Załuski, Wojciech2024-06-182024-06-182024Studia Prawnicze. Rozprawy i materiały 2024, nr 1, s. 13-30.1689-8052http://hdl.handle.net/11315/31309The paper is aimed at defending the following three claims: (1) that the objective value of privacy may change in time (as its significance is relative to concrete social context); (2) that in the contemporary world, in which the state’s and global corporations power to intrude upon our liberty, especially upon its variety called informational privacy, has become due to technological developments particularly strong, the need for protection of privacy has become especially urgent (given our attachment to the axiological fundamentals of liberal democracies), and therefore its objective value is very high; and (3) that in spite of this high objective value of privacy, it does not correspond to its subjective valuation by the ‘typical’ citizen of contemporary liberal democracies, who, if Byung-Chul Han’s picture of our society as ‘the burnout one’ is correct, has become mentally exhausted by overstimulation and overachievement, and for whom, consequently, the central value has become flatly understood happiness (as material comfort and security), rather than liberty and its constitutive part, which is the right to privacy.enUznanie autorstwa-Użycie niekomercyjne-Bez utworów zależnych 3.0 Polskadecisional privacysecrecysolitudetechnologyburnout societyPrawoArtykuł2451-080710.48269/2451-0807-sp-2024-1-01