Other government agencies and bodies	To increase society's resilience against influence, information, and psychological operations To increase social cohesion To increase social engagement in domestic political and social process To establish direct channels of communication with religious organisations
Strategic communication	State Chancellery Other government agencies and bodies	To encourage the population to behave in accordance with the comprehensive defence model. To manage the government's crisis communication To increase resilience against information operations against Latvia
Economic resilience	Ministry of Finance Ministry of Economics	To guarantee the provision of the essential government services in times of crisis and war To establish reserves of essential commodities at the national level To sustain businesses during crisis and war To guarantee personal economic security

Source: Ministry of Defence of Latvia, *Informatīvais ziņojums "Par visaptverošas valsts aizsardzības sistēmas ieviešanu Latvijā"* (Informative Report "About the Implementation of the Comprehensive Defence System in Latvia"), 2018, https://www.mod.gov.lv/sites/mod/files/document/Informativais%20zinojums_VVA%20ieviesana_2018.pdf, [accessed: 26 June 2022].

In 2020, the working group responsible for implementing these tasks produced a report evaluating their progress. It stressed that during 2019, the focus was on informing the society, amending the legislation, strengthening the relationship between the public and the private sector, and increasing the society's participation in the country's military defence system within the comprehensive defence's framework. The ministries engaged in a tabletop exercise to help establish priorities, tasks of specific organisations, and check the ministries' individual reaction plans in accordance with the exercise scenario. The conclusions showed the importance of the access to financial systems and energy reserves, as well as proper communication during crisis and identifying the staff responsible to guarantee the critical functions of the state.

These points were included in the Kristaps 2019 exercises, when the private sector had the opportunity to directly interact with the defence establishment to deal with a crisis situation. The exercise provided many valuable insights into critical services included in several pieces of legislation. The implementation of the subject of National Defence in the national school curricula started in the school year 2019/2020, with about 1000 students from 54 schools and 67 youngsters taking part in a defence camp. It will become mandatory in the school year 2024/2025. In addition, many events intended to raise society's awareness and provide the

opportunity to obtain information about defence issues such as the creation of the Sargs internet portal, the participation in the Lampa festival, just to name a few. These actions will continue.

Conclusions

Non-kinetic instruments of warfare are gaining importance to achieve military strategic objectives. At the same time, kinetic instruments might be used to reach non-military strategic objectives, blurring the traditional division into military and non-military means of warfare. As a result, the first step to evaluate the instruments a country might use against an opponent is to determine its strategic objectives.

In open-source discussions, Russia's strategic goal in the Baltic states is to stimulate a process described in literature as Finlandisation. It can be achieved by kinetic or non-kinetic means, although a combination of the two is also possible. In the case of the Baltic states, Russia has chosen non-kinetic means until now. This is mostly the result of NATO's reassurance and deterrence actions, but also the Baltic states' development of new defence capabilities. Therefore, one should not underestimate the relevance of military deterrence in the region. An important point to be taken into consideration is that the operationalisation of non-kinetic warfare, especially information, psychological, and influence operations, depends very much on the opponent's idiosyncratic fragilities. As a result, deterrence has to be mostly by denial. This means that it surpasses the mandate of the military and belongs in the political realm.

Finally, the Latvian Minister of Defence has initiated several programmes to establish a reliable system of comprehensive defence, in which society's role is fundamental. The results are already noticeable. These actions have been focusing on both increasing enlistment in the National Guard and raising the society's awareness and resilience in case of a military or non-military crisis.

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Latvia's comprehensive defence approach
Abstract

Russia has been employing old methods of warfare in innovative ways with the help of new technologies. At the same time, it has been looking to exploit non-military means to achieve political objectives. Among these are psychological, information, and influence operations, including financing pseudo-NGOs for achieving political goals, disinformation campaigns, and strong military posturing near the Baltic Countries' borders. The Russian strategy for the Baltic States is multi-layered and chiefly determined by Russia considering them part of the West. As a result, since the threat is multi-layered and presents a comprehensive challenge, Latvia developed a comprehensive defence strategy. This article analysis the evolution of Latvia's security and defence strategy towards a system that may be characterized as comprehensive defence. Its main features include several initiatives where society's role is fundamental. The results are already noticeable. These actions have been focussing on both enlarging enlistment in the National Guard, but also in increasing the society's awareness and resilience in case of military or non-military crisis.

Key words: comprehensive defence, Latvia, hybrid warfare, Russia, Latvian National Armed Forces, National Guard

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The total defence snap link for national resistance: territorial defence forces – the Swiss example

Introduction

For nations facing expansionist and revisionist neighbours such as Russia or China, a total defence approach provides a mechanism to protect both territorial integrity and political sovereignty. A key component for any effective total defence concept is volunteer, citizen-soldier territorial defence forces (TDF), also known as national guards, defence leagues, or home guards, depending on the country.

This paper will first define total defence, and then emphasise the role these territorial formations play as the critical snap link between the military and civilian population in such a national defence strategy. While a total defence strategy can address any number of threats – natural disasters, epidemics, grey zone operations, and armed conflict, this essay will focus on the conduct of national resistance in the event of foreign invasion, an extreme scenario for the total defence system. In mountaineering, a snap link is used to join equipment and people into a functioning system for successful climbing. Similarly, like the snap link, the territorial defence forces connect the military to the civilian population in a way to ensure popular support for the national resistance effort. The article will then examine the historical example of Switzerland as an exemplar of total defence from 1939 to 1991 and demonstrate the role its citizen-soldier forces played in linking the population to overall resistance efforts. This

Swiss historical experience provides three main concepts for consideration and tailored implementation by citizen-soldier territorial defence forces in national defence resistance missions today: (1) the creation of a government-directed and functional *levée en masse* that mobilises the entire population to support total defence and provide invasion deterrence; (2) the establishment of a national redoubt or refuge, either in-country or abroad, to provide sanctuary for the resistance movement during occupation; (3) and the organization of specialised, multi-crisis capable territorial units for the full range of total defence missions.

Total/Comprehensive defence

Sovereignty is the indispensable attribute of the state for both internal power and external international relations purposes.[1] Its preservation rests upon a competent national defence posture and plan. Total or comprehensive defence is a national security strategy based upon whole-of-government and whole-of-society involvement in protecting a nation's sovereignty. In the article "From 'total' to 'comprehensive' national defence: the development of the concept in Europe" Dr. Ieva Bērziņa provides a comprehensive historical perspective to this framework, explains its derivation from the idea of Total War, and offers a differentiation between total defence, with an emphasis on military components, used primarily by non-aligned states during the Cold War, and todays comprehensive national defence which counters both conventional and hybrid threats with both military and non-military means.[2] Simply defined, total or "comprehensive defence is an official Government strategy, which encompasses a whole-of-society approach to protecting the nation against potential threats."[3] This paper will use the term total defence to connote this meaning.

One of the key challenges in total defence is how to direct and harness the power of a wide range of involved, non-military stakeholders, especially the civilian population, to achieve the defined national security goals. The total defence effort requires cooperation, negotiation, and building consensus among stakeholders to achieve alignment of activities. In fact, for success, total defence requires the elusive, but essential unity of effort. Unity of effort – the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organisation – is the product of successful unified action.[4]

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[1]   B.D. Porter, *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundation of Modern Politics*, New York, NY: The Free Press, 1994, p. 6.

[2]   I. Bērziņa, "From 'total' to 'comprehensive' national defence: the development of the concept in Europe", *Journal on Baltic Security*, vol. 6, no. 2, 2020, pp. 7–15.

[3]   *Comprehensive Defence Handbook*, Edition A, Version 1, Mons: NATO Special Operations Headquarters, December 2020, p. 15.

[4]   See: *Joint Publication (JP) 3-0: Joint Operations*, Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 17 January 2017, Incorporating Change 1, 22 October 2018, pp. A2–A3.

While this unity can be facilitated among interagency stakeholders by the special operations community in its integrator role for resistance operations,[5] citizen-soldier territorial forces serve as the essential snap link for incorporating the civilian population into the broader national resistance effort.[6]

National territorial forces and resistance

The 21st-century establishment of territorial defence forces or national guards as a complement to active-duty forces in Eastern and Central European countries follows the same natural evolution of military organisations observed in Western Europe in earlier years. The French Revolution's *levée en masse* idea of an entire nation in arms evolved to the universal military conscription plus extensive reserve system that produced the mass armies of the World Wars. This structure then changed to a more limited conscription as many armies slowly shifted to an all-volunteer professional force. Unfortunately, all-volunteer professional military forces are expensive and often lack the mass and numbers necessary for adequate national defence. This situation requires a citizen-soldier component, generally voluntary, that can be called upon in times of crisis or war. The countries of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Georgia illustrate the contribution that citizen-solder or territorial units offer for national defence. The table below shows the number of personnel in each selected country in the active-duty Army compared to the part-time territorial forces. Based upon these *Military Balance 2021* figures, the citizen-soldier, territorial organisations provide substantial human resources to an overall national security establishment.

Table 1. Army and Territorial Force comparisons for selected countries

Country	Army (active force)	Territorial Defence Forces (TDF)	TDF as a percentage of the Army
Estonia	4,000	28,000 (Defence League)	700%
Latvia	1,700	9,100 (National Guard)	535%
Lithuania	8,450	5,550 (National Defence Volunteer Forces)	66%
Poland	58,500	32,000 (Territorial Defence Force)	55%
Georgia	19,050	1,600 (National Guard)	8%

Source: based on data from The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2021*, London: Routledge, 2021.

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[5]   K.D. Stringer, "Special Operations Forces (SOF): The Integrators for Total Defense and Resistance", *Journal on Baltic Security*, vol. 8, no. 1, 2022, https://journalonbalticsecurity.com/journal/JOBS/article/3/text [accessed: 17 May 2022].

[6]   Idem, *Territorial Defense and SOF Roles in National Resistance*, lecture and presentation, Ministry of Defense Resistance and Resilience Conference, Tbilisi, Georgia, 28 October 2021.

Barring an often-unrealistic *levée en masse* or universal military conscription system, territorial citizen-soldier military forces offer a realistic option for any threatened government to augment its active force, provide mass for a spectrum of military operations, and connect its civilian populace to an overall total defence plan. This utilisation is not new. Historically, even the United States during its American Revolution relied heavily on its citizen-soldier militia to provide a vast reservoir of personnel for a multiplicity of military needs in the majority of both conventional and irregular engagements against the British.[7]

As noted in this author's 2020 *Military Review* article, "resistance capabilities provide a sovereign nation an additional element of national defence that contributes to deterrence against an adversary, imposes real costs on an occupier, and sets conditions for the liberation of occupied national territory."[8] For resistance, national TDF possess three indispensable attributes that make them an ideal force. First, the territorial forces link the military to the civilian population and its respective civil institutions such as religious organisations, cultural associations, trade unions, and the like. This connection offers the TDF great potential for catalysing directed social mobilisation in the population to develop "non-violent struggle capacity."[9] According to Gene Sharp, non-violent struggle, also known as political defiance, is the most powerful form of resistance employed by the civil society institutions across psychological, social, economic, and political domains.[10] Additionally, territorial defence force "national service reminds citizens that they have obligations toward the state as well as rights."[11] Second, TDF geographical dispersion ensures persistent presence throughout the nation and in all county or municipality jurisdictions, which provides excellent knowledge of the population as well as close relationships with local leaders and communities. Third, TDF are voluntary organisations of patriots who are motivated to serve and defend the nation and local community, and they bring a broad base of civilian experience and skills which may be relevant in resistance situations.

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[7] See: *The Toll of Independence: Engagements and Battle Casualties of the Revolution*, ed. H.H. Peckham, Clements Library Bicentennial Studies Series, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974.

[8] K.D. Stringer, "Survival in the Russian Occupied Zone: Command and Organization in Resistance Underground Operations," *Military Review*, vol. 101, no. 4, 2021, pp. 125–132.

[9] G. Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*, New York: New Press, 2012, p. 77.

[10] *Ibidem*, pp. 22, 45.

[11] B.D. Porter, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

The Swiss total defence example

As a small European state, Switzerland from 1939 to 1991 offers a paragon exemplar of the application of total defence. Switzerland's defence is still based upon constitutionally enshrined universal military conscription. Switzerland maintains no standing army, but relies entirely upon a citizen-soldier force, where every capable male citizen is obliged to serve.[12] This approach is a modified *levée en masse*, where a citizen-soldier army, drawn from, but at the same time totally embedded in the population, connects the civilian population to national defence in a way that a professional force cannot hope to accomplish. Historically, Switzerland's approach to defence with universal male military service has given it all the advantages of a standing army without the associated centralised and bloated bureaucracy and financial costs.[13]

During World War II, the Swiss Army deterred an Axis war machine thirty times its strength. As most small countries, Switzerland had to decide the level of military deterrence needed to raise the cost of invasion to an unacceptable level.[14] Starting in 1940, after the Fall of France and the resulting encirclement of Switzerland, the Swiss Commanding General Henri Guisan revised the defence plan to conduct a cost-exacting conventional fight on the borders against Axis invaders, and as the balance shifted, to continue this battle from a pre-prepared national redoubt in the mountains, while forces in the occupied regions shifted to guerrilla warfare.[15] From the science of military fortification, a redoubt is an enclosed defensive emplacement that serves as a refuge.[16] A national redoubt is simply an area to which the remnants of the national armed forces can withdraw if the campaign has been lost. A good national redoubt should possess defensible geography.

This total defence decision was not without its risks. Essentially the bulk of the population, the prime economic regions, and all major cities would be left to adversarial occupation. A major concern with this scenario was the resilience of the population outside the national redoubt to conduct a sustained guerrilla war.[17] Although this apprehension was not tested by an Axis invasion, there were indicators that the populace exhibited readiness for this effort. For example, on 12 May 1940, with already almost 800,000 obliged citizen-soldiers mobilised for war and

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[12] Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft vom 18. April 1999, SR 101, Art. 59 Militär und Ersatzdienst.

[13] B.D. Porter, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

[14] A. Codevilla, *Between the Alps and a Hard Place: Switzerland in World War II and the Rewriting of History*, Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2000, p. 29.

[15] H. Guisan, *Bericht an die Bundesversammlung über den Aktivdienst 1939–1945*, Bern: Eidgenössische Drucksachen und Materialienzentrale, 1946, pp. 39–42.

[16] M. Brice, *Forts and Fortresses*, London: Quarto Publishing, 1990, p. 185.

[17] W. Rings, *Schweiz im Krieg 1933–1945: Ein Bericht*, Zürich: Verlag Ex Libris, 1974, pp. 231–235.

approximately 300,000 of these relocating into the emerging national redoubt, the Swiss General Staff issued guidelines for the establishment and recruitment of additional volunteer local guards (*Ortswehr*) units. These officially recognised and armed territorial formations were composed of volunteers, both males and females of all ages, who were not qualified for regular military service but wanted to defend their country.[18] These elements would also contribute to the armed guerrilla force together with the remnants of the military outside of the national redoubt should the Axis attack. By 1 January 1941, seven months after the official establishment of the local guards, there existed 2,835 local units, with a total of 127,563 persons, which corresponded to almost a fifth of the already activated Army.[19] This 7-month force generation accomplishment came from a small state with a total population of approximately 4 million persons in 1940.[20] Such an excellent force generation example provides a historical benchmark for a number of Central and Eastern European countries who currently evaluate the mobilisation potential of their populations in a modern total defence context.

Additionally, from a political perspective, the Swiss population supported the necessary, but unpopular national redoubt decision since they understood it raised Swiss deterrence effects and increased the cost calculation for the Axis powers, particularly Germany, who would have to contend with a protracted struggle and blockage of the strategic Alpine transversals between northern and southern Europe.[21] The Swiss operational approach was elegant, but simple. The overriding objective was to protract any conflict with irregulars in the pre-Alpine regions and regular forces in Alpine stronghold positions to raise the temporal and resource costs for any invader, thereby contributing to deterrence.

The very same total defence philosophy carried over into the Cold War period, where the main threat was the Soviet Union. During this era, Swiss defence went far beyond the armed forces and included the economic and psychological mobilisation of the population. "The entire populace was subject to call-up for both military and non-military functions, and the national infrastructure and industrial production base were co-opted and tooled for possible defence usage."[22] While the Swiss

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18   Der Oberbefehlshaber der Armee, *Weisungen für die Organisation von Massnahmen gegen Saboteure, Luftlandetruppen und durchgebrochene Panzertruppen*, AHQ, 12. Mai 1949, [in:] H.R. Kurz, *Dokumente des Aktivdienstes*, Frauenfeld: Verlag Huber, 1965, pp. 60–62.

19   H.R. Kurz, "Vor vierzig Jahren: Aufstellung der Ortswehren," *Der Fourier*, vol. 53, no. 6, 1980, pp. 211–215.

20   A.-L. Head-König, "Bevölkerung", *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz*, 30 March 2012, https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/007946/2012-03-30 [accessed: 27 December 2021].

21   A. Peer, *Der Aktivdienst. Die Zeit nationaler Bewährung 1939–45*, Zofingen: Ringier & Co., 1975, pp. 28–29.

22   K.D. Stringer, "Building a Stay-Behind Resistance Organization: The Case of Cold War Switzerland Against the Soviet Union", *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 86, 2017, pp. 109–114, specifically p. 110.

government did establish a cadre-based, clandestine cellular underground for this period in case of occupation,[23] equal efforts were made with the citizen-soldier territorial forces.

During the Cold War period and at its peak, Swiss Army 61, with its recruitment based upon a militia concept of universal conscription, encompassed 625,000 personnel.[24] Additionally, the Swiss military created territorial divisions and brigades in the force structure that were designed for domestic emergency missions and assistance to civil and local authorities in crises – natural or man-made disasters, hybrid threats, subversion, or actual conventional conflict. A Swiss territorial brigade was a compact, focused, reservist-based unit possessing security, medical, logistical, and rescue/engineering assets for critical infrastructure protection, internal and external security tasks, rescue missions, and limited combat functions. This unit was locality based and could build long-term habitual relationships with local civil authorities, fire, police, and medical services. Such relationships strengthened overall Swiss total defence exertions. These historical formations offer potential capability models for the development of territorial defence units today.[25] Overall, this Swiss approach to total defence during both World War II and the Cold War, modified for 21st-century conditions, could apply to those countries subject to potential Chinese and Russian aggression in current affairs.

Conclusion/Recommendations

The Swiss use of citizen-soldier forces during World War II and the Cold War offers three potential insights for territorial defence forces in a number of Central and Eastern European countries today.

First, while an actual 21st-century Swiss-like *levée en masse* or universal conscription is unrealistic for many countries for numerous social, political, and economic reasons, the concept of involving the entire population in total defence in a government-directed and functional *levée en masse* for national resistance is feasible, with the snap link function conducted by the territorial defence forces leading, managing, and shaping the effort. The national TDF have to connect with a population in such a fashion so as to enable and catalyse activities ranging from the development of non-violent resistance activities to the promotion of a spirit of political defiance. Stakeholder organisations for TDF engagement run the gamut from youth

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[23]   Idem, "Survival in the Russian Occupied Zone...", *op. cit.*, specifically pp. 129–130; idem, "Building a Stay-Behind Resistance Organization...", *op. cit.*, specifically p. 112.

[24]   H. Häsler, "Grundsätzliche Überlegungen eines ehemaligen Generalstabschefs", [in:] *Erinnerungen an die Armee 61*, ed. F. Betschon, L. Geiger, Frauenfeld: Verlag Huber, 2009, p. 96.

[25]   K.D. Stringer, *Military Organizations for Homeland Defense and Smaller-Scale Contingencies*, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006, pp. 44–48.

and church groups to senior citizen clubs. Every citizen can have a role, military or non-military, in total defence. The Swiss local guard (*Ortswehren*) units from World War II exemplify this phenomenon. For in the end, the local community is the veritable lifeline for the national resistance movement – once this connection is severed, the resistance movement withers and dies.[26]

Second, the Swiss experience illustrates the importance of creating a national redoubt or sanctuary to succour surviving forces until liberation. Such a redoubt could be within the country or as a sanctuary outside the country. Although differing from state to state based upon geopolitical and geographical factors, this concept can provide heightened deterrence towards an adversary and reinforce national morale by providing assurance to resistance members that there is a safe haven for rest, recuperation, and medical aid pending liberation operations.

Third, the Swiss Cold War territorial units offer force structure design considerations for states confronted with a full range of total defence threats. While these are just three extracts from the Swiss total defence experience, they are applicable in adapted form for 21st-century small states confronted by Russian or Chinese aggression. For in the end, "The Swiss Confederation demonstrated that any small state could survive if its territory was defensible and its population highly cohesive."[27] A crucial stakeholder for achieving these conditions was the volunteer, citizen-soldier territorial defence forces, connecting the broader civilian population to the military as well as mobilising all citizens for total defence contributions.

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[27]   B.D. Porter, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

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The total defence snap link for national resistance: territorial defence forces – the Swiss example
Abstract

For nations facing expansionist and revisionist neighbours such as Russia or China, a total defence approach provides a mechanism to protect both territorial integrity and political sovereignty. A key component for any effective total defence concept is volunteer, citizen-soldier territorial defence forces (TDF). This paper emphasises the role these territorial formations play as the critical snap link between the military and civilian population in such a national defence strategy. The territorial defence forces, like the snap link in mountaineering, connect the military to the civilian population in a way to ensure popular support for national resistance efforts.

The article offers the historical example of Switzerland as an exemplar of total defence from 1939 to 1991 and demonstrates the role its citizen-soldier forces played in linking the population to overall resistance efforts. This Swiss historical experience provides three main concepts for consideration today: (1) the creation of a government directed

and functional *levée en masse* that mobilizes the entire population to support total defence; (2) the establishment of a national redoubt or refuge, either in-country or abroad, to provide sanctuary for the resistance movement; (3) and the organisation of specialised, multi-crisis capable territorial units for the full range of total defence missions.

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How to build a resilient society in a weak state: the case of Lebanon

Introduction

Considered by the World Bank as one of the worst three global crises since the mid-nineteenth century, the current financial crisis that Lebanon is facing is showing the limits of an obsolete political system whose leaders failed to guarantee their institutional and social roles. With more than 78% of the Lebanese population living below the poverty line,[1] the question of whether Lebanese society can recover from decades of corruption and mismanagement of public policies is beginning to arise. According to Princeton University economist Markus Brunnermeier, a resilient society can bounce back from shocks, such as political, social, and economic crises.[2]

Building a resilient society requires teamwork and common goals across the development, humanitarian, and peace sectors. Thus, efficient collaboration and coordination between the United Nations (UN) agencies, governments, civil society, private sector, and other actors is indispensable to ensure this objective.[3]

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[1] World Bank Group, *Lebanon Economic Monitor*, Spring 2021, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/394741622469174252/pdf/Lebanon-Economic-Monitor-Lebanon-Sinking-to-the-Top-3.pdf [accessed: 13 March 2022].

[2] M. Brunnermeier, *The Resilient Society*, Colorado: Endeavor Literary Press, 2021.

[3] "Building Resilient Societies Critical Step towards Achieving 2030 Agenda", 1 October 2021, United Nations, https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/dsgsm1642.doc.htm [accessed: 13 March 2022].

Nevertheless, in the Lebanese case, structural and conjunctural political and economic dysfunctionalities, as well as regional and international interferences, impede achieving this resilience by the local society. This statement leads us to the following question: In a weak state with a divided society, what are the conditions for overcoming the different challenges and build lasting, inclusive, and efficient societal resilience?

The main hypotheses for addressing this issue are based on the importance of including all actors – local, regional, and international, and mainly local populations – in the cooperation mechanism, through a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches. Besides the institutional empowerment, an efficient fight against corruption and a review of the educational system are crucial in ensuring a lasting and inclusive new social contract based on meritocracy and solidarity.

In this article, we will analyse the main obstacles restraining Lebanese society from becoming resilient before suggesting processes towards achieving this goal. In order to do so, we will base our study on institutional analysis, legal acts investigation, and desk research to provide a succinct, yet concise examination of a deficient political, social and societal system, whose reforms are indispensable to ensure the survival of the Lebanese state in its various components.

The Lebanese political culture: communitarianism as the basis of the social contract

The first major obstacle impeding Lebanese society's resilience is structural, as it is linked to the state's weakness and the heterogeneity of its population. Since its creation, Lebanon has been suffering from structural deficiencies resulting in a divided society that turns more to its community than to the Lebanese entity. These deficiencies are the result of a particular national habitus, and create divisions within the population, and thus, in many cases, a lack of cooperation between different communities.

Habitus, according to Norbert Elias, means embodied social learning that evolves over time given the evolution and accumulation of a nation's fortunes. The German sociologist refutes the idea that "the fortunes of a nation over the centuries become sedimented into the habitus of its individual members."[4] The national habitus of a people is not biologically fixed and predetermined. It is rather closely linked to the process of state formation that corresponds to it on the one hand, and to the internalisation by men of certain behavioural norms on the other.[5] It is in this logic that a "Lebanese national habitus" emerges with the formation of the Lebanese state in

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[4]   E. Dunning, S. Mennell, *The Germans: Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996.

[5]   *Ibidem.*

1920. Sectarianism, violence, neo-patriarchy, and clientelism have become inherent components to Lebanese society.

Although sectarian consciousness is observable in all countries of the Middle East, it remains particular to Lebanon in view of the constitutional distribution of power between the different religious communities, known as political sectarianism.

Until today, this distribution reinforces the feeling of belonging to a particular community, which therefore becomes more important for the Lebanese citizen than the state itself due to the weight of each community in the development of Lebanese politics and the symbolic image that each community has regarding the individuals it represents. If the religious community constitutes the identity reference for the Lebanese, it is favoured by the geographical distribution of the different sects, thus creating not only identity, but also territorial divisions among the population and favouring the control of each community on a portion of the Lebanese territory and, thus, the population living in it.

Moreover, this feeling of belonging to a community pushes part of the population to think of the federation as a solution to political problems in view of "fear of the other", impeding the development of a strong national and united sentiment, and favouring neo-patriarchy and the culture of violence.[6]

In Lebanese society, neo-patriarchy and clientelism are closely linked and inseparable from each other. If certain societies perceive chiefs of tribes or the head of state as father figures it is the leaders of political parties who fulfil this task in Lebanon, which accounts the emergence of patrimonialism as a concrete and accepted reality. It is, in fact, a "traditional mode of domination characterised by weak institutionalisation and the direct appropriation of power by a family, an oligarchy, or a clan."[7]

By favouring patrimonialism, this neo-patriarchal structure of Lebanese society leads to the consolidation of clientelism which is characterised by "social relations that are both unequal and personalised, dominated by an exchange of services deemed mutually advantageous."[8] In fact, although they "are characterised by the indivisibility of supply and an absence of discrimination of beneficiaries,"[9] collective goods are controlled by these "political families" who redistribute them by favouring first the militants, and then the supporters. However, if collective goods are subject to appropriation, the same is true of the various functions, public or private, where priority is given to those who have a political support or "wasta".[10]

This observable phenomenon, which over time has become an omnipresent aspect in daily social relations, further explains the political commitment of the

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[6]   A. Issa, *The UNDP in Lebanon: The Impossible Governance*, Paris: FNSP, 2015.

[7]   P. Bonte, M. Izard, *Dictionnaire de l'ethnologie et de l'anthropologie*, Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 2007.

[8]   P. Braud, *Sociologie politique*, Paris : LGDJ, 2014.

[9]   *Ibidem.*

[10]   A. Issa, *The UNDP in Lebanon…*, *op. cit.*

population that appeals to the political party representing it for mainly socio-economic purposes. As nothing is free, these political parties impose on the beneficiaries first loyalty and then political or even, in certain circumstances, armed commitment. Neo-patriarchy and clientelism, in their relationship with sectarianism, are therefore a big source of violence.

Whether domestic or political, violence is a daily reality in many societies. Defined by Philippe Braud as a "political resource mobilising the threat or the effective use of physical coercion,"[11] political violence, in the case of Lebanon, is distinguished by its close relationship with sectarianism on the one hand, and instrumentalization by neo-feudal political leaders on the other. It manifests itself, above all, in most political parties' creation of an armed militia whose main mission is to control a Lebanese area or region.

Based on sectarianism, neo-patriarchy, clientelism, and violence, the Lebanese political culture is thus a major challenge to the construction of a resilient society because it incites the population to be divided and seek help from those who are inhibiting their decent and meritocratic political system. That is one of the reasons why many of the country's youth, who cannot find jobs based on merit, decide to flee Lebanon and look for better opportunities elsewhere, depriving the country of its potential technocrats and future economic and social leaders.

The legacy of the Lebanese Wars (1975–1990): internal divisions and foreign interferences

Building a resilient society requires a political will from the country's leaders. Nevertheless, in the Lebanese case, those leaders do not have any interest in offering resilience to their population because it might lead to a considerable decrease in their power and prerogatives.

Contrary to what most of the existing literature on the topic asserts, the Lebanese wars were not a conflict between Lebanese Christians and Muslims. They were rather a complex interaction between local unrest and a broader regional geopolitical configuration, with Palestinians, Israelis, and Syrians as the main protagonists.[12]

More than thirty years after the wars ended, local warlords are the ones in power and still pledge allegiance to the same regional actors, joined by Saudi Arabia, where the Taif Agreement ending the wars was signed. The Agreement imposed amnesia without resolving accountability for war crimes nor rebuilding the country on strong political, social, societal, and economic grounds. Oblivion was foisted on the population, with the fate of many disappeared victims still neither solved nor revealed.[13]

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[11]   P. Braud, *op. cit*.
[12]   F. Mermier, C. Varin, *Mémoires de guerres au Liban (1975–1990)*, Arles: Actes Sud, 2010.
[13]   G. Corm, *Le Liban contemporain : Histoire et société*, Paris : La Découverte, 2012.

Maintaining control over their respective communities, the current political leaders – warlords – are still able to manipulate their populations through a securitisation discourse inviting them to remain hostile towards the "others."

This "fear-of-the-others" logic is also transposed to the regional level, as these internal divisions are sustained by foreign interferences. Lebanon became one of the battlefields of the Iranian-Saudi duo and their allies, which was favoured by the weak state structure and the preponderance of non-state actors, such as the Hezbollah, who are part of the political scene nonetheless[14].

As a small and internally fragile state, Lebanon pays the price for any neighbouring unrest. Having interfered during the Lebanese wars, the Syrian army remained in Lebanon until 2005, which led to the development of an anti-Syrian feeling among a large part of the Lebanese population. Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, many Syrians have fled to Lebanon, and half of the country's population have become composed of refugees. Many business owners decided to hire Syrians, a cheaper workforce, leaving the Lebanese jobless in an already difficult economic situation.[15]

In the absence of any state economic programme, poverty, and thus, violence increased considerably until 17 October 2019, when the Lebanese population decided to take to the streets to protest against the ruling elite in an unprecedented national demonstration.

However, what was initially perceived as national hope was rapidly dismantled by the political oligarchs who played on the revisited sectarian war discourse, confirming that the Lebanese society was still, after all, mostly sectarian, and would turn again to its community rather than seek resilience.[16]

An unprecedented multi-level crisis: local inertia and international indifference

The national hope of the October Revolution was nothing but the confirmation of a national and state deficiency that led to an unprecedented multi-level crisis.

Since the October Revolution, the Lebanese economy has plunged in hyperinflation that made the Lebanese lose not only almost their entire purchasing power, but also access to imported products and, most importantly, medication.[17]

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[14]   A. Issa, "The Fragmented Middle East: Persistent Insecurity, Rising Instability", *Security: Theory and Practice*, no. 3, 2021.

[15]   R. Rabil, *The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon: The Double Tragedy of Refugees and Impacted Host Communities*, Minneapolis: Lexington Books, 2016.

[16]   A. Issa, "Liban : l'impossible sortie de la crise", April 2021, Fondation Jean Jaurès, https://www.jean-jaures.org/publication/liban-limpossible-sortie-de-la-crise [accessed: 13 March 2022].

[17]   Amnesty International, "Lebanon: Government recklessness in medication subsidy reform violates right to health and life", 16 December 2021, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/

One of the reasons for this situation is the failure of the banking system that has long been considered the most important and profitable aspect of the Lebanese economy. A shortage of US dollars affects all commercial banks, and people cannot withdraw their money from their bank accounts or transfer money to their relatives abroad. The question of whether people will get their money back also arises, and there are rumours about the political class's embezzlement of money and its transfer abroad.[18]

The global pandemic and the lockdown restrictions accentuated the problems as many businesses had to close down, leading to an increase in unemployment and therefore, in poverty. According to the World Bank, more than 78% of the Lebanese population lives below the poverty line, meaning that getting out of the crisis needs not only a rapid and urgent response, but also close cooperation between various international, regional, and local actors. Nonetheless, neither the rapid answer nor the multi-level cooperation was implemented. As a matter of fact, local negligence and indifference were brought to international attention only after the Beirut explosion of 4 August 2020, which revealed the inability by the Lebanese political class to fulfil its responsibilities and ensure both physical and human security to its population.

The international intervention to help those who were affected was limited, and despite the pressure on the local ruling class, no effort has been made to address the basic needs of the populations. On the contrary, international agencies promoting transparency and human security became part of the corrupted system and, consequently, limited in their efficiency, as they were pressurised from local leaders who would not accept any limitation of their prerogatives.

Some local and international non-governmental organisations tried to provide the Lebanese populations with the necessary services. However, their reliance on financial support from external donors who themselves depend on the local leaders' approval limits their action despite their commitment.[19]

Thanks to solidarity within the population and to the Lebanese diaspora, some of the basic needs, such as medications, are being provided. However, such quick impact initiatives cannot replace long-term policies, as other structural needs are yet to be met, for example hospitals, electricity, security, and other necessities that are supposed to be the responsibility of the Lebanese authorities. Therefore, with different actors who are meant to help building a resilient society but are either paralysed or unwilling to cooperate, the Lebanese population is yet to find its way towards strength and peace.

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news/2021/12/lebanon-government-recklessness-in-medication-subsidy-reform-violates-right-to-health-and-life [accessed: 13 March 2022].

[18] A. Issa, "Liban: l'impossible sortie de la crise"..., *op. cit.*

[19] A. Sewell, "What happened to the international aid promised to Lebanon after the Beirut port blast?", December 2021, *L'Orient le Jour*, https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1285046/what-happened-to-the-international-aid-promised-to-lebanon-after-the-beirut-port-blast.html [accessed: 13 March 2022].

Towards national (re)construction:
the imperatives for a resilient and solid society

After the Beirut Blast, Lebanese designer Zuhair Murad, who launched an initiative to help affected populations, created the slogan "Rise from the Ashes" to express the resilience of Lebanese society which was able to rise again after every incident.[20] However, the accumulation of structural and conjunctural deficiencies became more challenging.

Lebanon is suffering from double disintegration. The deficiencies of the state lead to disintegration from above. Defined by Max Weber as the monopoly of legitimate physical violence, the state's primary mission is to ensure the security of the populations on its territory.[21] To be able to do this, it must have the appropriate means, such as military and police institutions. It must also be able to carry out social and economic missions for the benefit of the populations' security. The state should intervene and redistribute wealth and to provide collective facilities and public services. From this perspective, the weak Lebanese state is far from ensuring its main missions that are its *raison d'être*.

The dysfunctions and shortcomings of the state are not, however, the only sources of conflict. Social and political disintegration from below can also lead to belligerent situations. For a state to endure, the individuals who compose it must feel attached to other members of that society. The lack of social cohesion and the feeling of exclusion of part of the population can lead to conflicts in various forms, ranging from organised crime to armed dissent.[22] As we have seen in this article, the Lebanese population itself is divided, and sectarian tensions characterise the political and social landscapes.

The first solution for building a resilient society must then be local and articulated around a new social contract based on coexistence, acceptance, and meritocracy. The current social contract has already shown on many occasions its limits. Both the political elite and the population need to get out of the vicious circle of corruption and sectarianism. The role of international organisations like the UN agencies can be crucial in coordinating such actions through efficient surveillance and development policies aiming at empowering the local population.

Reviewing the civil and civic education school programme and implementing mandatory public interest activities for students can develop common responsibility and an increased awareness of the impact the public sphere has on the personal level.

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[20] F. Andrews, "Rise from the ashes: Zuhair Murad sells T-shirt to raise money for Beirut disaster relief", August 2020, The National News, https://www.thenationalnews.com/lifestyle/fashion/rise-from-the-ashes-zuhair-murad-sells-t-shirt-to-raise-money-for-beirut-disaster-relief-1.1065595 [accessed: 13 April 2022].

[21] M. Weber, *Le savant et le politique*, Paris: Editions 10/18, 1998.

[22] F. Ramel, "(Dés)intégration institutionnelle, (dés)intégration sociale", [in :] *Nouvelles guerres. Comprendre les conflits du XXIe siècle*, Paris : La Découverte, 2015.

Regional and international powers also have their share of responsibility as they must support local efforts in building a resilient society instead of interfering to create more chaos and divisions.

Consequently, a resilient society in Lebanon can only be built if strong coordination and collaboration between the local population and authorities, international and regional powers, as well as international organisations and other non-governmental actors is implemented to address both the short- and long-term needs of the population through efficient and lasting public policies.

Conclusion

To conclude, Lebanese society is facing many challenges impeding its resilience given the numerous and increasing obstacles it is facing. These challenges are both structural and conjunctural and are the consequences of decades of deficient public management and policies, a divided society, and continuous foreign interferences. These different elements have created an environment conductive to corruption, tensions, and internal fragilities.

That is why broader cooperation is indispensable to ensure that the Lebanese population can indeed rise from the ashes. This cooperation needs to include all the actors involved in building a resilient society, starting with local populations whose role is indispensable in ensuring lasting, efficient, and authentic resilience. The empowerment of national institutions, the implementation of a new school curriculum encouraging civic and civil education and fighting corruption cannot be done without the implication of the local society who is not only the victim of, but also responsible for the current situation because of its solidarity not with its members, but with a corrupted system encouraging nepotism.

However, if global and inclusive cooperation is necessary, the current local, regional, and international conjunctures do not seem to be heading towards any improvement regarding the Lebanese case. None of the influential actors, namely the ruling political class, foreign regional and international powers, or international organisations, are willing to interfere to limit the disastrous consequences of decades of mismanagement.

In the absence of any reaction, extreme poverty and violence can become the new lasting reality for Lebanese society, which might result in the proliferation of organised crimes or even terrorist groups.

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How to build a resilient society in a weak state: the case of Lebanon
Abstract

The Beirut Port explosion brought to the world's attention the long-term struggle of a population suffering from structural deficiencies due to the lack of efficient public policies and strong state institutions capable of fulfilling their primary roles. The weak Lebanese state is the victim of its rulers' inability to ensure their population has access to its basic needs and rights. On the other hand, the population itself is stuck in a vicious circle due to the specificity of the Lebanese political culture that gives more power

and allegiance to the community than the state itself, creating an atmosphere revolving around corruption, clientelism and violence, and leading to massive flow of educated young people who desperately want to but cannot help their country. In such circumstances, both the state and the population become a target for bigger regional powers that use the Lebanese territory as a battlefield for their own rivalries and interests. Consequently, and with an unprecedent economic crisis, building a resilient society in Lebanon is challenged by various obstacles that need to be addressed as a whole, by including the different actors involved in such processes and mostly the local population itself, whose role is indispensable in building lasting resilience and peace.

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A tale of two hemispheres: Norwegian and Australian approaches to national resilience. A comparative analysis[2]

Introduction

The term *resilience* does not have a universal definition, as its meaning greatly depends upon the context within which it is used. For the purpose of this paper, we will focus on the connotations assumed by the term within the confines of the security sector, where resilience has become associated with the concept of a state's ability to respond to strategic shock, adapt, and continue to execute critical essential functions and services. It is important to note that in this context, the term *state* applies not only to government institutions, but also to the nation as a whole, including (but not limited to) individuals, society, and the private sector.

This paper examines two very distinct approaches to national resilience: the Australian Disaster Response and Resilience Model, and Norway's Total Defence

Concept. As will become evident, resilience can acquire significantly different definitions, depending very much on national realities and the country's specific security context. NATO's approach, for example, is very much centred on resilience as a military enablement and readiness tool, with a significant role in contributing to national and Alliance deterrence efforts.

Considering Australia's most recent history, it is fair to say that the nation's primary threat vectors have emanated from within, namely through ever intensifying natural disasters such as the bushfires of 2019–2020, which ravaged a significant part of the nation. It is therefore only natural that much of Australia's resilience strategy is currently focused on mitigating threats from natural calamities. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) has played a major role in enabling civil society's response to fires and floods. However, since 2020, there has been a significant strategic shift in Australia's security landscape, as China's aggressive posturing and hybrid actions have intensified over the past two years, causing Canberra to rethink how the nation looks at national mobilisation and resilience.

In stark contrast, since the end of World War II, Norway placed significant attention on a Total Defence Concept (TDC) which focused primarily (but not exclusively) on a whole-of-government approach to defending against conventional military threats. Essentially, it provided a structured approach to civil society enablement of the military. However, the concept has changed significantly over the years, particularly since the fall of the Berlin wall. With Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, there has been a renewed effort to bolster and expand the TDC. Today, it not only covers conventional threats, but also provides a comprehensive strategy for countering hybrid challenges as well, with some attention also provided to responding to national disaster.

The paper will provide a general overview of the two approaches to national resilience,[3] and then seek to present those strengths and weaknesses of the respective models that are most relevant for the Polish context. In an attempt to provide tangible recommendations aimed at informing national resilience policy and strategy, the paper has sought to compare two highly specialised but very different approaches, with the intention of providing Polish decision makers with a diverse spectrum of potential resilience models from which to choose. To this end, extensive desk research, complemented by interviews with subject matter experts, was conducted, with a primary focus on institutional and legal framework analysis. While the comparative analysis was at times challenging due to the very different structural nature of the two national approaches, this ultimately proved to be highly beneficial as it potentially provides Polish leadership "with the best of both worlds" in terms of approaches to a truly comprehensive national resilience model.

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[3]   It should be noted that for brevity, the outline cannot be exhaustive. Instead, it aims at providing a brief overview of some of the key organisational elements of the two models.

Australia's approach to resilience

As recent years have demonstrated, the Australian people have been required to demonstrate significant resilience. Between December 2019 and 2020, large portions of the country were ravaged by what became known as the Black Summer Bushfires. This catastrophic event would eventually take with it 3000 homes, 24 million hectares of land, an estimated 3 billion animals, at least 33 lives, with an approximated recovery cost of approximately 10 billion Australian dollars.[4] Shortly after, many of the affected areas were struck by intense hailstorms and flooding. Then came COVID-19. Many analysts believe that the effects of climate change will continue to generate unprecedented environmental challenges for the country, therefore, with good reason, much of the Australian resilience and crisis response focus is on natural calamities. However, as will be highlighted later, the process of expanding resilience considerations to include a total defence approach is well underway.

Resilience within the context of natural disaster response

The National Strategy for Disaster Resilience centres its approach on the following four principles: Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery,[5] with the main emphasis being placed on Prevention and Recovery. Another guiding principle of the strategy is its "shared responsibility" concept,[6] via which multiple stakeholders are empowered to directly participate in resilience building and crisis response, including individuals, families, local communities and authorities, the private sector (i.e., small and medium businesses), and state/territory and federal government.

As Australia is a federal state,[7] the primary responsibility for resilience and crisis response has been decentralised and lies primarily with the state/territory and local authorities,[8] with the national government primarily covering the roles and functions

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[4]   M. Binskin, A. Bennett, A. Macintosh, *Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements Report*, 28 October 2020, p. 5, https://naturaldisaster.royalcommission.gov.au/system/files/2020-11/Royal%20Commission%20into%20National%20Natural%20Disaster%20Arrangements%20-%20Report%20%20%5Baccessible%5D.pdf   [accessed: 20 May 2022].

[5]   Council of Australian Governments, *National Strategy for Disaster Resilience*, February 2011, p. 6, https://knowledge.aidr.org.au/media/2153/nationalstrategyfordisasterresilience.pdf [accessed: 20 May 2022].

[6]   Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, *Australian Emergency Management Arrangement Handbook*, 2019, p. 2, https://www.aidr.org.au/media/1764/aidr_handbookcollection_australian-emergency-management-arrangement_web_2019-08-22_v11.pdf   [accessed: 20 May 2022].

[7]   Australia is a federation of six states and two self-governing territories, which have their own constitutions, parliaments, governments, and laws.

[8]   Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

not otherwise assumed by the lower levels of governance. The federal government also retains operational and strategic capabilities which it can provide, upon request, to states/territories in times of crisis.

National government support during natural calamities is disciplined via the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework (AGCMF). This policy document identifies the principal stakeholders involved in the national authorities whole-of-government approach to natural and human-induced crises and resilience building efforts, as well as specifying their duties and responsibilities.[9] Finally, the AGCMF also outlines the processes and procedures through which the federal government supports states and territories.[10]

The Crisis Response and Resilience Structure

At the federal level, a lead ministry is selected to manage the crisis.[11] This choice will be dictated by the nature of the emergency, with the Ministry Responsible for Disaster Management leading natural disaster response, and the Ministry of Home Affairs assuming the role in case of threats to internal security or when there is ambiguity as to which ministry should take the lead.

The National Situation Room (NSR) is established[12] and acts as the crisis operations room for the response. The National Coordination Mechanism (NCM – Figure 1) is also activated and serves to ensure that the full capabilities of the Australian, state/territory governments, as well as the private sector, are brought to bear during a crisis. The NCM core functions are coordination, communication, and collaboration amongst all stakeholders, but it is not a mechanism for command and control.[13]

The NCM is an ideal venue for coordination and de-confliction between all levels of government, the private sector, and civil society as a whole (including non-governmental organisations). Key decisions and outcomes decided within the NCM will inform situational awareness and actions within the NSR.

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[9] K. Elphick, *National emergency and disaster response arrangements in Australia: a quick guide*, 28 April 2020, Parliamentary Library of Australia, p. 5–6, https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/7312885/upload_binary/7312885.pdf [accessed: 20 May 2022].

[10] Australian Government – Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, *Australian Government Crisis Management Framework*,17 December 2021, p. 28, https://www.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/aus-gov-crisis-management-framework-v3-1-2.pdf [accessed: 20 May 2022].

[11] *Ibidem*, pp. 14–15.

[12] The NSR falls under Emergency Management Australia (EMA), an office of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA). The NSR is activated regardless of which ministry is in the lead, but always falls under the jurisdiction of the MoHA.

[13] Australian Government – Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

Figure 1: The National Coordination Mechanism (NCM)

Source: Australian Government – Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Australian Government Crisis Management Framework, 17 December 2021, p. 47, https://www.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/aus-gov-crisis-management-framework-v3-1-2.pdf [accessed: 20 May 2022].

The lead ministry will activate the Australian Government's Disaster Response Plan (COMDISPLAN) which, amongst other things, represents the mechanism through which states/territories can request non-financial assistance from the federal government. National level plans are augmented by state/territory plans, some of which are specific to certain types of emergencies (e.g., bushfires or flooding).

One of the innovative aspects of the Australian model is the establishment of the National Recovery and Resiliency Agency (NRRA), a concept born out of the Royal Commission Report into the Black Summer Bushfires of 2019–20.[14] As a federal government agency under the Ministry of Home Affairs, this new entity is responsible for Australian government support to disaster-impacted communities. Deployed NRRA teams assess local needs[15] and provide federally funded financial support across a range of programmes.[16]

At the state/territory level, the same principles as those at the federal level apply, with a single agency taking the lead. As for risk management, emergency response,

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[14] M. Binskin, A. Bennett, A. Macintosh, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

[15] National Recovery and Resilience Agency, About Us, https://recovery.gov.au/about-us [accessed: 10 March 2022].

[16] Australian Government – Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

and recovery, all these are conducted at the lowest level of effective coordination, with resources and support augmented by regional and state-level coordination as required.[17] It is this level of governance that is responsible for maintaining the readiness of its emergency services, including ambulance, state and rural fire and rescue, and State Emergency Services.[18]

As state/territory emergency plans and structures vary slightly, it is not possible to provide a standardised disaster and resilience response structure. As an example, the New South Wales model has been selected. For identified hazards such as fire and flooding, a Combat Agency[19] will lead and coordinate the government response and will establish a Control Centre (CC) at the state, regional and local level. In specific circumstances,[20] an Emergency Operations Controller (EOCON) will lead the response and be supported by its own Emergency Operations Centre. If the EOCON is leading the response, it will coordinate subordinate regional and local level Combat Agency CCs. Coordination amongst state-level governmental entities is achieved through the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC). While similar horizontal coordination committees are established at the regional and local level, it is important to note that these organisational entities do not have command and control functions.

Finally, the provision of Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC) is actioned across six categories, with one to two being the most relevant to this paper.[21] This type of support can include the deployment of the ADF personnel in support of local response in combating emergencies or disasters. Requests for assistance, where there is immediate threat to life or property, can be made directly from local government authorities to a local defence commander. Known as DACC Category 1, this support can be sustained for 48 hours by local arrangement. DACC Category 2 applies to assistance beyond this time scale and for a more extensive or continuing disaster response, which requires federal level approval.

While the Australian approach is currently very much structured around resilience within the context of disaster and crisis response, there are strong indications that the scope of the policy is slowly broadening. Tensions between Australia and China have increased exponentially since early 2020. Since then, the Scott Morrison

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[17] New South Wales (NSW) Government, *NSW Emergency Plan(EMPLAN)*, December 2018, p. 7, https://www.nsw.gov.au/rescue-and-emergency-management/state-emergency-management-plan-emplan [accessed: 20 May 2022]. While State/Territory plans may vary, the local solutions approach is common to all.

[18] *Ibidem*.

[19] Combat Agencies include, but are not limited to, the State Ambulance, Fire and Emergency Services.

[20] This occurs when no specific Combat Agency can be identified or when the leading combat agency requests to transition authority to the EOCON.

[21] New South Wales (NSW) Government, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

government has been discreetly working to expand and reinforce the country's resiliency levels.

Despite having released its Defence White Paper in 2016, the Australian government ordered a review of the document and released the 2020 Defence Strategic Update.[22] The document underlined the strategic threat posed by China, intensifying great power competition and the no-longer-remote possibility of high-intensity conflict. The document also specifically mentioned the challenges posed by grey-zone competition and the need for multi-agency cooperation, placing high priority on resilience considerations being integrated into defence planning. Other issues raised within the document include addressing the challenges posed by supply chain security and the defence of critical national infrastructure, particularly from cyber threats.

In December 2021,the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act (SCIA) of 2018 was further enhanced[23] in order to include several new sectors,[24] most of which coincide with NATO's 7BLR. The changes also mandate that those responsible for critical assets (state or private sector entities) provide ownership and operational information to the Register of Critical Infrastructure Assets (CIA), which is managed by the Cyber and Infrastructure Security Centre.[25] The SCIA also establishes obligatory reporting mechanisms which require CIA owners to report cyber incident to the Australian Cyber Security Centre.

Vulnerabilities of the Australian approach

While the Australian approach can be deemed as battle tested and proven, its frequent and ample recourse to military support in disaster response is somewhat a cause for concern. Many have argued this has impacted on ADF readiness and resources in relation to their traditional task. While it must be acknowledged that the response to civil emergencies is usually delegated to the reservist components of the ADF,[26] it

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[22] Australian Department of Defence, *2020 Defence Strategic Update*, https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-11/2020_Defence_Strategic_Update.pdf [accessed: 20 May 2022]

[23] Department of Home Affairs,*Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018,* https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/national-security/security-coordination/security-of-critical-infrastructure-act-2018-amendments [accessed: 5 March 2022].

[24] These areas included communications, financial services and markets, data storage or processing, defence industry, higher education and research, energy, food and grocery, health care and medical, space technology, transport, and water and sewerage.

[25] This is a federal government agency.

[26] Information provided by Dr. Alan Ryan, Senior Defence Advisor and former Executive Director of the Australian Civil-Military Centre, during an interview held on the 12 March 2020, via the Webex platform.

nonetheless causes a serious drain on defence[27] and is a hindrance to its ability to prepare for tasks included in the 2020 Strategic Review, including high intensity conflict.

Finally, the most evident vulnerability of this resilience model is its scope. Australia does not fully appreciate the deterrence role of Total Defence Strategies and has thus far limited it to cyber resilience. Current resilience considerations need to be broadened beyond disaster response and must encompass both conventional and hybrid threats as well. This process would be greatly facilitated by a total defence-style approach. While there is progress within the Australian context of "mobilization"[28] and its contribution to a more comprehensive resilience strategy, there are still structural challenges to be overcome. For example, a Rand Australia report from 2021[29] underlines that, beyond government coordination and limited private sector engagement, there is currently no concrete and institutionalised link between civil society and the military sphere to facilitate relationship building, particularly during peacetime, with regards to pursuing total defence/mobilization objectives[30]. The paper also states that "the ADF does not effectively incorporate civil sector matters including social cohesion, citizen support, and material and psychological resilience, into its planning or doctrine."[31] But more broadly, Ewen Levick's ASPI article from 2019[32] highlights the requirement for the Australian government "to combine the elements of national power, including defence, in smarter ways. In other words, our internal silos need to learn to work together." To this end, it is imperative that a national mobilisation strategy and narrative are developed, as highlighted by another ASPI article from 2021, where the authors sustain that "[w]e[Australia] need to proactively and strategically establish a new national security narrative built around resilience embedded within a whole-of-nation construct such as total defence [...] What's missing [...] is a more comprehensive and purposeful national mobilisation strategy that accounts for the links between the military, civil, digital, economic, social, and psychological domains."[33]

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[27] During the Black Summer Bushfires of 2019–2020, it is estimated that approximately 20.000 military personnel took part in Operation Bushfire Assist; *ibidem*.

[28] *Mobilisation* is the more frequent term used within Australian civilian and military spheres, as opposed to *total defence*.

[29] J. Nicholson et al., *Defence Mobilisation Planning Comparative Study. An Examination of Overseas Planning*, Santa Monica: Rand Australia, 2021.

[30] *Ibidem*, p. 131.

[31] *Ibidem*, pp. 127–128.

[32] E. Levick, "The way we think about national security needs to change", 11 September 2019, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-way-we-think-about-national-security-needs-to-change [accessed: 2 March 2022].

[33] J. Nicholson, M. Black and P. Dortmans, "Australia needs to build total defence in the face of national crises", 18 October 2021, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-needs-to-build-total-defence-in-the-face-of-national-crises [accessed: 2 March 2022].

Strengths of the Australian approach

While civil-military connectivity, within the context of the development of a total defence capability, still requires some work, the situation is not as dire as it might seem. Decades of support to civilian entities in response to natural calamities has contributed significantly to establishing the basis and essential framework from which more comprehensive engagement can continue. The current disaster response and resilience framework already provide excellent linkages between the civilian and military sphere, connections that have passed the test of exceptional calamities. Therefore, the interaction and engagement required to lead defence and civil society towards a true resilience-based total defence structure is already in place. It simply needs to be expanded upon and broadened in order to include national mobilisation in response to collective defence challenges.

Recent disasters have demonstrated that during the response phase, the connection and coordination between all levels of government and the ADF are not only already in place (as mentioned above), but have also proven to be sufficiently versatile, responsive, and effective. This is most likely, at least in part, due to the direct linkages between state/local authorities and local military commanders, as well as the ample margin of autonomous decision making granted to those commanders, particularly with regards to the authorisation of short term but immediate support to the civil community.

Australia's approach to national resilience is extremely detailed, elaborate and truly a whole-of-society approach. Particularly noteworthy are the efforts to integrate and maximise the contribution of not only the various levels of government, but also other important stakeholders including local communities, non-government organisations and the business sector. The emphasis of the Australian disaster resilience model on prevention and recovery phase is also highly commendable. Enabled by the cross-societal approach highlighted earlier, these linkages facilitate the country's approach to mitigate environmental threats, before they manifest, through early prevention efforts such as ensuring businesses have disaster response and continuity plans,[34] as well as adequate insurance measures to ensure a rapid return to "business as usual." The linkages between government and society also facilitate the work of the National Recovery and Resilience Agency in ensuring

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[34] The focus on businesses goes beyond the traditional focus on providers of essential services and critical national infrastructure (i.e., food, water, and power providers). The Australian approach also encompasses small and medium-sized business owners, recognising that these elements of the private sector play an important role in the recovery of local communities. For more information on Australia's whole-of-society approach to disaster resilience, refer to the Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience's Handbook on Emergency Management Arrangements (2019).

the federal response and funding of early recovery is managed in an optimal manner. In fact, the local knowledge and understanding ensured by the whole-of-society response increases the likelihood of government resources being provided where they are needed most urgently. Finally, this level of cross-societal engagement, coupled with effective public communication, supports all levels of government in ensuring citizens have adequate information with regards to all phases of disaster management, including recovery, which provides a significant contribution to risk reduction and expectation management.

Total Defence Concept of Norway as a NATO member

As the international security environment becomes increasingly complex and contested, particularly by the re-emergence of great power competition across the globe, nations and international organisations like NATO are placing greater emphasis on countering hybrid threats and attacks beneath the threshold of war. During the 2016 Warsaw Summit, after closely monitoring Russian strategies employed against Ukraine in the 2014 conflict, the Alliance presented its policy on enhancing national resilience.[35] Central to this work effort was the identification of what has become known as the Seven Baseline Requirements (7 BLR) for National Resilience,[36] which represent key areas of strategic focus for Alliance member states as they seek to enhance their abilities to respond and adapt to strategic shock generated by adversaries.

The obligation to enhance national resilience is enshrined in Article 3 of the Alliance's founding treaty, which states: "In order to more effectively achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."[37] Through enhanced resilience, member states improve their ability to endure strategic shocks and ensure that critical functions are uninterrupted, enabling the state to continue to resist adversarial

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[35] While resilience can be defined in various terms, for the purpose of this paper, we will adhere predominantly to the Alliance's definition, which is: the capacity of each member nation to "resist and recover from a major shock such as a natural disaster, failure of critical infrastructure, or a hybrid or armed attack"; North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *Resilience and Article 3*, 11 June 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm [accessed: 1 March 2022].

[36] The 7 BLR are as follows: assured continuity of government and critical government services, resilient energy supplies, ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people, resilient food and water resources, ability to deal with mass casualties, resilient civil communications systems, and transport systems.

[37] The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, The North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949 (10 April 2019), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm [accessed: 13 March 2022].

actions, include grey-zone competition, and enable both national and Alliance military operations. Further, by increasing national resilience during peacetime, NATO nations are essentially contributing to deterrence effects by ensuring greater readiness and responsiveness to hostile actions, while also demonstrating the capacity to inflict greater costs on would-be adversaries.

The Alliance's approach recognises that national resilience begins with the individual, then the family unit, the community and ultimately, that of society. A cohesive and united society which fosters high levels of trust with regards to its public institutions is far less susceptible to malign efforts to undermine and destabilise the state, while at the same time increasing the likelihood that citizens will abide by resilience measures. Resilience is predominately a national responsibility. As such, how nations will seek to enhance their ability to respond to shock will vary and will depend upon a range of variables. Australia and Norway find themselves in very different security environments and face significantly different external and internal challenges. That is why their resilience models differ greatly, and also why they are such interesting systems to analyse, as each has very different strengths and vulnerabilities.

Norway's Total Defence Concept has its roots in the immediate post-World War II period, but has morphed over the years, reflecting geopolitical changes and the developments within the international security structure. Today, the TDC supports the three lines of effort of the Norwegian defence strategy,[38] as well as building national resilience and reducing vulnerabilities when faced with hybrid threats.[39] The effective employment of the national political, military, and economic instruments of power in an effort to fully mobilise the country's civil society in support of Norway's defence is seen by many allies as a model to replicate for various reasons. Perhaps the most important is the manner in which the Total Defence Concept reinforces national resilience, as defined by the Alliance. In fact, if one looks at the TDC framework and overlays it with NATO's 7 BLR, one can easily appreciate the lines of continuity between the two, in particular, how the concept seeks to mitigate risks to sectors specifically referenced within the NATO strategy (i.e., energy, food and water security, transport and telecommunications, etc.), while reinforcing the nation's ability to respond and adapt to strategic shock. However, as with all man-made things, nothing is ever perfect, including the Total Defence Concept.

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[38] Three lines of effort of the Norwegian defence strategy: national defence, collective defence within the framework of NATO, and bilateral support and reinforcement arrangements with close allies.

[39] Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *The defence of Norway: Capability and readiness Long Term Defence Plan 2020*, p. 4, https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/3a2d2a3cfb694aa3ab4c6c b5649448d4/long-term-defence-plan-norway-2020---english-summary.pdf [accessed: 20 May 2022].

Resilience within the context of the Total Defence Concept

The Norwegian model is based on four key principles:[40]

1. **Responsibility:** the authority which is responsible on a daily basis for an area, is also responsible for prevention, emergency preparedness and for the implementation of necessary measures in emergencies and disasters.
2. **Similarity:** the organisation that comes into operation during crises should be as similar as possible to the organisation that operates on a daily basis.
3. **Proximity:** crises are to be handled at the lowest possible organisational level.
4. **Collaboration:** the public authority, private enterprise or government agency has an independent responsibility to ensure the best possible cooperation with relevant actors and agencies in the work of prevention, emergency preparedness, and crisis management.

Just as in the Australian model, the TDC also requires that a lead ministry be identified based on the nature of the emergency. The Emergency Council[41] will select the most appropriate lead and in the case of disagreement within the Council, the decision will be taken by the Prime Minister. In the Norwegian model however, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MOJ) plays a central role.[42] The MOJ is the designated lead for all emergencies related to public security, civil protection, and emergency preparedness. As for crises related to security policy (i.e., hybrid attacks), it is officially the MoD that will take the lead, although there will be some overlap with the MOJ.[43] The Ministry of Justice and Public Security is also responsible for activating the Civil Situation Centre and exercises authority over the Directorate of Civil Protection (DCP).[44] The DCP has various important roles including liaising with County Governors to improve municipal and regional public security and emergency preparedness; it is the access point through which international organisations

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[40] Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, *Support and Cooperation. A description of the Total Defence in Norway*, 8 May 2018, p. 16, https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/5a9bd774183b4d548e33da101e7f7d43/support-and-cooperation.pdf [accessed: 20 May 2022].

[41] The Emergency council is the highest administrative coordinating body at the ministerial level. It seeks to reinforce the central coordination amongst Norwegian ministries on emergency response matters.

[42] Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, *op. cit.*, pp. 18–19.

[43] Due to the nature of hybrid attacks, the line of demarcation between an internal security issue (MOJ in the lead) and attacks that cross the threshold of conflict, and therefore challenge national security (MOD in the lead), are extremely difficult to identify. For this reason, MOJ and MOD will overlap and must work closely in order to coordinate and de-conflict their actions.

[44] Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, *op. cit.*, pp. 19–21.

such as NATO, the EU and the UN request and provide civil support assistance; and is responsible for the Norwegian Civil Defence.[45]

The TDC has a robust cyber protection structure which is managed at the central level, with policy development divided between the MOJ (civil ICT) and MOD (military ICT). The National Security Authority acts as the ICT operational entity, coordinating responses to cyberattacks against critical national infrastructure and/or functions.[46]

The Norwegian model demonstrates a detailed nuclear preparedness capability. Such events will be managed at the central level, despite numerous actors having executive functions in the regional and local areas. The Ministry of Health and Care Services holds the lead in this sector, with the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority as the primary agency responsible for radiation protection and nuclear safety.[47]

With regards to the protection of Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), the TDC identifies three principal stakeholders: the owners, law enforcement and the military. Norwegian Police will always have responsibility for the protection of CNI, even in war time. However, should military support be required, every effort should be made for this support to be pre-planned and will normally be executed by the Home Guard.[48]

Coordination between the central authorities and regional entities, with regards to civil protection, is done through the County Governors, who represent the government at the regional level. The Governors coordinate the various municipalities located within their regional jurisdiction and are supported by the County Readiness Council. The Governors contribute to the provision, coordination, and prioritisation of civilian support to the Norwegian military, and they support contractual stipulation between the military and local private sector entities.[49]

At the municipality level, core tasks include local risk assessments, emergency plan development and conserving emergency response capabilities assigned to the local jurisdiction. Municipality functions also include the establishment of Emergency Management Planning Committee and the provision of health preparedness measures and essential social services.[50]

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[45]   The entity has a force of approximately 8000 people, it covers 20 regional districts, ensures civil protection measures in war time, and contributes significantly to disaster response events in peacetime.

[46]   A Joint Cyber Coordination Centre has also been established for the national coordination of cyber events between the NSA, the Intelligence Service, the Police Security Service and the National Criminal Investigation Service. For more information refer to the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, *op. cit.*, pp. 39–40, 56–57.

[47]   *Ibidem*, pp. 41–42.

[48]   *Ibidem*, pp. 25–26.

[49]   *Ibidem*, pp. 63–64.

[50]   Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, *op. cit.*, pp. 23–25.

Vulnerabilities of the Norwegian approach

While vertical political integration and general coordination between the central government and the country governors would appear to be well developed and functional, there is potentially a requirement for further focus on interministerial cooperation and coordination at the national level. An analysis of the total defence governance structure would imply a possible underdeveloped interministerial coordination body on matters that would be of potential relevance to multiple ministries in times of crisis. This increases the risk of stovepiping and is a matter that is currently under review.[51]

In case of a hybrid attack and escaltion into a conventional conflict, there is a delicate transition phases within the Total Defence Concept which must be addressed. During the lead-up to grey-zone competition and the potential escaltion to full blown conflict, at some stage, despite the Total Defence Concept's principles of responsibility and similarity, the lead ministry will most likely transition from the MOJ to the MOD. This shift will probably occur in the context of very dynamic developments within the areaof opereations and will represent a delicate and critical moment in the Norwegian authorities' management of the crisis. Therefore, it is imperative that all stakeholders understand when and how this transition must take place and what their respective roles and responsibilities will be, in order to avoid any drop in operational momentum and ensure a smooth and rapid transition.

Strengths of the Norwegian approach

The strategy demonstrates a high degree of civil-military integration via a whole-of-government approach which has already seen significant work being carried out within the context of pre-established commercial agreements between the Norwegian government and critical service providers.[52] The nation has painstakingly transitioned from a cold war era requisitions approach to the current system where the government has established solid relations with important private sector companies. These relations were then built upon in order to establish commercial agreements that should ensure the continuity of essential services in times of crisis (i.e., grey-zone competition) or conflict. Much of this contractual success has been facilitated by a robust national legislative framework which has not only effectively enabled this contractual

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[51] Insight provided by Dr. Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen, Vice-Rector for Research and Development of Oslo Met University and author of various books and papers on Norway's Total Defence Concept, during an interview held on 11 March 2022 via the Microsoft Teams platform.

[52] Norwegian Ministry of Defence,Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, *op. cit.*, pp. 31–38.

success,[53] but has also established the required legal conditions for harnessing national capabilities in support of military enablement.[54]

The empowerment of the MOJ as the lead ministry for disaster response and internal threats has numerous advantages. The principal benefit of this dual-hatted responsibility is that the government apparatus can easily transition from one crisis to another without key stakeholders having to adjust to new roles and having to apply different procedures. Furthermore, during both exercises and responses to real world emergencies, the same mechanisms can be stress-tested, and critically important experience can be gained by the same stakeholders, regardless of whether it is a disaster or internal security crisis-based scenario. Overall, this enhances the response capability of the structure and allows it to be fine-tuned more frequently, making the entire Total Defence Concept, both practical and adaptive.

Finally, the TDC is structured in such a way as to explicitly outline the principal means through which the military instrument of power is to plug into the civilian structure, both from a national and NATO perspective. The national Joint Headquarters act as the primary focal point for both the Alliance and the Norwegian military and it is through this structure that both entities access and integrate into the national political apparatus. This ensures there is a clear connection point between the civil and military sphere and facilitates not only greater integration, but also enhances greater coordination amongst all state and Alliance stakeholders.

Conclusion

The two models in question approach national resilience challenges in different manners, dictated by both their national particularities and their specific strategic threats. Both have their strengths and weaknesses, and in an ideal world, a national resilience strategy would integrate only the positives of the respective models. With regards to Poland's current security challenges, the Norwegian TDC, with its strong NATO National Resilience base and general interoperability with Alliance military planning, would seem to be the more appropriate option. Also, considering Polish plans to invest in nuclear power solutions in the near future, replicating the Norwegian nuclear preparedness and disaster responce capability would seem a logical step. However, the Australian approach to resilience is not without merit. A Polish model that is also able to places emphasis on extensive local level engagement and integration of local knowledge, especially with regards to vulnurabilities and strengths, would facilitate the state in providing more comprehensive risk mitigation and recovery strategies. This extensive network would also provide the basis for relationship building with the

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[53]   *Ibidem.*
[54]   *Ibidem.*

national defence forces, as they seek to develop further contractual agreements in an effort to ensure private sector support for the Polish military in times of conflict. Part of this solution is already present in the form of the Territorial Defence Forces (TDF), which can provide that initial contact point and conduit between the national military apparatus and the communities within which they both live and serve. However, Poland would do well to take note of the dangers highlighted in the Australian approach with regards to allowing the military to become the instrument of choice with regards to response to national disasters. While the Territorial Defence Forces are mandated to play a role in such situation, the current security context along Poland's eastern flank requires, at this particular moment in time, that the military (including the TDF) focus its training and readiness efforts on their primary task: the defence of the Polish Republic.

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A tale of two hemispheres: Norwegian and Australian approaches to national resilience. A comparative analysis
Abstract

Paper conducts a comparative analysis of two different national approaches to national resilience in an attempt to identify useful considerations and recommendations for Poland: two models chosen were the Norwegian Total Defence Concept (TDC) and Australia's National Disaster Response and Resilience approach. They were selected due to their different areas of focus: the Norwegian model is centred on societal mobilisation and its military enablement with the primary purpose of national defence against conventional military and hybrid threats, while the Australian approach is still focused on enhancing national resilience in order to respond to major natural calamities.

By examining both models and extrapolating their strengths while noting their vulnerabilities, the basis for a well-rounded national resilience strategy can be identified. While the TDC appears to best suit Poland's current security challenges, the country would benefit from enhancing its comprehensive local engagement, perhaps through its Territorial Defence Forces. Caution should be exercised with regards to over-committing the Polish military in its support to disaster response at a time when the nation's eastern flank is once again highly volatile.

Key words: resilience, Australia, natural disasters, Norway, total defence

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How to increase Poland's resilience?

Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted critical weaknesses in the approach to overcoming the multifaceted, complex[1] emergencies it has caused. Poland must be prepared for the occurrence of similar phenomena, as well as for serious natural disasters or various types of hybrid, non-military, military and terrorist threats, including those carried out using the latest technologies. Therefore, it is essential to approach the problem in such a way as to prevent threats and overcome them quickly, efficiently, and effectively on the largest possible scale. One of the most important aspects of such an approach should be improved cooperation between government entities (interinstitutional) and non-governmental, including – what is particularly important – local government entities. It would serve to consistently eliminate all vulnerabilities to threats of various types and, at the same time, to systematically strengthen immunity.

A phenomenon that has recently raised the issue of immunity as a kind of antidote are hybrid or subliminal threats. According to all forecasts, they will accompany

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[1] Complex emergencies can be defined as "situations of disrupted livelihoods and threats to life produced by warfare, civil disturbance and large-scale movements of people, in which any emergency response has to be conducted in a difficult political and security environment", *Environmental Health in Emergencies and Natural Disasters: A Practical Guide*, eds. B. Wisner, J. Adams, Geneva: WHO, 2002, p. 12.

us permanently, taking on new forms – hence the constant strengthening of resilience becomes an inseparable imperative of state and society activities. The current situation on the eastern border of the Republic of Poland and the war in Ukraine prove this all too clearly.

This challenge should lead to synergy of activities of various governmental and non-governmental actors, to an improvement of mechanisms, procedures, and tools to prevent and counteract both traditional and unconventional threats: cyber or hybrid, as well as to deter hostile interference and intervention. The most important task should be to increase resilience in various areas of public, economic, and social life.

The overarching goal should be to create a comprehensive concept of strengthening resilience in Poland. In this context, "comprehensiveness" should be understood as decentralised action, yet managed from above. "Comprehensiveness" signals the desire for enhanced resilience by public administrations, various institutions, services, local governments, businesses, environments, and social groups to contribute to greater security for the state and its citizens and residents.

The resilience of the state is measured not only by the level of institutions' and services' readiness for crisis situations, but also by preparedness of society. State resilience is not only a set of procedures, but also actions to develop appropriate values and attitudes in response to crisis situations. The concept of resilience as such has become widespread "thanks" to the coronavirus pandemic, which does not mean that the need to build or strengthen resilience is obvious to the entire public administration sector and society in its basic aspect, i.e., ensuring national security – both of the state and individuals. Therefore, there is a need to "awaken" such awareness and provide knowledge about the essence of the problem and about specific aspects of strengthening the resilience of Poland and its citizens to current and projected security threats.

Strengthening resilience as a necessity is a relatively new issue dominating the security debate in both the Transatlantic and European area. The mater is about strengthening resilience to threats of any type in a given country, both in the civilian and military dimension. This issue has also become the subject of the Government Centre for Security's (GCS; Rządowe Centrum Bezpieczeństwa) work, although it goes beyond crisis management (CM) in Poland in the statutory sense of CM, but these aspiration fits into the context of striving to improve the national security system, defined in the National Security Strategy of 12 May 2020.[2] In this legal situation, as well as in the face of other circumstances, such as actions of the Government of the Republic of Poland aimed at rebuilding economic and social life after the coronavirus pandemic, it is advisable that the issue of strengthening the resilience of Poland be emphasized more

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[2]   *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, Warsaw: National Security Bureau, 2020, https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dokumenty/National_Security_Strategy_of_the_Republic_of_Poland_2020.pdf [accessed: 19 May 2022].

clearly than before in government documents relating to development issues, in practical activities of ministries (including state-owned companies subordinate to them), as well as in speeches of political decision-makers, in order to make the public aware of the importance of the issue.

Analysis of current solutions strengthening the resilience of Poland

Adequate preparedness for current and foreseeable security threats requires a coordinated and even integrated approach to resilience within the government (including lower levels), civil-military cooperation, and the involvement of the private sector, NGOs, educational institutions, and society as a whole. The issue of strengthening or building national and collective resilience is currently the goal of many states and international organisations established to ensure the security of their members. Therefore, when developing a national system, it is worth considering the efforts of NATO, the EU, the UN, the OECD, etc., in the context of strengthening the resilience of each member state and its society and the organisations themselves, made with a view to overcoming potential crises of various nature. It may also be helpful to draw attention to countries which gained experience in building resilience much earlier than Poland, i.e., Sweden, Finland, and Estonia.

The definition of resilience and building resilience are a national task and depend on the sovereign decisions of a given country, but it is also worth being inspired by the recommendations of NATO,[3] the EU,[4] and other entities. Point 2.7 of the National Security Strategy contains the following task: to "increase resilience to threats, predominantly in scope of: the continuity of government and the functioning of the state, resilient energy supplies, uncontrolled movement of people and relocation of the population, collection, protection and management of food

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[3]   In NATO, resilience is defined generally based on documents from the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, but it must contain three key elements: continuity of government administration, continuity of provision of basic services, and support for military operations. In addition to these criteria, there are 7 guidelines for resilience and work is underway on the resilience of society. "Resilience and Article 3", NATO, updated 11 June 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm [accessed: 19 May 2022].

[4]   In the EU, the starting point is the 2016 Foreign and Security Policy Strategy, which states: resilience is the ability of the state and society to transform themselves so that they can resist and rebuild internal and external crises. The "Strategic Foresight – Charting the course towards a more resilient Europe" points to 4 dimensions: socio-economic, geopolitical, green, and cyber. The EU is working on resilience indicators. European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 2020 Strategic Foresight Report Strategic Foresight – Charting the Course Towards a More Resilient Europe*, COM(2020) 493 final, Brussels, 9 September 2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0493&from=EN [accessed: 30 May 2022].

and water resources, ability to deal with mass casualties, resilient telecommunications networks and Information and Communications Technology systems, population information and alert systems and resilient transport system."[5]

In task-based terms, strengthening resilience is the ability to reduce the risk of a threat and to prepare the conditions for the functioning of institutions (state, community) in the event of a threat (regardless of its type). An important component of this process is risk management, which should be understood as: (a) risk assessment activities, including hazard identification, risk analysis, and risk estimation; (b) planning risk mitigation actions; (c) implementing risk mitigation actions; (d) achieving preparedness to respond in the event of a crisis; and (e) periodically assessing the results achieved.

According to the above philosophy, the concept of resilience is the quintessence of crisis management defined in the Crisis Management Act (ustawa o zarządzaniu kryzysowym).[6] Both issues (CM and resilience) generally concern the same thing: defining threats, preparing structures, tasks and reaction mechanisms that will make an institution resistant to external and internal shocks (threats). For this reason, resilience should not be considered in isolation from the crisis management mechanism already in place. On the other hand, it would be reasonable to extend the current solutions in the field of CM by new activities.

Currently, in Poland there are several documents which concern crisis management and national security covering activities which contribute to strengthening resilience. They can become the basis for the creation of a uniform and coherent system.

The most important documents in the field of crisis management include:

1. Threat Identification: Report on Threats to National Security

The basis for the functioning of an efficient system of strengthening resilience is the analysis / identification of potential threats to state security and the assessment of the risk of their occurrence. In Poland, the document fulfilling this task is the Report on Threats to National Security (Raport o zagrożeniach bezpieczeństwa narodowego)[7] (classified). The report comprehensively describes threats grouped into five main categories: (1) natural threats, (2) civilization threats and those caused by intentional human activity, (3) military threats, (4) terrorist threats which may lead to a crisis, and (5) threats in cyberspace which may lead to a crisis.

2. Preparation of procedures: National Crisis Management Plan

The next step, based on the identification of threats, is to develop the tasks and responsibilities of crisis management participants in order to prevent and prepare for the occurrence of diagnosed threats, as well as implement procedures for responding

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[5]   *The National Security Strategy…, op. cit.*, p. 16.
[6]   Ustawa z dnia 26 kwietnia 2007 r. o zarządzaniu kryzysowym, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland], 2020, item 1856.
[7]   Raport o zagrożeniach bezpieczeństwa narodowego przyjęty przez Radę Ministrów uchwałą nr 34/2021 z 11 marca 2021 r.

in the event of their occurrence, as well as post-crisis reconstruction activities. In Poland, a tool used for this purpose is, among others, the National Crisis Management Plan[8] (NCMP; Krajowy plan zarządzania kryzysowego). The Plan lists over 190 modules which cover the spectrum of activities carried out by the Prime Minister, each minister in charge of a government administration department, the heads of the Internal Security Agency (Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego) and Foreign Intelligence Agency (Agencja Wywiadu), voivodes, and the director of the GCS. In the NCMP, in 'the safety matrix' understood as a combination of potential threats and the designation of the leading entity in their removal, 19 threats have been identified. NCMP, considering its functionality, has been divided into two parts – A and B. Part A focuses on activities implemented to minimise the risk of a crisis and includes tasks carried out by public administration bodies in the first two phases of crisis management: the prevention and preparation phase. Part B, on the other hand, describes the actions of the administration after the crisis and contains solutions used during the subsequent phases: response and reconstruction.

3. Preparation of procedures: List of Projects and Procedures in the Crisis Management System

Another document, based on the identification of threats and the crisis response actions assigned to them, this time developed by NATO, is the List of Projects and Procedures of the Crisis Management System[9] (Wykaz przedsięwzięć i procedur systemu zarządzania kryzysowego) approved by the Prime Minister. It assumes that, depending on the development of the crisis, the emergence of threats to the security of the state, including the conduct of hybrid operations against Poland, selected measures may be implemented as part of the NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS).

4. Preparation and protection of resources: National Critical Infrastructure Protection Programme

A very important element of strengthening the country's resilience is an appropriate system of protecting key elements affecting the stability of the functioning of the state and society in peacetime. The Polish document that contributes to the fulfilment of such a task is the National Programme for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure[10] (NCIPP; Narodowy program ochrony infrastruktury krytycznej).

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[8]   Krajowy Plan Zarządzania Kryzysowego. Aktualizacja 2021/2022, przyjęty przez Radę Ministrów 3 marca 2022 r.

[9]   Currently in force Order of the Prime Minister no. 5 of 11 February 2019 on the list of measures and procedures of the crisis management system, as amended by the PM Order no. 152 of 6 October 2020. See: Zarządzenie nr 5 Prezesa Rady Ministrów z dnia 11 lutego 2019 r. w sprawie wykazu przedsięwzięć i procedur system zarządzania kryzysowego.

[10]   Uchwała nr 210/2015 Rady Ministrów z dnia 2 listopada 2015 r. w sprawie przyjęcia Narodowego Programu Ochrony Infrastruktury Krytycznej z uwzględnieniem Uchwały nr 116/2020 Rady Ministrów z dnia 13 sierpnia 2020 r. zmieniającej uchwałę w sprawie przyjęcia Narodowego Programu Ochrony Infrastruktury Krytycznej.

In Poland, just like in other countries, efficient and undisrupted operating of critical infrastructure (CI) has a great impact on citizens, administrative structures, and the economy (the SARS-CoV-2 virus epidemic has revealed a large network of interdependence in key services). Thus, a common infrastructure is created to carry out processes for the benefit of all parties. Unfortunately, this leads to dependence to such an extent that any dysfunction in this infrastructure can bring about effects extending beyond the organisation governing it. Therefore, it became necessary to recognize CI type protection as a process aimed at ensuring the continuity of providing specific service and restoring it if necessary.

Not only is the programme addressed to government administration and CI operators, but also to the whole society because every citizen depends on services provided by CI. Knowledge of the actions taken by the administration to increase the level of CI security (and thus of us all) needs to be disseminated. The programme presents solutions and good practices in the field of protection and enables their application in everyday life, which can be useful in increasing individual resistance to threats.

The rules and procedures of CI system, after proper replenishment and adaptation to needs, can successfully be used as a basis for creating a national system for strengthening Poland's resilience.

Rescue System: Procedures of the National Firefighting and Rescue System

Taking into account the purpose of National Firefighting and Rescue System (NFRS; Krajowy system ratowniczo-gaśniczy), its role in building resilience is significant. Due to its links with the State Emergency Medical System, it is one of the most important pillars of the state's resilience to crisis threats related to the protection of health and life of citizens, and thus occupies an important place in the national security system. This system covers the entire country with a division into national, provincial and district levels. The tasks of the NFRS include the fight against fires and natural disasters, technical, chemical, ecological rescue, and medical rescue. The scope of the NFRS's functionality includes the management of rescue operations and cooperation with authorities and other relevant entities in the event of extraordinary events, including those of a terrorist character.

Regardless of the above-mentioned documents, largely aimed at building or strengthening resilience, there are many others aimed at defence, economic, civilizational, and social development, and which contain elements affecting the building and strengthening of the resilience of the Republic of Poland. These quoted documents (plans, procedures) quoted contain not only the identification of threats, but also their analysis, assessment of the risk of their occurrence, their expected

effects, entities responsible for responding to these threats and also taking preventive actions in relation to each threat. Making more detailed analysis of the planning documents and comparing them with the conclusions of the actions taken in the phase of response and reconstruction of crisis management in the threats that Poland has faced so far would allow for the initial assessment of the state's resilience, which seems to be crucial for undertaking further work. Conclusions from the exercises carried out so far, especially those of interdepartmental character, may also be helpful.

However, the documents presented above, and the related procedures certainly contribute to the achievement of Poland's resilience, but for those who deal with these issues, it is clear that they do not form a comprehensive system ensuring a quick and effective response adequate to the current and possible threats to the security of Poland.

Recent experiences show that meeting various security challenges from the moment they are identified through planning and response requires broadly understood crisis management – without an artificial division into times of crisis and war as it is difficult to decide where this border lies, for example in hybrid activities. The systemic approach should involve different ministries, as these challenges are interdisciplinary and cross-cutting. As a legacy of the communist era, the Polish administration has been plagued for years by particularisms, sometimes manifested in the reluctance of some entities to cooperate with others, which means that the activities carried out are dispersed, and thus are not as effective as they could be.

To meet contemporary requirements, a holistic, interinstitutional approach is needed, including harmonisation of defence and civil planning with interaction between the military and civilian spheres, taking into account entrepreneurs, NGOs, and the public.

Proposal for functional division of resilience with assigning responsibility for the execution of tasks

Taking into account the solutions presented above as well as the Polish conditions and needs, such an approach to strengthening the resilience of the Republic of Poland, which will use the already existing regulations of the crisis management system, should be considered optimal. It seems reasonable to establish the following functional and competence division for strengthening the resilience system (table 1), noting that the following proposal contains an indication of only the leading structure in public administration, while it is possible, even desirable, to include other ministries as co-responsible bodies.

Table 1. Functional and competence division for strengthening the resilience system

Areas of resilience	Ministerial-level responsibility
Continuity of governance	the Chancellery of the Prime Minister
Energy and fuel supply	State Assets, Energy, Mineral Resources Management
Communications and ICT	Computerisation, communications
Cybersecurity	Computerisation
Financial	The budget, public finances, financial institutions
Food supply	Agriculture, Agricultural Markets
Water supply	Water management
Health	Health
Transport	Transport, Maritime Affairs
Rescue	Internal affairs
Social	the Chancellery of the Prime Minister

Source: Autor's own study.

The above division into areas of resilience is functional and refers to task areas included in the concept of process and service and is not object-oriented. It should be considered in the context of ensuring the functioning of a given "supply chain and services" as a whole. This approach means that the first step should be to identify services that are essential for ensuring security in a given area of resilience. Next, the supply chains and operators indispensable for the operation of such a service need to be identified. Following that, the assessment of the existing safety status of these operators should be carried out and, on this basis, a concept of increasing the operator's safety status should be developed. The minister indicated as the leading body in the implementation of the assigned tasks should cooperate as a coordinator with other ministers competent for a given task area and with other entities of economic and social life functioning in each field. It should be noted that this is not a closed catalogue and should be updated on a regular basis, as new security threats will arise or new solutions and methods increasing resilience in each field, as well as new stakeholders will occur.

Society – the key to a country's resilience

An important "new" area of the competence division proposed above is social resilience (or: the resilience of society as a whole). The ability of society to resist unfriendly or even hostile actions and, in particular, disinformation, as well as to gain public support for the actions of the entire state apparatus, even when it resorts to "unpopular" emergency measures in the face of serious threats, appears to be crucial for all other areas of resilience. Resilience must begin with the protection of democratic values, institutions, lifestyles, and choices made by a given state and its society, while there are attempts to undermine the foundations of democracy from

the outside: cyber-attacks, manipulating information, foreign interference, disseminating fake news, conspiracy theories, and extremist ideologies – discriminatory and racist, conducive to division or social unrest.

The aim of actions should be to effectively counteract serious disturbances in Polish society, which may seriously threaten our democracy and institutions. The experience of Finns and Swedes[11] shows the great importance of building psychological resilience as an individual and social ability to withstand a crisis situation and to rebuild post-crisis live, as it translates into the readiness of citizens to defend independence and is an important element of citizens' trust in the authorities.

Citizens bring important "added value" to emergency response activities. Social organisations provide assistance and volunteers complement or sometimes even replace qualified professional services to support the response. Therefore, it is necessary to make an effort to develop new, better, and corresponding to today's challenges rules and procedures for including Polish society in the process of strengthening resilience and preparing it to actively participate in the efforts to reduce the effects of negative phenomena and in reconstruction after crisis situations.

It is advisable to develop a modern and attractive educational offer which would be implemented in the national education system and within the framework of higher education. The aim of this activity would be to raise the awareness of children, pupils and students, in the field of contemporary challenges and threats in the area of national security. It must also strengthen the populace's ability to detect and resist influence and disinformation campaigns. In addition, the issue of training the population in universal self-defence should also be taken into account. It remains to be considered whether the existing regulations and practice in this area correspond to today's challenges. In case of doubt, it would be necessary to assess and indicate the direction of the necessary changes.

The scope of the social impact on the functioning of the state is very wide and the tasks related to strengthening its resilience are multifaceted, affecting all spheres of economic and public life, which are within the competence of all ministries, central offices, voivodes, local government administration units, and NGOs. In view of the above, it must be acknowledged that it is not possible to determine unequivocally which minister is most competent to coordinate social resilience. For this reason, the designation of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister as the entity with the best competence for setting directions of activities and tasks and supervise their co-contractors seems to be justified.

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[11] The Swedish Psychological Defence Agency, About Us, 28 February 2022, https://www.mpf. se/en/about-us [accessed: 19 May 2022].

Proposal for indicators and measures to determine the level of resilience

To ensure the effectiveness of the proposed functional division of resilience, an appropriate system for verifying its implementation should be devised and adopted. Appropriate metrics and indicators should help here, determining the level of a specific capability and an effective control and supervision system. Until the Polish measures and indicators are developed, the parameters agreed within NATO[12] and the regulations prepared by the EU (using and considering Polish standards and regulations in areas where they already exist) should be adopted as minimum requirements for a given area of resilience. Let us not forget that they were developed with the full participation of Poland as a member state of both these organisations. Any guidelines would be updated as the security environment changes. As a member of NATO, the EU, and other international organisations, Poland continues to influence the shaping of decisions taken in the field of adopting arrangements also in relation to measures and indicators.

As shown earlier, very important stakeholders of the resilience strengthening system are entities of socio-economic life, with non-governmental organisations and the media at the forefront. Their involvement in this process is necessary for achieving collective resilience to today's security threats to Poland. For such participants, it would be worthwhile for the ministers responsible for the area (or other indicated entities) to develop, for example, sets of good practices or recommendations and guidelines for action, in order to contribute to the success of the project, which should be as resilient as possible for the benefit of state and society.

Conclusion

The creation of a comprehensive and possibly coherent resilience system will require adequate time and an adequate level of funding from the state budget (within the budgetary resources allocated to the contractors of the agreed tasks). Ultimately, a formal and legal basis should be established to address resilience systemically at the national level.

The coordinator of issues related to strengthening Poland's resilience should be one institution (e.g., the GCS). The Centre is an institution co-responsible for national security and crisis management, with a unique legal and structural basis thanks to its direct subordination to the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland. It also has many years of experience in interdepartmental coordination of various

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[12]   *Updated Baseline Requirements, Resilience Guidelines and Evaluation Criteria*, NATO, June 2020.

types of projects. These factors predestine the GCS to a coordinating function also in terms of strengthening resilience. At the same time, the GCS should not and does not want to control all the factors which build resilience. Not only would this be impossible, but above all, pointless and deviating from the principles on which the responsibility of individual ministries and other entities, both economic and social, are based. The GCS, on the other hand, can and should take the lead where action aimed at interinstitutional cooperation is particularly required.

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Sławomir Łazarek

How to increase Poland's resilience?

Abstract

The aim of the article is to identify and analyse key formal and legal documents and applicable procedures in the field of state security, which contribute to building the resilience of society and the Polish state. The main emphasis is put on the description of current regulations and the principles of managing and responding to crisis situations. Following that, based on a brief assessment of current activities, the author will present general directional assumptions of his (unofficial) concept of comprehensive strengthening of Poland's resilience. This will include (1) a suggestion to designate national resilience areas, (2) identification of priority resilience areas, and (3) recommendation of directions for further action.

Key words: national security, crisis management, hybrid threats, strengthening resilience, cross-sectoral cooperation

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Enhancing resilience: the state of play in NATO, European Union, and Poland[1]

Introduction

History has taught us that security is an ongoing process, not a state granted to us forever. Change is the only constant we can be certain of. Since 2014, the security situation in Central and Eastern Europe has changed and is rapidly deteriorating. First, Russia annexed Crimea and now, it has invaded Ukraine. However, what we see in our news outlets on a daily basis, is just the tip of the iceberg.

For the past couple of years, the West has been observing an evolution of challenges and threats. The situation has become more and more complex. We see new players in the international arena, as well as the "old guard's" new levels of ambition. On top of that, we are operating in a rapidly changing technology environment. Yes, means of war have changed. Nowadays, we have to look at space and cyber and the vast hybrid domain. We cannot afford to focus solely on one challenge. Terrorism remains a real threat. The security situation in Syria, Afghanistan, and the Korean Peninsula remains unstable. The rivalry between China and the US is a fact. Moreover, Russia's aggressive policy proves that Putin aims at rewriting international order. The ongoing war in Ukraine shows that conflicts can be waged not only in the traditional battlefield, but also using the information sphere, cyber domain, and the economy.

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[1]   The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In order to respond to this complex security environment, we have to build resilience at state, local, and societal level. The COVID-19 pandemic has been an eye-opener for us, Europeans, as well as for the rest of the world. It had made us realise that major threats to our safety and security do not need to have a military component and that the plethora of options at the disposal of our adversaries has been expanded. Disinformation, fake news, cyber-attacks, and "little green man" are on the rise. The recent "weaponisation" of migration shows that there are no limits to hybrid means. Regardless of military aggression, one may assume that our adversaries will continue to pressure us through hybrid means. It goes without saying that they are cheaper, easier to apply, and more difficult to attribute to the perpetrator. That is why we have to be vigilant. The number and character of existing threats leads to the conclusion that no state can handle them alone. At the same time, no state is able to meet them in a "traditional" way by focusing on only one domain. Cooperation is key. That is why the concept of resilience has come to fruition both in NATO and in the EU.

Systemic actions, both at the government and society level, are crucial for adequate and effective monitoring and analysing of existing threats, as well as for being able to respond to them. Resilience can be military. Resilience can be civilian. Resilience can mean an increase in military capability. It can also mean educating children to distinguish misinformation from facts. Ensuring secure supply chains in times of a pandemic is also part of resilience. While understanding the complexity of this subject matter, each country must decide which elements of resilience are crucial at a given time. Focusing on a chosen element of resilience, we must remember that there are overlapping areas as well as those blurred, which cannot be overlooked. Even today, when Russia is waging a war against Ukraine, we realise that building military capabilities is as important as strengthening skills to counter disinformation.

The purpose of this paper is to present the growing role of resilience in the international fora, particularly in NATO and the EU, as well as in Poland. The assumption is that to counter threats, especially hybrid threats, states and international organisations need to strengthen resilience both at local as well as governmental level. The author attempts to prove that only a holistic approach ensures resilient states and societies. The research is based on publicly available documents and does not include sources covered by any confidentiality clause.

Resilience in NATO

Most people are familiar with Article 5 (collective security), some – especially recently – have heard about Article 4 (consultations when security is threatened), but few people know that the starting point for the security of all NATO members is resilience, broadly identified in Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It says that "in order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately

and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."[2]

This means that each Ally must first and foremost take care of its individual security. How can this be ensured? Primarily, by building and strengthening resilience at the government and society levels.

At the NATO Summit in Warsaw in 2016, the heads of states and governments issued a political declaration of strengthening resilience. Concrete steps were taken in this regard and seven baseline requirements for resilience were adopted. States committed to ensuring:
– continuity of government and critical government services;
– resilient energy supplies;
– ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people;
– ability to deal with mass casualties;
– resilient civil communications systems;
– resilient transport systems;
– resilient food and water resources.

It is common knowledge that these requirements are intertwined. The failure in securing one element may have consequences for the others.

However, it was the COVID-19 pandemic that increased awareness of the importance of these guidelines. The pandemic highlighted the lack of society's preparation to deal with crisis situations and its susceptibility to disinformation and various types of manipulations carried out by state and non-state actors that used this crisis to their advantage. The number and quality of methods used by adversaries in relation to society intensified.

Therefore, at the NATO Summit in June 2021, the commitment to further strengthening national and collective resilience, which is a key element of effective deterrence and defence, was reaffirmed. A commitment to take additional steps towards a more integrated and coordinated approach was made. Heads of states and governments noted the progress achieved in this area since 2016 and highlighted crucial steps to be taken in the coming years.

As part of the NATO 2030 Agenda, Allies are expected to develop proposals for the establishment and revision of NATO's resilience goals before the 2022 Madrid summit. These goals will guide national efforts in this regard. Further steps are also expected to improve coordination and cooperation with the EU and other partners. On top of that, states decided to appoint national senior resilience representatives to coordinate and oversee the implementation of NATO guidelines and national goals. Furthermore, a decision was taken to set up a special committee dedicated to resilience.

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[2]   *The North Atlantic Treaty*, Washington D.C., 4 April 1949, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm [accessed: 25 May 2022].

At the NATO forum, it is stressed that the responsibility for building resilience lies primarily with states. As the work on resilience has developed, it is becoming increasingly clear that in order to achieve full synergy, efforts need to include three domains: the public sector, public-private partnership, and society.

Resilience in the European Union

The EU's approach to resilience is both inward- and outward-looking. It is by all means a comprehensive approach, with European institutions, member states, and societies taken into account. The plethora of policies and fora where resilience is being approached poses a challenge.

The COVID-19 pandemic has put the focus on building state and societal resilience of the EU and its member states. First lessons from the pandemic have been described, among others, in the 2020 Strategic Foresight Report. It presents European Commission's take on resilience as a foundation for EU policies. In the report, resilience is defined as an "ability not only to withstand and cope with challenges but also to undergo transitions in a sustainable, fair, and democratic manner"[3]. In its strategic vision, the Commission analyses resilience through four interrelated dimensions – social and economic, geopolitical, green, and digital. The EC's approach points out that strengthening resilience of each member state strengthens the resilience of the EU as a whole. In order to better review the progress made by each member state, resilience dashboards were created. The purpose of the dashboards is to assess vulnerabilities and capacities in the four above-mentioned dimensions. Building a more resilient society calls for strengthening the mechanisms of shock absorption and enhancing the capacity for adaptation and transformation.

Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic has given impetus to the adoption of European Council conclusions on enhancing preparedness, response capability, and resilience to future crisis. It underlines the complexity of today's security environment and the need for a comprehensive response that takes into account cross-sectoral and cross-border crisis management.

Looking at resilience through the EU's "external lens," it was initially considered in the context of humanitarian and development policies. Resilience was defined as "the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, cope, adapt, and quickly recover from stresses and shocks

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[3]   European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council "2020 Strategic Foresight Report. Strategic Foresight – Charting The Course Towards a More Resilient Europe"*, COM(2020) 493 final, Brussels, 9 September 2020, p. 2, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0493&from=EN [accessed: 22 May 2022].

such as violence, conflict, drought and other natural disaster without compromising long-term development."[4]

With time, resilience made its way to foreign policy. And so, in 2016, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini presented the EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) to the European Council. The EUGS refers to resilience as "the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises [...]."[5] Moreover, in the EUGS, building "state and societal resilience to our East and South" is one of the five key priorities for the EU's external action.[6] It is a broad and dynamic concept that needs to be continuously adapted to the changing environment.

Nowadays, the EU should define a common perception of security threats and challenges, reflecting the interests and respecting geo-political sensitivities of all Member States, in line with a 360-degree approach. An important step in this direction was the adoption of Strategic Compass for Security and Defence by the European Council in March 2022. Initially, when the Compass concept was presented, it focused on four baskets: crisis management, capabilities, partnerships, and resilience. Although in the negotiating process these baskets have been renamed (i.e., act, invest, partner, secure), the notion of resilience still plays a prominent role. The Strategic Compass states that "the more hostile security environment requires us to make a quantum leap forward and increase our capacity and willingness to act, strengthen our resilience, and invest more and better in our defence capabilities."[7] Furthermore, it gives concrete proposals with regard to strengthening the EU's resilience linked predominantly to countering hybrid threats. It is strongly associated with cybersecurity, fighting disinformation, and protection of critical infrastructure.

This proves that we are not living in a vacuum and EU policies correctly reflect the changing security environment. The COVID-19 pandemic shifted our focus towards a more inward-looking and security-driven resilience in the EU. Russia's aggression in Ukraine will most likely strengthen this approach further.

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[4] *Building resilience: The EU's approach – factsheet*, European Commission, 2016, p. 2, https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/EU_building_resilience_en.pdf [accessed: 22 May 2022].

[5] European Union, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*, Brussels, June 2016, p. 23, https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf [accessed: 23 May 2022].

[6] Alongside building EU's security; pursuing integrate approach to conflict and crisis; supporting cooperative regional orders and a commitment to a reformed multilateral, rules-based system of global governance.

[7] European Union, A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/106337/A%20Strategic%20Compass%20for%20the%20EU [accessed: 23 May 2022].

Poland

Russia's actions in our region have been the main point of reference for Polish foreign and security policy for years. Nowadays, we can see that it was the right approach. It should have also been a decisive factor in the assessment of threats to Europe as a whole. Unfortunately, that was not the case. Russia's aggressive policy has been underestimated by many Western countries. Today, we are witnessing a bloody conflict in the heart of Europe, where borders are being redrawn and civilians are used as human shields – something unimaginable for many in the 21st century. The war in Ukraine is a test for the whole international community. In that regard, Poland has passed the resilience test. Within less than a month, Polish people welcomed to their homes 2 million refugees, proving that we are able to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people.

The Polish foreign policy reflects the complex security environment we are living in. Therefore, it is based on the following priorities and pillars:
– NATO membership;
– strategic security and defence cooperation with the United States;
– EU membership, including the EU Common Security and Defence Policy;
– regional cooperation (particularly with the Baltic and Nordic states and the Visegrad Group) as well as bilateral and trilateral cooperation (the Weimar Triangle).

The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, signed by President Andrzej Duda in May 2020, identifies the current security environment and means to address it. It lays out that in today's world, resilience plays a prominent role. The strategy emphasises the importance of increasing the state's resilience to threats by creating a system of common civic defence, based on the efforts of the entire nation, and building an understanding for the development of the Republic of Poland's resilience and defence capabilities: build a system of common civic defence, making full use of the potential of the state and local government institutions, education and higher education entities, local communities, economic entities, non-governmental organizations and citizens, which will provide comprehensive resilience of the state to non-military and military threats.[8]

The strategy underlines the need to build national resilience to threats, including hybrid ones. Furthermore, it stresses resilience in the context of the above-mentioned NATO seven baseline requirements i.e., predominantly in the scope of the continuity of government and the functioning of the state, resilient energy supplies, uncontrolled movement of people and relocation of the population, collection,

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[8]   *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, Warsaw, 2020, https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dokumenty/National_Security_Strategy_of_the_Republic_of_Poland_2020.pdf [accessed: 25 May 2022].

protection and management of food and water resources, ability to deal with mass casualties, resilient telecommunication networks and Information and Communications Technology systems, population information and alert systems, and resilient transport system.

The strategy puts emphasis on increasing public awareness of the threats in the information domain. Countering information manipulation through education in the field of information security is crucial. Strategic communication should be the foundation of state level efforts aimed at countering disinformation. It goes without saying that strategic communication should include both forecasting, planning, and implementing coherent communication activities.

Education is at the heart of building resilience. We must focus on raising awareness, critical thinking, and crisis response procedures in order to be better prepared to effectively respond to complex challenges and threats, including those of a hybrid nature. However, all these efforts must take place in an inclusive manner. Effective resilience policies are those based on mutual trust between the government, the private sector, and society. Resilient society is aware of its role in challenging situations and is willing to contribute to working hand in hand with state authorities.

That is why Poland, in NATO and the EU, emphasises – promoting societal resilience. Societies are like glue holding our security policies together.

Way ahead

Throughout the last couple of years, the notion of resilience has undergone a major transition. It has been strengthened and expanded. States' resilience has been complemented by societal resilience.

However, with Russia putting European institutions, states, and societies to a test, we cannot rest. Today is the time to take additional steps and set up resilience standards.

The key to resilience is education. That is why we should further develop and implement educational programmes and campaigns aimed at mobilising society, improving its preparedness, and increasing its independence from the state's support in case of crisis. At the same time, comprehensive national security courses for government, industry, civil society, and armed forces leaders ought to be organised. We should raise awareness of asymmetric threats, including influence operations and disinformation campaigns that can spread distrust and increase polarisation between society and government and within the society.

In the light of Russia's efforts at deepening divisions in our alliances and society, eroding trust in institutions, authorities, political leadership, and democracy itself, it is ever more important to boost media literacy, fact-checking practice, and critical thinking. Furthermore, resilience training in local communities should take place.

Preferably, it should be complemented by volunteering programmes to support efforts made by state authorities.

Conclusion

Resilient states are those where a comprehensive approach is dominant, i.e., where the government cooperates closely with the society. Such states have fewer weaknesses that could otherwise be used by adversaries. That is why resilience is also an important aspect of deterrence. The idea is to make a possible attack cost-ineffective and expected goals unachievable.

Building and strengthening resilience is recognised and needed both at international and national levels. This notion has been present to some degree in the EU and NATO. Whereas the transatlantic Alliance has more of a linear approach, i.e., with the seven baseline requirements as the building blocks, in the EU, resilience is spread out across multiple policies and institutions. EU's institutional structure and the external versus internal resilience building approach might be a challenge.

At the same time, resilience is an area where the EU and NATO can build upon shared interests to deliver tangible results in line with ambitious goals set in the EU–NATO declarations from 2016 and 2018.

The COVID-19 pandemic has been a global wake-up call. It highlighted the lack of state authorities' and society's preparedness to deal with multifaceted crisis situations. In international fora, the pandemic put more emphasis on building and strengthening resilience. Nowadays, we must accelerate this process not only in order to be better prepared and capable of response, but also to deter. Resilience is the foundation of our security.

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Enhancing resilience: the state of play in NATO, the EU, and Poland
Abstract

This article presents the current state of play on resilience in NATO, the EU, and Poland. It argues that in the past couple of years, the international security environment has undergone dramatic transitions. On top of existing challenges, new threats (including hybrid) and large-scale crises (i.e., pandemics) are emerging. This complex security situation requires a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach. Building resilience at state, local, and societal level is key.

This notion is well understood both in the EU and NATO. Resilience is rooted in the Alliance's founding Treaty. Article 3 of the Washington Treaty claims that each Ally must first take care of its individual security. Russia's annexation of Crimea and, subsequently, the COVID-19 pandemic stressed – both in NATO and the EU – the need to be better prepared and able to respond to complex crisis. In the last couple of years, the EU's approach to resilience has been more inward-looking. From building resilience by the EU, it has shifted to resilience of the EU. Russia's invasion of Ukraine puts the West to

a test, including a resilience test. Opening their homes to ca. 2 million Ukrainian refugees, the Polish people have passed the test and proved, inter alia, that they are able to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people.

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Assessing the potential of OSINT on the Internet in supporting military operations

Introduction

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) has usually been defined as "intelligence produced from publicly available information that is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement."[1] While open-source information is as old as humanity itself, its collection and analysis in a deliberate manner to meet the needs of the intelligence community has emerged relatively recently. The first dedicated OSINT cells were developed in the United States and the United Kingdom during World War II. In the United States, the University of Princeton established a Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service (FBMS), which was tasked with monitoring radio propaganda of the Axis powers. After the war, the Central Intelligence Agency took over the cell. In Great Britain, BBC Monitoring was created. It recorded and translated broadcasts from Nazi Germany and other Axis states.[2] During the Cold War, the significance of OSINT increased. Both sides of the international rivalry collected

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[1]   H.J. Williams, I. Blum, *Defining Second Generation Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) for the Defense Enterprise,* Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2018, p. 1.

[2]   A.A. Imholtz Jr., "The American (FBIS) Side of the Story", https://www.iwm.org.uk/sites/default/files/files/2018-11/The%20American%20%28FBIS%29%20Side%20of%20the%20Story%20-%20August%20Imholtz%20.pdf [accessed: 5 January 2022].

and analysed open-source information in a deliberate and massive manner. For instance, the East German Stasi was capable of analysing approximately as many as 1000 Western magazines and 100 books per month.[3]

However, the real breakthrough in OSINT activities took place in the post-Cold War era. Three processes contributed to this shift. To begin with, we could witness the process of broadening the concept of security.[4] In effect, while collecting open-source information related to military affairs was somewhat difficult at the time, OSINT offered tremendous opportunities in understanding economic and social processes. Secondly, the 9/11 terrorist attacks took place. They proved that traditional forms of intelligence, such as Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), were insufficient. State authorities reacted to these events by placing greater emphasis on collecting and analysing open-source data. This trend was manifested in creating the Open Source Center under the U.S. Director of the National Intelligence in 2005.[5] Last but not least, we witnessed the advent of the Internet becoming the medium consisting of an unprecedented – and constantly growing – amount of open-source data that can be manually, semi-automatically and automatically detected, extracted, processed, and analysed.[6]

In this context, the Internet has become an environment offering enormous opportunities to military intelligence. It consists of a variety of communication layers that can be utilised to benefit the armed forces. Aside from Web 1.0, composed of ordinary standalone websites or message boards, there is also Web 2.0, which is abundant in open-source data.[7] It comprises social networks, gathering billions of Internet users, blogs, file-sharing and file-stream services, and a broad spectrum of more specialised services, including web mapping platforms. Finally, in the 21st century, the so-called "dark web" emerged. This anonymity-oriented environment has become

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[3]   K. Tylutki, "Informacja masowego rażenia – OSINT w działalności wywiadowczej", *Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego*, no. 19, 2018, p. 178.

[4]   See: R. Zięba, *Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Scholar, 1999.

[5]   H. Bean, "The DNI's Open Source Center: An Organizational Communication Perspective", *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, vol. 20, issue 2, 2007, pp. 240–257, https://doi.org/10.1080/08850600600889100; *Hearing before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Riskd Assessment of the Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, First Session, June 21, 2005, Serial No. 109-22*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg24962/html/CHRG-109hhrg24962.htm [accessed: 5 January 2022].

[6]   I. Böhm, S. Lolagar, "Open source intelligence. Introduction, legal, and ethical considerations", *International Cybersecurity Law Review*, no. 2, 2021, pp. 318–319, https://doi.org/10.1365/s43439-021-00042-7.

[7]   Ł. Sarowski, "Od Internetu Web 1.0 do Internetu Web 4.0 – ewolucja form przestrzeni komunikacyjnych w globalnej sieci", *Rozprawy Społeczne*, vol. 11, no. 1, 2017, pp. 32–39, https://doi.org/10.29316/rs.2017.4.

a significant point of contact for the cybercriminal underground.[8] This means that it holds tremendous importance for the law enforcement and intelligence communities.

This paper aims to briefly discuss how the immense potential of the Internet can be utilised to support activities of the armed forces. It explores this topic in two particular dimensions. On the one hand, it examines how OSINT on the Internet can support conventional military operations. On the other, it also overviews the basic techniques that allow supporting cyber warfare. However, it should be emphasised that this paper has a significant limitation. Primarily due to the length limit, it mentions only a fraction of the existing and dominating approaches to military OSINT investigations subject to continuous and dynamic changes related to the development of new technologies, services, and software. Thus, this article should be treated as a mere introduction to this subject. This paper is based on the content and critical analysis of literature on OSINT and its potential for supporting military operations.

The advent and evolution of military-related open-source intelligence on the Internet

The military application of open-source intelligence on the Internet can be traced back to the beginning of the 21st century. Its significance and potential grew in time due to several processes. The first is related to the fact that in the last two decades, the number of Internet users has dynamically increased from approximately 400 million in 2000 to 4.6 billion in 2022.[9] Most of these users leave their posts, comments, pictures, and videos online, contributing to the constantly increasing amount of publicly available open-source data. This process has become especially evident since the advent of Web 2.0. When social media emerged, the Internet users became more engaged in creating online content. This process was combined with the emergence of a variety of new technologies. For instance, the introduction of smartphones with cameras enabled ordinary users to quickly and cheaply take pictures and record videos, which could be instantly posted online.[10] This was combined with the popularisation of broadband Internet access, which facilitated prompt uploading of these materials. This also corresponded with the emergence of the satellite imagery services.

Overall, the emergence of Web 2.0 marked a significant breakthrough in military intelligence, as a variety of new open sources of data emerged. This became evident

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[8]   D. Mider, "Czarny i czerwony rynek w sieci The Onion Router – analiza funkcjonowania darkmarketów", *Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego*, no. 21, 2019, pp. 154–190.

[9]   See: M. Roser, H. Ritchie, E. Ortiz-Ospina, "Internet", *Our World in Data*, https://ourworldindata.org/internet [accessed: 17 January 2022].

[10]   See, for instance: D.R. Brake, "Are We All Online Content Creators Now? Web 2.0 and Digital Divides", *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, vol. 19, issue 3, 2014, pp. 591–609, https://doi.org/10.1111/jcc4.12042.

in 2011, during the Arab Spring revolutions. On the one hand, some of them proved to rely heavily on online communication.[11] Thus, social media chatter analysis enabled important political events to be closely followed. On the other hand, the military conflicts originating from the Arab Spring were subject to interesting technological developments. Belligerents of Libya and Syria, including especially non-state actors, have recognised the immense potential offered by the Internet to distribute war propaganda directly to the online audience. It was manifested by the popularisation of audio-visual and visual content documenting combat and its aftermath. Belligerents were also increasingly keen to use social media and new technologies to boost their image, for instance, by publishing their pictures in daily life situations. Overall, since at least 2011, the Internet has become abundant in war-related footage.

This constituted a significant opportunity for military-related OSINT. Raw data related to the activities of state and non-state actors during ongoing military conflicts could be analysed by armed forces. Effectively, since 2011 we have been able to witness a considerable increase in publicly available military-related OSINT investigations. Some of the most eye-catching were carried out by the Bellingcat Investigation Team. It showed that skilful exploitation of geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), combined with imagery intelligence (IMINT) and a variety of other Internet sources, may provide valuable insights into the activities of violent extremist organisations. For instance, in 2014, the team managed to geolocate the Islamic State's training camp in Mosul by analysing propaganda images released by this terrorist organisation.[12] More recently, it also uncovered a pro-Chinese government information operation on Twitter and Facebook. Bellingcat's findings were mostly founded on analysing the social media chatter.[13] Other state and non-state actors have followed in the same footsteps. For at least a decade, we have been able to observe many interesting OSINT investigations that allowed, for instance, to geolocate military infrastructures or troops on the battlefield, measure casualties of belligerents, and determine their capabilities. Overall, there has been plenty of evidence indicating that the usability of OSINT in gathering military-related intelligence has steadily increased.

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[11] G. Wolfsfeld, E. Segev, T. Sheafer, "Social Media and the Arab Spring: Politics Comes First", *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, vol. 18, no. 2, 2013, pp. 115–137, https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161212471716.

[12] Bellingcat Investigation Team, "Gun Safety, Self Defense, and Road Marches – Finding an ISIS Training Camp", Bellingcat, 22 August 2014, https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/case-studies/2014/08/22/gun-safety-self-defense-and-road-marches-finding-an-isis-training-camp [accessed: 5 January 2022].

[13] B. Strick, "Uncovering A Pro-Chinese Government Information Operation on Twitter and Facebook: Analysis of the #MilesGuo Bot Network", Bellingcat, 5 May 2020, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2020/05/05/uncovering-a-pro-chinese-government-information-operation-on-twitter-and-facebook-analysis-of-the-milesguo-bot-network [accessed: 5 January 2022].

Open-source intelligence on the Internet as a means of improving armed forces' situation awareness in conventional warfare

The available examples of the aforementioned open-source intelligence investigations that have been publicly debated in recent years enable several interesting methods of gathering military-related open-source data to be identified. They include mainly:

- detection and analysis of military infrastructure;
- detection and analysis of military build-ups, including the assessment of the adversary's potential;
- monitoring the ongoing military operations, including war casualties' assessment;
- geolocating troops on the battlefield.

Most of these applications are primarily based on the combination of GEOINT and IMINT.[14] One of the most valuable services of this type is Google Maps. It offers detailed and usually up-to-date satellite imagery, aerial photos, and street views. On top of that, layouts of transport routes and traffic are available. The combination of these options opens up immense possibilities for gathering military intelligence. Careful analysis of available satellite pictures, combined with open-source information related to the general whereabouts of military bases, allows their geolocation and analysis of their features. In certain cases, even more sensitive information may be determined this way, including the specificity of air defence systems or surveillance installations. In order to do so, Google Maps usually needs to be combined with imagery or recordings available through other services, such as, Bing Maps (in the Aerial View mode) or Zoom Earth. Moreover, while based on a similar set of satellite pictures, the Google Earth Pro application offers interesting options. For instance, it is possible to compare up-to-date pictures with older images taken from the Google database. Effectively, it is possible to determine the evolution of the military infrastructure over time or to carry out GEOINT related to past events. Overall, GEOINT/IMINT usually focus on specific traits visible in analysed pictures, such as buildings, the layout of roads, rivers, mountains, military equipment or vegetation. Their specificity, shapes, and perspective are considered.

Aside from the mainstream apps, more specialised national-level services may be exploited. This was proven by the investigation of the Polish cyber security firm Niebezpiecznik.pl. In 2018, their experts combined data available in Poland's Ministry of National Defence's public information bulletin with spatial data shared at geoportal.gov.pl. Effectively, they managed, for instance, to determine the location of the U.S. National Security Agency's eavesdropping station in Poland.[15]

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[14] See: J.L. Ware, "Geospatial Intelligence and Engineers", *Military Engineer*, vol. 98, no. 640, 2006, pp. 57–58.

[15] M. Maj, "Jak namierzyć lokalizację (tajnych) polskich baz wojskowych?", Niebezpiecznik.pl, 23 August 2018, https://niebezpiecznik.pl/post/polskie-bazy-wojskowe-lokalizacja [accessed: 14 January 2022].

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The detection and analysis of military installations can and should be combined with other, less evident open sources. There is a variety of ways to collect data from the areas under consideration, including primarily social media. For instance, Twitter allows monitoring tweets posted in certain areas either through geotags or a "geocode:" command.[16] Dashcam recordings are also an obvious and promising choice. Even data originating from fitness applications can help determine or verify the locations of military bases. Similarly, they may allow the profiling of armed forces or the intelligence community members. This was demonstrated in 2018 by the case of the Strava fitness app that shared data allowing to pinpoint locations of secret military installations or reveal information about their layout in great detail.[17] Excellent opportunities in this regard are also provided by the Radar Interference Tracker, which is based on data provided by the SENTINEL-1 satellite system. This tool allows geolocating air defence elements (radars) both on land and sea.[18]

There are also various tools enabling military deployments to be detected and assessed. Aside from the up-to-date – and mostly subscription-based – geospatial intelligence on the Internet, the monitoring of social media chatter provides interesting results. This is mostly due to the fact that civilians using social networks tend to take pictures or record videos of the encountered military convoys. They are subsequently posted online and can be analysed with various techniques. For instance, the combination of GEOINT and IMINT allows learning the scale of military movements, their whereabouts, and the types of equipment deployed. This has been recently confirmed by the events taking place at the Russian-Ukrainian border. The accumulation of the Russian troops near Ukraine since the end of 2021 did not go unnoticed by the OSINT community. Aside from satellite imagery, the monitoring of the social media posts by experts provided definite evidence indicating that Moscow moved a large number of its troops to the vicinity of Donbas and the Crimea.[19]

The movement of troops, in certain circumstances, can be monitored with flight and maritime communication trackers, such as Flightradar24 or MarineTraffic. However, these services have certain limitations, as they do not track planes and ships carrying out military operations. Effectively, their movements can be monitored only in "ordinary" situations. Moreover, there were known cases of spoofing Automatic

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16   "How to use the Twitter geocode to search tweets by location", TweetBinder, https://www.tweetbinder.com/blog/twitter-geocode [accessed: 14 January 2022].

17   "Tajne obiekty wojskowe z całego świata zaświeciły się na żółto na tej mapie. Sprawdź, czy twój dom także", Niebezpiecznik.pl, 29 January 2018, https://niebezpiecznik.pl/post/tajne-obiekty-wojskowe-z-calego-swiata-zaswiecily-sie-na-zolto-na-tej-mapie [accessed: 14 January 2022].

18   brO, 5Ghz Interference Tracker, OSINT Editor, 14 February 2020, https://www.osinteditor.com/resources/guides/5ghz-interference-tracker [accessed: 14 January 2022].

19   W.P. Strobel, M.R. Gordon, "Russia's Military Buildup Near Ukraine Is an Open Secret", *The Wall Street Journal*, 4 January 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-military-buildup-near-ukraine-is-an-open-secret-11641292202 [accessed: 14 January 2022].

Identification System (AIS) data that feeds MarineTraffic. This means that this type of information is not always reliable.[20] Still, Flightradar24 and similar services have proven to be a valuable source of information related to the Russian military deployment in Kazakhstan in January 2022.[21]

Finally, there is a variety of other less evident tools and applications allowing military build-ups to be detected. For instance, the analysis of live streaming webcams showing transport routes can be utilised. Even dating apps may be helpful in certain circumstances. This was proven in 2021, when the military build-up at the Polish-Belarussian border could be spotted on Tinder.[22]

On top of that, quite a similar set of OSINT methods may be used to geolocate troops on the battlefield and monitor ongoing military conflicts. As mentioned above, Internet propaganda or amateur content documenting events on the battlefields have become an integral part of most wars nowadays. Subsequently, these materials posted on, e.g., YouTube or social media can be extracted and analysed. In this context, social media chatter analysis may reveal interesting information related to ongoing events, aside from purely visual and audio-visual content. For instance, the combination of IMINT, GEOINT, and analysis of posts on Twitter was utilised by the OSINT community to learn how the situation on the frontlines of Syria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Libya evolved. Among others, war propaganda released by both sides of the conflict served to measure casualties suffered by Armenians and Azeris during their conflict in 2020.[23]

Potential of OSINT to support cyber warfare operations

Publicly known cases of state-sponsored cyber operations show that open-source intelligence techniques can be used as a means allowing designating targets of computer attacks. This was proven, among others, by the "Glowing Symphony" operation carried out in 2016 against the Islamic State's digital assets. The operation was preceded

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[20] T. Bateman, "HMS Defender: AIS Spoofing is opening up a new front in the war on reality", Euronews, uptaded 28 June 2021, https://www.euronews.com/next/2021/06/28/hms-defender-ais-spoofing-is-opening-up-a-new-front-in-the-war-on-reality [accessed: 14 January 2022].

[21] A. Aidarbekova, A. Kaparov, "Launching an Open Source Flight Database for Kazakhstan in Wake of Protests", Bellingcat, 8 January 2022, https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/2022/01/08/launching-an-open-source-flight-database-for-kazakhstan-in-wake-of-protests [accessed: 14 January 2022].

[22] A. Coakley, "Borderline: Tinder profiles of Polish troops appear in Belarus", *The Independent*, 15 November 2021, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/belarus-poland-border-tinder-troops-b1957953.html [accessed: 14 January 2022].

[23] Oryx, "The fight for Nagorno-Karabakh: Documenting Losses on The Sides of Armenia and Azerbaijan", Oryx blog, 27 September 2020, https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2020/09/the-fight-for-nagorno-karabakh.html [accessed: 14 January 2022].

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by an intelligence-gathering phase that also employed OSINT techniques.[24] In similar fashion, state-sponsored Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, such as those against Estonia in 2007, were also frequently supported by OSINT determining suitable targets.[25] Thus, OSINT offers a variety of opportunities related to detecting and examining digital infrastructure and communication channels exploited by the adversary. Moreover, it can also be used to identify and profile members of the adversary's armed forces or employees of its institutions. It should be emphasised that the same set of techniques applies to both state- and non-state actors.

There are plenty of OSINT methods allowing the digital infrastructure of the enemy to be detected, scanned, and mapped. To begin with, each investigation aiming to gather intelligence related to hostile Internet communication channels initially relies on the so-called "Google hacking," which uses the advanced operators and options of the Google search engine. The skilful combination of available operators, such as "site:", "OR," "AND," "-", "cache:" or "filetype:;"[26] with properly selected keywords and advanced search options usually allow identifying valuable surface web locations associated with the adversary. Depending on the specificity of the potential targets of cyber operations, other search engines may also be utilised (Yandex, Baidu, Bing). Alternatively, this first step of all investigations can be automated with the use of web crawlers, such as Scrapy. Moreover, a similar set of techniques can be applied to the deep and dark web, but they depend on the specificity of the scanned environment. For instance, some social networks, such as Twitter, allow valuable search tools based on API to be created.[27] In contrast, the anonymity-oriented TOR (The Onion Router) makes browsing its content much more difficult. Still, there is a number of available search engines (Torch, Recon, Ahmia.fi), link directories (Hidden Wiki), and dedicated crawlers, such as ACHE or Scrapy. All of them facilitate gathering intelligence.

Another step of OSINT investigations allowing the digital infrastructure of the potential adversary to be mapped is mainly based on web scanning and scraping software. Tools and services allowing the interconnectedness of the communication channels to be measured can also be used. Each initially detected Internet address may be subject to more thorough analysis using the potential of web scanners, such as Shodan

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24   D. Temple-Raston, "How the U.S. Hacked ISIS", NPR, 26 September 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26/763545811/how-the-u-s-hacked-isis [accessed: 14 January 2022].

25   See: M. Lakomy, *Cyberprzestrzeń jako nowy wymiar rywalizacji i współpracy państw*, Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2015, pp. 184–201.

26   See: *Google Search Appliance. Search Protocol Reference*, Mountain View, CA: Google, 2015, https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/www.google.com/pl//support/enterprise/static/gsa/docs/admin/current/gsa_doc_set/xml_reference/xml_reference.pdf [accessed: 25 May 2022].

27   OSINT Essentials, Twitter, https://www.osintessentials.com/twitter [accessed: 17 January 2022].

or SpiderFoot. For instance, Shodan's ability to scan ports provides interesting opportunities to plan and carry out cyber-attacks. SpiderFoot, on the other hand, enables external links leading to other interconnected domains to be extracted. These tools may be combined with other publicly available services, such as ViewDNS.info. Its Reverse IP Lookup option allows determining other domains co-hosted at the same server. Effectively, these and many other methods enable the digital infrastructure of the adversary to be mapped in detail.[28]

Each discovered Internet address may be subject to more careful analysis focused on extracting and analysing metadata. There is a variety of ways to do this. Among others, Recon-ng or Metagoofil scripts allow detecting files of certain types at a given domain, downloading them, and extracting available metadata automatically. This leads to discovering, for instance, the identity of an individual who created these files or software used by the adversary. Alternatively, when it comes to published pictures, it is possible to extract EXIF metadata, which enables the place where it was taken to be geolocated.

It should be stressed that this approach is especially efficient in collecting intelligence related to non-state actors, such as terrorist organisations or rebel groups. Due to the shortage of skilled IT staff, their digital infrastructure is usually much less developed and secure when compared to state actors. This, in turn, means that it is usually more susceptible to OSINT methods, which has been demonstrated by numerous studies focused on online terrorism and political violence.[29] Still, similar methods are also applicable to state actors or enterprises. However, their cyber-security solutions frequently force the attacking side to use much more advanced scanning techniques that fall outside the remit of OSINT.[30]

In this context, the OSINT analysis may also help identify employees of the adversary's institutions. For instance, due to frequent operational security (OPSEC) mistakes, this may be done by analysing files published on official websites, e.g., of ministries. Extraction of their metadata may lead to identifying officials responsible for creating them. This process can be automatised, for instance, with the aforementioned Metagoofil script. Subsequently, each discovered individual may be profiled based on analysis of their social media activity or public databases. Alternatively, the activity of their family members may also be investigated, which sometimes provides

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[28]   See: M. Lakomy, "Listening to the 'Voice of Islam': The Turkestan Islamic Party's Online Propaganda Strategy", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1914361.

[29]   See: *idem*, "Mapping the online presence and activities of the Islamic State's unofficial propaganda cell: Ahlut-Tawhid Publications", *Security Journal*, vol. 34, 2021, pp. 358–384, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-020-00229-3.

[30]   See: E. Bou-Harb, M. Debbabi, C. Assi, "Cyber Scanning. A Comprehensive Survey", *IEEE Communications Survey & Tutorials*, vol. 16, no. 3, 2014, pp. 1496–1519, https://doi.org/10.1109/SURV.2013.102913.00020.

valuable results. It was proven by the famous case of the MI6 chief's wife, who shared information related to their family life and activities on Facebook.[31] Such a somewhat simplistic OSINT approach may facilitate planning and executing high-profile spear-phishing cyber-attacks aimed at infecting adversary networks with malware.[32]

Conclusions

This article should be considered as a brief introduction to how the constantly changing techniques of open-source intelligence may support conventional and cyber operations. There is no doubt that the opportunities in this area have become un-precedented, mostly due to the continuously growing amount of open-source data in all layers of Internet communication. In the future, even the Extended Reality appli-cations or apps for teenagers may be used for this purpose. Their skilful detection, ex-traction, and analysis by military intelligence enable the situation awareness of the armed forces to be significantly increased. These opportunities are especially evident when it comes to events and processes which fall outside the scope of the traditional intelligence-gathering capabilities.

Aside from those general uses mentioned above, OSINT may fulfil various other organisational unit-level functions. It might reinforce high-ranking officers' opera-tional security, especially when dealing with non-state institutions and individuals. Moreover, OSINT may be applied for accumulating knowledge on military-related events, which can be subsequently used in briefings with cadres or even practically employed during military exercises. These opportunities mean that creating dedicated OSINT cells at a brigade level should be considered. Obviously, much more devel-oped and specialised structures need to be developed by military intelligence units and the broadly understood cyber troops.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that OSINT should be treated as a panacea for all military intelligence problems. All OSINT-based investigations face serious chal-lenges that need to be tackled thoughtfully. Firstly, OSINT may respond to a wide range of operational needs of the armed forces. However, it has by no means the potential of answering all questions that might emerge. Results of OSINT need to be combined with other types of intelligence, including HUMINT, SIGINT and GEOINT. Secondly, using OSINT faces significant problems related to the wide-spread online disinformation. It takes time and effort to verify extracted open-source

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[31] "MI6 chief's cover blown by wife's holiday snaps on Facebook", *The Indian Express*, 6 July 2009, https://indianexpress.com/article/news-archive/web/mi6-chiefs-cover-blown-by-wifes-holiday-snaps-on-facebook [accessed: 17 January 2022].

[32] See: J.W. Bullee, L. Montoya, M. Junger, P. Hartel, "Spear phishing in organisations ex-plained", *Information and Computer Security*, vol. 25, no. 5, 2017, pp. 593–613, https://doi.org/10.1108/ICS-03-2017-0009.

data and information.[33] Thus, the risk of being misled needs to be considered. Last but not least, OSINT may be susceptible to information overload. Dealing with these – and many other – challenges should be considered a *sine qua non* requirement enabling the maximum usability of OSINT for the armed forces to be ensured.

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[33]   See: A. Školkay, J. Filin, "A Comparison of Fake News Detecting and Fact-Checking AI Based Solutions", *Studia Medioznawcze*, vol. 20, no. 4, 2019, pp. 365–383, https://doi.org/10.33077/uw.24511617.ms.2019.4.187.

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Assessing the potential of OSINT on the Internet in supporting military operations
Abstract

This article briefly discusses some of the selected open-source intelligence methods on the Internet, which may be utilised to support activities of the armed forces. The paper examines this issue in two particular dimensions. On the one hand, it overviews some of the most popular means allowing supporting conventional operations, for instance, by geolocating hostile military infrastructure or troops. On the other hand, it explores some of the selected methods allowing to support cyber warfare. It concludes that open-source intelligence offers increasing capabilities, for instance, in detecting targets for offensive cyber operations or geolocating hostile troops. Nevertheless, it also has considerable limitations, particularly in terms of susceptibility to disinformation.

Key words: open-source intelligence (OSINT), armed forces, military, the Internet

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Information activities during the migration crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border as a threat to society's resilience

Introduction

Dynamic changes taking place in the information environment, including the internationalisation of information activities, have affected the security of individual states and the realisation of political and military goals. Moreover, the escalation of hybrid tactics was caused by the activity of Belarusians, who organised the transport of migrants and instructed them on how to behave in order to destabilise the situation in the border region.[1] The informational campaigns conducted by Belarus shaped the desired image of reality and changed the perception of society both on the Polish and the Belarusian side. These campaigns were supported by the Russian Federation, which tried to present itself as a peacemaker in the conflict, in effect maintaining its role as the hegemon in Central and Eastern Europe.

The aim of this article is to answer the question of how information activities[2] have affected the society during the migration crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border, which arose as a result of the influx of migrants from Middle Eastern countries.

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[1]   T. Giczan, "Lukashenka's Dark Games Menace the EU's Border", 10 November 2021, CEPA, https://cepa.org/lukashenkas-dark-games-menace-the-eus-border [accessed: 6 February 2022].

[2]   Doctrinal document DD-3.10(A) *Operacje informacyjne*, Bydgoszcz: Centrum Doktryn i Szkolenia Sił Zbrojnych, 2017, p. 15. See: Z. Modrzejewski, *Operacje informacyjne*, Warszawa: Akademia Obrony Narodowej, 2015, *passim*.

Research methods from the field of scientific research methodology typical for social sciences (the comparative method and the method of content analysis) were used to study the undertaken research problem.

It is important to address this issue because for the first time Poland and NATO have had to face a migration crisis on the eastern flank. Information activities concerning the migration crisis posed a challenge to ensuring security in this part of Europe. Due to the recency of the issues raised, no studies exploring this subject have been published so far. The conclusions of the article can be a starting point for further research. It should be recognized that the issues discussed in the article are important for both the representatives of academia and the military.

Information activities

Over the years, together with the Russian Federation, Belarus has conducted an intensive information campaign aimed at achieving its strategic goals in Central and Eastern Europe. This became clearly visible when the Polish Central PSYOPS Group was accused of organising protests during the presidential election in Belarus (2020). The aim of the attack on this unit was to depreciate it among the Polish society and to accuse it of preparing aggressive acts against the Belarusian authorities.[3]

When analysing the information activities carried out in the information environment regarding the migration crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border, the main goals of Belarus government should be distinguished:
1. Undermining the legitimacy of legal authorities in Central and Eastern Europe.
2. Disparaging the Republic of Poland internationally and calling into question its credibility among allies.
3. Portraying the ineffectiveness of international institutions (NATO, the European Union) as outdated entities which fail to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
4. Destabilising NATO's eastern flank.
5. Criticising the principles of European humanitarianism.
6. Decreasing the sense of security among the population through destabilisation of the region.
7. Changing the perception of the border region population in order to support the actions carried out.

The information activities carried out by the Belarusian regime constituted a threat to the resilience of the Polish society as they influenced the public opinion

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[3]   See "Information Resilience: Countering Russian Propaganda and Disinformation", 7 October 2021, RUSI (NS), https://rusi-ns.ca/information_resilience/ [accessed: 1 February 2022]. Cf.: B. Fraszka, "The Situation on the Poland-Belarus Border: Background, Geopolitics, Narratives", 23 December 2021, https://warsawinstitute.org/situation-poland-belarus-border-background-geopolitics-narratives [accessed: 6 February 2022].

and exerted public pressure on the state administration. Capacities and information techniques coordinated as part of information operations (INFO OPS) included, e.g., psychological operations or disinformation.[4] Their intensification contributed to shaping and preparing the region for a potential conflict in Eastern Europe.

Information capabilities and techniques

The exegesis of source material made it possible to distinguish the information capabilities and techniques used by the adversary during the migration crisis to create an alternative reality.

Psychological operations

Psychological operations consisted in conveying created content through various methods and means of communication to the audience in order to induce the expected change in perception, attitudes and behaviour.[5]

Belarus government spread hostile propaganda and influenced the public awareness and consolidation of unfavourable attitudes by arguing that the Republic of Lithuania and the Republic of Poland were responsible for the migration crisis because they deliberately did not accept migrants. The public opinion was manipulated by fuelling anti-migrant sentiments and popularising the Russophobic attitude of Poles.[6] In addition, the narrative that Poland was an aggressive state posing a threat to Belarus and the Russian Federation was spread, which is why the Belarusian side was prepared to use weaponry.[7] Propaganda justifying the actions of the Belarusian authorities was directed at the Belarusian society, while in the Russian society the ethicality of the actions undertaken by the Polish side was questioned,

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[4] Information operations (INFO OPS) "consisting in analysing the information environment, planning, integrating and evaluating information activities in order to obtain the expected effects of influencing the will to act, understanding of the situation and the opponent's abilities." Doctrinal document DD-3.10(A) *Operacje informacyjne*, *op. cit.*, pp. 15, 23–33.

[5] Doctrinal document DD-3.10.1(B) *Operacje psychologiczne*, Bydgoszcz: Centrum Doktryn i Szkolenia Sił Zbrojnych, 2017, p. 14. See: T. Kacała, *Działania psychologiczne wybranych państw*, Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2016, pp. 181–195.

[6] See B. Bodalska, "Sondaż: Polacy nie chcą migrantów, a winą za kryzys obarczają Białoruś", 8 October 2021, EURACTIV, https://www.euractiv.pl/section/migracje/news/polska-migranci-kryzys-bialorus-granica [accessed:7 February 2022].

[7] Rzecznik Prasowy Ministra Koordynatora Służb Specjalnych, "Polska jako wróg", 7 October 2021, https://www.gov.pl/web/sluzby-specjalne/ataki-medialne-na-polske-w-zwiazku-z-wydarzeniami-na-bialorusi [accessed: 1 February 2022]. See: A. Legucka, F. Bryjka, "Russian and Belarusian Disinformation and Propaganda in the Context of the Polish-Belarusian Border Crisis", *PISM Bulletin*, no. 212 (1908), 9 December 2021, https://pism.pl/publications/russian-and-belarusian-disinformation-and-propaganda-in-the-context-of-the-polish-belarusian-border-crisis [accessed: 7 February 2022].

comparing the actions towards migrants to the infamous practices from the times of the Second World War.[8] A strategy of demoralisation was carried out towards the Polish society, the fears of the Polish society were amplified, and the situation was compared to the migration crisis on the Greek-Turkish border in 2020.[9]

What is more, a propaganda message was built to arouse a sense of injustice, so examples of actions negatively affecting the lives of people in the border region were given. Sensitive issues which resonated well in the local environment were raised, e.g., the damage suffered by the population due to the migration crisis and the destruction of roads and meadows by military trucks were pointed out. Apart from the media space, the awareness of local communities was directly affected through the use of urban space, as exemplified by the inscription "*4 zmarłych, wasza wina*" (Polish for: "four dead – your fault") on the building of the Multinational Brigade of the Land Forces Command LITPOLUKRBRIG.[10] The action was taken in order to depreciate the service of soldiers and to blame them for the death of migrants. It should be pointed out that arousing strong emotions and turning the society against uniformed services was a constant element of the information campaign of the adversary.

Another example of psychological actions was the dissemination in the information environment of images from the border, which showed the push-backs of migrants to the Belarusian side or oppressive actions taken against them, such as the use of water cannons.[11] Such visual materials were distributed not only in the Polish information environment, but also influenced the international community, including the United States of America (CNN, BBC), as well as Arab countries (Al Jazeera), shaping the awareness of recipients in accordance with the assumed objectives of the operation.[12]

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[8]   "Vyacheslav Volodin called on parliamentary organizations to develop unified standards to overcome migration crises", 29 November 2021, The State Duma, http://duma.gov.ru/news/52863/ [accessed: 6 February 2022].

[9]   J. Pawlicki, "Strach w strefie zakazanej", 13 November 2021, Newsweek, https://www.newsweek.pl/polska/spoleczenstwo/kryzys-na-granicy-z-bialorusia-reportaz-z-granicy-uchodzcy-w-strefie-zakazanej/604ecj4 [accessed: 6 February 2022].

[10] P.P., "4 zmarłych, wasza wina", 20 September 2021, https://www.dziennikwschodni.pl/lublin/4-zmarlych-wasza-wina-napis-na-murze-wojska-w-lublinie,n,1000295712.html [accessed: 1 February 2022].

[11] M. Roache, "In the Standoff Between Belarus and Europe, Migrants are Being Used as Human Weapon", 17 November 2021, Yahoo! News, https://news.yahoo.com/standoff-between-belarus-europe-migrants-105414247.html [accessed: 1 February 2022]. See: K. Bachman, "Kryzys polsko-białoruski i kwestia migracji. Międzynarodowy kontekst i możliwe sposoby zarządzania", Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, https://www.batory.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/K.Bachman_Kryzys..polsko-bialoruski.i.kwestia.migracji.pdf [accessed: 1 February 2022].

[12] "A new humanitarian crisis unfolds at the Polish-Belarusian border", 24 November 2021, Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2021/11/24/photos-a-new-humanitarian-crisis-unfolds-at-the-polish-belarusian-border [accessed: 1 February 2022]; A. Pikulicka-

As part of the psychological operations carried out by the adversary against the society, the image of migrant children asking for help was used to lend credibility to adversary's message, to arouse compassion and to present the passivity of Western countries. This propaganda message was reinforced by journalist Tomasz Lis (rule of authority), who published on his profile an alleged photo of children staying at the Polish-Belarusian border, which in fact was taken during the conflict in Serbia.[13] Children were also used as a tool to escalate emotions in society during other armed conflicts, e.g., in Syria or during the annexation of the Crimea. Moreover, the publication of images of children in the information environment contributed to the initiation of bottom-up controlled quasi-events, such as demonstrations. These types of events played an important part in the creation of internal divisions within the society. The protests related to turning back migrants, including children, to the border with Belarus by the Border Guard in Michałowo were an example of social polarisation.[14] It should be noted that the society was influenced by a shocking visual message, while the Belarusian regime used all available resources and means of information confrontation.

Disinformation

Another threat to public resilience was disinformation.[15] Disinformation operations created informational chaos to prevent the public from critically assessing the situation and seeking context. They were conducted in order to weaken Poland's position in the international arena and to undermine allied commitments and

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-Wilczewska, "How Poland influences opinion over the Belarus border crisis", 16 December 2021, Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/16/how-poland-influences-opinion-over-the-belarus-border-crisis [accessed: 6 February 2022]; K. Fox, "Tensions are rising on the Poland-Belarus border. Here's what you need to know", 21 November 2021, CNN, https://edition.cnn.com/2021/11/11/europe/belarus-poland-crisis-explainer-cmd-intl/index.html [accessed: 1 February 2022].

13   "Nie, to zdjęcie nie przedstawia dziecka przy polskiej granicy", 13 October 2021, Demagog, https://demagog.org.pl/fake_news/nie-to-zdjecie-nie-przedstawia-dziecka-przy-polskiej-granicy [accessed: 1 February 2022].

14   "Dzieci z Michałowa uwięzione w lesie. Jedna z dziewczynek ma ranną nogę", 13 October 2021, Onet, https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/granica-dzieci-z-michalowa-uwiezione-w-lesie-jedna-z-dziewczynek-ma-ranna-noge/kfy2mly [accessed: 1 February 2022]; "Belarus/Poland: Abuse, Pushbacks at the Border", 24 November 2021, Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/24/belarus/poland-abuse-pushbacks-border [accessed: 1 February 2022].

15   Disinformation is "all activities aimed at misleading an opponent by manipulating, simulating and preparing evidence, provocative activities that harm their own interests". Doctrinal document DD-3.10(A) *Operacje informacyjne, op. cit.*, p. 29. See: M. Wrzosek, "Wojny przyszłości. Doktryna, technika, operacje militarne", Warszawa: Fronda, 2018, *passim*; L. Sykulski, *Rosyjska geopolityka a wojna informacyjna*, Warszawa: PWN, 2019, pp. 80–101.

depreciate the uniformed services.[16] Disinformation operations focused on spreading the narrative of inhumane treatment of migrants. An example of this was the presence of a small group of migrants in Usnarz Górny, who wanted to cross the border illegally. The image of refugees fleeing war rather than economic migrants (technique: switching terms) and the callousness of the Border Guard (technique: criticising and judging) was used to influence the perception of the migration crisis. Suggestive messaging undermined the disproportionate forces and measures used against migrants, consequently lowering trust in the state.

The inability of Polish journalists to report on the situation from the border region contributed to the development of such a narrative, which prevented the rapid neutralisation of false information, and the media coverage provided came only from the Belarusian side. A lack of sufficient information divided the Polish society and created space for the enemy's information activities. A threat to the resilience of the society was the spread of fake news. An example of false information intentionally introduced into the information environment was the shooting of a Belarusian border post from the territory of Poland. The opponent also disseminated fake news concerning poor living conditions of soldiers serving on the Polish-Belarusian border, which shaped the image of inefficient state institutions.

Disinformation operations were reinforced by provocations organised by Belarusian forces, such as blinding soldiers with lasers, throwing stones at them and accusing them of using violence against migrants. The Belarusian authorities spread a false narrative and qualified the actions on the Polish-Belarusian border as a crime against humanity.

Another example of disinformation operations was the use of a personal source to poison the information environment. By reproducing interviews of the deserter Emil Czeczko in the Polish information space, the alleged mechanism of killing migrants by soldiers of the Polish Armed Forces was presented. In his statements, Czeczko addressed the issue of shooting migrants and burying them in mass graves. He tried to blame his desertion on the Polish Armed Forces and portray himself as a victim, thus arousing compassion in the audience. Disinformation operations were focused on destroying the image of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland among the public and accusing them of actions violating the law in force.

Considering the above examples, it should be noted that in the information environment, the adversary imposed the desired sequences of logical reasoning that targeted information influenced the reflection process of the recipients and kept them in a dual process of decision-making.

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[16] See: J. Eyal, "Belarus, the EU and the Refugee Crisis: Opportunities Missed", 19 November 2021, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/belarus-eu-and-refugee-crisis-opportunities-missed [accessed: 1 February 2022].

Key Leader Engagement

The key leader engagement at the national and local level influenced the behaviour, attitude and perception of the migration crisis. The statements of opinion leaders, such as the Permanent Representative to the EU, Andrzej Sadoś, who said that "the goal is to discredit countries and efforts to protect borders and sow divisions in Europe", as well as the reports on the border situation by the medics from the Granica Group.

Information activities carried out by the opponent were reinforced by opinion leaders (rule of authority), who spoke out on the migration crisis and influenced the public perception, including the dissemination of stereotypes. On the one hand, in the public space there were authorities supporting the demands of migrants; on the other hand, leaders prioritised security issues over humanitarian ones. This division polarised the society and contributed to heightened emotions in the public debate.

Poisoning the information environment occurred also through the activity of the Belarusian secret services which supported the media and exposed the lack of reaction of Western countries to the migrant situation. This message was reinforced by "useful idiots" in Poland and other Western countries who reproduced the narrative lines propagated by the Belarusian regime.[17] Additionally, scientific and cultural centres in the West were used to disseminate propaganda identical with the arguments presented in the public space by the Belarusian authorities. What is more, the opponent hit "sensitive" topics and targeted groups which could strengthen its narrative, e.g., environmentalists, politicians, and journalists. A theme which emerged during the construction of the wall preventing illegal border crossings was the closing of migration routes for animals. The Polish Border Guard denied fake news and assured that this aspect was taken into account during the construction of the wall.

Key leaders became triggers of change in the society: their attitude and opinions shaped emotions around the crisis. A significant threat was the galvanisation of the society for activities during the crisis, which were part of the Belarusian information war plan.

Other

When analysing the threats posed by the enemy's hybrid warfare, attention should be drawn to activities which increased the effectiveness of the conducted impact operation in Eastern Europe.

Violations of the Polish airspace by unmanned aerial vehicles aimed at tracking the officers of the Polish Border Guard and collecting information necessary for the

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[17]   "Kryzys na granicy i wojna informacyjna. Jak dezinformuje Moskwa?", 7 December 2021, Demagog, https://demagog.org.pl/analizy_i_raporty/kryzys-na-granicy-i-wojna-informacyjna-jak-dezinformuje-moskwa [accessed: 1 February 2022].

operation were observed. Besides that Belarus collected data and information through all available channels also from devices using electromagnetic waves.

In the case of the migration crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border there were no significant actions in cyberspace due to the implementation of a wide range of activities carried out in real life.

Actions building up social resilience

When analysing the migration crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border, it should be noted that the opponent's information activities were actively counteracted and social resistance to potential attacks was built. As part of neutralising the actions of the enemy, direct communication was conducted in the border region in order to reduce social tension and build a sense of security by Polish government, e.g., providing medical assistance, preventing illegal border crossings. Additionally, representatives of local governments were educated in the field of counteracting threats in cyberspace so as to minimise damage to government administration.

Another important form of building the society's resilience was the application of the principle of Posture, Presence and Profile, i.e., uniformed services were open to providing assistance to local communities through joint meetings or supplying necessary items to the elderly, thus consequently building the credibility of their message and mutual trust. Within the framework of broadening the local population's awareness of the situation, soldiers of the Territorial Defence Forces distributed specially prepared material of the *Polska Zbrojna* monthly to borderland residents.

Furthermore, uniformed services were constantly present in the local community during their everyday patrols ensuring the safety of Polish citizens and, at the same time, deterring the enemy. In addition, a positive image of uniformed services was shaped by exposing articles and billboards in the information space as proofs of local residents' gratitude for their actions.[18]

The above-mentioned activities strengthened the society's immunity to threats resulting from offensive actions carried out by the enemy and made it possible to ensure safety in times of crisis.

Conclusions

The information activities of Belarus had an impact on society as they were aimed at changing the perception of reality, to arouse certain emotions, and to create a new order at the international level. The most important conclusions resulting from the

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[18]   KE, "Niespokojna granica", 2 December 2021, *Polska Zbrojna*, http://www.polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/35920?t=Niespokojna-granica [accessed: 1 February 2022].

adversary's information activities during the migration crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border are as follows:

1. Belarus conducted information activities in every domain (physical, cognitive, and virtual) of the information environment.
2. Information activities of Belarus differentiate states and societies in terms of susceptibility to disinformation.
3. Belarus has poisoned the information environment with the aim of destabilising Eastern Europe and preparing the region for a wider conflict.
4. The information activities conducted by the Belarusian regime were a test of NATO's defensive information warfare capabilities and a test of narrative coherence and member state effectiveness.
5. The information activities made it possible to divert the attention of international relations entities from other activities carried out by Belarus and the Russian Federation in the international arena.
6. Information activities were aimed at influencing public attitudes and perceptions. They affected the public will and understanding of the situation and created an alternative reality.

Information activities during the migration crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border marked the beginning of a redefinition of security in Eastern Europe; their escalation expanded the sphere of influence, changed diplomatic relations between Belarus and Western countries, and aroused negative emotions in the society. Moreover, taking into account the experience of other conflicts, information activities preceded strictly military actions.

The broad spectrum of information capabilities and techniques used by Belarus posed a threat to the resilience of the Polish society, which was subject to constant influence. A psychological war was waged to win "hearts and minds" of the society in order to lower the level of support for actions taken by Poland and to depreciate the uniformed services.

This article does not exhaust or does not address many other aspects, which is an incentive for further scientific research.

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Information activities during the migration crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border as a threat to society's resilience
Abstract

The main purpose of the article is to describe the information activities and their impact on society during the migration conflict on the Polish-Belarusian border and to systematise the information on this subject. Therefore, the following question was asked: how did information activities affect society during the migration crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border?

Research methods from the field of scientific research methodology typical for social sciences were used to analyse the undertaken research problem (the comparative method, the method of content analysis).

The article consists of three parts. The introduction presents information activities as an important element of military activities. The second part shows the INFO OPS information capabilities and techniques which allowed the creation of an alternative reality. The last part includes conclusions from the conducted information activities which intoxicated the information environment.

The research allowed for identifying information activities which undermined European humanitarianism, showed the incompetence of European institutions, and aroused emotions in society which, in turn, exerted psychological pressure on decision-makers.

These information activities threatened the resilience of society because they left people in a dual process of decision-making. In order to counter information threats, awareness of the current situation was built, and their effects were actively neutralized in the information environment.

Key words: information activities, information operations, migration crisis, resilient society, disinformation

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The legal status of civil defence organisation during armed conflict and belligerent occupation

Introduction

The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, adopted in May 2020, clearly emphasises that strengthening the state's resilience to current threats, including hybrid ones, requires the development of "a system of common civic defence" through fully realising the potential of the state and local government institutions, education and higher education entities, local communities, economic entities, non-governmental organisations and citizens, all of which will provide comprehensive resilience of the state to non-military and military threats.[1] A similar approach to the issue of a state's resilience and its citizens is taken by the *Resistance Operating Concept* (ROC) of 2020 – a publication whose main purpose is to explore "actions that a sovereign state can take to broaden its national defence strategy and prepare to defend itself against a partial or full loss of national sovereignty."[2] It defines "resilience" as "the will and ability to withstand

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[1] *National Security Strategy of The Republic of Poland*, Warsaw, 12 May 2020, para. 2.1, https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dokumenty/National_Security_Strategy_of_the_Republic_of_Poland_2020.pdf [accessed: 5 January 2022].

[2] O.C. Fiala, *Resistance Operating Concept (ROC)*, MacDill Air Force Base: JSOU Press, 2020, p. xv.

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external pressures and influences and/or recover from the effects of those pressures or influences."[3]

Both documents also emphasise the role that civil defence plays in achieving the goals set by the broadly understood "resilience". In the case of the Polish Security Strategy, the need was observed to "redefine the civil defence system and the population protection system by making it universal, both within urban agglomerations, as well as in rural areas, focusing on building the capacity of the system to constantly adapt and respond to the changing challenges and threats."[4] In order to achieve this, it is also necessary to prepare legal solutions that will comprehensively regulate the subject matter of civil defence.[5] In the ROC publication, it was underlined that the objectives of establishing civil defence "are to protect the civilian population, safeguard the continuity functioning of crucial public services, attenuate the accompanying harmful effects of conflict, and contribute to the operational capabilities of the armed forces during conflict."[6] The document further explains that "individuals and organisations inside and outside of government may be conscripted for roles in support of wartime organisation. This may involve the establishment of municipal or regional reinforcement pools for rescue services, medical services [...], and home protection organisations, as well as the creation and maintenance of shelters and evacuation capabilities."[7]

However, the definitions of civil defence adopted in both documents have a broader meaning than the term "civil defence" applicable under international humanitarian law (hereinafter: IHL), specifically in the regulations of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, on the protection of victims of international armed conflicts of 1977 (hereinafter: Additional Protocol I, AP I)[8] – in particular, in its part IV concerning civilian population, section I on general protection against the effects of hostilities, Articles 61–67. This should not be surprising, however, since even the basic purpose of civil defence varies greatly from one state to another. Civil defence may be conceived as an essentially civilian task, or it may be considered as part of the general defence effort of the country.[9] According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, civil defence in the broad sense

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[3]   *Ibidem*, p. 5.
[4]   *National Security Strategy…*, *op. cit.*, para. 2.6.
[5]   *Ibidem*.
[6]   O.C. Fiala, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
[7]   *Ibidem*.
[8]   Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol I), 1125 UNTS 3, ICRC, 8 June 1977, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36b4.html [accessed: 5 January 2022].
[9]   M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch, W.A. Solf, *New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949*, 2nd ed., Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013, p. 435.

"generally comprises all measures for national defence which are not of a military nature (including, in particular, measures to safeguard the position of public authorities, to maintain public order, public services including the health service, the maintenance of public morale and the protection of the war industry), while civil defence in the narrow sense constitutes only part of this (measures aimed at saving lives and limiting damage)."[10] Considering the above, the organisation and structure of civil defence is not uniform either – there may be a single civil defence administration, civil defence functions may be exercised by a number of administrative agencies in such a way that it is impossible to separate them from other activities, or they may be exercised by private organisations.[11]

The above-mentioned differences caused considerable difficulties in creating a universal international legal regime ensuring protection to civil defence. However, it was recognised that, from the perspective of IHL governing the conduct of parties to armed conflicts, it is of the utmost importance to guarantee civil defence organisations the status that ensures their protection in the performance of their objectives and to establish a distinctive sign enabling them to be identified.[12] Ultimately, in the Additional Protocol I, it was decided to adopt a narrower understanding of civil defence, focusing primarily on its humanitarian aspect, i.e., on its role to mitigate the losses, damage and suffering inflicted on the civilian population by means and methods of warfare, particularly when modern weaponry is used in violation of the principles and rules of IHL.[13]

Since the civil defence formulated in such a way in specific treaty norms differs slightly from the general, and perhaps more widespread, view of it, the aim of this article is to take a closer look at the aforementioned provisions of AP I and to explain how civil defence is understood from the perspective of international law, what its tasks are and how its protection is shaped. In the context of broader "resilience", one should also refer to the legal situation of civil defence in the occupied territory, in particular to its rights, and the obligations of the occupying power towards the civil defence organisations. The above considerations are complemented by an analysis of when these organisations may lose such protection and what the legal and factual consequences of this are.

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[10] *Status of Personnel of Civil Defence Organisation. Report submitted by the ICRC at the 20th International Conference of the Red Cross (Vienna, 1965)*, Geneva, May 1965, p. 1.

[11] M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch, W.A. Solf, *op. cit.*, p. 435.

[12] Y. Sandoz, Ch. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann (eds.), *Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949*, Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1987, p. 713.

[13] *Ibidem.*

Civil defence – definition, tasks, and the scope of protection under IHL

In the general sense, the term civil defence refers to an organisation established to assist the civilian population at risk and affected in the event of armed conflicts or natural disasters, as well as a set of interdisciplinary preventative, protective and rescue actions undertaken in such cases, carried out with the collective effort of state bodies and institutions, as well as social organisations, economic entities, and individual citizens. In principle, then, civil defence tasks carried out in the conditions of armed conflict do not differ from protective and rescue activities undertaken during peacetime, in the event of natural disasters, industrial accidents, serious traffic and construction disasters, forest fires or fires in compact development of residential settlements, and other dangerous events. Therefore, the forms and methods of action during the rescue of people and property during a war will be the same, but the scale of protection and rescue needs in the event of war will undoubtedly be greater due to the direct effects of means of warfare are then multiplied as a result of damage or causing fires of residential buildings and industrial, energy, and communication facilities and installations.

Article 61 of AP I gives a definition of civil defence, civil defence organisations, and civil defence personnel and matériel. However, it was easier to first define the tasks of civil defence than its organisation, given the previously mentioned diverse organisational nature in individual countries. In addition, such an approach allows every citizen to perform the function of civil defence at the request of the authorities if such a need arises, while civil defence as such is not monopolised by specialised bodies and formations.[14]

According to Art. 61 (a) of AP I, the term "civil defence" means the performance of various humanitarian tasks, such as warning, evacuation, management of shelters, rescue, medical service (including first aid), firefighting, provision of emergency accommodation and supplies, and assistance in the preservation of objects essential for survival. The list of tasks consists of a total of 15 items and additionally, these tasks must have one of the following aims:

1) to protect the civilian population against the dangers of hostilities or disasters;
2) to help the civilian population to recover from the immediate effects of hostilities or disasters;
3) to provide the conditions necessary for the survival of the civilian population.[15]

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[14] *Ibidem*, p. 719.
[15] *Ibidem*, pp. 720–722. *Cf.* M. Sassòli, *International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019, p. 379; R. Geiß, Ch. Paulussen, Specifically Protected Persons and Objects, [in:] *The Oxford Guide to International Humanitarian Law*, eds. B. Saul, D. Akande, New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, pp. 189–190.

It should be emphasized that all of these tasks enumerated in Art. 61 (a) should be interpreted in conjunction with the above aims, which means that the above tasks are the functions of civil defence insofar as their exercise is "intended to protect the civilian population," etc. For example, the term "warning" means warning to the civilian population, in particular of forthcoming attacks or natural disasters, and the term "disaster" covers natural disasters as well as any other calamity not caused by hostilities, e.g., explosions of gas or oil tanks, civilian plane accidents, etc.[16] Problems may be caused by the interpretation of tasks consisting in "detection and marking of danger areas" (Art. 61 [a] item viii) and "decontamination and similar protective measures" (Art. 61 [a] item ix), because they are quite similar to operations pursuing military purposes. Therefore, these operations must be intended only for the civilian population. Operations such as detection and marking and removal of minefields during combat operations are not covered.[17]

The list of civil defence tasks is exhaustive, however, some flexibility is introduced – activities which are not specifically mentioned may be covered, provided they are activities complementary to those in the list, i.e., they must be necessary to carry out any of the tasks listed, and they may not go beyond that. In other words, such activities should not extend beyond what is necessary for carrying out any of the primary civil defence tasks.[18] Nevertheless, one of the reasons for establishing a closed list of civil defence tasks was a concern that a non-exhaustive list would allow functions to be included which were not specifically of a humanitarian nature and this could compromise all the efforts made to improve the protection of civil defence organisations. This concern was all the more justified because in many countries, the tasks of civil defence organisations include aspects related to the economy, defence, logistics, and the protection of key industry branches, so states cannot be expected to accept the protection of the performance of such functions on the same terms as the protection granted exclusively to the humanitarian functions of civil defence. On the other hand, civil defence organisations may perform only one or some of the tasks listed in Art. 61, while other tasks are carried out differently.[19]

From a theoretical perspective, all this seems quite clear, but in practice, there may be difficulties in distinguishing what is and is not the function of civil defence. For example, if a fire brigade belonging to a civil defence organisation extinguishes a fire in a military facility, it is not, in principle, performing a civil defence function. However, if the fire of a military facility may endanger the lives of wounded soldiers or civilians who are near this facility, and the firefighting is aimed at saving these people,

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[16]   Thus, civil defence tasks related to a natural or man-made disaster which are not linked to military activities, but occur in a state involved in an armed conflict are also covered by the regulations of AP I.

[17]   M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch, W.A. Solf, *op. cit.*, pp. 439–440.

[18]   Y. Sandoz, Ch. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 731.

[19]   *Ibidem*, p. 720.

then this is the task of civil defence. The same is true of a situation when a military fuel storage installation is on fire and its explosion can threaten thousands of civilians – combating the fire is then intended to protect the civilian population, even though the performance of this function is incidentally beneficial for the armed forces. Such an incidental benefit for non-civil-defence purposes does not mean that the activity giving rise to that benefit is not the performance of a civil defence function. For example, if military units hear alarm sirens designed to warning civilians about an air raid, this would be an incidental benefit, but if civilian defence communication lines are used to transmit military reports, this is a non-civil defence activity.[20]

One should also mention the task of civil defence consisting in "emergency assistance in the restoration and maintenance of order in distressed areas" (Art. 61 [a] item xi), because it can ostensibly blur the line between civil defence functions and police (law enforcement) functions. In principle, members of law enforcement agencies have civilian status, and routine domestic law enforcement is part of general protection of the civilian population. Thus, members of the civilian police force are not deemed to be legitimate objects of attack during international armed conflict unless they are incorporated into the armed forces.[21] Ordinary police functions are not civil defence functions, and nothing in the definition of civil defence alters the position of the civil police, who are protected as civilians. However, in distressed areas (i.e., areas stricken by hostilities or disasters), where the normal functioning of public administration has broken down, civil defence organisations may, as an exceptional measure, assist also in the restoration and maintenance of public order.[22]

According to Art. 61 (b) of AP I, civil defence organisations mean "those establishments and other units which are organised or authorised by the competent authorities of a Party to the conflict to perform any of the tasks mentioned under sub-paragraph (a), and which are assigned and devoted exclusively to such tasks," whereas persons employed by a party to the conflict to perform these objectives in a civil defence organisation and persons designated by the competent authority to manage these organisations should be treated as civil defence organisation personnel (Art. 61 [c] of AP I). A prerequisite for the effective functioning of civil defence is the possession of appropriate equipment, supplies and means of transport, which the AP I conventionally refers to as "matériel" (Art. 61 [d] of AP I). The way in which civil defence tasks are

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[20] See: M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch, W.A. Solf, *op. cit.*, pp. 442–443; Y. Sandoz, Ch. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 726.

[21] T.T. Richard, *Unofficial United States Guide to the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949*, Maxwell: Air University Press, 2019, p. 140. *Cf.* Art. 43, para. 3 of AP I ("Whenever a Party to a conflict incorporates a paramilitary or armed law enforcement agency into its armed forces it shall so notify the other Parties to the conflict").

[22] Y. Sandoz, Ch. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 729, footnote 58. Such assistance may include the direction of movements of refugees within or from distressed areas (*ibidem*).

organised, prepared, and carried out is an internal matter for each state and should be governed by the relevant provisions of national law of a state concerned.

Undoubtedly, civil defence forms part of civilian life – therefore, civil defence personnel are protected as civilians under the provisions of AP I.[23] As regards the organisations of civil defence, they may be small or large, and even performing just one of their tasks means that they can be protected. It can as well be a department of civil defence of an organisation that is also engaged in other activities. Importantly, however, affiliation to such an organisation is not a prerequisite for obtaining protection because protection is granted based on function and not on membership in the organisation.[24] Thus, the protection shall also apply to civilians who, although not members of civil defence organisations, respond to an appeal from the competent authorities and perform civil defence tasks under their control.[25]

What is the above-mentioned protection? Civil defence organisations and their personnel are in a general way to be respected and protected as part of the civilian population, and buildings and "matériel" used for civil defence purposes are protected to the same degree as civilian objects (Art. 62 of AP I). "Respected and protected" means that they must not knowingly be attacked or unnecessarily prevented from discharging their proper functions.[26] This latter element is the real essence of special civil defence protection; however, this element has one notable exception – the right to perform civil defence functions has to cede in a case of "imperative military necessity."[27] A very important feature for the enhancement of the protection of civil defence is its entitlement to a distinctive sign – an equilateral blue triangle on an orange ground, which may be used for the protection of civil defence organisations, their personnel, buildings and matériel and for civilian shelters.[28] This distinctive sign should help to prevent civil defence units which work in areas exposed to hostilities from being mistaken for combatants and therefore attacked.[29]

Protected civil defence organisations are only those "assigned and devoted exclusively" to civil defence tasks. They are organised or authorised by a party to the

[23]   M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch, W.A. Solf, *op. cit.*, p. 446.

[24]   Y. Sandoz, Ch. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, pp. 732–733.

[25]   T.T. Richard, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

[26]   M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch, W.A. Solf, *op. cit.*, p. 470.

[27]   *Ibidem*, p. 447. Although the meaning of this necessity is not explained in Art. 62, it boils down to the fact that civil defence tasks can only be prohibited or limited if the authorities are faced with the alternative of changing the main operational plans or forfeiting civil defence personnel. An example of this is work that must be carried out in an area where security cannot be guaranteed due to the availability of resources and in the light of absolute operational choices (Y. Sandoz, Ch. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 740).

[28]   International Committee of the Red Cross, Civil Defence in International Humanitarian Law – Factsheet, Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law, 21 May 2021, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/civil-defence-international-humanitarian-law [accessed: 5 January 2022].

[29]   M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch, W.A. Solf, *op. cit.*, p. 436.

conflict, but they are protected regardless of their organisational framework. However, exceptions to this rule are military personnel or units of civil defence – the general rule of protection relate only to civilian civil defence, whereas military civil defence personnel or units are subject to special rules. The guiding principle is "once civil defence, always civil defence," which means that it is forbidden to move from civil defence tasks to combat operations during an armed conflict.[30] It was also necessary to exclude the possibility that the protection afforded to civil defence would be used as a safe haven for combatants.

However, a compromise solution was found – according to Art. 67 para. 1 of AP I, military personnel and units assigned to civil defence organisations are respected and protected if they are permanently assigned and exclusively devoted to the performance of civil defence tasks, and so assigned, such personnel do not perform any other military duties during the conflict. Furthermore, military civil defence personnel must be clearly distinguished from combat personnel (primarily by the use of the international civil defence distinctive sign),[31] where identification is not only a prerequisite for effective protection but also protection in general. It should be added, however, that military civil defence personnel are only protected in the national territory to which they belong. Military civil defence personnel of an occupying state performing civil defence tasks in occupied territory are not protected.[32]

The performance of civil defence tasks by military personnel assigned to them must be permanent, which means that if such personnel (who, due to their functions, are entitled to special protection) commit acts harmful to the enemy or take part in hostilities, it loses its protection; moreover, such conduct constitutes an unlawful act and a serious violation of AP I. However, assigning military personnel to a civil defence organisation does not result in granting them a quasi-civilian status – if they fall into the power of an adverse party, they become prisoners of war. They may continue to be used for civil defence tasks, but only in an occupied territory[33] and under certain conditions: they may be employed on civil defence tasks in so far as the need arises, only in the interest of the civilian population of the occupied territory,[34] and if such work is dangerous, they volunteer for such tasks (Art. 67,

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[30]   *Ibidem.*
[31]   There is an obligation on military personnel, who generally wear the uniform of the armed forces, to display the international distinctive sign of civil defence and carry identity cards certifying their status. The use of the distinctive sign is also mandatory for the buildings, equipment and transports of military units assigned to civil defence organisations (Y. Sandoz, Ch. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 797, 802).
[32]   M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch, W.A. Solf, *op. cit.*, pp. 469–470; M. Sassòli, *op. cit.*, p. 379.
[33]   This "occupied territory" will be "the occupied home country of the prisoner, where he will have performed his duties before capture" (M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch, W.A. Solf, *op. cit.*, p. 471).
[34]   Thus, such work should not be carried out for the benefit of armed forces occupying the territory (*cf.* Y. Sandoz, Ch. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 802).

para. 2). As regards buildings and matériel used by military units for civil defence tasks, they remain subject to the laws of war, so if they fall into the hands of an enemy, they are, in principle, treated like any other military equipment – they may be seized and they constitute war booty (Art. 67, para. 4).

Civil defence under belligerent occupation

The first regulations concerning the organisation of civil defence in an occupied territory appeared in the Geneva Convention (IV) of 1949.[35] According to Art. 63, para. 2 of that Convention, civil defence organisations and their personnel, established for the purpose of ensuring the living conditions of the civilian population, shall be treated as National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and have the right to pursue their activities even under foreign occupation. However, research conducted since then on the general strengthening of the protection of the civilian population has shown that, in the opinion of many experts, the provisions of Art. 63 are inadequate and insufficient. This provision has therefore been supplemented by the solutions adopted in AP I, which develop the protection of civil defence in an occupied territory, especially through restrictions on requisition. Indeed, Art. 63 of AP I limits the powers of the occupying state and imposes duties on it to assist civil defence in an occupied territory.

The obligations imposed on the occupying state by Art. 63 of AP I are threefold:
1) an obligation to grant civil defence the necessary facilities;
2) an obligation to abstain from various acts of interference with the proper performance of civil defence tasks and with the way in which the local civil defence organisation sees fit to perform them;
3) an obligation to abstain from requisitioning or diverting from their proper use civil defence buildings or matériel (unless certain very restrictive conditions are satisfied)[36] or (without exceptions) shelters.[37]

Furthermore, the occupying state shall not change the structure or personnel of such organisations in any way which might jeopardise the efficient performance of their mission. These organisations shall not be required to give priority to the nationals or interests of that state.[38] As regards civilian civil defence personnel falling into the power of the adverse party, they are protected and may continue to fulfil their tasks in the occupied territory. However, the occupying state may disarm them for

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[35] Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 75 UNTS 287, ICRC, 12 August 1949, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36d2.html [accessed: 5 January 2022].

[36] See: Art. 63, para. 5 of AP I. For example, requisition of civil defence buildings and matériel is only possible for the benefit of the local population.

[37] M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch, W.A. Solf, *op. cit.*, p. 451.

[38] T.T. Richard, *op. cit.*, pp. 141–142.

reasons of security (Art. 63, para. 3). If military civil defence personnel fall into the power of the adverse party, they become prisoners of war, but may be used to continue to fulfil their task in the occupied territory.[39]

Protection of civil defence in the occupied territory shall apply only as long as local civil defence units refrain from activities that are not their proper functions in the light of the AP I. If these units engage in activities harmful to the enemy, they lose their protection.[40]

The cessation of protection

The issue of protection loss by civil defence units concerns not only the situation of military occupation but has a broader scope. Specific regulations have been introduced in Art. 65 of AP I. In principle, the protection to which civilian civil defence organisations, their personnel, buildings, shelters and matériel are entitled shall not cease unless they commit or used to commit – outside their proper tasks – acts harmful to the enemy. However, even if some measures against civil defence are taken, their effect will be suspended until a warning has been given and a time-limit has elapsed, giving the recipient of the warning time to obey.[41]

The notion of "acts harmful to the enemy" leaves some room for interpretation. Undoubtedly, transportation of heavy weaponry would be considered harmful to the enemy and would therefore result in the personnel concerned losing their right to protection.[42] Similarly, if a civilian fire brigade puts out a fire on a military airfield, this is outside the scope of protected civil defence activities and may be considered an act harmful to the enemy. The consequence of committing these acts is the loss of special protection provided to the organisation and its personnel, which means, firstly, that they can be prevented from performing their tasks, and, secondly, that the use of their distinctive sign becomes "improper use," prohibited by Art. 38, para. 1 of AP I. Special protection of civil defence is based on mutual trust; therefore, an organisation that has committed acts harmful to the enemy does not deserve this trust. However, these acts should not be equated with "direct participation in hostilities," which is a narrower concept. Therefore, civil defence organisations and their personnel are still protected as civilians, even if they have lost their right to special protection under Art. 65. Thus, it is forbidden to attack civil defence personnel who do not participate directly in hostilities, regardless of whether they have or have not lost the protection arising from Art. 65.[43]

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[39]   M. Sassòli, *op. cit.*, p. 379.
[40]   M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch, W.A. Solf, *op. cit.*, p. 451.
[41]   Y. Sandoz, Ch. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 771. See also T.T. Richard, *op. cit.*, p. 143.
[42]   Y. Sandoz, Ch. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 777.
[43]   M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch, W.A. Solf, *op. cit.*, pp. 457–458.

Additionally, there are some acts described in Art. 65 which are expressly singled out as not constituting acts harmful to the enemy, thus, they will not lead to protection loss. The fact that some military personnel are attached to civilian civil defence organisations, or that the performance of civil defence tasks may incidentally benefit military victims, particularly those who are *hors de combat* (e.g., wounded soldiers), cannot deprive civil defence units of protection,[44] nor does the formation of civilian civil defence organisations along military lines, and compulsory service in them. Neither shall it be considered an act harmful to the enemy that civilian civil defence personnel bear light individual weapons for the purpose of maintaining order or for self-defence.[45] However, in areas where land fighting is taking place or is likely to take place, the warring parties shall undertake the appropriate measures to limit these weapons to handguns, such as pistols or revolvers,[46] in order to enable distinguishing between civil defence personnel and combatants. The non-observance of this recommendation does not result in outright loss of protection, but it lessens the possibility of effective protection.[47]

In addition to activities as part of the public order maintenance, light individual weapons should be used by civil defence personnel solely for self-defence. It is understood that civil defence personnel may be armed for self-defence against marauders or other criminal individuals or groups. They may not engage in combat against the adverse party and may not use force to resist capture. If, however, they are unlawfully attacked by individual members of the enemy's forces, they may use their weapons in self-defence after having made a reasonable effort to identify themselves as civil defence personnel.[48]

Conclusions

There is no doubt that defence, as value consisting in the creation of a system ensuring safe functioning of the state during peace and enabling repulsion of any armed attacks

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[44]   R. Geiß, Ch. Paulussen, *op. cit.*, p. 190; T.T. Richard, *op. cit.*, p. 144. The term "incidental benefit" means that if civil defence personnel encounter military casualties while acting to protect civilians, they may aid them without losing their right to protection. The medical personnel of a civil defence organisation are even obliged to assist accidentally encountered wounded soldiers in the same way as civilians (Y. Sandoz, Ch. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 774).

[45]   As regards the carrying of arms, members of the armed forces assigned to civil defence organisations are subject to the same rules as civilian civil defence personnel.

[46]   In other words, the term "light individual weapons" excludes "fragmentation grenades and similar devices, as well as weapons which cannot fully be handled or fired by a single individual and those basically intended for non-human targets" (M. Bothe, K.J. Partsch, W.A. Solf, *op. cit.*, pp. 460–461).

[47]   *Ibidem*, p. 460.

[48]   Y. Sandoz, Ch. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 776.

in the event of armed aggression, belongs to those values whose implementation is one of the fundamental interests of a state.[49] Thus, functioning of the state defence system includes both the military and civil aspects. The latter are particularly important for strengthening society's resilience in order to withstand external pressures and influences, and also recover from the effects of those pressures or influences. In turn, the concept of resilience includes a civil defence organisation actively supporting society in fulfilling the above-mentioned objectives. The importance of civil defence was recognised by Sweden, who included it in its concept of total defence;[50] the value of which is well known to Ukraine, whose civil defence formations and units (e.g., fire brigades) risked and sacrificed their lives in assisting those in need during artillery shelling and air bombardments conducted by the Russian army in 2022.

It is true that in international law civil defence is understood in a narrower sense, covering only humanitarian tasks, intended solely to support a civilian population affected or threatened by hostilities or disasters, but this is a level directly related to the impact on society. An effective, properly equipped, and well-organised civil defence can help the state authorities (or, in the event of occupation, the government in exile) maintain high morale among the population, protect them from threats, save them from the effects of military operations and maintain the will to resist the enemy. The creation of a civil defence organisation is one of the precautionary measures against the effects of attacks that the defending party to the conflict may and even must take,[51] and full implementation and scrupulous compliance with the provisions of AP I concerning civil defence can contribute to providing the necessary, effective, and timely assistance to all victims of war.

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[49]   M. Paździor, B. Szmulik (eds.), *Instytucje bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo C.H. Beck, 2012, p. 412.

[50]   See: J. Gotkowska, "Sweden's Security: The Long Way Towards Total Defence", *Point of View*, no. 81, 2021, pp. 24–28.

[51]   See: M. Sassòli, *op. cit.*, p. 378.

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The legal status of civil defence organisation during armed conflict and belligerent occupation
Abstract

Civil defence, whose main objective is the protection of the civilian population, is a component of the concept of society's resilience, but in the provisions of international humanitarian law (regulating the conduct of parties fighting in an armed conflict), it is limited to the protection of civil defence organisations (such as a fire brigade) performing strictly defined humanitarian tasks, requiring thorough preparation and securing of appropriate resources. The state-parties to the conflict shall respect and protect civil defence organisations and personnel and military units designated to serve as civil defence on a permanent basis. Also, in the case of belligerent occupation, the occupying state is obliged to enable the implementation of these tasks by civil defence organisations of the occupied territory; in addition, the cases where it is permissible to seize buildings and equipment belonging to these organisations have been seriously limited. Thus, well-organised, efficient, and effective civil defence formations are an important element of the state's defence system, which serves the population in danger, and its efficient and effective functioning can contribute significantly to building and strengthening the resilience of society in the conditions of armed conflict and belligerent occupation.

Key words: civil defence, protection of civilians, resilience, international humanitarian law, belligerent occupation

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Human security and human-centred defence as individual responsibility and collective activity

Introduction

Total defence (TD) results from robust national security structures that possess the ways, means, and ends to pursue not only nation/state interests, but also collective ones as well. NATO provides an excellent example of collective defence. For more than 70 years, the alliance has been instrumental in keeping the peace on the European continent. As successful as NATO has been, it is time for a shift to a TD posture where human defence is the centrepiece around which all security concerns orbit.

The weakening of the Westphalian system requires new approaches to security. Clausewitz's Trinity – Government, People, and Military – is unbalanced. The three-legged stool has tipped over. Clearly, all three legs of the stool are necessary for defence, but in the new paradigm of "war amongst the people," the civil population takes

on a much larger role and level of importance.[1] No longer does the government and military maintain a monopoly on violence, nor do they own the peace process. The old saying "we are all in this together" applies. Government, military, people, and alliances are the ingredients of *collective defence*.

Once again, it is time to go "back to the future." We should re-energise civil defence corps activity to support collective defence that includes all aspects of society. Civil society is both a provider and a receiver of defence. A civil defence corps would be locally focused, and individuals would be identified and trained before conflict or humanitarian disaster occur. Considering the outsized role civil society is taking in "war amongst the people," a loosely configured civil defence network can take responsibility for local defence and peacebuilding. A network that would be loose enough to expand and contract as necessary.[2] Local actors are necessary in building resilience before, during, and post conflict. Civil defence activities may dominate policing, medical, transportation, and engineering activities. Enhancing civil defence capacities now will ensure they are available and can be surged when necessary. The civil population is no longer background in the drama of militaries clashing to advance the state. Populations are now the dominant f o r c e. Lose the population, and you lose the fight and the peace. There are ample examples of resistance movements throughout WWII that demonstrate the power and capacity of civil society.

Civil Military Interaction (CMI)

The pandemic has taught us that science, crisis response mechanisms, a trained civil defence core, and human-defence-minded individuals at the highest levels of society – political, economic, cultural – can work together to frame a resilient and "anti-fragile"[3] environment. Our goal is a civil environment where the measure of security policy and effectiveness is based on low death rates and hospitalisations. CMI provides the mindset necessary for different and unequal peacebuilding organisations to work collectively.

It is a crowded security landscape. Militaries no longer have the luxury of dominating the battlespace. In war amongst the people the battlespace is everywhere. Exploited hybrid threats and asymmetric warfare are the new normal.[4] We cannot intentionally turn a blind eye to this crowded space where autocratic governments,

1   R. Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, London: Penguin Books, 2019.
2   N. Ferguson, *The Square and the Tower: Networks and Power from the Freemasons to Facebook*, New York: Penguin Press, 2018.
3   N.N. Taleb, *Antifragile: Things that Gain from Disorder*, New York: Random House, 2014.
4   T. Matyók, S. Zajc, "Searching for a New Role for Military Forces Responding to Asymmetric Threat", *Sodobni vojaški izzivi / Contemporary Military Challenges*, vol. 22, no. 3, 2022, pp. 27–44.

oligarchs, unregulated social media platforms, and politicians at all levels of society seek to shape the daily lives of citizens. Resilient and sustainable public policy is not the result of good will, but of what is possible. Going back to the end of Gabriel Garcia Márquez' excellent novel, *One Hundred Years of Solitude*, we recognise how the author presents a simple conclusion: they lived as they did because they could not live any other. Technology is developing and changing much faster than our way of thinking and understanding the world in which we live. Mary Shelly's *Frankenstein* offers us a glimpse into a future where technology is uncontrolled. We are facing serious threats that cannot be solved by one person, not even by one nation. The challenges are great. Civil society and the military, following a CMI mindset (NATO) are obliged to find new and innovative ways of working together to advance human security policies that place people first. To paraphrase a Renaissance approach: humans are the measure of all things.

Where to begin? Don Quixote offers a good starting point. His purpose of tilting at all the windmills he came upon is a good metaphor for current approaches to defence. Try and defend everything just as Don Quixote attempted to defeat every windmill. Yet we know that attempting to defend everything, we defend nothing. Cervantes' brilliant novel makes visible an immanent problem for human society: unbeatable dualism illustrated by the idea of a common windmill and knights. When does it pay off to fight and die for one or another cause?

States' responsibility – but how strong is the state?

We can observe a crack in the Peace of Westphalia which has provided a state-driven security wall since 1648. Nevertheless, in the 3rd millennium that crack is growing. Instead of the light of peace shining through the crack we can only see darkness. States and societies are relying on a hodgepodge of approaches to collective defence, civil defence, and many other models, as well as a mixture of all of them, to cobble together a total defence.

Firstly, each state is responsible for the security and wellbeing of their citizens as well as those who are part of bilateral and multi-lateral, i.e., NATO, defence agreements. However, the most efficient model for TD does not yet exist. NATO provides us with a first-generation approach to collective defence. In the 3rd millennium we need to think of second-generation approaches.

Bureaucratic command-and-control (C2) methods for achieving harmonisation and cooperation are too slow to address the complicated, complex, and fluid nature of modern conflict occurring in all domains. We realise, finally, that we are confronting common global threats, such as climate change and pandemics, which resist all our attempts to arrest or eradicate them (even the richest one per cent cannot escape the threats society faces). Threats can only be artificially hidden under artificial

conditions and through artificial means. But, how long? The one per cent may be at the front of the queue for vaccinations, but even their freedom following a Don Quixote defence policy, where all are pitted against each other in a race to the bottom, will be limited and, at the end, they will share a reality with the remaining 99 per cent. We must change the course and recognise that TD is everyone's responsibility. Total for me and total for you. There cannot be two forms of TD.

Many parts of Europe were destroyed during WWII, the wellbeing of the common citizen was low, and motivation for a new order was strong. Institutions were constructed to provide the greatest good for the many and sustain the peace. Today's life in Europe is still good for many citizens and that is why immigrants are travelling towards the continent, risking their lives, and paying smugglers the last of their savings. However, the comfortable life of many Europeans can result in a lack of motivation to deal with the negative impacts of climate change and the need to develop solidarity with the rest of the world. This holds true across the Trans-Atlantic Alliance.

New and strong adversaries

Global climate changes and the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrate a troubling lack of global leadership. Local engagement of skilled individuals is missing. Yes, we are on the same boat, but not in the same cabin. The majority are under the deck in dark cramped quarters while on deck there are society's elites enjoying the open air. We can see this in the incoherent approach to making vaccinations available around the world. Irrespective of COVID-19 crisis being a p a n d e m i c, Western leaders worked to ensure that their citizens were at the front of the queue, and did not realise, that their attempts would not protect them from things happening on the other side of the world.

We should reinvent civil defence as the holistic concept of individual responsibility and collective action. Crisis management is one of our "new normals". Planners working to design a just future must at all times be aware of the need for individuals to be trained to minimise the potential damage to them and to society, which can result from unmanaged crises such as those stemming from climate changes and pandemics. The role of the state is to provide conditions supporting science and technology development needed to address current and potential crises. The state can shift expenses and investments in civil preparedness from the military to a n e w civil defence. Why? Because hybrid threats, climate changes, and pandemics can be exploited by bad actors in a much less expensive way than through direct combat.[5]

Civil defence guided by the civil-military interaction mindset is the natural environment by which to achieve stronger forms of structural and individual resilience;

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[5] *Ibidem.*

though it is not easy, vertical and horizontal coordination of government, military, and people must be established and maintained. Academia is essential in educating peace workers for the 3ʳᵈ millennium. Civil defence should maintain a flat and flexible organisation, a quantum or matrix approach. Resilience simply cannot be built and reinforced during a crisis, resilience is a multitask effort before any crisis: at individual, local and collective levels. Each instance of personal engagement counts.

Medical approaches to wellness provide an example of how civil defence can be envisioned. A medical approach recognises a need to use a building block approach to enhance wellness where blocks can be added and taken away as necessary, based on a patient's needs. There is no one model of civil defence. There are multiple civil defences that rest on each other to create a context-specific response to crisis management. Sometimes in medicine the talking cure is appropriate (diplomacy), at other times, pharmaceuticals may be what is needed (government agencies), while a combination of pharmaceuticals and other therapies may be what is necessary (whole-of-government), and invasive surgical interventions are used as a last resort to protect life (the role of military) when all other methods have proved inadequate to bring the patient to a desired level of wellness.

We need human-centred defence policy and planning, teaching, and practice. Above all, we need a few strong states to stand behind the civil defence concept that merges policy and strategy with local actors. A return to Great Power competition can detract leaders from taking a civil defence approach to crisis management and building resilience. Resources needed to battle climate change and prepare for future pandemics can be siphoned off by the military leaving fewer funds for diplomacy, cooperation, interaction, and solidarity. Rather than engage in collective action as NATO allies and partners, states may pull away from each other. This lessens the strength of a unified response to global threats. Decades of useless repairing of weak states are over. After Afghanistan, we entered a new era defined by Great Power competition. The competition is for the primacy, resources, way of life, and model of state and society. Institutions such as the UN, NATO, and the EU must reform themselves for humankind to survive.

Human security versus nation building

We do not know if the interactions of civil-military actors will help build resiliency, but we hope they will. We do not know if human rights and human needs play a role in building resiliency, but we assume they do. We do not know if civil-military actors enhance cross-cultural information sharing and communication. Will they invent a common language, or will they keep relying on interpreters? Linguistic and cultural barriers are high and not visible at first glance. And, finally there is the main question: what is the overlap of nation-building with human security?

Security is an individual responsibility and a collective activity that requires all elements of society to ensure success. Security cannot be outsourced to the military nor any civilian institution. In the past planning was oriented towards civilian support to military, while now we follow the opposite direction: military support to civilians. Quite expectedly, the resistance by the rigid institutions to change the way of thinking and mode of action necessary to adjust to the change was strong.

Military institutions are rigid, precisely structured, and subordinated to a vertical organisation. The military is not prepared, organised, or trained to work in a horizontal structure and beside civilians in a fluid all-domain approach to defence. This is the opposite of what is needed. Militaries prepare and train for a known and predictable future. Let's go back to the Don Quixote defence policy. What the military needs is an ability to e n g a g e all stakeholders, a l i g n efforts and resources, and a d a p t as necessary to a fluid environment.

The need to face the pandemic and a changing climate turned around the whole system of organisation, education, trainings, commanding (having on one side a vertical C2 culture and, on another, a horizontal, ever-changing civilian organisation) necessary to deal with a fluid threat environment. Instead of being interactive stakeholders, they were competing, though not everywhere. Governments do not know how to use different tools and the result is predictable – some are overused and many underused.

Current civil-military relationships often fall short of what is needed to meet emerging human security needs. Changing global antagonisms and hybrid conflicts call for innovative, whole-of-government (singular and plural, governments), whole-of-society approaches to conflict transformation. Everyday lives of today's people are shaped, guided, and limited by numerous visible and invisible actors where governments appear as almost unnecessary. When individuals lose trust in governments, experts, and elites' ability to respond proactively and wisely to crises, society begins to unravel. We should not forget we must start to build resilience before crises manifest themselves, during the crisis and post-crisis; thereby, developing a comprehensive crisis resume.

Theoretically, security is in the hands of governing elites who provide political, economic, and cultural leadership. Leadership is provided through traditional forms of policy development and with traditional forms of interior security and exterior defence, but collective defence can exist at a strategic level only while at a tactical level human security depends on individual resilience. War between states and their armies is being replaced by war between individuals, moving from open battlefields to the narrow streets of towns, into the houses, into private rooms, coming through wireless interconnections.

Parallel defence in a parallel world?

Collective defence and individual (human) security are not necessarily two sides of the same coin, they are often two different currencies where it is almost impossible to calculate their real exchange rate or value. Parallel systems and parallel worlds are produced daily, hidden agendas influence daily life on Wall Street and in the favelas, not in the same way but with visible results. Today's wicked problems require interventions that mobilise all aspects of society in a joint peacebuilding response. Approaches to contemporary crises and complex peace operations requires strategies and practices that integrate actors and agencies of civil society, the military, government, and academia. There is no wholly military-centric, nor exclusively civil-centric answer to today's complex issues.

In medicine, we receive smart and generic advice – an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. We remember most of smart advice when it is too late: conflict is warming up, the why-who-what is becoming more and more foggy and blurred, more and more actors are coming with their own goals and agenda, and we have numerous conflicts of interest within a basic conflict among multiple stakeholders (West Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, NATO versus the Russian Federation, China versus others in the Pacific).

Resilience is crisis prevention and management at a socio-political level and is recognised as the first line of defence in meeting human-security challenges in an unpredictable world. Although resilience is recognised as *a priori* good, and the benefits of resilient individuals, communities, and nations are well accepted, there is limited research available on how to make resilience happen; specifically, how to educate individuals to resolve and transform stakeholder conflicts in complex environments populated by numerous stakeholders, i.e., corporations, platforms, non-governmental organisations, governmental organisations, international organisations, military organisations, proxies, hired warriors, security companies, local stakeholders, etc., all with competing agendas. Knowing who is making a profit out of the chaos leads us to some answers, but not necessarily to solutions.

Nation-state capacities to respond to violent and non-violent crises are being challenged by an ever-increasing number of black swans. Whole-of-society collaborative response structures and systems are essential for building societal resilience in reacting to crises. A growing number of actors in an operational environment can lead to a destructive stakeholder conflict. Current analyses of stakeholder conflict and its impact on building resiliency focus primarily on w h a t needs to be done to limit negative outcomes with little emphasis on h o w .

Our proposed joint curriculum development project will address the missing "how" of building resiliency. In theory, life can be simple and solutions may just be round the corner, but in the real world the story unfolds in unpredictable ways with

inherent dynamism and moves in directions never imagined. Yesterday's paradigms were outdated yesterday. Is it possible to be a day ahead before things happen?

Institutions are changing slowly and politicians are rarely interested in anything but their next election. Corruption is ever-present and the bill for politicians' uninformed decisions is handed to future generations. Rural areas are more and more depopulated, urban spaces are growing, and the term "community" is misused to define a collection of atomised individuals. Rethinking local communities and their role in our individual lives is one of the most important steps that can be taken towards resilience. Resilience, security, and defence must belong again to the local community. Small is human-sized and beautiful.

Violent conflicts and humanitarian disasters are experienced at community levels. Irrespective of this circumstance, civil-military responses to conflicts and humanitarian disasters are often focused at political and strategic levels of engagement leaving the operational and grassroots unattended. The strength of individuals to do something for themselves is moral power. Individuals and local communities have given the responsibility for building resilience to traditional instruments of power: the military, national guard, and the police. Traditional power brokers do not always act in favour of the population; rather, they are instruments of political, economic, and ideological elites.

The traditional power approach to resilience is pursued irrespective of the observation that it is among the common people where human rights can have the most positive effect for themselves individually and a wider human security. Rights do not exist outside of a legal and codified framework. The United Nations declaration or convention on human rights provides such a framework. They also exist on the local plain from the perspective of the individual and their communities striving to make their lives better. Fundamentally, human rights are about how a person or group of people can live politically. That inequality is best tackled by those who experience and know it intimately, whether the cause is systemic or due to an eruption of violence. By working together with the local actors and institutions, joint civil military efforts can be repositioned to provide the necessary supports.

The escalating number of armed interventions around the globe, defined by military humanitarian doctrine, requires new forms of peace leadership incorporating all aspects of society. Peace and stability operations demand an individual's skilled working in complex operational environments, ones no longer dominated exclusively by states. The doctrines of the Responsibility to Protect (operationalisation of the Right to Protect or R2P) and the Responsibility to Rebuild require peace and stability operators to be active and responsible at all levels of society integrating Track I (formal), Track II (NGO and IO), and Track III (grassroots) diplomatic efforts simultaneously. Peace and defence diplomacy are massively ignored today even in the main institutions as the UN, NATO, and the EU. We must develop, as

we have already stated, a curriculum, a common platform of coeducation devising a common base to educate more in individual specialisations.

Not collective defence, nor civil defence, nor individual defence will be enough alone, or are enough when we are facing pandemics and climate changes. The answer is total defence. Algorithms fast and precise enough to react even before crises erupt, delivering to each specialist a list of tasks that they must fulfil, are an important wheel in a precise instrument. Another example of total defence is working as a member of a symphonic orchestra where each musicians represent its own sound and rhythm but, at the end, the symphony is a masterpiece. However: there is only one conductor, the one who decides when a single instrument enters. No musician is more or less important than the others. Yes, there is always the first violin, but there is a conductor's assistant prepared to replace the conductor shall they be accidentally missing.

Conclusion

Today's complex environments are often occupied by state-sanctioned armed combatants, non-state actors, international organisations, non-governmental organisations, media, and local populations, etc. Multi-level, multi-modal peace leadership now includes conflict prevention, assistance to civilian governance, and expanded forms of military-civilian cooperation. Single-minded approaches to peacebuilding are simply no longer relevant.

Who is the audience of our work? Are we going to wait until they come to our table, or are we going to present our specific product to them? Will we provide an academic approach against more active dissemination and constructing a net?

Following the Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice "to save succeeding generations" and to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small," and further "to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours," we must unite our strength to maintain international peace and protect the environment, the only one in which we can live, prosper, and be safe in every respect. It will not be enough if cards are only reshuffled, they must be replaced, and new rules engaged. Civilian and military players must learn how to play under new rules. This is not an easy task and many think-tanks, conferences, many published articles and finally a New Comprehensive and Interactive Peace College available to all on the globe via the Internet will help those changes become a reality and something between fiction, fairy-tale, and lost opportunities will become a fortress of new human security.

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Human security and human-centred defence as individual responsibility and collective activity
Abstract

Collective defence and individual (human) security are not necessarily two sides of the same coin, they are often two different currencies where it is almost impossible to calculate their real exchange rate and value. Current civil-military relationships often fall short of what is needed to meet emerging human security needs. We are confident that the positive interactions of civil-military actors help build resiliency. Human rights and human needs play a significant role in building resiliency. We call for the re-invention of civil defence as the holistic concept of individual responsibility and collective action. We need human-centered defence policy and planning, teaching, and practice. We need strong states to stand behind the civil defence concept that merges policy and strategy with local actors. Security is an individual responsibility and a collective activity that requires all elements of society to ensure success. Security cannot be outsourced to the military, nor any single civilian institution.

Key words: human security, individual responsibility, collective action, civil-military interaction, reimagine civil defence

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Education for security in the area of human threat

Introduction

The emerging disparities among societies of the new millennium are characterised by a series of internal and external military, social, environmental, and financial crises, unsustainable practices, the threat of globalisation, and finally, a crisis of democracy. The consequences of these crises include the exacerbation of social and economic inequalities and the loss of citizens' confidence in the democratic system.

The above disparities are also a sign of changing dynamics and the pace of changes. The pace of changes includes permanent scientific and technical progress, an all-encompassing communication and information network, more numerous and more complicated economic, political and cultural networks, and a model of a consumerist lifestyle. At the same time, we are witnessing horrific acts of violence of international terrorism, new forms of war (asymmetric, virtual, intra-social, semi-private, commercial), but also the depreciation and fall of apparent permanent truths and moral authorities. There is a belief that the current system of technological and industrial civilisation is in crisis, and that its ethics are evidently revalued.[1]

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[1]   *Mały słownik etyczny*, eds. S. Jedynak, 2nd edition complete and revised, Bydgoszcz: Oficyna Wydawnicza „Branta", [cop. 1999], pp. 280–281.

The current situation has made people realise that their living space is characterised by an increasing degree of anticipatory fear and insecurity, social division and polarisation, and a lack of hope, even among young people, who often face a more uncertain future.

Security in a place of residence and in the nearest neighbourhood is one of the most important aspects of a peaceful and comfortable human social existence. A large part of society is convinced that fighting crime rests exclusively with the state, and consistently demands effective actions of the police, efficient prosecutors, and courts. Society, however, notices the ineffectiveness of these entities' efforts and demands tightening penal repression.[2] All these factors contribute to the feeling of being lost and not keeping up with adaptation processes.[3] When analysing crime from the perspective of human security in a specific area of a person's life, we cannot ignore the issue of the entity that causes this threat. Broadly understood crime concerns people and their surrounding environment. It poses a serious threat to social order and public security. Security cannot be treated in isolation from the area of threats. The concept of threat is an antonym of security, these concepts are closely related and should not be considered separately.[4]

The world seems to be developing faster in the 21st century, and the number of threats is also increasing much more quickly. Due to numerous threats, people must protect their own freedom. In general, to protect them from ubiquitous, critical threats and other situations, it is necessary to create protective frameworks (security zones). It also means creating a strong system that will provide society with protection, dignity, livelihood, and survival.

The ongoing civilisational changes cause reshaping of our thinking about security and the related practical ways of ensuring it. Not all entities deal with this problem in a way which addresses the challenges of the 21st century. It largely depends on the nature and level of their safety culture. The first years of the 21st century have brought wider interest in the issues of security culture. It can be proven, inter alia, by the number of publications on the Internet and empirical research. The first scientific papers (master's theses and doctoral dissertations) are already being written on the basis of the internet research material on security culture. This issue is also being implemented in educational and scientific activities of many institutions.[5]

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2   J. Czapska, J. Widacki, Wstęp, [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo lokalne. Społeczny kontekst prewencji kryminalnej*, eds. *idem*, Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2000, p. 9.

3   J. Maciejewski, Niektóre aspekty bezpieczeństwa narodowego w ujęciu socjologicznym, [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo człowieka. Konteksty i dylematy*, ed. M. Rybakowski, Zielona Góra: Oficyna Wydawnicza Uniwersytetu Zielonogórskiego, 2007, p. 57.

4   D. Zbroszczyk, "Analysis of threats in the Masovian police district in the years 2016–2017", *Požární ochrana,* vol. 1, 2017, p. 306.

5   M. Cieślarczyk, Kultura bezpieczeństwa w realiach XXI wieku, [in:] *Czynić świat bardziej bezpiecznym: księga jubileuszowa dedykowana profesorowi doktorowi habilitowanemu Ryszardowi*

The emerging new knowledge architecture related to the culture of security imposes changes in all spheres of human life. The spread of computerisation and new media networks implies a "knowledge revolution" and transforms the entire knowledge system into an "infosphere" in a high-tech world, where knowledge is constantly being devalued and resources reorganised.

In the new architecture of knowledge, an area that requires special attention concerning the security of citizens is properly implemented education for security. It is a multifaceted process that calls for the integration of many scientific disciplines directly relating to the lives of individuals and communities.

The modern world poses many new challenges for education. One of them is undoubtedly "education towards responsibility". Responsibility in education is connected with striving to shape a rational person who has control over their existence, and who is therefore responsible for their own fate, actions, and relationships with other people.

The multifaceted nature of education raises the question of how to educate a person so that they can take responsibility for the planet and for themselves and future generations. Education is, in a sense, a form of a scientific conversation, and although – as Dawid Juraszek claims – this "conversation (face-to-face, on air, in writing) will show us a route, give us binoculars, even lace up our shoes, it won't get anywhere without us."[6]

It is worth noting that safety education is not only about solving specific problems, but about teaching the right way of thinking, teaching specific knowledge and skills, and understanding that people need to stay safe in a given situation. It is a process of gaining knowledge, which includes both upbringing and learning. It is a set of activities and influences aimed at educating people, especially children and adolescents, according to ideals and educational goals prevailing in a given society.[7]

Educating for security means preparing society to ensure the chances of survival and development, regardless of the type of security threats.[8] It can be assumed that a much desired component of education for security is creativity: the ability to learn, to be ready to face new challenges, and to modify learnt expectations; there can be no learning without re-learning, no revision when we do not realise the weakness of what we thought we knew. In the knowledge society, education is the ability

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Rosie, vol. 1, eds. A. Cudowska, J. Kunikowski, Siedlce: Wydawnictwo Akademii Podlaskiej, 2007, p. 107.

6   D. Juraszek, *Antropocen dla początkujących. Klimat, środowisko, pandemie w epoce człowieka*, Łódź: Wydawnictwo Liberté, 2020, p. 171.

7   Edukacja [headword], [in:] W. Okoń, *Nowy słownik pedagogiczny*, 10th edition complete and revised, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademickie „Żak", 2007, p. 93.

8   R. Stępień, Wstęp, [in:] *Współczesne zagadnienia edukacji dla bezpieczeństwa*, ed. *idem*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademii Obrony Narodowej, 1999, p. 9.

to be creative in an uncertain environment, and the ability to properly deal with cognitive dissonance which causes our failure to understand reality.[9]

The aim of the article is to present the role and significance of education for security in the context of the catalogue of threats to a person functioning and being active in various areas of life.

The main research problem is: What is the role and significance of education for security in the area of human danger?

The article uses the method of analysis, synthesis, and evaluation of literature.

The identity of a human being's space

A human being is a creature anchored in the surrounding space. They define their identity and navigate in the world thanks to the objects they use and spaces in which they spend time and act daily. They have a need to create, organise and get used to the existing reality.

Everyone needs a space to feel safe and free. The comfort zone, which guarantees a sense of security, requires space. Space affects the feeling of happiness and security, as well as efficiency and creativity. The space that shapes human security, on the one hand, fills people's surroundings and the environment, and on the other, it gives them the opportunity to shape the right attitudes.

The concept of space functions in many scientific fields. This indicates a very wide range of meanings of the concept, which continues to acquire new categories and features.

Space appears to be a specific superstructure which is the basis for relations between people of all professions and the world of existing objects. The list can be extended. Various social sciences vulgarise the word "space". They use it to describe what they want to know or the field they work in when they find no other term. There are as many types of space as there are sciences. Space is not a scientific work tool or even an instrument of history, which creates models and leaves its mark on space.[10]

In his book *Społeczne wytwarzanie przestrzeni* [Social Production of Space], Bohdan Jałowiecki focused on the ontological and epistemological meaning of space, and referred to the concepts of Henri Lefebvre, who took into account the structure and meaning of this concept and put forward four main theses concerning the above issues.[11]

9   D. Innerarity, *Incertesa i creativitat. Educar per a la societat del coneixement*, Barcelona: Fundació Jaume Bofill, 2010 (Debaty d'Educació, no. 18), pp. 5–6.

10   A. Pieczywok, Edukacyjne wyzwania bezpieczeństwa człowieka, [in:] M. Czuryk, K. Drabik, A. Pieczywok*, Bezpieczeństwo człowieka w procesie zmian społecznych, kulturowych i edukacyjnych,* Olsztyn: Katedra Bezpieczeństwa i Porządku Publicznego. Wydział Prawa i Administracji. Uniwersytet Warmińsko-Mazurski, 2018, p. 196.

11   B. Jałowiecki, *Społeczne wytwarzanie przestrzeni*, Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1988, p. 6.

The first of them indicates that space is "pure form, transparent brightness," and is therefore an idea free from any interpretation. In this approach, space is definite and unchanging. In the second approach, space is defined as a "social product" that can be described and researched empirically. Here, space is "the place of people and the objects and things produced by them." Apart from the social aspect, space also has a spiritual aspect because, according to Jałowiecki, it is "an objectification of what is social, and consequently, of what is spiritual." In the third sense, space is neither a starting point (that is, an idea in itself), nor a social product, but a means to act. The fourth claim is an extension of the previous one, that is, space is "the basis for reproduction of social relations of production."[12]

We can point to personal spaces of human functioning, spaces for professional and social work, spaces for free time and rest, etc. They are subject to the organisational rules and culture of good behaviour. They often reflect valuable observations on identity, personality, values, and past, present, and future behaviour. All people move between different spaces of belonging – physical and symbolic.

One of the most significant spaces of human functioning is social space filled with professional work, education, spending free time, etc. Not only does it create opportunities for the emergence of threats and fighting them, but it also has a significant impact on social, professional, and educational development. Additionally, it becomes a space for shaping human safety.

A place of frequent human presence and activity is public space. It can be assumed that there is a relationship between freedom and security in public space. The condition for the existence of a safe public space, however, is related both to the individual sense of personal security and to general public order. Zygmunt Bauman clearly noted this and wrote: "being people, we cannot live without freedom and security, but we cannot have both of them at the same time in quantities that we consider fully satisfactory."[13] In every city there are nooks and crannies with specific cultural values that evoke emotions and provoke reflection. These are usually places of special interest for residents and authorities – often in central districts of cities. They constitute public space in the traditional sense, together with a network of streets and squares, important buildings, monuments, and green urban areas.[14]

For public space, safety improvement programmes, guidelines for shaping high-quality public spaces and sustainable urban mobility plans are prepared. A safe space is not only a well-developed space, but also one that fosters building social capital.

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[12] *Ibidem.*

[13] Z. Bauman, *In Search of Politics,* Stanford University Press Stanford, California 1999, p. 2.

[14] M. Dymnicka, *Przestrzeń publiczna a przemiany miasta*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2013, p. 53.

A safe space consists of active residents who create a cooperation network for public safety and improvement of public space quality.[15]

Crime is not only a threat to residents' sense of security, but it also creates fear that can build an "atmosphere of consent and impunity," which leads to an increase in the intensity of crime. It is worth noting that urban public transport vehicles, bus stops, and communication stations are places where targets of criminal activities concentrate.

Urban development contributes to an increase in criminal behaviour, e.g., theft and violent behaviours. Certain categories of criminal behaviour (robbery, burglary, car theft) are characteristic for large-city centres and highly concentrated in them. Thus, by appropriately shaping this space, we can directly affect the environment in which crime may occur, and we can indirectly affect the target's or the victim's situation and the perpetrator's capabilities.[16]

The space of lifelong education, including education for security, plays quite a significant role in human development. The concept of educational space has its own definitions. Dictionary definitions of space and place refer to the approaches of Aristotle, who divided the categories of space into the following: *chora* – abstract space understood as a geometric extension, that is neither a void nor a place, and it is identified with the space of creation; and *topos* – a specific place constituting a location with contexts. It is not an area of sharp demarcation, but it is isolated.[17] Referring to the first approach to space, two definitions can be found in *Wielki słownik języka polskiego* [the Great Dictionary of the Polish Language]: 1) a three-dimensional and unlimited extension, and 2) a vast, empty area. As far as the second approach is concerned, space is defined as: 1) a set of objects located within it, and 2) distance and extent, space, and distance between one place and another.[18]

Educational space is a multidimensional social space in which the educational process, including teaching and upbringing, is carried out. Educational space understood in this way can be both material and immaterial, global and local, technological, cultural, institutional, and non-institutional.[19]

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[15]   A. Jasiński, *Architektura w czasach terroryzmu. Miasto, przestrzeń publiczna, budynek*, Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer Polska, 2013, p. 151.

[16]   B. Czarnecki, W. Siemiński, *Kształtowanie bezpiecznej przestrzeni publicznej*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Difin, 2004, p. 27.

[17]   H. Rämö, "An Aristotelian human time-space manifold. From Chronochora to Kairotopos", *Time and Society*, vol. 8, issue 2–3, 1999, pp. 309–328, https://doi.org/10.1177/096146 3X99008002006.

[18]   Przestrzeń [headword], [in:] L. Dereń, E. Polański, *Wielki słownik języka polskiego*, ed. E. Polański, Kraków: Krakowskie Wydawnictwo Naukowe, [cop. 2008], p. 678.

[19]   J. Morbitzer, Współczesna przestrzeń edukacyjna, [in:] *Ewaluacja i innowacje w edukacji. Kompetencje i odpowiedzialność nauczyciela,* ed. J. Grzesiak, Kalisz – Konin: Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu. Wydział Pedagogiczno-Artystyczny w Kaliszu – Państwowa Wyższa Szkoła Zawodowa w Koninie, 2010, p. 116.

Educational space in its essence is multidimensional, and entities and objects within it interact with each other. On the one hand, to some extent, educational space is imposed on its subjects; and on the other, it is created by them. Relationships between teaching space and learning space are also important.

Selected threats to human existence

Civilisation threats cross the borders of states and spread along with the processes of globalisation. They cause many dangers to people's lives. They are more dangerous as they are invisible, and knowable insofar as they are defined by science. These threats fundamentally change social and individual situations, cause new divisions, and create new areas of marginalisation and exclusion. In conjunction with changes of the third wave of globalisation, they are perhaps one of the most important factors determining the condition of the contemporary world society. This does not mean, however, that industrial societies were less risky, nor that the risk society replaced industrial ones. "Rather, the distinction between calculable risk and unpredictable uncertainty, between risk and awareness of risk, is blurred."[20]

In the scientific community, climate changes, loss of biodiversity, and pollution are key areas of urgent concern. While economic growth and technological innovation have led to an enormous increase in world wealth, they have also seriously degraded the planet's natural resources. This degradation is nowadays being accelerated by climate changes which also limit the energy capacities of many countries.

The world is now facing many health challenges. These include epidemics of vaccine-preventable diseases such as measles and diphtheria, more reports of drug-resistant pathogens, and the epidemic of obesity and inactivity. Since the first diagnosed case in China, the new coronavirus (COVID-19) infection has become the number one problem in the world and looks set to continue for a long time. The most affected are elderly patients, smokers, and patients suffering from multiple chronic conditions. The pandemic has shut down many major economies around the world, plunged millions of people into economic uncertainty, and killed 4.5 million people. For these and many other reasons, the pandemic has dominated all public health discussions.

Nowadays, cyber risk is included among the most serious threats to the global economy. Cyber criminals can use confidential data of a person or company to steal information or gain access to their financial accounts. Corporations are vulnerable to cyber-attacks, but individuals are also targeted because they store personal information on their cell phones and use unsecured public networks.

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[20] U. Beck, *Społeczeństwo ryzyka. W drodze do innej nowoczesności*, transl. by S. Cieśla, 2nd edition, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2004, p. 348.

Today, cyberspace is the fifth dimension of combat, offering many opportunities for offensive actions.[21] The dynamic qualitative development of threats (manifested, for example, in the creation and dissemination of new types of malware so far unknown) limits the possibilities of defence only to reactive actions. A modern terrorist who uses a computer or other device with Internet access is equipped with an efficient weapon that allows not only to attack in cyberspace or support recruitment, financing, propaganda, and communication, but also has the possibility of other, sophisticated activities, such as social engineering (influencing public opinion).[22]

Migration has emerged as a new global problem, and it is expected to accelerate in the coming years as climate changes and unfolding armed conflicts around the world make more people change their surroundings. The global community will have to deal with population mixing processes, and it is currently completely unprepared for this.

Poverty, exclusion, and negligence are fundamental social challenges to which there are no easy solutions. Before the pandemic, approximately one billion children worldwide suffered from at least one severe deprivation, such as a lack of access to education, health, housing, food, sanitation, and water. Unemployment is in fact one of the most important social challenges as it is a driver of exclusion and marginalisation, with the consequences of increasing crime, drug trafficking and use, family breakdowns, domestic violence, and migration in search of better opportunities.

The forces of disintegration are seen in growing evidence related to the collapse of government institutions with discredited leadership, widespread corruption, loss of public trust, and the currently growing groups of populist, reactionary and autocratic movements that reject multilateralism and diversity. The loss of moral responsibility, higher ethics, values, and even spirituality, significantly affects these forces of disintegration.[23]

Some minority languages are likely to become extinct in the near future. Many languages are falling out of use and are being replaced by others that are more widely used in a region or country, such as English in the USA or Spanish in Mexico. Unless current trends are reversed, these endangered languages will become extinct within the next century. Children do not learn old languages and these languages will become extinct when their last speakers die.

It can be stated that the nature of international security and conflicts remains unchanged. States – as usual – are entangled in military and economic rivalry. What is more, armed conflicts still seem inevitable, security dilemmas arise constantly, and it is still necessary to balance between them. In the following years,

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[21]   The others are air, sea, space, and land.

[22]   M. Witecka, Cyberterroryzm, [in:] *Zwalczanie terroryzmu*, eds. M. Marszałek, J.T. Limanowski, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademii Obrony Narodowej, 2014, p. 279.

[23]   S. Pinker, *Zmierzch przemocy. Lepsza strona naszej natury*, transl. by T. Bieroń, Poznań: Wydawnictwo Zysk i S-ka, [cop. 2015], p. 417.

there may be a further increase in the importance of hybrid threats to the security of Poland and NATO countries. Disinformation, cyber-attacks, subversive activity, and low-intensity conflicts will be exacerbated by the advancing technological revolution and global connectivity.

Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The attack is internationally considered an act of aggression. It can be concluded that Europe is facing its darkest hours since the Second World War. The Russian air force – which has played a low-key role so far – is launching devastating airstrikes. Massive cyber-attacks are sweeping across Ukraine, targeting key national infrastructure. Energy supplies and communications networks are cut off. Thousands of civilians are dying.

Conclusions

While summarising the content of this article, it should be stated that the author presented only selected areas of education and human threats. Two essential spaces are particularly close to people: virtual and real. Within these spaces, there are also social, public, educational space, etc.

In the area of human spatial security, it is important to note the need for cooperation between services responsible for security and for such activities which eliminate threats to the security of citizens and public order.

Modern education for security in the social dimension should support life skills and critical thinking among citizens, educate in the area of values, and develop analytical and decision-making skills. People who are responsible for this education should, in addition to direct communication, use the latest technologies, such as mobile applications, audio and video platforms, such as YouTube, podcasts, e-books, movies, etc., to educate people and make the learning process more engaging and interesting.

Furthermore, the implementation of education issues for safety requires dissemination of new spatial channels of communication, a greater variety of educational programmes, and the creation of a system offering a wider choice of these programmes.

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Education for security in the area of human threat
Abstract

Education for security serves to prepare citizens for appropriate behaviour and appropriate reactions in situations posing a threat to their health and life. At every step, we deal with many different threats that occur in all areas of human life. The main areas include

social, public, professional, and educational sphere. The aim of the article is to present the role and significance of education for security in the context of the catalogue of threats to a person functioning in various areas of their life. The article consists of an introduction, the identification of the human space, a list of selected threats, and a summary.

Key words: security, education for security, space, threats, identity

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The education system in the development of total defence. Poland's perspective

Introduction

The need for safety and security is a primary and existential one. Understood in personal terms, it pertains to individuals, small and large social groups, communities, and institutions which represent nations and states. Security understood negatively means a lack of threats. Security understood positively is the opposite of threats. According to Ryszard Zięba, national security is a category of individual nature and refers to individual states and their societies and nations, whereas international security pertains to a specified group of states, including the international system. It is often described as a sum of securities of particular states, including values that are common to a particular system.[1] However, Włodzimierz Fehler argues that the notions of national and international security constitute categories that are subject to change over time and space. It means that permanent state security, similarly to state position in the international arena, is impossible to achieve. It is the reasonable measures taken by political decision-makers who should take the national interest into consideration, that determine the creation of conditions for the secure development of a state.[2]

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[1]   R. Zięba, Pozimnowojenny paradygmat bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego, [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe po zimnej wojnie*, ed. *idem*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, 2008, pp. 15–16.

[2]   *Współczesne bezpieczeństwo*, ed. W. Fehler, Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Grado, [cop. 2005], pp. 11–15.

The essence of broadly understood security amounts to satisfying such fundamental spheres as: existence and survival; the sense, protection and enrichment of identity; independence; integrity; confidence and certainty regarding functioning and development; and respect for such imponderabilia as honour and tradition. The last two are of particular importance for national security. As rightly pointed out by Roman Kuźniar, without these imponderabilia nations lose their soul and individuals lose the sense of patriotism and willingness to make sacrifices for their country. Without them there can be no stable and democratic states with stable economic systems, where nations benefit from civilisational development thanks to modern education.[3]

Modern education, which in a multifaceted and multidimensional manner approaches and is devoted to issues related to security and its challenges and threats, as well as to social behaviours, including specifically defence in the event of broadly understood conflicts and wars, should constitute a pillar of education, especially at the beginning of the third decade of the 21st century.

This paper will present the education system model in Poland in terms of security education at the beginning of the third decade of the 21st century. It will also analyse education system model modification in connection with the reform of the education system. The hypothesis of this paper is included in the assumption that Poland's security in the 21st century is based on the state's military capacity and on the military and political alliances formed by decision-makers. However, this model of building security is not sufficient in the face of constantly changing and evolving security threats and challenges. Security should be based not only on a hard dimension, but also on a soft one, whose main pillar is security education aimed at preparing society for responding in situations which pose a broadly understood threat to security. Only an adequately educated society will be able to undertake effective actions in an emergency and avoid mass panic. The aim of this paper is to provide answers to questions concerning the targets, objectives, and effectiveness of the current security education module. Is the adopted educational model compatible with social expectations and does it correspond with the dominant challenges and threats to Poland and the world? Having completed this educational module, is a young citizen of the Republic of Poland aware of the challenges and threats to state security, the necessity of defence, and above all, the possible lines of action to be taken towards increased security? The following research methods will be used in the study: analysis of sources, systemic analysis, and the comparative method.

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3   R. Kuźniar, Wstęp, [in:] *Polska polityka bezpieczeństwa 1989–2000*, ed. *idem*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2001, pp. 13–14.

From civil defence training to security education – a step towards total defence or merely a change in the name of the school subject?

As accurately pointed out by Marcin Lasoń, a state security policy should be of preventive nature, thus its objective is to prevent negative phenomena as well as to prevent and eliminate threats which may have a destructive effect on the values protected by the state. Therefore, each state should have a specified security strategy based on strategic culture, as those two elements constitute the pillars of state security policy.[4] The educational dimension of the society and its awareness of threats constitute one of the bases upon which the aforementioned strategy, culture, and security policy should be built, and which should definitely be taken into account.

Piotr Małecki rightly indicates that Poland's security after 1989 was based on two extremely important determinants. One of them is the technical modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces and reforms of their structure as well as their command-and-control system. The other factor concerns building and strengthening alliances as well as the allied cooperation, which is expressed by Poland's accession to NATO, the Polish–American alliance, and regional cooperation. However, the main problem is that the most significant factor determining state security, which is society, has been practically left out in the whole process of building security. Meanwhile, in order to weather a crisis related to military aggression or a natural disaster, society must be resilient to crises. Society cannot succumb to mass panic in the event of a crisis or war. Society must be able to survive several weeks without access to electricity, running water, open shops, and the banking system. Society must have the appropriate knowledge of the safe shelter options. And finally, society must be able to support the fighting armed forces.[5] Adequate behaviour of society may be a factor having a significant impact on the course of a crisis or conflict and may even counterbalance the opponent's potential.

Therefore, the total defence strategy,[6] which assumes that the whole state and society should be involved in the defence of the state's sovereignty, while the armed forces constitute only one of the major elements of the defence system, becomes the basis for effective battlefield operations or actions in the face of danger. The total defence strategy, besides adequate technological and logistical preparation of the armed forces, also encompasses appropriate education and training on security

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[4]   M. Lasoń, Bezpieczeństwo w stosunkach międzynarodowych, [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe w XXI wieku. Wybrane problemy*, ed. E. Cziomer, Kraków: Oficyna Wydawnicza AFM, 2010, pp. 15–16.

[5]   P. Małecki, *Obrona Totalna – jak zbudować społeczeństwo odporne na kryzys [OPINIA]*, Defence24, 11 February 2020, https://defence24.pl/sily-zbrojne/obrona-totalna-jak-zbudowac-spoleczenstwo-odporne-na-kryzys-opinia [accessed: 10 February 2022].

[6]   P. Szymański, "New Ideas for Total Defence. Comprehensive Security in Finland and Estonia", *OSW Report*, 31 March 2020, pp. 11–13.

provided to the society and response to dangers, as well as civil defence preparation and adjustments made in the functioning of particular institutions in a situation of armed conflict.

In the case of Poland, teaching the theory and, to a small extent, also some practical skills within the framework of a school subject called security education (or, literally: "education for security") is one of the most significant educational pillars of the preparation of the society for total defence. Security education was introduced to lower secondary schools on 1 September 2009, and to schools above the lower secondary level on 1 September 2012. In both cases, it was only one hour per week. Importantly, security education replaced the subject included in the so-called old core curriculum, called civil defence training. This subject had been taught for two hours per week in secondary schools. Following the reform of the Polish education system and the abolishment of lower secondary schools, in accordance with the new regulations put into effect on 1 September 2017,[7] security education was taught in the eighth grade of eight-year primary schools and in post-primary schools. According to Article 166 [Obligation concerning security education] of the Act of 21 November 1967 on universal obligation to defend the Republic of Poland, "1. Security education is obligatory for primary and post-primary school students: general secondary school, technical secondary school, and stage I sectoral vocational school, with the exception of schools for adults. 2. Security education is a compulsory subject in the schools listed in clause 1. It is taught one hour per week in the education cycle."[8] The subject is taught only at the basic level.

The security education teacher – the key to success

When analysing the significance of security education for total defence, some conclusions can be drawn, which, regrettably, are not very positive. The first problem negatively affecting the quality of teaching security education, and thus resulting in poor preparation of the young generation for conscious actions in the event of a threat to security, is the security education teacher. The basic question arising at this point is: who can teach security education? The answer, in a way, seems to be banal. It can be any person who has graduated from a higher education institution with pedagogical preparation in any field and has completed a postgraduate security education course

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[7] Ustawa z dnia 14 grudnia 2016 r. – Przepisy wprowadzające ustawę – Prawo oświatowe, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland], 2017, item 60, http://www.dziennikustaw.gov.pl/du/2017/60/1 [accessed: 22 February 2022].

[8] Ustawa z dnia 21 listopada 1967 r. o powszechnym obowiązku obrony Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Dz.U., 2021, item 372 i.e., as amended on 21 December 2021, https://sip.lex.pl/akty-prawne/dzu-dziennik-ustaw-powszechny-obowiazek-obrony-rzeczypospolitej-polskiej-16787130?unitId=art(166) [accessed: 22 February 2022].

in accordance with the Regulation of the Minister of Science and Higher Education of 25 July 2019 on the standard of education preparing for the teaching profession.[9] The postgraduate programmes in the field of security education usually last three semesters (334 hours) and comprise the following thematic blocks: *The defence system and the armed forces in the Republic of Poland*; *Legal aspects of security management*; *Civil protection and civil defence*; *Dangers and threats in wartime*; *Dangers and threats in peacetime*; *Psychological foundations of actions in crisis situations*; *Methodology of working with a group*; *Basics of sanitary and medical rescue*; *Interpersonal communication*; and *Practical teacher training*. Completion of the course does not involve the need to possess specialist knowledge or specific abilities or skills. Security education can be taught by a teacher who has completed the postgraduate programme, that is a teacher of physical education, geography, history, but also mathematics or Polish. Hardly ever is the subject taught by a person who is truly passionate about security, a person experienced in the broadly understood uniformed services or a graduate from studies in the field of national and international security. Furthermore, in most cases such teachers teach security education only a few hours per week, in addition to their primary subject (which does not ensure full-time employment to them), which often means teaching part-time in several schools. The person teaching security education does so only in order to be employed full-time, which would not be possible if they taught only their primary subject. This is the reason why security education has become a subject of secondary importance to teachers, and teachers themselves do not treat it as a priority. Teachers' indifference to the educational process results in pupils also becoming indifferent to the theory and, even more importantly, to the practical dimension of security education.

Prestige of security education – can security education be a matriculation subject?

Another matter of some concern is the fact that both teachers and pupils frequently raise the argument that security education is not a GCSE (secondary school leaving examination) subject and thus it is not worth investing their intellectual efforts, which often has a negative impact on the pupils' and teachers' motivation. It is simply enough to "get through" and get a grade on the certificate. It is worth noting that this problem is wider in scope and cannot be solved by teachers or pupils. It is the state and political decision-makers, and also the Ministry of Education, who should take the status of security education in schools into consideration, if they take seriously

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[9]   Rozporządzenie Ministra Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego z dnia 25 lipca 2019 r. w sprawie standardu kształcenia przygotowującego do wykonywania zawodu nauczyciela, Dz.U., 2019, item 1450, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU20190001450/O/D20191450.pdf [accessed: 20 February 2022].

the objective to educate and make the society aware of security challenges and threats and the ways of coping with them. To achieve this, it seems necessary to resort to past solutions. The subject called "civil defence training" taught only in schools at the secondary level was a far better solution which had and still has its advantages. Older youth are more aware of the knowledge they acquire and of its applicability in practice, especially when it concerns the fundamental sphere of security of individuals, societies, and states. Teaching security education in the eighth grade of primary school is not substantially justified. Certainly, it would be preferable to increase the number of teaching hours in security education in post-primary schools and make security education a GCSE subject. This idea is not impracticable. It should be noted that several years ago the subject called social studies was treated in exactly the same way as security education is at present. Increasing the number of social studies teaching hours in classes in which it was an extended level subject and adding social studies to the list of GCSE subjects taken into account in the higher education recruitment process,[10] has considerably increased the youth's interest in this subject and has had a positive effect both on teaching and learning. Security education could thus follow in the footsteps of social studies. What is required, however, are reasonable and responsible political decisions and a will to make changes on the part of politicians at the central level.

Practical limitations to teaching security education – dividing classes into groups and a lack of professional equipment

Practical limitations to teaching security education constitute the third problem related to the low teaching standard of this subject. This is due to several factors, the most important of which is the fact that the subject is taught in large groups, usually whole classes, which often comprise over 30 students. Such large groups do not pose a serious obstacle in theoretical knowledge instruction. However, they constitute a significant limitation as far as the practical part is concerned. Is it possible to effectively practise saving human life with resuscitation in a 45-minute lesson attended by a group of thirty or more people? Such a task seems to be simply impracticable. In this case, however, the problem does not lie with the teachers or pupils, but with School Directors and authorities responsible for running schools, who do not agree to teaching the subject in classes divided into smaller groups due to financial reasons. It is important to note that Directors and authorities responsible for running schools do not comply with the provisions of the Regulation of the Minister of National Education of 28 August 2009 on the implementation of security education. According to

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[10]   *Egzamin maturalny: wiedza o społeczeństwie, poziom rozszerzony. Sprawozdanie za rok 2021*, Centralna Komisja Egzaminacyjna, 17 September 2021, https://cke.gov.pl/images/_EGZAMIN_MATURALNY_OD_2015/Informacje_o_wynikach/2021/sprawozdanie/EM_wos_sprawozdanie_2021.pdf [accessed: 21 February 2022].

§1 "1. Classes of over 30 pupils shall be divided into groups in security education lessons which include practical training in first aid. 2. Classes of 30 or fewer pupils may be divided into groups during practical training referred to in clause 1, with the agreement of the authority responsible for running the school [...]."[11] In Polish schools, modern foreign languages, physical education, and sometimes extended level subjects are usually taught in smaller groups, but certainly not security education.

When analysing the limitations related to the possibilities of effective security education teaching, it should be added that the fourth negative factor is the lack of appropriate equipment in the classrooms where security education is taught. Security education labs simply do not exist. The subject is taught in various subject-based classrooms, and it is the teacher's task to provide didactic aids if the class is of practical nature. The teacher frequently does not have any professional equipment as the school has limited financial resources, which means that the purchase of items such as phantoms, masks, training defibrillators, splints for bone fractures or even ordinary medical supplies, including dressing materials and disinfectants, becomes a secondary need. In reality, this means that practical training, which should account for 10% of the overall number of security education classes, is carried out far less frequently or does not take place at all. In this situation the question of how to teach pupils to respond to crisis situations if it is not possible for them to practise emergency procedures, becomes a rhetorical one. In this case theory is highly insufficient!

Security education curriculum

The final obstacle to be discussed in this paper, which makes it impossible for security education to become an effective instrument in strengthening total defence, is the course curriculum and the fact that is has been divided into two educational stages. The security education curriculum is based on the core curriculum defined in the Regulation of the Minister of National Education of 30 January 2018 on the core curriculum of general education for general secondary schools, technical secondary schools, and stage II sectoral vocational schools.[12] The security education

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[11]   Rozporządzenia Ministra Edukacji Narodowej z dnia 28 sierpnia 2009 r. w sprawie sposobu realizacji edukacji dla bezpieczeństwa, Dz.U., 2009, no. 139, item 1131, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU20091391131/O/D20091131.pdf [accessed: 21 February 2022]; Rozporządzenie Ministra Edukacji Narodowej z dnia 14 czerwca 2017 r. zmieniające rozporządzenie w sprawie sposobu realizacji edukacji dla bezpieczeństwa, Dz.U., 2017, item 1239, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU20170001239 [accessed: 21 February 2022].

[12]   Rozporządzenie Ministra Edukacji Narodowej z dnia 30 stycznia 2018 r. w sprawie podstawy programowej kształcenia ogólnego dla liceum ogólnokształcącego, technikum oraz branżowej szkoły II stopnia, Dz.U., 2018, item 467, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU20180000467/O/D20180467.pdf [accessed: 17 February 2022].

curriculum is based on four modules, which also specify general objectives defined for this subject. They are: 1) state security; 2) training in rescue activities in emergencies (mass casualty incidents and disasters); 3) first aid basics; 4) health education – individual and collective health and health-promoting behaviours.[13] It should be stressed that the curricula in primary schools and post-primary schools are practically identical. What is the point in implementing such a solution and what is the purpose of teaching virtually the same material twice? It is hard to provide a reasonable answer to this question. Revised textbooks with a more modern layout are not sufficient for security education to be taught effectively and to become interesting, and above all, to be helpful in social life. Introducing a new module called "Health education" to the new security education curriculum in post-secondary schools does not make this subject more valuable or useful. Perhaps it would be worth following the example of other European countries, especially Scandinavian, where a huge emphasis has for many years been put on actual "education for security" and not on "education about security" with a great deal of unnecessary information, which is typical of Polish schools.

Conclusion

Increased social resilience to aggression, which is inextricably linked to an adequate model of security education, is the key to effective protection and defence of society and a state against internal and external threats. Security education is thus a part of national education and constitutes one of the key elements of total defence. However, the idea of an effective model of security education is that, apart from teaching theoretical knowledge of wars and armed conflicts, challenges and threats to state security or the ability to identify structures and activities of uniformed services in Poland, it is necessary to instil in young people practical skills related to a response in crisis situations, including situations posing a threat to human health and life.

Therefore, the call for an increased number of security education teaching hours in post-primary schools, and above all, for an increased number of practical classes dedicated to medical rescue, and even battlefield rescue, as well as the basics of weapon handling, seems to be well justified. Such measures would certainly make a positive contribution to the training – at the basic level – of at least the younger part of society and to strengthening the social dimension of total defence. Placing greater emphasis on practical skills, raising the prestige of security education by adding it to the list of GCSE subjects, as well as selecting the teaching staff who can

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[13]   B. Boniek, *Edukacja dla Bezpieczeństwa. Program nauczania dla szkół ponadpodstawowych (liceum i technikum)*, Gdynia: Wydawnictwo Operon, 2019, pp. 3–16.

teach this subject (with emphasis placed on specialists in the field of security and graduates from faculties related to national and international security) is definitely the key to success in building the educational pillar of total defence.

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Rozporządzenia Ministra Edukacji Narodowej z dnia 28 sierpnia 2009 r. w sprawie sposobu realizacji edukacji dla bezpieczeństwa, Dz.U., 2009, no. 139, item 1131.

Rozporządzenie Ministra Edukacji Narodowej z dnia 14 czerwca 2017 r. zmieniające rozporządzenie w sprawie sposobu realizacji edukacji dla bezpieczeństwa, Dz.U., 2017, item 1239.

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The education system in the development of total defence.
Poland's perspective

Abstract

One of the key pillars of total defence is an increased social resilience to aggression, which is inextricably linked to an adequate model of security education. Poland's security in the 21st century is based on the state's military capacity and on the military and political alliances formed by decision-makers. However, this model of building security is not sufficient in the face of constantly changing and evolving security threats and challenges. Therefore, security should be based not only on a hard dimension, but also on a soft one, whose main pillar is security education. The idea of an effective model of security education is that, apart from giving young people theoretical knowledge, it is necessary to instil in them practical skills related to responding in crisis situations, including situations posing a threat to human health and life. Security education should constitute the first stage in training society in total defence. The educational model currently functioning in Poland definitely needs to be reformed.

Key words: security education, education system, Poland, total defence, security

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Opportunities to increase Poland's defence capacity through in-service training for teachers of military preparation units

Introduction

The professionalisation of the Polish Armed Forces in 2010 resulted in a reduction to a 100,000-strong force. This significantly decreased the supply of trained reserve personnel. In addition, until 2013, there was no training in this area, and these reserves were supplemented by professional soldiers leaving service, numbering about 7,000 per year. Therefore, in 2014, the Polish authorities restored and intensified the training of reserve personnel, and at the end of 2015, they made decisions aimed at doubling the size of the Polish army. Thus, the Polish Armed Forces today are facing the task of rebuilding their personnel reserves, including ensuring a large inflow of younger reserve soldiers.[1] New forms of short military training for volunteers have been created for this purpose, in line with the objective that within the next few years, the number of soldiers and employees of the military will exceed 200,000, while the

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[1]   *Koncepcja obronna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, Warszawa: Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, Maj 2017 / *The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland*, Warsaw: Ministry of National Defence, May 2017, p. 56.

Act on the Defence of the Homeland (ustawa o obronie ojczyzny),[2] currently being debated by the Polish Parliament, makes provisions for the Polish Armed Forces to grow to 300,000. Hence, it is now essential to conduct systematic monitoring of military human resources, and to take action to increase the number of recruits where necessary.[3]

With the above in mind, this article aims to analyse the possibility of increasing Poland's defence capacity through in-service training for teachers of military preparation units. The main problem is formulated in the following question: What are the possibilities of increasing the defence capacity of Poland through in-service training for teachers of military preparation units? To solve this research problem, a systemic approach was used, focused on the study of phenomena in their entirety, taking into account their characteristic features and qualities, and on determining the diversity of their internal relations.[4] An important element of the research was the analysis of literature on the subject of military education classes in Poland, as well as the study of regulatory documents in the area under consideration. The supporting research used theoretical methods such as analysis, synthesis and inference were applied.[5] The study presented here includes an account of the origins of the military preparation units and a description of the features of the in-service training for teachers of those units, conducted at the War Studies University. The discussion ends with a set of conclusions.

The origins of military preparation units

One finding that resulted from efforts to monitor and increase the defence capacity of Poland wat that the number of students in Polish secondary schools with military education classes[6] was about fifty thousand.[7] An analysis of the educational content

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[2]　Ustawa z dnia 11 marca 2022 r. o obronie Ojczyzny, tekst ustawy przyjęty przez Senat bez poprawek, http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/opinie9.nsf/nazwa/2052_u/$file/2052_u.pdf [accessed: 26 March 2022].

[3]　*Koncepcja obronna ..., op. cit.*, p. 56.

[4]　P. Sienkiewicz, *Podstawy teorii systemów*, Warszawa: Akademia Obrony Narodowej, 1993.

[5]　Cf. J. Apanowicz, *Metodologia ogólna*, Gdynia: [Wyższa Szkoła Administracji i Biznesu], 2002, pp. 24–28; M. Pelc, *Elementy metodologii badań naukowych*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademii Obrony Narodowej, 2012, pp. 67–71.

[6]　The term "military education classes" (or "uniformed service classes") is used in Poland to describe high school classes that follow a broadly defined educational programme, including topics related to national defence, the history of the Polish military, and the shaping of patriotic attitudes among children and youth. Cf. I. Urych, *Potencjał obronny klas wojskowych. Teoretyczno-empiryczne aspekty kształcenia obronnego*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademii Sztuki Wojennej, 2019.

[7]　*Program nauczania dla szkół ponadgimnazjalnych przedmiotu „Edukacja wojskowa"*, Warszawa: Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, 2017, pp. 4–12, 61; *Koncepcja sprawowania opieki (nadzoru) przez Akademię Sztuki Wojennej nad przebiegiem procesu edukacyjnego uczniów wybranych*

showed that the level of education of young people in those classes was varied and often based on teachers' own programmes.[8] As a result, graduates of military classes often exhibit varying degrees of military training and selective military knowledge. Therefore, in 2017, in 57 selected certified secondary schools with military education classes, the *Program nauczania dla szkół ponadgimnazjalnych przedmiotu „Edukacja wojskowa"* [Military Education Syllabus for Secondary Schools] was introduced. This syllabus mainly covered three semesters lasting from 4 September 2017 to around 11 February 2019 (the beginning of the 2019 school winter holiday). The implementation of the *Program pilotażowy przedmiotu Edukacja wojskowa* [Pilot Programme for Military Education] was supported by military units, training centres, and Territorial Military Administration Bodies (Terenowe Organy Administracji Wojskowej, TOAW) responsible for the regions in which the schools were located,[9] and with the support of the War Studies University on the matter of the course content.[10]

Another reform of the classes introduced the formula of what came to be known as military preparation units, created under provisions of the Act of 19 July 2019 on amendments to the Educational Law and the Act on the financing of educational tasks (ustawa o zmianie ustawy – Prawo oświatowe oraz ustawy o finansowaniu zadań oświatowych), which came into force on 1 January 2020.[11] The first recruitment procedure for military preparation units was conducted in the 2020/2021 school year, at which time, 120 such units were formed. In the following school year, 30 more units were set up. These actions serve to make education popularising defence more widespread, which is considered by the Ministry of National Defence to be of particular importance. The ministry's objective is to supply the personnel reserves of the Armed Forces, the Territorial Defence Forces, with volunteers, increasing the number of troops in the long term, as well as strengthening defence education in society.[12]

Educational supervision over the implementation of military training in secondary schools with military preparation units is exercised by the Minister of National Defence, who, in consultation with the Minister of Education, is responsible for establishing appropriate regulations determining the following:

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  klas mundurowych szkół ponadgimnazjalnych prowadzących przedmiot nauczania „Edukacja wojskowa", Warszawa: Akademia Sztuki Wojennej, 2017, pp. 1–4.

[8] L. Kanarski, M. Koter, K. Loranty, I. Urych, Wstępna diagnoza funkcjonowania klas mundurowych – wyniki badań pilotażowych, [in:] *Klasy mundurowe. Od teorii do dobrych praktyk*, eds. A. Skrabacz, I. Urych, L. Kanarski, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademii Obrony Narodowej, 2016, pp. 71–82.

[9] *Ibidem.*

[10] *Koncepcja sprawowania..., op. cit.*

[11] Ustawa z dnia 19 lipca 2019 r. o zmianie ustawy – Prawo oświatowe oraz ustawy o finansowaniu zadań oświatowych, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland], 2019, item 1681.

[12] Wojsko Polskie, Oddziały Przygotowania Wojskowego, https://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/opw/ [accessed: 20 February 2022].

1) the Syllabus implemented by the military preparation units, with a view to preparing students for military service, developing skills useful in such service, and shaping patriotic and pro-defence attitudes among students;

2) the organisation and form of classes carried out under the aforementioned Syllabus, including the minimum number of hours of theoretical and practical instruction, the place where these classes are held, and the size of a unit;

3) the conditions in which practical classes are conducted, taking into account the safety of students, the need to ensure the uninterrupted operation of military units, and the possibility of some practical classes being conducted by instructors of pro-defence organisations to enable students to acquire practical military skills.[13]

The formation of a military preparation unit must not violate the rights of a student to obtain the knowledge and skills necessary to complete the type of school in question, or the conditions and manner of conducting the appropriate examinations, and in the case of public schools, it must not violate the rights of a student to free education and care as provided by Polish law. The military preparation unit training programme, therefore, constitutes extracurricular content whose theoretical part is provided by the school, and the practical one – by the patron military unit. The training ends with a 50-hour training camp organised at the beginning of the final year of schooling.[14]

The organisational structure responsible for the operation of military preparation units is the Office for the "Become a Soldier of the Republic of Poland" Programme ("Zostań żołnierzem RP"). The activities of this Office are in line with the objective of the Minister of National Defence related to increasing the number of troops in the Polish Armed Forces, and with the objective of the President of the Republic of Poland related to reinforcing the personnel reserves of those forces. Hence, the mission of the Office is to create a coherent and integrated system for strengthening military potential. In other words, the Office strives to achieve a synergy effect, starting with organisational matters, and continuing through training programmes, in order to create an increased potential for the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland. These actions are systemic in nature; therefore, the Office emphasises that the benefits of the programme will be achievable and perceptible within a certain time frame.[15]

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[13] Rozporządzenie Ministra Obrony Narodowej z dnia 7 sierpnia 2020 r. w sprawie wsparcia dla organu prowadzącego oddział przygotowania wojskowego, Dz.U. 2020, item 1390.

[14] Wojsko Polskie, Oddziały..., *op. cit.*

[15] J. Graf, "Gen. Dębczak: Potrzebny spójny system rekrutacji do Wojska Polskiego [wywiad]", Defence24, 21 February 2020, https://www.defence24.pl/gen-debczak-potrzebny-spojny-system-rekrutacji-do-wojska-polskiego [accessed: 21 February 2022].

In-service training for teachers of military preparation units at the War Studies University

To meet expectations associated with the need to train teachers of military preparation units to teach the course, members of the War Studies University staff[16] have prepared a part-time postgraduate "In-service training programme in the implementation of the syllabus for military preparation units."[17] The programme expands the knowledge and competences of teachers conducting the 70 hours of theoretical instruction contained in the *Program szkolenia realizowany w OPW* [Syllabus for Military Preparation Units].[18] In this way, the role of the War Studies University has also changed, and instead of merely supervising the content, it seeks to take part in the professional development of teachers in relation to the implementation of the Syllabus for Military Preparation Units.[19]

It is no coincidence that this form of in-service training is carried out at the War Studies University. This is because, as the successor to the National Defence University (Akademia Obrony Narodowej), since 1 October 2016,[20] it has continued in the tradition of the Military Training School (Szkoła Wojskowa Aplikacyjna) (1820–1831) and the Higher School of War (Wyższa Szkoła Wojenna) (1919–1946). It plays an important role in the system of preparation and professional development of command, staff, and logistics personnel of the Polish Armed Forces at all levels of command: tactical, operational, and strategic. It does so within the framework of relevant post-graduate studies and qualification and in-service training courses conducted as part of the professional development system of the Polish Armed Forces. The tasks of the University also include training civilians

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[16]   The authors of the programme of part-time postgraduate "In-service training in the implementation of the syllabus for military preparation units" are Ilona Urych and Col. Zbigniew Leśniewski, both associate professors at the War Studies University.

[17]   *Program studiów podyplomowych Doskonalenie zawodowe w zakresie realizacji programu szkolenia w Oddziałach Przygotowania Wojskowego. Forma studiów: niestacjonarne*, Warszawa: Akademia Sztuki Wojennej, Wydział Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, Wydział Wojskowy, 2020.

[18]   Program szkolenia realizowany w OPW, załącznik do rozporządzenia Ministra Obrony Narodowej z dnia 21 maja 2020 r., Dz.U. 2020, item 977.

[19]   I. Urych, *Możliwości doskonalenia zawodowego w Akademii Sztuki Wojennej, w zakresie realizacji programu szkolenia w oddziałach przygotowania wojskowego*, paper delivered at IX Ogólnopolskie Forum Szkół „Edukacja Obronna Młodzieży", Wrocław: 9–10 January 2020; I. Urych, Z. Leśniewski, *Naprzeciw oczekiwaniom... O nowo tworzonych oddziałach przygotowania wojskowego*, paper delivered at I Pedagogiczno-Mundurowa Krajowa Konferencja Naukowa "Bezpieczeństwo a edukacja w świetle współczesnych zagrożeń", Kielce: 21–22 February 2020; I Pedagogiczno-Mundurowa Krajowa Konferencja Naukowa „Bezpieczeństwo a edukacja w świetle współczesnych zagrożeń", https://konferencjapedagogicznomundurowa.konsorcjum.edu.pl/ [accessed: 2 March 2020].

[20]   Ustawa z dnia 20 maja 2016 r. o utworzeniu Akademii Sztuki Wojennej, Dz.U. 2016, item 906.

in the field of national security and defence, particularly for the needs of the central administration and local government, or in other words, preparation of individuals for public tasks, especially in the field of national security and the emergency response system.[21]

The programme for part-time postgraduate "In-service training in the implementation of the syllabus for military preparation units" consists of four educational modules consistent with the *Program szkolenia realizowany w OPW* [Syllabus for Military Preparation Units].[22] These are as follows: Basic Civic and Military Education, Combat Training, Logistics Training, and Legal Training. Within the framework of these modules are subjects[23] whose Syllabus and number of hours correspond to the content of the instruction provided by the military preparation units (table 1). In the Basic Civic and Military Education module, the subjects taught are Military Drill and Regulations, and Civic Education, Military Practice and Discipline. The Combat Training module includes Tactics, SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape), Marksmanship Training, Military Reconnaissance, Engineer-Sapper Training, Defence against Weapons of Mass Destruction, General Air Defence, Communications, Topography, Protection and Defence of Facilities, Fitness Classes, and Medical Training. The Logistics Training module is itself a subject that includes content on Construction and Operation of Armament and Military Equipment, Logistics Security, Environmental Protection, Fire Prevention, and Occupational Health and Safety (OHS). The Legal Training module consists of Legal Training and Protection of Classified Information.

The studies last for two semesters, in a system of 7–8 meetings each semester, held on Saturdays and Sundays. A prerequisite for graduation is earning at least 30 ECTS credits, and the basis for calculating the final grade for the studies, recorded on the diploma, is as follows:

1) 60% – cumulative average of all examinations and final class grades earned over the entire course of studies;
2) 30% – positive grade for the diploma thesis, according to the assessment of the thesis supervisor;
3) 10% – grade for the diploma examination, which is calculated by the examination committee as the average of the grades given by each of the individual members of the committee.[24]

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21   Wojsko Polskie, Misja i zadania, https://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/aszwoj/o-akademii-misja-i-zadania [accessed: 2 June 2022].

22   *Program studiów..., op. cit.*

23   *Ibidem*, pp. 3–5.

24   *Ibidem*, pp. 17–19.

Table 1. Subjects in the programme of part-time postgraduate "In-service training in the implementation of the syllabus for military preparation units"

No.	Subject name	Hours
1	Military Drill and Regulations	14
2	Civic Education, Military Practice and Discipline	20
3	SERE	8
4	Tactics	26
5	Marksmanship Training	28
6	Military Reconnaissance	6
7	Engineer-Sapper Training	6
8	Defence against Weapons of Mass Destruction	6
9	General Air Defence	4
10	Communications	12
11	Topography	18
12	Protection and Defence of Facilities	4
13	Fitness Classes	12
14	Medical Training	10
15	Logistics Training	10
16	Legal Training and Protection of Classified Information	8
17	Diploma Seminar	28
	Total	**220**

Source: *Program studiów podyplomowych Doskonalenie zawodowe w zakresie realizacji programu szkolenia w oddziałach przygotowania wojskowego. Forma studiów: niestacjonarne*, Warszawa: Akademia Sztuki Wojennej, Wydział Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, Wydział Wojskowy, 2020, p. 19.

Admission to the diploma exam is contingent upon the above and on the submission of documents required for the award of the diploma. The diploma exam is conducted by an appropriately designated committee. The committee includes a chairperson and the supervisor of the diploma thesis, and at least one member of the committee should hold a post-doctoral degree (*dr hab.*) or an academic title. The diploma exam is an oral exam during which the student should demonstrate knowledge and skills in the subject area of the thesis and the course of study. A positive grade is required for the diploma to be awarded.

Completion of the Diploma Seminar is a prerequisite for the final diploma exam. The seminar is conducted by duly appointed prominent instructors at the War Studies University. The diploma thesis is prepared by diploma students in accordance with the *Wytyczne do przygotowania prac dyplomowych w Akademii Sztuki Wojennej od roku akademickiego 2019/2020* [Guidelines for the Preparation of Diploma Theses at the War Studies University as of the Academic Year 2019/2020].[25]

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[25] *Wytyczne do przygotowania prac dyplomowych w Akademii Sztuki Wojennej od roku akademickiego 2019/2020*, Warszawa: Akademia Sztuki Wojennej, Oddział Organizacji Kształcenia, 2020.

The authors of this article, who are also the supervisors of the studies discussed here, believe that it is no easy task to complete this form of in-service training for teachers of military preparation units at the War Studies University. However, it should be pointed out that both the knowledge and skills gained during the studies, as well as the opportunity to formulate research inquiries in the form of a thesis, will contribute to an increase in the quality of education in military preparation units. Thus, this shall result in an increase in the number of recruits to the Polish Armed Forces.

Conclusion

Against the background of the constitutionally mandated duties of the Polish Armed Forces and unfavourable changes in the Polish geostrategic environment in military terms, this article has described a particular measure aimed at increasing Polish defence capacity by enlarging the personnel of the Polish Armed Forces. This is made possible by the provision of military education classes and the evolution of that project into a statutory measure in the form of military preparation units. Therefore, the origins of military preparation units have been briefly presented in addition to a description of the in-service training for teachers of military preparation units, provided at the War Studies University. The authors of this article, and of the in-service training for teachers of contemporary military education classes in Poland that has been presented here, assume that only competent and committed teachers are able to motivate their students to take specific actions, and in the case of defence education, to become involved in national defence.

The institutionalisation of the educational efforts of the schools in which the programmes of military education classes are implemented, and their inclusion in the system of preparation of military reserves, are fully justified actions. This is because they may enable students or graduates of military education classes to take part in emergency response or to join mobilisation reserves, and above all, to contribute to building a civil society. Moreover, such directed activity would strengthen the defence capacity of Poland, thus complying with the objectives of the *Strategia rozwoju systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2022* [Strategy for the Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022].[26]

To conclude these considerations, it should be recorded that in February 2022, the first course of the postgraduate studies described above was completed, during which 24 teachers were trained, and the second course began in March 2022.

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[26]   *Strategia rozwoju systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2022*, przyjęta uchwałą Rady Ministrów, 9 April 2013, p. 80, https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/01/strategia_rozwoju_systemu_bezpieczenstwa_narodowego_rp_2022.pdf [accessed: 26 March 2022].

All this is also intended to strengthen the ability of the Republic of Poland to defend itself in a strategically difficult time, when the drama of a regular war is playing out on the territory of our eastern neighbour, Ukraine.

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Opportunities to increase Poland's defence capacity through in-service training for teachers of military preparation units
Abstract

The substantial re-education of the Polish Armed Forces has necessitated replenishment of the number of reserve personnel. To this end, new forms of short military training for volunteers have been introduced, in line with the objective that within the next few years the number of soldiers and civilian employees of the military will initially exceed 200,000, and later 300,000. The aim of this article is to analyse the possibilities of increasing Poland's defence capacity through in-service training for teachers of military preparation units. The research included analysis of the literature on the subject of military education classes in Poland, as well as the study of regulatory documents in the area under consideration. Theoretical research methods such as analysis, synthesis and inference were also applied. The study presented here includes an account of the origins of the military preparation units and a description of the features of the in-service training for teachers of those units, conducted at the War Studies University.

Key words: defence capacity, Polish Armed Forces, military classes, military preparation units, teacher

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Pro-health education of youth and the physical fitness of the 21st century society

Introduction

Nowadays, there are more and more problems related to society's fitness. This is mainly due to the fact that a significant part of society declares that they do not have enough time for regular physical activity. A majority are preoccupied with work, and in their free time they choose a kind of resting that does not require too much physical activity. In 2011, the NATPOL and WOBASZ[1] studies were conducted in Poland, and their aim was to assess people's physical activity in their free time, at work, or when commuting to school or work.

> In the NATPOL 2011 study [...], less than a half (48%) of the surveyed adult Poles admitted that they tried to be physically active for at least 30 minutes on most days of the week. One in ten replied that they did not try and did not practice physical activity in their spare time. In this study, every fourth Pole of working age (26%) declared medium and hard physical work, and as in the WOBASZ study, a half of the surveyed Polish women

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[1] NATPOL – National Study of Dissemination of Risk Factors for Cardiovascular Diseases; WOBASZ – Multicenter Population Health Survey.

described their work as sedentary. Significant daily traffic on the way to work or school was reported by every fourth (27%) respondent. Half of the "active" people spent less than 15 minutes walking on their way to work, with every third walk or bicycle journey lasting 15 to 30 minutes, and only every sixth – over 30 minutes.[2]

The results of the international project aimed at assessing 23 health indicators, in which 28 European Union member states participated, carried out in 2015, also played an important role.

> Among the 28 EU countries that participated in this project, the average percentage of residents performing the recommended amount of physical activity was 30%. The highest percentage of physically active people was in Iceland, Norway, and Denmark. In these countries, it was 55–65%. In Finland, Sweden, Austria, and Germany, it ranged from 45% to 55%. Poland, with 18%, was placed 24th, together with Greece. Worse indicators were found only in Bulgaria and Romania.[3]

The results of these studies show that, despite the desire to maintain any physical activity, its low level and sedentary lifestyle contribute to an increasing the number of overweight and obese people in modern society. In addition, people with physical disabilities are much more likely to develop heart disease, diabetes, and many other serious life-threatening illnesses.

Health is the greatest value for every human being. It is not only the proper functioning of the body, but also the ability to recognise emotions, express them in an appropriate way, and the ability to deal with them. Health is also the ability to think logically and to establish and develop relationships with other people. Nowadays, we underestimate our health very often, we neglect it and forget that we should take care of itbecause we may lose it. We usually only realise the importance of our health when something bad happens. Many of us only take action when we feel unwell. Before that, weare not interested in it at all, wedo not undergo medical check-ups, do not pay attention to how we eat or whether there is even a little physical activity in our lives. In today's society, most people cure rather than prevent, they do nothing to take care of their health and safety, only when something happens, do they start to react. In order to avoid this, the ability to take care of one's own health and that of the community in which we live should be shaped from an early age. It should be one of the goals of a properly running educational process. Therefore, in schools, students are provided with health education, and it is part of the curriculum at all levels of education. According to Louise E. Berman, "students, along with their needs, hopes and dilemmas, need a rich, empowering, energising, and challenging curriculum that would inspire

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[2]   T. Zdrojewski, B. Wojtyniak, G. Juszczyk, W. Drygas, Quo Vadis Polskie Zdrowie? Niekorzystne zmiany w latach 2011–2020, [in:] *Niedostateczny poziom aktywności fizycznej w Polsce, jako zagrożenie i wyzwanie dla zdrowia publicznego. Raport Komitetu Zdrowia Publicznego Polskiej Akademii Nauk*, eds. W. Drygas, M. Gajewska, T. Zdrojewski, Warszawa: Narodowy Instytut Zdrowia Publicznego – Państwowy Zakład Higieny, 2021, p. 24.

[3]   *Ibidem*, p. 25.

them to change and boost their comprehensive development".[4] Health education is one of the possibilities to meet these needs.

Health and physical fitness of society against contemporary threats

Health education is a process of transfering and acquiring knowledge, skills, and values necessary for maintaining and improving one's health. At all stages of their lives,people should take care of their own health and safety. Therefore, the main goal of pro-health education is to shape and develop in children and adolescents health habits and attitudes conducive to making independent behaviour choices appropriate from the point of view of maintaining full health as well as creating a healthy life-style. Pro-health education is not only about imparting knowledge of what is beneficial or harmful to health, but also about developing skills and habits that will help use this knowledge effectively. Here, too, the physical activity of society plays a huge role, which is why physical education classes, where we can develop physically from an early age, are an important element of pro-health education.

Physical education should be understood as planned, purposeful and conscious action aimed at shaping pro-social attitudes, i.e. interpersonal relationships built on the basis of one's own beliefs and recognized moral values.[5] In health education,physical education plays the role of a leading subject and an important role in shaping children and adolescents' social behaviour.

> A modern approach to physical education by extending its issues to health education is the result of the integration of two overlapping areas of human education – physical education and health education, emphasising the following needs:
> - physical activity as a condition for health,
> - nutritional balance,
> - active attitude and interpersonal relationships,
> - education for safety,
> - personal hygiene.[6]

The implementation of physical education classes and the health education they include helps in the current development and improvement of students' physical fitness through their active participation in these classes. Additionally, students are systematically acquainted with the subject of health. Physical education and health education constitute the basis of a healthy life style and enable young people's fuller preparation of for lifelong physical activity, care of their health, and physical fitness.

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[4]   L.E. Berman, "Perception, Paradox and Passion: Curriculum for Continuity", *Theory into Practice*, XXVI, 1987, pp. 346–350, [as cited in:] D. Michałowska, "Edukacja prozdrowotna – podejścia, modele, metody, *Przegląd Terapeutyczny*, no. 4, 2008, p. 8.

[5]   W. Osiński, *Zarys teorii wychowania fizycznego*, Poznań: AWF, 1996, pp. 28–48.

[6]   B. Wolny, *Edukacja zdrowotna integralnym elementem oceny z wychowania fizycznego*, Warszawa: Ośrodek Rozwoju Edukacji, 2014, p. 4.

The aim of the article is to present the problems of young people's pro-health education and the decline in physical fitness of our society. What is happening in our society today is a very big problem threatening our health and safety. All of this is due to neglecting one's health or physical activity. Most of us do not have time to eat healthy food, spend time actively, or just get to know ourselves. We approach this issue lightly, and then we are unable to accept the consequences, so the sooner we realise how important physical fitness and taking care of our health are, the sooner we can counteract the occurrence of unwanted effects. Our health and safety are the most important, which is why pro-health education is crucial here as it is thanks to it that our society, from an early age, acquires appropriate knowledge and skills which will help them maintain health and physical fitness for years to come.

Physical activity and health are closely related. Our body was designed to move; therefore, to function properly, it requires regular physical activity. Many studies have proven that a sedentary lifestyle is a high-risk factor for the development of many chronic diseases. Publicly available data shows that as much as 40 to 60% of the EU population lead this way of life. Living an active lifestyle has many social and psychological benefits, and physically active people tend to live longer than inactive people. In the modern world, not only chronic diseases, catastrophes, wars, terrorism, and man-made disasters are threats to our health and safety, but also poverty and social pathologies.

However, the most common threats are precisely chronic diseases. The most prevalent chronic diseases are diabetes mellitus, atherosclerosis, hypertension, ischemic heart disease, and cancer. These diseases can affect every person, regardless of their gender or lifestyle. There are many factors considered to be leading causes of these conditions. These include, for example, inadequate diet, a lack of physical activity, chronic stress, addictions, and simply genetic conditions. It is very common that chronic diseases are difficult to prevent. It often happens that they affect people who have always taken care of their health. Nevertheless, each of us should take care of our health to reduce the likelihood of these diseases. We should pay attention to how we eat, introduce some physical activity into our lives and, above all, give up addictions such as smoking. The US Center for Disease Control and Prevention, a unit of the government's Department of Health and Human Services, recommends exercising for your health at least 150 minutes a week. This advice is confirmed by the research they have been carrying out for many years. One of the studies was conducted by a scientist from Loughborough University on a group of 64,000 people.[7] The participants were at least 40 years old and exercised for 150 minutes a week. The result of this study was a 21% lower risk of developing cancer and 41% lower risk of cardiovascular disease. The results of these studies show us that even such a small amount

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[7]   "Weekend exercise alone 'has significant health benefits'", BBC, 10 January 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/health-38560616 [accessed: 30 January 2022].

of physical activity pays off, so for our own health, each of us should find a few minutes a day to exercise. The effort is small in comparison with the potential gains.

Ensuring public safety and order is one of the basic tasks of the state authority, the implementation of which is carried out by the administration of public safety and order. It includes, inter alia, uniformed services that are responsible for the direct implementation of specific tasks.[8] Uniformed services's fundamental duty is to ensure safety in society. Each of us planning our future in uniformed services should be aware that fitness and health are of prime importance in the military. Defending the country in times of conflicts, guaranteeing the defence of the state, resisting aggression, ensuring the safety of citizens, supporting internal security, helping with the removal of the effects of natural disasters, and participating in crisis response and humanitarian operations are among the most important tasks undertaken by uniformed services. In addition to keeping a cool head, thinking logically,and being courageous in such situations, endurance and physical fitness are most important. You often need to have strength, e.g., when extinguishing a fire, incapacitating a criminal, or placing sandbags during a flood. These are,of course,just some of the tasks which uniformed services have to deal with. They must also be constantly ready, as they never know when their help will be needed, so it is important to keep their physical readiness. What is more, people who want to pursue their careers in uniformed services should meet the psychophysical requirements specific to their profession. Particular attention is also paid to physical capacity. Each person wishing to work for uniformed services has to undergo medical examinations checking their health condition, psychological tests that allow to determine their psychophysical fitness, as well as fitness tests assessing the candidate's level of physical fitness. Only after passing successfully, is the candidate able to continue with further procedures. As we can see, physical fitness and health play key roles in the recruitment process.

An example of this can be military service. "A professional soldier may be a person of Polish citizenship, of unblemished reputation, whose fidelity to the Republic of Poland is beyond doubt, having appropriate qualifications and physical and mental capacity to perform professional military service."[9] The physical and mental capacity to perform professional military service is established by a military medical board which then issues a certificate based on the examinations and tests carried out. Each soldier is obliged to undergo examinations ordered by the Military Medical Commission, including specialist and psychological tests and, if necessary, additional examinations. These tests allow to define the category of the soldier's physical and mental abilities. Moreover, each candidate for a soldier is referred to a military psychological

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[8]   M.A. Liwo, *Status służb mundurowych i funkcjonariuszy w nich zatrudnionych*, Wolters Kluwer, https://sip.lex.pl/komentarze-i-publikacje/monografie/status-sluzb-mundurowych-i-funkcjonariuszy-w-nich-zatrudnionych-369297424 [accessed: 30 January 2022].

[9]   Ustawa z dnia 11 września 2003 r. o służbie wojskowej żołnierzy zawodowych, Dz.U. [Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland], 2003, no. 179, item 1750, article 2.

laboratory in order to take psychological tests on the basis of which psychological assessment is made about the existence or absence of contraindications for performing this service. "Physical fitness is one of the basic abilities required by soldiers to perform their duties in an effective manner."[10]

In the history of military affairs, we can see how important the level of soldiers' physical fitness has been in performing obligatory tasks and how important it has been on the battlefield. During every battle or war, the army had to be physically fit to have the strength to fight the enemy for a long time. An example could be hussars, who were a phenomenon on a global scale. They fought hundreds of battles and spread terror among European armies for decades. As we can see, in the old days, a lot of attention was paid to physical fitness, and it remains so now. Uniformed services professions are very responsible. They are responsible for the safety of the entire society, which is why physical fitness plays such an important role here, thanks to which the efficiency in the performed tasks increases.

Education and pro-health prevention of polish youth in the 21st century

Health education in schools has a long history. The first guidelines concerned teachers' obligations to introduce health-related issues date back as early as 1787, and they were initiated by Grzegorz Piramowicz, a co-founder of the Department of National Education. However, it was not until 1982 that the first formal document of the Ministry of Education and Upbringing was issued. It defined the scope, structure, and organisation of health education in primary and secondary schools. Unfortunately, these guidelines did not significantly improve the implementation of health education in schools. In 1997, for the first time in the history of education in Poland, health education was included in general education curricula in all types of schools, and their content was specified for each stage of education. In 1999, thanks to the structural and programme reform of the system, the educational pathway of "pro-health education" was introduced into general education course of study. As a result of subsequent modifications of the core curriculum, this pathway was included in general education requirements in all types of schools in 2002.

Already in grades 1–3, the material to be taught to children included:

- "getting to know your own body;
- care for health, personal and environmental hygiene;
- similarities and differences between people, understanding and tolerance of these differences;
- food and nutrition;

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[10] J. Jaroszuk, *Sprawność fizyczna i aktywność fizyczna a poczucie jakości życia żołnierzy zawodowych*, doctoral thesis draft, Poznań: AWF im. Eugeniusza Piaseckiego w Poznaniu, 2019, p. 3.

- safety, including moving on public roads, recognising danger warning signals emergency signals."[11]

In addition, it was advisable to organise the entire didactic and educational process in such a way that there were physical activities on each day, and they would last at least 3 hours in total.

In general secondary schools, specialised secondary schools, and technical secondary schools, the main goal was to deepen the awareness of pro-health behaviours aimed at protecting, maintaining and improving individual and public health, as well as to develop life skills conducive to physical, mental, social, and spiritual development. The intention was to raise the need to create a healthy environment and shape active and responsible attitudes towards one's own and other people's health. Therefore, the task of the school was to increase students' interest in health matters and provide them with reliable knowledge about various aspects of and factors contributing to health, the most common threats to health, and the possibilities of eliminating them. It became necessary to create an environment allowing students to practice a healthy lifestyle, strengthen their self-esteem, self-confidence, and their abilities, and provide students with support in difficult situations and in solving their health problems. Having completed their education at this stage, students know they are able to skillfully use medical and psychological help, cope with challenging situations and help others. They also know how to communicate and maintain good relationships with other people, how to function properly and work in a group, and how to deal with environmental pressure. What is more, they know the factors contributing to and threatening human health, and the basic principles of preventing the most common disorders and diseases. As a result, they will strive to protect, maintain, and improve their own and other people's health.

In a vocational school, the goals set include developing basic knowledge about health, its determinants and hazards, making students aware of their responsibility for their own and other people's health, and preventing youth problems. The school has been tasked with making students interested in health matters, and in the possibility of eliminating or reducing threats to their health. In addition, the school is to support students in practicing a healthy lifestyle and to provide them with support in difficult situations. Having learnt the material at this stage of education, students are aware that health is a value for people and a means of achieving life goals and a good quality of life. They accept responsibility for their own health and consciously seek to protect, maintain, and improve it; they skillfully recognise risky behaviours and choose those that are safe for them. Moreover, they can give first aid in life- and health-threatening situations, which is an absolutely necessary skill.

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[11]   Rozporządzenie Ministra Edukacji Narodowej i Sportu z dnia 26 lutego 2002 r. w sprawie podstawy programowej wychowania przedszkolnego oraz kształcenia ogólnego w poszczególnych typach szkół, Dz.U. 2002, no. 51, item 458, p. 6, attachment no. 2.

In 2007, the new Minister of National Education, Katarzyna Hall, initiated work on a programme reform. As a result, a new core curriculum for general education was developed, in which the existing educational pathways, including "pro-health education", were abandoned. It was decided that from then on, that material would be included in subjects such as biology or physical education. In the core curriculum of lower secondary schools and upper secondary schools, similarly to primary schools, the educational requirements were incorporated into other subjects. Establishing a separate area of "health education" in the core curriculum of physical education turned out to be the most important and a very good idea. This solution includes many requirements for various aspects of health and is a clear improvement on the previous changes and provisions. Moreover, it was agreed that health education classes would be compulsory and carried out within the pool of elective physical education classes. In recent years, issues related to health education have gained quite a significant importance and are still developing.

By including pro-health education in the core curriculum of physical education, an opportunity was created to gradually improve the implementation of health education of students at all stages of education. Unfortunately, a big problem in Poland today is the fact that most students avoid physical education. This problem is widely known, but frequently underestimated and neglected. Students very often make excuses not to take part in physical education. They often miss the classes or bring long-term sick leave. This causes their fitness level to decline. Sport allows you to shape your character, teaches you to overcome your weaknesses, develops perseverance, orientation, and agility. In addition, thanks to it, students' physical condition is improved, which has a positive effect on their health. Therefore, unjustified exemptions of students from physical education classes prevent them from actively developing their physical fitness. What is more, physical education teachers lack training and materials which would prepare them and improve their knowledge necessary to conduct classes in the field of health education. All of this means that knowledge about health education is not fully passed on to students, so they do not realise the importance of physical fitness in their lives. Here we also need to address the issue of parents and doctors consciously taking part in children's avoidance of physical activity. Additionally, "using the advances in technology, the modern man increasingly limits their physical activity to the necessary minimum, and as shown by the research to date, gradual reduction of general mobility leads to lower physical efficiency and limits the possibilities of individual development; it also reduces adaptability to constantly changing living conditions."[12] Each of these elements, to a greater or lesser extent, contributes to lowering the physical fitness of our society.

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[12]   R. Dutkiewicz, I. Niesłuchowska, M. Dutkiewicz, Rekreacyjna aktywność fizyczna studentów wychowania fizycznego, [in:] *Zdrowy styl życia jako kapitał XXI wieku*, eds. A. Borcuch, M. Knefel, A. Krzysztofek, Kielce: Laboratorium Wiedzy Artur Borcuch, 2019, p. 20.

To sum up, children and adolescents should be encouraged to actively participate in physical culture from an early age. It is an essential element for their smooth and healthy functioning for years to come. Much research has been done to show that physical activity can positively affect our health. Research has shown that regular exercise contributes to, e.g., reducing the risk of developing cardiovascular diseases, increasing cardiac output, and improving concentration. Moreover, physical activity also has a positive effect on our well-being, e.g., helps to fight stress and makes it easier to fall asleep. It helps us feel good and enjoy life. Despite all this pro-health education, young people very often approach this matter lightly. Living as a young and able-bodied person, they push away the thought of growing old and neglect their physical sphere, remembering it only when they notice problems. Therefore, let us not neglect our physical sphere and health education, let us be a good example to our society.

Summary

The contemporary prosperity of developed countries means that people do not lack anything; therefore, they should focus on self-fulfilment and taking care of their own health. By undertaking regular activity, you can fully develop physically, mentally, socially, and spiritually. There is much to be said about the issues of physical activity and proper nutrition, but all this falls by the wayside because people focus mainly on pursuing material wealth and social status. As a result, they forget about the most important value, which is health. "If the world's population were more active, four to five million deaths each year could be avoided."[13] To this end, World Health Organization (WHO) has presented the 2018–2030 Physical Activity Guidelines to help you achieve good health and quality of life. Unfortunately, global estimates show that 27.5% of adults and 81% of adolescents do not comply with WHO's 2010 recommendations for physical activity, so there has been hardly any positive change in the last decade. The new WHO guidelines recommend that children and adolescents should on average have at least 60 minutes a day of moderate to high-intensity exercise, and that this should be mainly aerobic exercise. In addition, to strengthen bones and muscles, children and adolescents should perform high-intensity aerobic exercise at least 3 times a week.

Nowadays, it is very important to develop education and health promotion among young people. Teachers, especially of physical education, play an important role here, as they have a significant impact on children's and adolescents' development

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[13]   *Wytyczne WHO dotyczące aktywności fizycznej i siedzącego trybu życia: omówienie*, Kopenhaga: Biuro Regionalne WHO na Europę, 2021, p. 1, https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/341120/WHO-EURO-2021-1204-40953-58211-pol.pdf [accessed: 31 January 2022].

and health, and on their current and future lifestyle. The entire level of society's culture depends on teachers, their knowledge, skills, and attitudes. Due to the constantly changing living conditions, different expectations are placed on physical activity and care for health. Motivation to take up physical activity is built from an early age; therefore, school education has a large impact on the type and frequency of physical activity throughout students' entire life. It is at school that children should acquire basic knowledge about their body and health. The educational system helps prepare young people to undertake physical activity later in their adult life. "Regular physical activity at any age is of great importance. The right amount of exercise shapes young organisms, allows adults to maintain an appropriate level of fitness and physical efficiency, and delays the aging process."[14] Thanks to proper physical activity, well-being and the quality of life, regardless of age, also improve. Moreover, physical activity is the most effective factor in preventing of lifestyle diseases. Unfortunately, activities at all levels of school education do not bring the expected results, and in recent years, the health of our society has deteriorated significantly. Due to the fact that modern society is subjected to multimedia influence at an increasingly young age, and traditional forms of education and influence are replaced by television, computer, radio, or magazines, it is with their help that we should additionally promote physical culture and a healthy and active style of life. Increasing the whole society's physical activity should be one of our most important goals.

Conclusions

In conclusion, there are many factors contributing to a healthy lifestyle. The knowledge we acquire thanks to health education helps us pursue the right course of action. That is why children are taught in schools how to properly take care of their health and safety from an early age. This education should be constantly developed and improved in order to best present knowledge about the proper protection of their life and health to students, and to encourage them to lead a healthy lifestyle. Thanks to this, they will become an example for society. Physical activity, healthy diet, and eliminating addictions that harm our health are other factors influencing our lifestyle. By maintaining regular physical activity, we are able to prevent the occurrence and development of diseases. This will have a beneficial effect not only on our physical but also mental fitness. Reducing fatigue and improving our well-being will make it possible for us to fully enjoy life. However, all of that depends primarily on ourselves and how we approach this topic. Today's pace of life, the constant race against the clock, and a growing number of lifestyle diseases make it more and more difficult for people to

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[14]   E. Sieńko-Awierianów, J. Wesołowska, „Edukacja szkolna a aktywność ruchowa", *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego. Ekonomiczne Problemy Usług*, no. 78, 2011, p. 301.

properly take care of their health. On the one hand, they claim that the most important value for them is health; on the other, many of them do not take care of it well enough, eat unhealthy food and lead a sedentary lifestyle. Many people do not engage in any physical activity or do any sports. As a result, the number of people not only suffering from chronic diseases, but also from obesity and lack of physical fitness is increasing. A pro-health policy and promoting a proper lifestyle play an important role here because only regular care for yourself and your health from an early age can bring positive results. We recommend that you read the WHO guidelines for physical activity and sedentary lifestyle more closely and try to follow them. For anything to change, we must take the initiative ourselves and take appropriate steps for our health.

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Pro-health education of youth and the physical fitness of the 21st century society
Abstract

The problem of physical fitness in the 21st century society is, on the one hand, the result of the last century negligence, and on the other, a natural result of a deepening regression of pro-health education among young people. Such a situation negatively affects both the health and physical condition of society, which indirectly also affects the level of state security. Physical fitness is an indispensable condition for the effective functioning of all services in this sector, especially uniformed formations such as the armed forces, the police, and many others in their areas of responsibility. Unfortunately, it will be difficult to change the society's habits, but it is possible to develop new habits among young people by focusing on pro-health education, i.e., education and upbringing in the spirit of responsibility for their own health and physical fitness. Therefore, the main goal of this article is to show the essence of the problem of young people's pro-health education in the context of the fitness level decline in the 21st century society, and how these issues can be discussed in the face of contemporary threats. The paper also includes references to the issue of education and health promotion strategy among young people in order to identify the causes of the decline in society's fitness level. The issues addressed were studied using theoretical research methods, i.e., analysis, synthesis, abstraction, explanation, generalisation, and inference.

Key words: education, health, physical fitness, youth, society

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The role of the family environment in strengthening pro-defensive attitudes of the 21st century society

Introduction

It is hard to deny that modern society is significantly different from the previous ones. Its specificity is inherent in the progress of civilisation and technology – the exponential growth of the Internet has enabled rapid transfer of information; its mass availability and free circulation has many advantages such as ease of communication or gaining specific knowledge. However, we cannot just focus on the advantages of this phenomenon, as it also presents many threats and pitfalls directly affecting both individuals and the entire community. The primary aspect that should be carefully examined is ensuring security, which is, in a way, the basis of development. Along with the growing importance of the globalisation phenomenon, new threats began to appear – not only military, but also those that the society creates for itself, often not on purpose. The volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity of the contemporary world has been defined as VUCA world, i.e., a response to the need to ensure national security. The key to success is the appropriate education not only of functionaries, cadres, or commands, but also of local communities, and consequently, of the citizens

themselves, who have been affected the most by technological progress. One contemporary problem revealed by globalisation are local economic, social, and educational disproportions.[1]

The notion of globalisation is inherently connected with cosmopolitanism, which negates all kinds of differences or cultural variability. It greatly destroys the diversity or uniqueness of different civilisations, depriving them of what really distinguishes them from others. The phenomenon of educational cosmopolitanism, which we can also observe now, stirs up young people, causes them to reject, in the name of misunderstood freedom and democracy, all values instilled by teachers and educators, questioning their rightness and truthfulness. The figure of the teacher was once seen as a role model or authority, someone deserving of absolute respect, and respected; it is not the case anymore. We often deal with questioning teachers' competences, and the best example of this is the fact that the student has an opportunity to assess the teacher's skills and knowledge delivery methods, and even the educator himself. Too much freedom and a lack of discipline and values weaken motivation, the will to acquire knowledge and, in a way, discourage from following the attitude of the educator whose authority is not unquestioned. Unfortunately, this phenomenon has no positive consequences – it leads to stupefaction of young people, a decline in their social awareness and the disappearance of patriotism. After all, it is well known that it is easier to rule uneducated and less intelligent people than those who can skilfully present their arguments and those who are well-read because they cannot be easily manipulated. This situation is perfectly reflected in the words of John Paul II: "a democracy without values easily turns into open or thinly disguised totalitarianism." Although the Pope said them over twenty years ago, only now do we discover their true meaning and the dangers they bear. Perhaps we should consider whether all these changes and civilisational advances really bring as much good as we think? Or is it just a trick to distract from what is starting to happen?[2]

There is no one definition of the word "attitudes". However, the term is inseparable from psychology and human needs. Three overarching instruments of motivation have been identified. These are: science, emotions, and all kinds of intellectual processes. Shaping attitudes is a very complex process: in the early years of life, the child imitates and learns behaviours from its caregivers, then repeats them and begins to see which evoke approval and praise in adults. It is very motivating for the child, enhancing these behaviours as successful and desirable in the future. Later, when the child begins to understand the meaning of actions, starts pursuing own goals, and learns to predict possible outcomes, the identification process takes place. This is

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[1]   W. Krztoń, "Wiek XXI – wiekiem społeczeństwa informacyjnego", *Modern Management Review*, vol. 20, no. 22(3), 2015, pp. 101–112.

[2]   I. Isterewicz, "Psychospołeczne mechanizmy kształtowania postaw", *Rocznik Naukowo-Dydaktyczny. Prace Pedagogiczne*, no. 63(2), 1978, pp. 7–18.

when the process of shaping attitudes begins for good. Acquiring new experiences and skills results in certain situations inducing different behaviours and shaping the world view. Two concepts deserve special mention here: internal and external integration. The former brings together subject–object relations around the attitude. The best example internal integration is shaping a patriotic attitude at school by acquiring knowledge about culture, traditions, and national symbols. There are also reasons why school celebrations and academies are organised – presenting the history of Poland is supposed to evoke a feeling of belonging and pride in one's nationality. It is also possible to volunteer in patriotic organisations such as the Polish Red Cross or Caritas, which also greatly shapes personalities. External integration, in turn, means combining attitudes around a common object.

The upbringing process occurs only in the educational environment. Its simplest definition says that it is the influence of the educator on the pupil, but in the present, difficult and changing times, it is no longer sufficient. There is now a great need to reorganise this process as it has many shortcomings and weaknesses. Edmund Trempała, the founder of the Higher Pedagogical School in Bydgoszcz, described schools as "the central institutions of the education system". He argued that the school and out-of-school environment should start to cooperate with each other in order to achieve a certain effect. He characterised the environment as a specific area of impact, where development stimuli are controlled in accordance with the educational goal, at the same time causing a permanent change in the pupil's attitude. The first environment in which a person comes to function – the family – is equally important. The old Polish proverb "the apple does not fall far from the tree" presents the truth about the formation of a child's personality – in fact, the family influence is the longest and in the period when they are just beginning to learn about the world, hence the assimilation process is the most productive. It is the first seven years of an individual's life that shape them to a very large degree – it is the time of the greatest assimilation of information about the surrounding world, acceptance of the rules, culture, and values of a given community. It seems that there is no single complete definition of the term "family" as each is different, each has its own unique features, its own traditions, and fulfils other functions in society. We also distinguish different typologies of families: there are full, incomplete, foster, and reconstructed families – in each of them it is important that the members feel mutual attachment and emotional ties. There is no upbringing when there is no place for values in it – it is in their own families that the parents learn the goals of upbringing and the most important values that guide them in the educational process – these are usually moral values. It is worth noting that moral education usually takes place in an elusive way: through joint activities, conversations, sometimes by inspiring people to take up new challenges.[3]

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[3]   E. Trempała, *Wychowanie zintegrowane w środowisku szkoły*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, 1976.

The need to build pro-defensive attitudes in the 21st century society

Security is a fundamental human need, and Abraham Maslow included it in his pyramid just above the physiological needs. We can consider them both as a state and a process. The overriding interest of each state is to ensure the security of its citizens.[4] The level of security is influenced by many factors, such as geographic location, ethnic diversity, or membership in political and economic alliances. Nowadays, security is not only about military aspects – all kinds of armed conflicts or wars – now we are dealing with an information war accompanied by the COVID-19 pandemic, i.e., a kind of biological weapon. This new situation revealed a wide spectrum of shortcomings, both in terms of preparation for the possible threat of weapons of mass destruction, and educating people who found themselves in a completely strange and incomprehensible reality in the blink of an eye. The security process directly affects both the present and the future, but its formation should take into account the conditions and realities of the past and its possible modifications.

The volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity with which the VUCA world has been described show that the very concept of security should be undergoing constant modifications and transformations.[5] As Ulrich Beck wrote in his publication, societies are not informed about the possibility of catastrophes and the risks resulting from the progress of civilization. They only learn about it when there is an imminent threat.[6] The consequences of all kinds of scientific experiments affect society directly, and sometimes this happens semi-consciously, by some kind of negligence or ignorance of what is changing. Sometimes this process is completely unconscious, caused by a lack of proper education and even elementary knowledge about the possible risks which might appear to be phenomenal progress in civilisation. Society is exposed to all kinds of conspiracy theories or fake news which, unidentified, have nothing to do with the actual state of affairs, and as a consequence, succumbing to disinformation makes it difficult to deal with real threats. Unfortunately, this does not lead to anything good, and certainly does not help deal with

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[4]   Materials from academic conference „Uczenie się kadr systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego sposobem na przetrwanie w świecie VUCA", Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. KEN w Krakowie, Akademia im. Jakuba z Paradyża w Gorzowie Wielkopolskim, Akademia Sztuki Wojennej w Warszawie, Instytut Bezpieczeństwa i Rozwoju Międzynarodowego SDirect24, Ośrodek Edukacji Informatycznej i Zastosowań Komputerów w Warszawie, Kraków 22 September 2020.

[5]   D. Kaźmierczak, Projekt jako metoda szkoleniowa, [in:] *Edukacja w świecie VUCA. Szanse wyzwania, zagrożenia*, eds. D. Kaźmierczak, J. Ropski, O. Wasiuta, W. Zakrzewski, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Libron – Filip Lohner, [cop. 2021], pp. 267–287.

[6]   U. Beck, *Społeczeństwo światowego ryzyka: w poszukiwaniu utraconego bezpieczeństwa*, transl. B. Baran, Warszawa: Scholar, 2012, pp. 288–351.

the consequences of crisis situations. It is also a mistake to believe that if a given problem is not popularised scientifically or in the media, it is belittled, and its importance is understated. This leads to broadly understood depreciation and avoidance of responsibility, and such passivity in the present reality increases the risk of danger even more. Currently, we are also dealing with redundancy and consumerism, and societies focus on possessing and accumulating material goods, instead of on what they really need, that is, security, the construction of which is additionally hindered by the rapidly growing phenomenon of propaganda and disinformation.

The aim of pro-defence education is, above all, to increase the awareness and sense of responsibility for one's own country, to prepare citizens to defend its borders (if necessary), and to be patriotic. History has clearly shown that shaping citizens' awareness is a process which should be implemented not only when the country's sovereignty is threatened, but also now, when we are living in seemingly peaceful times. Although membership in national alliances such as NATO or the United Nations is a crucial aspect of a state's security, non-military aspects are also important and they involve social structures in the operation, and consequently, the citizens themselves, who should show commitment to the process of building security. The words of Jan Zamoyski are of key importance: "Such will be the Republics of Poland as their youth's upbringing." Despite the fact that they were spoken a long time ago, their meaning has been preserved to the present day because the future of young people depends not only on themselves, but also on the entire nation. We often forget that defending the country's borders is not only the duty of the soldiers of the Polish Army or other uniformed services, but also of every Polish citizen.[7]

Service to the motherland is a kind of moral responsibility that we experience when our awareness of core values is enhanced. Deep attachment to the country where we grew up guarantees that in a crisis, we will feel civic responsibility to fulfil our obligations resulting from being a citizen, with the common good in mind. As accurately noted by Edward Shils: "Citizenship is a particular worldview and disposition of civil society, derived from the participation of individuals in this society's collective self-awareness. Citizenship results in attachment to the whole of society, manifested in decisions and actions aimed at protecting and multiplying the good of the entire community."[8] Aristotle, on the other hand, considered a citizen to be a rational man distinguished by freedom and the ability to decide both about his own fate and the political life of the community in which he functions. Let us therefore take a closer look at the moment in history when this "freedom was most

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[7]   K. Walancik-Ryba, "Wychowanie patriotyczno-obronne jako rozszerzenie wychowania w polskiej tradycji niepodległościowej", *Rocznik SNPL*, vol. 20, 2020, pp. 285–299.

[8]   E. Shils, Co to jest społeczeństwo obywatelskie, [in:] *Europa i społeczeństwo obywatelskie. Rozmowy w Castel Gandolfo*, compilation and foreword by K. Michalski, transl. by B. Janicka, D. Lachowska, M. Łukasiewicz, A. Pawelec, W. Pięciak, W. Witalisz, Kraków – Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Znak – Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, 1994, s. 11.

threatened."[9] It is hard to disagree with the statement that the most difficult moment in Poland's development were the partitions, over the period of a hundred years, during which the country permanently disappeared from maps. The partitions were to somehow erase from the memory of compatriots any attachment to their own culture or language. The partitioners assumed that if they managed to implement the process of Russification and Germanization permanently, the Poles would give up all dreams and hopes concerning a free homeland and would accept the existing state of affairs. It did not happen; despite all kinds of repression and harassment by the partitioning powers, the Polish elites instilled in their compatriots national awareness, cultural traditions and the memory of the Polish language and national holidays that were secretly celebrated. All of this had a positive effect: when the invaders turned against one another, the Poles took up arms. They fought for what they believed in and what they were hoping for, and which became a priority for them, greater than their own then-current ventures or interests. Currently, we are living in seemingly peaceful times, but as we all know, a lack of conflict does not last forever – one day we will have to fight again for our country, for our traditions, and for what we share. Will we be ready for this? Is our homeland's freedom, independence, and security still of such great significance to us? Or maybe our own deals, interests, and material goods are of paramount importance for us?

In quite recent history, there was another turning point when human morality should have been of key importance for the actions of state authorities in particular.[10] The broadly understood restrictions of civil liberties and repressions during the martial law should have been an opportunity to delve into the meaning of patriotic and, above all, moral education. Blessed Jerzy Popiełuszko is a figure who should be looked at in more detail. The paramount values for him, apart from faith and love, were patriotism and his fatherland. He argued that shaping people's love for the homeland may turn out to be the only efficient way to change reality; he believed that in unity and ideals there was a force capable of stopping the evil then present in the country. All his life he followed these principles and died for them. He believed that "people are won over with an open heart, not with a clenched fist." He also placed high hopes in traditions and culture, which were supposed be a reflection and a mainstay of moral values. His compatriots were like a family to him – a spiritual community in which people were supposed to motivate each other to live a good life in mutual respect, willingness to serve, self-sacrifice, and familiarity with other people. Here, we can observe a return to the era of Romanticism because at that time, people hoped

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9   P. Szlanta, "Polskie drogi ku niepodległości – wersja rozszerzona", Niepodlegla.gov, https://niepodlegla.gov.pl/o-niepodleglej/polskie-drogi-ku-niepodleglosci-wersja-rozszerzona/ [accessed: 22 June 2022].

10   P. Burgoński, "Polski patriotyzm w dobie komunizmu. Koncepcja patriotyzmu w nauczaniu Księdza Jerzego Popiełuszki", *Warszawskie Studia Teologiczne*, vol. XXIII, no. 1, 2010, pp. 241–252.

that suffering would bring about the end of the homeland's torment and the regaining of freedom. This illustrates the fundamental meaning of the saying "history goes in circles": contrary to what might seem, martial law, communism, and partitions have more in common than we think. There are times in the history of a nation when the need for solidarity, a sense of community, and respect for human rights should be paid more attention than usual – by nature, people get used to the good in their lives, not realising that nothing is given for ever, downplaying everything that goes beyond the material realm, living in the present, not turning back and, most importantly, not drawing conclusions from the past.

Educational functions of the family environment in the process of shaping protective attitudes

The educational environment is a space created by people directly influencing and shaping the development of an individual. We can distinguish three basic spaces: family, school, and peers. The family is said to be the overriding one, so we'll take a closer look at it later. Following it is the school environment: by appropriately guiding students, teachers accompany them during the development process. A good teacher can see the uniqueness of each student, helps them discover their abilities, accept themselves, and answer two questions: "who am I?" and "who would I like to be?." The teacher should be an authority, someone like a mentor who transmits not only knowledge, but also values that are worth following in life. Moreover, the school has its own rules and requires absolute obedience and discipline from students. The teacher must have a lot of knowledge and experience. The 21st century is a time of many school reforms; some goals of the institution have changed – now, the focus is on providing students with skills which they themselves want to shape. More and more frequently, the teacher is treated as the students' partner, an inspirer or advisor in solving tasks, often giving up the relationship of superiority and replacing it with equality.[11]

The family environment itself, as mentioned earlier, has a huge impact on the child's development. Its components include the financial situation, i.e., the parents' income; satisfying the child's needs; the social position; and the cultural situation, i.e., the parents' education and all kinds of intellectual needs of the family. It is important that the early years of children's lives pass in a good and warm atmosphere because then they have a friendlier attitude to the world and, later on, greater mental resistance to, e.g., stress. The parental attitude itself can be equated with parental love which must be shown to the child in an appropriate amount – the parents should not

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[11]   J. Skibska, *Środowisko rodzinne jako czynnik warunkujący życie dziecka*, [in:] *Przekraczanie granic*, vol. II, eds. K. Feruga, A. Ostrowska-Knapik, R. Wojtoń, Praha: Verbum, 2012, pp. 109–117.

be too distanced as this results in emotional withdrawal. Excessive concentration on the child, e.g., keeping the child enclosed in the parents' own sphere and away from peers, is also harmful as it significantly hinders self-development. Parents must set limits for the child, the contact between the parents and the child must be free and based on trust, while the parents' authority should be maintained and emphasised. For generations, the family has not only been the most important environment, but also the source of influence, because it is the family that introduces the child to the world and teaches the most important, universally functioning laws. A young person often perceives their parents as role models, emulates their behaviour, and in the future strives to surpass their greatest achievements.[12]

Today's family differs slightly from the above description – nowadays, this environment is becoming more and more flexible and susceptible to changes. Moral values cease to be as important as they used to be, less importance is also attached to the authority of parents, and more and more often we are dealing with strictly partnerships. The father, in the past referred to as the head of the family, and now only the breadwinner who works hard to provide for the family, is becoming more and more a secondary figure, giving way to the mother, who can now also be professionally active and earn money. She is not only a co-founder of the family, but a friend of her children and a person who cares for family warmth and the right atmosphere. Still, the parents' happiness and their successful marriage are, in some way, a guarantee of the happiness of the children, who are able to perceive feelings and later show them themselves. Since the family is still an important value, why fear that young people will start it? The last decade has shown a significant decline in the number of young people's marriages, which results, to some extent, from the desire to be independent and the obligations to start a family.[13] The primary value for young people is finding a well-paid job that would provide opportunities for personal development, various types of profits, and promotions. There is also a fear of creating deeper bonds with other people, independence is now an appreciated value, postponing it until later when the time would seemingly be more appropriate. Perhaps it is a good solution – bringing up a child means not only providing them with an appropriate standard of living, but also teaching them values and bringing them up in accordance with these values. Only then can we talk about educational success.

The role of the family in the entire upbringing process is beyond doubt as it is the only environment that remains unchanged. Shaping civic attitudes currently poses

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[12]   J. Nikołajew, G. Leśniewska, "Rola rodziny w kształtowaniu społeczeństwa obywatelskiego", *Management and Business Administration. Central Europe*, no. 2, 2012, pp. 123–135, https://doi.org/10.7206/mba.ce.2084-3356.10.

[13]   Cf. J. Stańczak, K. Stelmach, M. Urbanowicz, "Spadek liczby małżeństw i urodzeń żywych w Polsce", Eurostat, 18 December 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:Marriages_and_births_in_Poland/pl&oldid=272910 [accessed: 23 June 2022].

a very big problem – more and more the phenomenon of "citizenship deficit" can be observed among young people, modern families do not attach much importance to raising children in a pro-defence and patriotic spirit.

Firstly, we should take a closer look at citizenship.[14] Who actually is a real citizen? It is a person who has the right to decide about the affairs of the state and who exercises this right in a responsible manner. A citizen is distinguished by their readiness to take responsibility for the common good and to become involved in public affairs. It is also someone for whom the overriding value is the common good, and not only their own particular interests. Parents should demonstrate themselves how to be sensitive to the surrounding evil and human misfortune, teach their children to be emotional and respectful of others. Various benefits can come from different types of work done together: it teaches solidarity, reduces selfishness, shows the importance of building deeper relationships with others, and gives a sense of acceptance. The role of the parents is also to show their children their rights and obligations. The rights must be presented in such a way that the child realises that, despite certain privileges, they also have obligations towards their parents and the whole society, which in turn has a positive effect on independence. The family should do more to encourage their offspring to learn cooperation, responsibility, and awareness of all humans being equal. Only then can we talk about pro-defence and civic upbringing. In practice, they differ significantly – civic upbringing is caused by the feeling of isolation, and by the fact that individualism and practically unconscious submission to the general public dominate in democratic societies. However, it should be taken into account that a human is a social being so connecting with other people and belonging to various types of social groups are superior, natural needs of every individual who consciously or not fulfils specific roles in society. It is also important that the influence of the family does not end when the child goes to school, the family also influences the school environment – it has a large impact on later successes and helps develop emotional maturity – it prepares them for their later roles in family and society. The kinds of values shared by the parents have a direct impact on their children: when expecting the offspring to go to church, the parents should do it themselves, because if not their authority will be seriously disturbed.

The current situation of Polish families is not easy, the sequence of changes, departure from tradition, and attempts to follow trends and adapt to the present situation do not support upbringing with values – a lack of time and, consequently, loosening family ties are also very dangerous.[15] We are facing humanity's age-old dilemma of "to

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14   *Kształcenie Obywatelskie w Szkole Samorządowej, Obywatel – kto to taki?*, https://koss.ceo. org.pl/dla-nauczycieli/scenariusze/vi/1-obywatel-kto-taki [accessed: 28 February 2022].

15   R. Doniec, "Rodzina polska jako środowisko życia i wychowania w XXI wieku – indywidualne doświadczenia i interpretacje", *Horyzonty Wychowania*, vol. 12, no. 24, 2013, pp. 163–195.

have or to be?" The Polish family is currently trying to find its place in a difficult and changing environment. The changes presently taking place are the result of the entire society's transformation, yet this cannot be an explanation for neglecting moral education because the early years leave a huge mark on the child's personality, creating deficits which will not be possible to eliminate later. Parents have not only the right to teach values to their children, but also a duty, because only in this way can the uncertainty and instability in today's world be controlled.

Conclusions

The world we are living in now is extremely challenging, constantly changing and transforming, posing significant risk to the life and development of people, who are not only witnesses to a wide spectrum of changes but also their primary participants.[16] What seems to be really convenient and time-saving, may turn out to be catastrophic. What once seemed to be a distant future which might not even happen, is now real and possible. What is important here is the rapid development of both the entire process of globalisation and the Internet with its universality. Everything is happening at the pace we cannot keep up with. It is crucial that we are aware of the fact that this does not positively influence the level of our security and poses huge challenges to it. The only good and effective solution to counter the consequences of this phenomenon is proper education which will make distinguishing manipulation from real information possible. It will also help us understand the importance of our unique culture and traditions to be nurtured, not foreign customs. Education is not only knowledge, but also shaping the values without which human life is pointless. Another big problem that can be countered by proper education are various threats in the cyberspace and addiction to the virtual environment. Without proper background, we cannot verify whether the information we come across on the Internet is true, we are more susceptible to manipulation, and it is easier to trick us into providing sensitive data. Not everyone is aware of the fact that prolonged sitting in front of a computer increases the risk of many health problems (e.g., cardiovascular and poor vision), and our psyche is also at risk. We must start countering these threats immediately. It is important to start this process as soon as possible and to educate children from the earliest years of their lives – you cannot convince anyone of the integrity of the world because it may turn out seeing reality for what it is will be very painful. A child must be able to distinguish good from evil, know the value system, and learn how to be guided by it in their life. The key role is played by the family, which has a decisive influence on the personality of a young person –

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[16]   M. Bereźnicka, J. Rokitowska, *Wybrane aspekty związane ze świadomością młodzieży na temat zagrożeń internetowych oraz potrzeba edukacji w tym zakresie*, [in:] *Edukacja w świecie VUCA...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 351–376.

it shapes faith in God, love for the motherland, willingness to defend its borders, respect for fellow citizens, and respect for differences between people. Cyprian Kamil Norwid said that "the Fatherland is a great collective obligation,"[17] and it is true because one man will not protect it, you need solidarity, a wise and educated community fighting to protect their values.

It is therefore important to learn the right attitudes, for example, from our ancestors who fought for the values they believed in and hoped for. A wise nation is the one that faces adversities with respect for freedom and love for God. A person who does not believe in their ideals loses their goal, does not see any meaning in their existence, and is only interested in a good job, money, or other material goods.

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[17]   Ochotnicze Hufce Pracy, "'Ojczyzna to wielki zbiorowy obowiązek' – 200. rocznica urodzin Cypriana Kamila Norwida", https://ohp.pl/en/?view=article&id=15964:ojczyzna-to-wielki-zbiorowy-obowiazek-200-Rocznica-urodzin-cypriana-kamila-norwida&catid=14 [accessed: 28 February 2022].

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The role of the family environment in strengthening pro-defensive attitudes of the 21st century society

Abstract

The first educational environment of every human being is usually the family. This is where the lifelong process of shaping attitudes and acquiring the desired character traits begins. Just as social attitudes are shaped and strengthened on the basis of values derived from the family environment, the ethos of service is built, which develops and strengthens pro-defence attitudes. Nowadays, such attitudes are less and less often seen among young people due to the crisis of values in developed countries and the promotion of a consumerist lifestyle. Ensuring security in the 21st century depends not only on the military or the intellectual potential of citizens, but above all on the extremely important human factor, most often expressed by patriotic pro-defence attitudes allowing for heroic efforts, especially in the event of a real threat. The aim of this article is therefore to show the extremely important role of the family environment in shaping and strengthening pro-defence attitudes among the society of the 21st century. The research was carried out using theoretical methods, such as analysis, synthesis, generalisation, and inference, and using the technique of examining documents and source materials. Particular attention was paid, *inter alia*, to the need to build pro-defence attitudes among young people and to the educational functions of the family environment constituting the basis for the process of shaping pro-defence attitudes.

Key words: educational environment, pro-defence attitudes, family, education

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The shaping of moral attitudes as a pillar of contemporary security and social order

Introduction

Until recently, the term "security" covered all matters related to national security and its problems. For a short time, the category of "security" was identified not only with the protection of physical endurance or territorial integrity, but also with the freedom ensuring, for example, cultural and socio-economic development, or improving the quality of life. That is how the issue of security is explained in the White Book of National Security of the Republic of Poland, which distinguishes four forms of security, one of which is social security.[1]

The social aspect is a part of spiritual culture, which has quite a significant impact on how our relationships with other people develop and how we look at some sociological phenomena. It is a kind of creation that influences the shaping of our moral and ideological principles, as well as those that guide us in interactions with other people. It happens very often that a group of people belonging to the same community

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[1] J. Gierszewski, "Bezpieczeństwo społeczne jako dziedzina bezpieczeństwa narodowego", *Historia i Polityka*, no. 23(30), 2018, pp. 21–38, http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/HiP.2018.002.

has similar moral principles, although each person has different experiences which affect their outlook on life. The role of a given individual in society is influenced by another factor, namely their personality, and this in turn leaves significant marks on the choice of life ideologies. Each person feels the need to fulfil an appropriate role, some will feel good as revolutionists striving to change the world, while others will come to terms with systems already developed by someone who created the existing reality. A vast majority of people are inclined to maintain a certain social order and to follow it. The word "order" is associated with something nice and good, that is, with something to which most of us are prone: a certain equality that occurs in interpersonal relationships. Sometimes the pursuit of order results in many unfavourable changes only because someone is trying to impose their moral principles on other individuals, often stating that someone else is bad, and our moral principles are good no matter what – without approaching the problem more openly. The basis for creating healthy social ties is the recognition of the equality between two individuals. Statistically, it can be said that in traditional societies, birth was the foundation for establishing a certain order and creating a hierarchy which, in turn, formed the basis for defining a person's higher or lower social status. This contributed to the use of the terms "better" and "worse" depending on what hierarchy level they came from.

Moral disorder in society as a source of real dangers

Two aspects of education are considered in this article. The first one – psychological – is the complex system of exerting and coming under influence. These processes take place between individuals who play their specific roles: on the one side there is the tutor, the other is the caretaker, so upbringing consists of mutually dependent processes. In psychology, the goal is to work on conscious assumptions about the pupil's personality. We are therefore dealing with the good of an individual. The simplest and probably the most common example of such upbringing is the influence of the adult generation on those who have not yet matured for social life. An adult subject aims to inculcate in the pupil certain specific behaviours required by the environment and universally acceptable. Upbringing can also be considered in terms of pedagogy. The human personality is shaped by various social, interpersonal, and institutional influences, so here we are talking about social good. Each person is a developing individual, and all processes occurring during this development are the products of the individual's activities in the environment and its response to them.[2] Upbringing is nothing else than shaping in each individual specific attitudes which are commonly considered attractive. A person's upbringing consists of many factors, and we can talk about it in

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[2]   A. Gurycka, *Struktura i dynamika procesu wychowawczego: analiza psychologiczna*, Warszawa: PWN, 1979, pp. 54–55.

various categories. One of the areas of education is moral education which is a process aimed at developing in an individual such features which facilitate functioning in society, but also allow them to improve themselves. All educational activities aim at changing the human psyche and shaping a person's socio-moral attitude[3] that is desirable from the point of view of the interests of a certain society. The attractive attitudes are altruism, disinterestedness, loyalty, and kindness.

How a human being is brought up translates into their moral education. Why? Because from the first days of our lives, the caretaker's approach has a strong influence on the child's brain. Connections responsible for the emotional sphere are created in the brain, on our "memory card", that is in our brain, the first memories are already recorded, which, unfortunately, in the adult world are not remembered by us, but they subconsciously play a great role in the process of upbringing. Scientists believe that our character, shaped through upbringing, is influenced by stimuli we perceive while still in the womb. The kind of music the mother listens to, the books she reads affect our development. A baby's hearing organs begin to develop and form after about 16 weeks of pregnancy. It is true that music can have a calming effect on our mood. Soft music lowers the cortisol level, and this also translates into how the child develops. Listening to low-frequency music, such as classical music, has a beneficial effect on the child's development, influences later brain plasticity, memory, and concentration, as well as neurological and psychomotor development. It happens that when the mother listens to a certain musical genre during pregnancy, the child remembers this music and it is not about the artist or the title of the piece, but about the sounds; we remember sounds at an early stage of development, and thus, when the child hears a familiar sound after being born, it may be easier for them to fall asleep or calm down when crying; hearing these sounds provides a feeling of safety. Thus, our upbringing is already influenced by various factors even before we are born.[4]

The environment in which we live influences our moral values. Since humans began to form relationships with other humans by creating communities, there have been disputes about what values the law is to serve, and more precisely, what values it is to protect.[5] Law and morality are two separate systems, but there is a certain relation between them. The relations that exist between law and morality occur throughout the history of philosophical thought. They consisted of questions about what should be right and what should be considered as "right" and "good". They also answered the question of what "bad" law is and what it should be used for. We can find such questions in Aristotle's notes. Considerations about the relationship between law and

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[3]   L. Zarzecki, *Teoretyczne podstawy wychowania. Teoria i praktyka w zarysie*, Jelenia Góra: Karkonoska Państwowa Szkoła Wyższa, 2012, p. 114.

[4]   Doktor Gaweł – O Zdrowiu Kobiet Bez Tabu, Jak słuchanie muzyki w ciąży wpływa na dziecko?, 22 December 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eHYxtea-L_Y&ab_channel=DoktorGawe%C5%82-OZdrowiuKobietBezTabu [accessed: 6 February 2022].

[5]   W. Łączkowski, "Prawo i moralność", *Poznańskie Studia Teologiczne*, vol. 9, 2000, p. 205.

morality were aimed at finding out whether the foundations of law were deeper and more lasting in the life of the state, and thus also in social life; and at assessing the law. According to Aristotle, the state should fulfil its role in passing "good" law, and these foundations and criteria for assessing the law had their roots in moral principles.[6]

Things get complicated when it turns out that the goals the law is supposed to serve are wicked and the system of values underlying a given law is contrary to the values considered by us as the most important. This is when a moral dilemma arises. This dilemma is not easy to solve as it consists in making a choice either that is against our beliefs and values while remaining obedient to the law, or in breaking the law while remaining faithful to our own convictions. It happens that the situation in which we are caught between a rock and a hard place is a determinant of disorder in society, which affects social security. The problem is serious when it influences a large group of citizens, and even worse when it affects the vast majority of citizens. The legal community emphasises the fact that law deserves absolute respect and obedience because it guarantees order and determines justice. The problem arises when different people have their own interpretation of the law, when a group expresses their views in an unrestrained way, of course, in an unlawful manner. In our rich history, there are several examples of such behaviour, for example, officials of the Third Reich, or representatives of the Marxist doctrine from the moment when they transformed the old law for their own needs and the so-called revolutionary vigilance.[7]

Any established and generally accepted moral norms which society follows, and any law that is considered good, goes hand in hand with security. Abraham Maslow placed them as the second most basic needs in his hierarchy.[8] Undoubtedly, it is true that this need plays an important role in the sphere of primary and existential needs, not only in the case of the individual, but the entire society, and even states. It is not only about the integrity, inviolability of borders, or independence, but also about ensuring security in terms of a given person's development, which will contribute to enriching the identity of a person or a nation.[9] Moral and legal norms are two separate systems of conduct. This is not to say that the development of morality does not influence the development of law, or that the development of law does not influence the development of morality.[10]

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[6]   M. Michalik, "Moralność a prawo – przegląd typowych ujęć relacji", *Doctrina. Międzynarodowy Przegląd Humanistyczny*, no. 2, 2005, pp. 377–388.

[7]   W. Łączkowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 206–207.

[8]   Cf. J. Pawłowski, J. Marczak, K. Gąsiorek, Definiowanie i uwarunkowania bezpieczeństwa narodowego (państwa), [in:] *Podstawy bezpieczeństwa narodowego (państwa). Podręcznik akademicki*, ed. J. Pawłowski, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademii Sztuki Wojennej, 2017, p. 32.

[9]   *Obrona narodowa w tworzeniu bezpieczeństwa III RP. Podręcznik dla studentek i studentów*, ed. R. Jakubczak, Warszawa: Bellona, 2003, p. 59.

[10] A. Łopatka, *Encyklopedia prawa*, Warszawa: Prywatna Wyższa Szkoła Handlowa, 1997, pp. 130–131.

A threat to national security, that is, a threat to the society making up a nation is such a series of events, of an internal or international character, which carries with it the probability of detriment or loss of conditions for unhampered existence or development. Such situations also contribute to the deprivation or violation of the state's sovereignty and the reduction of its international position as a result of the use by enemy entities perpetrating various forms of violence, e.g., military, political, financial, economic, or of other nature, e.g., hybrid.[11]

In axiological terms, threats to security are related to direct or indirect disruptions in meeting material and non-material social needs that are essential to our human existence.[12] From the epistemological perspective, a lack of morality may have a negative impact on the development of an individual or a social group.

In the ontological area, Lech Krzyżanowski mentions three forms of being: objects (not only real, but also abstract), processes, and events. Beings are things (objects) that last over time, and are both tangible and intangible, such as an idea. Beings include, for example, liberty, freedom of development, truth, identity, justice, and dignity.[13] An idea is considered to be a skeleton in the construction of the "moral compass" motivating a person to search for an essential value in their lives, which is the meaning of life. American thinker Richard Malcolm Weaver states that "ideas bring consequences," that is, they are nothing but signposts which, like a motor, drive people to search for the meaning of life.[14]

Processes and phenomena extending over time constitute another ontological category. Some examples of these phenomena are the process of human self-improvement, the process of social integration, and the process responsible for building people's national identity, all of which important for national security.[15]

Events, another ontological category, are facts that take place at a given time. Certain facts may play a significant role in terms of changes affecting state security, such as the introduction of martial law by General Wojciech Jaruzelski did in Poland in 1981. Another event related to the national security of another country is the 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center skyscrapers in New York.[16]

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[11] J. Piwowarski, *Nauki o bezpieczeństwie. Zagadnienia elementarne*, 2nd edition, Kraków: Wyższa Szkoła Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego i Indywidualnego „Apeiron", 2017, p. 33.

[12] A. Lisowski, *Skutki występowania wybranych zagrożeń naturalnych i ich percepcja w Polsce*, Warszawa: Uniwersytet Warszawski, 1993, p. 15.

[13] J. Piwowarski, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

[14] J.M. Bocheński, *Sens życia i inne eseje*, 2nd edition, Komorów: Wydawnictwo Antyk Marcin Dybowski, 2008; V.E. Frankl, *Man's Search for Ultimate Meaning*, foreword by H.S. Kushner, afterword by W.J. Winslade, Boston: Beacon Press, 2006; E. Becker, *The Birth and Death of Meaning. An Interdisciplinary Perspective on the Problem of Man*, 2nd edition, New York: The Free Press, 1971.

[15] J. Piwowarski, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

[16] *Ibidem*.

A threat to the security of a state is uncritical adoption of foreign models without taking into account own traditions, experiences, history, and changes taking place all over the world.[17]

Moral education as the basis for shaping desired social attitudes

Each type of education has its stages and this is also the case here. Considering the process of moral education in a psychological category, where the parent is the tutor and the child is the pupil, we can distinguish three such stages.

At the first stage, the child is not yet aware that certain specific social norms exists, and yet people are often assessed through them. This is the stage where we are completely dependent on the parent, the infant and post-infant period may be the stage where we cannot demonstrate our filters of perception, but definitely a lot starts here. Values, which are being perfected and shaped by society, are very often founded at this stage.

The second stage is the so-called moral heteronomy: the child becomes aware of some not too complicated actions and concludes that there are certain standards which must be followed, as non-compliance may result in a penalty. An individual, already formed at the earlier stages of education, realises that punishment is not a good thing, and hence adheres to the norms.

At the final stage of morality formation, there is a human being who is fully aware that this world is based on certain standards, who knows that one has to take them into account, and self-discipline helps with this. Speaking of a conscious individual, we mean someone who has exceeded a certain level of self-knowledge, so they already have substantial information about themselves and their mental states; they have the ability to control their feelings, know how to deal with stress, also have the experience which allows them to make informed decision and function responsibly in a social reality.[18]

Moral attitudes are among the first to be shaped during the upbringing process which accompanies us from the first weeks of our lives. Upbringing is not only punishing when a child does something wrong, although in the past such primitive forms of shaping moral attitudes in an individual were very often used. After all, the parent is the first person responsible for how our moral compass is shaped, and every loving parent will undoubtedly make every effort to ensure that their child grows to be a person able to make the right choices in difficult and critical situations.

In his works, Heliodor Muszyński calls moral attitudes interpersonal attitudes because their subject is the other person, and more precisely, values such as dignity,

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[17] W. Okoń, *Nowy słownik pedagogiczny*, extended 2nd edition, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademickie „Żak" 1998, p. 84.

[18] Based on the theory of moral development in terms of Lawrence Kohlberg.

life and health, the right to obtain reliable information, and the right to be different. A person may adopt various attitudes towards another person, e.g., an attitude of respect for life and health, an attitude of tolerance, or an attitude of caring. All these attitudes are usually very desirable in our society, and people who adhere to certain values are considered attractive.[19] After all, people are herd animals, and all animals living in herds look after their families. Wolves are a beautiful example here: for them, the pack is the most important. Unfortunately, there is the flip side of this coin. An individual, who is a human, may also exhibit attitudes that will deprive them of values they have, and may result in their destruction.

Moral education is based on two different educational systems. One of them is established on moral relativism, the other – on a systematic process aimed at instilling certain moral principles. A community supporting the first type of upbringing mainly asks itself the question of what moral values are good to convey to their children, and whether it is worth communicating to them those values which result from own experience and views, or maybe those that are widely accepted as attractive in society. The truth is that each party perceives and defines stimuli differently, thus adopting other values as positive. Some will be led in their lives by the Decalogue, while others will choose something completely different as attractive guidance. Since every person is guided in life by a different understanding of such concepts as "positive," or "moral values," is it a good idea to impose them on our children? Is it not more prudent to present these concepts to children and let them decide for themselves?[20]

The second system rejects moral relativism in upbringing, and those in favour of this method of upbringing claim that pupils should be taught certain moral principles and use them to act in accordance with the adopted moral code. This system is very old. For a long time, societies have sought to systematise and formulate certain moral values that were considered very important for living in harmony with other people. Each young person had to internalise them. Education based on indoctrination was characterized by the use of rewards and punishments. The reward system was intended to show that a particular behaviour was socially acceptable and should be used as guidance, while the punishment system was intended to condemn the behaviour.

However, education based on indoctrination raises some doubts. It is not adjusted to the mental development of an individual. The value system and all norms passed onto children often do not take into account their moral level. It happens that the transferred values and norms exceed their moral level, and thus, no moral argumentation brings the expected results in upbringing. In addition, this system aims to fit a given individual into a rigid framework created by older generations, lifestyle, or

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[19] M. Szalkiewicz, "Problematyka wychowania w koncepcji pedagogicznej Heliodora Muszyńskiego", *Zeszyty Naukowe Państwowej Wyższej Szkoły Zawodowej im. Witelona w Legnicy*, no. 4, 2016, pp. 93–105.

[20] R. Murawski, "Rozwój i wychowanie moralne dzieci i młodzieży", *Seminare. Poszukiwania Naukowe*, vol. 4, 1979, p. 57.

ideology, without taking into account its destructive impact on the individual. Living in such a diverse society, where each group has the right to express their interests, a person is exposed to various influences from different environments or institutions. These, in turn, express their disparate hierarchies of values, often leading the individual into moral uncertainty and doubt. Each community has adopted its own desirable and it uses them to form young people.[21]

There are many factors influencing the process of moral development, including both the family and peer groups or teachers. There is no doubt that the family is the social unit that first influences children. It is the parents who show what is right and what is wrong. As Ralph Linton accurately states, "the first few years of an individual's life are critical to establishing highly generalized value-attitude systems that constitute the deeper layers of personality."[22]

Traditional families were characterised by a closed educational system. It was based on pre-established parenting goals that had been practiced over years. For the young generation, parents were role models and the examples to follow; the shaping of moral attitudes in a young individual was therefore predetermined.[23] Over time, the family began to change its function. Today, this social unit is becoming an emotional community. This consists in a change from former relations between things into contemporary relations based on emotional ties. Family life expectations are also changing. Nowadays, marriage is treated as a decision for a specified period of time, a life-long commitment seems to be too a decision. Marriage and the family instability may, in turn, contribute to the failure to fulfil certain obligations in the family, posing the threat of its breakup. Family breakdown has a strong impact on the child's psyche, which often manifests itself in being lost in the world and questioning the values of moral norms. In Poland, the family is considered to be the highest value, many believe that it necessary for a successful and happy life. It is in the family that children absorb important values and create a protective barrier against the inappropriate barriers arising from the social environment.

As we already know, the family plays a significant role in the moral development of children. This social unit is the first influence on the child, hence the justified view that all problems with bringing up children begin in a family that has not fulfilled its educational, caring and developmental role as needed. Unfortunately, pro-family and socio-economic policies are affected by the social and economic problems of the state, and these, in turn, affect family life. As a result of the economic crisis and the lack of a vision for the state's development, society is experiencing an increase in social pathology. This has multiple consequences, for example, parental authority, so

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[21] *Ibidem*, p. 59.

[22] J. Mariański, *Wprowadzenie do socjologii moralności*, Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1989, p. 190.

[23] *Idem*, *Moralność w kontekście społecznym*, Kraków: Zakład Wydawniczy „Nomos", 2014.

important in the upbringing process, is weakened. Other values contributing to the violation of security and order in social life are also shaken. Political disputes or all kinds of struggle among parties for domination on the political scene also affect the local environment and the situation of families. Parents wanting to ensure their child's well-being forget that this is not their only task. The amount of time they need to spend working to provide for their family means that they often do not have time for their children. Parents come home tired, the first thing they think about is rest because they know that when the new day comes, they will have to go to work again to earn a living. The pursuit of money, which, unfortunately, plays a significant role nowadays, adversely influences the amount of time we spend with our children. Because of tiredness and the daily rush, we forget that the parent is the first person who influences the upbringing of a young individual. Parents are on top of the list of those who young people trust and believe; trusted parents lend credibility to their actions and words. Certainly, there are many people who, at least once in their lives, have heard from a child that it wants to be like daddy or mummy because it is first and foremost the parents who are first role models for their children. In today's fast-changing world, moral values are also changing. These changes are caused by conflicting ideals and lifestyles. Everyone chooses a different lifestyle and pursues some ideal. Conflicts occur when two different individuals or social groups follow different lifestyles, and it happens that there is rivalry over which one is more attractive. Religion and culture are also sources of conflict. Looking around, we can see a division in society caused by religious differences. Each of these religious groups has their own beliefs, their doctrines, sometimes the assumptions of one are contradictory to the assumptions of the other, which affects the division of opinions on a given issue.

Conclusions

This short review of topics related to moral attitudes and social order enables understanding of the importance of the role moral attitudes play in the security of a state, a social group, or an individual. Better and better comprehension of these issues makes us aware of the role they play in the lives of individuals and social groups they create. Proper shaping of law and moral attitudes enables positive interpersonal relations, and what is more, it also allows us to understand other people functioning with us in society. Muszyński adopted a specific division of moral norms, thanks to which we can classify them properly. He calls the attitudes he distinguished "interpersonal", arguing that their subject is the other person, or more precisely, their values. In relation to another human being, an individual may adopt an attitude of respect for life and health, an attitude of tolerance, an attitude of caring, etc., but may also have an anti-social attitude, i.e., one that will depreciate the other person or pose a threat of losing values, such as dignity, autonomy, life and health,

property, the right to be informed, and the right to be different. In a situation where certain moral values, established as attractive in the society in which we live, are taken away from us, a certain homeostasis is disturbed, and this leaves its mark on an individual's and a group's safety, and when the balance is disturbed in a vast majority, even the state's safety is affected. As the *Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego* [Dictionary of Safety Terms] says that "security is one of the basic human needs"[24] it is the greatest need, which means that a need of security results from a natural inclination to live in a community enables human survival and development.

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[24]   Bezpieczeństwo [headword], [in:] *Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, eds. J. Kaczmarek, W. Łepkowski, B. Zdrodowski, 6th edition, Warszawa: AON, 2008, p. 14.

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The shaping of moral attitudes as a pillar of contemporary security and social order
Abstract

The long-term process of education, and above all, shaping the desired social attitudes among young citizens of each country is the basis of the future social order. Individual moral order translates directly into order in social structures and relations, which is important in the context of ensuring both internal and external security. In an orderly society, the so-called "strong moral backbone" is much more resistant to threats, and also much more effective in counteracting them. Unfortunately, the issue of moral education is not much emphasised in contemporary educational systems. Therefore, the main goal of this article is to identify the components of the moral education process as key factors shaping the contemporary order and social security. Thus, the issues of moral disorder as a source of real threats, both in the individual and social dimension, as well as the problem of moral education as the basis for shaping the desired social attitudes in the contemporary world, were analysed. In order to achieve the assumed goal, the following research methods (theoretical) were used: analysis, synthesis, abstraction, explanation, generalization, and inference. The research was carried out using the technique of examining documents and source materials.

Key words: moral education, shaping attitudes, social security

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Military leadership: case studies

Introduction

Leadership is a research subject which has been and for a long time will be in the centre of scientists' interests around the world, both in the civilian and military environment. As Waldemar Łydka notes, "[m]anagement of organisations, and in particular human resources management, requires managers at all levels to have skills and qualities that ensure effective use of their subordinates' potential."[1] Additionally, he indicates that "poor information resources in national professional publications are a problem, which might be a subject for deeper analysis."[2] The importance of this area of activity is emphasised by Tomasz Majewski, who unequivocally states in his considerations that "[t]he phenomenon of leadership in the army for many years has been both a source of research inspiration and a subject of interest for those commanders who want to efficiently command soldiers."[3] The two above approaches presented by

[1] W. Łydka, *Przywództwo wojskowe*, Warszawa: Wojskowe Centrum Edukacji Obywatelskiej im. płk. dypl. Mariana Porwita, 2017, p. 23.
[2] *Ibidem*, p. 24.
[3] T. Majewski, Rola przywództwa w dowodzeniu wojskami, [in:] *Współczesne dylematy dydaktyki obronnej*, ed. K. Krakowski, Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2015, p. 387.

academic teachers experienced in the field of theoretical and empirical research on leadership gained at the War Studies University, but also from practical experience of commanding troops and leading teams, testify to the fact that there is a need to take on challenges in this area.

Reflecting on the essence of military leadership, it is worth familiarising the reader with the specifics of this type of leadership. Leadership is defined in various publications, and explanations of this term can be found not only in Polish scientific papers, but also in many works in other languages. Some are more business-like in nature, while others are typically military.

According to the views of Michael Armstrong, leadership is defined as the ability to convince others to change their own behaviour. In turn, Leszek Kanarski notes that leadership is the ability to unite people whose priority is to achieve specific goals. Andrew J. DuBrin, on the other hand, points out three basic characteristics of a good leader, such as inspiring, convincing and supporting those who, through the realisation of tasks, are necessary to achieve the goals of the group or organisation.[4]

It is easy to see that DuBrin has highlighted key elements in the essence of leadership that also affect the development of subordinates. When analysing military leadership, we identify adopted elements from the previously mentioned definitions, but transformatively add others that are very relevant to the military leadership aspect of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland. The above brief comparative analysis indicates that this is still a very much alive and viable research area.

A very disturbing and, at the same time, despite the last few years, still valid characteristic of leadership in the Armed Forces was provided by Bogdan M. Szulc in his 2001 research,[5] which was brought to our notice after less than 20 years: "the basic relationship which exists and will exist in command is being lost. It is a relationship between people, between a commander and a subordinate."[6] Therefore, in its essence, man loses himself. At this point, we can ask ourselves two questions:

1) What are my relationships with other people?
2) What could I do to improve my relationship with another person?

Modern armed forces require leaders to possess a variety of qualities and skills, some of which are: availability, responsibility, independence, caring for a good image of the Polish Armed Forces, and the ability to self-educate continuously. Anyone who works with the military and enters their structures for the implementation of their tasks can observe the elements inherent in typical corporate systems, which are also found in the organisational units of the Polish Armed Forces.

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[4]   See T. Majewski, D. Kurek, B.M. Szulc, *Przywództwo: konteksty, reminiscencje, odniesienia*, Warszawa: Akademia Sztuki Wojennej, 2020, p. 14.

[5]   See B.M. Szulc, *Przywództwo w dowodzeniu wojskami lądowymi RP*, part 1: *Koncepcja*, Warszawa: Akademia Obrony Narodowej, 2001, p. 16.

[6]   T. Majewski, D. Kurek, B.M. Szulc, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

Military leadership is a component of command, which is a part of the combat system as one of the main systems in relation to which a high level of readiness is required. This is guaranteed to a large extent by a very well-functioning leadership system in which the commander takes credit; he may not always be fully deserving of it, but he has superbly trained subordinates at the highest level. Then, it is not his merit but the merit of non-commissioned officers and privates who have professional and specialist competences which their superior sometimes lacks. When considering the leadership aspect of command, a legitimate question arises about who today's leaders are and what their role is. Referring once again to the thought of Szulc that in the whole command of the Polish Armed Forces a man loses himself, we can see a very different level of leadership competence among soldiers serving in the structures of the Polish Armed Forces at various levels in different organisational units. This is especially true of some officers with quite significant experience and not necessarily the youngest ones. An additional factor are military ranks which do not always correspond to the expected level of leadership. Therefore, looking at this problem in an individualised manner presents a challenge.

A good research method that has been used to obtain reliable research results is the case study. Most of the researchers dealing with the issue of competencies agree on the principle that the set of competencies held will never be complete and ready, despite education or qualifications. Today's environment of professional functioning requires constant change in the area of soft and hard competencies. It is therefore reasonable to assume that there will never be a commander who would meet all expectations and be perfect for everyone – both their subordinates and superiors. There is a dilemma: is there not a lack of commanders in the Polish Armed Forces today, who have the basic skills and characteristics to be called leaders in the full meaning of this word? We should understand leadership as true leadership at the highest level, not just at a minimum level sufficient to pass exams or meet formal requirements for promotion to the next higher military rank. Being a leader calls for true leadership, not just being an officer occupying a specific duty position. We can apply the same theory to NCOs (non-commissioned officers), who are the first commanders in the way of privates. Therefore, as strange as it may seem, the execution of leadership functions is largely directed to mid-level commanders.

Case study and discussion

The research was conducted with randomly selected soldiers performing their professional military service in different organisational units of the Polish Armed Forces. The object of the research were the selected characteristics, predispositions, and competencies of leaders. The following are the variables that were adopted for the research process:

1)   responsibility,
2)   communicativeness,
3)   ability to work under pressure,
4)   care for the team,
5)   self-presentation,
6)   professional expertise,
7)   care for of one's own and the subdivision's image,
8)   own values,
9)   patriotism,
10) equal treatment,
11) care for self-development,
12) care for the development of their soldiers.

This is a limited set that includes, in the opinion of the authors, some of the key variables relevant to the issue being addressed.

The first case

The first case is a representative of the professional private corps with three years of service in the rank of senior private and the age of 23. When asked if he sees leadership competence in his company commander, the soldier gives the following answer: "Yes, he is a responsible commander and has the knowledge necessary for the position. He lacks the communication skills. He has military knowledge, and you can learn from him, but he does not bind the company together. Our relations are based only on tasks from 8.00–15.00."

The next question the soldier is asked, "Do you see leadership competence in your platoon leader?", is answered more broadly:

> Yes, he is fully prepared for the role of a commander. He maintains the military hierarchy but binds us together and teaches the principle of one for all and all for one. We are never afraid to go to him with anything. We know when we do something wrong and should be punished, but we are also sure that he will stand up for us. I wish every commander was like that.

The third question in this case asks for elf-assessment: "Do you notice leadership competencies in yourself and would like to use them as a leader?" We have a very short answer here: "I see some qualities in myself, but I'm not sure I could handle the responsibility."

The described case allows us to conclude that his company commander is a well-educated man with a sufficient level of expertise required for the position. The subordinate's assessment shows that the commanding officer is a responsible person, but in the eyes of the private he has a problem with soft skills such as communication and

maintaining relationships outside the service. The private sees no action that should be taken by the commander.

A slightly different view of the platoon leader is that he is a man who possesses the qualities of a leader and is able to use them practically. He can maintain the required level of discipline but does not build artificial barriers. On the contrary, his openness, decisiveness, and instilling the principle of shared responsibility in the platoon result in him being perceived as a person to whom you can turn with a problem and who always takes his people's side when necessary. The private emphasises the great responsibility associated with holding a commanding position in the sub-units of the Polish Armed Forces.

The second case

The second case is a representative of the professional private corps with five years of service, in the rank of private and aged 27. When asked if he sees leadership competence in his company commander, the soldier gives the following answer: "The commander tries to be the commander he was in the old days. He keeps discipline in the unit and tries to train us to be the best soldiers possible, but this desire is not based on cooperation and listening to each other."

When asked another question, "Do you see leadership competence in your platoon leader?", the soldier gives an answer showing an interesting aspect, namely that one's own feelings about a person do not always translate into a biased assessment: "I am not fond of him as a person, but he's fantastic as a commander. He knows how to impart knowledge and control crisis situations. If I could, I would swap him for a company commander."

The third question in this case asks for self-assessment: "Do you notice leadership competencies in yourself and would you like to use them as a leader?" Here we have a very specific answer showing that he is aware of the responsibility of leadership: "I don't know how to spot them in myself. I wouldn't want to have that responsibility on me."

Case two establishes that his company commander is a man with a particular leadership style. He is a commander who uses the method of force and position to achieve the required results and win respect. However, when questioned, the soldier emphasises that he notices in his company commander a desire to impart knowledge and train the subdivision. However, he sees the absence of a key factor for success, which is interpersonal relationships

The assessment of the platoon leader, on the other hand, is quite different. The subordinate, despite difficulties with personal relationships, sees him as a leader and notices the necessary competencies, skills, and qualities. An important element is the fact that the interviewee would swap positions between the platoon leader and

the company commander. This is an indication that the company command level is lacking leadership and that there is a strong need for it.

Thus, it can be concluded that in this company, the commander should use his NCOs' help to develop an appropriate leadership model in the subunit and tap into their knowledge and skills to enhance his leadership skills.

The third case

The third case is a representative of the professional private corps with ten years of service, with the rank of senior private and aged 34. When asked whether he sees leadership competence in his company commander, the soldier gives the following answer: "The commander is a young lieutenant who came after officer school. He is not prepared to command a company. He does not have the developed qualities that were given. He is not even theoretically prepared."

The next question: "Do you see leadership competence in your platoon leader?", is answered as follows: "He is an old non-commissioned officer. He has the knowledge and desire to teach young soldiers very well. Such a person is the best fit for a company commander, not someone who is inexperienced."

The third question asks for self-assessment: "Do you notice leadership competencies in yourself and would like to use them as a leader?" Here we have a very specific answer: "Although I do have enthusiasm for further self-development, it has been reduced to a minimum due to a lack of promotion opportunities."

The third case helps to corroborate the voices coming from the students of military academies saying that they get an opportunity to encounter real leadership only after graduation. In this case, the company commander is a young lieutenant. As the interviewee notes, he does not have the leadership competencies that we asked about. He emphasises the lack of not only practical but also theoretical preparation. Thus, one can note the imperfect military universities training for leadership skills development in their students.

What differs in this case is the assessment of the platoon commander. He is the opposite of the company commander. The experienced NCO has the most experience in the platoon. As the soldier points out, this NCO, despite his old age, has been teaching soldiers since the beginning, "he moulds them like clay". The interviewee emphasises that this NCO is the best replacement for a company commander who has a very low level of experience. Thus, we can conclude that this senior NCO is an invaluable teacher for younger soldiers, even those with higher military rank. But there is one condition: the company commander should want to draw knowledge from him.

As for our private, he is aware of the leadership competencies he possesses. However, the system of promotion and the path and limitations existing at the moment have significantly reduced his willingness. In all likelihood, it will not be possible to

achieve the same results we would have achieved a few years earlier when training this soldier as a non-commissioned officer.

The fourth case

The fourth interviewee was a representative of the non-commissioned officer corps with four years of service, with the rank of corporal and aged 25. When asked if he sees leadership competence in his company commander, the soldier gives a short answer: "I do and I am proud of him for his ability as a commander to stand up for us as soldiers."

The question about assessing the competence of his subordinates – "Do you see leadership competence in your subordinates?" – was answered in the following way: "I can see it in some, but I don't have the opportunity to send them to courses to develop them."

The last question was "Do you notice leadership competencies in yourself and use them as a leader?" The soldier responds: "I do, and I am aware of it. I try to develop them all the time."

When looking at the fourth respondent, we can see a fairly young NCO who has not served long. Nevertheless, he is specific in his answers. In the evaluation of the company commander, he emphasises one important element, "he knows how to stand up for his soldiers." The company commander applies the rule that the sub-unit is a unity and is not a separate element but a part of the whole. Analysing the third and fourth respondent's statements, one can notice some similarities. The corporal notices in his subordinates leadership qualities which could be developed, but it is not possible for him to send them to courses and training. The third case concerns a soldier in the corps of privates, who has these competencies, but has not been sent to any competencies development course, which resulted in limiting his desire for further development. It can be assumed that the corporal, without the opportunity to support his subordinates with leadership competences, will also lose his enthusiasm and willingness to work on leadership. In his self-assessment, systematic work on his competencies requires special consideration.

The fifth case

The fifth interviewee is a representative of the professional non-commissioned officer corps with ten years of service, with the rank of sergeant and aged 35. Asked if he sees leadership competence in his company commander, the soldier indicates: "He has the qualities necessary to be a company commander, but I am not convinced that his competence would work in higher positions."

The answer to the next question – "Do you see leadership competence in your subordinates?" – which is addressed to the soldier, is as follows: "This is a difficult issue. I try to keep a superior-subordinate distance. During the eight hours at work, there is no way I can notice them."

The third question asks for self-assessment in the area of having and using leadership competencies ("Do you notice leadership competencies in yourself and use them as a leader?"), and the respondent says: "I have them, but I don't develop them. I think this level is enough for me."

In the fifth case, we have a soldier who is aware of the level of his leadership competence. He also notices the qualities that are more or less important in leadership. When evaluating his company commander, he acknowledges he leadership qualities the commander possesses and expresses a good opinion of leadership at the company command level. However, he is not sure if his company commander has not already reached his highest level in leadership because, according to the sergeant, the qualities possessed by the company commander may not be sufficient for higher positions.

Assessing leadership qualities and competencies in subordinates is difficult. As the soldier points out, he is trying to maintain the essential element of service which is the supervisor-subordinate relationship. He is not able to notice his subordinates during eight hours of work.

In conclusion, the respondent is aware of his leadership competence level, but he is also sure that there is no need to develop it further because the level he has is sufficient and satisfactory for him.

The sixth case

The sixth case is a representative of non-commissioned officer corps with twelve years of service, rank of chief warrant officer and aged 46. When asked if he sees leadership competence in his company commander, the soldier replies: "He's trying to be the best possible commander for his soldiers."

The next question addressed to the soldier – "Do you see leadership competence in your subordinates?" – is answer with the following statement: "They very rarely have the opportunity to demonstrate it. However, there are some people who do, and I try to support them in their development."

The third question asks for self-assessment: "Do you notice leadership competencies in yourself and use them as a leader?" and the answer is short and surprising. "I don't know. I can't tell."

Case five reflects an ideal situation with acceptable minor shortcomings. Here, the interviewed soldier emphasises the knowledge, skills, and role of his company commander. He sees in him a true leader whose example he can and does follow and learns how to be the best leader for his own soldiers.

The evaluation of subordinates in the ensign's words is somewhat complementary to case five. The ensign notes that his subordinates rarely have the opportunity to demonstrate leadership qualities. In case five, the sergeant felt that there was no opportunity to see these qualities in eight hours. Therefore, does the problem lie in the lack of opportunity to see the leadership competence of subordinates? Perhaps it does to some extent because in this case the sergeant manages to notice these competences and qualities in some of them. As he declares, he tries to support these soldiers in developing their potential.

What is surprising in this case is that the NCO is not aware of his competencies and therefore cannot evaluate them. In Maxwell's 21 laws of leadership,[7] the law of intuition is mentioned. A soldier may have it highly developed so that he can make good decisions for the unit, but Maxwell himself points to the need to be aware of one's own competencies because without this knowledge, a leader is not able to determine his strengths, weaknesses, and level of leadership skills. He is also unable to work with Maxwell's upper limit law, which is extremely important in the functioning of the Polish Armed Forces.

The seventh case

Case seven is a representative of the professional officer corps with seven years of service, with the rank of lieutenant and aged 28. When asked if he sees leadership competencies in his subordinates (non-commissioned officers), the soldier gives a short answer: "Yes, my NCOs have the leadership competencies necessary for their positions."

When presented with another question – "Do you see leadership competencies in your subordinates (privates)"? - the soldier responded with an answer emphasising the role of non-commissioned officers: "I don't have much opportunity to notice it in privates. I try to rely on the opinion of non-commissioned officers."

The third question asks for self-assessment: "Do you notice leadership competencies in yourself and use them as a leader?", and the short answer is: "Sometimes in certain situations I try to focus on myself."

In the first case of the soldier from the officer corps, we have the case of an officer young in age and seniority. When assessing the leadership qualities in his subordinates, he places a strong emphasis on the non-commissioned officers who are well prepared for the role of the first commanders in a soldier's path. His role is extremely important in communicating information to the privates as subordinates. As he points out, he does not have the opportunity to observe leadership competence in privates. He relies on of his NCOs' opinions.

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[7]   J.C. Maxwell, *The 21 Irrefutable Laws of Leadership: Follow Them and People Will Follow You*, Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 1998.

When it comes to self-assessment, we do not notice a great desire to develop or learn. He is aware of the level of competence he possesses, and the effort needed to develop them. However, he has no desire to continue acquiring new competencies. A certain (larger) part of leadership and training private soldiers in their responsibilities rests on the shoulders of non-commissioned officers.

The eighth case

Case eight is a representative of the professional officer corps with thirty years of service, with the rank of second lieutenant commander and aged 50. Asked whether he sees leadership competence in his subordinates (non-commissioned officers), the soldier gives the following answer: "I talk a lot with my NCOs about training young soldiers and how important their role as commanders is in that process. Some understand this and try to develop their competencies."

The next question, "Do you see leadership competences in your subordinates (privates)?", was answered more broadly. "Twice a month at the company, I meet with privates to talk about their self-development and insights into the service. I try to support the privates in whom I have noticed greater competence by assigning an NCO to support them."

The third question asks for self-assessment: "Do you notice leadership competencies in yourself and use them as a leader?", and here the answer is quite long: "Yes. Over the years of service, I have learned to identify my strengths and weaknesses. More than once, I have learnt some competencies from my NCOs, who have developed them to a high level."

This is an officer with many years of service and a rare approach to service, and we could combine it with case four, where the company commander, according to the corporal, stood up for his soldiers. The officer emphasises the commander's participation and involvement in training soldiers. He points to numerous conversations with NCOs about training young soldiers and their vital role in the process. He states that some understand this and try to develop their leadership qualities and competencies. Thus, the commander starts the preparation for the process of training young soldiers with a crucial element, namely the preparation of the NCO as a trainer.

The officer schedules time twice a month to meet and talk with privates about their self-development and insights into the service. He tries to support them in their plans. When he notices outstanding leadership competencies in a soldier, he assigns an NCO to help enhance his development, perhaps preparing him for an NCO course.

In his self-assessment, the officer stresses the role of his experience in the service, which helped him realise the strengths and weaknesses of his leadership. He emphasises that he often learns from his subordinates who have reached a higher level of competence.

The ninth case

The ninth and last case is a representative of the professional officer corps with ten years of service, in the rank of captain and aged 33. When asked whether he sees leadership competencies in his subordinates (non-commissioned officers), the soldier gives the answer: "I believe that since they are in these positions, they have the necessary skills."

The next question the soldier is asked – "Do you see leadership competencies in your subordinates (privates)?" – is answered briefly: "I believe that this is the task of NCOs."

The third question is a request for self-assessment: "Do you notice leadership competencies in yourself and use them as a leader?", and here the answer is confident. "Yes, I do. I believe they are at a high level and use them when necessary."

The answers in the last case are very short but, at the same time, they show us distinctly that the commander has clear rules to which he adheres. He believes that to be in a position, one must have the required leadership competencies which he emphasises when evaluating NCOs. As for the privates, the captain is of the opinion that the determination of their competence falls within the remit of NCOs.

The captain's self-assessment is confident but positive at the same time. He is aware of his competence and uses it when necessary.

Conclusions

One might therefore ask the question why such a strongly characterised model of a commander is put as an officer? Its image was formed historically where the most outstanding commanders were high ranking officers and generals. But let us think about how many outstanding NCOs trained those soldiers. How many such NCOs and privates are there now? Nowadays, the Polish Armed Forces should focus on the greatest possible development of leadership competences in the non-commissioned officer and non-commissioned officer corps because it is there that the most exceptional leaders for the whole military structure are formed.

As for officers: if an officer develops these competencies in the non-commissioned officer corps, he is likely to be additionally predisposed to develop these competencies in the officer corps. Officers graduating from officer schools should be prepared to perform the role of a commander and not just be perceived through the prism of the rank on their armband. Unfortunately, most officer schools' graduates leave with theoretical knowledge of military skills, but the issue of leadership is often overlooked. Asking my colleagues at different military academies and at different levels of learning, I can come to one conclusion: leadership and being a good leader is not discussed at all, or it is discussed but does not play a major

role in learning. Due to this omission, there is a lot of friction and miscommunication in the company, the privates' resentment against the officers, and worse performance of the subunit. In our opinion, if we want to have a model where the leader is an officer, then we should let the person who is to be an officer be evaluated for leadership competence by his subordinates because they see and can say the most.

An important question we should ask is "What qualities, predispositions and competencies are needed among security system personnel?" The answer can be found in many publications both in the scientific discipline of security sciences and in management and quality sciences. An example of this can be the monograph *Cechy przywódcze kadr systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego*.[8] Moreover, the issues of security culture, which were the subject of the research described in the article "Culture Functions for Creating Security Culture,"[9] are also very important. The problem of military leadership is characterised by a large number of variables and, according to the authors, requires undertaking interdisciplinary research.

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[8]   See P.R. Ostolski, Cechy przywódcze kadr systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego, [in:] *Edukacja w świecie VUCA: Szanse, wyzwania, zagrożenia*, eds. D. Kaźmierczak, J. Ropski, O. Wasiuta, W. Zakrzewski, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Libron, 2021, pp. 161–180.

[9]   See P.R. Ostolski, "Culture Functions for Creating Security Culture", *Security Dimensions*, vol. 37, 2021, pp. 78–90.

Military leadership: a case study
Abstract

The purpose of this article is to draw the reader's attention to the research problems of military leadership that are identified at the lowest levels of command in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland. The authors presented cases of soldiers who present various attitudes in the context of understanding the role of a military leader, as well as ambiguously perceived competencies in this area, including their self-assessment. The problem of a systemic approach to the formation of leadership competencies in military education units is addressed, and the dangers of low levels of commander traits, aptitudes, and competencies are highlighted. The final conclusions inspire the reader to gain knowledge and undertake interdisciplinary research on military leadership.

Key words: military leadership, case study, leadership competencies

VARIA

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Russian information war: the activities of the Russian propaganda apparatus in the context of the war in Ukraine (as of the first half of March 2022)

As Russia launched a full-scale offensive against Ukraine, there was a parallel launch of new activities in the directions of information warfare. In its activities, the Russian propaganda apparatus focused on developing the narratives of previous years, relatively limiting the appearance of completely new plots.

The course of the first days of the war influenced a reduction in Russian disinformation activities (the Russians lost the initiative on the information warfare front). Russia was clearly unprepared to perform propaganda and disinformation activities in the absence of a quick victory. However, the situation began to change around day 7/8 of the war. By then, the Russians were ready to conduct new activities which took into account the unfavourable turn of cases from their perspective. The heavy losses suffered by the forces of the Russian Federation and the inability to launch an effective attack on key Ukrainian regional cities meant that the Russians had to change not only their military tactics, but also their tactics regarding information warfare activities.

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Having encountered strong resistance from Ukraine, the Russian propaganda apparatus was forced to revise its tactics and produce messages in response to the protracted military action. As part of its activities, Russia focused on producing messages for the needs of the internal information market. It seems that the Russians, aware of the fact that their messages were not credible, limited their efforts to influence Western audiences' opinion. They continued to broadcast messages whitewashing Russia's image, but the number of messages, their content and the degree of broadcasting were definitely lower than it could be expected. This assumption is confirmed, among other things, by the Kremlin's method of argumentation, which referred to the reason for starting the war. The immediate goal of the operation was supposed to be the liberation of Ukraine from "Nazi rule" and the neutralization of the threat Ukraine allegedly posed to Russia. These messages could not be considered credible by the West. They are clearly aimed at the internal audience (the citizens of the Russian Federation, Belarus and the occupied territories – the Crimea and a part of Donbass) and referring to the myths and propaganda narratives popularized after 2014. It is also worth noting that the Russian offensive was not preceded by a major provocation that would be a direct reason for war, which could be presented in the West as a factor independent of Russia that forced the Russian Federation to act. It may seem that the Kremlin considered this unnecessary, assuming that the Western world would interpret the Russian operation as a full-scale war anyway. It should also be noted here that in Russian nomenclature, the current war is called an "operation" to liberate Ukraine from unspecified "Nazis". The word "war" practically does not appear in Russian propaganda messages, which also has a serious significance from the perspective of shaping the minds of Russian citizens. According to the leading narrative, the Russians are providing "assistance" to the Ukrainians, which is supposed not only to serve the liberation of Ukraine from the rule of the "Bandera regime," but also to ensure peace and security for the entire region and the Russian Federation. The word "war" would contradict these assumptions.

The key directions for the development of the activities of the Russian propaganda apparatus have become: 1) an attempt to whitewash the image of the Russian Federation; 2) an attempt to present Ukraine and the West as subjects threatening the security of the Federation; 3) an attempt to shift responsibility for the suffering of Ukrainian civilians onto the Ukrainian authorities and the West; and 4) an attempt to consolidate Russian society around a strong leader.

The first of the mentioned directions refers to the construction of messages about the necessity for Russia to launch a so-called "peace operation" ("denazification") in Ukraine. Messages on this subject are to convince the citizens of the Russian Federation that the Kremlin's actions are worthy of approval, and even necessary. This direction is mainly being developed in order to reach Western audiences. It is inseparably connected with the second direction, within which Russia is trying to build a message

that the Kremlin could not have acted otherwise, since Ukraine posed a direct threat to the security of the citizens of the Russian Federation. Within the approach, messages are being developed about the alleged presence of secret American biological-chemical laboratories in Ukraine, which were supposed to conduct research on a pathogen devastating "ethnic Russians". A similar role is played by messages about Ukraine's alleged nuclear programme, whose development has been halted as a result of the Russian "peace operation". It is worth noting that, in order to lend credibility to this narrative, on 10 March 2022, the Russians shelled the building of the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology, which houses a reactor used for research purposes. The next day, the Russian media (including the Ria Novosti portal) reported on the alleged attack by Ukrainian nationalists on the building in question, which resulted in "concealing" the evidence of the alleged work of Ukrainian researchers on the atomic bomb. Messages about the threat posed to Russia by Ukraine's aspirations to join NATO are also developed along this line. The main message for Russians boils down to the narrative that "the operation in Ukraine was a necessary thing to ensure the security of Russia and the Russians".

Figure 1. One of the Telegram channels used by the Kremlin to carry out disinformation activities – part of the message reads: "The Great Russian Army. We will defeat the Nazis!"

Source: WarDonbass Telegram channel, 11 March 2022.

Figure 2. RIA Novosti, "Ukraine's territorial defence forces blew up the building of the Institute of Physics and Technology in Kharkiv"


Source: https://ria.ru/20220311/vzryv-1777722018.html [accessed: 11 March 2022].

This direction, in turn, is connected with yet another one – creating the image of Ukraine and the West as the party responsible for the suffering of civilians. Within this direction, it is emphasized that Russia was forced to attack the Ukrainian state because of Western activities stimulating Ukraine to fight with Russia (alleged militarization of Ukraine by NATO). In order to lend credibility to the narratives regarding this direction, the Russians broadcast messages about the support the West is giving to Ukraine. The conclusions for the citizens of the Russian Federation are clear: 1) had it not been for the West, Ukraine would have quickly capitulated; 2) had Ukraine capitulated, Ukrainian civilians would not have suffered; 3) the West – not Russia – is therefore responsible for the suffering of civilians. The fourth direction ties together the Russian Federation's activities aimed at influencing its own society. More and more messages are reaching Russians about the losses suffered (including the deaths of Russian soldiers). Russians may begin to ask themselves why their soldiers are dying. The answers to this question are being prepared by the Russian disinformation apparatus. The fundamental answer is: "it had to be so" / "it was necessary". Other answers refer to the belief that "they are fighting for the freedom of a brotherly nation" (however, this message is now marginalised) and that "they are fighting in the defence of Russia" (defence against a mythical Western enemy). At the same time, Russia carries on activities of heroization of the fallen soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Messages about heroic deaths in the fight against the "Nazis" or sacrifice for the "defence of the state" are being built. Videos showing bombings of Ukrainian cities and footage revealing the deaths of Russian soldiers are not reproduced by the Russian media, neither are they "properly" commented

on (e.g., footage showing Kharkiv being bombed is presented as an "attack by Bandera forces" on Donetsk). A disturbing trend is taking place, indicating that in addition to consolidating society around a "strong leader who will defend Russians from Western aggression," measures are being taken to radicalize Russian society. As a result of constructing an image of reality in which Russian soldiers are dying in the "defence of peace" at the hands of "Nazis" supported by the West, the possibility of an outbreak of a popular anti-war sentiment in Russia is not only being limited, but it is leading to a state in which average citizens of the Russian Federation will gradually become more and more hateful of Ukrainians (whom they will accuse of the death of their loved ones or the deaths of "heroic Russian soldiers"). This trend could prove extremely dangerous as the Kremlin is beginning to settle ethnic Russians in the occupied areas – as it did in the Crimea after 2014. Then, the newly arrived population, with the support of the occupation structures, may take an active part in terrorizing the local people with the aim of crushing the resistance of the conquered population.

Figure 3. RIA Novosti, "In the DPR, it was announced that Kiev was preparing a provocation involving humanitarian corridors"

Source: https://ria.ru/20220309/ukraina-1777253358.html [accessed: 11 March 2022].

The Russian Federation is clearly focused on the internal direction of disinformation and propaganda activities. The Kremlin is trying to explain the current situation

to Russians from the perspective of rivalry between Russia – the "force of good", and the West – the "force of evil". Not only does this picture of reality arouse in Russians resentment towards Ukrainians and the West, but it also stimulates readiness for further unreflective support of the Kremlin policy.

Russia side is using all the tools at its disposal to carry out these actions – television and the radio, the press, the so-called "troll factories," Telegram channels, and authorities such as influencers and politicians. Parallel to its intensive disinformation activities, the Kremlin conducts actions aimed at isolating the Russian information space. The introduction of criminal liability for speaking about losses suffered by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or for informing citizens about the real course of the war is a form of definitive gag on the media remaining outside the Kremlin's control. Currently, Russia is seeking to neutralize social effects of the imposed sanctions and to consolidate the society. This is a form of preparation for a prolonged war and international isolation. At the same time, the Russian Federation is getting ready to conduct information activities in an outward direction, which will probably take place once the internal information front has solidified. One potential direction in which Moscow will actively operate concerns the stimulation of an anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland, and the stimulation of fears in Poland and the West regarding the risk of Russia's attack NATO. These actions will be aimed at limiting the level of support given to Ukraine and Ukrainians by Poles, Polish state structures, and the West in general.

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- refrain from disclosing any information to third parties concerning the materials submitted for publication;
- have the right to withdraw a given publication after it has been published if there is evidence to prove a possible lack of reliability or falsification of research data, plagiarism, or a breach of the editorial ethics, as well as where major methodological flaws have been made.

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AUTHOR
The Author shall
- familiarise him/herself with the principles of publishing ethics that have been set by the Editor, as well as the procedure applied for qualifying materials

submitted for publication, the principles of cooperation of the Editor and the Author, and any other technical guidelines provided;
- have the right to submit for publication only his/her individual and original texts. All borrowings, quotes/citations, tables and comments/notes used in the text should be followed by a relevant reference/footnote;
- provide a reliable and accurate description of the studies conducted, and an impartial interpretation of the research findings obtained;
- provide detailed information about the contribution of individual authors where a material that has been submitted for publication has multiple authors;
- enclose a relevant bibliography that includes all the publications that have been used throughout the preparation of the material;
- in the event that major flaws and/or discrepancies are revealed in his/her text, without undue delay notify the Editor of this fact in order to allow for corrections of these mistakes at the editing stage.

DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE SCIENCE EDITOR OF A JOINT STUDY
The Science Editor shall
- decide which materials will be published in the joint study that has been proposed by him/her;
- bear responsibility for observing the principles of publishing ethics and the overall academic value of the publishing house;
- in the event of suspected plagiarism or falsification of research data by any of the Authors, take necessary decisions to withdraw the text from the joint study and notify the Editor thereof;
- make certain that the persons who have contributed to the creation of a joint study have accepted and acknowledged its form, once the editing process conducted by the Editor has been completed.

DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE REVIEWER
The Reviewer shall
- carry out an impartial assessment of the material submitted for publishing;
- if need be, point to the relevant books or papers connected to the subject matter of the text that have not been quoted or referred to by the author;
- report to the Editor any and all major similarities of the reviewed text with other works;
- not be allowed to use and enjoy the reviewed text for the purposes related to his/her individual benefits; s/he shall not assess the text in the event of a possible conflict of interest with the author either;
- submit his/her review within the agreed deadline, adding a statement that there is no conflict of interest with the author;
- evaluate the materials submitted for publishing in line with an established and transparent procedure.