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BEZPIECZEŃSTWO

TEORIA I PRAKTYKA

SECURITY

THEORY AND PRACTICE

EVOLVING HUMAN SECURITY CHALLENGES

edited by
Beata Molo, Thomas Jäger

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SECURITY

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Kwartalnik
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ul. Gustawa Herlinga-Grudzińskiego 1, A, pok. 219
30-705 Kraków
tel. (12) 25 24 666
e-mail: biuro@kte.pl
btip.ka.edu.pl

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Beata Molo

Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University
ORCID: 0000-0002-4924-8950

Thomas Jäger

University of Cologne
ORCID: 0000-0003-3060-2689

Evolving Human Security Challenges. Introduction

The concept of *human security* has become the next stage in the evolution of the concept of expanded recognition of security. Admittedly, human security refers to an expanded idea of security, which, in contrast to traditional security conceptualisations, does not focus merely on the protection of the state, but rather on the protection of an individual and his/her human dignity.

The term *human security* was disseminated by the United Nations Development Report (UNDP) of 1994. The document attempts to interpret the conceptual security of the individual and the relationship between sustainable human development and security.¹ Apparently, the best way to solve the problem of global threat is to awaken in each person a sense of freedom from scarcity and freedom from fear. The concept of *human security* can be broken down into seven areas or types of security relevant from the perspective of the human being: economic, food, health, ecological, physical, social and political security. The last decades have been characterized not only by the rapid pace of social transformation, but also by the diversity of phenomena, as well as the evolution of challenges and threats to broadly understood human security.

¹ United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report 1994*, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf [accessed: 25.03.2020].

The “Articles and Materials” section opens with a paper by Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (*Climate Security in the Light of the Realist Paradigm in the Theory of International Relations*), which deals with the application of the realistic paradigm of international relations in research on climate security. Isabela de Andrade Gama, in her study *Human Security: Designed Cynicism, or a Poorly Implemented Idea?*, critically addresses the concept of human security, and its application, based on several documents issued by the UN. The relationship between public diplomacy and human security in the field of foreign policy has been scrutinised by Karina Paulina Marczuk in her study entitled *Human Security and Public Diplomacy*. The case studies of Japanese and Canadian policies were used to explore the usefulness of public diplomacy for the promotion of human security internationally. The paper by Jan Kowalczyk (*Broad Approach to Human Security in the Visegrad Group Countries*) looks at the approach of the Visegrad Group countries – Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary – to a wide range of human security issues. The analysis rests on documents that concern social and economic rights of citizens, the internal security system, and the implementation of the concept of sustainable development. An analysis of air quality in Europe and the impact of greenhouse gas emissions on human health has been conducted in the paper by Anna Bałamut titled *The Impact of Greenhouse Gas Emissions on Human Health Across Europe*, whereas Anna Sakson-Boulet, in her study *Ambient Air Pollution as a Human Security Challenge in Poland*, has focused on identifying the scale of outdoor air pollution in Poland and assessing the menaces it poses to human security. Low quality air is one of the most important environmental perils for Polish citizens, and the measures taken to reduce the levels of air pollution and their negative impact on human health are not sufficient. Anna Diawoł-Sitko, in turn, has devoted her text on *Scarcity of Food: a Factor Destabilizing Security in the MENA Region* to the influence of food security on political stability in the MENA region at the state, regional and individual levels. Its goal is to assess the effectiveness of governments in the region in terms of food safety risk management strategies and interregional cooperation. This part of the volume ends with a paper by Adrian Siadkowski – *Syrian Immigrants: a Subject that Requires Protection, a Threat, or an Object of International Politics?*, in which immigration is discussed in the context of pursuing national and international interests, chiefly on the example of Turkey and Poland.

In the article featured in the “From History” section, Anna Kargol and Waldemar Gniadek (*The Royal Art of Free Masonry in Poland and in Germany in the First Half of the 20th Century. Relations, Differences, Similarities*) discuss the state of research on German freemasonry in Poland, and the mutual relations between the Polish and German lodges in the first half of the twentieth century.

The “Varia” section contains a synthetic approach to the issues of resettlement, expulsions, exile and migration to Germany after the end of World War II, featuring the text by Ragnar Leunig entitled *Deutschland als Wanderungs- und Einwanderungsland seit 1945*. An integral part of this volume is also the “Forum” section, which presents papers published in the *WeltTrends* monthly: Ralf Havertz’s *Entmilitarisierung der Politik in Südkorea?*, Norman Paech’s *Zur deutschen Beteiligung*

am Krieg in Syrien, and Petra Erler's *Jenseits von Öffentlichkeit. Die geheimen Forschungen zu Chemiewaffen*.

The volume closes with the "Reviews" section, including Anna Balamut's critique of the publication edited by Minoru Takahashi, entitled *The Influence of Sub-state Actors on National Security. Using Military Bases to Forge Autonomy*, published in 2019 by Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

* * *

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Articles and Materials
Artykuły i materiały
Beiträge und Materialien
Статьи и материалы



Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak

University of Lodz

ORCID: 0000-0003-0425-9987

Climate Security in the Light of the Realist Paradigm as Part of the Theory of International Relations

Introduction

Over the last couple of decades, climate change has become a major international challenge, and a factor that mobilises international researchers to carry out deeper analysis. This reflection is necessary due to the global nature of the problem. Climate change concerns individuals, local communities, countries, and, in general, the future of the planet. Both its origins and consequences have a complex character that requires international solutions, extensive implementation, and political will. Having said this, it very much depends on the decision of national governments whether they will include climate policies in the catalogue of main political interest.

On the whole, adding the problems of environmental protection within the scope of external activity of the state allows to broaden the foreign policy instruments, which helps to position the state on the international arena. The goals of climate policy, just as the goals of foreign policy, can therefore serve to ensure security, increase strength and/or influence, boost prestige and position, and shape the rules of international relations.¹ However, states must first define their attitude to two fundamental issues: first of all, how they define their security paradigm in relation to the current and projected climate change; and second, whether they

¹ R. Zięba, *Cele polityki zagranicznej państwa*, [in:] *Wstęp do teorii polityki zagranicznej państwa*, red. R. Zięba, Toruń 2005, p. 50.

have opted for certain multilateral actions to ensure their national interests. Therefore, the solution to the problem of climate change to a large extent concerns the issue of conflict and cooperation between states, and thus the main currents of research in international relations can provide their insightful interpretations.

This paper is an attempt to determine the explanatory potential of the realist paradigm in the interpretation of the activities of states and the international community in the field of climate change and climate policy. Therefore, the research field has been intentionally narrowed to a selected trend, disregarding the liberal or constructivist paradigm. The hypothesis assumes that the realist paradigm has an explanatory value to selected aspects of climate security, such as short-term national interests, or failures of international cooperation on climate change. The research questions which can be a useful tool to verify the above hypotheses are as follows. What is the scope of climate security? What is the connection between the realist notion of national interest and climate change? Are games theories relevant in the case of climate politics?

Climate change as a challenge for national security

Traditionally, climate change has been understood as an element of environmental security. Ensuring environmental security by the state can be interpreted as a form of protection against global threats, such as climate change, or the deficit of drinking water, but also as limiting the impact of natural phenomena that disrupt the functioning of societies. According to Marek Pietraś, environmental security implies “a state of social relations, including the content, forms and methods of organising international relations, which not only limits and eliminates ecological threats, but also promotes positive action enabling the realisation of values relevant to the existence and development of nations and states.”² The starting point for this approach is the assumption that the state should anticipate negative events by minimising threats and conflicts, taking up challenges, and securing the achieved level of citizens’ quality of life. Climate change undoubtedly falls within the presented understanding of ecological security: both as a factor determining the duration and functioning of states and societies, and at the same time as a problem that requires extensive international cooperation.

There are several trends that help to define the concept of ‘ecological security’ that highlight different elements. The first one draws attention to the key importance of direct relationship between the human world and the natural environment. A special role is assigned to services delivered by the natural environment, i.e. the support of life itself. The second trend “associates ecological security with deliberate and planned actions that prevent ecological changes that are unfavourable to people.”³ The third, in turn, draws attention to the anthropogenic nature of environmental changes and “on this basis, seeks opportunities to ensure security in this field through the evolution of relations and activities, both internally

² M. Pietraś, *Bezpieczeństwo ekologiczne w Europie. Studium politologiczne*, Lublin 2000, p. 85.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

and internationally.”⁴ In defining the importance and scope of ecological security, Pietraś draws attention to four elements: 1) the anthropogenic nature of ecological threats; 2) the key role of positive actions, including international ecological cooperation; 3) importance in the security policy of protection and preservation of significant social values, and 4) elimination of international tensions and conflicts against the background of ecological problems.⁵

Undoubtedly, a majority of authors prefer the broad understanding of ecological security, which is not equated only with the environment itself, as it covers a whole range of diverse activities in various areas of social, economic and political life that can have a direct or indirect impact on the environment. Lech Zacher, who defines them as a set of norms and activities connected with appropriate means of their use, seems more inclined towards highlighting the aspect of ecological security in the category of broad political practice.⁶

In the twenty-first century, the academic community, as well as political and economic institutions, tend to distinguish climate security from environmental security. Increasingly more often, climate change is becoming a category analysed from the perspective of current and future security scenarios, both nationally and internationally. The reason for this is that the magnitude of climate change can alter social order on a global scale. Sudden weather phenomena – such as snowstorms, heat waves, floods or hurricanes, massive migrations for which even the world’s richest economies are not prepared – are intensifying rapidly. In the long term, climate change causes, among others, water shortages or the loss of biodiversity, leading to famine and mass migration, and ultimately to armed conflicts.⁷ These conflicts have already been given the name of so-called “climate wars”, in which a number of phenomena associated with climate change become a catalyst for a deep social crisis, followed by the degradation of the state, which subsequently generates military tensions in the entire region, like e.g. in the case of Sudan.⁸ In this approach, climate change can be seen as a “threat multiplier”, directly affecting national security.

In effect, climate security refers to climate-related change endangering the security of humans, ecosystems, economy, infrastructure, and societies. According to Matt McDonald, the discourse on climate security includes, beyond ecological security, the perspective of national, international and individual security.⁹ Each of these perspectives takes a different standpoint in defining reference points, threats, entities making changes, and possible solutions. From a national perspective, the main threat associated with climate change is the possibility of conflict,

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ L. Zacher, *Bezpieczeństwo ekologiczne – wymiary polityczne, międzynarodowe i globalne*, [in:] *Międzynarodowe bezpieczeństwo ekologiczne*, red. Z. J. Pietraś, M. Pietraś, Lublin 1991, pp. 98–99.

⁷ I. Salehyan, ‘Climate Change and Conflict: Making Sense of Disparate Findings’, *Political Geography*, vol. 43, 2014, pp. 1–5.

⁸ See e.g. H. Welzer, *Wojny klimatyczne*, Warszawa 2010; D. Heffron, ‘What do Realists Think about Climate Change?’, *Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies Publications*, 13 November 2015, p. 10, <http://cgsrcs.org/publications/30> [accessed: 20.11.2019].

⁹ M. McDonald, ‘Discourses of Climate Security’, *Political Geography*, vol. 33, no. 1, 2013, pp. 42–51.

the loss of sovereignty, and the violation of economic interests. In contrast, individuals will primarily emphasise the prospects of deterioration of their well-being, or the need to abandon their basic values and/or practices. Meanwhile, the perspective of international security will mainly take into account the role of international organisations in their efforts to resolve conflicts and achieve global agreement. In this approach, ecological security will refer only to the state of the biosphere and postulate a change in social behaviour. It will include for example loss of biodiversity resulting from climate changes.

The above division of discourses on climate security is not clear-cut and excluding; however, it undoubtedly indicates the complexity of the relationship between climate change and security. It is clear to see that there are not only several analytical possibilities for interpreting this relationship, but they also lead to the legitimacy of various activities that potentially affect the climate policy of the state. This leads to the conclusion that due to the complexity of the problem of climate change, it is necessary to comprehensively treat the subjective and objective scope of climate security. Therefore, the subjects of such security should become both individuals, nations, states, as well as entire ecosystems, which, in turn, implies a look at the objective dimension including social, political, economic, ecological or military aspects. From the perspective of the needs of this paper, however, it seems justified to take a state-centric approach to the problem that requires a number of different solutions, both at the national and international level.¹⁰

Realist paradigm and climate security – the discussion

In the realist paradigm, the main areas of interest have become national interest, sovereignty, power, and military potential. In this view, the states, deemed rational actors, undertake the activities that remain the most beneficial for them, and therefore estimate profits and losses and optimise the resources used. On the other hand, the main feature of the international system is anarchy, where in the absence of regulation, the interests of states collide, just as in the pictorial metaphor of “billiard balls”.¹¹ The conflicting nature of international relations forces on to ensure security by building own security and on the basis of strategic alliances serving to maintain the balance of the system.¹²

The neo-realist reflection, developed in the late 1970s, added a number of elements to the traditional realism described above.¹³ First of all, the focus has been shifted from the analysis of human nature and the essence of the state to the very structure of the international system. Moreover, research on traditional security has been enriched with questions about international economics.

¹⁰ J. Vogler, *Climate Change in World Politics*, New York–London 2016, pp. 60–85

¹¹ J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 2, 1994/1995, p. 48.

¹² H. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York 1973.

¹³ K. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, London, 1979; *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. R. Keohane, New York 1986.

In a situation where climate security is a new area of research and scientific reflection, the question arises whether the traditional approach represented by realism has sufficient tools to analyse this phenomenon. It is Daniel Heffron's conviction that realism, in relation to the problem of ecological security and climate change itself, does not bring such convincing and coherent explanations as in the case of research on power, war or rivalry of superpowers. The reason is that realists define a security paradigm due to a military factor, while climate change is a different kind of global challenge. According to Simon Dalby, the realistic perception of security that shaped foreign policy during the Cold War "is currently not a sufficient conceptualisation or political framework for new conditions in which threats result from global change, not rivalry between powers."¹⁴ What is more, solving the problem of climate change requires, by definition, constant cooperation of the international community, which realistically has no chance of implementation due to the collision of state interests and the anarchic nature of the international system. In addition, realists rely heavily on the state-centric world view to ignore the impact of transnational and non-governmental actors, which are central from a climate policy perspective. The impact of international oil concerns, but also of environmental organisations is crucial at the stage of formulating the objectives of national climate policy, but also increasingly visible during international negotiations in this area.¹⁵

Considering all of the above-defined deficits of traditional realist paradigm in research on international climate policy, its exploratory possibilities should not be interpreted as exhaustive. One should acknowledge that realism revolves around the category of power and interests, which is directly linked to the problem of the causes of climate change themselves. For example, the main assumption of offensive realism is that states always strive to maximise their power, often at the expense of other states, explains the absolute efforts of states to gain access to natural resources or ensure energy security.¹⁶ The offensive nature of the states thus explains the famous "tragedy of common goods" described in 1968 by Garrett Hardin, who noted that the exploitation of goods or areas which are not subject to any jurisdiction – such as ocean waters, or global atmosphere – leads to their inevitable exhaustion, or destruction.¹⁷ For decades, access to hydrocarbons, which are non-renewable resources, has remained the imperative of most countries, i.e. their shrinking pool may cause growing competition. As Andrew Heywood noted, countries value energy from oil or gas because it gives them the opportunity to influence other countries.¹⁸ What's more, competition for resources often intensifies tension and military presence, as is the case today in the Arctic region, and often transforms into an armed conflict, e.g. during the two Iraqi wars.

¹⁴ S. Dalby, *Climate Change and Environmental Security*, [in:] *Security Studies: an Introduction*, ed. P. Williams, New York 2013, p. 312.

¹⁵ R. Giplin, *War and Change in World Politics*, New York–Cambridge 1981, pp. 10–33.

¹⁶ J. Grieco, *Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics*, [in:] *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*, ed. M. Doyle, J. Ikenberry, Boulder–Oxford 1997, pp. 163–201.

¹⁷ G. Hardin, *The Tragedy of the Commons*, [in:] *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, ed. R. Art, R. Jervis, Harlow 2015, pp. 422–427.

¹⁸ A. Heywood, *Global Politics*, London 2014, p. 417.

In addition, realists point to the lack of cooperative capacity among countries, which may explain the inertia of governments during the creation of an international climate change regime. Countries, according to John Mearsheimer and Robert Powell, are always looking for relative benefits over other countries.¹⁹ According to Mark Purdon, this explains why countries want to minimize the impact of the climate change regime and lower their level of ambition to protect their own economies.²⁰

On the other hand, in the neorealist approach, research on international climate policy will emphasize an important element of the structure of the international system itself. According to the theory of hegemonic stability expressed in the works of Robert Gilpin, Charles Kindleberg and Stephen Krasner, the international system is stable if the hegemonic state is able to impose goals and rules of action on other states, also in the form of institutionalized coordination mechanisms.²¹

Assuming that the United States still remains a hegemonic entity in the international system, and for decades also the main CO₂ emitter, it can be deduced that the success of the global fight against climate change depends to a large extent on its intentions. Present experience indicates that the US has not taken the role of a leader and promoter of ambitious climate solutions. One should be aware that this country has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, and President Donald Trump has undermined the legitimacy of the Paris Agreement of 2015. A certain form of hegemonic leadership was presented by the Barack Obama administration during the adoption of the 2009 Copenhagen Accords. Kyoto II, however, also served to guarantee the continuation of existing policy in line with US economic goals. Duncan Snidal indicates that the hegemon can act good-natured or sinister on the environment, and this is the politically variable attitude that characterizes the American administration²². In general, however, it cannot be said that the United States has used its potential and changed the structure of the international system in favour of a more cooperative climate agreement. It have gained the status of a state that significantly limits the progress of climate negotiations (*quasi veto state*). Thus, the hegemonic state did not use its resources and power for a specific global solution.

The examples presented above indicate that realism can offer a diagnosis of the failures and conflicts related to international climate policy. However, is that

¹⁹ J. Mearsheimer, *Can China Rise Peacefully?*, *The National Interest*, 25 October 2014, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204> [accessed: 20.11.2019]; R. Powell, 'Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory', *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 85, no. 4, 1991, pp. 1303–1320.

²⁰ M. Purdon, 'Neoclassical Realism and International Climate Change Politics: Moral Imperative and Political Constraint in International Climate Finance', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, vol. 20, no. 2, 2017, pp. 263–300.

²¹ See: R. Keohane, *The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967–1977*, [in:] *Change in the International System*, ed. O. Holsti, R. Siverson, A. George, Boulder 1980.

²² D. Snidal, 'The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory', *International Organization*, vol. 39, no. 4, 1985, pp. 579–614.

all? One should remember, for example, that defensive realism assumes that the international system creates incentives for moderate and predictable behaviour, and the security dilemma can be resolved through cooperative actions. Stephen Walt coined an interesting term “balance of threat”, which was a significant modification for the realistic concept of balance of power.²³ The author claims that states, guided by their own interests, are taking collective action to balance the threat. As he noted, “countries risk their own survival if they don’t limit the potential hegemon before he becomes too strong.” More importantly, the perception of a phenomenon is important, and not necessarily its real potential for destruction.

If one assumes that climate change were to be recognized as such a threat, countries could collectively take action to reduce emissions, guided by their own security interests. The first stage, i.e. attributing significant security implications to climate change, has already occurred in most countries, at least in a declarative sense. In 2008, the US National Intelligence Council launched a program to determine the implications of climate change for US security by 2030²⁴. The project’s conclusions made clear that climate change will contribute to increased political destabilization, migration crises and armed conflicts. The US Department of Defence has also stated that climate change will be one of the key factors shaping the security environment in the future, affecting US military capabilities, the functioning of missions and operations. In 2015, the State Department recognized climate change as one of the top four national and global security challenges.²⁵ Similar conclusions appear in the strategic documents of other leading powers.²⁶ The second stage, i.e. cooperation against a common threat, has also been institutionalized to some extent through the entry into force of the December 2015 Paris climate agreement.

The realistic paradigm also seems to justify the actions of states in the area of adaptation to climate change. The fear of destabilization and economic losses, and in extreme cases also a direct threat to the survival of the state (as in the case of oceanic states) makes anticipation of future changes and adaptation to them a category directly related to the *raison d’état*. Adaptation measures for countries belonging to the same region can also be considered as an attempt at the aforementioned threat balancing. Even if less severe impact in most of the cases will be felt all countries would have to redefine their risk management strategies and think more about human security, the leading topic of this volume.

²³ S. Walt, ‘Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power’, *International Security*, vol. 9, no. 4, 1985, p. 5.

²⁴ *Quadrennial Defence Review Report January 2010*, US Department of Defence, p. 84, <https://archive.defense.gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20of%2029JAN10%201600.pdf> [accessed: 25.11.2019].

²⁵ ‘Enduring Leadership in a Dynamic World’, US Department of State, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review 2015*, p. 42.

²⁶ See for example: *UK Climate Change Risk Assessment 2017 Presented to Parliament pursuant to Section 56 of the Climate Change Act 2008*, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/584281/uk-climate-change-risk-assess-2017.pdf [accessed: 20.11.2019].

Game theory and climate politics: the operational level

An interesting tool for analysing international climate policy may also be the game theory, which – it should be clearly emphasised – combines elements of realism and liberalism. It assumes that players have a uniform will, that is, that each government acts as an integrated entity, not a complicated social organisation, whose decisions result from internal political interactions. At the same time, this theory shows the mechanisms of how behaviours driven by self-interest can lead to an improvement in order and well-being through cooperation.²⁷

From nearly thirty games that can be used to analyse international climate negotiations involving two entities or two groups of countries for several decades, there is a clear focus on investigating the problem of cooperation through the prism of the so-called “prisoner’s dilemma”.²⁸ It clearly indicates that unit gains may conflict with group gains. At the same time, if the entities created cooperation mechanisms, their benefits would be optimised. Thus, the individual decision, e.g. to discontinue climate action, is beneficial from the perspective of the current economic profits of a given player, however, it contributes to increasing global emissions or induces other countries to similar actions, resulting in a dangerous increase in temperature in the long run.²⁹ There is a phenomenon known as free-rider problem, i.e. the use of the effects of cooperation without participating in it.³⁰

A kind of modification of the “prisoner’s dilemma” is the so-called “chicken dilemma”, i.e. a non-cooperative game in which the most can be gained or lost through confrontation. A peace strategy brings protection against the biggest loss, but it does not bring any reward. This game can be used with the assumption that the supreme goal of the state is short-term protection of own resources, i.e. current economic profit instead of long-run efforts to reduce emissions.³¹

Given the complexity of the interests of different countries during climate negotiations, it seems right to create aggregation models, i.e. oscillating around specific frameworks of behaviour patterns adopted by states. For example, Peter Wood focuses on the concepts of cooperative, non-cooperative and implementation games.³² The author has simulated various games regarding players’ decisions on further CO₂ emissions, as well as regarding decisions on

²⁷ See: Z. Pietraś, *Teoria gier jako sposób analizy procesów podejmowania decyzji politycznych*, Lublin 1997.

²⁸ J. Zhu-Gang, C. Wen-Jia, C. Wang, ‘Can Simulation of Climate Negotiation Strategies between China and the U.S. Based on Game Theory’, *Advances in Climate Change Research*, vol. 5, no. 1, 2014, p. 34.

²⁹ K. Pittel, D. Rübbecke, ‘Transitions in the Negotiations on Climate Change: From Prisoner’s Dilemma to Chicken and Beyond’, *International Environmental Agreements*, vol. 12, no. 1, 2012, pp. 23–39.

³⁰ M. Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, Harvard 1971.

³¹ A. Endres, C. Ohl, ‘Introducing “Cooperative Push”: How Inefficient Environmental Policy (Sometimes!) Protects the Global Commons Better’, *Public Choice*, vol. 111, 2002, pp. 285–302.

³² P. Wood, ‘Climate Change and Game Theory’, *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, vol. 1219, 2011, pp. 153–170.

participation in an international agreement. His research shows that it is necessary to build a new game model, in which climate balance means the optimal effect for all players. The above research also shows that combining an international agreement with other issues such as international trade will facilitate its implementation.³³

Similar conclusions have also been reached by Beijing researchers, who applied the game theory to the simulation of negotiation strategies on climate change between the US and China.³⁴ The model adopted by them that takes into account the impact of climate change on the GDP of countries, aggregated on the basis of research done by other scientists, clearly shows that it is necessary to create compensatory mechanisms for China, encouraging investment in new technologies. This strategy was considered a cooperative game. However, in all non-cooperative game scenarios, i.e. China acts first (or first move advantage), or two countries operate simultaneously), Beijing's losses outweigh the profits. On the other hand, a strategy favourable to the United States is to help developing countries, provided that the largest emitters are joined by effective and enforceable cooperation. Practice has shown that China and the United States in 2013–2016 decided to create a strategic partnership on climate change, which was symbolically confirmed by the joint signing by Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping of the Paris Agreement.

The game theory is undoubtedly an interesting analytical tool; however, with specific deficits. First of all, most games methodologically use the two-player model, which may be justified for research into the above-described bilateral relations, e.g. US-Chinese relations; however, it does not apply to a wider group of entities. Of course, it becomes possible to combine countries into specific groups with correlated interests (e.g. those occurring during international climate negotiations, such as small, Pacific countries) and to apply game theory to groups of countries. The problem, however, is that coalitions are subject to constant fluctuations, and even among a group of players representing a theoretically coherent position, there are significant differences of view (the European Union casus).

In addition to the problems that arise with the selection and justification of given actors – mostly states – there may appear some misunderstandings about the assumed gains so crucial for the game theory. These may be as follows. What do we define as potential profit or loss from the individual player level? Can the current costs be interpreted as an indispensable burden that will result in winning the game in the future? Finally, will this victory be described as stopping the rise in global temperature or maintaining, for example, high economic growth?

Conclusions

Undoubtedly, the realist perspective does not fully reflect the problems associated with climate security. By emphasizing game theory and a positivist approach, it is

³³ See: P. Chander, *Game Theory and Climate Change*, New York 2018.

³⁴ J. Zhu-Gang, C. Wen-Jia, C. Wang, *Can Simulation...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 34–40.

unable to explain changes in the behaviour of individual actors³⁵. It neither refer to historical conditions of state actions. Realism, in fact, attributes a specific, unchanging identity to the state, i.e. it assumes that states will respond to the state of anarchy in a similarly predictable way, based on rational choices³⁶. States change however, they climate policies due to political reasons and just to give an example different rationale was presented during Barack Obama and Donald Trump presidencies. With the occurrence of rapid climatic catastrophes the rational choice will be even altered within short period of time.

Another point to raise would be that realism seems to focus on military aspect of security and thus is not an adequate tool to research global problems of different origin. This is true, but only to certain degree. Climate change will have immense impact on military security too, as Expert Group of International Military Council Climate and Security noted in the World Climate and Security Report 2020, presented at the Munich Security Conference.³⁷ Thus, the military perspective of realism could be useful in analysing the dynamics of international conflicts caused by climate change but not its origin.

As a rationalist departure, the realism also assumes the maximisation of the usefulness of certain solutions as the basis for most countries' activities.³⁸ Thus, it ignores the increasingly acknowledged axiological layer of the fight against climate change, which refers to issues such as justice and responsibility of e.g. developed countries or the biggest emitters. On the other hand, the logic of maximizing own interests is the cornerstone of Paris Agreement of 2015, which in contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, does not refer to economic level of development characterizing the parties, so it ignores historical burden of emissions.

Realism, on the other hand, chiefly explains the reasons for the lack of ambition of the international climate change regime. The atomistic picture of the world it assumes, implies that individual entities maximize their needs without taking into account the needs of other entities. Countries compete thinking, above all, about maintaining access to raw materials or the competitiveness of their economies, simultaneously not taking into account the overall end result, which is to stop anthropogenic climate change. Moreover, there is no hegemonic actor or actors being able to exert their power over other countries during climate negotiations. The European Union strives to become a so called "climate normative leader", but its voice can hardly be heard outside of Europe.

Trying to foresee the future explanatory potential of realism, one may assume that it will clearly increase. Firstly, climate change will pose more pressure on the social *status quo*, putting all mitigation and adaptation strategies at the core of national interests, as the sovereignty of many countries and nations may be at risk.

³⁵ C. Cutler, *Critical Historical Materialism and International Law: Imagining International Law As Praxis*, [in:] *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, ed. S. Hobden, J.M. Hobson, Cambridge 2002, p. 181

³⁶ A. Wendt, *Spółeczna teoria stosunków międzynarodowych*, Warszawa 2008, p. 43.

³⁷ See: <https://imccs.org/2020/02/19/climate-change-more-prominent-than-ever-at-munich-security-conference-with-world-climate-security-report-2020-release> [accessed: 08.03.2020].

³⁸ J. Sterling-Folker, *Neoliberalism*, [in:] *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, ed. T. Dunne, M. Kurki, M.S. Smith, Oxford 2010, p. 118.

Secondly, collective actions may occur as perceived risks are not manageable with individual measures. The realist “balance of threat” will enable to form coalitions against either the threat of climate change in general, or the individual states, free riders ignoring others efforts. Thirdly, climate security will have an even more direct impact on military security, as its consequences will be solved with military means. Finally, all critical elements of realism – like national interest, sovereignty, power, and military potential – will play a part in solving the problem of climate change, one of the most severe global threats of the twenty-first century.

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Bezpieczeństwo klimatyczne w świetle paradygmatu realistycznego teorii stosunków międzynarodowych

Streszczenie

Niniejszy artykuł podejmuje kwestie możliwości zastosowania paradygmatu realistycznego stosunków międzynarodowych do analizy bezpieczeństwa klimatycznego. Specyfika wyzwań związanych z globalnymi zmianami klimatu staje się inspiracją do wskazania

specyfiki bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego i wyróżnienia w jego ramach bezpieczeństwa klimatycznego. Następnie ukazana zostaje relewancja eksplanacyjna paradygmatu realistycznego w badaniach nad bezpieczeństwem klimatycznym w takich kwestiach, jak państwocentryczny obraz relacji międzynarodowych, prymat interesów indywidualnych ponad kolektywnymi czy znaczenie władzy i dominacji. Kategorie te analizowane są nie tylko w świetle dokonań realizmu tradycyjnego, ale również neorealizmu czy realizmu strukturalnego. Podjęta zostaje również kwestia możliwości zastosowania teorii gier do analizy międzynarodowych negocjacji klimatycznych.

Słowa kluczowe: zmiany klimatu, bezpieczeństwo klimatyczne, paradygmat realistyczny

Climate Security in the Light of the Realist Paradigm as Part of the Theory of International Relations Abstract

This paper addresses the possibility of using the realist paradigm of international relations to look at climate security. The challenges related to global climate change have become an inspiration to indicate the features of ecological security, and to distinguish climate security within it. The explanatory relevance of the realist paradigm in the research conducted on climate security has been presented in issues such as the state-centred picture of international relations, the primacy of individual interests over collective, or the importance of power and domination. These categories are scrutinised not only in light of the achievements of traditional realism, but also of neo-realism, or structural realism. The possibility of applying the game theory to look at international climate negotiations has also been raised as a potential research tool.

Key words: climate change, climate security, realist paradigm

Die Klimasicherheit vor dem Hintergrund des realistischen Paradigmas der Theorie von Internationalen Beziehungen Zusammenfassung

Dieses Paper betrachtet die Möglichkeit, das realistische Paradigma der Theorie der internationalen Beziehungen zur Analyse von Klimasicherheit zu nutzen. Die Herausforderungen, die mit dem globalen Klimawandel verbundenen sind, regten dazu an, die Besonderheiten ökologischer Sicherheit aufzuzeigen und Klimasicherheit in diesem Rahmen davon zu unterscheiden. Die Aussagekraft des realistischen Paradigmas zur Erklärung in Forschungen zur Klimasicherheit zeigte sich dabei in Fragen wie der staatszentrierten Sicht auf die internationalen Beziehungen, Vorrangindividueller vor kollektiven Interessen oder der Bedeutung von Macht und Dominanz. Diese Kategorien werden nicht nur vor dem Hintergrund der Leistungen des traditionellen Realismus, sondern auch des Neorealismus oder des strukturellen Realismus analysiert. Auch die Möglichkeit internationale Klimaverhandlungen spieltheoretisch zu analysieren, werden als Forschungszugang diskutiert.

Schlüsselswörter: der Klimawandel, die Klimasicherheit, das realistische Paradigma

Климатическая безопасность в свете реалистической парадигмы теории международных отношений

Резюме

В статье рассмотрены вопросы о возможности применения реалистической парадигмы теории международных отношений для анализа климатической безопасности. Специфика проблем, связанных с глобальными изменениями климата, требует обратить особое внимание на проблематику экологической безопасности и выделения в ее рамках вопросов касающихся климатической безопасности. В исследовании раскрывается релевантность реалистической парадигмы в исследованиях климатической безопасности по таким вопросам, как государственно-центрическая картина международных отношений, первенство индивидуальных интересов над коллективными, значение власти и доминирования. Эти категории анализируются не только в свете достижений традиционного реализма, но и неореализма и структурного реализма. В статье рассмотрен также вопрос о возможности применения теории игр для анализа международных переговоров направленных на принятие мер для борьбы с изменением климата.

Ключевые слова: изменения климата, климатическая безопасность, реалистическая парадигма



Isabela de Andrade Gama

Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
ORCID: 0000-0002-0394-2752

Human Security: Designed Cynicism or a Poorly Implemented Idea?

Introduction

According to the website of the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, the main goal of the organisation is to establish, as its leading motto says, “Freedom from Want, Freedom from Fear, and Freedom to Live in Dignity.”¹

Most of what the UN Trust Fund for Human Security affirms comes from Resolution A/RES/66/290 of 2012. Approved by the General Assembly, it puts together many sources of threat to humans, which means decentralising the traditional security approach from states to human beings. On pages 1 and 2, an attempt has been made at defining human security:

- (a) The right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. All individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential;
- (b) Human security calls for people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people and all communities;
- (c) Human security recognizes the interlinkages between peace, development and human rights, and equally considers civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights;
- (d) The notion of human security is distinct from the responsibility to protect and its implementation;
- (e) Human security does not entail the threat or the use of force or coercive measures. Human security does not replace State security;
- (f) Human security is

¹ United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, <https://www.un.org/humansecurity/what-is-human-security/> [accessed: 20.11.2019].

based on national ownership. Since the political, economic, social and cultural conditions for human security vary significantly across and within countries, and at different points in time, human security strengthens national solutions which are compatible with local realities; (g) Governments retain the primary role and responsibility for ensuring the survival, livelihood and dignity of their citizens. The role of the international community is to complement and provide the necessary support to Governments, upon their request, so as to strengthen their capacity to respond to current and emerging threats. Human security requires greater collaboration and partnership among Governments, international and regional organizations and civil society; (h) Human security must be implemented with full respect for the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, including full respect for the sovereignty of States, territorial integrity and non-interference in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States. Human security does not entail additional legal obligations on the part of States.

Having read this lengthy excerpt that provides a definition of human security, it is clear to see that there is no definition of the notion at all. Like many other resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, it gives the impression of being loaded with a wealth of words that have just been put together to make it look like the international community cares about human security.²

The above resolution dates back to 2012, but the concept and discussions on human security started long before. In another document, whose origins go back to 2009, the definition on the topic tries to be more cohesive.³ The document also makes an attempt to define the potential threat to human security:

[e]conomic security – persistent poverty, unemployment; food security – hunger, famine; health security – deadly infectious diseases, unsafe food, malnutrition, lack of access to basic health care; environmental security – environmental degradation, resource depletion, natural disasters, pollution; personal security – physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence, child labour; community security – inter-ethnic, religious, and other identity based tensions; political security – political repression, and human rights abuses.⁴

The point here is to underline the difficulty of defining human security – even within the scope of documents launched by the United Nations. Especially since 1994, after the debate around the Human Security Development Report, the definition and the applicability of the concepts at stake have been debated at large.

Looking at a selection of documents issued by the United Nations, as well as several websites of the UN that include information about what human security is, how the concept of human insecurity is undefined, and how to deal with

² S. Tadjbakhsh, A.M. Chenoy, *Human security: concepts and implications*, London 2007.

³ *Human Security in Theory and Practice. Application of the Human Security Concept and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security*, Human Security Unit Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs United Nations, 2009, <https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/HSU/Publications%20and%20Products/Human%20Security%20Tools/Human%20Security%20in%20Theory%20and%20Practice%20English.pdf> [accessed: 20.11.2019].

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

such “risky” situations, there seems to be little or no agreement on the issue even within the organisation itself.

At times, human security seems to be tied to some conflict-threatening situations embedded in some form of security in the traditional way. However, at other times, human security is linked to conflict prevention, and dealing with the causes of conflict. Any initiative undertaken to deal with the underlying causes of human suffering is valid. Having said that, this specific concept of human security is problematic in its own conception.⁵

What is Human Security?

In this section of the paper, an attempt is made to raise a debate about the concept of Human Security, based how it was defined by the UN General Assembly in the document A/RES/66/290. In this sense, it is interesting to scrutinise some of the points that look to define the concept:

[t]he right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. All individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential.

The first question that arises from the above assertion is: “which people?” Many other questions arise from one single paragraph: for example “what is dignity?” Because concepts such as dignity, freedom or fear can be questionable, they can have multiple meanings in different places. This gives rise to more questions, like those about who is the one to define who these vulnerable people are.

Since the resolution was drafted by the General Assembly, it aims to be more “democratic,” i.e. it aspires to be not only a document that establishes some guidelines from the Global North to the Global South. Yet this resolution seems shallow, so the next point to be analysed is as follows:

(d) The notion of human security is distinct from the responsibility to protect and its implementation; (e) Human security does not entail the threat or the use of force or coercive measures. Human security does not replace State security.

This paragraph on the definition of Human Security is more about what Human Security is not, what the members of UN won’t do as regards human insecurity. Later, in another paragraph, the document states that the primary goal to protect humans lies on the part of the individual states, and the international community would act to complement them, with some support of the governments. This is in accordance to the UN Charter on no intervention. The next point to be highlighted is also in accordance to the non-intervention, although it raises some questions:

⁵ J. Baylis, S. Smith, P. Owens, *The globalization of world politics: an introduction to international relations*, New York 2007.

(g) Governments retain the primary role and responsibility for ensuring the survival, livelihood and dignity of their citizens. The role of the international community is to complement and provide the necessary support to Governments, upon their request, so as to strengthen their capacity to respond to current and emerging threats. Human security requires greater collaboration and partnership among Governments, international and regional organizations and civil society.

It is understandable that the primary responsibility to keep human security lies on the shoulders of the state. But what if the state is the main perpetrator of atrocities against its population? Or, what if it is an issue affecting a failed state? In this case, maybe there is no government to ask for international help. And what should one say about the so-called “stabilisation” mission carried out by US government in Syria? This “stabilisation” mission took place in Eastern Syria: exactly in two places which at the time were the only places in Syria which Assad’s regime wasn’t able to control. Even though the human security vocabulary was not evoked, the actions seemed like “human security” was being applied in order to “stabilise” a region and prevent ISIS to get back there.⁶ A point to stress here is that the concepts that involve human security are extremely vague. Clearly, applying them with regard to the situation in Syria would imply going against one’s own guidelines, and their vagueness leads to the paradox that even the state is uncertain whether or not a given situation is indeed a case to apply the notion of human security.

A priori, the definition of human security, as well as the definition of threats to human security, clearly indicate that this concept was designed to ensure the safety of populations at risk. This, for example, relates to populations that are in the midst of epidemics, extreme poverty, famine, post-conflict situations, post-natural disasters, and so many other threats that are listed in UN documents.

In 2015, the UN released a new document containing what the organisation assured to be a more concise version of the “applicability” of the pillars supporting human security.⁷ Due to its vague terminology, once again the document reminds the readers about the “limited” role of UN. However, the document tries to define what would be necessary for the applicability of Human Security. It is clear to see the emptiness of a sentence that reads “affirming human security is a multi-sectoral approach, and demands cooperation, a comprehensive exercise, and so on.” This is indeed something close to no definition. After all, there is no definition; for example, what would be a “comprehensive exercise”, and who would the cooperation be carried out with?

The document rests on five pillars, which are called fundamental for the human security. These principles are people-centred; comprehensive; context-specific; prevention-oriented, and to bring protection and empowerment. Without being

⁶ S. Heydemann, *Rethinking Stabilization in Eastern Syria: Toward a Human Security Framework*, Atlantic Council, 2018, p. 2.

⁷ *Framework for Cooperation for the system-wide application of Human Security*. Prepared by the Human Security Unit, September 2015, <https://www.un.org/humansecurity/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Framework-for-Cooperation-for-the-System-wide-Application-of-Human-Security.pdf> [accessed: 20.11.2019].

repetitive, again, there is absolutely no clarity on how these principles could be put into practice.⁸

Human Security: a concept for whom?

The United Nations website related to the Trust Fund for Human Security is supposed to lay down not only the key objectives, but also the major schemes funded by the donations of UN members. Thus, it shows where these initiatives are applied. The website features a world map accompanied by a list of countries which shows the Human Security schemes that are being put into practice.⁹

It is not difficult to note that all the initiatives are centred around the Global South, South America, Africa, parts of Asia, Middle East, Eurasia, as well as a part of Europe which is not exactly Europe, like Kosovo, Albania, Moldova, Belarus, and a few others. It is really hard not to notice that Brazil is on the list of countries that require international help. The list contains many countries, so it is complicated to select one to look into deeper. In this sense, Brazil has been chosen.

As the research about the applicability of Human Security in Brazil took place, the website of the scheme was accessed for deeper analysis. The UN Trust Fund for Human Security established a plan for the city of São Paulo. The project began in August 2008 and lasted until July 2012, the budget oscillating around 3,228,984 USD. The description of the project is the following:

[s]ustained improvement of human security in the city of Sao Paulo through humanization actions in public schools, health services and communities. The programme aimed to reduce violence and promote a culture of peace in Sao Paulo. Through a comprehensive set of interventions in the areas of education, health care and community participation, networks of participants designed action plans to address issues related to gender, race, ethnicity, youth and local development. As a result, integrated public policies based on the human security approach were developed, resulting in greater impact and improved relations between communities and the Government.¹⁰

Besides this information, there are no further mentions of what exactly was done in São Paulo from 2008 to 2012. Clearly, the city of São Paulo is one of the biggest urban areas in Brazil, and one of the most populous areas in the world. In a huge urban organism like this, not only is it possible to question where the initiatives actually took place, but what happened to such an extensive budget as one of 3,228,984 USD. It is indeed a city with many problems, mainly social, and in this sense this budget would not make much difference in the scenario. Besides,

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁹ See: United Nations Trust Fund – Programmes, <https://www.un.org/humansecurity/trustfund> [accessed: 20.11.2019].

¹⁰ United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security – city of São Paulo, <https://www.un.org/humansecurity/hsprogramme/sustained-improvement-of-human-security-in-the-city-of-sao-paulo-through-humanization-actions-in-public-schools-health-services-and-communities> [accessed: 20.11.2019].

the UN does not provide crucial information on aspects such as e.g. who was responsible for the programme, and/or how the budget was spent.

Doubtless, Human Security is important for communities in distress: to relieve people from suffering. Still, looking more closely at the issue, it seems like a “red herring” which is aimed to deviate the attention of the international agenda that is really getting attention, and those issues are being debated on the UN Security Council. Nevertheless, it is important not to forget the relevance of keeping the discussion alive.

Let us get back to the question in point: “Human Security: an idea for whom?”¹¹ While the threats listed include climate change, poverty, diseases epidemics, terrorism, ethnical problems, so on and so forth.¹² It is clear that the problems come from the Global South, and they actually threaten the Global North too. Because in the end, extreme poverty in the Global South and others issues in these areas can impact the Global North, after all immigration to the developed countries is one of the troubles for the rich countries. Spreading a few crumbs to contain these people from the Global South can actually protect the Global North, and not the other way around.¹³ While it should not be about fear of the foreign, but also what multiculturalism can aggregate.

What is next?

Criticism is not going to stop, given the vagueness of the United Nations when it comes to putting forward a definition and a *modus operandi* of the applicability of Human Security. Another thing that must be stressed here is that UN documents admit that the projects are “context-based”, but they are not. They are a disguised form of implementation in practical and abstract ways of the Western Modernity¹⁴ on the Global South. According to a broadly postcolonial and ontological security approach, whatever the concept of Human Security encompasses, it should really be context-based; otherwise it is just creating modern-anxiety.¹⁵ Although it is necessary to highlight not only the Global South in the scope of Human Security, partially the Global North also falls within the definition of Human Security, and it is passive to UN initiatives too.¹⁶ As can be seen on the United Nations Trust Fund website, there are many projects that are being implemented in the Global North, but it is not the nodal point here to exhaust all points regarding this topic.

¹¹ S. Tadjbakhsh, ‘Human Security: Concepts and Implications with an Application to Post-Intervention Challenges in Afghanistan’, *Les Etudes du CERI*, no. 117–118, 2005.

¹² S.N. Romaniuk, M. Thapa, P. Marton (eds.), *The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Global Security Studies*, Springer Nature Living Reference, 2019.

¹³ A heated debate has been going on over this topic, although this is not the nodal point of this paper.

¹⁴ A. Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity; Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Cambridge 1991.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁶ United Nations Trust Fund, <https://www.un.org/humansecurity/trustfund> [accessed: 20.11.2019].

For now, what involves the notion of Human Security seems to be a way of disciplining the “rest,”¹⁷ a way of spreading neoliberalism and imposing existential anxiety. After all, while a part of the world defines who is in a situation of insecurity and imposes ways of “fixing” such regions, they may not constitute their own identity. Yet mirroring the modern Western development teleology, we long for a certain status that will probably never be attained. On the contrary, it can create even more insecurity and frustration. This is another reason to think that Human Security deserves so many criticism given the way it is being conducted at the moment. It deserves more attention, and it needs to be more articulated to fit diverse culturally-based projects. After all, humans matter.

This brief analysis was meant to stir debate, rather than just to provide an answer to the issues raised. There are nodal points concerning Human Security and its tangents that have not been discussed here. They include the object of security, the kind of security, mapping the impacts of the projects,¹⁸ and many other issues that are not within the scope of this paper, although much more can and needs to be said and done in this respect.

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¹⁷ G. Shani, ‘Human security as ontological security: a post-colonial approach’, *Postcolonial Studies*, vol. 20, no. 3, 2017, pp. 275–293.

¹⁸ A. Acharya, S.K. Singhdeo, M., Rajaretnam, ‘Preface – Human Security: From Concept to Practice – Case Studies from Northeast India and Orissa’, *World Scientific Series on Human Security* 2011, vol. 1.

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Human security: zaprojektowany cynizm czy źle wdrożony pomysł?

Streszczenie

Pojęcie *human security* weszło do agendy międzynarodowej w 1994 r. Moment nie mógł być bardziej sprzyjający dla przesunięcia debaty na temat spraw ludzkich w stronę problematyki bezpieczeństwa i uwzględnienia innego podejścia do bezpieczeństwa. Należy przyznać, że wczesne lata 90. były w dużej mierze naznaczone końcem zimnej wojny, co położyło kres wysokiemu poziomowi niepewności między państwami. W tym czasie, chociaż nadal istniały napięcia między państwami i jednostkami wewnątrzpaństwowymi, były populacje zaniedbywane przez długi czas w kwestiach bezpieczeństwa. Głównym celem artykułu jest analiza różnorodnych oficjalnych dokumentów wydanych przez ONZ dotyczących *human security* oraz, w ramach nadrzędnego celu prowadzonych badań, przyjrzenie się koncepcji *human security* i jej zastosowaniu.

Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo jednostki ludzkiej, ONZ, zastosowanie

Human Security: Designed Cynicism, or a Poorly Implemented Idea?

Abstract

The notion of Human Security entered the most prominent international agenda in 1994. The moment could not be more conducive to the debate on human issues to broadly shift the debate towards security issues, and to include another safety approach. Admittedly, the early 1990s were largely marked by the end of the Cold War, which put a stop to the high level of insecurity between the states. At that time, although there were still tensions between states and intra-state units, there were populations in distress that had been neglected for a long time. The primary goal of this paper is to scrutinise a variety of official documents issued by the United Nations regarding human security, and, as part of the overriding objective of the research conducted, to look at the concept of Human Security and its applicability.

Key words: human security, United Nations, applicability

Human security: entworfenener Zynismus oder eine schlecht umgesetzte Idee?

Zusammenfassung

Das Konzept Human Security wurde im Jahre 1994 auf die internationale Agenda gehoben. Es konnte keinen günstigeren Moment geben für eine Debatte, die menschliche Angelegenheiten und in die Sicherheitsthematik einbezog und andere Ansätze von Sicherheit berücksichtigte. Die frühen 90er Jahre waren offensichtlich in hohem Maße von dem Ende des Kalten Krieges geprägt, wodurch der besonders hohe Grad an Unsicherheit zwischen den Staaten beendet wurde. In jener Zeit traten die mit Blick auf Sicherheitsfragen vernachlässigten Bevölkerungen in den Blick, obwohl immer noch Spannungen zwischen und in den Staaten existierten. Hauptziel des Artikels ist die Analyse verschiedener offizieller, durch die Vereinten Nationen ausgegebenen Dokumente zur human security und, im Rahmen des vorrangigen Forschungsziels, ein genauer Blick auf das Konzept von human security und seine Anwendung.

Schlüsselwörter: menschliche Sicherheit, die Vereinten Nationen, die Anwendung

Human security: запроектированный цинизм или плохо реализованная идея?

Резюме

Концепция human security (безопасность человека, безопасность личности) появилась в международной повестке дня в 1994 году. Это был очень благоприятный момент для начала дискуссии о привлечении широких масс людей к проблемам безопасности. Следует вспомнить, что начало 90-х гг. было связано с окончанием холодной войны, которое положило конец высокому уровню неопределенности между государствами. В то время, хотя все еще присутствовала напряженность между отдельными государствами и внутригосударственные конфликты, существовали большие группы людей, которые не интересовались вопросами безопасности. Основной целью статьи является анализ различных официальных документов ООН, касающихся human security, изучение концепции human security и ее применение.

Ключевые слова: безопасность человека, ООН, применение



Karina Paulina Marczuk

University of Warsaw
ORCID: 0000-0003-1870-7728

Human Security and Public Diplomacy

Introduction

In 2001, Roland Paris published a paper entitled 'Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air', in which he pointed to the ambiguity of the notion of human security.¹ Encompassing the international dimension of security, the term is seen as something more than pure military power, as it includes a human component too. Similarly, public diplomacy – a term that embraces a set of activities undertaken within foreign policy, i.e. "diplomacy" – is addressed not only to the authorities abroad, but also to a wider spectrum of foreign audiences, i.e. the "public". Public diplomacy and human security belong to the area of external relations of states, i.e. their foreign policies. Also, they are both frequently criticised for their lack of theoretical framework (human security), and abusing of the concept of diplomacy (public diplomacy).

This paper looks at the interplay between public diplomacy and human security within the field of foreign policy. First, the author explains what human security means by providing three main groups of definitions of the term. Second, the concept of public diplomacy is explained by emphasising the evolution of "classic" diplomacy and its functions. Finally, an attempt has been made to research the issue of how public diplomacy can be used to promote human security. To do so, the paper provides several case studies of the policies of the two main supporters of human security: Japan, and Canada.

The main question posed in this paper is whether public diplomacy – alongside its modern tools, such as digital technologies – is indeed used to promote human

¹ R. Paris, 'Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air', *International Security*, vol. 26, no. 2, 2001, pp. 87–102.

security. It is argued that due to the fact that both public diplomacy and human security belong to the domain of foreign policy, human security – as an official policy in the states that affirm it – is promoted abroad through a variety of means of public diplomacy. To verify this claim, an attempt has been made to look into the positions of Japan and Canada in this respect.

The notion of human security

For many years, the idea of human security has been around in the academic debate. Until now, a huge number of monographs, papers and chapters have been published in various countries and in numerous languages, and scholars have coined a multitude of definitions of human security. Human security has been criticised due to the lack of a rigorous methodological framework, which can be noticed when one compares it with, for example, (inter-)national security. Numerous states and their political leaders, however, have decided to incorporate the human security doctrine into their policies, and follow its principles and values. Similarly, such international organisations as the United Nations (UN) or the European Union (EU) have been putting into practice the assumptions underlying human security. Taking this into consideration, the mainstream definitions on human security have been reviewed in order to identify the most relevant explanation that can be used for the purposes of this paper.

There are two main dimensions of human security: the Japanese school, which rests on the so-called “freedom from want” doctrine; and the Canadian school, which hinges upon the idea of “freedom from fear”. In general, the Japanese school concerns human dignity in daily life in a very broad meaning of the term (social affairs), while the second one is chiefly related to safeguarding political rights and ensuring safety to everyone. Reviewing the subject literature on human security, one can single out three main approaches taken to determine human security: 1) the definitions proposed by the UN; 2) the definitions coined by scholars; 3) the definitions given by the governments of Japan and Canada.² As the term human security was originally promoted by the UN, let us begin with the explanation of the point of view put forward by the UN on what human security is supposed to be.

Within the UN, the idea of human security gained popularity after the demise of the Cold War order. It was in 1994, when a new Human Development Report, titled *New Dimensions of Human Security*, was presented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The document emphasised a new global political and economic situation, and the need for a security transition, which implied a shift from the classical understanding of security in military terms, conflicts between states, protection of borders, or weaponry to a broader, human-centred approach focused on the eradication of the threats posed to people and their

² In this part of the paper, the research on the numerous definitions of human security has been based on the book by K.P. Marczuk, *Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej: od bezpieczeństwa państwa do bezpieczeństwa ludzi*, Warszawa 2012, pp. 55–66.

environment, and human development in general. A key part of the report is the fourth chapter, titled New Dimensions of Human Security, where an explanation of human security can be found:

Human security is not a concern with weapons – it is a concern with human life and dignity. [...] A consideration of the basic concept of human security must focus on four of its essential characteristics: human security is a universal concern. [...] The components of human security are interdependent. [...] Human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention. [...] Human security is people-centred. [...] human security is more easily identified through its absence than its presence.³

This is the reason why security threats are understood broadly, including the authors of the report, which goes down to economic security, food insecurity, health insecurity, ecological security, as well as personal, societal and political security.

The UN's point of view on human security was further developed by numerous UN officials and experts, such as the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata. In their public addresses, they stressed the fact that human security had to be advanced in both its dimensions, that is “freedom from fear”, and “freedom from want”, and through human development. In particular, Annan marked that in some cases, even the states could become a source of insecurity for their citizens (for instance genocide), so he emphasised the importance of the narrow dimension of human security, i.e. the core of the Canadian school. Ogata was rather focused on the promotion of its broader dimension, i.e. the foundations of the Japanese school.⁴ In short, in the UN's view, human security is understood extensively, and as such it encompasses both military and non-military threats, as well as natural and man-made risks posed to the security and safety of people. The key elements of the concept are human dignity,

³ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security*, New York–Oxford 1994, pp. 3, 22–23, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf [accessed: 17.10.2019].

⁴ For further information, see: *Secretary-General [Kofi Annan] salutes International Workshop on Human Security in Mongolia*. Press Release SG/SM/7382, Ulaanbaatar, 8–10th May 2000, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2000/20000508.sgsm7382.doc.html> [accessed: 17.10.2019]; K.A. Annan, *We the Peoples: The role of the United Nations in the 21st Century*, New York, United Nations, Department of Public Information, 2000, p. 43, https://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/We_The_Peoples.pdf [accessed: 17.10.2019]; idem, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization: General Assembly Official Records Fifty-fifth Session*. Supplement No. 1 (A/55/1), New York, United Nations, 2000, p. 4, http://legal.un.org/ola/media/info_from_lc/A_55_1E.pdf [accessed: 17.10.2019]; S. Ogata, *Statement of Mrs. Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, at the Asian Development Bank Seminar “Inclusion or Exclusion: Social Development Challenges For Asia and Europe”*, Geneva, 27 April 1998, <https://www.unhcr.org/en-ik/admin/hcspeeches/3ae68fcd54/statement-mrs-sadako-ogata-united-nations-high-commissioner-refugees-asian.html> [accessed: 17.10.2019]; eadem, “*Human Security: A Refugee Perspective*”. Keynote Speech by Mrs. Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, at the Ministerial Meeting on Human Security Issues of the “Lysoen Process” Group of Governments, Bergen, 19 May 1999, <https://www.unhcr.org/admin/hcspeeches/3ae68fc00/human-security-refugee-perspective-keynote-speech-mrs-sadako-ogata-united.html> [accessed: 17.10.2019].

and human development. In this case, human security is also perceived as an alternative to national security.

With regard to the definitions coined by the scholars, one needs to admit that the number of works said about human security has been growing over the recent years. For instance, a critical study of these concepts was proposed by Taylor Owen, who has made an attempt to review a set of definitions of human security offered by the academic community.⁵ In general, all these concepts can be divided into two main groups. The first group encompasses the definitions that highlight the broad dimension of human security (i.e. “freedom from want”), while the second group rests on the narrow dimension (i.e. “freedom from fear”). According to Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha M. Chenoy, however, the academic community looks at human security in three ways. First, it is regarded as a fancy concept without a robust methodological framework. Second, human security is mainly about “freedom from fear”; and, third, it is predominantly about “freedom from want”. In this way, the academic debate on human security is taking place on the two dimensions mentioned above: on the hand, there is an ongoing discussion between the advocates of human security and its opponents; on the other hand, there is a debate going on between the advocates and opponents of the narrow and broad approaches to human security.⁶ Others, such as Malcolm McIntosh and Alan Hunter, claim that human security is a handy term in the sense that it covers the *Realpolitik* and the rule of law (security), and the rules of humanitarianism and anthropocentrism (human dimension) too. The authors also emphasise that human security consists of three key elements. First, it is human-centred; second, it is aimed at the examination of the relations occurring between the human being and society, and, third, it postulates to protect people from national, international and global threats.⁷ For the purposes of this paper, a broad approach to human security has been adopted, which postulates that human security encompasses sustainable human development.⁸

The third approach to defining human security is based on the positions of the governments of Japan and Canada, i.e. the two countries that have been staunch supporters of human security. Both have been managing their foreign policy by implementing the principles of human security and incorporating them into their agenda: Japan has focused on social and economic issues, while Canada has put more emphasis on “freedom from fear” issues. Their human security policies will be analysed in the final part of the paper.

⁵ T. Owen, ‘Human security – Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition’, *Security Dialogue*, vol. 35, no. 3, 2004, pp. 373–387.

⁶ S. Tadjbakhsh, A.M. Chenoy, *Human security: Concepts and implications*, Abingdon, Oxon, New York 2007, p. 40.

⁷ M. McIntosh, A. Hunter, ‘Perspectives on human security: The emergent construct’, [in:] M. McIntosh, A. Hunter (eds.), *New perspectives on human security*, Sheffield 2010, pp. 3–4.

⁸ G. King, Ch.J.L. Murray, ‘Rethinking human security’, *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 116, no. 4, 2001–2002, p. 585.

The notion of public diplomacy

Diplomacy and its functions, as traditionally understood, has evolved from focusing on dialogue and negotiation to advance the foreign policy goals of a state, secrecy, diplomatic protocol, ceremonial, and gradual professionalization⁹ towards a variety of new diplomatic activities, one of them being of key interest – public diplomacy. Public diplomacy, the concept that gained popularity in the US a few decades ago, has been more popular in other states, including Western and non-Western countries. For instance, in Poland the term “public diplomacy” came into use only when Radosław Sikorski became the minister of foreign affairs serving from 2007 to 2014. For the first time, Sikorski mentioned the term in his exposé on Polish foreign policy in 2009, in which he stated that the “[...] task [of public diplomacy] is not only to promote Poland as broadly understood, but also to convince public opinion abroad of our assessment and our understanding of international problems.”¹⁰

What exactly is “classic” diplomacy? Traditionally, diplomacy was about establishing and conducting official relations between states in various areas. To advance this goal, states have developed the art of negotiation (mainly bilateral treaties), which has since then been the major field of interest for ‘classic’ diplomacy. Of the numerous diplomatic law provisions, the key ones are those included in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which describes diplomatic functions as follows: information gathering, communication, representation, negotiation, and the promotion of friendly relations. Article 3 of the 1961 Vienna Convention includes the term *inter alia*, too, what allows diplomacy to be exercised in new ways and forms: “The functions of a diplomatic mission consist *inter alia* [...]”¹¹ More importantly, diplomacy as classically understood has remained in the sphere of activity of sovereign states while public diplomacy involves various international actors.¹²

Public diplomacy, i.e. the art of influencing and attracting foreign audiences, is associated with the concept of soft power. Soft power, the term propagated by American scholar Joseph S. Nye, is about ability to achieve aims through attractiveness rather than coercion or payment¹³. Brian Hocking has noticed that “it is not the case that public diplomacy is itself uniquely the expression of soft power”¹⁴ while Beata Ocieпка notes that public diplomacy integrates all states’ soft power activities in their foreign policy.¹⁵ As such, nowadays it is called “new public diplomacy”.

⁹ C. Jönsson, M. Hall (eds.), *Essence of Diplomacy*, Houndmills, Basingstoke and New York 2005, p. 11.

¹⁰ *Exposé 2009: Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych Radosława Sikorskiego na temat polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2009 roku*, 2009, http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/priorytety_polityki_zagr_2017_2021/expose2/expose_2009 [accessed: 25.10.2019].

¹¹ *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*, 18 April 1961, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1964/06/19640624%2002-10%20AM/Ch_III_3p.pdf [accessed: 29.10.2019].

¹² B. Ocieпка, *Miękka siła i dyplomacja publiczna Polski*, Warszawa 2013, p. 77.

¹³ J.S. Nye, *Soft power: jak osiągnąć sukces w polityce światowej*, Warszawa 2007, p. 25.

¹⁴ B. Hocking, ‘Rethinking the ‘New’ Public Diplomacy’, [in:] J. Melissen (ed.), *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, Basingstoke, New York 2005, p. 34.

¹⁵ B. Ocieпка, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

Other concepts that link with public diplomacy are, as Jan Melissen suggests, propaganda, nation-branding, and foreign cultural relations. He also emphasises the fact that: “[t]he new public diplomacy will be an increasingly standard component of overall diplomatic practice and is more than a form of propaganda conducted by diplomats.”¹⁶

To date, diplomacy has developed and expanded and, thereby, it covers various dimensions of international relations. This is the way one can talk, for instance on conference diplomacy, international cooperation between parliaments (parliamentary diplomacy), mitigation of hostile relations between states through exchange of nationals (people-to-people diplomacy, P2P), or various other ways of enhancing the influence and position of a state on the international forum, which explains the idea of “new diplomacies”. Among them, the crucial role goes to public diplomacy, although one has to keep in mind cultural diplomacy too, which is focused on enhancing inter-state mutual relations through art, performances, concerts, movies festivals, and other forms. This type of diplomacy is therefore often included into bi- or multilateral agreements that states conclude.¹⁷ Moreover, states promote themselves in international relations using digital tools, such as social media (digital or cyber-diplomacy and its particular types as Facebook diplomacy, Twitter diplomacy – Tweeploamy, Instagram diplomacy – Instaplomacy or Instadiplomacy, or LinkedIn diplomacy).¹⁸ Other ways of increasing the impact of states abroad can be, for instance, through the promotion of cooperation in science (science diplomacy),¹⁹ or in economics (economic diplomacy).²⁰ Numerous states also boost their international influence through so-called gastrodiploamy or culinary diplomacy,²¹ not to mention sports (sports diplomacy).²² The list of “diplomacies” is long and, what is more, there is extensive literature on the subject of diplomacy and its evolution.²³

¹⁶ For further information, see: J. Melissen, ‘The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice’, [in:] J. Melissen (ed.), *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, Basingstoke, New York 2005, pp. 11; 16–23.

¹⁷ In the case of Poland, see: K.P. Marczuk, ‘Evolution of Poland’s Cultural Diplomacy: Case Study of Spain, 1977–2017’, [in:] M. Mizerska-Wrotkowska, J.L. Orella Martínez (eds.), *Poland and Spain in Late Modern and Contemporary Civilisation and Culture*, Madrid 2018, pp. 129–138; K.P. Marczuk, ‘Good Neighbourhood Treaties and Public Diplomacy: Polish Activities in Neighbouring States (2007–2014)’, [in:] K.P. Marczuk (ed.), *Good Neighbourhood Treaties of Poland: Political, Security and Social Relations*, Cham 2019, pp. 25–40.

¹⁸ For example, see: S. Riordan, *Cyberdiplomacy: Managing Security and Governance Online*, Cambridge, Medford 2019.

¹⁹ O. Krasnyak, *National Styles in Science, Diplomacy, and Science Diplomacy: A Case Study of the United Nations Security Council P5 Countries*, Leiden 2018.

²⁰ P.A.G. van Bergeijk, M. Okano-Heijmans, J. Melissen (eds.), *Economic Diplomacy: Economic and Political Perspectives*, Leiden–Boston 2011.

²¹ P.S. Rockower, ‘Recipes for Gastrodiploamy’, *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, vol. 8, no. 3, 2012, pp. 235–246.

²² J.S. Rofo (ed.), *Sport and Diplomacy: Games within Games*, Manchester 2018.

²³ For instance see: P.M. Seib, *The Future of Diplomacy*, Cambridge, Malden 2016; P. Sharp, *Diplomatic Theory of International Relations*, Cambridge, New York 2009; B. Surmacz, *Ewolucja współczesnej dyplomacji: aktorzy, struktury, funkcje*, Lublin 2015.

In contrast to “classic” diplomacy, public diplomacy is aimed at enhancing the position of states in international relations, increasing the value of their brands, and building up their soft power. This is also the ability to influence other international players to further one’s own national interest. As such, public diplomacy is a tool for foreign policy used to support the advancement of its goals and, as such, it is complimentary to traditional diplomatic activity, which Manuel Castells sums up as follows: “[p]ublic diplomacy is the diplomacy of the public, that is, the projection in the international arena of the values and ideas of the public.”²⁴ Paul Sharp offers a concise definition of public diplomacy, which he understands as a very timely concept and as “[t]he process by which direct relations are pursued with a country’s people to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented, appears to be an idea whose time has come.”²⁵ Sharp’s definition has been applied for the purposes of this paper.²⁶

Finally, public diplomacy is different from the notion of “classic” diplomacy mainly by its means and methods. For example, it involves political marketing, and it is geared towards different target groups, as it is focused not only on governments, but also on societies and individuals. Therefore, as suggested by Beata Ociepka, we should not in fact be talking about the recipients of public diplomacy, but rather its stakeholders.²⁷

How can public diplomacy be used to promote human security?

Public diplomacy, as Efe Sevin notices, is a combination of two terms which, on the one hand, demonstrate their strong links with international relations (“diplomacy”). On the other hand, the “public” component is about broadening the scope and the recipients of traditional diplomacy – from states to nationals.²⁸ Therefore, public diplomacy remains a tool of foreign policy, while human security is a concept which is applied to and furthered by foreign policy. This is the plane where they both intersect, and this process is discernible when one looks at the approach to human security of the key states that support it, that is Japan and Canada.

To begin with Japan, this country’s government perceives human security as of the key pillars of its diplomacy, the other pillar being, *inter alia*, economic diplomacy, science and technology diplomacy, or public diplomacy. Human security is

²⁴ M. Castells, ‘The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, and Global Governance’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 616, no. 1, 2008, p. 91.

²⁵ P. Sharp, ‘Revolutionary States, Outlaw Regimes and the Techniques of Public Diplomacy’, [in:] J. Melissen (ed.), *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, Basingstoke, New York 2005, p. 106.

²⁶ Efe Sevin, Emily T. Metzgar and Craig Hayden reviewed the key literature on public diplomacy: E. Sevin, E.T. Metzgar, C. Hayden, ‘The Scholarship of Public Diplomacy: Analysis of a Growing Field’, *International Journal of Communication*, vol. 13, 2019, pp. 4814–4837.

²⁷ B. Ociepka, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

²⁸ E. Sevin, *Public diplomacy and the implementation of foreign policy in the US, Sweden and Turkey*, London 2017, p. 3.

understood as “[...] a concept aimed at creating a community in which people can fully develop their potential through protecting all individuals, and at the same time empowering them to solve their own problems.”²⁹ As such, human security is the leading rule of the overall Japanese development cooperation. Therefore, one can conclude that Japan has adopted a wide approach to human security, which brings us back the already mentioned Japanese school of human security. Also, although public diplomacy has not been defined explicitly in the latest government *Diplomatic Bluebook 2019*, it is safe to say that public diplomacy is not only an essential tool of Japan’s foreign policy, but also the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) of Japan strongly emphasises its digital dimension (digital diplomacy). In particular, it is about active dissemination of information through the Ministry’s website – available both in Japanese and English – and social media, such as Facebook,³⁰ Twitter,³¹ Instagram,³² and YouTube.³³ The key objective is to stay in touch with the public (for instance, the third section of the *Diplomatic Bluebook 2019* is entitled “Diplomacy with the Support of the Public”), that is both Japanese nationals (so-called domestic public diplomacy³⁴) and the recipients abroad. This is the way the government promotes and informs on the vision of its Japanese foreign policy, as well as any advancements of human security issues. The authors of the *Diplomatic Bluebook 2019* have stressed the fact that the Ministry “[...] considers its English website an important tool of public diplomacy, and has been enhancing the distribution of information in English on *Japan’s foreign policy* (including maintaining territorial integrity, historical issues and *security*), Japan’s position on international affairs, and Japan’s rich and varied attractiveness.”³⁵

If one accesses the Ministry’s English version of its website, which is – according to the government’s position – the main source of communication with the foreign audience, they can easily find some information on the human security activities taken by the government. For instance, the Ministry has emphasised the assistance provided by the Trust Fund for Human Security, founded by Japan and operating within the United Nations. What is more, the promotion of human security is one

²⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, *Diplomatic Bluebook 2019: Japanese Diplomacy and International Situation in 2018*, 17 October 2019, pp. 246–247, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pp/pa-ge22e_000929.html [accessed: 5.11.2019].

³⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Facebook, <https://www.facebook.com/MofaJapan.en> [accessed: 5.11.2019].

³¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Twitter, https://twitter.com/MofaJapan_en [accessed: 5.11.2019].

³² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Instagram, <https://www.instagram.com/mofajapan> [accessed: 5.11.2019].

³³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, YouTube, <https://www.youtube.com/user/mofachannel> [accessed: 5.11.2019].

³⁴ Ellen Huijgh, who has researched domestic dimension of public diplomacy, argues that “[p]ublic diplomacy remains a cipher for the domestic public. It is predominantly associated with its international aspect: directed towards foreign publics and conducted abroad. Nevertheless social media and the increasing mobility of global citizens have blurred distinctions between domestic and international audiences” – E. Huijgh, ‘Changing Tunes for Public Diplomacy: Exploring the Domestic Dimension’, *The Journal of Public Diplomacy*, vol. 2, no 1, 2011, p. 63.

³⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, *op. cit.*, p. 295. Italics marked by the author.

of the priorities of Japan's foreign policy, and the government has committed itself to organise a set of actions aimed at the dissemination of information on Japan's engagement in human security. In particular, these actions are: "[...] (1) making policy speeches and organising symposia, (2) engaging other countries on human security in bilateral and multilateral meetings and referring to human security in the outcome documents of such meetings, (3) establishing groups aiming to mainstream human security and cooperating actively with them."³⁶

Human security is strongly related to the official development assistance (ODA), provided by Japan, in that sense that development cooperation is perceived as a key tool of Japanese diplomacy. Looking at the issue in more detail, the major priorities of the Japanese ODA are "addressing global challenges and promoting human security toward achieving the SDGs [Sustainable Development Goals]."³⁷ In particular, it is about covering such fields as "[...] health, food, women (gender), education, disaster risk reduction and tsunami countermeasures, water and hygiene, and climate change and global environmental issues."³⁸ One should also note that all these areas concern the broad dimension of human security.

Canada is perceived as a state that puts forward a narrow approach to human security. It means that, besides the development agenda, the government is focused on such issues as active involvement in international peace and security campaigns, promotion of human rights or inclusive governance and democracy. "Revitalising the rules-based international order" is one of the four pivotal areas of concern for Canada's diplomacy in the years 2019–2020.³⁹ To approach this aim, Justin Trudeau, Canada's Prime Minister, in his Minister of Foreign Affairs Mandate Letter of 1 February 2017, pointed to the various foreign policy priorities. Among them is the priority of "[e]xpanding Canadian diplomacy and leadership on global issues and in international institutions," which, *inter alia*, means "to champion the values of inclusive and accountable governance, including by promoting human rights, women's empowerment and gender equality, and peaceful pluralism, inclusion and respect for diversity."⁴⁰ What is significant is that in 2017, Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland claimed that "[t]o put it plainly, Canadian diplomacy and development sometimes require the backing of *hard power*."⁴¹ This statement proves a clear links with Canada's approach to human security.

³⁶ Global Issues Cooperation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *The Trust Fund for Human Security: For the "Human-centred" 21st Century*, August 2009, p. 4, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/t_fund21.pdf [accessed: 7.11.2019].

³⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 233.

³⁹ Government of Canada, Global Affairs Canada, *Plans at a glance and operating context*, 6 June 2019, <https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/priorities-priorites.aspx?lang=eng> [accessed: 7.11.2019].

⁴⁰ J. Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, *Minister of Foreign Affairs Mandate Letter*, 1 February 2017, <https://pm.gc.ca/en/mandate-letters/minister-foreign-affairs-mandate-letter> [accessed: 7.11.2019].

⁴¹ Ch. Freeland, Minister of Foreign Affairs, *Address by Minister Freeland on Canada's foreign policy priorities*, 6 June 2017, Ottawa, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2017/06/address_by_ministerfreelandoncanadasforeignpolicypriorities.html [accessed: 7.11.2019]. Italics marked by the author.

The commitment to develop public diplomacy was clearly pointed out in the 2017 Minister of Foreign Affairs Mandate Letter too. Since 1995, Canada has developed its public diplomacy, understood as the promotion of Canadian ideals and culture abroad, with a particular emphasis on human security, which it treats as the third pillar of its foreign policy.⁴² The others two pillars are the promotion of economic growth, and the pursuit of international peace and security. The crucial time was the period when Lloyd Axworthy became minister of foreign affairs, serving from 1996 to 2000. Axworthy was a staunch advocate of human security, and it was he who brought human security to Canada's foreign policy.⁴³

Nowadays, Global Affairs Canada – i.e. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – develops its public diplomacy activities mainly on the Internet, applying digital diplomacy tools. In particular, it goes down to extensive presence in the social media – the Canadian government uses a variety of channels to reach out to a broadest possible audience worldwide⁴⁴. Global Affairs Canada has developed various social media channels, and other types of communication tools, such as podcasts. Table 1 below illustrates the social media and other digital media used.

Table 1. Global Affairs Canada social media and digital tools

Type of communication	Sorts of medium
Social media	Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, Flickr, Weibo, WeChat, LinkedIn
Podcasts	–
RSS feeds	
Mobile apps and mobile websites	
Email subscriptions	

Source: author's own compilation based on Government of Canada, Global Affairs Canada, *Stay connected*, 16 October 2019, https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/contact-contactez/social-media_medias-sociaux.aspx?lang=eng [accessed: 8.11.2019].

All these channels are used to communicate Canada's vision of human security. To do so, numerous posts on several issues are published, like e.g. the activity of Canadian functionaries and humanitarian personnel abroad.

Conclusions

Not only diplomacy but also security has evolved over the last years – from a diplomacy and security of and by the states to a diplomacy and security by and for the

⁴² E. H. Potter, *Canada and the new public diplomacy*, The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2002, p. 8.

⁴³ L. Axworthy, 'Introduction', [in:] R. McRae, D. Hubert (eds.), *Human security and the new diplomacy: Protecting people, promoting peace*, Montreal 2001, p. 3.

⁴⁴ The list of social media is available at: Government of Canada, Global Affairs Canada, *Stay connected*, 16 October 2019, https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/contact-contactez/social-media_medias-sociaux.aspx?lang=eng [accessed: 8.11.2019].

people. Both have remained a crucial element of states' foreign policies too. Therefore, it is natural for them to take part in a complex interplay, and it is the task of researchers to explore how this is happening.

First, there are two main dimensions of human security: the Japanese school, based on the notion of "freedom from want", and the Canadian school, whose doctrine is "freedom from fear". Numerous definitions of this term go back to these broad or narrow approaches. There are three main groups of definitions that refer to the UN approach to human security (a broad dimension), proposals of scholars who represent either the Japanese or the Canadian school, as well as definitions provided by the governments of these two states, which have been supporters of human security.

Second, in opposite to "classic" diplomacy, public diplomacy uses numerous means of promotion of the vision and values of a state abroad. Therefore, it is used to support foreign policy goals by soft means and, as such, it is complimentary to "classic" diplomacy. In particular, contemporary public diplomacy applies digital tools to reach the broadest possible audience.

Third, Japan and Canada are the key states that implement human security values into their foreign policies. At the same time, they have developed their public diplomacy in a way that makes them currently focused on digital technologies. By spreading their visions on foreign policy abroad, they also spread their human security values.

To conclude, it is clear to see that both public diplomacy and human security remain in the field of interest that pertains to foreign policy. Human security, an official policy in such states as Japan or Canada, is thus supported by a variety of means of public diplomacy abroad, these days these means being chiefly digital.

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Human security i dyplomacja publiczna *Streszczenie*

Zarówno *human security* (bezpieczeństwo jednostki ludzkiej), jak i dyplomacja publiczna są poddawane krytyce za brak precyzji. Obie te kategorie należą do obszaru polityki zagranicznej. Artykuł dotyczy zależności między dyplomacją publiczną a *human security* w dziedzinie polityki zagranicznej. Po pierwsze, dokonano przeglądu definicji *human security*, wyodrębniając trzy ich główne grupy. Po drugie, wyjaśniono pojęcie dyplomacji publicznej, wskazując na ewolucję „klasycznej” dyplomacji i jej funkcji. Wreszcie zbadano użyteczność dyplomacji publicznej do promocji *human security* na forum międzynarodowym. W tym celu przeanalizowano studia przypadków polityki Japonii i Kanady, wiodących zwolenników *human security*. Główne pytanie dotyczy tego, czy dyplomacja publiczna i jej nowoczesne narzędzia, takie jak technologie cyfrowe, są wykorzystywane do rozpowszechniania założeń *human security* na forum międzynarodowym. Przyjęto, że *human security*, jako oficjalna polityka w państwach, które je promują, jest upowszechniane środkami dyplomacji publicznej. W celu sprawdzenia tego twierdzenia zbadano stanowiska Japonii i Kanady w omawianym zakresie.

Słowa kluczowe: dyplomacja publiczna, *human security*, Japonia, Kanada, polityka zagraniczna

Human Security and Public Diplomacy *Abstract*

Both human security and public diplomacy have been openly criticised for their lack of precision. They also both belong to the area of foreign policy. This paper deals with the interplay between public diplomacy and human security in the field of foreign policy. First, definitions of human security are reviewed, and three main groups of definitions of this term are provided. Second, the concept of public diplomacy is explained, emphasising the evolution of “classic” diplomacy and its functions. The final part of the paper looks at the relevance of public diplomacy to the promotion of human security. To do so, case studies of policies of the two main human security supporters, Japan and Canada, have been scrutinised. The main research question posed is whether public diplomacy, and its modern tools such as digital technologies, is used to spread human security values abroad. The key point is that human security – an official policy of the states that affirm it – is promoted through public diplomacy abroad. To verify this claim, the author has looked at the positions of Japan and Canada in this respect.

Key words: public diplomacy, human security, Japan, Canada, foreign policy

Human security und die öffentliche Diplomatie *Zusammenfassung*

Sowohl *human security* als auch die Public Diplomacy werden für ihren Mangel an Präzision kritisiert. Beide Kategorien gehören zum Gebiet der Außenpolitik. Der Artikel behandelt das Zusammenspiel zwischen *Public Diplomacy* und *human security* auf dem Gebiet der Außenpolitik. Erstens wurden Definitionen von *human security* betrachtet und in drei Hauptgruppen unterschieden. Zweitens wurde der Begriff der Public Diplomacy mit Hinweis auf die Evolution der „klassischen“ Diplomatie und ihrer Funktion erklärt. Der

letzte Teil dieses Paper betrachtet die Relevanz von *Public Diplomacy* für die Förderung von *human security*. Zu diesem Zweck wurden in Fallstudien die Politik von Japan und Kanada, der zwei wichtigsten Befürworter, geprüft. Die zentrale Forschungsfrage ist, ob *Public Diplomacy* und ihre modernen Werkzeuge, wie die Digitaltechniken, zur Verbreitung von *human security* international genutzt werden. Das Hauptargument lautet, dass *human security* als offizielle Politik der Staaten, die diese Politik fördern, durch *Public Diplomacy* international verbreitet wird. Zur Überprüfung dieser Behauptung wurden die Haltungen von Japan und Kanada in diesem Bereich untersucht.

Schlüsselwörter: die öffentliche Diplomatie, *human security*, Japan, Kanada, Außenpolitik

Human security и общественная дипломатия

Резюме

Human security (безопасность человека, безопасность личности) и общественная дипломатия подвергаются критике из-за отсутствия точности определения. Обе эти категории относятся к области внешней политики. В статье рассмотрена взаимосвязь между общественной дипломатией и *human security* в области внешней политики. Во-первых, были рассмотрены существующие определения *human security* и выделены три их основные группы. Во-вторых, объяснено понятие общественной дипломатии и прослежена эволюция «классической» дипломатии и ее функций. Наконец, было исследовано влияние общественной дипломатии на распространение *human security* на международной арене. С этой целью были проанализированы выбранные действия Японии и Канады – двух ключевых сторонников *human security*. Главный вопрос заключается в том, как используется общественная дипломатия и ее современные инструменты (напр. цифровые технологии) для распространения *human security* на международном форуме. Было выдвинуто предположение, что *human security*, как официальная политика государств, которые ее продвигают, распространяется с использованием средств общественной дипломатии. Чтобы проверить это предположение, были изучены позиции Японии и Канады в исследуемой области.

Ключевые слова: общественная дипломатия, *human security*, Япония, Канада, внешняя политика



Jan Kowalczyk

Freelance academic writer
ORCID: 0000-0001-7261-7331

Broad Approach to Human Security in the Visegrad Group Countries

Introduction

The Peace of Westphalia, signed in 1648 to mark the demise of the Thirty Years' War, had a long-lasting impact on perception of international relations and the notion of security. According to Stanisław Sulowski, the original understanding of security was focused on the safety of the state, its institutions, its order, and its individual properties.¹ Such a narrow perspective on security, limiting this notion solely to states,² was characteristic of a trend called realism, which had dominated international relations studies in the post-war period. The representatives of the realist school of thought saw military power as the main guarantee of state security.³ The new socio-political order, which has been taking shape since the beginning of the 1990s, became a catalyst for a change in the approach to matters of security and forced a review of state policies in this area. In particular, these changes concerned the states that had been dominated by the so-called real socialist ideology where ongoing transformation included many aspects of political, economic and social life.

This paper looks at the way the concept of human security has been perceived and enforced in the countries of the Visegrad Group. The working hypothesis is as follows: in the course of political transformation and democratisation, facilitated

¹ S. Sulowski, 'W poszukiwaniu definicji bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego', *Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego*, no.1, 2009, p. 10.

² H.J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson, New York 1993.

³ P.D. Williams (red.), *Studia bezpieczeństwa*, Kraków 2012, p. 79.

due to the decomposition of the Eastern bloc, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary started a process of implementing guidelines of broadly understood human security in their internal security policies. This hypothesis will be tested through an analysis of strategic documents and legal acts adopted by Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary. There are a number of research questions that will be answered. What is the current perception of human security in the world? What is the perception of human security in Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary? What are the similarities and differences in the scope of realisation of the human security concept in the aforementioned countries?

Narrow and broad scope of human security

As the spectre of a looming world war had faded, thanks to the end of the bipolar division of the world, the perception of security began to change. It started to be seen in a dynamic and positive way, as expressed by Ryszard Zięba in his definition, which postulates that in its most general meaning, security can be described as a certainty of existence and survival, a state of possession, functioning and development of a subject. Zięba puts emphasis on the fact that this certainty results not only from a lack of threats (through their nonexistence, or elimination), but also from the creative activity of a subject, and that it varies over time, and thus has a nature of a social process.⁴ New concepts of international relations started to appear due to the need for a new post-Cold War paradigm of security, which would be inclusive of dimensions that had not until then been within the scope of interest, such as human rights, living conditions or ecology. The new currents in security research, brought in by a gradual departure from the state-centred approach, are often called 'alternative' in literature, as they form an alternative to the realist approach characteristic of the post-war years. The table below provides characteristics of these new concepts.

The alternative concepts postulate the treatment of an individual human being as one of the subjects of security. According to Ken Booth, such perception of security stems from the emancipation of human beings:

[t]rue (stable) security can only be achieved by people and groups if they do not deprive others of it. [...] Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. [...] Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security.⁵

The concept of human security has its roots in the United Nations (UN), which treats it as an analytical tool used to identify the international environment and its needs, as well as to develop various methods of their realisation.⁶ Recognising

⁴ R. Zięba, 'Pojęcie i istota bezpieczeństwa państwa w stosunkach międzynarodowych', *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, no. 10, 1989, p. 49.

⁵ K. Booth, 'Security and emancipation', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 17, no. 4, 1991, p. 319.

⁶ E. Halizak, 'Przewartościowania koncepcji rozwoju ONZ', [in:] J. Symonides (red.), *Organizacja Narodów Zjednoczonych: bilans i perspektywy*, Warszawa 2006, p. 272.

human security as a separate area of interest within security studies stems from the conviction that state security is not the same as security of its people.⁷ The security of an individual human being is an ambiguous notion, and different states treat its various dimensions with different levels of importance. In general, two main approaches can be distinguished here: the so-called “Canadian school” – which is based on the narrow scope – and the so-called “Japanese school” – which is rooted in the broad scope.⁸

Table 1. Alternative concepts of security

Security type	Environmental security	‘Embedded’ security	Human security
Security focus	The ecosystem	Nations Social groups Class/economic Political action committees/ interest groups	Individuals Mankind Human rights Rule of law Development
Security concerns	Global sustainability	Identity/inclusion Morality/values/conduct Quality of life Wealth distribution Political cohesion	Survival Human progress Identity and governance
Security hazards	Mankind: through resource depletion, scarcity, war, and ecological destruction	States Nation Migrants Alien culture	The state itself Globalization Natural catastrophes and changes

Source: own work based on P.H. Liotta, ‘Creeping Vulnerabilities and the Reordering of Security’, *Security Dialogue*, vol. 36, no. 1, 2005, p. 58.

The narrow scope of human security, featured in the slogan “freedom from fear”, was mainly promoted by the authorities of Canada and Norway. One of the proponents of the narrow scope of human security was Lloyd Axworthy, a Member of Canadian Parliament and minister, who in 1997 stated that “human security is much more than the absence of military threat. [...] At a minimum, human security requires that basic needs are met, but it also acknowledges that sustained economic development, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development and social equity are as important to global peace as arms control and disarmament.”⁹ In the following years, Axworthy, serving as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, concluded that human security implied

⁷ G. Michałowska, ‘Bezpieczeństwo ludzkie’, [in:] J. Symonides (red.), *Świat wobec współczesnych wyzwań i zagrożeń*, Warszawa 2010, p. 227.

⁸ K.P. Marczuk, ‘Pojęcie i zakres human security’, [in:] S. Sulowski, M. Brzeziński (red.), *Trzy wymiary współczesnego bezpieczeństwa*, Warszawa 2014, p. 40.

⁹ L. Axworthy, ‘Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership’, *International Journal*, vol. 52, no. 2, 1997, p. 184.

securing people from threats connected to violence, as well as non-violent ones. He thought that it was a condition or a state characterised by a freedom from omnipresent threats to human rights, their safety and their life.¹⁰

The Japanese school of human security is strictly related to the position of Japanese authorities, expressed through the slogan “freedom from want.” This approach to human security stems from the experience of the economic crisis that hit East and South-East Asia in the late 1990s, as well as from further security threats, such as the epidemics of SARS, bird flu, or other calamities, such as tsunamis, and earthquakes.¹¹ The term “human security” was for the first time used in 1998 by the Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, who stated that security of an individual human being was a concept that embraced a comprehensive point of view on all threats to human survival, life and dignity, and also underlined the need to react to such threats.¹² Putting emphasis on the matter of human dignity means that the traditional catalogue of threats to human security should be expanded by adding those connected to the socio-economic dimension (poverty, social exclusion, inability to fulfil the basic needs, such as e.g. shelter).¹³ This is the essence of the broad scope of human security and its realisation level can be tracked through a variety of indicators pertaining to poverty levels, socio-economic development (e.g. HDI), and sustainable development.

Table 2. Narrow and broad scope of human security

	Narrow scope of human security (Canadian school)	Broad scope of human security (Japanese school)
Main idea	Freedom from fear	Freedom from want
Main values	Democratic governance; respect for human rights; freedom from violence	Fulfilment of basic human needs; dignified life; development opportunities for individuals
Main assumptions	Non-democratic state regimes; lack of respect for human rights and basic freedoms; political violence	Poverty and social exclusion; socio-economic problems (e.g. unemployment); environmental degradation
Examples of indicators used to determine level of human security realisation	Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI) in the part pertaining to quality of democracy and ‘good governance’	Human Development Index (HDI); Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI) in the part pertaining to economic, social and environmental policies

Source: own work based on: K.P. Marczuk, *Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej: od bezpieczeństwa państwa do bezpieczeństwa ludzi*, Warszawa 2012, pp. 27–95.

¹⁰ L. Axworthy, *Navigating a New World: Canada's Global Future*, Toronto 2003, pp. 10–29.

¹¹ A. Fukushima, W.T. Tow, ‘Human Security and Global Governance’, [in:] W.T. Tow (ed.), *Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific: A Regional-Global Nexus?*, Cambridge, New York, 2009, p. 171.

¹² K.P. Marczuk, ‘Pojęcie i zakres... *op. cit.*’, p. 44.

¹³ P.J. Katzenstein, N. Okawara, ‘Japan's Security Policy: Political, Economic and Military Dimensions’, in P.J. Katzenstein (ed.), *Rethinking Japanese Security: Internal and External Dimensions*, New York, 2008, pp. 59–75.

In sum, human security, in its narrow scope, represented by the Canadian school, means providing people with basic safety conditions related to democratic ways of governance, respecting the rule of law by the public institutions, the assurance of human and citizen rights, and several other features. The Japanese school of broad approach to human security, on the other hand, requires not only the creation of a state that does not constitute a threat to its individuals, but also a provision of opportunities to fulfil those individuals' socio-economic needs. The table no. 2 provides a comparison of both approaches.

The Visegrad Group: genesis, goals, and cooperation in the area of security

Admittedly, the demise of the Eastern bloc was a key moment that resulted in a wave of significant changes in the international order, especially for countries that had formerly orbited within the Soviet sphere of influence. According to Laszlo Nagy, from a geopolitical point of view, these countries became a "grey area" between the stable West and the unstable East,¹⁴ and, even though their history was varied, at the beginning of the 1990s, their situation was very similar.¹⁵ This similarity was especially discernible in the cases of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, which historically shared common civilisational, religious and cultural roots.¹⁶ Grażyna Michałowska admits that the renouncement of the concept of two fighting systems led to the elimination of barriers in communication and consequently resulted in cultural changes in the post-communist countries.¹⁷ Severing ties with the USSR necessitated an intensive search for a new identity and forms of cooperation with the Western world. Such an atmosphere encouraged the countries to try coordinating mutual cooperation in the areas of economy and foreign policy. This form of cooperation provided a feeling of security and common interests in a period of volatile international relations.¹⁸

As a result of tightening cooperation between the aforementioned countries, Poland's President Lech Wałęsa, President of Czechoslovakia Václav Havel, and Hungary's Prime Minister József Antall on 15 February 1991 signed the Declaration on Cooperation Between the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Hungary in Striving for European Integration.

¹⁴ G. Calopareanu, 'The Visegrad Group Security Policy During the Euro-Atlantic Structures Pre-Accession Period', *Buletin Stiintific*, vol. 2, no. 32, 2011, p. 93.

¹⁵ L. Nagy, *Security Concepts of the Visegrad Countries*, 2010, https://www.atlcom.nl/ap_archive/pdf/AP%201998%20nr.%208/Nagy.pdf [accessed: 31.10.2018].

¹⁶ P. Andrzejewski, M. Szczepaniak, 'Państwa Grupy Wyszehradzkiej – obraz gospodarczy', *Przegląd Zachodni*, no. 4, 1995, p. 57.

¹⁷ G. Michałowska, 'Bezpieczeństwo kulturowe w warunkach globalizacji', [in:] D.B. Bobrow, E. Hałizak, R. Zięba (red.) *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe i międzynarodowe u schyłku XX wieku*, Warszawa 1997, p. 136

¹⁸ E. Kuźlewska, A. Bartnicki, 'Grupa Wyszehradzka – nowe wyzwania bezpieczeństwa i perspektywy współpracy', *Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej*, no. 11, 2017, pp. 103–104.

Following T. Klepner, "since that moment, it was possible to talk about the existence of a so-called Visegrad Triangle. The declaration itself formulated the main goals that the signatory countries had set themselves."¹⁹ The Visegrad Group – after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the initiative had four members; thus, it was no longer called a Triangle – was a forum of international cooperation with a broad scope that encompassed many areas: foreign policy, security and defence policy, economy, transport and infrastructure, agriculture, regional development, internal affairs, environmental protection, education, culture, tourism, sports, and a few others.²⁰ The main determinants of creation of the Visegrad Group (V4) included:

- an attempt at filling political, economic and military void, created through dissolution of the Eastern bloc;²¹
- building a sense of community and good neighbourly relations in a new geopolitical reality;²²
- mutual support in the efforts geared towards the integration with NATO and the European Union;
- willingness to sever ties with undemocratic past and to express political emancipation of the signatory states;²³
- strengthening Central European identity within the European Union and promoting regional cooperation between countries of Central Europe.²⁴

The goals of the Visegrad Group were also laid out in the 1991 Declaration, and they include:

- full reinstatement of state independence, democracy and freedom;
- getting rid of all existing social, economic and spiritual aspects of totalitarian regime;
- building parliamentary democracy, modern legal state, respecting human rights and basic freedoms;
- creating modern free market economy;
- full inclusion into European political, economic, legal and security systems.²⁵

Security policy constituted one of the areas of cooperation. During the first stage of V4 existence, security cooperation was mostly centred upon military aspects; however, it needs to be made clear that at that time cooperation in this area was based on bilateral agreements, not on a single document signed by all

¹⁹ T. Klepner, 'Współpraca transgraniczna państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej na rzecz zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa granic', *Poliarchia*, vol. 2, 2014, p. 104.

²⁰ T. Kubin, 'Grupa Wyszehradzka – perspektywa dalszej współpracy', *Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne*, vol. 42, 2014, pp. 25–26.

²¹ A. Czyż, 'Grupa Wyszehradzka – 20 lat współpracy', *Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne*, vol. 42, 2014, p. 11–12.

²² E. Kuźlewska, A. Bartnicki, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

²³ J. Mizgała, *Perspektywy Grupy Wyszehradzkiej*, Warszawa, Departament Strategii i Planowania Polityki Zagranicznej. Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, 2003, p. 3.

²⁴ A. Wach, 'Znaczenie oraz rola Grupy Wyszehradzkiej w latach 1991–2007', *Słupskie Studia Historyczne*, no. 16, 2010, p. 224.

²⁵ *Deklaracja z dnia 15 lutego 1991 r. o współpracy Czeskiej i Słowackiej Republiki Federacyjnej, Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Republiki Węgierskiej w dążeniu do integracji europejskiej*, <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/visegrad-declarations> [accessed: 30.10.2018].

parties.²⁶ One of the main successes of V4 concerned the collaboration of the defence ministers of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in withdrawing Soviet soldiers from their respective territories.²⁷

The dynamics of changes that were taking place in security, influenced by the occurrence of new types of threats (e.g. terrorism, economic, social and environmental threats), resulted in the need to undertake reforms of the security systems operating in the Central European states. The need for further reforms ensued too quickly, becoming a burden for states that at the same time had to undertake fundamental socio-economic structural changes. For them, the series of reforms was not just an exercise in changing the focus of defence politics, but it also meant a necessity to launch multiple changes within the reform itself. In addition, the assets of these small and medium countries were severely limited.²⁸ The accession of the V4 countries to NATO in 1999 (Poland, Czechia, and Hungary) and in 2004 (Slovakia) allowed to base further military cooperation on the structures of the Alliance. The Visegrad Group evolved into a forum of cooperation and experience exchange in the area of internal security. One of the potential directions of further activity within V4 could also be the strengthening of energy security of the member states.²⁹

Poland and the broad scope of human security

Poland occupies an area of 312,700 km² and has a population of approximately 38.4 million people, which makes it the biggest member state of the Visegrad Group. Poland is bigger than the other three countries put together, both by area and population. The GDP per capita in Poland is equal to 29,600 USD at purchasing power parity, and the rate of registered unemployment stands at 4.9%.³⁰ The principal act that formulates the state's legal and political framework is the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997.³¹ This act of basic law guarantees that the Polish state ensures freedoms and rights of persons and citizens, the security of its citizens, safeguards national heritage and ensures the protection of natural environment pursuant to the principles of sustainable development (Section 5). The political, social and economic rights of individuals have been listed in Chapter 2. They

²⁶ A. Cottey, *East-Central Europe after the Cold War. Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary in Search of Security*, London 1995, p. 133.

²⁷ R. Morawiec, 'Military Cooperation in Visegrad Group', [in:] M. Madej (ed.), *Cooperation on Security in Central Europe: Sharing V4 Experience with the Neighbouring Regions*, Warszawa, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2010, p. 12.

²⁸ P. Dunay, 'Security Sector Expert Formation: Achievements and Needs in the Visegrad Countries', [in:] P. Fluri (ed.), *Security Sector Reform in South East Europe*, Geneva, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2003, pp. 283–284.

²⁹ T. Kubin, *op.cit.*, p. 24–31; K. Sobczyk, 'Współpraca państw Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa energetycznego', *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, vol. 4, no. 20, 2011, p. 175.

³⁰ *CIA World Factbook: Poland*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pl.html> [accessed: 30.11.2019].

³¹ Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r., Dz.U. 1997, no. 78, item 483.

include the duty to respect rights and freedoms of others (art. 31), and equality before the law (Section 32). The social and economic rights include the freedom to choose and to pursue any occupation, and to choose a place of work (Section 65), the right to social security whenever incapacitated for work by reason of sickness or invalidism, as well as upon reaching the retirement age (Section 67), the right to health protection (Section 68), and the right to education (Section 70). Particular protection from the state has been granted to the family (Section 71), and children (Section 72). Under the Constitution, the Polish state should also provide conditions for equal access to the products of national culture (Section 6).³²

The key strategic document pertaining to matters of security in Poland is the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, approved upon request of the Prime Minister by the then President Bronisław Komorowski on 5 November 2014. This document specifies national security interests, which include:

- possession of effective national security capacities ensuring readiness and ability to prevent threats, including deterrence, defence and protection against them, as well as elimination of their consequences;
- strong international position of Poland and membership in reliable international security systems;
- individual and collective protection of citizens against threats to their life and health, as well as against the violation, loss or degradation of goods (tangible and intangible) which are important for them;
- ensuring that citizens freely enjoy freedoms and rights, without detriment to the safety of others and of the security of the state, as well as assuring national identity and cultural heritage;
- ensuring a sustainable and balanced development of the social and economic potential of the state, with particular attention paid to environmental protection, as well as living conditions and health of people as the basis of existence.³³

The first two interests pertain to international relations and are typical of the classical approach to security, according to the realist paradigm. The other three goals, on the other hand, have a direct connection to the basic rules of human security and concern the provision of decent living conditions for individuals, respect for human rights and basic freedoms, as well as the provision of sustainable socio-economic development respectful of natural environment.

The definition of sustainable development was introduced in an earlier Act, i.e. The Environmental Protection Act of 27 April 2001. According to its definition, sustainable development means “a socio-economic development which integrates political, economic and social actions, while preserving the natural equilibrium and the sustainability of basic natural processes, with the aim of guaranteeing the ability of individual communities or citizens, of both the present and future

³² J. Dziobek-Romański, ‘Prawa człowieka w Konstytucji RP z 2 kwietnia 1997 roku na tle Konstytucji PRL z 22 lipca 1952 r.’, *Rocznik Nauk Prawnych*, vol. 9, no. 1, 1999, pp. 143–154; M. Chmaj (red.), *Wolności i prawa człowieka w Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, Warszawa 2008, pp. 151–198.

³³ *Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, pp. 10–11, <https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/SBN%20RP.pdf> [accessed: 3.11.2018].

generations, to satisfy their basic needs.”³⁴ The notion of sustainable development can also be found in the Long-Term National Development Strategy – Poland 2030. Third Wave of Modernity. According to this document, the improvement in quality of life of Polish citizens is treated by the state as a strategic goal. The quality of life is defined broadly, as well-being in various areas of life, influencing, among others, overall longevity, longevity in good health, efficient social security network and participation in culture.³⁵ Such goals meet the definition of the broad scope of human security.

Czechia and the broad scope of human security

Czechia is a country occupying a territory of 78,900 km² and inhabited by 10.7 million people. In 2017, its Gross Domestic Product per capita at purchasing power parity reached 35,500 USD. The rate of registered unemployment oscillates around 2.9%.³⁶ As is the case with other Visegrad Group countries, the changes of 1989, frequently dubbed “the autumn of nations,”³⁷ led to a fundamental political, social and economic redesign of the country. The so-called “velvet revolution” culminated on 1 January 1993 in the dissolution of the Czechoslovakian state and the formation of two independent state entities: the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic.³⁸ The foundations of the new democratic system were set down in the Constitution of the Czech Republic of 16 December 1992. Democratisation opened the way for cooperation, both with the Western world and with other post-Soviet states. Interestingly, Czechia has not always been too enthusiastic about its cooperation within the Visegrad Group. Czech Prime Minister Václav Klaus was one of the strong opponents of V4, considering it to be an artificial attempt at regional integration, supported by the West. He was of the opinion that Czechia was on a higher level of socio-economic development than its neighbours and, because of that, its integration with European structures would be quicker. Such position of the Czech authorities inhibited the processes of integration within the Visegrad Group.³⁹

The founders of the aforementioned Czech Constitution were focused on providing a catalogue of citizens’ rights pertaining to the narrow scope of human security. The document states that “state power shall serve all citizens and may be exercised only in cases, within the limits and manner provided by law” (Section 2) and that “every citizen can do what is not prohibited by law, and nobody may

³⁴ Art. 3, pt. 20, Ustawa z dnia 27 kwietnia 2001 r. Prawo ochrony środowiska, Dz.U., 2001, no. 62, item 627 as amended.

³⁵ *Long-Term National Development Strategy – Poland 2030. Third Wave of Modernity*, Warszawa, Ministerstwo Administracji i Cyfryzacji, 2013, pp. 42–43.

³⁶ *CIA World Factbook: Czechia*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ez.html> [accessed: 30.11.2019].

³⁷ A. Centkowska, *Jesień Ludów 89’: kalendarium wydarzeń*, Warszawa 1992.

³⁸ M. Czyżniewski, *Powstanie i tradycje państwowe Republiki Czeskiej*, <https://repozytorium.umk.pl/handle/item/279> [accessed : 31.10.2018].

³⁹ A. Cottey, *op. cit.*, pp. 130–131.

be compelled to do what the law does not" (Section 2).⁴⁰ As far as social rights are concerned, an integral part of the Constitution is the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, which determines, among others, political, economic, social and cultural rights, as well as the right to court protection and other forms of legal protection.⁴¹ The citizens are guaranteed access to medical care institutions (Section 31), adequate material security in old age and during periods of work inability (Section 30), special protection is also granted to parenthood, family and children (Section 32).

A key document of Czech security policy is the Constitutional Act on the Security of the Czech Republic of 22 April 1998, amended in 2000. The importance of security issues for the Czech authorities is highlighted by the highest possible rank of this legal act, i.e. a constitutional act. Even though no definition of national security can be found in the document, it was underlined that "it is the State's basic duty to ensure Czechia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, the protection of its democratic foundations, and the protection of lives, health and property,"⁴² thus designating the goals of national security, which were later invoked in other documents regarding the Czech policies of defence.

Another document significant from the point of view of security matters is the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic of 2015. It states that the main aim of state security politics is to "safeguard the security of the individual and to protect his/her life, health, liberty, human dignity and property."⁴³ The document also asserts that, even though the state is responsible for the security of its citizens, an acceptable level of security can only be attained through cooperation with local administration authorities, non-governmental organisations, and local communities. Among the main security threats, the strategy includes weakening of international cooperation in the area of security, destabilisation and conflicts in the Euro-Atlantic region, terrorism⁴⁴, cyberattacks, negative effects of mass migrations⁴⁵, extremism and social tensions, organised crime, ensuring continuity of energy supply, and natural disasters.⁴⁶

In the context of the broad scope of human security, one should also mention the legislation connected to the implementation of a sustainable development

⁴⁰ Art. 3 and 4, *Ustawa konstytucyjna czeskiej rady narodowej z dnia 16 grudnia 1992 r. Konstytucja Republiki Czeskiej*, <http://libr.sejm.gov.pl/tek01/txt/konst/czechy-a.html> [accessed : 31.10.2018].

⁴¹ *Resolution of the Presidium of the Czech National Council of 16 December 1992 on the Declaration of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms as a Part of the Constitutional Order of the Czech Republic*, https://www.usoud.cz/fileadmin/user_upload/ustavni_soud_www/Pravni_uprava/AJ/Listina_English_version.pdf [accessed : 31.11.2019].

⁴² *Constitutional Act of 22 April 1998 on the Security of the Czech Republic*, https://www.usoud.cz/fileadmin/user_upload/ustavni_soud_www/Pravni_uprava/AJ/Zakon_o_bezpecnosti_English_version_110_1998.pdf [accessed: 31.10.2018].

⁴³ *Security Strategy of the Czech Republic*, p. 6, http://www.army.cz/images/id_8001_9000/8503/Security_Strategy_2015.pdf [accessed : 31.10.2018].

⁴⁴ J. Jelínek, 'International Terrorism: Current Challenges and Legal Means of protection in the Czech Republic', *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies*, no. 2, 2018, pp. 28–45.

⁴⁵ K. Tamchynová, 'Securitizing Migration, Europeanizing Czechs?', *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies*, no. 4, 2017, pp. 107–132.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 13–14.

strategy. The Czech authorities have already prepared a strategic sustainable development document by the name of The Czech Republic Strategy for Sustainable Development, adopted in 2004, the year of the country's accession to the European Union. This document includes the three main pillars of sustainable development – economic, social, and environmental – as well as research and education in this area, cooperation within the EU and internationally, and the concept of good governance. It also takes advantage of the definition of sustainable development, found in the Our Common Future report and encompasses world (main assumptions of Agenda 21, arrangements of the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit), as well as European (EU Strategy for Sustainable Development, EU Lisbon Strategy) output in this field.⁴⁷

Slovakia and the broad scope of human security

Slovakia occupies a territory of approximately 49,000 km² and is inhabited by close to 5.5 million people. Slovaks, who constitute 80.7% of the country's citizens, are Slovakia's biggest national group, while Hungarians at 8.5% are the biggest minority. The country's GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity) was equal to 33,100 USD in 2017, while the registered unemployment rate stood at 8.1%.⁴⁸

In the post-WW2 period, Slovakia did not gain independence as a state; instead, it became a part of Czechoslovakia, with the Soviet Union's influence effectively suppressing any nationalistic sentiments. The events of the "autumn of nations", coupled with a systemic transformation of the Czechoslovakian state, led to a significant revision of the Czech-Slovak relations. Political, economic and societal changes triggered a progressive disintegration of the common state, highlighted by the creation of Public Against Violence (*Verejnosc' proti nasiliu*, VPN), a Slovak counterpart to the Czech Civic Forum (*Občanské fórum*, OF) – a party that gathered together main politicians of the anti-communist opposition.⁴⁹ Differences of vision regarding the country's future culminated in its dissolution. The modern Slovak state appeared on the European map on 1 January 1993 in the aftermath of a peaceful split with the Czech Republic.

The new state based its political order on the Constitution of the Slovak Republic (*Ústava Slovenskej republiky*) of 1 September 1992. Similarly to the Czech constitution, it proclaims that "state bodies may act solely on the basis of the Constitution, within its scope and their actions shall be governed by procedures laid down by a law" and also that "everyone may do what is not forbidden by a law

⁴⁷ *The Czech Republic Strategy for Sustainable Development*, [http://www.mzp.cz/C125750E003B698B/en/czech_republic_strategy_sd/\\$FILE/KM-CR_SDS_eng-20041208.pdf](http://www.mzp.cz/C125750E003B698B/en/czech_republic_strategy_sd/$FILE/KM-CR_SDS_eng-20041208.pdf) [accessed: 31.10.2018]; K.P. Marczuk, *op. cit.*, p.386.

⁴⁸ *CIA World Factbook: Slovakia*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/lo.html> [accessed: 30.11.2019].

⁴⁹ K. Žarna, 'Przed rozwozem. Sytuacja polityczna na Słowacji w ramach Czeskiej i Słowackiej Republiki Federacyjnej (1990–1992)', *Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne*, no. 2, 2018, pp. 35–48.

and no one may be forced to do what the law does not enjoin.”⁵⁰ Additionally, the constitution contains basic social rights, including the right to free healthcare (Section 40), adequate material security in old age and cases of incapability to work (Section 39), more extensive health protection for women, minors and disabled persons (Section 38). Special protection is guaranteed for the institutions of marriage, parenthood, and family (Section 41). Further guarantees include the right to choose one’s profession and appropriate training (Section 35), as well as the right to fair and satisfactory working conditions (Section 36). The constitution also provides protection of the environment and cultural heritage, stating that everyone has the right to live in a favourable environment (Section 44), and the right to full and timely information about the state of the environment and its consequences (Section 45).⁵¹

The main Slovak internal security document is the Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic 2005. Even though it had been passed quite a long time ago, it has not been updated since.⁵² This strategy defines the main aims of the activities undertaken by the state in the area of security:

The Slovak Republic adheres to the values of freedom, peace, democracy, rule of law, justice, pluralism, solidarity, and human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Slovak Republic guarantees security to its citizens irrespective of their origin, social status and place of their stay in conformity with international legal human rights standards, and in accordance with the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. The security guarantee for the citizens is a basic prerequisite for the exercise of their human and civil rights and for a harmonious development of the society as a whole.⁵³

According to the founding fathers of this document, the main security threats include terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, organised crime, illegal and uncontrolled migration, activities of foreign intelligence services, globalisation, increasing influence of non-state entities, deepening economic imbalances and disruption of the natural environment.⁵⁴

The pursuit of the implementation of the broad scope of human security by the Slovak authorities has been reflected in yet another document – the 2001 National Strategy for Sustainable Development for the Slovak Republic, created as a part of preparations for the 2002 Johannesburg Summit.⁵⁵ In this document, there are ref-

⁵⁰ *Konstytucja Republiki Słowackiej z 1 września 1992 roku*, trans. K. Skotnicki, Warszawa 2003, p. 695.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² In 2005 another document – *The Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic* was prepared, with final amended version coming in 2017. A new defence strategy is also being prepared – the project is currently undergoing consultations, see: *New strategy responds to current threats*, <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20665019/new-strategy-responds-to-current-threats.html> [accessed: 31.10.2018].

⁵³ *Security Strategy of Slovak Republic*, <https://www.mosr.sk/data/files/795.pdf> [accessed: 31.10.2018].

⁵⁴ See also: V. Frianová, ‘Safety and security threats: Perception of inhabitants of the Slovak Republic’, *Forum Scientiae Oeconomia*, vol. 4, no. 1, 2016, pp. 53–62.

⁵⁵ The World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002, organised by the United Nations, took place in Johannesburg from August 26 to September 4, 2002.

erences to the economic, social and environmental aspects of sustainable development, defined, according to the Czechoslovakian Act on the Natural Environment of 1992, as a targeted, long-term and comprehensive process that affects all conditions and aspects of life at global, regional and local levels, which meets biological, material, spiritual and social needs and interests of people in a way, that does not destroy conditions and forms of life.⁵⁶ The principles of Slovak sustainable development have been defined as, among others, ensuring protection of human health, and optimal development of human resources, which undoubtedly realises the main premises of the broad scope of human security.

Hungary and the broad scope of human security

The Hungarian state has a surface area of over 93,000 km² and 9.8 million inhabitants. Its Gross Domestic Product per capita at purchasing power parity is equal to 29,600 USD, while registered unemployment stands at 4.2%.⁵⁷ Up until 2011, the main act of fundamental law in Hungary was the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary (*A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya*) adopted on 18 August 1949.⁵⁸ The 2010 parliamentary election victory of Fidesz, in alliance with the Christian-Democratic People's Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt, KDNP) and the following election of Viktor Orbán to the position of Prime Minister,⁵⁹ paved the way for the commencement of intensive efforts on adopting a new constitution. The new act, by the name of The Fundamental Law of Hungary (*Magyarország Alaptörvénye*), was passed by the National Assembly on 18 April 2011 without any public consultations. According to its provisions, the country's name was changed to Hungary, the Forint became the official currency, and the Supreme Court was abolished.⁶⁰ The content of the new Hungarian constitution and the manner in which it had been adopted were met with due concern from the international circles. In particular, Amnesty International pronounced that Hungary took "a leap backwards when it comes to guaranteeing human rights and basic freedoms."⁶¹

The Fundamental Law guarantees that the inviolable and inalienable fundamental individual and collective rights should be respected, and that the protection of those rights is the primary obligation of the state (Section I). It also asserts

⁵⁶ *The National Strategy for Sustainable Development for the Slovak Republic*, http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/Slovakia_NSSD_Final.pdf [accessed: 31.10.2018].

⁵⁷ *CIA World Factbook: Hungary*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/hu.html> [accessed: 30.11.2019].

⁵⁸ *Hungary Constitution of 1949*, <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-5878.html> [accessed: 2.11.2018].

⁵⁹ *Hungary Országgyűlés: Elections in 2010*, http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2141_10.htm [accessed: 2.11.2018].

⁶⁰ *Ustawa Zasadnicza Węgier z dnia 25 kwietnia 2011 r. uchwalona przez Zgromadzenie Krajowe w dniu 18 IV 2011 r. i podpisana przez Prezydenta Republiki w dniu 25 IV 2011 r.*, Warszawa 2012.

⁶¹ D. Atol, *Hungary's Constitutional Undermining of Internationally Protected Human Rights*, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2013/03/hungary-s-constitutional-undermining-of-internationally-protected-human-rights> [accessed: 2.11.2018].

that the state should strive to provide all its citizens with social security and a state pension system based on social solidarity (Section XIX). The guarantees of human rights that fall within the scope of the broad approach to human security include the right to physical and mental health (Section XX), decent housing conditions (Section XXII), education (Section XI), freedom to choose one's occupation, and the right to work (Section XII). Particular protection has been granted to children (Section XVI). Hungary also guarantees the fundamental rights to everyone without discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, sex, disability, language, religion, political views or other views, national or social origin, property, birth, or any other status (Section XV).

As for internal security, one of the main Hungarian documents is Hungary's National Security Strategy of 2012.⁶² It states that guaranteeing citizens' security and securing a safe environment for their freedom and welfare are among the fundamental obligations of the Hungarian government. According to its creators, in the modern world, security threats exist on several levels: from individual security, through the security of communities, states and regions, up to the global level. The impact of these threats can be felt not only on the national level, but also among social organisations, and local communities. Among the main threats, the document mentions international terrorism, organised crime, drug trade, and migration,⁶³ while the main challenges are financial security, and energy security.⁶⁴ In addition, it is stated that "the absence of political, economic and social development in its totality increases the likelihood of the emergence of the aforementioned threats."⁶⁵ The document concludes that only a stable and sustainable development can positively influence the level of security.

The strive for sustainable development found its expression in the National Framework Strategy on Sustainable Development of Hungary, adopted by the Parliament on 28 March 2013. The goal of this strategy is to promote a common understanding of sustainability, not only within the government, but also among all individuals, families, enterprises, and organisations. The document defines its objective as "enhancing a happy and senseful human life and expanding public well-being while containing human actions within the limits of Earth's carrying capacity, maintaining and developing the quality and quantity of expandable human, social and economic resources."⁶⁶ The goals of the strategy have been divided into four main groups: human resources, social resources, natural resources, and economic resources, and have been outlined in the table below.

⁶² J. Ušiak, *Security and Strategic Culture of the Visegrad Group Countries*, Banská Bystrica 2013, pp. 161–165.

⁶³ S. Sarkar, 'Engendering Trafficking and Human Security: A Comparative Study of India and Hungary', *International Journal of Development Research and Quantitative Techniques*, no. 2, 2011, pp. 25–42.

⁶⁴ *Hungary's National Security Strategy*, <http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/download/4/32/b0000/National%20Security%20Strategy.pdf> [accessed: 2.11.2019].

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁶⁶ *National Framework Strategy on Sustainable Development of Hungary*, <http://www.parlament.hu/documents/127649/1361679/NFFT-ENG-web.pdf/f692c792-424d-4f5a-9f9d-9e6200303148> [accessed: 2.11.2018].

Table 3. Goals of sustainable development in Hungary

Resource group	The main goal	Specific goals
Human resources	A society with stable population, of healthy individuals, possessing knowledge and skills required to tackle the challenges of current Times	– reversing negative demographic trends by increasing the number of births and decreasing the mortality rate; – catching up with Central European average standards in regards to healthcare and reducing the number of lifestyle-based diseases; – creating an educational system which enhances values, moral standards as well as knowledge and skills required on the labour market; – improving social cohesion;
Social resources	Creating a sustainable society through enhancement of positive values, norms and attitudes;	– strengthening the level of trust in society through fighting corruption and creating reliable public services; – reducing workplace stress and social exclusion in the labour market through development of organisational culture and targeted programmes; – enhancing family values; – maintaining heritage of the past and developing cultural services;
Natural resources	Environmental capacity must be considered an economic barrier;	– conservation of biodiversity and utilisation of renewable energy resources; – controlling and regulating emissions and other factors harmful to human health and living conditions; – rational management of non-renewable natural resources;
Economic resources	Maintaining sovereignty in economic decisions, while strengthening entrepreneurship and increasing the level of capital investment	– improvement of the business environment, increase in the efficiency of innovation expenses and use of resources, promotion of technologies that reduce environmental load; – reduction of public debt to a reasonable level and prudent budget management – restoring generational balance and reallocating financial resources between generations;

Source: *National Framework Strategy on Sustainable Development of Hungary*, <http://www.parlament.hu/documents/127649/1361679/NFFT-ENG-web.pdf/f692c792-424d-4f5a-9f9d-9e6200303148> [accessed: 2.11.2018].

Conclusions

Attempting to verify the hypothesis formulated in the introduction to this paper, it must be stated that after the fall of the Eastern bloc, all the four member states of the Visegrad Group started to implement several aspects of the broad scope of human security by taking various actions steeped in their policies. These include:

- taking into account not only the basic human rights pertaining to politics, but also providing social and societal rights, e.g. concerning support in case of social risks, the right to healthcare, education and freedom of employment;
- recognising human security as one of the duties of the state;
- acknowledging in the national security strategies the threats that are of major relevance from the point of view of individuals, such as uncontrolled mass migrations, crime, or organised crime;
- undertaking initiatives aimed at the implementation of sustainable development principles through adoption and realisation of strategic documents.

Even though in all the four states the principles of human security are formulated in a similar way, the achieved level of their realisation is different. This level may be determined using selected country-level development indicators, one of which is the Human Development Index (HDI), a synthetic measure used to describe the level of socio-economic development of all the countries in the world. It is calculated from the following component measures: life expectancy at birth, average number of years of education received by citizens aged 25 and over, expected number of years of education from birth, and gross national income per capita in USD at purchasing power parity.⁶⁷ The HDI ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates the highest possible value.

Another measure useful in this kind of analysis is the set of Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI), aimed at determining the level of realisation of sustainable development policies in selected countries. It is comprised of measures regarding:

- realisation of policies:
 - economic policies (including labour market, fiscal policy, research and development, national budget);
 - social policies (including education, social inclusion, health policy, family policy, pension system, security);
 - environmental policies (including natural environment protection);
- democracy:
 - quality of democracy (including freedom of media, electoral process, access to information, human rights and basic freedoms, rule of law);
- good governance:
 - executive capacity (including social participation, public consultations, strategic and operational maturity);
 - executive accountability (including the ability of various governmental and non-governmental entities to implement sustainable development policies.)⁶⁸

The individual measures are assigned a value between 0 and 10, with 10 being the maximum. Both HDI and SGI allow to compare the living conditions across various countries, while HDI can also be used to rank the countries based on one synthetic measure. The following table presents HDI and SGI results achieved by the Visegrad Group countries.

⁶⁷ *Human Development Reports*, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/data> [accessed: 2.11.2018].

⁶⁸ *About the SGI: Mission statement*, <http://www.sgi-network.org/2018/About> [accessed: 3.11.2019].

Table 4. Values of HDI and SGI indicators for the Visegrad Group countries

Measure analysed	Poland	Czechia	Slovakia	Hungary
Human Development Index (HDI) in the years 2013–2017				
2017	0.865	0.888	0.855	0.838
2015	0.855	0.878	0.846	0.836
2013	0.834	0.861	0.830	0.818
Human Development Index (HDI) in the year 2017, divided into component measures				
Position in the world ranking	33	27	38	45
Life expectancy at birth	77.8	78.9	77.0	76.1
Average number of years of education received by citizens aged 25 and over	12.3	12.7	12.5	11.9
Expected number of years of education from birth	16.4	16.9	15	15.1
Gross national income per capita in USD at purchasing power parity	26,150	30,588	29,467	25,393
Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI) data for the year 2018				
Economic policies	5.9	6.6	5.5	5.1
Social policies	5.4	6.1	5.2	4.6
Environmental policies	5.0	6.2	6.1	6.1
Quality of democracy	5.3	7.3	6.8	3.5
Executive capacity	5.2	5.4	5.0	5.0
Executive accountability	5.4	6.6	5.4	4.8

Source: Own work based on: *Human Development Index and its components*, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/data> [accessed: 31.10.2018] and *SGI 2018 Survey*, <http://www.sgi-network.org/2018> [accessed: 31.10.2018].

The indicators presented in the table reveal that the best living conditions, i.e. the ones that guarantee survival and development of human beings, have been achieved in Czechia. In the HDI ranking, it occupies the 27th place and boasts the highest values of the four Visegrad Group countries in all component categories (healthcare, education, GNI per capita). SGI confirms this state of things – Czechia has the highest values of all the component indices. The situation of Poland and Slovakia is largely similar: while Poland is ranked higher in the HDI ranking (33th place in comparison to Slovakia's 38th), largely due to longer life expectancy at birth and expected number of years of education at birth, it is placed slightly below Slovakia in the SGI rankings. The biggest difference between these two countries can be seen in environmental policies (Poland ranks the lowest of the four countries taken under scrutiny), and the quality of democracy. Both HDI and SGI indicate that the worst living conditions among the V4 are in Hungary, which ranks lowest in all component categories (apart from environmental policies, where Poland ranks at the bottom). This is particularly visible in the quality of democracy measure, where Hungary scored merely 3.5 against Czechia's score of 7.3.

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Szerokie podejście do human security w państwach Grupy Wyszehradzkiej Streszczenie

Zakończenie zimnej wojny i oddalenie się widma wybuchu konfliktu zbrojnego sprzyjało poszerzeniu analiz dotyczących bezpieczeństwa o inne niż państwo podmioty. Jedną z rodzących się w latach 90. XX w. alternatywnych koncepcji było *human security* (bezpieczeństwo jednostki ludzkiej) stawiające w centrum zainteresowania jednostkę ludzką. W ujęciu wąskim (zwanym szkołą kanadyjską), *human security* nawiązuje do zapewnienia człowiekowi podstawowych praw politycznych oraz wolności od strachu. W ujęciu szerokim (szkoła japońska), *human security* obejmuje również kwestie praw społecznych i ekonomicznych oraz możliwość przetrwania i rozwoju każdego człowieka. Założenia japońskiej szkoły *human security* zostały zawarte w hasle „wolności od niedostatku”. Szeroki

zakres bezpieczeństwa jednostki ludzkiej pozostaje w ścisłym związku z koncepcją zrównoważonego rozwoju. W niniejszym artykule przedstawiono podejście państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej: Polski, Czech, Słowacji i Węgier do szerokiego zakresu *human security*. Analizie poddano główne dokumenty strategiczne dotyczące: praw społecznych i ekonomicznych obywateli, systemu bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego oraz implementacji koncepcji zrównoważonego rozwoju.

Słowa kluczowe: *human security*, Grupa Wyszehradzka, Polska, Czechy, Słowacja, Węgry

Broad Approach to Human Security in the Visegrad Group Countries

Abstract

The demise of the Cold War and the fading risk of a global military conflict caused researchers to extend the notion of security to subjects other than the states. One of the alternative concepts that emerged in the 1990s was Human Security, which put individual human beings at the heart of analysis. In its narrow approach, called the "Canadian school", human security seeks to provide all people with the basic political rights and ensure "Freedom from Fear". The broad approach, advocated by the "Japanese school", encompasses social and economic rights, as well as the need to offer people the ability to survive and develop. Thus, it has been labelled as the "Freedom from Want" concept. The broad approach to individual human security is closely linked to the concept of sustainable development. This paper looks at the approach taken by the Visegrad Group countries – Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary – to the broad concept of Human Security. It presents the analysis of the main strategic documents that deal with social and economic rights of people, the internal security system, and the implementation of the concept of sustainable development.

Key words: Human security, Visegrad Group, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary

Die Staaten der Visegárd-Gruppe vor dem breiten Bereich von Human Security

Zusammenfassung

Das Ende des Kalten Krieges und die nachlassenden Risiken eines globalen militärischen Konflikts veranlasste die Forschung, das Verständnis von Sicherheit über die Staaten hinaus um andere Akteure zu erweitern. Eines dieser alternativen Konzepte, das in den 1990er Jahren hervortrat, war *Human Security*, das die Individuen ins Zentrum der Analyse rückte. In einem engeren Ansatz (die kanadische Schule genannt), soll *human security* allen Menschen die grundlegenden politischen Rechte ermöglichen und „Freiheit von Angst“ bedeuten. Im weiteren Sinne (die japanische Schule) umfasst *human security* soziale und ökonomische Rechte sowie die Notwendigkeit, Menschen die Fähigkeit zu überleben und sich zu entwickeln zu ermöglichen. Dieses Konzept wurde als „Freiheit von Not“ erfasst. Der weite Ansatz der Sicherheit des Einzelnen steht im engen Zusammenhang mit dem Konzept der nachhaltigen Entwicklung. In diesem Artikel wurde der Ansatz der Länder der Visegrad-Gruppe: Polen, Tschechien, der Slowakei und Ungarn zum weiten Konzept von *human security* dargestellt. Es wurden die wichtigsten strategischen Dokumente analysiert, die sich mit sozialen und ökonomischen Rechten der Menschen,

dem System der inneren Sicherheit und die Umsetzung des Konzepts der nachhaltigen Entwicklung befassen.

Schlüsselswörter: *human security*, die Visegárd-Gruppe, Polen, Tschechien, die Slowakei, Ungarn

*Широкий подход к human security
в государствах Вышеградской группы
Резюме*

Окончание холодной войны и снижение угрозы начала вооруженного широко-масштабного конфликта способствовали расширению анализа проблем безопасности на другие, кроме государства, субъекты. Одной из родившихся в 90-е гг. XX века альтернативных концепций была концепция *human security* (безопасность человека, безопасность личности), ставящая в центре внимания человека. В узком смысле (так называемая канадская школа) концепция *human security* базируется на предоставлении человеку основных политических прав и свободы от страха. В широком смысле (японская школа), *human security* также охватывает вопросы касающиеся социальных и экономических прав, возможностей выживания и развития каждого человека. Сущность японской школы *human security* содержится в лозунге «свобода от недостатков». Широкий спектр концепции *human security* остается в тесной связи с концепцией устойчивого развития. В статье представлен подход государств Вышеградской группы: Польши, Чехии, Словакии и Венгрии к проблеме *human security*. Анализу подверглись основные стратегические документы касающиеся социальных и экономических прав граждан, системы внутренней безопасности и реализации концепции устойчивого развития.

Ключевые слова: *human security*, Вышеградская группа, Польша, Чехия, Словакия, Венгрия



Anna Bałamut

Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University
ORCID: 0000 0001 7300 7367

The Impact of Greenhouse Gas Emissions on Human Health Across Europe

Introduction

Admittedly, climate is changing. There is extensive scientific evidence that proves that the average global temperature is rising, and the rainfall structure is changing, which can be noticed by simply looking out of the window. Sometimes it is difficult to determine the actual season due to the diversity of climatic phenomena. At the same time, many towns and cities are dealing with smog – a mixture of fog, smoke, and exhaust fumes – especially in the autumn and winter. In light of these facts, it is possible to put forward the following hypothesis: the poor condition of air affects human health and leads to an increased number of respiratory diseases.

This paper has been divided into three sections. First, it looks at the EU's strategy towards air pollution – what position the EU presents with regard to greenhouse gas emissions, what solutions it proposes, and whether they are beneficial for countries or not. Second, it discusses air quality in Europe – whether smog can be found in European countries, and if so, where, and how these countries are dealing with the problem. Third, it looks at the impact of air pollution on human health – whether smog affects human health and life, and if so – whether there are any statistics available. That is why the paper rests on the analysis of the content of international documents, or websites. Empirical methods have also been applied, i.e. observation (learning the phenomenon through publications), description (the outcome of observation), and general technology, i.e. analysis, synthesis,

induction (transition of general conclusions based on specific premises), and deduction (whereby general premises give rise to specific conclusions).

The EU's strategy towards air pollution

In 1979, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe adopted the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution. The main guidelines of the convention are to limit and gradually reduce air pollution, and to prevent such pollution. So far, eight protocols have been attached to it, including the protocol from Gothenburg to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone. The protocol was agreed in November 1999 and has contributed to creating the NEC Directive (2001/81/EC). The protocol was revised in 2012 and was made into EU law by the Directive on National Emission Reductions (Directive 2016/2284/EU). The amended protocol was ratified by the Council Decision (EU) 2017/1757.¹ On 7 October 2019, the amendments to the Gothenburg Protocol became effective. 18 countries were covered by the protocol: Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the US, as well as the EU. The main goal was still to reduce the emissions of sulphur dioxide (SO₂), nitrogen oxides (NO_x), ammonia (NH₃), volatile organic compounds (VOCs), and fine Particulate Matter (PM_{2.5}). For example, reduction of PM 2.5 reached 46% for Cyprus; 37% for the Netherlands; 36% for Slovakia; 35% for Greece; 33% for Denmark; 30% for Finland and the UK; and 22% for the European Union.²

In June 2012, the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development was held in Rio de Janeiro. One of its key outcomes was the decision taken by the member states of the UN to inaugurate the process geared towards developing a set of new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to pursue the Millennium Goals. The formulation of SDGs was part of the work done on the global development agenda after 2015, i.e. the Post-2015 Development Agenda. It was also the first step to The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The document encompasses 17 sustainable development goals. The underlying assumptions concern not only reduction of poverty, the fight against hunger, or safeguarding health, but also such issues as sustainable use of the natural environment, reduction of social inequality, or ensuring access to energy.³

¹ The coming into force of the amended Gothenburg Protocol is a landmark for actions taken in the field of clean air and climate. *Entry into force of amended Gothenburg Protocol is landmark for clean air and climate action*, UNECE, 2019, <https://www.unece.org/info/media/presscurrent-press-h/environment/2019/entry-into-force-of-amended-göthenburg-protocol-is-landmark-for-clean-air-and-climate-action/doc.html> [accessed: 18.11.2019].

² *Ibid.*

³ *Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, UN, 2015 <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf> [accessed: 18.11.2019].

The EU's clean air policy is also based on:

- Directive 2008/50/EC on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe;
- Directive 2015/1480/EC of 28 August 2015 amending several annexes to Directives 2004/107/EC and 2008/50/EC – data validation and location of sampling points for the assessment of ambient air quality;
- Commission Implementing Decision 2011/850/EU: Commission Implementing Decision of 12 December 2011 laying down rules for Directives 2004/107/EC and 2008/50/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the reciprocal exchange of information and reporting on ambient air quality (notified under document C(2011)).⁴

The above listed documents set the standards for emission and created certain resolutions for the problem with limit values. For example, Directive 2008/50/EC assumed cooperation between several stakeholders: the Member States, governance, the private economic sector, various trade organisations, civil society, or citizens.

On 28 November 2018, the European Commission put forward a long-term strategic vision for the economy: by 2050 it should be modern, competitive, and climate-neutral. The strategy shows whether Europe can lead in the pursuit of climate neutrality, and how it can do so, e.g. by investing in realistic technological solutions.⁵ The Commission adopted its strategic vision on 28 November 2018, before the UN Climate Summit (COP24), which took place in Katowice from 2 to 14 December 2018. The final document is a so-called “road map” for the implementation of the Paris Agreement of 2015. The countries have pledged to take action to halt global warming at 2 degrees Celsius – even at 1.5 degrees Celsius – above the average pre-industrial temperatures.

“Less than 1 % of EU cohesion policy funding is directly allocated to air quality measures. However, other cohesion policy actions can indirectly benefit air quality.”⁶ That's why the report prepares recommendations for the countries. The report recommends launching a policy that aims at air quality, and making use of EU support for air quality to tackle air pollution, in particular PM, NO_x and SO_x. The time line for implementation has been set by 2022.⁷

It should be noted that by adopting the monthly package of decisions on the issue of failure to fulfil their obligations, the European Commission is taking legal action against the Member States that have not complied with their obligations under EU law. These measures are infringement procedures, based on the main decisions taken in July, for example:

⁴ *Air Quality – Existing Legislation*, EU, August 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/quality/existing_leg.htm [accessed:18.11.2019].

⁵ *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank a Clean Planet for all A European strategic long-term vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate neutral economy, 28 November 2018*, (COM/2018/773 final).

⁶ Official website of COP 24 Katowice 2018, <https://cop24.gov.pl/pl> [accessed: 18.11.2019].

⁷ *Air pollution: Our health still insufficiently protected*, ECA, Luxembourg, 2018, p. 47.

- The Commission has brought a case before the Court against Bulgaria and Spain over exposing citizens to poor air quality.⁸ Bulgaria does not comply with the limit values for sulphur dioxide (SO₂), and Spain for nitrogen dioxide (NO₂). There have been cases of exceeding standards in the south-eastern part of the country, where four of Bulgaria's largest power plants are located. In Spain, there were breaches of EU legislation on nitrogen dioxide (NO₂) emissions, legally binding since 2010;
- The Commission calls on Croatia and Romania to address systemic irregularities in monitoring pollution (based on EU law: Directive 2004/107/EC and Directive 2008/50 / (EC). In the case of Romania, the lack of an adequate number and type of air quality measurement points was revealed. For Croatia, one of the discernible weak points in its domestic includes the incorrect transposition of the definition of "air" and "share of pollutants from natural sources."⁹

The EU has set a policy framework for both energy and climate change. However, some areas, such as the choice of the energy mix, are left to the Member States. The differences found in the Member States' strategies and the diversity of energy mixes make it difficult to achieve the goals set. Energy the notion of neutrality, promoted by the EU, can be difficult to achieve, let alone the goal of maintaining a temperature rise well below 2°C. What is needed is increased cooperation of states, organisations and entities in the area of a common, uniform strategy and an increase in the EU budget for combating not only the emission of greenhouse gases, but also the fight against the effects of smog.

Air quality in Europe

The European Environment Agency (EEA) is an analysis centre of air pollution. It cooperates with the EU, develops statistical data and monitors the problem of air pollution across Europe. The data that are collected and elaborated are available on the agency's website in the form of reports or publications. The agency also investigates the side effects of air pollution, and their impact on climate change, energy, transport, industry, and human health. Three pollutants have been indicated as those that have the greatest impact on human health: particulates, nitrogen dioxide and ground-level ozone that cause respiratory damage and even death. 90% of Europe's population is located in cities where concentrations exceed safe air health standards. Numerous studies show that inhaling fine particles (PM_{2.5}) can shorten people's lives in the EU by about eight months. Another example is benzo(a)pyrene, which is a carcinogen component.¹⁰

In 2019, a new European Environment Agency report occurred, which sets out the analysis of air quality in Europe from 2000 to 2017. Just as in the 2018 report,

⁸ *July infringements package: key decisions*, EC, July 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/press-corner/detail/pl/inf_19_4251 [accessed: 18.11.2019].

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Air pollution*, October 2017, EEA, <https://www.eea.europa.eu/pl/themes/air/intro> [accessed: 12.11.2019].

the findings are the same: high concentrations of air pollutants have a negative impact on Europeans, mainly those who live in cities. Air pollution affects not only the economy, but also the lives of residents, a case in point being the rising medical costs, and the growing number of working days lost due to poor health. Air pollution affects ecosystems, destroying soil, forests, lakes and rivers, and reducing agricultural yields.¹¹

The EU ETS system, launched in 2005 within the EU, is the first international emissions trading system in the world. It also remains the largest, as it covers over three-quarters of international emissions trading. It operates in 31 countries (28 EU countries and Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway). Companies receive or buy emission allowances that they can trade according to their needs. In addition, they reduce emissions from over 11 thousand energy-intensive industrial installations and airlines.¹² Through the Emissions Trading System (ETS), the EU governs about 40% of total EU greenhouse gas emissions. The goal is to decrease the amount of emissions by 2040, which is a consequence of, among others, the following events:

- abandoning nuclear energy for fossil fuels (e.g. Belgium);
- increase in energy-consuming energy production (e.g. Ireland, Denmark, Malta);
- increase in industrial processes (e.g. Ireland, Lithuania, Poland, Romania);
- increasing the share of renewable energy (e.g. Ireland);
- withdrawal from coal-fired power plants (e.g. France, Spain);
- withdrawal from bituminous shale (Estonia);
- increase in biomass co-firing (e.g. Ireland).¹³

Checking the current state of air in a given country, or even an individual town or city, can be done by means of a dedicated website that features a real-time visual air quality map illustrating air pollution across Europe. In addition, it is possible to trace the following contaminants: PM 2.5 (atmospheric aerosols), PM10 mixture of heavy metal particles – benzopyrenes, furans, dioxins, O₃ (tropospheric ozone), NO₂ (nitrogen oxides), SO₂ (sulphur dioxide) and CO (carbon monoxide) in the perspective of e.g. the last 24 hours, or look at the ranking of the last four hours for the most polluted countries. Here, Poland came ninth (in a group of 100), and the most polluted city was Zgierz (air quality rankings).¹⁴ As of 11 November 2019, there are a lot of European countries that are ahead of Poland (170); for example: Turkey 862, Ukraine (189), Italy (159), Spain (158), and Bulgaria (152). The ranking is updated on a regular basis, which proves its accuracy.¹⁵

The second source of information can be the website with the World's Air Pollution: Real-time Air Quality Index.¹⁶ In a nutshell, the World Air Quality Index project is a non-profit project launched in 2007. It collects information from over 100 countries, where there are over 12,000 stations. The information is published on

¹¹ *Air quality in Europe — 2018 report*, EEA, Luxembourg, 2018.

¹² See: Official website of European Commission: <https://ec.europa.eu> [accessed: 12.11.2019].

¹³ *The EU Emissions Trading, System in 2019: trends and Projections*, EEA Luxembourg 2019, p. 4

¹⁴ See: Official website of Real-time Air Quality Index (AQI), <https://aqicn.org/rankings> [accessed: 12.11.2019].

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Official website of World's Air Pollution, *Real-time Air Quality Index*, <https://waqi.info/pl> [accessed: 12.11.2019].

two websites: *aqicn.org* and *waqi.info*. The idea originated in China and was over time joined by Singapore, India, Australia, and the US. Anyone can download the Widget – the Air Quality Index for Android, iPhone & iPad, Google Chrome, Firefox, WordPress, and Cloud API.¹⁷

Another example is the European Air Quality Index. This is an EEA and European Commission initiative. It gathers air quality measurements from over 2,000 air quality monitoring stations across Europe, and it discloses the following impurities: fine dust (PM_{2.5} and PM₁₀), ground-level ozone (O₃), nitrogen dioxide (NO₂) and sulphur dioxide (SO₂). The concentration levels indicated in the small table are: the hourly concentrations for NO₂, O₃ and SO₂ and based on 24-hour running means for PM₁₀ and PM_{2.5}.¹⁸

The European Union distinguishes between two air quality standards: short-term (hourly/daily), and long-term (annual). The European air indicator has one drawback: it does not reflect the long-term (annual) issue. It should be emphasised that the results obtained on the basis of this approach may be different than those presented on an ongoing basis on the website, which points to the number of problems that EU members must face. First of all, it requires a change in the way of thinking – understanding that the problem of air pollution will not disappear, and the effects will be visible not only in the short-term perspective, but also in the long-term perspective, which can be dangerous for social life.

Among other things, greenhouse gas emission leads to the creation of smog. It arises as a result of mixing air with various impurities, or exhaust fumes. They are generic as a result of human activity. Its appearance may also be caused by the climate and the condition of the area. Smog causes a number of negative effects on human health: it hinders breathing and causes several diseases – like e.g. asthma, affects the quality of vegetables or meat offered on the market. Its effects can also be seen in the construction of buildings that over time start to be covered with a strange-looking coating. The effects can be indicated in both the short and long term, a case in point being the 1952 smog in London, which caused more than 4,000 casualties.¹⁹ Apparently, European countries are dealing with smog in various ways:

- in Paris, passenger cars registered before 1997 have been banned from entering the city from 1 July 2015, just like all motorcycles registered before 1 June 1999; and trucks and buses from before 1 October 2001. On specific days, only cars with even or odd registration numbers have access to the heart of the city. Vignettes, similar to the German ones, were introduced in Paris, where individual colours indicate the level of vehicle emissions. Drivers who do not have the “CritAir” badge can pay a high fine. From July 2019, it is prohibited to enter Paris with a diesel car manufactured prior to 2006, as well as on motorcycles and tricycles (with gasoline engines) that were produced before 30 June 2004;²⁰

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *European Air Quality Index*, November 2019, <https://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/air/air-quality-index> [accessed: 12.11.2019].

¹⁹ See: Official website of Airly, <https://airly.eu/pl> [accessed: 12.11.2019].

²⁰ A. Kubik, *Do Paryża nie wjedziesz starym dieslem. Kto poczuje to w kieszeni?*, July 2019, <http://wyborcza.pl/7,155287,24957051,do-paryza-nie-wjedziesz-starym-dieslem.html?disableRedirects=true> [accessed: 12.11.2019].

- in London, by 2020, selected streets are due to be banned for vehicles with diesel engines; currently, drivers must pay 12.5 pounds a day for moving around the centre during rush hour; in addition, a fee is charged for the entry of lorries, buses and vans to the gates of London, which can go up to 200 pounds per day;²¹
- in Germany, the badge for cars is available in different colours, depending on the Euro emission class; entry to the centre of Berlin is possible with a green badge and number 4 gasoline engines produced at least in 1993. On 7 October 2019, a decision was made to ban diesel vehicles on eight Berlin streets: Leipziger Straße, Brückenstraße, Reinhardtstraße, Alt-Moabit, Friedrichstraße, Stromstraße, Hermannstraße and Silbersteinstraße (blue badge);²²
- as for Rome, the number of cars with oil fuel-driven engines is growing, the increase in exhaust emissions contributes, for example, to the deterioration of Italians' health and the destruction of historic buildings. This is to change: by 2024, a ban will be introduced for diesel cars to enter the city centre;²³
- in 2019, Oslo removed all public parking spaces in its city centre; in this car-free zone, people can travel by public transport, ride a bike, or go on foot. Norway aims to become "carbon neutral" by 2030, but hopes are high that this will happen already by around 2025. In addition, it is expected to suspend the sale of cars powered by fossil fuels.²⁴

The above solutions indicate that the states do not want to be indifferent to the problems of combating air pollution, including smog. However, it is commonly regarded as a drop in the ocean because not only capital cities, but also other towns and cities, are struggling with the issue. You need not only good ideas, but also funds that will allow you to modernise the available solutions. Air pollution is a tangible problem for most European countries. Their actions are visible, but the question arises whether these actions are indeed sufficient. The answer is certainly not, and these actions ought to be intensified.

The impact of air pollution on human health

An alternative source of reliable greenhouse gas emissions information and their effects is the World Health Organization. According to the Organisation, around seven million people die each year due to poor air conditions. Pregnant women, infants and children are exposed to the biggest risk. Breathing poor quality air may lead to several disturbances of the immune system in an unborn child, hinder the development of children's cognitive functions, or be the cause of numerous

²¹ *Smog w Europie. Jak inne miasta walczą z trującym powietrzem?*, luty 2017, <https://superbiz.se.pl/wiadomosci/smog-w-europie-jak-inne-miasta-walczą-z-trującym-powietrzem-aa-oxKE-Qar5-r1Zg.html> [accessed: 19.11.2019].

²² See: Official website of GEMB mbH and Green-Zones GmbH, <https://www.blaue-plakette.de/pl.html> [accessed: 19.11.2019].

²³ *Samochody z silnikiem diesla w Europie – gdzie nie wjedziesz i gdzie zapłacisz karę?*, March 2018, <https://autempoeuropie.pl/aktualnosci/samochody-z-silnikiem-diesla-w-europie-gdzie-nie-wjedziesz-i-gdzie-zapłacisz-karę> [accessed: 19.11.2019].

²⁴ See: <https://www.mojanorwegia.pl> [accessed: 19.11.2019].

diseases – such as asthma, or respiratory infections.²⁵ How and where we live, what we eat, what lifestyle we are leading – whether it is in the countryside or in the city – will significantly affect our health. That's why air quality depends not only on emissions, but also on the distance from which and the height at which pollutants are released, the meteorological conditions, e.g. wind, the chemical transformations, and the geographical conditions.²⁶

The world health statistics of 2018 focus on the health and health-related Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). They are also linked to the three SDG-aligned strategic priorities of the WHO's 13th General Programme of Work, 2019–2023. The WHO report of 2018 divided health-related indicators in the following way: “reproductive, maternal, new-born and child health, infectious diseases, noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) and mental health, injuries and violence, universal health coverage (UHC) and health systems, environmental risks, health risks and disease outbreak.”²⁷

The report states that the transition to clean fuels and technologies is still a major problem. It is estimated that three billion people use unsuitable furnaces and fuels. In 2016, household air pollution caused 3.8 million deaths from heart disease, stroke and cancer, or lower respiratory tract infections. According to WHO, in 2016, about 91% of the world's population didn't have access to clean air, and more than half of the cities were exposed to levels at least 2.5 times above the WHO safety standard. It is estimated that in 2016, air pollution caused 4.2 million deaths worldwide.²⁸ Across the EU, air pollution causes on average more than 1,000 premature deaths each day, which is more than ten times the number of casualties reported in road accidents. Modern society is affected by respiratory and cardiovascular diseases caused by air pollution.²⁹ According to EEA data, in 2014 fine dust (PM_{2.5}) caused the deaths of around 400,000 people in the EU: NO₂ caused 75,000 deaths, and O₃ resulted in as many as 13,600 deaths.³⁰

Several studies have proven the correlation between polluted air and the risk of low birth weight of new-borns or their prematurity, e.g. half a million births in London were tested for the impact of NO₂, NO_x, O₃, PM₁₀, PM_{2.5} on the child's life, which confirmed the correlation. As a consequence, symptoms of inflammation of the upper and lower respiratory tract, and even a change in the capacity of the sexes are the leading factors revealed among new-borns.³¹

²⁵ *Daly's attributable to ambient air pollution*, 2016, http://gamapserver.who.int/gho/interactive_charts/phe/aap_mbd/atlas.html [accessed: 19.11.2019].

²⁶ *Air pollution: Our health still insufficiently protected*, European Court of Auditors, 23/2018, <https://op.europa.eu/webpub/eca/special-reports/air-quality-23-2018/pl/> [accessed: 19.11.2019].

²⁷ *World Health Statistic 2018, Monitoring health for the SDGs*, WHO, Geneva 2018, p. 4.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

²⁹ *Mapping the sources and level of air pollution in Europe: Commission publishes new Air Quality Index and Atlas*, Brussels, 2017.

³⁰ *Air quality in Europe — 2017 report*, EEA, Luxembourg, 2017, p. 56.

³¹ M. Krzyżanowski, *Wpływ zanieczyszczeń powietrza na zdrowie*, Global Compact Network Poland, article is from: GCNP „SDG 11 – Zrównoważone Miasta – 2018”, <https://ungc.org.pl/programy/zrownowazone-miasta> [accessed: 16.11.2019].

In 2018, scientists from the Barcelona Institute for Global Health and the Erasmus University Medical Centre in Rotterdam published the results of their work in *Biological Psychiatry* journal. In total, 783 children participated in the experiment, whose development was observed from the foetal stage. The researchers confirmed the relationship between fine dust pollution and brain changes, as well as a number of other related problems, such as e.g. self-control, or hyperactivity (including ADHD). Interestingly, such a relationship occurs not after exceeding the norms, but within their scope.³²

One of the latest publications is the State of Global Air 2019 report, which looks at pollution caused by fine air particles (i.e. the particles with an aerodynamic diameter smaller than 2.5 microns, also known as PM2.5), and ozone found near ground level (tropospheric ozone). Air pollution is a major risk factor for death and disability in the world. Polluted air can cause heart and chronic respiratory diseases, lung infections, and cancer. In 2017, it was the fifth highest risk of mortality in the world, causing 4.9 million deaths and the loss of 147 million years of healthy life.³³ The top ten countries with the lowest national PM2.5 exposure levels were the Maldives, the United States, Norway, Estonia, Iceland, Canada, Sweden, New Zealand, Brunei, and Finland. Population-weighted PM 2.5 concentrations oscillated around 8 µg/m³ or less in these countries on average. Another factor is ozone, a gas that commonly found in the stratosphere, that serves to protect the Earth from harmful ultraviolet radiation. The problem arises when it is too close to the ground, i.e. in the troposphere, when accumulates gases and pollution, thus being harmful to people's health. Its appearance so close to the earth is caused by human activity related to industrial activities, or transport. The underlying causes of ozone are volatile organic compounds and nitrogen oxides, as well as regresses to sunlight. The ozone found in the troposphere, the lower layer of the atmosphere, causes respiratory and lung diseases.³⁴

The report also discusses the impact of air pollution on people's lives around the world, based on three elements:

- 1) analysis of PM2,5 and ozone standards;
- 2) mathematical functions derived from epidemiological studies;
- 3) death rates: the relationship between disease and air pollution.³⁵

Air pollution is commonly known as one of the key factors that leads to the shortening of human life. According to the report, a child born today will die 20 months earlier due to poor air conditions.³⁶ In the summary, it is argued that the governments of individual countries are facing a very big challenge: on the one hand, economic development is their core; on the other hand, there is the issue of air pollution, which is quite relevant. Nobody argues with the fact that it exists; however, the difficulty arises when it comes to understanding, i.e. determining

³² *Badania: smog a cięża – skutkiem mogą być zaburzenia neurologiczne u dziecka*, March 2018, <http://www.rynekzdrowia.pl> [accessed: 16.11.2019].

³³ *State of Global Air 2019 report*, Health Effects Institute, Boston 2019.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 11

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.16

the level of air pollution, population structure, basic and economic diseases, or determining factors that burden health.

An example of cooperation undertaken in the field of environmental protection can be The European Environment Agency's (EEA), which includes several recommendations of the World Health Organization (WHO). It can be seen in the relationship between air pollution and health outcomes, by looking e.g. at the data on diseases, or the death rates. The EEA also takes into account the WHO factors for calculating health risk:

- functions of concentration response – risk of health effects, and basic health statistics.

In addition, in its reports, it uses concentration response functions specified by the WHO in 2013, which are based on relative risk, i.e. increase in mortality due to air pollution. The results relate to the general population, and they are not assigned to specific people. The risk allows you to determine the percentage of cases. They can be attributed to air pollution. The relative risk estimates the number of deaths. These results are obtained at the so-called grids and are later summed for an individual country, or for Europe.³⁷

Conclusions

To sum up, looking at the vast research available and the numerous analyses of WHO, EEA and EU presented above, one can fully agree with the hypothesis put forward at the beginning of this paper. Air pollution is indeed a significant factor that has a major influence on the environment, the health risk, not to mention its role as a cause of cancer. The WHO, EEA and the EU point to the undeniable correlation between air pollution and its impact on human health and human life. The impact of NO₂, NO_x, O₃, PM₁₀ or PM_{2.5} is discernible not only in the natural environment that we live in and enjoy on a daily basis, but it also affects each of its members. Emission standards in European cities often exceed the accepted limits, which distorts the picture of healthy living. All this leads to the question whether bio food is really bio, since it is frequently grown in areas affected by air pollution. Do air purifiers really protect people from smog? These are just a few of the many questions that cannot be answered. People have to work, go to school, do their shopping even on the days when emission standards are exceeded. On other days, when the information about the clean air appears, we are happy that nothing is wrong with us. Studies show, however, that indexes should be modified, because often the information about clean air is a threat to our lives. Recent studies have shown that even low gas concentrations are dangerous for humans. Worse still, unborn children are already exposed, as they experience the effects of so-called smog and may be born with respiratory diseases, asthma, or even ADHD.

WHO, EEA and EU reports clearly indicate that the problem of protection of human life against polluted air requires more intensive activities and closer

³⁷ *Assessing the risks to health from air pollution*, EEA, January, 2019, <https://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/air/health-impacts-of-air-pollution/assessing-the-risks-to-health> [accessed: 15.11.2019].

cooperation. Countries, entities and organisations alike should build upon available research, exchange experiences, and cooperate for clean air. The effects of non-cooperation can be seen not on the regional level, but they apply to the entire European continent. What is happening in China and India has an impact on the lives of people in Europe, and vice versa. Countries cannot live alone today, so they need to look at the problem of air pollution as a multidimensional problem with an increasing risk scale, which is an inseparable element of the development of the economies of the countries in the twenty-first century.

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Wpływ emisji gazów cieplarnianych na zdrowie ludzi w Europie *Streszczenie*

Zmiany klimatu mają wpływ na nasze życie w sposób pośredni, np. zacieranie się różnic między porami roku, oraz bezpośredni, np. anomalie pogodowe – powodzie, wysokie lub niskie temperatury, mgły które często stają się smogiem, tzw. zanieczyszczenia powietrza. Europejczycy mają dostęp do statystyk analizujących stan powietrza, jednak nie oznacza to, że coś się zmienia. Ciągłe widoczny jest wzrost zachorowalności na choroby związane z układem oddechowym. Pomocne jest WHO, które zajmuje się skutkami zmian klimatu, udziela państwom pomocy w celu adaptacji zmian. Emisje w państwach członkowskich

UE stanowią tylko 10% globalnej emisji gazów cieplarnianych. Sytuacja ta pokazuje, że ochrona klimatu wymaga intensyfikacji działań nie tylko członków Wspólnoty, ale i pozostałych państw europejskich oraz organizacji rządowych i pozarządowych, wszystkich uczestników rynku, w tym osób fizycznych. W świetle tych faktów można postawić następującą hipotezę: zły stan powietrza wpływa na ludzkie zdrowie i prowadzi do zwiększonej liczby zachorowań na choroby układu oddechowego. Celem pracy jest wskazanie wpływu emisji gazów cieplarnianych na zdrowie ludzi. W rezultacie praca została podzielona na 3 rozdziały. Pierwszy opisuje strategię UE wobec zanieczyszczenia powietrza, drugi analizuje jakość powietrza w Europie, a trzeci skupia się na wpływie zanieczyszczenia powietrza na ludzkie zdrowie. Praca została zaopatrzona we wstęp i zakończenie zawierające końcowe wnioski. Informacje zostały przygotowane na podstawie nie tylko polskich, ale także zagranicznych źródeł. W pracy wykorzystano analizę zawartości dokumentów międzynarodowych i stron internetowych.

Słowa kluczowe: zanieczyszczenie powietrza, zdrowie, Europa, choroby, strategia

The Impact of Greenhouse Gas Emissions on Human Health Across Europe

Abstract

Climate change can be seen every day. It affects our lives indirectly, e.g. by blurring the differences between the seasons, and directly by causing weather anomalies such as floods, high or low temperatures, mists that often become smog, and so-called air pollution. Europeans have access to statistics analysing the state of the air they breathe, but this does not mean that something is changing. There is still a visible increase in the incidence of respiratory diseases. The WHO, which deals with the effects of climate change, helps countries to adapt to change. Emissions in EU Member States represent only 10% of global greenhouse gas emissions. This shows that climate protection requires intensification of actions not only of the Community members, but also of other European countries, as well as governmental and non-governmental organisations, market participants, including individuals. In light of these facts, it is possible to make the following hypothesis: air pollution is a threat to the environment, health, and a major cause of death. The goal of this paper is to indicate the impact of greenhouse gas emissions on human health. As a result, it has been divided into 3 sections. The first section describes the EU's strategy on air pollution; the second section looks at air quality in Europe; and the third section focuses on the impact of air pollution on human health. The paper rests on the analysis of international documents and/or websites.

Key words: air pollution, health, Europe, diseases, strategy

Die Auswirkungen der Treibhausgasemissionen auf die menschliche Gesundheit in Europa

Zusammenfassung

Der Klimawandel ist jeden Tag sichtbar. Er beeinflusst unser Leben indirekt, z. B. durch immer unschärfere Abgrenzung zwischen den Jahreszeiten und direkt, z. B. extreme Wettererscheinungen, Überschwemmungen, hohe oder niedrige Temperaturen, Nebel, der oft zum Smog wird, die sog. Luftverschmutzung. Die Europäer haben Zugang zu

Статистики, которые den Luftzustand analysieren, aber das bedeutet nicht, dass sich etwas ändert. Wir beobachten eine immer höhere Inzidenz von den mit dem Atemsystem verbundenen Krankheiten. Die WHO, die sich mit den Auswirkungen des Klimawandels beschäftigt, hilft Staaten bei der Anpassung an den Klimawandel. Die Emissionen in den Mitgliedsländern stellen nur 10% der globalen Treibhausgasemissionen dar. Diese Situation zeigt, dass der Klimaschutz die verstärkten Anstrengungen nicht nur seitens der Mitgliedsstaaten der Gemeinschaft, sondern auch sonstiger europäischen Länder, Regierungs-, und Außerregierungsorganisationen, aller Marktteilnehmer und jedes Einzelnen erfordert. Angesichts dieser Tatsachen kann man folgende Hypothese aufstellen: schlechter Luftzustand hat einen Einfluss auf die menschliche Gesundheit und führt zu einer höheren Inzidenz von den mit dem Atemsystem verbundenen Krankheiten. Das Ziel dieses Artikels ist, auf den Einfluss der Treibhausgase auf die menschliche Gesundheit hinzuweisen. Somit wurde die Arbeit in drei Kapitel aufgeteilt. Das erste beschreibt die Strategie der EU gegen Luftverschmutzung. Das zweite analysiert die Luftqualität in Europa und das dritte konzentriert sich auf den Einfluss der Luftverschmutzung auf die menschliche Gesundheit. Für die Analyse wurden internationale Dokumente oder Internetseiten benutzt.

Schlüsselwörter: Luftverschmutzung, Gesundheit, Europa, Krankheiten, Strategie

Влияние выбросов парниковых газов на здоровье людей в Европе Резюме

Изменение климата влияет на нашу жизнь косвенно, например, нивелируя отличия между временами года и прямо, например, вызывая погодные аномалии – наводнения, крайне высокие или низкие температуры, туманы, которые часто становятся смогом – так называемые загрязнения. Европейцы имеют доступ к статистике, указывающей на состояние воздуха, однако это не означает, что они могут что-то изменить. Постоянно можно наблюдать возрастание числа острых респираторных вирусных инфекций. Всемирная Организация Здравоохранения, которая занимается последствиями изменения климата, помогает государствам адаптироваться к этим изменениям. Выбросы парниковых газов в государствах-членах ЕС, составляют лишь 10% глобальных выбросов парниковых газов. Эта ситуация показывает, что охрана климата требует активизации деятельности не только членов ЕС, но и остальных европейских государств, а также правительственных и неправительственных организаций, всех участников рынка, включая физические лица. В свете этих фактов можно выдвинуть следующую гипотезу: плохое состояние воздуха влияет на здоровье человека и ведет к увеличению числа острых респираторных вирусных инфекций. Целью статьи является указание влияния выбросов парниковых газов на здоровье человека. Исследование состоит из трех глав. В первой описана стратегия ЕС, связанная с уменьшением загрязнения воздуха, во второй – анализируется качество воздуха в Европе, а в третьей рассмотрено влияние загрязнения воздуха на здоровье человека. Статья была подготовлена на основе не только польских, но и зарубежных источников. В ней дан анализ содержания международных документов, а также веб-сайтов.

Ключевые слова: загрязнение воздуха, здоровье, Европа, болезни, стратегия



Anna Sakson-Boulet

Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań
ORCID: 0000-0002-4014-7483

Ambient Air Pollution as a Human Security Challenge in Poland

Introduction

The concept of human security emerged in the Post-Cold War era of the briefly announced unipolar order, which seemed to implicate the end of inter-state security threats. The need to revise the concept of security and abandon territorial security – i.e. the security for land – in favour of food, employment and environmental security – i.e. the security for people – was highlighted by the authors of the 1993 *Human Development Report*. In the annual publication by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) after 1990, human security was identified as one of the five pillars of a people-centered world order¹ – alongside sustainable human development, new partnerships between state and markets, new patterns of national and global governance and new forms of international cooperation.

The subsequent UNDP report elaborated on the concept of human security and distinguished two aspects of human security: freedom from fear, and freedom from want. The former regards freedom from violence, as well as internal and external armed conflicts; the latter concerns the guarantee of economic and social security. Seven aspects of human security were distinguished: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security.² Polluted air is one of threats to human safety

¹ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1993*, New York–Oxford 1993, p. 2.

² United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994*, New York–Oxford 1994, pp. 24–25.

due to its adverse impact on human health and life, and on the environment, which results in human and economic losses. The UNDP report also noted that threats to human security, including environmental pollution, are becoming global challenges, since they occur with varying intensity around the whole world. The same is true about pollutant emissions to the atmosphere.

In the 2012 publication, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) predicted that failure to take new measures to prevent air pollution would make the poor quality of ambient air the main cause of death in the world by 2050. The OECD estimated that by 2050 the number of premature deaths from exposure to particulate matter would reach 3.6 million, which would imply more than that caused by lack of potable water, sanitation and malaria combined.³ Given the absence and/or insufficiency of actions and steps taken to solve the issue, the effects of exposure to air pollution have become the major environmental risk factor affecting health much faster than the OECD projected. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimated that air pollution with particulate matter (PM) whose aerodynamic diameter is below 2.5 μm (PM_{2.5}) alone was the cause of ca. 3 million premature deaths in 2012 (including 479,000 in Europe),⁴ and 4.2 million in 2016 (including ca. 500,000 in Europe).⁵

Of the 79 health risk factors studied by epidemiology and related to lifestyle, the environment, working conditions and metabolic disorders in the human body, air pollution with PM_{2.5} and ozone is ranked among the ten most dangerous. In 2013, low quality air was considered fifth in these terms (5.5 million premature deaths and 141.5 million years of life lost/YLLs⁶), after dietary risks, high blood pressure, child and maternal malnutrition, and smoking. Health risks related to unsafe water and unsafe sanitation were in ninth position (ca. 1.4 million premature deaths and 84 million disability-adjusted life-years/DALYs).⁷ In 2016, air pollution was the sixth most dangerous health risk factor (nearly 4.5 million premature deaths and 103.1 million DALYs), possibly leading to non-communicable diseases and premature deaths. Unsafe water was not included among the top ten threats.⁸

³ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *OECD Environmental Outlook to 2050: The Consequences of Inaction*, OECD Publishing, 2012, p. 276.

⁴ World Health Organization, *Ambient Air Pollution: a global assessment of exposure and burden of disease*, Geneva, WHO Document Production Services, 2016, p. 40.

⁵ World Health Organization, *Air pollution. Key facts*, 2018, [https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/ambient-\(outdoor\)-air-quality-and-health](https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/ambient-(outdoor)-air-quality-and-health) [accessed: 15.09.2019].

⁶ YLLs are years lost due to premature mortality. YLLs are calculated from the number of deaths multiplied by the standard life expectancy at the age at which death occurs. YLLs take into account the age at which deaths occur by giving greater weight to deaths at younger age and lower weight to deaths at older age. World Health Organization, *Years of life lost (percentage of total)*, <https://www.who.int/whosis/whostat2006YearsOfLifeLost.pdf> [accessed: 18.09.2019].

⁷ M.H. Forouzanfar et al., 'Global, regional, and national comparative risk assessment of 79 behavioural, environmental and occupational, and metabolic risks or cluster of risks in 188 countries, 1990–2013: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2013', *The Lancet*, vol. 386, no. 10010, 2015, pp. 2302–2305, <https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S0140-6736%2815%2900128-2> [accessed: 7.09.2019].

⁸ M.H. Forouzanfar et al., 'Global, regional, and national comparative risk assessment of 79 behavioural, environmental and occupational, and metabolic risks or cluster of risks, 1990–2015: a sys-

The goal of this paper is to identify the scale of ambient air pollution in Poland and to assess the threats it poses to human security, as Poles are exposed to air pollution above the established norms, especially during winter. Under the Environmental Protection Act of 27 April 2001, air pollution is understood as the emission of solid, liquid and gaseous substances which may be harmful to human health or the environment, may cause damage to material property, may deteriorate the aesthetic values of the environment, or interfere with other legitimate uses of the environment.⁹ The main hypothesis adopted for the purpose of the research process is that low quality air is one of the major environmental threats to Polish nationals. In order to verify this hypothesis, the following research questions were asked: first, the concentrations of which pollutants pose the greatest threat to the life and health of Poles, and what are the sources of their emissions?; second, what legal acts have been developed by the national authorities in order to ensure that air quality conforms to European standards as concerns the pollutants posing the greatest threat to the life and health of Poles?; third, are the solutions adopted sufficient to ensure human safety in terms of clean air? The attempt to answer the above questions was made using quantitative and decision-making methods, as well as an institutional and legal analysis.

Health consequences of exposure to excessive concentrations of benzo(a)pyrene and particulate matter

The quality of air in Poland is assessed based on the criteria specified in Directive 2008/50/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe (OJ EU L 152/1, 11.06.2008), and Directive 2004/107/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004, relating to arsenic, cadmium, mercury, nickel and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons in ambient air (OJ EU L 23/3, 26.01.2005). These regulations were incorporated into Polish legislation by the Regulation of the Minister of Environment of 24 August 2012 on the levels of certain substances in the air. Due to the adverse effects of air pollution on health, air quality is examined annually with respect to the content of twelve substances: sulphur dioxide (SO₂), nitrogen dioxide (NO₂), carbon monoxide (CO), benzene (C₆H₆), ozone (O₃), particulate matter (PM₁₀ and PM_{2.5} whose aerodynamic diameter is below 10 µm and 2.5 µm, respectively) and PM₁₀ contamination with lead (Pb), arsenic (As), cadmium (Cd), nickel (Ni) and benzo(a)pyrene (BaP). The standard concentrations of individual pollutants and the results of air quality assessment in Poland in terms of health protection in 2017 have been illustrated in Table 1.

tematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2015', *The Lancet*, vol. 388, no. 10053, 2016, pp. 1677–1688, <https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S0140-6736%2816%2931679-8> [accessed: 7.09.2019].

⁹ Ustawa z dnia 27 kwietnia 2001 roku – Prawo ochrony środowiska [The Environmental Protection Act of 27 April 2001], Section 3, Polish Journal of Laws of 2001, no. 62, item 627.

Table 1. Exceedances of standards of air pollution concentrations in relation to human health protection in 2017 in individual air quality assessment zones in Poland

Substance	Permissible or target level of substance in ambient air	Number of ambient air quality assessment zones with exceedances
SO ₂	350 µg/m ³ , one-hour concentration, 24 exceedances allowed per year	0
	125 µg/m ³ , 24-hour concentration, 3 exceedances allowed per year	1
NO ₂	200 µg/m ³ , one-hour concentration, 18 exceedances allowed per year	0
	40 µg/m ³ , average annual concentration	4
CO	10 000 µg/m ³ , eight-hour concentration, maximum moving average calculated from one-hour concentrations	0
C ₆ H ₆	5 µg/m ³ , average annual concentration	0
O ₃	120 µg/m ³ , eight-hour concentration, maximum moving average calculated from one-hour concentrations, 25 days exceeding the target level allowed per year	6
PM ₁₀	50 µg/m ³ , 24-hour concentration, 35 exceedances allowed per year	34
	40 µg/m ³ , average annual concentration	10
Pb	0.5 µg/m ³ , average annual concentration	0
As	6 ng/ m ³ , average annual concentration	3
Cd	5ng/ m ³ , average annual concentration	0
Ni	20 ng/ m ³ , average annual concentration	0
BaP	1 ng/ m ³ , average annual concentration	43
PM _{2.5}	25 µg/m ³ , average annual concentration	19

Source: author's analysis based on Państwowy Monitoring Środowiska – Inspekcja Ochrony Środowiska, *Ocena jakości powietrza w strefach w Polsce za rok 2017. Zbiórny raport krajowy z rocznej oceny jakości powietrza w strefach wykonywanej przez WIOŚ według zasad określonych w art. 89 ustawy – Prawo ochrony środowiska*, Warszawa 2018, pp. 20, 27, 35–36, 39, 45, 51, 71, 74, 78, 82, 86, 98.

The state monitors the ambient air quality in Poland in 46 zones constituted by agglomerations with the population of over 250,000, cities of over 100,000 inhabitants, and the remaining territories not covered by the above.¹⁰ The zones have been specified in the Regulation of the Minister of Environment of 2 August 2012 on the zones in which ambient air quality is assessed. Based on air quality assessments, the zones are currently classified as those where the concentration levels of any of the pollutants monitored do not exceed allowable/target levels (class A)

¹⁰ Ustawa z dnia..., *op. cit.*

or those where the concentration level of even one of the pollutants exceeds the allowable/target level (class C). The results of air quality assessment in 2017 presented in Table 1 demonstrate that problems with maintaining standard concentrations concerned benzo(a)pyrene contained in PM_{10} , PM_{10} and $PM_{2.5}$ to the greatest extent. The level of exceedances recorded was lower for ozone and nitrogen dioxide, and that for arsenic and sulphur dioxide was low.

The standard concentration level of benzo(a)pyrene was exceeded across almost the whole territory of Poland (in over 93% of zones) and numerous exceedances of values for PM_{10} (in 76% of zones taking into account the 24-hour standard) and $PM_{2.5}$ (in 41% zones) were recorded, which is why this article attempts to assess the threat posed by these substances to the health and life of Poles. Permissible concentration levels for BaP, PM_{10} and $PM_{2.5}$ occur mainly in winter, which is due to the increased emissions of matter generated by solid fuel burning for heating purposes, in particular in individual buildings. Regional environmental protection inspectorates, which perform air quality assessment, indicated heating to be the main reason for the exceedances, accounting for 100% of exceedances of the BaP target level, as well as for 91% of violations of the permissible level specified for 24-hour concentrations of PM_{10} , 88% for average annual concentration of PM_{10} and 90% of average annual concentration of $PM_{2.5}$.¹¹

Benzo(a)pyrene, a polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon (PAH) from the group of persistent organic compounds, is a product of incomplete combustion of coal, wood and household waste among others. Since the Polish power industry is coal-based, the concentration of BaP in Poland is the highest in Europe. This highly lipid soluble compound is absorbed in lungs and intestines and may lead to neoplastic lesions¹² that develop over approximately fifteen years from the first contact with significant amounts of this substance at the shortest.¹³

Particulate matter is a mixture of fine solid particles and droplets of liquid suspended in the air, which are primary pollutants emitted directly into the atmosphere, as well as secondary pollutants generated in the atmosphere as a result of chemical reactions. Primary PM comes from natural sources, such as forest fires and volcanic eruptions, as well as from anthropogenic sources related mainly to fuel combustion processes, especially those of solid fuels, and industrial processes. Due to the size of solid particles, PM is divided into fine, with particles under 10 μm and very fine, with particles smaller than 2.5 μm .¹⁴ PM below 10 μm in diameter may adsorb heavy metals and chemical compounds, especially organic. Therefore, in order to assess air quality the concentrations of benzo(a)pyrene, arsenic, lead, cadmium and nickel in PM_{10} are examined.

¹¹ Państwowy Monitoring Środowiska – Inspekcja Ochrony Środowiska, *Ocena jakości powietrza w strefach w Polsce za rok 2017. Zbiórny raport krajowy z rocznej oceny jakości powietrza w strefach wykonywanej przez WIOŚ według zasad określonych w art. 89 ustawy – Prawo ochrony środowiska*, Warszawa 2018 p. 62, 64, 103.

¹² K. Juda-Rezler, *Oddziaływanie zanieczyszczeń powietrza na środowisko*, Warszawa 2006, pp. 76–77.

¹³ H. Mazurek, *Zagrożenie dla zdrowia czy moda na ekologię?*, Warszawa 2018, p. 28.

¹⁴ K. Juda-Rezler, *Oddziaływanie zanieczyszczeń powietrza...*, op. cit., p. 66.

The health effects of exposure to PM pollution are related to particle size and chemical composition which are associated with the source of particles. Mineral dust (e.g. desert dust) has been found to be less harmful than PM generated when combusting fossil fuels and biomass, which has a negative effect on the respiratory, circulatory, nervous and reproductive systems.¹⁵ If the PM₁₀ particles inhaled with air are not trapped in the nasal passages, they travel to the lower respiratory tract. Particles smaller than 0.1µm in diameter can additionally enter alveoli and – carried with blood – reach various human organs, including the brain.¹⁶

Exposure to particulate matter increases the incidence of respiratory infections, including pneumonia, especially in children and the elderly, and the risk of intensified symptoms of asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and consequently the number of hospitalizations. Prolonged exposure may result in new cases of asthma.¹⁷ PM pollution not only aggravates the symptoms of current cardiovascular diseases, but also contributes to their development (e.g. coronary artery disease, hypertension) in persons considered healthy. Increased exposure to PM_{2.5} for several hours up to several weeks may result in a heart stroke or even death. The risk of hospitalization or death due to heart failure increases by 2.11% per 10 µg/m³ of PM_{2.5} and by 1.13% for PM₁₀.¹⁸ The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), an agency of the World Health Organization, has determined that PM is carcinogenic to humans.¹⁹ Based on many years of research conducted in the USA, Western Europe and Japan, it was found that in the case of long-term exposure, the incidence of lung cancer in humans increases by 9% per 10 µg/m³ of PM_{2.5}.²⁰ In women expecting a child, PM_{2.5} particles easily permeate the placenta-vascular barrier and enter the foetus. This often results in low birth weight and weaker lung development, and later translates into the child's general intellectual and physical development.²¹

In 2012, exposure to ambient air pollution in Poland resulted in 5,284 deaths from ischemic heart disease, 4,514 from stroke, 1,678 from lung cancer, and 171 from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.²² In 2015, the European Environment Agency reported that 44,500 persons died prematurely due to exposure to PM_{2.5} in Poland. YLLs attributable to PM_{2.5} exposure in Poland were estimated at 533,300,

¹⁵ J. Jędrak, A. J. Badyda and E. Konduracka, 'Wpływ zanieczyszczeń powietrza na zdrowie ludzkie', [in:] United Nations Global Compact Network Poland, *Zrównoważone Miasta. Życie w zdrowej atmosferze*, Warszawa, Publications Office of the Global Compact Poland, 2016, pp. 86, 89–95.

¹⁶ H. Mazurek, *Smog... op. cit.*, pp. 17–18.

¹⁷ United Nations Global Compact Network Poland, *Zrównoważone miasta. Poprawa jakości powietrza w Polsce*, Warszawa, Publications Office of the Global Compact Poland, 2018, pp. 75–76.

¹⁸ E. Konduracka, 'Konsekwencje ekspozycji na zanieczyszczenia powietrza dla układu krążenia', [in:] H. Mazurek and A. Badyda (eds.), *Smog. Konsekwencje zdrowotne zanieczyszczeń powietrza*, Warszawa 2001, p. 101.

¹⁹ International Agency for Research on Cancer, *Outdoor Air Pollution. IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans*, Vol. 109, Lyon, 2016, p. 34.

²⁰ J. Jędrak, E. Konduracka, *Wpływ zanieczyszczeń powietrza na zdrowie*, Kraków 2017, p. 54.

²¹ A. Rzędowska, K. Rybikowski, K. Prudel, *Jak aktywizować przedsiębiorców w wojnie ze smogiem? Rekomendacje środowiska*, Warsaw Enterprise Institute, Warszawa 2018, p. 12.

²² World Health Organization, *Ambient Air Pollution...*, p. 77.

which translates into 1,403 YLLs per million inhabitants.²³ Epidemiological studies have shown that short-term exposure to higher concentrations of $PM_{2.5}$ increases overall mortality by 1% per $10 \mu g/m^3$ of $PM_{2.5}$, subject to variations in different regions of the world.²⁴ Studies conducted in the USA have confirmed that long-term exposure to $PM_{2.5}$ increased total mortality by 4% per $10 \mu g/m^3$ and mortality related to cardiovascular disease and lung cancer by 6% and 8%, respectively.²⁵ All-cause daily mortality is estimated to increase by 0.2–0.6% per $10 \mu g/m^3$ of PM_{10} .²⁶

Major legislative initiatives launched by the state authorities aimed at the reduction of reduce ambient air pollution from municipal and domestic sources after 2015

The key legislative solutions aimed to reduce emissions from municipal and domestic sources adopted after the 2015 elections, won by Law and Justice, include the introduction of emission standards for new heating devices and the development of coal quality requirements. These regulations are important because the amount of pollutants entering the atmosphere is influenced by both fuel quality and the type and condition of the heating device. Approximately 200,000 coal boilers are estimated to be sold in Poland annually, approximately 140,000 of which currently have very poor emission parameters and should not be available for purchase.²⁷

In order to eliminate high-emission boilers from the market in Poland, the Regulation of the Minister of Development and Finance of 1 August 2017 on requirements for solid fuel boilers²⁸ became effective on 1 October 2017. The restrictions pertain to boilers with a capacity of up to 500 kW, that is those used in domestic heating. The devices available on the market have to meet the parameters for energy and emission efficiency set out for the fifth, and highest level. New hand-fuelled boilers, among other things, cannot emit more than $60 mg/m^3$ of PM. In the case of automatic boilers, emissions cannot exceed $40 mg/m^3$ of PM. Emergency furnaces, often used to burn municipal waste, cannot be installed in boilers.²⁹

²³ European Environment Agency, *Air quality in Europe – 2018 report*, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2018, pp. 64–65.

²⁴ E. Konduracka, 'Konsekwencje ekspozycji ...', op. cit., p. 103.

²⁵ C. A. Pope et al., 'Lung Cancer, Cardiopulmonary Mortality, and Long-term Exposure to Fine Particulate Air Pollution', *JAMA*, vol. 287, no. 9, 2002, p. 1137.

²⁶ World Health Organization, *Health Effects of Particulate Matter. Policy implications for countries in eastern Europe, Caucasus and central Asia*, Copenhagen, WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2013, p. 6.

²⁷ A. Guła, 'Bez regulacji czystego powietrza nie będzie', [in:] A. Dworakowska (ed.), *Efektywność energetyczna w Polsce. Przegląd 2013. Domy jednorodzinne. Efektywność energetyczna a jakość powietrza*, Kraków 2014, pp. 41–47.

²⁸ The regulation is effective from 1 July 2018 for boilers manufactured and not available for purchase or put into service before 1 October 2017.

²⁹ Rozporządzenie Ministra Rozwoju i Finansów z dnia 1 sierpnia 2017 r. w sprawie wymagań dla kotłów na paliwo stałe, Dz.U. 2017, poz. 1690.

The above regulation did not completely rule out the possibility of buying a non-class boiler, which was why an amendment was adopted after eighteen months, resulting in the withdrawal of two exemptions which businesses took advantage of to produce non-class boilers,³⁰ and clarifying the meaning of “making available for purchase.” Pursuant to the amendment, it denotes “every manner of handling a product on the territory of the Republic of Poland by any legal or factual act, including rental and selling by means of distance communication or carried out in a form other than as part of business operations.”³¹ Consequently, making available for purchase includes not only the first sale of the boiler on the market but also sales on the secondary market, including between natural persons, online sales, rental as well as installations and connections to the heating system.

One of the significant weaknesses of the regulation is that it failed to introduce the obligation of replacing old boilers that did not meet the requirements of the regulation. Approximately 1.7 million of single-family houses in Poland use coal boilers that are ten or more years old, most of them being low-efficiency manual-fed boilers.³² Primitive heating appliances that emit considerable amounts of PM and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon compounds should be gradually eliminated under the new regulations. However, it should be borne in mind that the average solid fuel boiler can be used for as long as twenty years, therefore the introduction of the Regulation on the requirements for solid fuel boilers should not be expected to bring a rapid improvement of air quality. Another thing is that third- and fourth-class boilers continue to be offered for sale, as found out, for instance, by one of the authors of a blog on technology and lifestyle, who called five sellers each of whom was ready to sell a heating appliance that did not meet the requirements.³³ This demonstrates the necessity for tighter control and supervision of trading in solid fuel boilers.

Another significant legislative step to ensure clean air involves the Act of 5 July 2018, amending the law on fuel quality monitoring and control system and the law on the national tax administration. Under this Act, it was prohibited to sell solid fuels such as coal sludge, flotation concentrates, brown coal and fuel mixtures containing less than 85% of coal and not adapted for combustion in individual boilers and low power installations, to households and combustion installations with a nominal heat output below 1 MW (e.g. boiler rooms in residential buildings,

³⁰ Businesses took advantage of exclusions in the regulation pertaining to (1) devices generating heat for the sole purpose of providing hot utility water and (2) non-wood biomass boilers. It was therefore possible to sell, for example, primitive heating devices as water heaters, and not as central heating boilers.

³¹ Rozporządzenie Ministra Przedsiębiorczości i Technologii z dnia 21 lutego 2019 r. zmieniające rozporządzenie w sprawie wymagań dla kotłów na paliwo stałe, Dz.U. 2019, poz. 363.

³² Ł. Pytliński, ‘Stan techniczny budynków jednorodzinnych w Polsce. Potrzeby remontowe, źródła ogrzewania i standardy izolacyjności cieplnej. Raport z badań’, [in:] E. Walczak, M. Zaborowski (eds.), *Efektywność energetyczna w Polsce. Przegląd 2017. Domy jednorodzinne. Smog*, Kraków 2018, pp. 33–74.

³³ M. Tabaka, *Próbowałem kupić kocioł niższej klasy. Ten zabroniony prawem. Po paru minutach mogłem finalizować transakcję*, [web blog], 27 November 2018, <https://www.spidersweb.pl/2018/11/kociol-nizszej-klasy.html> [accessed: 12.10.2019].

schools, and hospitals).³⁴ Sellers of solid fuel that violates the law are punishable by a fine of PLN 50,000–500,000 or imprisonment. Despite the ban, coal sludge and flotation concentrates continue to be offered online. In November 2018, journalists from *Gazeta Wyborcza* contacted fuel sellers, who offered to deliver the prohibited fuel to the customer, but refused customers with their own means of transport to pick the fuel up from them. One of the sellers said: “A lot of people are buying sludge from us now. If anything, you have to say you bought it the year before. You know what’s going on. We’ll bring the sludge under the tarpaulin, and on the site we’ll cover it with coal to mask it. Nobody will find out.”³⁵

The Act has obliged businesses to issue a quality certificate for fuel sold. If the certificate is not issued, or contains incorrect data, or if the seller fails to provide the buyer with a copy of the certificate issued, he faces a fine of PLN 10,000–25,000 if the value of solid fuel sold does not exceed the amount of PLN 200,000; or a fine of PLN 25,001–PLN 100,000 if the value of solid fuel sold exceeds PLN 200,000.³⁶ The quality of solid fuels admitted to trading is set out in the Regulation of the Minister of Energy of 27 September 2018 on the quality requirements for solid fuels, effective from 4 November 2018. This regulation is necessary to ensure clean air because domestic heating appliances are not equipped with flue gas cleaning installations. The amount of pollutant emissions depends on the quality of coal burned; for instance, SO₂ emissions are directly proportional to the sulphur content in coal, and PM emission goes up by 9–20% per 1% of ash.³⁷

The new regulations introduced quality standards (including ash and total sulphur content) for two fuel groups. The former rests on hard coal and briquettes, or pellets containing at least 85% of hard coal. The latter includes the products of the thermal processing of hard or brown coal, such as coke and semi-coke. If the fuel does not meet the quality standards set out in the regulation, it cannot be sold for use in households and installations with a thermal power below 1 MW.³⁸

In the opinion of environmental and social organisations dealing with air protection, the quality standards introduced for solid fuels are too liberal. The Polish Smog Alert (*Polski Alarm Smogowy*, PAS) demands that the following parameters for coarse and medium coal grades be lowered: maximum sulphur content from 1.7% to 0.8%; maximum moisture content from 20% to 12%, and ash content from 12–14% to 10%, as well as the introduction of a minimum calorific value of 25MJ/kg, instead of 21–22 MJ/kg for these types of fuels. In the opinion of PAS, changes should also be introduced regarding the quality requirements for eco-fine coal.

³⁴ The ban on sales has been in force since 12 September 2018, except for the ban on placing brown coal on the market, which will apply from 1 June 2020.

³⁵ P. Zapotoczny, ‘Handel mułem i flotem kwitnie. To jak my się chcemy pozbyć smogu?’, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 30 November 2018, <https://opole.wyborcza.pl/opole/7,35086,24226459,handel-mulem-i-flotem-kwitnie-to-jak-my-sie-chcemy-pozbyc-smogu.html?disableRedirects=true> [accessed: 14.10.2019].

³⁶ Ustawa z dnia 5 lipca 2018 r. o zmianie ustawy o systemie monitorowania i kontrolowania jakości paliw oraz ustawy o Krajowej Administracji Skarbowej, Dz.U. 2018, poz. 1654.

³⁷ A. Badyda, J. Jędrak, ‘Możliwości ograniczenia emisji’, [in:] *Smog. Konsekwencje zdrowotne ... op. cit.*, p. 164.

³⁸ Rozporządzenie Ministra Energii z dnia 27 września 2018 r. w sprawie wymagań jakościowych dla paliw stałych, Dz.U. 2018, poz. 1890.

Importantly, the Ministry of Energy allows a deviation of 0.3% for sulphur content, 3% for moisture and ash content and 1 MJ/kg for calorific value. PAS deems it necessary to depart from the deviations permitted, interpreting them as an attempt to further lower coal quality standards.³⁹ The standards proposed by the organization refer to those presented by the Polish Chamber of Ecology during the consultations on the regulation.⁴⁰

The regulation does not eliminate worst-quality coal – fine coal with high ash content (as high as 31% with the permissible deviation), moisture (up to 27%) and sulphur (up to 2.1%) and with a minimum calorific value of 17 MJ/kg, before 30 June 2020. Such fuel should not be burned in domestic furnaces and boilers due to the high emission of pollutants into the atmosphere. Additionally, a high content of subgrain was allowed – up to 30%, which may lead to the mixing of fine coal with forbidden coal waste – sludge and flotation concentrate. Before the Regulation on the quality requirements for solid fuels was adopted, the Supreme Audit Office (NIK) issued a report in which it stated that “the solid fuel parameters proposed in the draft of the regulation (in particular ash, sulphur and moisture content) protect the coal sector much more than they take into account the pursuit of the protection of citizens and the environment against the negative effects of air pollution.”⁴¹

Numerous representatives of local authorities voiced their criticism of the Regulation on the quality requirements for solid fuels at the consultation stage. The quality standards for solid fuels introduced by the regulation are not consistent with anti-smog resolutions adopted by regional assemblies. These resolutions often set out higher, more restrictive standards for fuels permitted in a given area. On 20 August 2018, one month before the adoption of the regulation, Jacek Krupa, the Marshal of the Małopolskie Region, requested Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki and the Minister of Energy Krzysztof Tchórzewski to adopt more stringent quality standards for solid fuels, arguing that “the draft regulation does not give a realistic chance for air quality improvement.”⁴² The same opinion was shared by Wojciech Saługa, the Marshal of the Śląskie Region, who on 21 August 2018 sent a letter to the Minister of Energy too.⁴³ Despite these reservations, no changes were made to the regulation concerned. The Marshal of the Mazowieckie Region Adam Struzik stated that admitting low

³⁹ *Ibidem* and Polski Alarm Smogowy, *Stanowisko PAS w sprawie rozporządzenia dotyczącego wymagań jakościowych dla paliw stałych*, 20 August 2018, <https://smoglab.pl/stanowisko-pas-w-sprawie-rozporzadzenia-dotyczacego-wymagan-jakosciowych-dla-paliw-stalych/#sdfootnote5anc> [accessed: 19.10.2019].

⁴⁰ K. Kubicka, L. Kurczabiński, K. Włodarczyk, *Propozycja wymagań jakościowych dla węgla jako paliwa dla sektora komunalno-bytowego*, Katowice 2013, pp. 3–4.

⁴¹ Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, *Ochrona powietrza przed zanieczyszczeniami. Informacja o wynikach kontroli*, Warszawa 2018, p. 88.

⁴² *Apel do rządu o zdecydowane działania w sprawie złej jakości węgla*, 20 August 2018, <https://www.malopolska.pl/aktualnosci/srodowisko/marszalek-krupa-apeluje-do-rzadu-w-sprawie-rygorystycznych-norm-dla-paliw-stalych> [accessed: 19.10.2019].

⁴³ *Stanowcze nie dla złych paliw*, 21 August 2018, <https://slaskie.pl/content/stanowcze-nie-dla-zlych-paliw?page=6&t=ekologia> [accessed: 19.10.2019].

quality coal for sale would promote smog formation, making it more difficult to combat smog. He also criticised the consultations on the provisions of the regulation conducted by the Minister of Energy, who requested comments not from local authorities and organizations dealing with air protection but from coal companies and trade unions, among others.⁴⁴

Energy poverty is indeed a major obstacle to the rapid elimination of emissions from the municipal sector, which primarily results from low income, high energy prices and low energy efficiency in buildings. As a consequence, some Poles are forced to purchase heating equipment and fuel that do not meet accepted standards and outside official trading channels. The Regulation on the requirements for solid fuel boilers liquidated low (the cheapest) and partly also middle segments (moderate prices) of the boiler market. The cost of buying a new heating device has increased several times, which is too high a burden for most of the 1.3 million Polish households inhabited by 3.35 million people affected by multidimensional energy poverty.⁴⁵

In order to protect vulnerable social groups from energy poverty, the Act of 6 December 2018 amending the Act on supporting thermal modernization and refurbishment and some other laws was adopted. Under this law, the municipality pursuing the reduction of emissions and air quality improvement may establish a low-emission municipal program. Its beneficiaries receive subsidies when exchanging high-emission heating appliances for devices that meet emission standards, or when connecting to a heating or gas network while conducting thermal modernization of their single family residential building. Depending on the household income, these investments will be subsidized up to 100% from the program,⁴⁶ for which ca. PLN 1.2 billion has been earmarked.⁴⁷

The Thermal Modernisation and Refurbishment Fund co-finances the activities covered by the program on the basis of agreements that will have been concluded by the relevant minister of economy and municipalities by the end of 2024 at the latest, for a period of up to 3 years, provided that five conditions are met. The conditions include, among other things: the anti-smog resolution has been

⁴⁴ Adam Struzik: *Jak walczyć ze smogiem? Rząd psuje przepisy*, [website], 21 August 2018, <https://www.portalsamorzadowy.pl/ochrona-srodowiska/adam-struzik-jak-walczy-z-smogiem-rzad-psuje-przepisy,112341.html> [accessed: 19.10.2019].

⁴⁵ J. Sokołowski, P. Lewandowski, A. Kielczewska, S. Bouzarovski, *Measuring Energy Poverty in Poland with the Multidimensional Energy Index*, Instytut Badań Strukturalnych, Working Paper 07/2019, July 2019, p. 6. The authors of this publication classified a household as suffering from energy poverty if it experiences at least two forms of deprivation. The most common are 'low income, high cost' (household has high required energy costs – above the national median level and low income) and 'high actual cost' (household spends a high share of its income on actual energy costs) which applies to 31% of energy-poor households in Poland, followed by a combination of 'presence of leaks, damp, or rot' and 'inability to keep the home adequately warm' which applies to 16% of energy-poor households.

⁴⁶ Ustawa z dnia 6 grudnia 2018 roku o zmianie ustawy o wspieraniu termomodernizacji i remontów oraz niektórych innych ustaw, Dz.U. 2019, poz. 51.

⁴⁷ *Wchodzi w życie nowelizacja ustawy o wspieraniu termomodernizacji i remontów*, [website], Ministerstwo Rozwoju, 11 February 2019, <https://www.gov.pl/web/rozwoj/wchodzi-w-zycie-nowelizacja-ustawy-o-wspieraniu-termomodernizacji-i-remontow> [accessed: 21.10.2019].

implemented by the municipality; low-emission projects have been implemented, covering not less than 2% and not more than 12% of the total number of single-family residential buildings in the municipality, excluding cities with a population of over 100,000 inhabitants; and the municipality covers part of the investment costs planned. In the case of towns with a population of up to 100,000, municipal contribution should amount to 30% of the costs, and for larger cities it should be higher than 30%.⁴⁸ The first agreement concluded within the framework of the solutions introduced by the new law provided for PLN 11.1 million to be transferred for low-emission projects in 300 single-family houses. It was signed on 1 July 2019 between the municipality of Skawina and the Ministry of Entrepreneurship and Technology.⁴⁹

Conclusions

Low-quality air is among the major environmental threats to Polish people, as highlighted by the number of casualties attributed to the lethal exposure to ambient air pollution, and associated primarily with the deteriorated operation of the circulatory and respiratory systems. The compounds that are most dangerous to the health of Poles include benzo(a)pyrene and particulate matter, whose standard concentration levels are commonly exceeded.

The main source of the pollutants concerned is the combustion of solid fuels in households. The replacement of obsolete high-emission heating devices, and allowing only high quality coal to be offered for sale, alongside appropriate monitoring and control systems, are imperative to improving air quality. Therefore, the adoption of regulations regarding emission standards for new heating devices and quality requirements for coal is a positive step forward, although it should be emphasised that the Supreme Audit Office called for the Minister of the Environment to introduce the latter as early as in 2000.⁵⁰ Additionally, the provisions introduced are not sufficient to quickly improve air quality in Poland. The biggest doubts are raised by the Regulation of the Minister of Energy of 27 September 2018 on the quality requirements for solid fuels.

The success of the actions taken by state authorities for clean air is associated with the nationwide limitation of the use of solid fuels in the municipal and domestic sector. Other future actions to this end include the elimination of solid fuels in newly constructed buildings that remain within the range of district heating or gas networks or the obligation to connect existing buildings to district heating or gas networks if such possibilities exist technically.

⁴⁸ Ustawa z dnia 6 grudnia 2018 roku..., *op. cit.*

⁴⁹ *Stop Smog – pierwszy samorząd podpisał umowę z rządem*, [website], 1 July 2019, <http://www.miasta.pl/aktualnosci/stopsmog-pierwszy-samorzad-podpisal-umowe-z-rzadem> [accessed: 21.10.2019].

⁵⁰ *NIK o smogu alarmowała od 2000 roku*, 18 January 2017, <https://www.nik.gov.pl/aktualnosci/nik-o-smogu-alarmowal-od-2000-roku.html> [accessed: 23.10.2019].

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Zanieczyszczenie powietrza zewnętrznego jako wyzwanie dla bezpieczeństwa jednostki ludzkiej w Polsce

Streszczenie

Celem artykułu jest identyfikacja skali zanieczyszczenia powietrza zewnętrznego w Polsce oraz ocena zagrożeń, jakie stwarza ono dla bezpieczeństwa jednostki ludzkiej. Odpowiedzi na postawione pytania badawcze: (1) stężenia których zanieczyszczeń stanowią największe zagrożenie dla życia i zdrowia Polaków oraz jakie są źródła ich emisji?; (2) jakie działania podejmowane są przez władze centralne w celu zagwarantowania jakości powietrza zgodnej ze standardami europejskimi w odniesieniu do zanieczyszczeń stwarzających największe zagrożenie dla życia i zdrowia Polaków?; (3) czy przyjęte rozwiązania są wystarczające, a jeśli nie – jakie kierunki działań powinny być wzięte pod uwagę, by zapewnić bezpieczeństwo jednostki ludzkiej w odniesieniu do czystości powietrza? – prowadzą do wniosku, że powietrze niskiej jakości stanowi jedno z najważniejszych zagrożeń środowiskowych dla polskich obywateli. Konstytucyjny obowiązek podjęcia przez władze publiczne działań, które ograniczą poziom zanieczyszczenia powietrza oraz jego negatywny wpływ na zdrowie ludzi, nie jest realizowany w sposób wystarczający.

Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo jednostki ludzkiej, bezpieczeństwo ekologiczne, polityka ochrony powietrza, jakość powietrza, niska emisja

Ambient Air Pollution as a Human Security Challenge in Poland

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to identify the scale of ambient air pollution in Poland and to assess the threats it poses to human security. Answering the research questions posed: (1) the concentrations of which pollutants pose the greatest threat to the life and health of Poles, and what are the sources of their emissions?; (2) what acts of law have been introduced by the national authorities in order to ensure that air quality conforms to European standards as concerns the pollutants posing the greatest threat to the life and health of Poles?; (3) are the solutions adopted sufficient, and if not – what course of action should be taken into account to ensure human safety in terms of clean air? leads to the conclusion that low quality air is among the major environmental threats to Polish people. Admittedly, the constitutional duty of the public authorities to take adequate measures aimed at limiting the level of air pollution and its negative effect on human life has not fulfilled at a sufficient level yet.

Key words: human security, environmental security, clean air policy, air quality, low-stack emission

Die Außenluftverschmutzung als Herausforderung für die menschliche Sicherheit in Polen

Zusammenfassung

Das Ziel des Artikels ist das Ausmaß der Außenluftverschmutzung in Polen zu identifizieren und die damit verbundenen Gefahren für die menschliche Gesundheit zu beurteilen. Folgende Forschungsfragen sollen beantwortet werden: (1) Die Konzentrationen welcher Verschmutzungen bilden die größte Gefahr für das Leben und die Gesundheit der Polen und was sind ihre Emissionsquellen?; (2) Welche Maßnahmen werden durch die Zentralbehörde zum Zweck der Gewährleistung der den europäischen Standards entsprechenden Luftqualität in Bezug auf die Verschmutzungen, die das größte Risiko für das Leben und die Gesundheit der Polen bilden, ergriffen?; (3) Sind die angenommenen Lösungen ausreichend, und wenn nicht – welche Handlungsmaßnahmen sollen berücksichtigt werden um die menschliche Sicherheit in Bezug auf die Sicherstellung der sauberen Luft zu gewährleisten? Sie führen zur Schlussfolgerung, dass Luft von schlechter Qualität eine der wichtigsten Umweltgefahren für die polnischen Bürger ist. Die Behörde, die verfassungsrechtlich verpflichtet ist, die Maßnahmen zu ergreifen, die den Grad der Luftverschmutzung und ihren negativen Einfluss auf die menschliche Gesundheit reduzieren, geht dieser Pflicht nicht ausreichend nach.

Schlüsselwörter: die menschliche Gesundheit, die ökologische Sicherheit, Politik für die Verbesserung der Luftqualität, Luftqualität, geringe Emission

Загрязнение наружного воздуха как вызов безопасности человека в Польше

Резюме

В статье указаны масштабы загрязнения наружного воздуха в Польше и дана оценка рисков, которое оно создает для безопасности человека. Предпринята попытка дать ответы на следующие исследовательские вопросы: (1) концентрация каких загрязняющих веществ представляет наибольшую опасность для жизни и здоровья поляков и каковы источники их выбросов?; (2) какие меры принимает центральная власть для обеспечения качества воздуха, соответствующего европейским стандартам, касающимся концентрации загрязняющих веществ, представляющих наибольшую опасность для жизни и здоровья поляков?; (3) являются ли принятые решения (а если нет то какие решения следует принять) достаточными для обеспечения чистоты воздуха? Ответы на эти вопросы позволяют сделать вывод, что воздух низкого качества представляет собой один из важнейших экологических рисков для польских граждан. Также следует указать, что государственные органы власти недостаточным образом реализуют конституционную обязанность в части принятия мер по ограничению уровня загрязнения воздуха и его негативного воздействия на здоровье людей.

Ключевые слова: безопасность человека, экологическая безопасность, политика защиты воздуха, качество воздуха, низкие выбросы



Anna Diawoł-Sitko

Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University
ORCID: 0000-0003-2064-7314

Scarcity of Food: a Factor Destabilising Security in the MENA Region

Introduction

The goal of this paper is to examine the impact of food security on political stability in the MENA region at three levels: the state level, the regional level, and the individual level. The paper also discusses the assessment of the effectiveness of governments in the region in terms of food security risk management strategies, and interregional cooperation. The author has decided to put forward the thesis that food shortages is one of the main driving factors of political instability in the MENA region, and ensuring food security is an important task for current governments in the region.¹

The paper can be broken down into three parts. The first depicts the socio-political and economic situation in the MENA region and the level of food security, and it discusses the relationship between conflict and food insecurity. The second part presents the analysis of examples of the impact of food insecurity on instability

¹ As defined by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), food security refers to four issues: accessibility, access, use and stability. Food must be available at country level, through domestic production and / or import. Households must have access to food, which is associated with adequate distribution to individual consumers. Consumed food should be adequate to maintain health and an active life and be available at all times. See: World Food Summit 1996, *Rome Declaration on World Food Security*, <http://www.fao.org/3/w3613e/w3613e00.htm> [accessed: 10.10.2019], The United Nations, 'Arab Horizon 2030: Prospects for Enhancing Food Security in the Arab Region', Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Beirut 2017, pp. 3–4, <https://www.unescwa.org/sites/www.unescwa.org/files/uploads/arab-horizon-2030-prospects-enhancing-food-security-summary-english.pdf> [accessed: 16.11.2019].

in the MENA region. In the third part, the author provides examples of numerous mechanisms and strategies implemented to counterbalance the negative implications of food insecurity on political stability at the state and regional level.

The analysis carried out in this paper was based on various sources: books, reports, and articles from the period of 2015–2019, and the author’s own research. The critical, problem-oriented approach has been applied, which takes into account the behaviour of basic actors, important from the point of view of the topic, and the following research methods have been used: factor analysis, institutional and legal, and content analysis.

Characteristics of the MENA Region

According to the author, the Middle East and North Africa is a region that consists of countries from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya through countries of Levant (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Israel and Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Iraq) and the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) to Iran. However, it is worth mentioning that the term Middle East is not strictly defined. What constitutes the Middle East is open to several interpretations. The main dispute between various interpretations is whether or not to include countries such as Turkey, Sudan, Afghanistan, and the Maghreb region. Studies identify two groups of definitions of the Middle East. The so-called “narrow” approach sees the Middle East as the area of the Arabian Peninsula and the Fertile Crescent (the area from Egypt through Palestine and Syria to Mesopotamia) and does not include Maghreb countries: Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauretania. The Middle East is also defined broadly, including the Maghreb region with Afghanistan and Pakistan. There are some researchers who divide the Middle East into three sub-regions: Levant, Maghreb and the Persian Gulf. One of the reasons for this is that the Middle East cannot be defined by objective features – it cannot be characterised by using criteria of a physical geography perspective. It is more a geopolitical term, and in order to define it, is essential to take historical, geo-cultural, geo-political, geo-economic and geo-strategic factors into account.²

There are several links between conflicts and food insecurity. Doubtless, the conflict negatively affects food security, and uncertainty in this area persists as its heritage.³ The lack of food security is not only a consequence, but also a cause of conflict. Research has been conducted for several years now in this area and was intensified after the economic crisis of 2008. Studies suggest that the relationship between food insecurity and conflict is not automatic but rather depends on the context concerning the existing political institutions, the type of political system, the level of economic development, social security networks, citizens’ trust in

² P. Bilgin, ‘Whose Middle East’? Geopolitical Inventions and Practices of Security’, *International Relations*, 2004, vol. 18, pp. 25–28.

³ S. Abis, ‘Food Security and Conflicts in the Mediterranean Region’, *Mediterranean Yearbook*, IEMed 2018, pp. 274–276.

public authorities, and their mobilization capabilities.⁴ As Christopher Barrett emphasises, neither hunger nor conflict exist in a vacuum.⁵ The risk of conflict or unrest due to the food insecurity is higher in so-called hybrid regimes where democratic and authoritarian institutions intertwine, in countries with the low level of development and where social inequalities exclude some citizens from access to goods.⁶ The interaction between the food, water, energy and climate sectors must also be taken into account, as well as agricultural structure and efficiency.⁷ Moreover, the countries that have a large share in food imports and those where households spend a large part of their income on food are more exposed to the conflict.⁸ The likelihood of conflict also increases within ethnically diverse communities and in developing countries, where there is often a lack of stable dispute resolution institutions.⁹ Also, the type of food that causes riots can play a major role, as in many places food plays a significant cultural role: for example, in Egypt, bread fulfils this role.¹⁰ The countries with high levels of unemployment and the dominance of young people aged 15–24 are prone to conflicts. The degree of urbanisation also plays a role when the rural population moves to cities, the proportion of consumers and producers of food is disturbed. City dwellers are more geographically concentrated, are closer to the governments, and bear lower costs for joint action against those who rule them. However, as Henk-Jan Brinkman and Cullen Hendrix point out, city dwellers generally have better access to food than the rural community and political actors pay more attention to their needs and demands.¹¹ At the internal level, food and water shortages increase the risk of humanitarian crises, uncontrolled migratory flows, resettlements, protests against the authorities related to civil disobedience and may contribute to the community conflict. At regional level, they increase competition for limited resources.¹²

⁴ C. Breisinger, O. Ecker, J.F. Maystadt, J.T. Trinh Tan, P. Al-Riffai, K. Bouzar, A. Sma, M. Abdelgadir, 'How to Build Resilience to Conflict: the Role of Food Security', Food Policy Report, IFPIR 2014, pp. 1–6.

⁵ Ch.B. Barrett, 'Food or Consequences: Food Security and Its Implications for Global Sociopolitical Stability', [in:] Ch. B. Barret (ed.), *Food Security and Sociopolitical Stability*, Oxford 2013, p. 5. The World Food Program USA, 'Winning the Peace: Hunger and Instability', Washington D.C. 2017, p. 44, <https://www.wfpusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/2017-Winning-the-Peace-Hunger-and-Instability.pdf> [accessed: 15.11.2019].

⁶ The World Food Program USA, 'Winning the Peace...', *op. cit.*, pp. 44–45.

⁷ Sh. Efron, Ch. Fromm, B. Gelfeld, Sh. Nataraj, Ch. Sova, 'Food Security in the Gulf Cooperation Council', RAND Corporation, December 2018, pp. 7–8, https://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP67748.html [accessed: 15.11.2019], M. Hameed, H. Moradkhani, A. Ahmadelipour, H. Moftakhari, P. Abbaszadeh and A. Alipour, 'A Review of the 21st Century, Challenges in the Food-Energy-Water Security in the Middle East', *Water*, vol. 11, April 2019, pp. 2–3.

⁸ H.J. Brinkman, C.S. Hendrix, 'Food Insecurity and Violent Conflict: Causes, Consequences, and Addressing the Challenges', Occasional Paper, No. 4, The World Food Program, Rome 2011, p. 11.

⁹ The World Food Program USA, 'Winning...', *op. cit.*, p. 19.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

¹¹ C.S. Hendrix, H.J. Brinkman, 'Food Insecurity and Conflict Dynamics: Causal Linkages and Complex Feedbacks', *International Journal of Security and Development*, 2013, vol. 2, p. 8.

¹² H. J. Brinkman, C.S. Hendrix, 'Food Insecurity and Violent Conflict...', *op. cit.*, p. 8.

All the above mentioned issues exist in the MENA region. In terms of political matters and security, the region is epitomised by political crisis. The countries of the region, formed as a result of decolonisation, were struggling with instability from the beginning of their existence. Inter-state relations are defined by competition and a lack of cooperation not only at the political level, but also at the economic level. With the creation of Israel in 1948, the long-lasting Israeli-Palestinian conflict has dominated security architecture of the region. Nowadays, the region faces several interconnected conflicts that tear countries and societies apart, including, among others, the Syrian civil war, the Yemeni civil war, the Libyan civil war, or the struggle for regional leadership between Iran and Saudi Arabia. All of them are fuelled by sectarian, political, economic, and security differences. The authoritarian but domestically weak countries pave the way for radical non-state actors to act. Ethnically and religiously heterogeneous societies do not find a common language.¹³ The state structures in the MENA region are too weak and vulnerable to provide solid defence mechanisms against the challenges they are facing. The conflicts at the political level are accompanied by growing social disparities, poverty, high unemployment, population growth, as well as inefficient and unproductive economies. The region is struggling with an identity crisis and a lack of regional security architecture and a sense of community and common responsibility for the future at domestic and regional level.¹⁴

In terms of income, the MENA countries can be divided into two groups. The first group, which includes those with high incomes, are oil exporters, mainly the Arabian Peninsula countries (without Yemen), but also Libya and Algeria, where over 56% of the world's oil resources and about 36% of the world's natural gas resources are based.¹⁵ The second group, in which 90% of the total population lives, are low- and middle-income countries, such as Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Yemen.¹⁶ Despite positive GDP indicators, the problem is unstable economic growth. Inequalities are a dominating problem in the region, and some citizens are excluded from participation in income.¹⁷ The region is also not attractive to investors. Most countries are listed at the end the World Bank's Doing Business Index ranking, and they have to deal with high levels of corruption, and low governance indexes.¹⁸ What is common to the countries of the region is also a rapid increase in energy consumption, which

¹³ Sh. Akbarzadeh, K. Baxter, *Middle East Politics and International Relations. Crisis Zone*, New York 2018, pp. 2–5.

¹⁴ E. Holmquist and J. Rydqvist (eds.), *The Future of Regional Security in the Middle East: Expert Perspectives on Coming Developments*, FOI, April 2016, pp. 17–23.

¹⁵ M. Hameed, H. Moradkhani, A. Ahmadelipour, H. Moftakhari, P. Abbaszadeh, A. Alipour, 'A Review of the 21st Century...', *op. cit.*, p. 4.

¹⁶ H. Lofgren, A. Richards, 'Food Security, Poverty, and Economic Policy in the Middle East and North Africa', Discussion Paper, No. 10, IFPRI, February 2003, p. 3, <http://ebrary.ifpri.org/utils/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/87844/filename/87845.pdf> [accessed: 20.11.2019].

¹⁷ M. Hameed, H. Moradkhani, A. Ahmadelipour, H. Moftakhari, P. Abbaszadeh, A. Alipour, 'A Review of the 21st Century...', *op. cit.*, p. 9.

¹⁸ Food and Agricultural Organization, 'Near East and North Africa, Regional Overview of Food Security and Nutrition', Cairo 2018, p. 42, <http://www.fao.org/3/ca3817en/ca3817en.pdf> [accessed: 15.11.2019].

is associated with the demographic boom and economic transformation. It is estimated that between 2012–2040 energy demands will increase by 95%.¹⁹

The region has one of the highest population growth rates. Over 50% of its people are aged 15–24. According to the UN, in 1970–2000, the population growth rate in the region was one of the highest in the World and amounted to 2.57%.²⁰ By 2050, the region's population will have almost doubled, reaching 650 million.²¹ The population growth is accompanied by rapid urbanisation. In the years 1970–2010, the number of city dwellers increased four times, and by 2050, it is expected that 66% of the region's population will be living in cities.²² The level of urbanisation in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) stands at 84%, and in the least developed ones it reaches 34%.²³ High unemployment particularly affects younger workers. In the last couple of years, the unemployment rate of people aged 15–24 has gone up to almost 25%, a level twice as high as the world average.²⁴

There are significant differences between the countries of the MENA region, both in terms of food safety, and in their ability to cope with the challenges in this area. Overall, the food security prospects in the MENA region are not promising.²⁵ However, most countries are self-sufficient in food. The Average Dietary Energy Supply Adequacy Index (ADESA) for the Arab region is around 134%, which means that the region, taken as a whole, has much more food than it is required for its population to live a healthy and active life. On the one hand, some countries have ratios of over 150%, e.g. Egypt. On the other hand, some reach just 100%. However, ADESA does not take into account how food is distributed.²⁶ According to the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the number of malnourished people has increased since the beginning of the 1990s. It is estimated that this problem

¹⁹ M. Hameed, H. Moradkhani, A. Ahmadelipour, H. Moftakhari, P. Abbaszadeh, A. Alipour, 'A Review of the 21st Century...', *op. cit.*, p. 15.

²⁰ The United Nations, 'World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision', United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, New York 2014, <https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Highlights/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf> [accessed: 15.11.2019], cited in G. Jobbins and G. Henley, 'Food in an Uncertain Future. The Impacts of Climate Change on Food Security and Nutrition in the Middle East and North Africa', WFP 2015, p. 20, <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/food-uncertain-future-impacts-climate-change-food-security-and-nutrition> [accessed: 15.11.2019].

²¹ M. Martens, 'Food and Water Security in the Middle East and North Africa', NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Science and Technology Committee Special Report, 8 October 2017, p. 2, <https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2017-11/2017%20-%20176%20STC%2017%20E%20bis-%20FOOD%20AND%20WATER%20SECURITY%20MENA%20-%20MARTENS%20REPORT.pdf> [accessed: 15.11.2019].

²² *Ibid.*, p. 6.

²³ The United Nations, 'Arab Horizon 2030...', *op. cit.*, p. 15.

²⁴ C.E. Werrell, F. Femia (eds.), *The Arab Spring and Climate Change. A Climate and Security Correlations Series*, Center for American Progress, Stimson, The Center for Climate and Security, p. 43, <https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/climatechangearabspring-ccs-cap-stimson.pdf> [accessed: 20.10.2019].

²⁵ A. Balduzzi, 'Bread, Freedom and Migration: the Role of Food in the Arab Awakening', Barilla Center for Food and Nutrition, 22 May 2019, <https://www.foodandmigration.com/bread-freedom-and-migration-the-role-of-food-in-the-arab-awakening> [accessed: 29.11.2019].

²⁶ The United Nations, 'Arab Horizon 2030...', *op. cit.*, p. 15.

concerns about 33 million people in the region, mostly those living in rural areas.²⁷ A study by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) has revealed that, with the exception of oil-rich Arabian Peninsula countries, most face the risk of food insecurity.²⁸ According to the Global Food Security Index (GFSI) for 2012, 2014 and 2016, Israel, Qatar and Kuwait are classified as the most food-safe countries in the region. Syria and Yemen are the most vulnerable states to food insecurity.²⁹ In Yemen, in March 2017, about 17 million people, accounting for 60% of the total population, required food assistance. In Syria, an estimated 6.5 million are at risk of not having access to food.³⁰

The lack of food security at the macro level is influenced by import dependency and challenges related to domestic production; at the micro level, the problems with its even distribution. MENA countries import around 50% of wheat and barley, 40% of rice and 70% of corn. Food import dependency is expected to increase by 64% between 2010 and 2030. In some GCC countries, grain import rates exceed 90%.³¹ What is more, according to the FAO, the slow growth of animal production, a lack of good quality feed in adequate quantities and a lack of appropriate policies supporting infrastructure and services have led to a sharp increase in live animal import over the last decade.³² The poor are the ones who are most affected by the changes occurring in food prices, as they spend between 35% and 65% of their income on groceries.³³

Only 4% of the land in the region is cultivated, and 55% is unsuitable for agricultural production. At present, used land is severely degraded to such an extent that

²⁷ G. Jobbins, G. Henley, 'Food in an Uncertain Future...', *op. cit.*, p. 7.

²⁸ C. Breisinger, T. van Rhee, C. Ringler, A. Nin Pratt, 'Food Security and Economic Development in the Middle East and North Africa: Current State and Future Perspectives'. IFPRI Discussion Paper, No. 00985, 2010, <http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/ifpridp00985.pdf> [accessed: 15.11.2019], cited in, M. Solh, 'The Outlook for Food Security in the Middle East and North Africa', Rosenberg International Forum on Water Policy, Aqaba, Jordan 2013, p. 99, <http://ciwr.ucanr.edu/files/168767.pdf> [accessed: 5.12.2019].

²⁹ The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Global Food Security Index 2017: Measuring Food Security and The Impact of Resource Risks*, London, 2017, The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Global Food Security Index 2012: An Assessment of Food Affordability, Availability and Quality*, London 2012, The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Global Food Security Index 2014: An Annual Measure of the State of Global Food Security*, London 2014, The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Global Food Security Index 2016: An Annual Measure of the State of Global Food Security Contents*, London 2016, cited in M. Hameed, H. Moradkhani, A. Ahmadalipour, H. Moftakhari, P. Abbaszadeh, A. Alipour, 'A Review of the 21st Century...', *op. cit.*, p. 3.

³⁰ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and Food and Agricultural Organization, *The Middle East and North Africa: Prospects and Challenges, Agricultural Outlook*, 2018, p. 87, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/agr_outlook-2018-5en.pdf?expires=1575659070&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=01CA2C360736DE863F51A87629911BB7 [accessed: 20.11.2019].

³¹ M. Martens, 'Food and Water...', *op. cit.*, p. 5.

³² *Improving livestock and livelihoods, and responding to animal health threats*, FAO 2019, <http://www.fao.org/neareast/perspectives/transboundary-animal-diseases/en> [accessed: 5.12.2019].

³³ J.A. Lampietti, S. Michaels, N. Magnan, A.F. McCalla, M. Saade, N. Khouri, 'A Strategic Framework for Improving Food Security in Arab Countries', *Food Security*, vol. 3, February 2011, Supplement 1, pp. 10–18.

its productivity is estimated to have been reduced by up to 30-35%.³⁴ Most of the arable land is concentrated in the Fertile Crescent region around the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and in the Nile basin.³⁵ The largest food producers are Iran and Egypt, producing half of the total agricultural production value.³⁶

Despite the fact that the agricultural sector employs about 40% of the labour force in Morocco and between 20% and 30% in Yemen, Egypt and Iran, the regional governments have invested little in the transformation of rural areas.³⁷ Government spending in this sector has been steadily decreasing since the 1980s.³⁸ Most farmers grow grain, for which 60% of the land is allocated. However, grain production generates only 15% of the gross agricultural production value. Farmers do not want to specialise in more profitable and, what is more important, less water-consuming horticulture, not to mention nutritional values or export opportunities. Grain crops are associated with a lower risk, because they are more immune to changing climatic conditions. Public support for agriculture and access to credit favours large farms. In some countries of the region – such as Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon and Iran – most farms are smaller than one hectare. The modernisation policy has largely excluded small owners from public support. These farms are small, technologically backward, and poor. Facilitating large-scale land acquisition by domestic and foreign investors is another policy supporting and promoting large farms³⁹. Another common problem is related to food waste. Food losses account for almost 30% of production.⁴⁰ Another problem is poor infrastructure. Food is often stored on so-called open stalls, making them susceptible to pollution, heat, and humidity, which speeds up the rotting of food.⁴¹ The lack of infrastructure often prevents delivery to urban markets. As a result, food prices are low in producing regions and high in cities. At individual level, many rural farms do not have a market in their area. In Yemen, for 40% of rural households, the nearest market is between 6 and 20 km away, and for the next 20%, the nearest market is more than 20 km away. In addition, these people must invest more to get food when, for example, fuel prices rise.⁴²

³⁴ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and Food and Agricultural Organization, 'The Middle East and North Africa...', *op. cit.*, p. 71.

³⁵ 'The Food Security. Factor Stability', Governance, and Development Choices, Dialogue Snapshot Report, The Hollings Center for International Dialogue, April 2018, p. 4, <https://hollingscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Food-Security-Layout-Final.pdf> [accessed: 1.12.2019].

³⁶ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and Food and Agricultural Organization, 'The Middle East and North Africa...', *op. cit.*, p. 79.

³⁷ G. Jobbins, G. Henley, 'Food in an Uncertain...', *op. cit.*, p. 20.

³⁸ A. Balduzzi, 'Bread, Freedom and Migration: the Role of Food in the Arab Awakening', Barilla Center for Food and Nutrition, 22 May 2019, p. 4, <https://www.foodandmigration.com/bread-freedom-and-migration-the-role-of-food-in-the-arab-awakening> [accessed: 1.12.2019].

³⁹ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and Food and Agricultural Organization, 'The Middle East and North Africa...', *op. cit.*, p. 77.

⁴⁰ 'The Food Security. Factor Stability...', *op. cit.*, p. 6

⁴¹ The United Nations, 'Arab Horizon 2030...', *op. cit.*, p. 95.

⁴² Oxfam, 'Missiles and Food Yemen's Man-Made Food Security Crisis', Oxfam Briefing Note, December 2017, p. 11, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/bn-missiles-food-security-yemen-201217-en.pdf> [accessed: 16.11.2019].

All of the region's economies will face water scarcity by 2050.⁴³ The average water availability in the region is only 1,200 cubic metres per year per person, compared to the global average of 7,000 cubic metres.⁴⁴ The countries of the region over-exploit their water resources.⁴⁵ Water-use efficiency is only half the world average. Due to the dry climate, around 40% of the crop's areas in the region need irrigation.⁴⁶

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has identified the MENA region as a hotspot for climate change due to water scarcity, low levels of socio-ecological resilience, social tensions, political conflicts, and the ongoing immigration crisis.⁴⁷ Research indicates that by 2035, the average temperatures in the region will have risen by 1° C in winter, and by 1.5 to 2° C in the summer. By the end of the century, the average temperature may reach 50° C.⁴⁸ By 2030, more frequent and intense drought and heat waves are expected, which implies that precipitation can fall by 20–40%⁴⁹ and crop efficiency can be reduced by up to 30%. Higher temperatures will cause faster rotting of food.⁵⁰ In addition, the projected increase in sea level will have a strong impact on densely populated, low-lying coastal areas, in Qatar, Egypt, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates.⁵¹ It is estimated that between two and four million people would have to be relocated from the Nile Delta if the sea level rose just by 50 centimetres.⁵²

Food security and instability in the MENA Region

Deepening problems and challenges with food security are not the main reasons for conflicts in the MENA region, but in combination with weak institutions,

⁴³ French National Institute for Agricultural Research, *North Africa and the Middle East through to the year 2050: towards a greater dependence on agricultural imports*, 10 March 2018, <http://institut.inra.fr/en/Objectives/Informing-public-policy/Advanced-Studies/All-the-news/North-Africa-Middle-East-2050-food-dependency> [accessed: 15.10.2019].

⁴⁴ M. Martens, 'Food and Water...', *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁴⁶ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and Food and Agricultural Organization, 'The Middle East and North Africa...', *op. cit.*, p. 70.

⁴⁷ I. Carry, 'Climate Change, Water Security, and National Security for Jordan, Palestine, and Israel', *EcoPeace Middle East*, Amman, Jordan, Tel Aviv, Israel, Ramallah, Palestine 2019, p. 9, <https://eco-peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/climate-change-web.pdf> [accessed: 15.10.2019].

⁴⁸ M.A. Lang, 'Impacts of Climate Change on the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East and North Africa Region and the Water–Energy Nexus', *Atmosphere*, vol. 10, August 2019, p. 6.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ G. Jobbins, G. Henley, 'Food in an Uncertain...', *op. cit.*, p. 34.

⁵¹ The United Nations, 'Arab Horizon 2030...', *op. cit.*, p. 11.

⁵² O. Brown and A. Crawford, 'Rising Temperatures, Rising Tensions. Climate change and the risk of violent conflict in the Middle East', *International Institute for Sustainable Development*, 2009, p. 26, https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/rising_temps_middle_east.pdf [accessed: 17.11.2019].

authoritarian regimes, divided societies, the lack of adaptability they are indeed the major factors.⁵³ Several protests related to food shortages took place in response to higher food prices in Egypt as early as in the 1970s, as well as in Jordan and Morocco in the 1980s and 1990s.⁵⁴

The scarcity of food played a significant, though indirect, role in the Arab uprisings sweeping across the region in 2011. Beginning with Tunisia, massive protests touched most of North Africa and the Middle East. During the year, four Arab regimes were overthrown. Tunisian President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali fled the country. President Hosni Mubarak from Egypt was forced to resign and later convicted and imprisoned. As a result of international intervention, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi from Libya lost control of the country and was later killed by his opponents, and the country – given the political, economic and tribal differences – plunged into civil war. In Yemen, President Ali Abdullah Saleh was forced to transfer power but the political transformation was not successful and resulted in a long violent civil war. A civil war began in Syria and despite the fact that the governmental forces have been able to stay in place, fighting continues today. The protests did not bypass the Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, proving that they can happen even in rich economies and no one is exempt from the need to change.⁵⁵

These events were preceded by an increase in global food prices in 2008–2009. By mid-2008, food prices on world markets had risen sharply by several percent.⁵⁶ This was due to higher energy prices, the use of corn not only as food, but also for the production of biofuels, reduced exports due to the growing internal demand for food in exporting countries, speculation on food prices, land accumulation by international corporation⁵⁷ Most governments in the region responded by reducing import duties and increasing subsidies and wages in the public sector. However, food prices for consumers increased by several percent anyway.⁵⁸ Self-immolation of Muhammad Buazizi, a street vendor in Tunisia who had sparked a local uprising, was partly due to the rising costs of food prices. When the Egyptians took to the street in 2011, “bread”, “dignity” and “social justice” were among the main

⁵³ The United Nations, ‘The Drivers and Impact of Conflict on the Sustainable Development Agenda in the Arab Region’, Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Beirut 2018, pp. 1–4, https://www.unescwa.org/sites/www.unescwa.org/files/publications/files/the_drivers_and_impact_of_conflict_on_the_sustainable_development_agenda_in_the_arab_region_0.pdf [accessed: 29.11.2019].

⁵⁴ P. Bilgin, ‘Re-visioning Security in the Middle East, a Critical Security Studies Perspective’, Paper Prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions Workshop *Re-defining Security*, Mannheim, 26–31 March 1999, p. 10, <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/9f75d90a-6c7e-4928-b6e2-a099b9492340.pdf> [accessed: 29.11.2019].

⁵⁵ L. Sadiki, ‘The Arab Spring: The People in International Relations – International relations of the Arab Spring’, [in:] L. Fawcett (ed.), *International Relations of the Middle East*, Oxford 2016, pp. 346–355.

⁵⁶ M. Solh, ‘The Outlook for Food Security...’, *op. cit.*, pp. 97–105.

⁵⁷ L. Brown, ‘The Great Food Crisis of 2011. It’s real, and it’s not going away anytime soon’, *Foreign Policy*, 10 January 2011, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/10/the-great-food-crisis-of-2011> [accessed: 18.10.2019].

⁵⁸ C.E. Werrell, F. Femia (eds.), *The Arab Spring...*, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

slogans.⁵⁹ According to the Environmental Justice Foundation, among the major wheat importing countries, “the nine largest importers are in the Middle East, seven had political protests, in 2011. Two countries – the United Arab Emirates and Israel – despite the relatively high level of wheat imports, did not experience major protests because they have high income per capita and most importantly, a low percentage of income spent on food.”⁶⁰ The number of malnourished people in the MENA region has increased by 5% since 2011 in countries affected by conflict, the level of malnutrition in non-conflict countries has remained the same.⁶¹ Since 2018, new waves of protests, called New Arab Spring or Arab Spring 2.0, have been taking place in the region; food safety and access to basic services have become one of their driving factors.⁶²

Syria and Yemen are good examples of underlying how problems with access to food, in an ethnically and religiously divided society, a brutal and corrupt regime, widespread social exclusion, and lack of modernization reforms can become a driving force for change. In Yemen, on the eve of the outbreak of the Arab Spring, 45% of the population, over ten million, did not have food security.⁶³ Yemen imports 90% of food, including 90% wheat and 100% rice, which are basic food products.⁶⁴ Several years of internal conflict in Yemen made the situation worse. More than half the population urgently needs help.⁶⁵ The negative consequences of the conflict, such as blockades in ports and damaged infrastructure, have increased food, water and fuel prices, as well as reduced production. Humanitarian aid covers only about 20% of the country’s monthly needs. The population of Yemen has become much more prone to diseases. Oxfam reports that areas with high levels of food insecurity in Yemen have been particularly affected by the cholera epidemic.⁶⁶

In Syria, 40% of the population depends on agriculture. In the years 1999–2011, around 60% of Syria was affected by droughts. Although, as Erik Holmquist and John Rydqvist indicate, the severe drought caused neither a popular uprising nor a civil war in Syria, but created physical and economic conditions that made the Bashar al-Assad regime more prone to general resistance.⁶⁷ As a result of droughts,

⁵⁹ C.O. Ecker, J.F. Maystadt, J.F. Trinh Tan, P. Al-Riffai, K. Bouzar, A. Sma, M. Abdelgadir, ‘Building Resilience to Conflict Through Food-Security Policies and Programs. Evidence from Four Case Studies’, IFPRI 2020 Conference Paper, Vol. 3, May 2014, p. 10.

⁶⁰ Environmental Justice Foundation, ‘Beyond Borders: Our changing climate – its role in conflict and displacement’, 2017, p. 31, <https://ejfoundation.org/resources/downloads/BeyondBorders-2.pdf> [accessed: 17.10.2019].

⁶¹ Food and Agricultural Organization, ‘Near East and North Africa...’, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁶² A. G Bhaya, *Analysis: Are we seeing the beginning of Arab Spring 2.0?*, CGTN, 20 November 2019, <https://news.cgtn.com/news/2019-11-19/Analysis-Are-we-seeing-the-beginning-of-Arab-Spring-2-0--LKem9chUeA/index.html> [accessed: 10.12.2019].

⁶³ C.O. Ecker, J.F. Maystadt, J.F. Trinh Tan, P. Al-Riffai, K. Bouzar, A. Sma, M. Abdelgadir, ‘Building Resilience...’, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁶⁴ Oxfam, ‘Missiles and Food Yemen’s...’, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁶⁵ Food and Agricultural Organization, ‘Monitoring Food Security in Countries with Conflict Situations’, January 2019, pp. 26–30, <http://www.fao.org/3/ca3113en/CA3113EN.pdf> [accessed: 16.11.2019].

⁶⁶ Oxfam, ‘Missiles and Food Yemen’s...’, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁶⁷ E. Holmquist and J. Rydqvist (eds.), *The Future of Regional...*, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

wheat, cotton and barley crops decreased by up to 50%. Shepherds in north-eastern Syria lost about 85% of their cattle, 800,000 Syrians lost their livelihood. The drought coincided with the limitation of government subsidies for irrigation and fertilizers. In 2010, nearly three million people lived in extreme poverty. By 2011, more than one million Syrians had moved to cities that were already experiencing economic and social uncertainty due to the influx of refugees from Iraq and Palestine.⁶⁸ According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), 69% of Syrians live in extreme poverty for less than two dollars a day. 54% of people in Syria do not have food security, around 15 million people do not have access to safe water. Syria spends more on buying food than it receives revenues from export.⁶⁹ What is more, food has also been used as a tool and instruments in conflict through, among others resource control, targeting food production, support or exclusion of specific groups from food distribution, or limiting access to humanitarian aid⁷⁰. Material incentives can be an important recruitment strategy. For example, young men joined the so-called Islamic State to meet basic needs, including access to food.⁷¹

Access to resources in the region can become a source of conflict not only at the internal level, but also between countries. More than 60% of the water used in the MENA region is in cross-border rivers and is shared between countries.⁷² The Jordan River is an important source of water for Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Jordan. Over 80% of renewable water resources in Syria come from outside. Jordan shares Azraq Aquifer with Syria and Disi Aquifer with Saudi Arabia. Oil Brown and Alec Crawford indicate that access to the Euphrates River between Turkey, Syria and Iraq has long been a bone of contention.⁷³ Water resources are used as a tool in regional conflicts. Since Israel's occupation of West Bank in 1967, all of its water resources have been under military administration. Division on access to water has been a central element in almost every peace negotiation between Israel, Jordan, Syria and Palestinians.⁷⁴ During conflicts, taxation of water resources, manipulation of water prices, blocking access to water or pollution, as well as damage to water facilities as a result of attacks, redirection of river branches flooding agricultural land or entire villages occurs⁷⁵. For example, when the so-called Islamic State conquered the Nuaimiyah Dam on the Euphrates in 2014, it used the reservoir to flood the lower areas and cut off water for millions Iraqis.⁷⁶

⁶⁸ Environmental Justice Foundation, 'Beyond Borders...', *op. cit.*, p. 32.

⁶⁹ The United Nations, 'Arab Horizon 2030...', *op. cit.*, p. 13.

⁷⁰ 'Breaking the Cycle of Conflict, Hunger and Human Suffering', Concern Worldwide, 3 September 2018, pp. 12–14, https://admin.concern.net/sites/default/files/media/migrated/breaking_the_cycle_of_conflict_hunger_and_human_suffering.pdf [accessed: 20.10.2019].

⁷¹ The World Food Program USA, 'Winning...', *op. cit.*, p. 32.

⁷² N.A. Zawahri, *Water Security in the Middle East and North Africa*, Franklin Humanities Institute, 2017, <https://humanitiesfutures.org/papers/water-security-middle-east-north-africa> [accessed: 29.11.2019].

⁷³ O. Brown, A. Crawford, 'Rising Temperatures...', *op. cit.*, p. 21

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 21–22.

⁷⁵ The United Nations, 'The Drivers and Impact of...', *op. cit.*, pp. 9–13

⁷⁶ N.A. Zawahri, *Water Security...*, *op. cit.*

Given the development problems of the region and the history of strained bilateral and multilateral relations, as well as the constant political distrust between the MENA countries, the shortage of water resources may cause another wave of increased tensions and conflicts in the region. Resources are still seen as national assets, MENA leaders regard them as an integral part of national security and political stability, which leads to their militarization.⁷⁷

Examples of food security risk management strategies

One of the key government schemes adopted is an extensive social security network. The central element of it are food subsidies that consume up to several percent of GDP in many MENA countries.⁷⁸ Specialists emphasise that they are not the most effective way to build food security. They are regressive. They generate high costs in terms of distribution and management. They negatively affect the investment potential of individual countries and a more rational, economical and effective policy.⁷⁹ They do not always reach the poorest: for example, in Jordan, to receive food cards people must have social security, and 20% of the poorest do not have it. In countries like Egypt, where subsidised goods are sold through government stores, a common problem is that few of them are in poor areas, making access to them even more difficult.⁸⁰ Reforming the grant systems would lead to cost savings that could be invested in more directed programs improving food safety and nutrition, as well as job creation in poorer areas.⁸¹ It is worth mentioning that some countries limit or reform subsidy policies. For example, in February 2018, Jordan replaced the general wheat bread subsidy program with a targeted aid program, and the Saudi government plans to withdraw subsidies by the end of 2020.⁸²

Further strategies include food concentration, diversification of supply, investments in food-producing enterprises and the acquisition of agricultural land abroad. The governments of Jordan and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates maintain stocks of basic products for several months. Wheat imported by Egypt comes from various countries, including Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Poland, France, USA and Argentina.⁸³ Rich Gulf countries invest in food companies abroad, e.g. United Arab Emirates invests in Serbia and India. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are ranked among the ten largest countries investing in agricultural crops abroad.⁸⁴

⁷⁷ O. Brown, A. Crawford, 'Rising Temperatures...', *op. cit.*, p. 10.

⁷⁸ C.O. Ecker, J.F. Maystadt, J.F. Trinh Tan, P. Al-Riffai, K. Bouzar, A. Sma, M. Abdelgadir, 'Building Resilience...', *op. cit.*, pp. 10–12.

⁷⁹ A. Lampietti, S. Michaels, N. Magnan, A.F. McCalla, M. Saade, N. Khouri, 'A Strategic...', *op. cit.*, pp. 10–18.

⁸⁰ G. Jobbins, G. Henley, 'Food in an Uncertain...', *op. cit.*, p. 12

⁸¹ C.O. Ecker, J.F. Maystadt, J.F. Trinh Tan, P. Al-Riffai, K. Bouzar, A. Sma, M. Abdelgadir, 'Building Resilience...', *op. cit.*, pp. 15–24.

⁸² Food and Agricultural Organization, 'Near East and North Africa...', *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 27

⁸⁴ Sh. Efron, Ch. Fromm, B. Gelfeld, Sh. Nataraj, Ch. Sova, 'Food Security...', *op. cit.*, p.18.

The countries of the region are also making attempts at modernising and improving domestic agricultural production. The situation is most propitious in the GCC countries that invest in alternative crop varieties. The Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research and International Centre for Biosaline Agriculture conduct advanced research on the development of drought-resistant plant varieties as well as projects to combat desertification by increasing afforestation and appropriate land development. The production of greenhouse vegetables is also developing in these countries. In addition, in terms of providing access to water, GCC countries have invested in the water desalination process. However, it is highly expensive and energy-consuming and not all countries have this opportunity.⁸⁵ Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates produce about one third of desalinated water in the World.⁸⁶ Many GCC countries are also increasing their water resources by using treated wastewater to irrigate certain types of crops. GCC countries have also made efforts to improve groundwater management.⁸⁷

The countries are trying to support local production. The examples are programs in Tunisia and Jordan, which focus on the needs of local farmers by promoting the use of local products in school canteens,⁸⁸ and Morocco has introduced provisions to decentralize agricultural projects and to consult them with the local community.⁸⁹ Good practices also come from projects financed by external organizations such as FAO or WFP. In 2017–2017, FAO implemented the Youth Mobility, Food Security and Rural Poverty Reduction project, which held training sessions in the field of running small farms for unemployed youth.⁹⁰ The WFP implemented the Home-Grown School Feeding project providing school meals for around 2.5 million children in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia based on locally produced products.⁹¹

Regional cooperation is a challenge, although here good practices and examples of involvement can also be seen. The Arab Ministerial Water Council, the Arab Ministerial Council for Electricity and the General Assembly of Arab Ministers for Agriculture, the Council of Arab Ministers Responsible for the Environment, and the Joint Committee on the Arab the Region have adopted several regional strategies

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁸⁶ N. Farajalla, R. Hajj, A. Jagerskog, T. Terspta, 'Enhancing Regional Cooperation in the Middle East and North Africa through the Water-Energy-Food Security Nexus', Planetary Security Initiative, Policy Brief, April 2017, p. 5, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317036677_Enhancing_regional_cooperation_in_the_Middle_East_and_North_Africa_through_the_Water-Energy-Food_Security_Nexus [accessed: 30.11.2019].

⁸⁷ Food and Agricultural Organization, 'Near East and North Africa...', *op. cit.*, p. 27. See: R. Bailey, R. Willoughby, 'Edible Oil: Food Security in the Gulf. Energy, Environment and Resources', Chatham House Briefing Note, November 2013, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Energy%2C%20Environment%20and%20Development/bp1113edibleoil.pdf> [accessed: 30.11.2019].

⁸⁸ The International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, 'Social Protection after the Arab Spring', Policy in Focus, vol. 14, Issue 3, December 2017, p. 36, https://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/eng/PIF40_Social_protection_after_the_Arab_Spring.pdf [accessed: 30.11. 2019].

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 56–62.

⁹⁰ A. Balduzzi, 'Bread, Freedom and Migration...', *op. cit.*

⁹¹ The International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, 'Social Protection...', *op. cit.*, p. 35.

on water climate issues and food security. In 2016, The League of Arab States commissioned regional institutions and academic partners to develop a series of reports on the issues discussed. Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Sudan and Yemen implement a project funded by the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Kuwaiti Fund for Economic Development, and the Islamic Development Bank. The aim of the project is to improve food security and greater efficiency of the agricultural sector, taking into account the challenges related to climate change and population growth.⁹² Moreover several countries have taken steps to resolve disputes regarding water resource management in the region. Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan have signed a Khartoum declaration which attempted to resolve disputes with access to shared water resources. In 2015, Saudi Arabia signed an agreement with Jordan on mechanisms for settling disputes over cross-border water resources.⁹³ Jordan, Israel and Palestinians have been cooperating in a large project (Red-Dead) aimed at transporting water from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea.⁹⁴

Conclusions

As indicated above, all countries of the region that is the object of scrutiny are affected by the problem of food shortage due to the lack of adequate land for cultivation, which affects import dependence and susceptibility to fluctuations in food prices on international markets, water shortage and the negative effects of climate change. Despite the fact that each country of the region has a unique experience and history, a distinct power structure in the economic and political dimension and, most importantly, an ideological specificity, they all struggle with economic problems, a high unemployment rate especially among young people, social inequalities, weak institutions, which negatively affects the implementation of mechanisms and strategies for dealing with challenges. The situation is further complicated by the fact that hydrological borders do not coincide with political ones, and the MENA region is one of the most conflicted areas on Earth, where cooperation is difficult. Conflicts heritage has breached the ability of communities and governments to cope with change. Although external and internal conflicts in the region have a political dimension, in some cases their broader socio-economic context, including access to basic resources and lack of food security, determines their outbreak, intensity, scale or duration.

Despite the examples of schemes and initiatives launched by individual countries and regional institutions to improve food security and in sectors that are directly or indirectly correlated with it, they are mostly sectoral and the challenges faced by the countries of the region must be treated comprehensively. Investments

⁹² M. Solh, 'The Outlook...', *op. cit.*, p. 113.

⁹³ Sh. Efron, Ch. Fromm, B. Gelfeld, Sh. Nataraj, Ch. Sova, 'Food Security...', *op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁹⁴ T. Baconi, 'Testing the water: How water scarcity could destabilise the Middle East and North Africa,' Policy Brief, European Council of Foreign Relations, 13 November 2018, p. 8, https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/how_water_scarcity_could_destabilise_the_middle_east_and_north_africaFiNALV3.pdf [accessed: 30.11.2019].

in food security should be a part of the national security strategy and in post-conflict states should be treated as part of their reconstruction. Food safety issues, if not properly and timely addressed, can strengthen existing social pressure and become a source of further internal and regional conflicts. This will not take place without external support and without a broad cooperation platform involving all entities and institutions in the region.

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Niedobór żywności: czynnik destabilizujący bezpieczeństwo w regionie MENA

Streszczenie

Niniejszy artykuł analizuje wpływ bezpieczeństwa żywnościowego na stabilność polityczną w regionie MENA na szczeblu państwowym, regionalnym i indywidualnym. Omówiono także ocenę skuteczności rządów w regionie pod względem strategii zarządzania ryzykiem bezpieczeństwa żywności i współpracy międzyregionalnej. Autor wysuwa tezę, że niedobór żywności jest jednym z głównych czynników niestabilności politycznej w regionie MENA, a zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa żywnościowego jest ważnym zadaniem dla obecnych rządów w całym regionie. Biorąc pod uwagę problemy rozwojowe regionu oraz historię napiętych stosunków dwustronnych i wielostronnych, a także ciągłą nieufność polityczną między krajami regionu MENA, brak zasobów żywności i wody może zaostrzyć napięcia i wywołać dalsze konflikty w regionie.

Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo żywnościowe, zmiany klimatu, region MENA, arabska wiosna

Scarcity of Food: a Factor Destabilising Security in the MENA Region

Abstract

This paper looks at the impact of food security on political stability in the MENA region, at the state, regional and individual levels. It also discusses the assessment of the effectiveness of governments in the region in terms of food security risk management strategies and interregional cooperation. The author puts forward the thesis that food shortage is one of the main driving factors of political instability in the MENA region, and ensuring food security is a major task for current governments in the entire region. Given the

development problems of the region and the history of strained bilateral and multilateral relations, as well as the constant political distrust between the MENA countries, the shortage of food and water resources may exacerbate tensions and stir further conflict in the region.

Key words: food security, climate change, MENA region, Arab Spring

Nahrungsmittelknappheit: ein destabilisierender Faktor für die Sicherheit in der MENA-Region

Zusammenfassung

Der vorliegende Artikel analysiert den Einfluss der Ernährungssicherheit auf die politische Stabilität in der MENA-Region auf staatlicher, regionaler und individueller Ebene. Er diskutiert auch, wie die Wirksamkeit der Regierungen in der Region in Hinsicht der Strategie des Risikomanagements, der Ernährungssicherheit und der interregionalen Zusammenarbeit beurteilt wird. Die Autorin stellt die These auf, dass die Nahrungsmittelknappheit einer der Hauptfaktoren der politischen Instabilität in der MENA-Region ist und die Gewährleistung der Ernährungssicherheit eine wichtige Aufgabe für die derzeitigen Regierungen in der ganzen Region darstellt. Angesichts der Entwicklungsprobleme der Region und der Geschichte der bilateralen und multilateralen gespannten Beziehungen, als auch des ständigen politischen Misstrauens unter den MENA-Ländern, kann Knappheit bei der Lebensmittel- und Wasserversorgung die Spannungen verschärfen und weitere Konflikt in der Region schaffen.

Schlüsselwörter: Ernährungssicherheit, Klimawandel, die MENA-Region, der arabische Frühling

Дефицит продовольствия: фактор дестабилизирующий безопасность в регионе MENA

Резюме

В статье дан анализ влияния продовольственной безопасности на политическую стабильность в регионе MENA на государственном, региональном и индивидуальном уровнях. Также дана оценка эффективности действий правительств государств региона с точки зрения стратегии управления рисками продовольственной безопасности и межрегионального сотрудничества. Автор выдвигает тезис о том, что дефицит продовольствия является одним из основных факторов политической нестабильности в регионе MENA, а обеспечение продовольственной безопасности остается важной задачей для нынешних правительств государств региона. Учитывая проблемы развития региона и историю напряженных двусторонних и многосторонних отношений, а также существующее политическое недоверие между государствами региона MENA, нехватка продовольствия и водных ресурсов может усугубить напряженность отношений и вызвать новые конфликты в регионе.

Ключевые слова: продовольственная безопасность, изменение климата, регион MENA, арабская весна



Adrian Siadkowski

WSB University in Dąbrowa Górnicza
ORCID: 0000-0002-6561-4770

Syrian Immigrants: a Subject that Requires Protection, a Threat, or an Object of International Politics?

Introduction

The political and social changes that began in the Maghreb and Middle East (MENA) countries in 2011 in some of them introduced changes that had been expected by the demonstrators, but to a larger extent destabilised the situation and led to the strengthening of non-state actors, such as e.g. the terrorist organisation by the name of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. The political struggle for power and territory in the MENA area is extremely brutal and, combined with the ideology of the Salafist jihad, leads to the extermination of the population that shows any form of deviation from faith. It is not surprising, therefore, that there has been a huge exodus of people from these areas, and dramatic attempts have been made by many to reach safer countries.

However, there is a problem in understanding this situation and this help, which concerns not only the scale of the phenomenon facing Europe, but also the qualitative issue of the clash of cultures and religions. The so-called Arab Spring, as the political and social changes in the Arab world used to be referred to, has given rise to a wave of changes and opportunities for new political groups. This includes both new modernist political groups who oppose the authoritarian and totalitarian governments, and the return to the political scene of Islamic groups from conservative and fundamentalist circles. The changes launched at the end of 2010 have a significant and far-reaching impact not only on the stability and security in the Maghreb and Middle East regions, but also on Europe's

security. The protests against the regimes governing Arab states, from Morocco to Sudan, Syria and the Arab Peninsula, which began in January 2011, did not have a uniform character; from the relatively peaceful overthrow of President Ben Ali in Tunisia, the bloody fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya or the ongoing rule of Bashar As-Sadat in Syria, which, together with the dynamics of change, can be regarded as a catalyst for the activity of the Islamic State, on the other hand, as a field of political play of powers such as Russia, the US or Turkey, which protect their own interests. The struggle for the interests of individual actors and the inability of the central government to ensure the security of its own citizens living within the borders of the state is of key importance in determining the determinants of strengthening the position and activities of the terrorist organisation "Islamic State of Iraq" in Syria and Iraq (Islamic State of Iraq and Sham, ISIS), which was the direct cause of the wave of emigration from the areas under its control and, as a result, led to an immigration crisis in Europe.

The above factors were the direct cause of the massive emigration of Syrian people. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of 7 November 2019, more than 5.7 million refugees were registered, including more than 3.7 million in Turkey; 918,000 in Lebanon; 654,000 in Jordan; 231,000 in Iraq; 129,000 in Egypt; and more than 800,000 in Europe with a significant proportion of European immigrants coming from Turkey.¹ In spite of certain cultural and religious solidarity, the presence of Syrian refugees is becoming an ever-increasing burden on Turkey. Since signing a migration agreement with the European Union in March 2016, their number in Turkey has increased from over 2.7 million to over 3.7 million. Increasing anti-Syrian sentiment in society is threatening the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Faced with the threat of a new wave of refugees from the Syrian Idlib region, Ankara is determined and ready to take radical steps to reduce the threat to the authorities' camp posed by the migration issue. On the other hand, the wave of migration that affected Europe in 2015, the cause of which is seen in the policy of open German borders and the rejection of the relocation mechanism by the governments of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia led to a conflict against this background also within the European Union itself by starting a discussion on mechanisms of assistance to immigrants based on showing cultural differences and creating a major threat.

The above circumstances lead to a research problem concerning the subjectivity of Syrian immigrants in political games between the interests of states and powers. As P. Buhler notes, "the interest is the foundation of the rationality of political action, giving politics an autonomous sphere, governed by reasons of state and independent of moral, legal and economic reasons. Just like human beings, states are rational egoists, constantly competing for prestige, resources, and security with the drug of assault."² Following this approach, the discussion on the place of Syrian immigrants within the concept of human security and the question on the validity of their subjectivity become topical issues.

¹ UNHCR, *Total Persons of Concern by Country of Asylum*, 2019, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria#_ga=2.139839738.858547710.1573988038-1746140355.1573988038 [accessed: 16.11.2019].

² P. Buhler, *O potęgę w XXI wieku*, Warszawa 2014, p. 94.

The underlying goal of this paper to look at the issue of Syrian immigrants in the politics of Turkey, the European Union, and Poland. The main research problem has been included in the title question, i.e. Syrian immigrants: a subject requiring protection, a threat, or an object of international politics? To achieve this research goal, despite the limited framework, the author has applied a constructivist approach to discourse research with elements of text analysis.

Refugees or immigrants: a protected entity under international law

In political discourse, especially in Poland, with regard to the introduced mechanism of relocation in the EU, a conceptual discussion has been taking place on whether immigrants from Syria are in fact to be considered refugees. A distinction should, therefore, be made between the concepts of “a refugee” and “an immigrant.” Nowadays, the most significant scope of meaning is the general understanding of refugees as one of the categories of foreigners. In its broadest sense, the term “refugee” covers all of the following persons forced, due to circumstances beyond their control, to leave their place of residence. According to this definition, the term “refugee” will refer both to the persons who have had to leave their country of origin or residence because of armed conflicts and persecution, as well as due to natural disasters.³

Under the Geneva Convention of 1951, a refugee is a person who, due to a well-established fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, resides outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable, or, due to such fear, is unwilling to use the protection of that country, or who has no nationality and is as a result of similar events, outside the country of former habitual residence, is unable or, due to such fear, is unwilling to return to that country.⁴ It should be noted that the provisions of the Convention refer to events that go back to before 1951, which expressed the conviction that the refugee problem will not occur in the future. This turned out to be a mistake and forced the international community to revise its position in the New York Protocol adopted in 1967.⁵ The term “immigrant”, in turn, refers to anyone coming from a different country, and – in accordance with EU regulations – from a third country. Therefore, until the reasons for refugee status have been examined, it is abusive to use this term in relation to all immigrants. This is all the more important as the percentage of immigrants recognised as refugees by EU Member States is marginal.

³ J. Stawnicka, R. Stawicki, ‘The concept of a “refugee” from the perspective of various cognitive planes’, *Police Quarterly*, no. 2. 4, 2015, p. 23.

⁴ Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, Article 1 (Journal of Laws 1991, No. 119, item 515).

⁵ *Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, done at New York on 31 January 1967* (Journal of Laws 1991, No. 119, item 517).

This distinction is fundamental when it comes to the creation of a protection entity. Immigration policy is created by individual states in relation to their own interests, which are e.g. accepting economic immigrants or refusing to accept immigrants in the context of broadly understood security. Unlike immigrants, refugees have certain rights under the provisions of the Convention and the Protocol, which are exercised under the supervision of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The UNHCR is a United Nations agency with the mandate to protect refugees, forcibly displaced communities and stateless people, and assist in their voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement to a third country. According to Article 35, "[t]he Contracting States undertake to cooperate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency of the United Nations which may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of this Convention. In order to enable the Office of the High Commissioner to make reports to the competent organs of the UN, the Contracting States undertake to provide them in the appropriate form with information and statistical data requested concerning: (a) the condition of refugees, (b) the implementation of this Convention, and (c) laws, regulations and decrees which are, or may hereafter be, in force relating to refugees."

The legal situation of each refugee is determined, in accordance with the principle of international law, first and foremost by the law of the country in which he or she resides. This rule is also introduced by the Geneva Convention, which states in Article 12(1) that "[t]he personal status of each refugee is determined by the law of the country of his permanent residence and, if he does not reside permanently, by the law of the country in which he is staying." The enforcement of these prerogatives has therefore been ceded to individual countries. Nevertheless, international law is increasingly influencing the development of internal legal norms in this area through the formulation of general rules of conduct adopted by States in international agreements. Among the agreements that have a fundamental impact on the rights and obligations of refugees, in addition to the abovementioned Geneva Convention, the International Pacts on Human Rights⁶ of 1966 and the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 should be mentioned.⁷ These agreements contain the widest catalogue of human rights and freedoms, and it is noteworthy that they apply to all persons on the territory of the States party to these agreements, including refugees.⁸ The Geneva Convention sets almost no "absolute" standards for the rights and benefits of refugees. In principle, the only exceptions to this principle are: the inadmissibility

⁶ Two international agreements adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1966: *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights opened for signature in New York on 19 December 1966* (Journal of Laws 1977, No. 38, item 167) and *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights opened for signature in New York on 19 December 1966* (Journal of Laws 1977, No. 38, item 169)

⁷ *Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, done at Rome on 4 November 1950, subsequently amended by Protocols Nos 3, 5 and 8 and supplemented by Protocol No 2*, (Journal of Laws 1993, No. 61, item 284).

⁸ B. Wierzbicki, *Uchodźcy*, Białystok 1993, p. 62.

of discrimination against refugees on the grounds of race, religion or country of origin in the application of the Convention (Article 3) and the prohibition of expulsion or return of a refugee to the borders of territories where his life or liberty would be endangered on grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (Article 33 of the Convention). It is also important that the Geneva Convention introduces three standards of refugee treatment with regard to other rights: national treatment – consists in making refugees even with citizens in reference to the scope and content of rights; treatment identical to that of other foreigners all benefits granted to refugees are in relation to the laws in force in a given country in relation to other foreigners; priority treatment – granting rights that foreigners already have or will have in the future.⁹

As has already been mentioned, Article 3 of the Convention prohibits the expulsion or return of a refugee to the borders of territories where his life or liberty would be in danger. However, this principle is not always respected, and the countries for which refugees are a problem in their internal policies have been making several efforts to bypass this provision, a case in point being Turkey's military operation at the Syrian border, and the creation of a so-called safe buffer zone, which is discussed later herein. Although the Convention imposes protection obligations on its signatories, it contains a number of exceptions on the grounds of national security. This clause was applied in the Polish discourse of security policy refusing to participate in the mechanism of permanent relocation and resettlement established by the European Commission. The exclusions invoking national security concern temporary refusal to grant protection on the territory of the state, issuing travel documents or the possibility of expulsion and return of persons posing a threat to security.

In addition to international legislation, the United Nations has also introduced the concept of human security into science. In the United Nations Development Programme of 1994, there is more than just security in the sense of survival from military threats. The authors of the report declared that human security is a universal concern and concerns rich and poor nations. Its components are indivisible, risks arising in one country can be transferred to all others. It is easier to provide them through early prevention than through late intervention. It's focused on people, on how they live their lives. It is not a question of opposing the threat to the security of states, therefore, but of combating the threats faced by ordinary people, which often stem from the very weakness of states and the political institutions that should serve them.¹⁰

Despite such important and universal ideas of the UN in the mainstream of human security, clauses concerning threats to the security of states are often used to implement particular national interests.

⁹ R. Stawicki, 'Ochrona uchodźców na gruncie prawa międzynarodowego – zarys problematyki', *Kwartalnik Policyjny*, no. 4, 2015, p. 34.

¹⁰ W. Kostecki, *Strach i potęga. Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe w XXI wieku*, Warszawa 2012, pp. 135–136.

Securitisation of the migration issue in Polish political discourse

The confrontation of the concept of human security usually takes place on the basis of the realization of political interests of individual states. The government's policy on the inflow of immigrants within the framework of the so-called migration crisis underwent a fundamental change with the parliamentary elections in 2015. The commitments of the government of the Republic of Poland to participate in refugee relocation and resettlement programmes were adopted in September 2015. Pursuant to Council Decisions (EU),¹¹ a total of 6,182 individuals should be relocated until 26 September 2017 from Italy and Greece. Additionally, on the basis of the conclusions of the Representatives of Governments adopted during the meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 July 2015¹², the Republic of Poland adopted the resolution whereby Poland has decided to resettle 900 refugees who had been located in camps in third countries. The Law and Justice government of the Republic of Poland, elected in 2015, did not undertake any new obligations in this respect by, on the one hand, carrying out declaratory actions to accept relocated and displaced persons, and, on the other hand, by making this declaration conditional on the necessity to carry out appropriate security checks on these persons. Despite the declarative sphere, the government's attitude in this respect is consistently refusing to accept the provisions of the relocation mechanism. The policy measures taken can be scrutinised in the context of the securitization discourse in the so-called Copenhagen School trend.¹³

The conceptualisation of theory begins with a statement that represents a traditional heritage: *security is about survival*. Where a problem is presented as threatening the vital interests of the reference object (things perceived as existentially endangered that have a legitimate right to survival), it justifies the application of extraordinary measures to resolve the problem.¹⁴

The most important thing in the Copenhagen school current is not only the concept, but the whole concept of securitisation, which is closely related to the understanding of security as a social construct, and, therefore, also to the discursive construction of threats. This process of constructing social threats involves *a securitization actor* – mainly the political elite – who considers the issue urgent

¹¹ Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece, Official Journal of the European Union, L 239 of 15.9.2015, pp. 146–156. Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, Official Journal of the European Union, L 248 of 24.9.2015, pp. 80–94.

¹² Justice and Home Affairs Council, Brussels, 20.07.2015, www.consilium.europa.eu/pl/meetings/jha/2015/07/20/ [accessed: 16.11.2019].

¹³ A huge contribution to contemporary security research was made in the 1990s by a group of scientists, including Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde and others from the now non-existent Institute for Conflict and Peace Research (COPRI) in Copenhagen, which culminated in the work of *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Buzan, Wæver, Wilde 1998), and the proposed thought current name of the so-called Copenhagen School.

¹⁴ B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, London 1998, pp. 21, 36.

and poses a threat to the survival of the reference object. The acceptance by the recipients of a threat as existential justifies the application of exceptional measures to neutralize it. Through the securitisation movement, the issue is moved into the sphere of security (i.e. securitised) and removed from the normal boundaries of democratic political procedure, introducing, as it were, a programme of “political panic”.¹⁵ Securitization is carried out through *an act of speech* that not only expresses the preferences of the subject, qualifying a given issue as a threat to survival, presenting it as an objective image of external reality, perhaps historically even corresponding to such a threat, but also constitutes the implementation of the described truth – a power relationship. These are *securitization conditions* which, apart from their context, also require such a *securitization actor* that announces the threat from a specific location in institutional mode (having the authority to do so, e.g. as a result of the function of a minister responsible for security). In this sense, the concept of securitization does not only appear as an analytical tool, but also as a practical political tool. The migration problem in Europe has also been recognised by many countries as a threat, but it seems that only Hungary, Poland and Slovakia have effectively securitised this problem. The conditions of a securitization provide the context necessary for a successful securitization process. It should be stressed that the context of securitization results not only from the negative potential of immigrants, but also, in particular, from the real events invoked in the securitization process.

In the context of the issues discussed, pointing out fundamental axiological and normative differences between the Western man and an immigrant from the Arab-Islamic culture as a factor generating a threat seems an idea that is not without foundations. Such differences between the Polish political elites in the act of speech included in particular the different state of cultural awareness manifested in cases of women being abused on New Year’s Eve nights in Cologne and is an example of cultural and personal conditions of not only potential but also real appropriation of personal space. This situation shows that a human security policy for immigrants based on the central recognition of fundamental human rights for liberalism – life, freedom, gender equality and the pursuit of happiness – can paradoxically lead to the deprivation, or at least the reduction, of these rights of the citizens of the European Union. Immigration as a vital threat also insists on the need to ensure cultural security, which can determine the state’s ability to lay the foundations and protect cultural identities, cultural assets and national heritage, in conditions of openness to the world, as well as accession to supranational community structures, enabling the development of culture through the internalisation of values that are not at odds with its own identity. The internalisation of attitudes is the second category of securitization. The attacks that have hit Europe in recent years, such as those in Belgium in 2016, at the airport and underground network in Brussels, driving a lorry into a crowd of people in Nice or Berlin, followed by counter-terrorism operations by the secret services, highlight a much more serious problem in relation to Islamic enclaves. It is no longer just a manifestation of

¹⁵ The main concepts used by the Copenhagen School are *security complexes, sectors and securitization*, vide: W. Kostecki, *Strach i potęga...*, pp. 7–8. Ł. Fijałkowski, ‘Teoria sekurytyzacji i konstruowanie bezpieczeństwa’, *Przegląd Strategiczny*, no. 1, 2012.

dissatisfaction with the social policy of the state, but an activity aimed at the total destruction of the state and national society. The lack of effective control mechanisms and, in many cases, a conscious policy towards diasporas living in enclaves have led to the creation of an environment conducive to the emergence and development of radical Islam incubators.

In addition to the act of speech containing the above mentioned categories of differences, in 2016 the Polish government undertook concrete actions to verify the persons intended for relocation from camps in Greece and Italy. The consent or refusal procedure concerned checking the data of foreigners in available databases and conducting interviews with foreigners by liaison officers with the participation of a cultural expert competent in the field of identification of national affiliation of qualified candidates for relocation. Liaison officers appointed by the Border Guard to Italy and Greece were involved in this verification process. The examination procedures were carried out until it was ascertained that the candidates for relocation did not constitute a threat to the defence or security of the State of the tubes for the protection of security and public order. With regard to persons examined, no such certainty was obtained, as none of the persons indicated for relocation or resettlement was admitted to Poland until the end of the validity of the EC decision, referring to the Act¹⁶ whose provisions stipulate that a foreigner shall be refused subsidiary protection if he/she constitutes a threat to the security of the state or society.

However, the political discourse was not about denying the right to international protection to refugees. One should also not look for a rejection of the idea of human security in the attitude of the Government of the Republic of Poland. It was a political game against the introduction by the European Commission of a permanent mechanism for relocating immigrants arriving in Europe, almost at the invitation of Germany, in flagrant violation of the common migration policy and the protection of particular national interests. Opinion polls show that securitisation has achieved its desired effect. Negative attitudes towards accepting refugees are common in countries that define their social values in terms of the axiological and normative system derived from the roots of Christianity. Interestingly, the attitude towards relocation of refugees arriving in the European Union is connected with opinions on the principles of Community functioning. Respondents who believe that each country should be free to determine its migration and asylum policies are much less likely to accept relocation (9%) than those who would prefer these issues to be decided at Community level. Among those who claim that migration policy should be partly decided by the European Union, the level of acceptance of accepting some refugees is much higher (38%), and among those who would prefer a completely common policy, it exceeds half (53%). Respondents who would like the European Union to strive for deeper integration of all Member States (34%) are also more likely to agree to a relocation project.¹⁷

¹⁶ *The Granting Protection to Foreigners within the Territory of the Republic of Poland Act of 1 June 2003* (Journal of Laws 2016, No. 1836).

¹⁷ Centre for Social Opinion Research, *Communication from Research No. 44/2017 – Attitudes towards Reception of Refugees*, Warsaw 2017, p. 3.

These studies correspond to the opinions on relocation and attitudes towards refugees in V4 countries, so it can be stated that the Government of the Republic of Poland managed to implement the conceptual postulate of a regional security complex. The European Parliament's Eurobarometer survey carried out in September 2015 shows that citizens of Central and Eastern European countries are the least likely to support proposals for a more even distribution of refugees arriving in the European Union among the Member States.¹⁸

The CBOS has been monitoring the attitude towards the mechanism of relocation and reception of refugees since May 2015 on a regular basis. In a study published in April 2017, it is clear to see that Poles were back then still mostly sceptical about the relocation of refugees coming to the European Union from the Middle East and Africa. Moreover, since December 2015, the percentage of firm opponents of accepting part of the refugees arriving in Europe has been higher than the total percentage of moderate and firm supporters. Currently, three quarters (74%) of the surveyed are opposed to relocation, which is the highest value among the previously quoted ones, with a strong opposition (43%) being the dominant response. In total, slightly more than one fifth of Poles (22%) are in favour of accepting refugees.¹⁹

The latest research conducted by the CBOS in 2018 concluded that "Poles are not open to accepting refugees from countries affected by armed conflicts, although the willingness to provide them with at least temporary shelter depends on which country they come from. The Czechs are even more critical than Poles when it comes to admitting migrants. From October 2017 to June 2018, the strong opposition to the reception of refugees from the Middle East and Africa decreased, so there is a certain correction to the record high level of reluctance at that time. A hypothetical financial penalty on the part of the European Union worsens the attitude towards migrants from Muslim countries".²⁰

The decisions of the European Commission were taken for two years and after their expiry in 2018, the mechanism of relocation was abandoned and work was undertaken on a legislative package to develop effective methods of preventing the negative effects of a possible sudden increase in the number of migrants in subsequent years. Poland pointed to the lack of control over who enters the territory of the European Union. This threatens the security of all its citizens – some of the terrorists who carried out the attacks in France and Belgium came to Europe with a wave of refugees. Undoubtedly, abandoning the reactivation of the permanent relocation mechanism is a triumph for the interests of individual countries, especially the V4 Group. The governments of these States argued that it is for the Member States to take measures to ensure their external and internal security and that only the Member States are competent to maintain public order and ensure internal security. Security policy is therefore a matter for individual states and not a matter for Community policy. The top-down imposition of the country to which

¹⁸ Centre for Social Opinion Research, *Communication from research no. 151/2015. Relation to refugees in the Visegrad Group countries*, Warsaw 2015, pp. 4–5.

¹⁹ Centre for Social Opinion Research, *Communication from Research no. 44/2017... op. cit.*, p. 1.

²⁰ Centre for Social Opinion Research, *Communication from research no. 87/2018. Poles and Czechs' attitudes towards reception of refugees*, Warsaw 2018, p. 1.

the relocated persons often find themselves against their will means that some of them will move to other Member States. This procedure is still ongoing and applicants consider relocation as a tool for obtaining international protection and then going to the country of destination. Such mobility is caused by differences in living standards in different countries, e.g. in labour markets, access to housing or in the level of social benefits. As can be seen, these latter issues, although raised by states as a counter-argument and emphasizing the right to security and treating immigrants as a threat, are nothing more than the pursuit by individuals of the concept of human security, not only the right to survival, but also the right to a dignified life.

Turkish instrumental policy towards Syrian immigrants

Today's Europe, like a besieged fortress, is a world of coveted freedom for hundreds of thousands of migrants from failed, conflict-ridden and authoritarian regimes. On the other hand, in addition to the root causes of migration, Europe is facing the biggest migration crisis caused by the conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa due to the erroneous migration policy of the European Union with the relocation mechanism and the so-called open door policy, devised by German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Acts of solidarity with immigrants arriving in Europe via the so-called Balkan route have created a precedent which, in fact, suspends the application of Community asylum legislation by Germany. Undoubtedly an indirect factor, but the important one was the unsealing of borders by Turkey, which, while playing for its own interests, effectively uses the almost four million-strong migration "potential" as an argument of coercion against the European Union. On 18 March 2016, an agreement was concluded on the basis of which Turkey agreed to accept all new migrants who had been migrating illegally from Turkey to Greek islands after 20 March 2016. The basis for this was the readmission agreement concluded at EU-Turkey level. The costs will be covered by Brussels, which will transfer €3 billion to Turkey to compensate for expenses related to the reception of refugees and will speed up the €3 billion that was promised in 2015. At the same time, the Agreement stipulates that the Union will accept a Syrian refugee under resettlement procedures to a specific Member State for each person returned on the basis of a readmission agreement. Paradoxically, by opening its borders, Germany has brought over a million illegal migrants from the Arab-Islamic world into Europe, and by implementing a policy of appeasement with Turkey, the European Union can open the door to a further 75 million Turkish Muslims. The EU has committed itself to speeding up visa liberalisation and opening new chapters in accession negotiations, starting with Chapter 33, which deals with budgetary policy.²¹ Progress in this work is not yet visible, although after one year of the agreement's validity, the European Commission positively assessed its effects by stating in its communication that there

²¹ European Commission, *EU-Turkey Statement: Questions and Answers*, Brussels 19 March 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-963_pl.htm [accessed: 10.11.2019].

had been a 97% drop in illegal migration to Greece.²² Nevertheless, already in 2015, some EU Member States, protecting their internal integrity, responded to the threats by isolating themselves with fences (e.g. Hungary) or questioning the permanent relocation mechanism and refusing to accept immigrants from a mandatory subdivision of the European Commission (Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, and also Austria in 2016).²³ The EU's positive assessment of the effectiveness of the agreement was used once again by Turkey to break off the agreement in 2017, immediately after Germany and the Netherlands banned the organisation of the electoral rallies that Turkish ministers wanted to hold in their territories in order to organize support for constitutional reform, whereby President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, seeking greater Islamisation in Turkey, would concentrate all the executive power in his hands. Turkey's instrumental actions have not only been recognised but also condemned. UNICEF called on Turkey not to use minors, refugees and illegal migrants as bargaining chip in its recent dispute with the European Union. UNICEF's humanitarian adviser Lucio Melandri said at a press conference that "children should never be used as bargaining chip and refugees and migrants should not be manipulated for political reasons".²⁴

The growing atmosphere of mistrust and recriminations is a major stumbling block in the dialogue between Turkey and the EU. In the case of Turkey, this is the use of anti-Western rhetoric in internal politics (especially in the electoral context). In the case of the EU, this is the atmosphere of seeking responsible and guilty migration crises at various levels, both within and outside the EU. In this context, Turkey is presented as a country shifting its refugee problem to the EU to media accusations of organising and supporting illegal travel to the EU. The problem of the conflict in Syria and the associated problem of Syrian refugees is a serious burden for the authorities, not only political but also economic (the authorities speak of almost 8 billion US dollars, social (impact on the labour market, disruption of the demographic structure in many cities in southern Turkey) and in ensuring security (from assassinations, feeling of criminalisation, indirectly conflict with the Kurds to the threat of escalation) with no real possibility of a positive solution to the problem. Making it possible, or even facilitating, the departure of refugees from Turkey is, in this context, an immediate reduction of the scale of the problem.²⁵

Paradoxically, the Syrian crisis and the refugee problem are treated by the authorities as a justification for the current policy, and an impulse for its intensification in accordance with Turkish assumptions. On the international arena, Turkey is once again strongly promoting the need for active action in Syria against both

²² European Commission, *EU-Turkey Statement: one year on*, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/eu_turkey_statement_17032017_en.pdf [accessed: 10.11.2019].

²³ A. Siadkowski, *Islam. Anatomia strachu*, Warszawa 2018, pp. 151–158.

²⁴ *UNICEF urges Turkey not to use children, refugees as bargaining chips*, <https://www.efe.com/efe/english/life/unicef-urges-turkey-not-to-use-children-refugees-as-bargaining-chips/50000263-3211178> [accessed: 19.11.2019].

²⁵ A. Jarosiewicz, K. Strachota, 'Turcja a problem uchodźców syryjskich', *Komentarze OSW*, no. 186, 2015, p. 6, https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/komentarze_186.pdf [accessed: 18.11.2019].

Islamic radicals (in Turkish logic, also against Kurdish terrorists) and, above all, against Assad's regime. Ankara's aim is to create a security zone in Syria itself as a buffer for further waves of refugees, a place for the repatriation of current refugees, a base for forces capable of finally and positively ending the conflict in Syria. To this end, Turkey launched a military offensive on 9 October 2019 under the code name *Source of Peace* in northern Syria, which met with severe criticism from the European Union and ambivalent attitude of the United States. Brussels has called on Ankara to suspend its military action and five European countries have tabled a motion for a resolution condemning Turkey in the UN Security Council. During the meeting of EU foreign ministers on 14 October, the operation was condemned (despite opposition from Hungary, among others), but there was no common embargo on arms sales to Turkey (unilaterally announced by France, Germany, Sweden, Finland, and the Netherlands). In addition, the EU announced that it would not finance the so-called "security areas" devised by Turkey in the intervention territories. Turkey's planned activities in Syria in recent months have been presented primarily as a humanitarian project, rather than a military one. Ankara unsuccessfully sought its political recognition in the West, and ultimately also financial support for a security zone in which adequate infrastructure would be built. The course of the conducted operation seems to indicate that we are dealing with activities of a clearly military nature. Already in the first few days, the Turkish army and its subordinate Syrian opposition units, from which the Syrian National Army was formed, caused a wave of tens of thousands of refugees – mainly Kurds fleeing to areas in the interior of Syria not covered by the operation, and partly also to Iraq. In addition, several dozen civilian victims and war crimes have been documented. This course of operations, combined with plans to relocate Syrian refugees (mostly Arabs) from the Turkish territory, makes Operation Source of Peace perceived by the West as an attempt to carry out ethnic cleansing.²⁶ This is another example of the instrumental use of Syrian immigrants as part of international policy. Under the umbrella of humanitarian action, Turkey is dealing with Kurds, whose Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is treated as a terrorist organisation. The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that the European public opinion openly favours the Kurds, and that European cities have been swept by a wave of demonstrations organised by the Kurdish Diaspora and its supporters. This, in turn, increases pressure both on the governments of individual Member States, and on the European Union as a whole. For Turkey, on the other hand, this is yet another reason to accuse the EU of ignoring, in Turkey's view, the terrorist activities of the PKK on its own territory. In view of the above, it is very likely that Turkey's verbal threats will also be followed by the unblocking of migration routes to Europe, which could result in serious political tensions within the EU. The political relations described above only prove the instrumental use of migration issues to realize particular interests in the spirit of political realism theory.

²⁶ M. Chudziak, *Turecka interwencja w Syrii – nowy kryzys w stosunkach Turcji z Zachodem*, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2019-10-16/turecka-interwencja-w-syrii-nowy-kryzys-w-stosunkach-turcji-z> [accessed: 18.11.2019].

Conclusions

To conclude, the research question posed in this paper revolves around Syrian immigrants: whether they are a subject that requires protection, a threat, or an object of international politics. The goal of the paper has been to outline the issue of immigration in the context of the realisation of national and international interests. Undoubtedly, the concept of human security is close to the work of international institutions such as the UNHCR, which aims to provide transnational solutions to the problems of immigrants, not only in terms of ensuring their survival in a state of crisis, but also in terms of a dignified life. The contemporary challenge in this sphere is the instrumental use of migration issues in the international policy as a factor of pressure or in the internal policy of individual states. As shown in the example of Turkey, Syrian immigrants are directly treated as an element of pressure exerted on the EU in the political, economic and visa policy spheres. In the case of Poland, the migration issue has been securitised as an existential threat to internal security in the context of a clash of cultures but also of terrorist threats. It also became an element of political games between the Community authorities and the right to shape the internal policies of individual states. As can be seen, despite the momentous ideas of the concept of human security, it loses to the realistic concepts of power, and particular interests of the individual states.

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Syryjscy imigranci: przedmiot wymagający ochrony, zagrożenie, czy obiekt polityki międzynarodowej?

Streszczenie

Postawione w tytule niniejszego artykułu pytanie ukazuje problematykę imigracji w kontekście realizacji interesów narodowych i międzynarodowych. Niewątpliwie idee koncepcji *human security* bliskie są instytucjom międzynarodowym takim jak UNHCR, którego celem jest ponadnarodowe rozwiązywanie problemów imigrantów nie tylko w sferze zapewnienia im przetrwania w stanie kryzysu, ale również godnego życia. Współczesne wyzwanie w tej sferze stanowi instrumentalne wykorzystanie kwestii migracyjnych

w polityce międzynarodowej jako czynnika nacisku czy też w polityce wewnętrznej poszczególnych państw. Na przykładzie Turcji wskazano, że imigranci syryjscy są wprost traktowani jako element nacisku na UE w sferach politycznych, gospodarczych czy polityki wizowej. W przypadku Polski kwestia migracyjna została sekurytyzowana jako egzystencjalne zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego w kontekście zderzenia kultury, ale i zagrożeń terrorystycznych. Stała się też elementem rozgrywek politycznych pomiędzy władzą Wspólnoty a prawem do kształtowania wewnętrznych polityk poszczególnych jej państw. Jak widać, mimo doniosłych idei koncepcji *human security* przegrywa ona z realistycznymi koncepcjami siły, władzy i partykularnych interesów poszczególnych państw.

Słowa kluczowe: *human security*, syryjska imigracja, sekurytyzacja

Syrian Immigrants: a Subject that Requires Protection, a Threat, or an Object of International Politics?

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to look at immigration in the context of the realisation of both national and international interests. Undoubtedly, the concept of human security is close to the work of international institutions – such as the UNHCR, which aims to provide transnational solutions to the problems of immigrants, not only in terms of ensuring their survival in a state of crisis, but also in terms of a dignified life. The contemporary challenge in this sphere is the instrumental use of migration issues in the international policy as a factor of pressure or in the internal policy of individual states. As shown in the example of Turkey, Syrian immigrants are directly treated as an element of pressure on the EU in the political, economic and visa policy spheres. In the case of Poland, the migration issue has been securitised as an existential threat to internal security in the context of a clash of cultures but also of terrorist threats. It has also become an element of political games between the Community authorities and the right to shape the internal policies of individual states. As can be seen, despite the momentous ideas of the concept of human security, it loses to the realistic concepts of power, and particular interests of the individual states.

Key words: human security, Syrian immigration, securitisation

Syrische Flüchtlinge: ein schutzbedürftiger Gegenstand, Gefahr oder das Objekt der internationalen Politik?

Zusammenfassung

Der Zweck des vorliegenden Artikel ist Zuwanderung im Kontext der Umsetzung nationaler und internationaler Interessen zu betrachten. Zweifellos liegt das Konzepts *human security* nahe an der Arbeit internationaler Institutionen – wie UNHCR, deren Ziel ist, transnationale Lösungen für die Probleme von Flüchtlingen zu gewährleisten, nicht nur hinsichtlich ihres Überlebens in der Krise, sondern auch bezüglich eines würdigen Lebens. Die heutige Herausforderung in diesem Bereich ist die instrumentelle Nutzung der Migrationsprobleme als Druckfaktor in der internationalen Politik oder in der Innenpolitik der einzelnen Staaten. Am Beispiel der Türkei wurde festgestellt, dass die syrischen Flüchtlinge direkt als Druckmittel gegen die EU eingesetzt werden, in den Bereichen Politik, Wirtschaft oder in der Visapolitik. Im Fall Polens wurde das Migrationsproblem als existenzielle Bedrohung für die innere Sicherheit im Kontext des Kampfs der Kulturen,

aber auch der Terrorgefahren versicherheitlicht. Dieses Problem wurde auch zum Element der politischen Kämpfe zwischen den Behörden der Gemeinschaft und dem Recht auf Gestaltung der inneren Politik ihrer einzelnen Staaten. Dies belegt, dass das Konzept *human security* trotz seiner wichtigen Ideen, gegen die realistischen Begriffe der Macht und insbesondere der nationalen Interessen einzelner Staaten zurücksteht.

Schlüsselwörter: *human security*, syrische Zuwanderung, Verbriefung

Сирийские мигранты: субъект, требующий защиты, угроза или объект международной политики?

Резюме

Целью поставленного в заглавии вопроса было показать проблему миграции в контексте реализации национальных и международных интересов. Несомненно, идеи концепции *human security* (безопасности человека) близки философии деятельности международных организаций, таких как Управление Верховного комиссара Организации Объединённых Наций по делам беженцев (UNHCR), которое призвано решать проблемы мигрантов на наднациональном уровне не только в сфере обеспечения возможности их выживания в кризисной ситуации, но также в сфере обеспечения им достойной жизни. Современным вызовом в этой сфере является инструментальное использование миграционных проблем в качестве фактора давления в международной политике либо во внутренней политике отдельных государств. Как показано на примере Турции, сирийские мигранты используются непосредственно как элемент давления на Европейский Союз в политической и хозяйственной сферах, а также в сфере визовой политики. В случае Польши, миграционный вопрос был секьюритизирован как экзистенциальная угроза для внутренней безопасности в контексте соприкосновения культур и террористической угрозы. Он также стал элементом политических игр между руководящими органами (институтами) Европейского сообщества и правом (мандатом) на формирование внутренних политик государствами-членами ЕС. Таким образом, несмотря на весомость идей концепции *human security*, эта идея проигрывает с реалистичными концепциями силы, власти и партикулярными интересами отдельных государств.

Ключевые слова: *human security*, сирийская иммиграция, секьюритизация

From the History
Z kart historii
Aus der Geschichte
Страницы истории



Anna Kargol

Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University
ORCID: 0000-0002-3127-3955

Waldemar Gniadek

Freelance academic writer
ORCID: 0000-0002-7685-6943

The Royal Art of Free Masonry in Poland and in Germany in the First Half of the 20th Century: Relations, Differences, and Similarities

The studies

The studies on the history and culture of freemasonry and co-masonry in Poland, currently carried out on an increasingly larger scale, not only offer some concrete research results, but are also matched by the growth of the academics who explore the topic. At this point, it needs to be stressed with some degree of pride that these studies also make up the subject of numerous dissertations that allow scholars to be awarded academic degrees. Of the numerous publications, shorter and longer biographic studies, exhibitions and conferences, a project was organised being a part of the research grant “Polish Culture in Relation to Western Esoteric Philosophy, 1890–1939”, financed by the National Programme for the Development of Humanities.¹ Apart from the grant as such, a number of independent studies were also conducted.

¹ See: <http://www.tradycjaezoteryczna.ug.edu.pl> [accessed: 2.01.2020].

This paper is the presentation and the result of the scientific interests of Doctor Waldemar Gniadek, who specialises in German freemasonry, and Associate Professor Anna Kargol from Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University, who has been delving into free masonry and co-masonry in Poland in the inter-war period. Before Waldemar Gniadek's doctoral dissertation, the subject of German lodges in Poland had been described solely in a chapter in one of the books written by Leon Chajn, a scholar researching freemasonry. Yet this issue had never been further developed in a form of a more extensive study.² Scholars are practically completely silent about the difficult subject of Polish and German freemasonry relations. This is the reason why the two authors of this study have decided to shed light onto this issue, which makes up a significant part of their daily research. However, given the limited framework, this paper only looks at the few basic facts and conclusions on the subject at hand.

Freemasonry in Poland after the First World War

The inter-war period in Poland is marked by an evident dominance of the Scottish Rite freemasonry, represented by the Grand Lodge of London. At that time, the political scene of freemasonry was practically dominated by one obedience, although it must be stressed that there were obviously other obediences too, with a much smaller significance. Before the rebirth of the Polish state, there had been several attempts at the restoration of freemasonry, which had been illegal during Poland's partitions and thus, some requests for assistance were sent to France. It was a natural process, as many Poles residing in Paris, which was the seat of the Polish political emigration, belonged to the Lodges there. A few outposts were created on the Polish territory, yet the outbreak of war put an end to their existence. Numerous sources prove that only two of them had managed to survive the turmoil of the war. After the establishment of the Second Polish Republic, it turned out that the connections with France were not convenient for the Polish authorities, with which the freemasons had close ties. They played a significant role in regaining independence and in the creation of the first state structures, so their attitude can, by all means, be regarded as state-oriented. French masonry, especially the *Grand Orient de France*, was an organisation with a republican, democratic, secular and largely leftist profile. This might raise some controversies in Poland, even among the progressively oriented intellectuals, and, what is more, political connections with France with some likely political dependency did not suit Józef Piłsudski. On the other hand, the French freemasons had a very low esteem of the cosmopolitanism and modernity of their Polish fraters.³

² L. Chajn, *Wolnomularstwo w II Rzeczypospolitej*, Warszawa 1975; W. Gniadek, *German free-masonry lodges in the Second Polish Republic* (doctoral dissertation written under the supervision of Professor J. Szczepański, defended at the Faculty of History of Pułtusk University of Humanities on 24 January 2019).

³ See also: L. Chajn, *Polskie wolnomularstwo 1920–1938*, Warszawa 1984; W. Giełżyński, *Wschód Wielkiego Wschodu*, Warszawa 2008.

For this reason, the ties with the *Grand Orient de France* were loosened and were gradually replaced with the contacts with Italian freemasonry. It was the Italians who helped to settle, in accordance with the freemasonic rules, the Grand National Lodge of Poland, which represented a different trend in freemasonry: more deistic and conservative, traditionally represented by the Grand Lodge of London. This young Polish obedience had a very specific nature. First of all, it was a small, quite elitist and secret group. It had never been officially registered, and it acted in confidentiality, so the public opinion was not aware of its existence. For this reason, among others the Grand National Lodge of Poland could not be recognised by the Grand Lodge of England. However, the Polish Lodge gained the acknowledgment of other masonry jurisdictions – both European and American ones.

The status of the Grand Lodge of Poland was determined by the political atmosphere. The right-wing governments did not encourage it to disclose itself, whilst the authoritarian direction adopted after the May Coup was also far from being friendly for freemasonry. Paradoxically, many free masons who had connections with the authority held significant state positions or, at least, posts in the then state administration, which was also the reason why the secret was kept. Therefore, the Grand National Lodge of Poland had a clandestine existence and preferred isolation and distance even from other masonry obediences. The surviving sources suggest that the discretion and loyalty among Polish fraters were very high.⁴ It is characteristic that, in contrast with Czechoslovakian, Austrian or Yugoslavian freemasonry, freemasons in Poland did not print their newsletters or journals informing about their current activity, organisation structures, or composition. A similar approach was taken with respect to all original documents produced by specific freemasonry institutions.

Apart from the Grand National Lodge, there was also another organisation – the third masonry organisation: the *le Droit Humain* Order, i.e. the Human Right Order, which accepted both men and women as its members. This was indeed exceptional at that time in the world of freemasonry. The French obedience, *le Droit Humain*, was founded in Poland, as the third one, in 1925 as a result of the efforts of general Tokarzewski and Wanda Dynowska. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, after the congress of theosophists, the *le Droit Humain* Order established close relations with theosophists, and the obedience was definitely esoteric in its nature.⁵

The freemasonry landscape in Poland at that time is completed also by co-masonry organisations, such as B'nai B'rith, Odd Fellows, or Schlarafia. The Jewish organisation by the name of *B'nai B'rith*, in particular, was widespread amongst Jewish intellectuals in Poland. It was officially registered as a charity association

⁴ L. Chajn, *Polskie wolnomularstwo...*, op. cit., pp. 229–243.

⁵ L. Chajn, *Wolnomularstwo...*, op. cit., pp. 431–441; D. Bargiełowski, *Po trzykroć pierwszy. Michał Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz. Generał broni, teozof, wolnomularz, kapłan Kościoła liberalnokatolickiego*, t. II, Warszawa 2000–2001. A few years before the aggression of the Third Reich against Poland, in 1937, a lodge "Piramida Północy" ("The Pyramid of the North") belonging to the occultist trend was founded in Warsaw thanks to the support of the Sovereign Sanctuary of France of Memphis-Misraim Rite from Lyon), led by Borys Smysłowski. L. Hass, *Masoneria polska XX wieku, losy. Łoże, ludzie*, Warszawa 1993, p. 135.

and effectively represented the interest and opinions of this social group in the Polish public life.⁶

Freemasonry in Germany after the First World War

In Germany, freemasonry went through a slightly different path. First of all, it must be noted that from the moment of its foundation up to the times of the Nazi repressions, freemasonry in Germany could develop freely, and thus the activity of the lodges was epitomised by an unbroken continuity. A club-like form of a freemasonry lodge was much more popular in German culture than in Poland, both among the Catholics and Protestants. Undoubtedly, its popularity in Germany can be attributed to the flourishing bourgeois class, and their traditions.

In Germany, many lodges were founded, and they were all characterised by a strong particularism and autonomy in practising their various rites. This situation persisted for the entire eighteenth and the majority of the nineteenth centuries. Interestingly, this was indicative of the great strength of the movement, and its independent position. It was the time when the lodges, initially dependent on France and England, started to gain social recognition, and to work out their own characters that were typical of German freemasonry. Unification tendencies started to appear already at the beginning of the nineteenth century, which in 1877 led to the creation of the *Vereinigte Großlogen von Deutschland*.⁷

Yet the innate particularistic tendencies – perhaps culturally connected with the “eternal” territorial division – finally prevailed; so in the 1930s, there were as many as nine Grand Lodges acting in Germany, and they were all independently from one another.⁸

Shortly after the First World War, the German Grand Lodges joined their efforts and structures in the distribution of the humanitarian aid for women and children, co-operating in the process with the Grand Lodge of England, the United States, and neutral countries. In 1922, three Berlin Grand Lodges left the federation built half a century before, in which some tensions and conflicts between “Christian” and “humanitarian” lodges had occurred. The federation was further weakened by the departure of the Grand Lodge of Saxony.

In 1930, the freemasonry of the German Reich had about 75 thousand members, associated in nine Grand Lodges. Of this number, two thirds belonged to the most ancient Old Prussian Lodges with a Christian and strongly nationalistic orientation. It was still in 1907 that the *Freimaurerbund zur aufgehenden Sonne* (the Masonic Union of the Raising Sun) was created, which was an organisation regarded as irregular by the majority of the world Grand Lodges. The freemasons from this

⁶ A. Kargol, *Zakon Synów Przymierza. Krakowska Łoź „Solidarność” 1892–1938*, Warszawa 2013, eadem, *Łoźa Solidarność i Zakon B’nei B’rith. Z dziejów parawolnomularstwa żydowskiego na ziemiach polskich, Przegląd Historyczny* 2008, no. 99/2, pp. 249–275.

⁷ See: <http://freimaurer.org/en/united-grand-lodges-of-germany/the-founding-history> [accessed: 27.12.2019].

⁸ As a rule, a Grand Lodge is in charge of so-called “obediences”, playing the superior role and grouping the subordinate lodges.

organisation became the members of the Supreme Council of Austria, where, in 1929, they gained the highest 33rd degrees, and then, in the following year, they founded the Supreme Council of the Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite of Freemasonry. The above-mentioned Supreme Council was installed by the Supreme Council of the Netherlands, which considered it to be oriented at the struggle against nationalism and Christian despotism.

In June 1930, 600 fraters left the obedience of *Freimaurerbund zur aufgehenden Sonne* to set up the Symbolic Grand Lodge of Germany, recognised by the Grand Lodge de France. The first Master Mason was Leo Muffelman. These fraters started to edit a journal by the name of *Die Alten Plichten* (Former Duties), where they proclaimed the aim of the newly created Grand Symbolic Lodge to be the struggle against fascism, bolshevism, and national socialism. To meet this objective, the obedience was supposed to go “hand in hand” with the Roman Catholic Church.”⁹

These actions were carried out until 1933, when the Nazi authorities dissolved all the freemasonry lodges. Then, the majority of freemasons decided to go dormant, and to liquidate the lodges. However, the Grand Symbolic Lodge not only did not take the decision to go dormant, but it also sent telegrams with congratulations to Goebbels and Hitler.¹⁰ The Grand Lodge in Vienna then got involved in the internal political games of German freemasonry by allowing young masons from Germany who were dissatisfied with the German lodges going backward to be affiliated with the Austrian lodges. One of the affiliated members was Leo Muffelman, the founder of the *Freimaurerbund zur aufgehenden Sonne*, and then of the Symbolic Grand Lodge.¹¹

German Lodges in Poland

Both for Poland and Germany, the year 1918 marked a great breakthrough. Yet it seems that it was also a threshold date for freemasonry in these two countries. After Poland had regained independence, Polish freemasons started a process of obedience formation, which led to the creation of the Grand National Lodge of Poland in 1920. However, on the territories that had previously been under the Prussian rule, Prussian freemasonry lodges were set up with largely developed structures. On these areas, German lodges and German lodges of Polish provenience

⁹ A. Kargol, ‘Zapiski masona. Relacja Kurta Reichla z rozmowy z Andrzejem Strugiem w 1932 roku w świetle polskiej historiografii’, *Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i praktyka* 2017, no. 1, pp. 187–206.

¹⁰ W. Gniadek, *German free-masonry..., op. cit.* A few Old Prussian Lodges set up the National Christian Order and wanted to develop relations with fascists, claiming that Old Prussian Lodges never admitted Jews. These lodges declared that they stopped being masons and modified the existing ritual. Other lodges dissolved and transferred into Christian charity orders. Yet the act of 1933 concerned all freemasonry and co-masonry organisations, forcing them all to be dissolved. See also: A. Kargol, ‘Likwidacja łóż B’nei B’rith w Niemczech i w Polsce (1933–1938)’, *Ars Regia* 2010, no. 19, XII, pp. 159–160.

¹¹ W. Gniadek, *German free-masonry..., op. cit.*, [quoting] L. Hass, *Zasady w godzinie próby. Wolnomularstwo w Europie Środkowo Wschodniej 1929–1941.*, Warszawa 1987, pp 27, 28, 39–45; www.freemasons-freemasonry.com/bernheim12.html [accessed: 4.02.2017].

had been operating since the moment of liquidation of Polish freemasonry in 1821. They operated under the power of three Grand Berlin Lodges, also named Old Prussian lodges, whilst their members remained under a strong political influence of the "Iron Chancellor", and his *Kulturkampf*.¹²

What is more, since 1915, German field lodges, i.e. military lodges, had been created on Polish territories. German army entered Warsaw in August 1915, and already in autumn of that year, a founding meeting of the first field lodge was organised. Within six months of setting the freemasonry lights in the first such outpost, the number of members grew to one hundred fraters. The growth of the German free masonry lodges can be evidenced by the list of its members, "Zum Eisernen Kreuz im Osten" in Warsaw, which was published in June 1918. The list included one hundred and seventy three freemasons belonging to eight German obediences who were the members of the lodge.¹³

After the war, German field lodges were gravely attacked, in particular by General Erich Ludendorff and his followers, who regarded these lodges as "the cradle of the traitors of the homeland." Yet the character of these accusations was mainly delusional and clearly devoid of realistic content. In 1926, the General published his first book by the name of *Vernichtung der Freimaurerei durch Enthüllung ihrer Geheimnisse* (The Destruction of the Freemasonry by Revealing its Secrets). He wanted to prove that "the secret of the masonry lay in the fact that Jews were everywhere," with which he followed very closely the NSDAP rhetoric.¹⁴

In the regions of Greater Poland, Pomerania and Silesia, there were sixteen German lodges, and a few freemasonry clubs. Professor Ludwik Hass describes the situation in one of his works concerning free masonry on Polish territories after the First World War:

[...] German lodges, active on the lands previously under the Prussian rule, and under the authority of one of the three strongly conservative Grand Lodges in Berlin

¹² More than fifty freemasonry lodges operated on the area of contemporary Germany under the authority of the conservative Grosse National-Mutterloge "zu den drei Weltkugeln" (Grand National Lodge – Mother "Under Three Globes"), Grosse Landesloge der Freimaurer von Deutschland (Grand National Freemasonry Lodge of Germany) and Grosse Loge von Preussen, genannt Royal York "zur Freundschaft" (Grand Lodge of Prussia, called Royal York "Under Friendship"). See more: L. Chajn, *Wolnomularstwo w II Rzeczypospolitej*, Warszawa 1975, p. 459.

¹³ As a point of interest, the atmosphere in the Warsaw lodge must be mentioned. It can be evidenced by the symbolism of the badges worn by German freemasons. Most probably, this is the most beautiful badge of all the other badges found in the field lodges. It displays the Iron Cross against the background of a burning star and the Square and Compasses are bolted on the Cross. In the upper part of the compasses, there is the Warsaw Mermaid, and the symbol of the Polish White Eagle next to it. This was seen as a visible sign of the support and sympathy of the German lodge members for the Polish efforts for the restoration of the state independence. Criticism for this badge came from General Erich Ludendorff, who claimed that such ideas stood in contrast with the German national nature. He believed that the combination of mason and national ideas always led to abuses of the symbols sacred for many Germans, and employed these symbols for the purposes which, from ethical and moral points of view, were contradictory with the nationalistic feelings. He would say, with great indignation, that this was a sheer mockery of the Iron Cross combined with masonry symbols.

¹⁴ W. Gniadek, *Niemieckie loże...*, op. cit.

(so-called Old Prussian Lodges) with significant nationalistic and monarchist attitude, were realised from the subordination after these territories had been included into the Polish state. These lodges thus found themselves in a situation of “independent lodges” i.e. not subordinate to any centre of authority.¹⁵

Given the findings of Leon Chajn, there was not one, but actually three Grand Old Prussian Lodges, which left their freemasonry outposts within the borders of the newly restored Polish state. Seven of them carried out their activity under the authority of the *Grosse National-Mutter Loge* “zu den drei Weltkugeln”. These lodges were located in Bydgoszcz, Chojnice, Gniezno, Inowrocław, Krotoszyn, Poznań, and Ostrów. Five other lodges – in Chełm, Grudziądz, Leszno, Starogard, and Tczew – were dependent on the *Grosse Loge von Preussen, genannt “zur Freundthafft”*, whilst four lodges – in Brodnica, Katowice, Rawicz, and Toruń – fell within the jurisdiction of the third Old Prussian Lodge: the *Grosse Landesloge der Freimaurer von Deutschland*.¹⁶

On 28 October 1919, a conference of the Master Masons of German Lodges in Poland was held. The effect of this meeting was a resolution to address the Old Prussian Lodges in Berlin to be released from the organisational dependence existing so far.¹⁷ It was already on 25 November 1919 that the *Grosse Loge von Preussen, genannt “zur Freundthafft”* exempted from its authority the two lodges: “*Augusta zur Unsterblichkeit*”, working in the symbolic east of Stargard, and the “*Friedrich zum unausloschlichen Gedachtnis*” lodge in Tczew. Three other lodges falling under this obedience received such an exemption; if it was not together with the two first ones, it was definitely soon after. The two other Grand Old Prussian Lodges followed suit, exempting their subordinate freemasonry workshops from the dependence.¹⁸ Leon Chajn also believes that this was the outcome of the pressure of the Polish government of these lodges.

Frail mutual relations

In his doctoral dissertation, Waldemar Gniadek stresses the fact that German Lodges in the Second Polish Republic never really aspired to be unified with the Polish outposts subordinated to the Grand National Lodge of Poland, and never asked them for any formal or actual approval of their situation. The author points out that

[t]he majority of German freemasons and their superiors in Berlin, similarly as the minority remaining on the territories separated from the German statehood, had high

¹⁵ L. Hass, *Masoneria polska XX wieku. Losy, loże, ludzie*, Warszawa 1993, p. 66.

¹⁶ L. Chajn, *Wolnomularstwo...*, op. cit., pp. 459–460.

¹⁷ W. Gniadek, *Niemieckie loże...*, op. cit., on the basis of the research at the State Archives in Bydgoszcz, Loge zum Licht im Osten, Inowrocław, Verband und Satzungsänderungen 1933–1938, Ref.: 4, p. 171.

¹⁸ L. Hass, *Ambicje, rachuby, rzeczywistość. Wolnomularstwo w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej 1905–1992*, Warszawa 1984, p. 206.

hopes of a quick change of the Treaty of Versailles. These groups regarded Poland to be a “seasonal state”. Also the numerous co-masonry organisations active in Germany tried in many ways to preserve their close ties with their outposts remaining in Poland. In 1920, two German freemasonry lodges in Poland could apply to the Grand National Lodge, “Unified Poles” for the consent for the creation of their own Grand Lodge of Germany in Poland. German lodges in the interwar Poland were, from the legal point of view, in a much better and more stabilised situation than Polish orders, which, as it is known, remained outside the law for the entire period of their activity.¹⁹

In 1920, the “*Bund deutscher Freimaurerlogen in Polen*” (The Association of German Freemasonry Lodges in Poland) was created by fourteen lodges operating in Poznań and the Pomeranian regions, and the Katowice lodge was soon to join them.²⁰ The association operated as a legally registered association.

There were several causes for the above situation. First of all, close connections between the histories of both Polish and German lodges with the political situation in both countries must be emphasised. Polish freemasonry, mainly connected with the camp of Piłsudski’s followers, made up some kind of a political background of the “old guard”. They took part in the creation of the intellectual atmosphere, paving the way for the May Coup. In the 1930s, it shared the turbulent fortune of this incoherent group: internally in conflict, representing its various fractions and branches, which resulted in numerous departures and – to use the freemasonry jargon – so-called “dormitions” of the fraters manifesting antidemocratic attitudes. Undoubtedly, for the above reasons, i.e. on account of the connections with the authorities and the administration, Polish lodges remained officially not registered, they did not have the form of a legal organisation and kept their activity strictly confidential. This discretion not only concerned profanes, but also fraters from other freemasonry obediences. Therefore, it must be emphasised that Polish freemasonry deliberately alienated itself from German lodges, did not seek contacts with them and was far from treating German freemasonry movement as a potential partner for any forms of collaboration or joint activity.

The situation was similar for the German lodges in Poland, which, as discussed in Gniadek’s doctoral thesis, regarded their situation as temporary. They perceived the Second Polish Republic as a so-called “banana republic”, failing to believe in its historic continuity. Thus, they did not see any sense in the unification with the Grand National Lodge of Poland. It must be stressed here that getting rid of the authority of the German Grand Lodges was regarded as a form of loyalty towards the Polish state – at least officially – and assuming the position of the “wild lodges” from the point of view of freemasonry rules. Beyond all doubt, this was the outcome of the reticent attitude of the Polish administration towards all types of German organisations, and the German element.²¹ The belief in their anti-Polish

¹⁹ W. Gniadek, *German free-masonry...*, *op. cit.*

²⁰ Hass mentions the year 1921, Chajn – 1920. Cf. L. Hass, *Ambicje, rachuby...*, *op. cit.*, p. 206; L. Chajn, *Masoneria polska...*, *op. cit.*, p. 462. Chajn’s version seems to be confirmed by the articles of incorporation of the association presented in the Moscow Archives. A copy owned by the author of the dissertation. See more: W. Gniadek, *German free-masonry...*, *op. cit.*

²¹ W. Gniadek, *German free-masonry...*, *op. cit.*

propaganda or even espionage activity was not far-fetched. In the case of German freemasonry lodges, such actions were never proven, although it may be guessed that not all fraters were the apologists of the Polish state. However, it must be stated that these institutions, by all means, behaved neutrally, or even in an exceptionally loyal way.

The Brothers: who were they?

The social differences between German and Polish freemasons also had some degree of significance here. As a matter of fact, Polish masonry originated from the elites: intellectuals and social activists. Many of them belonged to the ministerial administration staff serving there as counsellors and department directors, or even ministers, not to mention a few prime ministers too.²² The social composition of the German freemasonry was more of middle class and bourgeois, rather than intellectual or elitist. As for numbers – both milieus were comparatively small. According to official data, in 1931–1932, the number of German freemasons associated in lodges on Polish territories was four hundred and ninety eight; amongst them only twenty three were younger than 35, one hundred and fifty nine were aged 35–50, whilst a definite majority, i.e. three hundred and sixteen, were over fifty.²³

The social and professional status of the above group in 1932 differed significantly from the one before the First World War, which meant that German masonry in Poland was going through a wave of major internal changes. The group comprised seventy-six merchants, and seventy-four landowners and real property owners. There were also sixty-five company owners, forty-one craftsmen, thirty-one physicians, forty-seven engineers and technicians, twenty directors (banks, ironworks, factories), twelve teachers and academics; four superintendents and pastors, seventeen construction entrepreneurs, as well as seventeen proxies, agents and administrators, eighteen pensioners, three artists, the rest representing all the other professions.²⁴ With time, taking into account the baseline, the lodges had lost more than six hundred members since 1918. The regular censuses of the lodges revealed the disappearance of the army and police officers, civil servants, a large group of school headmasters and teachers. Only the few members who could perform a significant role in the intellectual development of the community remained in the lodges.²⁵

²² A. Kargol, *Strug. Biografia polityczna*, Warszawa–Kraków 2016, pp. 201–225; W. Gniadek, 'Doktor Judym z Buska-Zdroju – biografia Szymona Starkiewicz', *Medycyna Rodzinna* 2014, no. 2; idem, 'Mieczysław Michałowicz – życie i działalność', *Medycyna Rodzinna* 2014, no. 3; idem, 'Rafał Radziwiłłowicz – wybitny psychiatra, działacz społeczny i wolnomularski', *Medycyna Rodzinna* 2015, no. 2; idem, 'Prof. Jan Mazurkiewicz – wolnomularz, twórca nowoczesnej polskiej psychiatrii i psychofizjologii', *Medycyna Rodzinna* 2016, no. 1.

²³ W. Gniadek, *Niemieckie loże...*, *op. cit.*, after: *Mitglieder – Verzeichnis der dem Bunde deutscher Freimaurer Logen in Polen angehörenden, Johannisfreimaurer – Logen für das Jahr 1931/32*.

²⁴ L. Chajn, *Wolnomularstwo...*, *op. cit.*, p. 460.

²⁵ L. Hass, *Ambicje, rachuby...*, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

A significant element which could lower the attractiveness of freemasonry ideas in the German community inhabiting Poland was the gradual penetration of the chauvinist and radically nationalistic ideology originating from Germany after 1924. What is also important is that this political trend was characterised with an overt aggression towards freemasonry.

Once this composition of the lodges is compared with the typically intellectual character of Polish freemasonry, with the domination of progressive and definitely social democratic trends (as the majority of Polish freemasons originated from Polish Socialist Party and in the 1930s they set up Alliance of Democrats and Democratic Clubs)²⁶, it is clear to see that these two social groups of different nationality could not have anything in common. This was due to the fact that at the beginning of the twentieth century Polish freemasonry was restored by a progressive and socialist-oriented intelligentsia. In Germany, in turn, where the bourgeoisie had always been very strong, masonry, traditionally closely linked with this social group, not only was continually growing and getting more and more cultivated, but also was spreading more and more into petit bourgeoisie. In Polish freemasonry, in contrast, there were lodges consisting entirely of professors, which was both a reason for glory and a limitation for Polish freemasonry.

The influences

The lack of mutual contacts and the far-reaching indifference for each other's existence were also the outcome of cultural differences, as Polish and German freemasonry stemmed from two completely different masonry traditions.

In the initial stage of its development, German freemasonry was the area of strong influences of both French and English freemasonries. The rite created following the spirit of medieval symbolism and knightly ethos was the Order of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem (called *Strictae Observantiae* – Strict Observance with regards to its monocratic character), founded in 1751 by Karl Gotthelf von Hund und Altengrotkau, a Silesian baron.²⁷ In the eighteenth century, more than 70% of the German freemasonry lodges worked in the system of the Templar Strict Observance.

At the same time, in Sweden, the principles of a new rite were worked out by merging various European systems: the English St. John's rite, the French rite, the York rite, the SOT (Templar Strict Observance), and the elements borrowed from the rites of the Rosicrucian Order. In 1774, the Master Mason of Swedish freemasonry Prince Charles of Södermanland (later Charles XIII of Sweden) in 1801 introduced the final modifications to the rite, developing moral philosophy, and adding some characteristics of a knightly order. This is a rite of a Christian mystical nature, based on a gnostic and cabbalistic tradition, in which Jesus Christ is regarded to be the Highest Master and a True Knight. There are historical reasons

²⁶ *Materiały do historii Klubów Demokratycznych i Stronnictwa Demokratycznego w latach 1937–1939*, parts 1 and 2, Introduction and Edition by L. Chajn, Warszawa 1964.

²⁷ W. Gniadek, *Niemieckie loże...*, op. cit.

for which German freemasonry lodges used a number of rites, but most frequently they reached back to the Swedish Rite.²⁸

Generally speaking, in Germany in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, at least eight rites were cultivated, being either the reformed Swedish rite, or a mutation of the Templar Strict Observance, like for instance the Rectified Scottish Rite. As opposed to the countries in which only one Grand Lodge existed and used only one rite, in German countries there was a great and misleading diversity of the rites in St. John's Lodges. Currently, almost 80% of German lodges carry out their activity on the basis of the Swedish and Rectified rites, whilst other lodges use mainly the "*Schröder*" Rite, and eclectic rituals.

Polish freemasons, in turn, who came into being at the beginning of the century in the Paris lodges of the *Grand Orient de France*, were "brought up" in the French (in other words – secular) rite, which was significantly simplified and ideologically linked with republican and democratic traditions.²⁹ It was only when the Grand National Lodge of Poland was founded in 1920 with the assistance of the Grand National Lodge of Italy that the rules of English freemasonry were introduced, and they were supported by the Grand Lodge of England. These rules rest chiefly on deism and primarily, although not solely, on the Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite of Freemasonry.³⁰ In spite of this change, the majority of Polish fraters remained closely connected to the ideas of French freemasonry from which they had grown. The circles of the French and German freemasonry cultures had never overlapped before and were quite hostile towards each other.

Brothers in the Army

The study of the similarities and differences between the Polish and German lodges should definitely include some references to military lodges. The tradition of the field or regimental lodges is as old and freemasonry itself. Taking into consideration that the majority of high officers in Western Europe came from the middle classes, freemasonry traditions easily penetrated to the army. German freemasons founded field lodges, already mentioned above, which operated until 1918. Military lodges also existed in Polish freemasonry in the inter-war period. These lodges had a slightly different nature, because they were not field lodges created on the front, but rather organisations formed out of military ones – informal bodies within the official army structure. The most known were the lodges by the name of "Machnicki", "Łukasiński", and "Sowiński", which gathered Piłsudski's followers and were supposed to provide the party's background among the army officers. Within the army, there were also secret organisations modelled on freemasonry; yet their true freemasonry character seems doubtful.³¹

²⁸ W. Kirk MacNulty, *Wolnomularstwo*, Warszawa 2007, pp. 212–214.

²⁹ K. Wojciechowski, *Ryt Francuski od Alchemii do racjonalizmu*, Wrocław 2009, pp. 29–62.

³⁰ A. Millar, *Masoneria. Zarys dziejów*, Warszawa 2006, pp. 219–225; for more information, see: I. Mainguy, *La symbolique maconique du troisieme millenaire*, Paris 2019.

³¹ L. Chajm, *Polskie wolnomularstwo 1920–1938*, Warszawa 1984, pp. 158–165.

A unique occurrence in the mutual contacts of Polish and German freemasons was an incidental meeting between Kurta Reichl and Andrzej Strug in 1932. Kurt Reichl, a German freemason of a higher rank had political connections with the Grand Lodge of Vienna, being its High Officer and an active member of the Supreme Council. He sought contact with Andrzej Strug, one of the founders of Polish freemasonry, a holder of the 33rd degree initiation and a member of the Supreme Council in Poland. Both gentlemen met in the Prague lodge called "*Adon-hiram*", which belonged to "*Lessing zu drei Ringen*", the most socially active lodges within the section of the Grand Lodge of Germany.³² Reichl's goal was to obtain information about Polish freemasonry. The aspect of this situation that strikes one the most is that this German mason could not meet his objective by contacting ... German lodges in Poland; he had to take a roundabout approach and use the agency of freemasons of other obediences to arrange a meeting with a representative of a Polish order ... in Prague! This very fact already offers a full picture of the mutual relations between Polish and German lodges, their knowledge of each other, and the degree of alienation of each of them.

Grand Master's opinion

In the opinion of Andrzej Strug, the German Freemasonry Order had no cultural or political significance. "It was neither efficient in national or supranational terms. German fraters were either obscure world cosmopolitans, or accidental philistines," according to Strug. But, as he further noted "[i]n German freemasonry, the very few classics of humanity were a great thing."³³ He goes on to argue that

[y]ou probably know very little about German freemasonry in Poland. I could convince you that we are dealing with it only formally and we are satisfied with it. Thus you have a full reflection: neither national nor international, neither water nor wine, rather diluted fraters associated over some wine. The order which did not have enough spirit to live, but too many members and contributions to die. This is the example that confirms how right you are in talking about the lack of cultural or political mission of German workshops not only in Poland.³⁴

The twilight

Apart from masonry lodges, in both countries there were also numerous co-masonry organisations, and they should not be neglected. The largest co-masonry organisation, having many lodges both in Poland and in Germany, was a Jewish co-masonry that operated in line with the principles of a charity association by the

³² K. Reichl, *Memorandum w sprawie Polski*, Część Zbiorów Specjalnych, Zbiory Masońskie Biblioteki Uniwersyteckiej w Poznaniu (BUP), Papiery dr Leona Chajna, teczka Artykuł o Strugu, Materiały i Korespondencja, brak paginacji.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

name of *B'nai B'rith*, and, to be precise, the *B'nai B'rith* Order (Hebrew: the Children of the Covenant). In both countries, *B'nai B'rith* founded its lodges as early as in the nineteenth century (in the case of Poland it was on Polish territories under the rule of partitions). In this case of co-masonry, the co-operation and mutual contacts of these two Jewish diasporas were very advanced. Both in Poland and in Germany, the *B'ani B'rith* was legally registered pursuant to the regulations on associations. The German *B'ani B'rith* Order survived the liquidation of the masonry lodges in the first months of 1933, but the Nazi law of 11 April, which banned the political activity of all non-Aryans, gave grounds for a battle against Jews and Jewish organisations. The repressions which affected all German *B'ani Brith* fraters resounded widely in Poland and in Europe, and the Polish *B'nai B'rith* lodges wanted to commence an extensive aid with the support of other lodges of the Order. This, however, was met with a firm opposition of the German *B'nai B'rith*, which feared an increase of the repressions. Thus the Polish Order requested its Viennese fraters (as there were also Jewish lodges) to go to Berlin in order to get the idea about the situation. The Viennese fraters did not take up this mission, but they delegated a trusted person to go from Prague to Berlin. This is how the command not to take any actions was sent from Berlin.³⁵ This situation clearly illustrates the profound relations within the *B'nai B'rith* in all the surrounding countries of the region. It was completely different than in the case of freemasonry, where internal political situation motivated to remain confidential, whilst mutual differences and frequent animosities of purely freemasonic character led to alienation. Once the disparity caused by the circumstances of the state foreign policy is taken into account, the picture of the above relationship is complete.

In Germany, the actions taken by the authorities towards freemasonry and *B'nai Brith* took diverse courses. Some lodges tried to oppose the Nazis, whereas the Old Prussian lodges tried to ingratiate themselves with the authorities by claiming that they were "free from Jews". Yet finally, in 1935, all the freemasonry associations were dissolved, and their assets were confiscated. The *B'nai B'rith* lodges, given their Jewish character, were not taken into consideration as a political entity.

In Poland, since 1937 a crude manhunt for masons was making itself conspicuous, and it was favoured by the authoritarian government. The Grand National Lodge of Poland, taking advantage of the friendly contacts in the governmental milieus, was informed in advance about the plans of the authorities and managed to be one step ahead of the decree dissolving the lodges. Before President Ignacy Mościcki issued the decree dissolving freemasonry associations in November 1938, the lodges managed to get dissolved themselves and hide their archives. The Polish government needed all the more some spectacular actions to prove its effectiveness which, in this situation, had clearly been undermined. Therefore, the decree affected the easiest target, i.e. the legally registered German lodges, and the legally active co-masonry lodges of *B'nai B'rith*. Contrary to popular belief, dissolving *B'nai B'rith* lodges in Poland was not an act of anti-Semitism.

In Germany, in 1935, *B'nai B'rith* was not regarded as belonging to masonry lodges, and thus it did not share their fate, nor was it dissolved. In Poland, *B'nai*

³⁵ A. Kargol, 'Likwidacja łóż B'nei B'rith...', *op. cit.*, pp. 159–160.

B'rith lodges were dissolved as co-masonry organisations that depended on free-masonry in November 1938.³⁶

The Second World War

During the Second World War, the Gestapo carried out the searches and detentions amongst both German and Austrian freemasons. In the summer of 1940, the then political police appeared in the apartment of Stanisław Stempowski, one of the long-time Master Masons of the Polish freemasonry. Stempowski was not arrested but, instead, he was ordered to draft a report concerning Polish freemasonry. He intentionally marginalised the role of the lodges, and apart from his own name and the name of then-deceased politician, Walery Sławek, there were only the names of the freemasons generally known to the public from masonic publications. He described the lodges as branches of Piłsudski's party operating at his orders.

Without any knowledge about Polish lodges, the Nazi political police was unable to verify the information contained in the report. Perhaps this incidence of misleading the gestapo could be the key to understanding the strange discovery in the Szczecin archives. This was a collection of files with a significant value for the studies of the freemasonry in Germany and the states occupied by the Third Reich, contained in the personal files kept in the State Archives in Szczecin.

The files were created by the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) in 1939–1945.³⁷ Apart from RSHA, the data concerning the opponents of the national socialism (and freemasons were considered to be some of them) were also collected by the Secret State Police (Gestapo) and Security Service (SD). These files make up a new source of information about Polish citizens – members of freemasonry lodges carrying out activity on Polish territories in 1918–1938.³⁸ It is interesting to see that these files do not contain the names of the freemasons who were the members of any of Polish obediences.

It might seem surprising that the number 41,533 belongs to the file created for Józef Piłsudski /sic!/, although it is widely known that the Marshall never belonged

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 159–160.

³⁷ This set contains 46,528 uniform evidence charts containing information about individual members of freemasonry or co-masonry. Each chart contains twelve typed or handwritten windows with some space for a photograph, name and surname, birthdate, residence address, lodge affiliation, function, religion, nationality, profession, etc. Some people listed there have two or even three charts like that. This is the effect of some dispute concerning the competencies of the offices responsible to searching the milieus regarded as hostile for the Third Reich.

³⁸ This set contains an evidence chart that allows to identify the name and surname of a Warsaw merchant who received initiation in 1915 in a German field lodge by the name of "Under the Iron Cross", active in Warsaw, which clearly shows that German freemasons during the First World War admitted local Poles, which even recently was not obvious. Some other charts certify that Polish citizens of German origin belonged to lodges in Poznań, Katowice, Leszno, Gniezno, Stargard, Toruń, Bydgoszcz, and the lodges active in the then Free City of Danzig. Not all the names listed in the RSHA charts are present in the reports of the Association of German Freemasonry Lodges in Poland, which were regularly submitted to the Polish administration.

to freemasonry. In the opinion of Professor Eugeniusz Cezary Król, Director of the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN), this fact could well confirm the allegations that at the turn of the 1920s and the 1930s, German intelligence was preparing a provocation addressed at Marshall Piłsudski.

Conclusions

To sum up the report concerning the studies of the mutual relations between Polish and German freemasons, reference should also be made to the valuable materials documenting the activity of German freemasonry lodges in inter-war Poland, kept by the Special Section of the Russian State Military Archives in Moscow. These documents have never been used in the studies of Polish masonry scholars. These materials were seized and taken to the Soviet Union by special military units following the frontline moving westward, and taking over the archival materials looted by RSHA in Germany, and on the territories occupied by the German Army.

It was only in 1990 that the authorities of the Russian Federation decided to render the documents collected in these Archives available for academic research. The first scholar to study these documents was Professor Helmut Reinalter, an Austrian scholar carrying out research of the history of freemasonry. He made an objective catalogue of a few thousands of archival materials containing freemasonry documents, including a set of files concerning the German lodges active in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries on Polish territories, and then published this catalogue at Peter Lang, a Frankfurt-based publishing house.³⁹ The first Polish academic to use and study these materials was Waldemar Gniadek.

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³⁹ H. Reinalter, *Die deutschen und österreichischen Freimaurer Bestände im Deutschen Sonderarchiv in Moskau (heute Aufbewahrungszentrum der historisch-dokumentarischen Kollektionen)*, Frankfurt 2002.

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Królewska sztuka wolnomularstwa w Polsce i Niemczech w pierwszej połowie XX wieku. Relacje, różnice i podobieństwa **Streszczenie**

Artykuł dotyczy stanu badań nad wolnomularstwem niemieckim w Polsce oraz wzajemnymi relacjami pomiędzy lożami polskimi i niemieckimi w pierwszej połowie XX wieku. Łoże niemieckie na pozaborskich terenach polskich dalej wiodły swój żywot w okresie II Rzeczypospolitej. Równocześnie w Polsce żywo rozwijała się masoneria. Autorzy artykułu

starają się dać odpowiedź na pytania, jak układała się koegzystencja obydwu wolnomularskich kręgów kulturowych oraz jakie były przyczyny takiego stanu rzeczy.

Słowa kluczowe: wolnomularstwo niemieckie w Polsce, wolnomularstwo w Polsce w pierwszej połowie XX w., wolnomularskie relacje polsko-niemieckie

*The Royal Art of Free Masonry in Poland and in Germany
in the First Half of the 20th Century:
Relations, Differences, and Similarities*
Abstract

This paper looks at the research on German Freemasonry in Poland, and the relations between Polish and German Lodges in Poland in the first half of the twentieth century. The German Lodges which remained in the post-partition territories of Poland continued their existence during the Second Polish Republic. At the same time, the Polish Lodges started to grow vividly. The authors of the paper have made an attempt to answer the questions about the model of coexistence of both the Masonic circles of different culture and the type of reasons that played a major role in this process.

Key words: German Freemasonry in Poland, Freemasonry in Poland in the first half of the 20th century, Masonic Polish-German relations

*Die königliche Kunst der Freimaurerei in Polen
und in Deutschland in der ersten Hälfte des XX. Jahrhunderts:
Beziehungen, Unterschiede und Ähnlichkeiten*
Zusammenfassung

Der Artikel betrachtet die Forschungen über die deutsche Freimaurerei in Polen und die gegenseitigen Beziehungen zwischen den polnischen und deutschen Logen in der ersten Hälfte des XX. Jahrhunderts. Die deutschen Logen bestanden in der II. Republik Polen in denjenigen polnischen Gebieten weiter, die früher besetzt waren. Gleichzeitig entwickelte sich in Polen die Freimaurerei lebhaft. Die Autoren des Artikels versuchen die Fragen zu beantworten, wie beide Kulturkreise der Freimaurer nebeneinander existieren konnten und was die Gründe hierfür waren.

Schlüsselwörter: die deutsche Freimaurerei in Polen, die Freimaurerei in Polen in der ersten Hälfte des XX. Jahrhunderts, die polnisch-deutschen Beziehungen der Freimaurerei

*Королевское искусство свободного масонства
в Польше и Германии в первой половине XX века.
Взаимоотношения, различия, сходства*
Резюме

Статья посвящена состоянию исследований проблематики немецкого масонства в Польше и взаимоотношений между польскими и немецкими ложами в первой половине XX века. Немецкие ложи действовали во Второй Речи Посполитой на польских территориях ранее находящихся в составе других государств. В то время в Польше масонство развивалось очень динамично. Авторы статьи предприняли

попытку ответить на вопросы касающиеся того, как складывалось сосуществование обоих масонских культурных кругов и каковы были факторы сыгравшие главную роль в этом процессе.

Ключевые слова: немецкое масонство в Польше, масонство в Польше в первой половине XX века, польско-немецкие масонские отношения

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Ragnar Leunig

ehemaliger Leiter des Europa-Instituts Bocholt
Gastdozent an der Adam-Mickiewicz-Universität
ORCID: 0000-0002-2819-1393

Deutschland als Wanderungs- und Einwanderungsland seit 1945

Schon im Zweiten Weltkrieg kamen Millionen Menschen nach Deutschland. Sie gelangten zwangsweise in das Deutsche Reich oder in dessen Einzugsbereich als polnische und sowjetische Kriegsgefangene, Häftlinge in Konzentrationslagern und Zwangsarbeiter aus den vom Deutschen Reich besetzten Ländern. Ohne die Arbeit von sechs Millionen Zwangsarbeitern und die 5,7 Millionen sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen, von denen 2,4 Millionen an Kälte, Hunger und Misshandlungen starben, in den Rüstungsbetrieben und der Landwirtschaft, hätten die Nationalsozialisten den Krieg 1944 nicht fortführen können.¹

Nach Kriegsende kehrten diese „displaced persons“ in ihre Heimatländer zurück, aber aus politischen Gründen nicht alle Mittel- und Osteuropäer. Sie blieben in Deutschland oder wanderten in die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, Kanada und Australien aus. Laut der Volkszählung vom 16. Juni 1933 lebten im Deutschen Reich 65 362 115 Menschen.² Geschätzt starben 6,3 Millionen Deutsche, darunter 5,2 Millionen Soldaten. Insgesamt verloren in diesem Krieg etwa 55 Millionen Menschen ihr Leben. Polen verlor etwa 6 Millionen Menschen, meist aus der zivilen Bevölkerung, die Sowjetunion mehr als 27 Millionen Soldaten und Zivilisten, darunter 6 Millionen Juden aus diesen Ländern.³

¹ *Die nationalsozialistische Zwangsarbeit – Hintergrundinformationen*, [in:] *Zwangsarbeit 1939–1945, Erinnerungen und Geschichte*, unter <https://www.zwangsarbeit-archiv.de/zwangsarbeit/zwangsarbeit/zwangsarbeit-2/index.html> [abgerufen am 15.10.2018].

² *Liste der Wohnbevölkerung*, unter https://www.wikizero.com/de/Liste_der_Volksz%C3%A4hlungen_in_Deutschland [abgerufen am 15.10.2018].

³ *Hintergrund: Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Zahlen und Fakten*, Quelle: dpa, unter <https://www.zeit.de/news/2015-05/08/geschichte-hintergrund-der-zweite-weltkrieg-in-zahlen-und-fakten-08065612> [abgerufen am 15.10.2018].

Flucht, Vertreibung, Zwangsaussiedlung von Deutschen und Umsiedlung von Polen am Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges

Am Ende des Krieges beschlossen die siegreichen Alliierten, dass Polen wieder als eigener Staat entstehen sollte, bei gleichzeitiger Anerkennung der Annexion der durch die Sowjetunion 1939 okkupierten Gebiete. Um Polen einen Ausgleich für die verlorenen Gebiete im Osten zu geben, kam es zu einer „Westverschiebung“ Polens auf Kosten des besiegten Deutschlands. Aus Schlesien, Pommern, Ostpreußen und danach auch aus der Tschechoslowakei, Ungarn, Rumänien sowie Jugoslawien waren bis 1950 etwa 12 Millionen Deutsche oder Deutschstämmige von Flucht, Vertreibung und Zwangsaussiedlung betroffen. Geschätzt wurden eine halbe Million Opfer von Flucht und Vertreibung. Fast jeder Vierte war in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone und jeder Siebte oder Achte in den alliierten Westzonen Flüchtling oder Vertriebener. Zwölf Millionen Vertriebene gab es 1947 auch bei der Bildung der Staaten Indien und Pakistan.⁴

In den neuen Gebieten Polens um Wrocław/Breslau, Szczecin/Stettin, Olsztyn/Allenstein siedelten zwangsweise etwa 1,8 Millionen Polen aus den an die Sowjetunion verlorenen Gebieten. Aus Zentralpolen wanderten 3,6 Millionen in diese Regionen, wo nach 1970 mehr Menschen leben als 1937 unter deutscher Herrschaft. Einige hunderttausend Deutsche verblieben in Polen, vor allem in Opole/Oppeln, Oberschlesien und Olsztyn/Allenstein als „Autochthone“.

In der sowjetischen Besatzungszone, ab 1949 in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (DDR), erhielten einige Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene das Land aus den enteigneten Gütern. Die Pflege ihrer Traditionen und Sprache in Vereinen wurde ihnen nicht gestattet. Im Görlitzer Vertrag erkannte die DDR 1950 die Oder-Neiße-Grenze zu Polen endgültig an.

Weder im Osten noch im Westen wurden die „Flüchtlinge“ begrüßt. Städte und Industrie waren durch die alliierten Bombardierungen zerstört. Die „Einheimischen“ mussten ihre Wohnungen teilweise aufgeben und einen „Lastenausgleich“ an diese Neusiedler für das im Osten verlorene Hab und Gut zahlen. Die Flüchtlinge erhöhten die Arbeitslosigkeit im Westen. Viele von ihnen wanderten wegen der anscheinenden Perspektivlosigkeit aus (1949–1961: 779 200). Die Flüchtlinge wurden aber mit den Einheimischen und dank des amerikanischen „Marshall-Plans“ sowie der US-Investitionen, Motor für den wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung, das „Wirtschaftswunder“ der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.

Flüchtlinge in Westdeutschland betrieben nicht nur Traditionspflege in Vereinen. Sie waren mit der Partei der „Heimatlosen und Entrechteten“ (BHE) im Deutschen Bundestag und in der Regierung vertreten. Der Glaube an eine Rückkehr verlor sich jedoch immer mehr. Aber erst im deutsch-polnischen Vertrag von 1990

⁴ T. Schieder (Hrsg.), *Handbuch der Europäischen Geschichte*, Bd. 6, Stuttgart 1979, 569ff.; G.D. de Fenffe, *Flucht und Vertreibung*, unter <https://www.planet-wissen.de/geschichte/deutsche-geschichte/flucht-und-vertreibung/index/html> [abgerufen 15.10.2018]; *Indien*. Informationen zur politischen Bildung, Heft 332, 2018.

erkannte die Bundesrepublik Deutschland die Oder-Neiße-Grenze völkerrechtlich an. Die Integration der Millionen Flüchtlinge und Vertriebenen wurde in der Bundesrepublik im Gegensatz zu späteren Integrationsbemühungen auch dadurch zu einer Erfolgsgeschichte, dass diese Menschen eine gemeinsame Tradition, Sprache und religiösen Hintergrund mit den Einheimischen besaßen. Viele Menschen sagen noch heute, dass ihre Eltern oder Großeltern aus Schlesien, Pommern oder Ostpreußen stammen. Die heutige Generation und selbst die betroffenen Flüchtlinge unterschätzen die gewaltige Dimension der millionenfachen Umsiedlung nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg.⁵

Flüchtlinge aus der sowjetischen Besatzungszone und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik bis zum Bau der Mauer 1961

In Ostdeutschland herrschten die brutale sowjetische Besatzungsmacht und die Zwangspolitik der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei (SED) der DDR. Die Kollektivierung der Landwirtschaft in den Landwirtschaftlichen Produktionsgenossenschaften (LPG) nahm den Bauern das Land und auch den Flüchtlingen, die gerade erst Land erhalten hatten. Durch Reparationen wurden Betriebe in Ostdeutschland abgebaut und in der Sowjet-Union wieder errichtet. Der Wiederaufbau des zerstörten Landes wurde behindert.

Da die Grenzen zwischen Ost- und Westdeutschland und Ost- und Westberlin noch offen waren, gingen bis 1961 2,6 Millionen Ostdeutsche nach Westdeutschland. Ihre Integration bot wegen der prosperierenden Wirtschaft bei gleicher ethnischer Herkunft keine großen Probleme. Das Gleiche galt auch für die vier Millionen Kriegsgefangenen der Alliierten, zuletzt 1955 aus der Sowjetunion, wo über eine Million von ihnen gestorben war.⁶

Anders in der DDR. Die permanente Abwanderung von jungen Menschen, Fachkräften und Akademikern sah die Regierung der DDR als Bedrohung des eigenen Staates. Zwar hatte Walter Ulbricht, der Generalsekretär der SED, noch im Juni 1961 gesagt: „Niemand hat die Absicht eine Mauer zu errichten“. Aber am 13. August 1961 wurde mit Zustimmung der Sowjetunion mit dem „antfaschistischen Schutzwall“ die Grenze zwischen Ost- und Westdeutschland geschlossen und die Mauer in Berlin gebaut. Die Ost-Westwanderung in Deutschland endete.⁷

⁵ *Flucht, Vertreibung, Integration*, Begleitbuch zur Ausstellung Haus der Geschichte, Berlin 2006.

⁶ „Der Tagesspiegel“, 25.01.2014; K.J. Bade (Hrsg.), *Deutsche im Ausland. Fremde in Deutschland. Migration in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, München 1992 (weiter K.J. Bade).

⁷ Walter Ulbricht, Generalsekretär der SED, Rede vom 15.06.1961, unter <http://www.chronik-der-mauer.de/material/178773/internationale-pressekonzferenz-des-staatsrats-vorsitzenden-der-ddr-walter-ulbricht-in-ost-berlin-15.juni-1961> [abgerufen am 15.10.2018].

„Wir riefen Arbeitskräfte und es kamen Menschen“ (Max Frisch) – Ausländische Arbeitskräfte und Familiennachzug 1955–1990

Mit dem wirtschaftlichen Aufstieg gab es in der Bundesrepublik einen erhöhten Bedarf an Arbeitskräften, besonders im Bereich der Industrie und des Bauwesens, was sich nach dem Bau der Mauer noch verstärkte. Die Bundesregierung schloss daraufhin Anwerbeabkommen, 1955 mit Italien, 1960 mit Spanien und Griechenland, 1961 mit der Türkei, danach mit Portugal (1964), zuletzt 1968 mit Jugoslawien. Während Abkommen mit den nordafrikanischen Ländern Tunesien, Algerien und Marokko wenig Zuwanderung brachten, kamen vor allem Arbeitnehmer aus der Türkei (mehr als 700 000) und Jugoslawien, die meist im Bereich der ungelerten oder angelernten Tätigkeiten arbeiteten.⁸ Italiener oder Spanier gehörten einer andern ethnischen Gruppe und Sprache an. Mit den Türken – sie stellten bis 1973 mehr als drei Viertel der Ausländer – kamen erstmals Menschen (Muslime) einer anderen Religion nach Deutschland.

Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland sah sich nicht als Einwanderungsland. Weder in Politik und Wirtschaft noch Gesellschaft wurde über die sozialen Folgen der Zuwanderung der „Gastarbeiter“ – seit wann arbeiten Gäste – nachgedacht, da man von ihrer Rückkehr in die Heimatländer ausging. Während 1960 1,2% der Bevölkerung in Deutschland Ausländer waren, waren es 1970 schon 4,9%, darunter etwa ein Drittel Türken. Von den geschätzten 14 Millionen Wanderarbeitnehmern kehrten etwa 11 Millionen in ihre Heimatländer zurück.⁹

Die Migranten kamen aus wirtschaftlich schwachen Regionen Südeuropas und entschlossen sich oft nach einer Binnenwanderung zur Weiterwanderung nach Deutschland. Ein Drittel waren Frauen. Sie alle ließen ihre Familien zurück und wollten nach Erwerb finanzieller Mittel in die Heimat zurückkehren. Das änderte sich nach 1973 mit der Energiekrise, der erhöhten Arbeitslosigkeit und dem deutschen „Anwerbestopp“. Zwar sahen sich jetzt viele Migranten zur Rückkehr gezwungen. Aber es kam zu einem verstärkten Familiennachzug, wenn ihre Arbeit den Migranten eine Bleibeperspektive bot. Die Zahl der Ausländer stieg bis 1989 auf 4,9 Millionen, das waren 7,3 % der Bevölkerung. Der Rückkehrwunsch blieb. Aber nachdem 1987 schon fast die Hälfte der Arbeitsmigranten 10 bis 20 Jahre in der Bundesrepublik lebte und die Kinder wenig Verbindung zum Heimatland hatten, verstärkte sich die Tendenz zum Bleiben.¹⁰

Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland wurde immer mehr zum Einwanderungsland, ohne dass die deutsche Politik und Gesellschaft ihr Land als Einwanderungsland sahen. Die rechtliche Stellung der Migranten verfestigte sich. Damit gewann die Frage der Integration zunehmend an Bedeutung. Behörden, Schulen und Wohnungsmarkt waren gefordert. Die Migrantenfamilien siedelten sich aus finanziellen, aber auch aus Gründen des Zusammenhalts und der Pflege der eigenen

⁸ K.J. Bade, S. 395.

⁹ *Ibid.*, S. 394.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 396ff.

Kultur in mietgünstigen Stadtteilen an. Dies konnte die Entwicklung zu „Parallelgesellschaften“ fördern, wurde aber von deutscher Seite nicht genügend beachtet, äußerte sich höchstens in der wachsenden ablehnenden Haltung vor allem gegenüber Türken.

Auch in Ostdeutschland gab es ausländische Arbeitnehmer aus befreundeten Ländern wie Angola, Mozambique, Kuba und Vietnam. Sie lebten nach der Arbeit völlig getrennt von den Deutschen. Die bis nach 1990 und dem Ende der DDR stationierten 370 000 Sowjetsoldaten waren kaserniert und besaßen nur minimalen Kontakt zu Deutschen. Sowjetische Offiziere und Honoratioren der DDR trafen sich gelegentlich in der „Gesellschaft für deutsch-sowjetische Freundschaft“, was aber nicht zu engerer Verbindung führte. Anders die amerikanischen Soldaten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Sie hatten viel Kontakt mit Deutschen und Kenntnis von Deutschland. Seit dem Abzug der meisten US-Soldaten nach 1990 ging die Vertrautheit mit der deutschen Situation in den USA verloren, was sich bis heute in einer Entfremdung der amerikanischen Politik gegenüber Deutschland auswirkt.

Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland war Einwanderungsland für Menschen anderer Nationalität, Ethnie, Sprache, Kultur und Religion geworden. Bewusstseinsmäßig sträubten sich die Westdeutschen – wie auch ihre Politik – dagegen ein Einwanderungsland zu sein. Aber die tägliche Praxis des Zusammenarbeitens und Zusammenlebens schuf einen gewissen Gewöhnungs- und Lerneffekt, der sich teilweise positiv auf die kommenden Herausforderungen auswirkte.

Wanderung und Einwanderung nach Deutschland um und nach 1990 – die deutsche Einheit

Seit dem Mauerbau 1961 kamen bis Ende 1988 nur 61 605 Menschen meist durch lebensgefährliche Flucht über die Grenze der DDR nach Westdeutschland. In den letzten Jahren der DDR gab es legale Ausreisen. Neben älteren Menschen mussten die „Übersiedler“ nach Antragstellung zur Ausreise privat und beruflich starke Einschränkungen in der DDR erleben. 1989 kamen viele über die jetzt offene ungarische Grenze oder als „Botschaftsflüchtlinge“ aus Prag. Nach der Öffnung der Mauer am 9.11.1989 und der deutschen Einheit 1990 gingen von den ursprünglich 16,7 Millionen Ostdeutschen 1,36 Millionen (8% der Bevölkerung) nach Westdeutschland, bis 2017 etwa zwei Millionen.¹¹ Ursprünglich waren es mehr Männer, die nach dem Westen gingen, später viele junge, gut ausgebildete Frauen. Nach 2015 gleicht sich die Wanderungsbilanz für Ostdeutschland wieder aus, da verstärkt Menschen, die länger in Westdeutschland gelebt haben, wieder in ihre ostdeutsche Heimat zurückziehen. Durch die höhere Arbeitslosigkeit, die Verödung einiger Regionen und das Ungleichgewicht zwischen Männern und Frauen in einigen Gegenden (80 junge Frauen im Alter von 18–29 Jahren auf hundert junge Männer) ergeben sich immer größere soziale und politische Folgen.

¹¹ P. Gans, *Bevölkerung. Entwicklung und Demographie unserer Gesellschaft*, Darmstadt 2011, 213ff. (weiter P. Gans).

Aussiedler auf dem Weg nach Deutschland – seit 1993 Spätaussiedler Juden aus der früheren Sowjetunion

1959 nach dem Ende von Flucht und Vertreibung kamen Deutsche durch Familienzusammenführung in die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, aber auch in die DDR. Nach dem Ende des Sozialismus in Mittel- und Osteuropa zogen 4,6 Millionen Aussiedler nach Deutschland, darunter fast 60% aus Polen (1988 140 226; 1989 250 340; 1990 133 872) aber auch aus dem rumänischen Siebenbürger, aus Sachsen und Banater Schwaben. Von 1991, dem Ende der Sowjetunion, vor allem 1,3 Millionen Menschen aus diesen Gebieten.

Die Aussiedler erhielten die deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft und eine sofortige Arbeitserlaubnis. Die Deutschstämmigen aus Polen, dort „Autochthone“ genannt, hatten trotz früherer politischer Einschränkungen recht gute Deutschkenntnisse und vermochten sich schnell in die deutsche Arbeitswelt einzufügen. Sie behielten neben dem deutschen oft den polnischen Pass und konnten sich mit in Deutschland verdienten Geld beispielsweise in Schlesien eine Existenz aufbauen.

Die Deutschstämmigen aus der Sowjetunion wurden unter Josef Stalin während des Zweiten Weltkrieges als „Unzuverlässige“ meist in Kasachstan angesiedelt. Wegen ihrer geringen Deutschkenntnisse oft als „Russen“ bezeichnet, hatten sie größere Schwierigkeiten sich in Arbeit und Gesellschaft in Deutschland einzugliedern. Aussiedler aus Mittel- und Osteuropa kamen zwar aus wirtschaftlichen Gründen nach Deutschland. Aber auch die mangelnde Förderung ihrer Kultur, Tradition und Sprache und ihre Diskriminierung in der Sowjetunion als Fremde, brachte sie zur Umsiedlung.¹²

Bis 1989 gab es nach dem Holocaust und der Auswanderung von Überlebenden noch etwa 30 000 Juden in den deutschen jüdischen Gemeinden. Nach dem Zerfall der Sowjetunion wurden bis Mitte der 1990er Jahre etwa 220 000 Juden als „Kontingentflüchtlinge“ in Deutschland aufgenommen, um ihnen angesichts der deutschen Vergangenheit eine gewisse Wiedergutmachung zukommen zu lassen. Auf Grund der Verfolgungen und der Benachteiligungen in der Sowjetunion besaßen diese Juden nur einen geringen religiösen Hintergrund. Sie gingen nur teilweise in die deutschen jüdischen Gemeinden. Ihr Einfluss führte aber in den Gemeinden zu Auseinandersetzungen mit den bisher in Deutschland lebenden Juden.¹³

Die Herausforderungen nach 1990

Im Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland aus dem Jahre 1949 steht im Artikel 16: „Politische Verfolgte genießen Asylrecht“. Dies gilt für Menschen, die aus

¹² K.J. Bade, S. 402.

¹³ D. Belkin, *Jüdische Kontingentflüchtlinge und Russlanddeutsche*, unter <https://www.bpb.de/Gesellschaft/migration/kurzdossiers/252561/juedische-kontingentfluechtlinge-undrusslanddeutsche?p=all> [abgerufen am 15.10.2018].

ethnischen, politischen oder religiösen Gründen oder wegen ihrer Nationalität verfolgt werden. Außer nach dem „Ungarnaufstand“ 1956 und der Niederschlagung des „Prager Frühlings“ 1968 blieben die Zahlen der Asylbewerber bis zum Ende des Sozialismus 1987–1990 gering. Mit der Demokratisierung stieg die Zahl der Asylbewerber besonders aus Polen stark an. Auf dem Höhepunkt 1992–1993 gelangten neben den Übersiedlern aus Ostdeutschland mit den 440 000 Asylbewerbern – meist aus dem ehemaligen Jugoslawien – und den Spätaussiedlern über eine Million Menschen nach Deutschland.¹⁴

Nach den hohen Zuwanderungszahlen gab es in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland verschärfte politische Diskussionen. Und es fanden auch Anfang der 1990er Jahre Anschläge in Ostdeutschland (Hoyerswerda, Rostock) und Westdeutschland (Möln, Solingen) statt, bei denen auch Migranten starben. Eine Terrorzelle ermordete zwischen 2000 und 2007 zehn Menschen.¹⁵ Die Bundesregierung reagierte auf den Anstieg der Asylbewerberzahlen 1993 mit einer Verschärfung des Asylgesetzes. Bis heute ist dabei die Definition „sicheres Drittland“ umstritten. Das Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) entscheidet, ob es sich um politische Verfolgte handelt. Die Abschiebung abgelehnter Asylbewerber ist oft schwierig, da Asylbewerber häufig ihre wahre Identität zu verbergen versuchen, um eine Anerkennung zu erreichen und einige Länder die Rücknahme von abgelehnten Asylbewerbern verweigern.¹⁶

Als Folge des geänderten Asylgesetzes sank die Zahl der Antragsteller in Deutschland von 71 000 (2002) auf 28 000 (2008). Grund dafür war auch das Dubliner Abkommen der Europäischen Union (EU), das festlegt, dass das Einreiseland in ein EU-Mitgliedsland für Flüchtlinge auch das Land des Asylverfahrens ist. Davon profitierte Deutschland, da es kaum Außengrenzen im Süden besitzt, über die Flüchtlinge einreisen konnten.

Im Jahre 2000 weicht Deutschland erstmals vom Abstammungsrecht ab und gewährt danach in Deutschland Geborenen die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit (endgültige Entscheidung darüber bis zum 23. Lebensjahr) und erkennt damit erstmals an, dass Deutschland Einwanderungsland ist.

2004 treten mit „big bang“ 10 mittel- und osteuropäische Länder in die EU ein. Erst ab 2011 konnten Migranten aus diesen Ländern Arbeit und Zuzug in Deutschland erlangen. Großbritannien erlaubte dies sofort, weshalb viele Polen die Gelegenheit ergriffen auf der Insel zu arbeiten. Beim Ausbau der neuen Hauptstadt Berlin und in Berliner Haushalten arbeiteten viele Polen illegal. 2007 traten Rumänien und Bulgarien, Länder mit hoher Arbeitslosigkeit, in die EU ein und erhielten 2015 zusammen mit Kroatien die Freizügigkeit und die Arbeitserlaubnis in der EU.

¹⁴ P. Gans, S. 142; K.J. Bade 411ff.

¹⁵ V. Hanewinkel, *Fluchtmigration nach Deutschland und Europa: Einige Hintergründe* (weiter V. Hanewinkel), unter <http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/kurzdossiers/2173697/fluchtmigration-hintergruende?p=all> [abgerufen am 15.19.2018].

¹⁶ „Süddeutsche Zeitung“ (weiter SZ), 5.09.2018.

Der Krieg im Nahen Osten und die Flüchtlingssituation in Deutschland und Europa

Der Krieg im Nahen Osten nach der Ausbreitung der islamistischen Terrororganisation (IS) in Syrien und Irak, geführt von Kurden mit Unterstützung der USA und des syrischen Regimes von Präsident Baschar al-Assad mit russischer Hilfe gegen Rebellengruppen, trieb Millionen Menschen aus diesen Ländern in die Flucht. Meist bleiben sie in Jordanien und der Türkei (über 3,6 Millionen), aber Hunderttausende versuchten nach Europa zu gelangen. 2015 saßen Tausende ohne Perspektive in Ungarn fest. Die deutsche Kanzlerin Angela Merkel entschied, diese Menschen nach Deutschland weiter wandern zu lassen, in der Annahme, dass auch andere Länder diese Menschen aufnehmen würden und im Glauben an die Integrationsfähigkeit der deutschen Gesellschaft. Die deutsche Regierung geht außerdem von der Gültigkeit des Dubliner Abkommens aus.¹⁷

2015 und 2016 kamen über 1,2 Millionen Flüchtlinge aus Syrien und dem Irak nach Deutschland. Die Balkanländer sperrten die Fluchtrouten durch ihre Länder. Die Türkei behielt nach einem finanziellen Abkommen mit der EU weitere Flüchtlinge. Für Flüchtlinge, meist aus Afrika, blieb nur die oft tödliche Mittelmeerroute nach Europa. Nach diesem riesigen Anstieg der Flüchtlingszahlen gibt es jetzt seit Jahren heftige Diskussionen in Politik und Gesellschaft über den richtigen Kurs und den weiteren Zuzug von Menschen nach Deutschland. Rechte Parteien hatten bisher wenig Zuspruch, weil sie mit dem Tabuthema Holocaust verbunden blieben. Jetzt sammelt die Partei Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) den Protest von rechtsgerichteten und nationalistisch denkenden Bürgern im Protest gegen die Flüchtlingspolitik, was sie in die Länderparlamente und 2017 in den deutschen Bundestag brachte.

Die deutsche Wirtschaft floriert seit Jahren, kennt die niedrigste Arbeitslosigkeit seit der deutschen Einheit. Die Auswanderung bleibt gering (1991–2017: 1,365 Millionen). Gleichzeitig ist eine weit verbreitete Unzufriedenheit, besonders in der ostdeutschen Bevölkerung, feststellbar. Hier gibt es eine höhere Arbeitslosigkeit, unsichere Arbeitsverhältnisse und „gebrochene Biographien“ der Älteren. Ostdeutsche fühlen sich oft gegenüber den Westdeutschen zurückgesetzt und wenden sich stärker einfachen nationalen Lösungen zu. Hier wirkt es sich aus, dass Ostdeutschland direkt vom Nationalsozialismus über den Sozialismus in die deutsche und europäische Einigung ging, die eigene regionale Identität daher nicht genügend ausgebildet ist.

Ostdeutsche haben weniger Erfahrungen mit Migranten als Westdeutsche. Aber rechtsextreme Aktionen gegenüber Migranten und Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund gibt es in Ost wie West, zuletzt in Halle und Hanau. Nach 2015 hat ein Teil der deutschen Bevölkerung die Flüchtlinge durch aktives Engagement

¹⁷ Siehe: V. Hanewinkel; *Grenzöffnung für Flüchtlinge*, unter [https:// www.de/2016/35/grenzoeffnung-fluechtlinge-september-2015-wochenende-angela-merkel-ungarn-oesterreich/seite-2](https://www.de/2016/35/grenzoeffnung-fluechtlinge-september-2015-wochenende-angela-merkel-ungarn-oesterreich/seite-2) [abgerufen am 15.10.2018].

und Sprachvermittlung unterstützt. Eine teilweise bereits erfolgte aktive Einbindung in den Arbeitsmarkt ist für die Migranten wichtig.¹⁸

Die derzeitige wirtschaftliche Konjunktur und weitere ökonomische Stabilität vorausgesetzt, hat Deutschland bei derzeit einer Million offenen Stellen einen Bedarf an geschulten Arbeitskräften. Auch angesichts der relativ niedrigen Kinderquote (etwa 1,5 Kinder pro Frau) ist eine Einwanderung von 200 000 bis 300 000 Menschen pro Jahr notwendig, um den jetzigen Lebensstandard zu erhalten.¹⁹

Aufgrund der Freizügigkeit in der EU kamen von 2011 bis 2018 über 5 Millionen Menschen nach Deutschland und auf den hiesigen Arbeitsmarkt und über die Blue Card der EU jährlich 20 000 besonders qualifizierte Fachkräfte von Ländern außerhalb der EU.²⁰ Ein deutsches Einwanderungsgesetz soll die Arbeitseinwanderung auch aus solchen Ländern fördern. Derzeit gibt es 10,5 Millionen Ausländer in Deutschland. Davon sind 44% Bürger der EU, 1,5 Millionen Türken (ohne Einbürgerung), 867 000 Polen, knapp 700 000 Syrer, 643 000 Italiener, 623 000 Rumänen. In den westdeutschen Bundesländern sind 8% bis über 13% der Bewohner Ausländer, in den ostdeutschen Bundesländern sind es weniger als 3,5%. Trotzdem ist die Aversion gegenüber Migranten aus den genannten Gründen viel höher.²¹

Mögliche Perspektiven einer zukünftigen deutschen und europäischen Migrationspolitik

Viele der seit den 1960er Jahren Eingewanderten sind wieder in ihre Heimatländer zurückgegangen. Der Familiennachzug der seit 2015 zugewanderten Flüchtlinge ist begrenzt. Nach einem eventuellen Friedensschluss im Nahen Osten wird sicher ein Teil der Flüchtlinge in ihre Heimat zurückkehren. Aber nach den bisherigen Erfahrungen mit Migranten wird auch ein Teil dieser Menschen auf Dauer in Deutschland bleiben. Zu den derzeit über 10 Millionen Ausländern in Deutschland kommen noch die Eingebürgerten, so dass heute etwa jeder vierte oder fünfte in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Lebende ein Migrant ist oder einen Migrationshintergrund hat.²²

Deutschland hat insgesamt eine bedeutende Integrationsleistung vollbracht. Neben Schweden, Österreich, der Schweiz und Luxemburg ist es vor allem Deutschland, das viele Menschen aufgenommen hat und noch aufnimmt. Deutschland

¹⁸ W. Schmidt, *Die Integration von Flüchtlingen und Arbeitsmigranten in der Arbeitswelt. Betrieblicher Universalismus unter Druck*, „Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte“, 26.06.2017, unter <http://www.bpb.de/apuz/250665/die-integration-von-fluechtligen-und-arbeitsmigranten-in-der-arbeitswelt?p=all> [abgerufen am 15.10.2018].

¹⁹ *Geburtenrate bleibt unter EU Durchschnitt!*, Quelle: irb/AFP/dpa, unter <http://www.spiegel.de/gesundheit/schwangerschaft/deutschlands-geburtenziffer-bleibt-unter-eu-durchschnitt-a-1147782.html> [abgerufen am 15.10.2018].

²⁰ *Zuwanderer sorgen für Wachstum. DIW: Fachkräfte aus der EU steigern das BIP*, Quelle: AFP [in:] „Der Tagesspiegel“, 1.11.2018.

²¹ „Bocholter Borkener Volksblatt“, 3.10.2018.

²² SZ, 6.09.2018

ist seit 1945 fast durchgehend Wanderungs- und Einwanderungsland. Andere EU-Länder, besonders die osteuropäischen, sperren sich vor allem gegen muslimische Migranten. Die Versuche der EU mit Sperrung der Mittelmeerroute durch eine Aufstockung der EU-Frontex-Grenzeinheiten eine künftig zu erwartende massenhafte Zuwanderung besonders aus Afrika zu verhindern, wird auf Dauer nicht möglich sein.

Bei der hohen Geburtenrate in den afrikanischen Staaten wird eine europäische Sperrpolitik dauerhaft nicht wirksam sein. Wir brauchen, bei den künftig zu erwartenden niedrigen Geburtenraten in Deutschland und Europa, Menschen, die zu uns kommen. Vor allem muss aber auch Europa entscheidend dazu beitragen, dass sich die afrikanischen Länder wirtschaftlich entwickeln. Die deutsche und europäische Entwicklungspolitik muss noch eine weitaus höhere Bedeutung erhalten als bisher und die wirtschaftliche Ausbeutung der afrikanischen Regionen beenden, um den afrikanischen Menschen Chancen in ihren Heimatländern zu geben. Nur so lässt sich ein ausgewogeneres Verhältnis zwischen Afrika und Europa erreichen. Derzeit sind über 60 Millionen Menschen in der Welt auf der Flucht. Ihre Zahl wird angesichts der bestehenden und der zu erwartenden zukünftigen Konflikte kaum geringer werden.

Wir benötigen Einwanderer und es werden Einwanderer kommen. In den früheren Jahrzehnten waren die Wanderer oder Einwanderer meist Deutsche oder Deutschstämmige. Zukünftig werden es hauptsächlich Menschen anderer Nationalität, ethnischer Herkunft, Sprache, Tradition und Religion sein. Die Einwanderung wird in Zukunft zu einer noch gewaltigeren Herausforderung für Politik und Gesellschaft in Deutschland und Europa.

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Niemcy jako kraj migracji i imigracji po 1945 roku *Streszczenie*

Artykuł dotyczy Niemiec jako państwa migracji i imigracji w ujęciu historycznym (po 1945 roku). Prezentowane są kolejne etapy/fazy migracji, z uwzględnieniem jej przyczyn, oraz przywoływane dane statystyczne obrazujące wielkość przepływów migrantów czy też uchodźców. Autor artykułu stara się również udzielić odpowiedzi na pytanie dotyczące perspektyw niemieckiej i europejskiej polityki migracyjnej.

Słowa kluczowe: Niemcy, migracja, imigracja, migranci, uchodźcy

Germany: a Country of Migration and Immigration since 1945 *Abstract*

The paper looks at Germany as, historically, a migration and immigration state after 1945. The subsequent stages and/or phases of migration have been discussed, taking into account its causes, and the relevant statistical data has been provided to show the volume of flows of migrants and/or refugees. The author has also made an attempt to provide an answer to the question about the prospects of German and European migration policy.

Key words: Germany, migration, immigration, migrants, refugees

Deutschland als Wanderungs- und Einwanderungsland seit 1945

Zusammenfassung

Der Artikel befasst sich – in historischer Hinsicht – mit Deutschland als Wanderungs- und Einwanderungsland (seit 1945). Die nachfolgenden Phasen der Migration werden unter Berücksichtigung ihrer Ursachen und der angegebenen statistischen Daten, die das Volumen der Migranten- oder Flüchtlingsströme veranschaulichen, dargestellt. Der Autor des Textes versucht auch, die Frage nach den Perspektiven der deutschen und europäischen Migrationspolitik zu beantworten.

Schlüsselwörter: Deutschland, Migration, Einwanderung, Migranten, Flüchtlinge

Германия как государство миграции и иммиграции после 1945 года

Резюме

В статье рассмотрена история миграции и иммиграции в Германию после 1945 года. Представлены этапы миграции, указаны ее причины и приведены статистические данные, отображающие размер потоков мигрантов и беженцев. Автор статьи также пытается дать ответ на вопрос о перспективах германской и европейской миграционной политики.

Ключевые слова: Германия, миграция, иммиграция, мигранты, беженцы

VARIA – FORUM



Ralf Havertz

Keimyung University, Daegu, Südkorea

Entmilitarisierung der Politik in Südkorea?*

Über Jahrzehnte war die Politik in Südkorea durch Militär und Sicherheits-apparat bestimmt. Die Einführung einer zivilen Aufsicht über das Militär war ein langwieriger Prozess. Auch wenn bei der Entmilitarisierung der Poli-tik in Südkorea in den letzten Jahren viel erreicht wurde, so gibt es jüngste Ereignisse, die Zweifel aufkommen lassen. Es ist offensichtlich: In der süd-koreanischen Armee, insbesondere im Heer, gibt es weiterhin ein Potenzial für Interventionen in die Politik.

Die Politik in Südkorea wurde über mehrere Jahrzehnte von militärischen Machthabern geprägt und kontrolliert. Diese Entwicklung nahm ihren Anfang mit der Machtübernahme durch General Park Chung-hee durch einen Coup im Jahre 1961. Während Park seinen Offiziersposten im Jahre 1963 aufgab, um Präsident zu werden, setzte er Angehörige des Militärs in Schlüsselpositionen von Regierung, öffentlicher Verwaltung und staatlichen Unternehmen ein. Eine informelle, mit Park eng verbundene Gruppe innerhalb des Militärs namens *Hanahoe* (Gruppe Eins) dominierte alle wichtigen Positionen in der Armee und erlaubte es ihm, das Militär zu steuern. Gleichzeitig war das Militär die bestimmende Kraft in der südkoreanische Gesellschaft,¹ wo es seinen Einfluss weit über den Tod Parks im Jahre 1979 hinaus bis in die ersten Jahre der Demokratisierung Südkoreas behielt. *Hanahoe* war von Chun Doo-hwan, einem General der Infanterie, zusammen mit mehreren Absolventen der Militärakademie in Daegu ins Leben gerufen worden. Die Gruppierung

* „WeltTrends. Das außenpolitische Journal“ 2020, Jg. 28, Nr. 159, S. 43–47.

¹ Kuehn, David (2016): Institutionalising Civilian Control of the Military in New Democracies: Theory and Evidence from South Korea. In: GIGA Working Paper 282, S. 14.

stellte später einen wichtigen Unterstützerkreis für Chun dar, als er sich 1979 nach der Ermordung Parks an die Macht geputscht hatte, die er 1987 unter dem Druck der Demokratiebewegung aufgab. Chun war es auch, der das Militär im Jahre 1980 für die brutale Niederschlagung des Aufstandes in Gwangju missbrauchte, was zu über 600 Toten führte.

Während der Militärdiktatur in den Jahren 1961 bis 1988 besetzten aktive Offiziere und ehemalige Angehörige des Militärs alle wichtigen Regierungsposten. Das Land stand unter einer straffen militärischen Führung, weil sich das Militär nicht nur auf die Dominanz der Regierung konzentrierte, sondern auch den internen Sicherheitsapparat unter seine Kontrolle brachte. In diesem Zusammenhang ist insbesondere der militärische Inlandsgeheimdienst zu nennen, der die Aktivitäten von Oppositionellen überwachte und die Medien stark einschränkte.

Beginn der Demokratisierung

Die Demokratisierung des Landes begann im Jahre 1987, als eine Bewegung von Studenten und Arbeitern das Ende der Militärdiktatur und den Übergang zur Demokratie erzwang. Doch während der Amtszeit von Roh Tae-woo (1988–1993), des ersten demokratisch gewählten Präsidenten Südkoreas, geschah seitens der Regierung so gut wie nichts, um das Militär zu entmachten. Wichtige Institutionen wurden weiterhin vom Militär kontrolliert und die militärischen Inlandsgeheimdienste fuhren entgegen einer Anweisung von Roh mit der Überwachung von Zivilisten fort. Dies verwundert nicht, da Roh ein Mitglied der *Hanahoe*-Gruppe und eng mit der Militärregierung verbunden gewesen ist.² Während der Präsidentschaft Rohs gab es innerhalb des Militärs Widerstände gegen den Demokratisierungsprozess. Aber es gelang Roh, das Militär unter Kontrolle zu behalten, indem er einige Personalwechsel vornahm.³ Veränderungen beschränkten sich während dieser Phase vornehmlich auf die personelle Ebene. Das System blieb weitgehend unangetastet.

Die zivile Kontrolle des Militärs

Die ersten Schritte hin zur Selbstbehauptung der zivilen Regierung gegenüber dem Militär wurden von Präsident Kim Young-sam (1993–1998) unternommen, der den bürokratischen Apparat im Verteidigungsbereich umbaute und die Kompetenzen des Verteidigungsministeriums gegenüber der militärischen Führung stärkte.⁴ Kim war auch seit über 30 Jahren der erste Zivilist im Amt des Präsidenten. Die entscheidenden Änderungen aber wurden in den Jahren der Präsidentschaften von

² Ebd., S. 15.

³ Kim, Yung Myung (2004): Patterns of Military Rule and Prospects for Democracy in South Korea. E Press, Australian National University Canberra; <http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p33231/pdf/ch0827.pdf>, S. 128.

⁴ Croissant, Aurel / Kuehn, David / Lorenz, Philip (2012): Breaking with the Past? Civil-Military Relations in the Emerging Democracies of East Asia (Policy Studies 63), S. 35.

Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) und Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008) vorgenommen. Kim führte den von Zivilisten geleiteten Nationalen Sicherheitsrat ein, der den Präsidenten in allen sicherheitsrelevanten Fragen beraten und die Aktivitäten des Sicherheitsapparates koordinieren sollte. Die Institution hatte bis heute eine wichtige Rolle für das Verhältnis Südkoreas zu Nordkorea und zu den USA.

Als Roh das Präsidentenamt im Jahre 2003 von Kim übernahm, konnte er auf den Reformen seines Vorgängers aufbauen. Militärpolitische Entscheidungen wurden ausschließlich von Zivilisten gefällt. Roh festigte die zivile Kontrolle über das Militär weiter, indem er politische Bildung für Soldaten und eine Ausbildung von Offizieren an zivilen Einrichtungen der höheren Bildung einführte. In die Zeit von Roh fällt auch eine Reform des Personalmanagements und des Beförderungswesens im südkoreanischen Militär, die von vetternwirtschaftlichen Strukturen weitgehend befreit und auf ein meritokratisches System umgestellt wurden. Über viele Jahre wurden die obersten Positionen in der Armee vorwiegend von Angehörigen der *Hanahoe*-Gruppe besetzt. Diese Bevorzugung führte zur Unzufriedenheit unter denjenigen Soldaten, die nicht Teil dieser Gruppierung waren, da sie bei Beförderungen übergangen wurden. Seit der Präsidentschaft Kim Young-sams im Jahre 1993 ist *Hanahoe* an den Rand gedrängt worden. Es wurden seitdem gezielt nur diejenigen befördert, die *Hanahoe* nicht angehörten. Kim ist damals ein Risiko eingegangen, als er gegen diese Gruppe vorging, weil nicht ganz klar war, inwiefern sie innerhalb des Militärs noch über die Macht verfügte, eine Gegenwehr – und möglicherweise einen Coup – zu organisieren.⁵ In der historischen Rückschau wird klar, dass Kim die Situation innerhalb des südkoreanischen Militärs damals richtig eingeschätzt hat.

Heute werden politische Entscheidungen hinsichtlich des Militärs vornehmlich von zivilen Politikern gefällt. In diesem Zusammenhang ist erwähnenswert, dass viele der Beschäftigten im Verteidigungsministerium einen militärischen Hintergrund haben, was zu persönlichen Verbindungen und Loyalitäten zwischen Regierungsbeamten und Angehörigen des Militärs führt. Seit der Demokratisierung waren fast alle Verteidigungsminister, bevor sie dieses politische Amt übernahmen, hochrangige Offiziere in der koreanischen Armee. Nach seinem Amtsantritt im Mai 2017 hat Präsident Moon Jae-in zwei Verteidigungsminister eingesetzt. Es ist auffällig, dass der derzeitige Amtsinhaber, Jeong Kyeong-doo, und sein Vorgänger Song Young-moo, als Soldaten beide nicht dem Heer angehörten. Jeong war General der Luftwaffe und stand dem südkoreanischen Generalstab vor; und Song war Marineadmiral. Aufseiten der Regierung gibt es offenbar Vorbehalte gegen einen Verteidigungsminister mit militärischem Hintergrund im Heer – *Hanahoe* setzte sich vor allem aus Angehörigen des Heeres zusammen.

Rückfall in autoritäre Muster

Diese Vorsicht hat ihren Grund auch in jüngsten Ereignissen, die mit dem Amtsenthebungsverfahren von Park Geun-hye, der Tochter des ehemaligen Militärdiktators

⁵ Kuehn (2016), S. 17f.

Park Chung-hee, zu tun haben. Am 9. Dezember 2016 hatte das südkoreanische Parlament mit großer Mehrheit (234 von 300 Stimmen) für eine Entfernung Parks aus dem Amt der Präsidentin gestimmt, weil sie sich groben Amtsmissbrauchs und korrupten Verhaltens schuldig gemacht hatte. Der Verfassung entsprechend musste das Verfassungsgericht der Entscheidung des Parlaments zustimmen. Das geschah am 10. März 2017 mit einstimmigem Votum. Während das oberste Gericht Südkoreas seine Entscheidung in dem Fall vorbereitete, wurden seitens des Sicherheitskommandos für Verteidigung (Defense Security Command, DSC), einer 2.900 Mann starken Spezialeinheit, die auch geheimdienstlich tätig war, Pläne für eine militärische Intervention ausgeheckt. Für den Fall einer Entscheidung zugunsten Parks sahen diese Pläne vor, etwaige Proteste gegen diese Entscheidung unter Einsatz des Militärs niederzuschlagen. Dazu gehörten der Einsatz von Panzern und Spezialkräften, die Kontrolle der Presse und die Besetzung von Regierungsbehörden. Die Pläne des Kommandos sahen auch die Möglichkeit vor, das Kriegsrecht über Südkorea zu verhängen.⁶

Das Amtsenthebungsverfahren wurde von regelmäßigen Großdemonstrationen im ganzen Land, vor allem auf dem Ganghwamun-Platz im Zentrum Seouls, begleitet. Über sechs Monate hinweg hatten sich dort jeden Samstag mehrere Hunderttausend, an einigen Tagen weit über eine Million Menschen versammelt und die Entfernung Parks aus dem Amt und ihre strafrechtliche Verfolgung gefordert. Diese Proteste verliefen ausnahmslos friedlich. Hätte das Verfassungsgericht anders entschieden, hätte es mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit weitere Demonstrationen gegen Park gegeben. Ihre Unterbindung durch das Militär hätte zu einer Eskalation der Gewalt und zu einem zweiten Gwangju-Massaker führen können.

Bei einer Untersuchung der Aktivitäten des DSC kam auch ans Licht, dass diese Einheit weiterhin mit der Überwachung von Zivilisten befasst war und umfangreiche Datensammlungen über Personen angelegt hatte. Sie mischte sich mit Postings in sozialen Netzwerken in innenpolitische Debatten ein und versuchte den Ausgang von Wahlen zu beeinflussen. Aus Sicht der Moon-Regierung war dieses Verhalten völlig inakzeptabel. Das DSC wurde im August 2018 aufgelöst und durch das DSSC (Defense Security Support Command) ersetzt. Letzteres soll sich auf reine Verteidigungsaufgaben konzentrieren und weder Zivilisten noch Soldaten überwachen.

Fazit

In den sechs Monaten des massiven Protests gegen die Regierung von Park Geun-hye zwischen Oktober 2016 und März 2017 hat sich die Demokratie Südkoreas bewährt. Viele Bürger haben eine erstaunliche Urteilsfähigkeit und eine große

⁶ He-suk Choi: Moon Orders Special Probe into Martial Law Allegations. In: Korea Herald, 10.7.2018; <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20180710000261>; DSC in its Current Form Should Be dismantled. In: Hankyoreh, 7.7.2018; http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/852310.html; New Intel Unit Bans Monitoring Military Personnel, Installs Whistleblowing System. In: Yonhap News, 2.9.2018; <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20180902002200315>.

Bereitschaft gezeigt, sich für den Erhalt ihrer Demokratie einzusetzen. Die Amtsenthebung Parks war absolut verfassungskonform und in ihrer Ausführung geradezu ein Lehrstück. Gleichzeitig haben die Vorbereitungen des DSC für eine Unterbindung der Proteste gegen Park durch das Militär und seine Pläne für eine Verhängung des Kriegsrechts gezeigt, dass die Konsolidierung der Demokratie in Südkorea nicht abgeschlossen und eine Umkehr zu einem autoritären Militärregime möglich ist.



Norman Paech

Prof. für Politikwissenschaft und Öffentliches Recht an der Universität Hamburg

Bundesverfassungsgericht gibt der Außenpolitik Beinfreiheit Zur Beteiligung der Bundeswehr am Krieg in Syrien*

Der Einsatz der Luftwaffe der Bundeswehr in Syrien seit 2015 ist völker-rechtlich fragwürdig. Die aktuelle Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungs-gerichts ebnet den Weg, unter Verzicht auf ein UN-Mandat, nur auf der Basis eines Mandats der NATO oder EU, die Bundeswehr in Auslandsein-sätze zu schicken. Notwendig ist ein Gesetz, um die Klagebefugnis der Frak-tionen durch Gesetz zu erweitern, damit Klagen gegen Völkerrechtsverstöße nicht immer wieder als unzulässig zurückgewiesen werden.

Am 17. September 2019 hat das Bundesverfassungsgericht die Klage der Links-fraktion im Bundestag gegen die Beteiligung der Bundeswehr am Krieg in Syrien verworfen.¹ Die Bundesregierung hatte am 1. Dezember 2015 die Entsendung von Tornado-Aufklärungsflugzeugen in den syrischen Luftraum beschlossen. Der Bundestag stimmte am 4. Dezember 2015 zu, 1.200 Bundeswehrangehörige im Kampf gegen den IS einzusetzen. Zur Begründung hatte die Bundesregierung im Mandatsentwurf geschrieben: „Der deutsche Beitrag dient dem Kampf gegen den Terrorismus im Rahmen der Allianz gegen IS und zur Unterstützung insbesondere Frankreichs, Iraks und der internationalen Allianz in ihrem Kampf gegen IS durch Bereitstellung von Luftbetankung, Aufklärung (insbesondere luft-, raum- und see-gestützt), seegehendem Schutz und Stabspersonal zur Unterstützung“. Sie stützte

* „WeltTrends. Das außenpolitische Journal“ 2020, Jg. 28, Nr. 159, S. 32–36.

¹ BVerfG 2 BvE 2/16 vom 17. September 2019.

sich dabei vor allem auf Art. 51 UN-Charta. Zwei Tage später begann die Bundeswehr ihre bis heute andauernde „Operation Counter Daesh“. Das Mandat wurde mehrfach verlängert, zuletzt am 31. Oktober 2019.

Die Linksfraktion hatte ihre Klage im sogenannten Organstreitverfahren am 31. Mai 2016 damit begründet, dass die Entscheidung von Bundesregierung und Bundestag weder ein notwendiges Mandat des UN-Sicherheitsrats habe, noch vom Völkerrecht gedeckt sei, es läge auch keine Einwilligung der Regierung in Damaskus vor. Der Einsatz der Flugzeuge sei völkerrechtswidrig, da er die territoriale Souveränität Syriens verletze, er müsse beendet werden.

Kompetenzgerangel zwischen Parlament und Regierung

Der Senat hätte sich die Sache leichtmachen und die Klage als unzulässig abweisen können, da die Klägerin durch den Einsatz der Bundeswehr nicht unmittelbar in ihren Rechten verletzt sei. Das wäre auch für die Fraktion keine Überraschung gewesen, denn sie war schon früher in ihrem Kampf gegen die Auslandseinsätze derart beschieden worden. So lautete denn auch der erste Satz der Urteilsbegründung: „Der Antrag ist mangels Antragsbefugnis unzulässig. Die Antragstellerin hat nicht hinreichend substantiiert dargelegt, dass die von ihr behauptete Verletzung der [...] Rechte des Bundestages möglich erscheint.“ Er erteilte der Klägerin noch die Rechtsbelehrung, dass der „Organstreit [...] maßgeblich der gegenseitigen Abgrenzung der Kompetenzen von Verfassungsorganen oder ihren Teilen in einem Verfassungsrechtsverhältnis [dient], nicht hingegen der Kontrolle der objektiven Verfassungsmäßigkeit eines bestimmten Organhandelns [...]. Für eine allgemeine oder umfassende, von eigenen Rechten des Antragstellers losgelöste, abstrakte Kontrolle der Verfassungsmäßigkeit einer angegriffenen Maßnahme ist im Organstreit kein Raum.“

Hierbei hätte der Senat es belassen können. Aber er wollte der Klägerin noch einige inhaltliche Markierungen mit auf den Weg geben.

Zunächst geht es ihm darum, die Kompetenzen von Regierung und Parlament in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik noch einmal gegeneinander abzugrenzen. Dazu hatte sich das Gericht schon mehrfach geäußert, und zwar mit der klaren Prerogative für die Regierung. So auch hier: „Das Grundgesetz überlässt ihr [der Regierung] im Bereich auswärtiger Politik einen weit bemessenen Spielraum zu eigenverantwortlicher Aufgabenwahrnehmung. Sowohl die Rolle des Parlaments als Gesetzgebungsorgan als auch diejenige der rechtsprechenden Gewalt sind in diesem Bereich beschränkt, um die außen- und sicherheitspolitische Handlungsfähigkeit nicht in einer Weise einzuschränken, die auf nicht funktionsgerechte Teilung der Staatsgewalt hinausliefe.“ (Rz. 34) Diesen Grundsatz eines „weit bemessenen Gestaltungsspielraums“ hatte sie schon in der Entscheidung herangezogen, mit der sie die Klage der Linksfraktion gegen die Erweiterung des NATO-Vertrages von einem reinen Verteidigungspakt zu einem Interventionspakt durch alleinige Entscheidung der Bundesregierung ohne Beteiligung des Bundestages im Frühjahr 1999 abgewiesen hatte (BVerfG vom 22. Nov. 2001, E 118, 244). Das ist ein altes Relikt aus der Kaiserzeit, welches sich in die Gegenwart

hinübergerettet hat und vom Bundesverfassungsgericht in das Grundgesetz hineininterpretiert wird.

Sodann widmete sich der Senat der Rüge der Fraktion, mit der Beteiligung an dem Angriff auf den IS überschreite der Einsatz die Grenzen der Selbstverteidigung gem. Art. 51 UN-Charta, da der IS ein nichtstaatlicher Akteur sei. Seit dem Angriff der USA 2001 auf Bin Laden und Al Qaida in Afghanistan ist es kaum mehr umstritten, dass Art. 51 UN-Charta auch bei nichtstaatlichen Akteuren Geltung hat. Das Gericht hat es allerdings nicht einmal mehr für notwendig erachtet, zu erörtern, ob hier überhaupt ein Fall der Selbstverteidigung vorliegt. Es nimmt offensichtlich eine kollektive Selbstverteidigung für Frankreich an, welches sich nach dem Attentat in Paris am 13. November 2015 mit terroristischem Hintergrund auf die Beistandsklausel des Art. 42 Abs. 7 EUV² berufen hatte. Auch hatte offenbar der Irak um ein Eingreifen dritter Staaten auf der Grundlage von Art. 51 UN-Charta ersucht. Es ist äußerst zweifelhaft, ob derartige Tatbestände militärische Einsätze auf einem fremden Territorium ohne Mandat oder Zustimmung der legalen Regierung legitimieren. Der Senat sieht darin offensichtlich kein Problem, dem man zumindest einige Sätze hätte widmen müssen. Er kümmert sich auch nicht um die eindeutige Verletzung der territorialen Souveränität Syriens (Art. 2 Ziff. 7 UNCH). Sie ist für das Gericht nur eine *quantité négligeable*: „In diesem Fall sind die Rechte des Territorialstaats nur dadurch betroffen, dass das Gebiet, auf dem die Verteidigungshandlung erfolgt, ihm völkerrechtlich zugeordnet ist, obwohl er dort allenfalls noch eingeschränkt Staatsgewalt ausübt.“ (Rz 51) Der Senat übernimmt offensichtlich die höchst problematische US-amerikanische und auch von der Bundesregierung akzeptierte Konstruktion, dass ein Staat, der „unfähig oder unwillig“ ist, die Terrororganisation auf seinem Territorium zu bekämpfen, die Intervention dritter Staaten dulden muss. Das steht in eindeutigem Widerspruch zu der Regelung des Art. 2 Ziff. 7 UN-Charta und der unantastbaren territorialen Souveränität eines Staates. Wird sie aufgeweicht, wird jedes Land angreifbar, in dem sich eine Organisation aufhält, die des internationalen Terrors verdächtig wird.

Umgehung von UN-Charta und Sicherheitsrat

Noch ein weiteres Dictum fällt auf. Auch die EU wird von nun an als ein System kollektiver Sicherheit zu gelten haben. (Rz. 52) Dies folgt der früheren Entscheidung zur NATO, die seinerzeit noch gegen die überwiegende Meinung in der Literatur getroffen wurde. Obwohl das Gericht damit den schon begrifflichen Unterschied zwischen „kollektiver Verteidigung“ (NATO, EU) und „kollektiver Sicherheit“ (UNO), in welcher der mögliche Gegner mit umfasst wird, berücksichtigt, ist zumindest die Entscheidung zur NATO heute aber „herrschende Meinung“ geworden.

² Art. 42 Ziff. 7 EUV: „Im Falle eines bewaffneten Angriffs auf das Hoheitsgebiet eines Mitgliedstaats schulden die anderen Mitgliedstaaten ihm alle in ihrer Macht stehende Hilfe und Unterstützung, im Einklang mit Artikel 51 der Charta der Vereinten Nationen. Dies lässt den besonderen Charakter der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik bestimmter Mitgliedstaaten unberührt.“

Wirklich bedenklich ist: Das Urteil könnte den Weg ebnen, auch unter Verzicht auf ein UN-Mandat, nur auf der Basis eines Mandats der NATO oder EU, die Bundeswehr in Auslandseinsätze zu schicken, wenn das Gericht formuliert: „Die Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts ist, [...] nicht dahingehend zu verstehen, dass die Europäische Union grundsätzlich nicht als System im Sinne von Art. 24 Abs. 2 GG eingeordnet werden kann. Vielmehr ist es zumindest vertretbar, die Europäische Union als ein System gegenseitiger kollektiver Sicherheit anzusehen. Ein Streitkräfteeinsatz auf der Grundlage der Beistandsklausel des Art. 42 Abs. 7 EUV ist verfassungsrechtlich dem Grunde nach jedenfalls nicht ausgeschlossen.“ (Rz. 52)³ Wenn, wie im vorliegenden Fall, immer mehr Militäreinsätze unter dem Vorwand der Terrorverteidigung auf ein Mandat des UN-Sicherheitsrats verzichten und sich mit dem Eigenmandat von NATO oder EU begnügen, hätten sich die Hauptinterventionsmächte, vor allem in der NATO, von den engen Fesseln der Art. 2 Ziff. 4 und 39ff. UN-Charta befreit.

Dass diese Befürchtung nicht abwegig ist, zeigt ein Interview des neuen Generalinspektors der Bundeswehr Eberhard Zorn. Er geht wie selbstverständlich davon aus, dass Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr in Zukunft kein Mandat des UN-Sicherheitsrats mehr benötigen: „Schauen Sie z. B. auf den Einsatz ‘Counter-Daesh’ in Syrien und im Irak. Dort agieren wir in Abstimmung mit den beteiligten Partnern, ohne dass es unter einem UN-Mandat stattfindet. Es kann solche Situationen auch in Zukunft geben, wenn es darum geht, unsere gesamtstaatlichen Interessen zu schützen. Dass diese Ad-hoc-Kooperationen als Instrumente der internationalen Krisen- und Konfliktbewältigung weiter an Bedeutung gewinnen, steht übrigens so auch im Weißbuch 2016.“ Diese Position ergibt sich zwar nicht zwingend aus dem Urteil. Sie könnte jedoch aus dem Urteil interpretiert und dann zu einer „herrschenden Meinung“ werden, die schließlich vom Bundesverfassungsgericht abgesegnet wird. Ein klarer Verstoß gegen die UN-Charta!

Als Konsequenz aus diesem erneuten Scheitern, völkerrechtswidriges Handeln der Bundesregierung gerichtlich zu kontrollieren und zu untersagen, bleibt schließlich nur eine Gesetzesinitiative, wie sie die Fraktion der Bündnis-Grünen im Bundestag planen: ein Gesetz, um die Klagebefugnis der Fraktionen durch Gesetz zu erweitern, damit Klagen gegen manifeste Völkerrechtsverstöße nicht immer wieder als unzulässig zurückgewiesen werden.

³ Vgl. Crosspost: Verfassungsgericht lehnt Klage gegen Anti-IS-Einsatz ab – und stellt Weichen für künftige Mandate (m. Nachtrag). In: Augen geradeaus, 10.10.2019; <https://augengeradeaus.wordpress.com/2019/10/10/crosspost-verfassungsgericht-lehnt-klage-gegen-anti-is-einsatz-ab-und-stellt-weichen-fuer-kuenftige-mandate-m-nachtrag>.



Petra Erler

seit 2010 Geschäftsführerin von The European Experience Company GmbH

Jenseits von Öffentlichkeit. Die geheimen Forschungen zu Chemiewaffen

Es gehört zu den Herausforderungen der 1997 in Kraft getretenen internationalen Chemiewaffenkonvention, neue Chemiewaffen auszuschließen. Das Wissen über bereits bekannte Nervengifte ist vielen Spezialisten zugänglich. Forschung und Entwicklung stehen auch in diesem Bereich nicht still. Zwar ist die Konvention ein robustes Vertragswerk mit soliden Überprüfungsmechanismen, aber sie bietet Interpretationsspielräume und hat Schwachstellen. Ein Teil der Konvention erfasst militärisch relevante Fragen. Was in den Chemiewaffenlaboren der Welt geschieht, ist streng geheim. Seriöse wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichungen und gezielte Desinformation gehen in dem Bereich Hand in Hand.

Im Jahr 1991 kam es zu einem einzigartigen Vorgang. Wil Sultanowitsch Mirsayanow, ein sowjetischer Chemiewaffenspezialist, machte das geheime sowjetische Forschungsprogramm zu Nervengiften öffentlich, mit dem die Sowjetunion mit der US-Forschung gleichziehen wollte. Mirsayanow war überzeugt, dass es Kräfte um Gorbatschow gab, die die geplante Chemiewaffenkonvention unterlaufen wollten. Er wusste, dass die Ausgangsstoffe der erforschten sowjetischen Gifte legitime chemische Produkte waren, was die Enttarnung nahezu unmöglich machte. Er war davon überzeugt, dass die Konvention nicht strikt genug bezüglich der Forschungsbestimmungen war. Mirsayanow verpasste diesen Giften den Namen „Nowitschok“ und beschrieb sie als Supergifte. 1992 gingen seine Enthüllungen um die Welt. Drei weitere sowjetische Chemiewaffenspezialisten unterstützten damals Mirsayanow. Seither besteht auf westlicher Seite die Mutmaßung, Russland habe

* „WeltTrends. Das außenpolitische Journal“ 2020, Jg. 28, Nr. 160, S. 50–55.

bei der Offenlegung seiner Chemiewaffen in den 1990er-Jahren nicht die Wahrheit gesagt. Offen konfrontierte niemand Russland – angeblich, um die Chemiewaffenkonvention zu retten. Mit einer Ausnahme (Substanz 33) fehlen die sogenannten Nowitschok-Gifte in den Anhängen der Konvention.

„Nowitschoks“ und Skripal

Im Jahr 2018 machten „Nowitschoks“ wegen des Skripal-Falls Schlagzeilen. Russland wurde durch Großbritannien sowie durch den damaligen Generalsekretär der Organisation für das Verbot chemischer Waffen (OPCW), die mit der Chemiewaffenkonvention (CWK) 1997 entstand und ihren Sitz in Den Haag hat, beschuldigt, ein geheimes, militärisches Forschungsprogramm zu Nervengiften zu haben. Bestätigt wurden diese Anschuldigungen nicht. Im Gegenteil! Durch die Art und Weise, wie Großbritannien die OPCW nutzte, wurde ausgeschlossen, dass die OPCW der Verdächtigung durch Inspektionen nach Art. IX auf den Grund gehen könnte, obwohl Russland die Anwendung von Art. IX CWK forderte. Schon 2007 kritisierte Jonathan B. Tucker, Experte auf dem Gebiet von Massenvernichtungswaffen, dass die Unwilligkeit aller Vertragsparteien, Verdachtsinspektionen durchzuführen, die Konvention schwäche.

Die Befürchtungen der sowjetischen Whistleblower waren, wie sich im Lauf der Zeit herausstellen sollte, nicht aus der Luft gegriffen. Kapitel 4 von *Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies* des Pentagon aus dem Jahr 1998, aber auch Tuckers Buch *War of Nerves* (2006) legen nahe, dass auch auf westlicher Seite intensiv daran geforscht wurde, Nervengifte aus alltäglichen und damit schnell verfügbaren chemischen Substanzen zu schaffen. Zudem brachte ausgerechnet der Skripal-Fall ans Tageslicht, worüber lange der Mantel des Schweigens gebreitet worden war: Die sowjetischen „Nowitschoks“ waren in ausgewählten westlichen Chemiewaffenlaboren heimisch geworden. Wann und wie die „Nowitschoks“ den Westen erreichten, ist nicht eindeutig belegbar. Folgt man der öffentlichen Spur, dann begann es mit Mirsyanow. Nach seiner Emigration in die USA veröffentlichte er 1995 (Stimpson Center) eine Aufstellung zu unitären und binären Giften, die aus sowjetischer Entwicklung stammten, einschließlich des Standes ihrer militärischen Beurteilung. Nur die binäre Variante dieser Gifte nannte er „Nowitschoks“, aber diese feine Unterscheidung ging schnell verloren.

Nicht enthalten in dieser Liste war „Nowitschok“ A 234, die mutmaßliche Tatwaffe im Skripal-Fall. A 234 wurde erstmals in einem geheimen US-Papier vom 24. Januar 1997 erwähnt, das die *Washington Times* am 4. Februar 1997 zitierte. Verfasser dieses Geheimdokuments war der Chemiker James W. Poarch vom National Ground Intelligence Center. Die veröffentlichten Auszüge belegen, dass Poarch das sowjetische Programm gründlich ausgewertet hatte. Zwei renommierte Chemiewaffenexperten, Steven Hoenig und D. Hank Ellison, veröffentlichten 2006 bzw. 2007 Informationen zu „Nowitschoks“. Hoenigs Werk enthielt Formeln, Ellisons Werk die Molekulargewichte. Dann veröffentlichte Mirsyanow 2009 im Eigenverlag ebenfalls Formeln von „Nowitschoks“, die sich jedoch von den Veröffentlichungen Hoenigs und Ellisons unterschieden. 2011 befassten sich tschechische

Wissenschaftler mit den verschiedenen Werken.¹ Sie folgerten, dass Mirsayanows Formeln korrekt seien, während die von Hoenig und Ellison Analoge von „Nowitschoks“ abbildeten. Das heißt nichts anderes, als dass die westliche Forschung nach neuen Mitgliedern der Familie „Nowitschok“ im ersten Jahrzehnt des neuen Jahrtausends offenbar in vollem Gange war.

Gifte der neuen Generation

Über solche Nervengifte, die unter Insidern als „Gifte der neuen Generation“ bezeichnet wurden, sollte keine Öffentlichkeit bestehen. 2003 wurde der britische Chemiker Robinson wegen seines Interesses an „Nowitschoks“ gemäßregelt. Die USA intervenierten 2006 in Tschechien, weil deren Chemiewaffenexperte Jiří Matoušek in einem westlichen Gremium über sogenannte „Nervengifte der neuen Generation“ zu viel gesagt hatte. Die USA erklärten damals intern, nicht an „Nowitschoks“ zu forschen. Sie sprachen sich gleichzeitig gegen die Aufnahme dieser Gifte in die Anhänge der Chemiewaffenkonvention aus. Das ist anhand von Wiki-leaks-Dokumenten nachweisbar. Der Vollständigkeit halber sei hinzugefügt, dass Russland auch keine Anstalten unternahm, Transparenz herzustellen.

Mirsayanows Veröffentlichung hatte unter Experten in der OPCW einigen Staub aufwirbelt. Erneut wurde auf Betreiben der USA jede wissenschaftliche Diskussion in der OPCW abgewürgt. Mehr noch, der beratende wissenschaftliche Ausschuss der OPCW befand sowohl 2011 als auch 2013, nicht über genügend Informationen zu „Nowitschoks“ zu verfügen. Erst 2018, als „Nowitschok“-Gift A 234 wegen des Skripal-Falls in die Schlagzeilen geriet, wurde die Katze aus dem Sack gelassen. Der damalige US-Außenminister erklärte am 13. März, diese Gifte seien nur „in wenigen Laboren“ der Welt verfügbar. Porton Down, das geheime britische Chemiewaffenlabor, räumte ebenfalls den Besitz ein, bestand aber darauf, dass es nicht aus dem Labor entkommen könnte. Die Tschechen gaben zu, einmal ein „Nowitschok“ synthetisiert, dann aber vernichtet zu haben. In Deutschland wurde publik, dass der Bundesnachrichtendienst sich ebenfalls in den 1990er-Jahren eine Probe verschafft hatte. In der OPCW taten alle so, als wüssten sie von nichts. Die Einzigen, die sich offenbar völlig korrekt verhielten, waren iranische Wissenschaftler, die 2015 / 2016 unter Aufsicht der OPCW mehrere „Nowitschoks“ synthetisierten.

Das Schweigekartell zu „Nowitschoks“ beziehungsweise zu den „Nervengiften der neuen Generation“ zeigte im Skripal-Fall Wirkung. Sie wurden dort als „seltene“ oder „exotische“ Gifte russischen Ursprungs beschrieben, obwohl sie längst internationalisiert, weder exotisch und leider auch nicht mehr selten waren. Wie schon in den 1990er-Jahren stand ihre angebliche extreme Giftigkeit im Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit. Mirsayanow betonte, dass es nur 1 Milligramm brauchen würde, um einen Menschen zu töten, 2 Milligramm „um sicher zu gehen“. Zwei Studien, vom Skripal-Fall inspiriert, folgerten Ende 2018 bzw. Anfang 2019, dass Mirsayanow irrte. Wie bereits Poarch im Jahr 1997 kamen sie zu dem Ergebnis,

¹ Halamek, Emil / Kobliha, Zbynek (2011): Potencialni bojove chemicke latky. In: Chemicke Listy 105 (5), S. 323–333.

dass „Nowitschok“ A 234 hinsichtlich der Letalität mit dem chemischen Kampfstoff VX vergleichbar sei.

Der alleinige Blick auf die Letalität verhinderte, dass eine andere Eigenschaft der „Nowitschoks“ Beachtung fand: ihre Therapieresistenz. Auch dazu findet sich im erwähnten Papier von James W. Poarch ein Hinweis. Er formulierte: „Diese neuen Gifte [...] sind so giftig wie VX, resistent gegen Therapien, so wie Soman [...]“. 2016 kam Kelli Johnson in einem Auftragswerk der US-Army (Vertragsnummer W81XWH- 14-R-0102) zu dem Ergebnis, dass „Nowitschoks“ eine hohe Letalität mit Therapieresistenz kombinieren. Er verglich sie deshalb mit dem Nervenkampfstoff GV. Dieses Gift fehlt ebenfalls in den Anhängen der Chemiewaffenkonvention.

Wladimir Uglew, einer der damaligen sowjetischen Whistleblower, sagte der Zeitung *The Bell* am 20. März 2018, dass es gegen „Nowitschoks“ kein Gegenmittel gäbe. Gleichlautend äußerte sich der Leiter von Porton Down Anfang April 2018. Aber niemand fragte, warum das so wäre? Denn grundsätzlich existieren solche Gegenmittel. Sie müssen allerdings schnell verabreicht werden, bevor das Gift im menschlichen Körper altert. Sobald die Alterung eines Giftes im menschlichen Organismus begonnen hat, können dessen schädigende Wirkungen nicht mehr rückgängig gemacht werden. VX beispielsweise lässt der Medizin einen Interventionspielraum von 36,5 Stunden, sofern die Dosis nicht unmittelbar tödlich war. Sarin altert innerhalb von 4 Stunden.

Die Frage der Gegenmittel

James W. Poarch setzte an diesem Punkt die „Nowitschoks“ mit Soman gleich. Soman altert rapide, in einer Zeitspanne von nur einer bis sechs Minuten. Richard Stone („How to Defeat a Nerve Agent“, Januar 2018) bemaß den Zeitraum der Alterung von Soman auf 2 Minuten. Diese extreme Heimtücke von Soman bzw. die eines „Nowitschok“ bewirkt, dass alle ärztliche Kunst bei einem Vergiftungsfall versagen muss, weil Gegenmittel immer zu spät kommen. Deshalb erholte sich auch der sowjetische Chemiewaffenforscher und Whistleblower Andrei Schelesnjakow niemals von seinem Laborunfall 1987, bei dem er eine geringe Dosis „Nowitschok“ inhaliert hatte. Er verstarb, schwer geschädigt, fünf Jahre später. Aus diesem Grund hat die aktuelle Forschung nach Gegenmitteln zum Ziel, präventive Mittel zu finden, die vorab verabreicht werden können. Der letzte Bericht des wissenschaftlichen Ausschusses der OPCW, der darauf hinweist, datiert aus dem Jahre 2015. Wenn ein „Nowitschok“ derartig schnell altert, wie konnten dann die Skripals, die angeblich einer tödlichen oder nahezu tödlichen Dosis „Nowitschok“ A 234 ausgesetzt waren, völlig genesen? Der öffentliche OPCW-Bericht geht nicht auf die Frage ein, mit welcher Dosis die Skripals konfrontiert waren. Ihre Blutwerte, die Rückschlüsse zulassen würden, sollen im nichtöffentlichen Teil fehlen. Es ist völlig unklar, wie viele „Nowitschoks“ es heute gibt. Aber das Versteckspiel ist vorbei. Im November 2019 sind sie in die Liste der verbotenen Substanzen der OPCW-Konvention aufgenommen worden.

Für Entwarnung besteht kein Anlass


Niemand weiß, ob es nicht bereits andere, noch bösartigere Stoffe gibt, die in Experimenten aus Versehen oder absichtlich das Licht der Welt erblicken. Sicher ist nur, dass die wissenschaftlichen Fortschritte zur Entschlüsselung der biochemischen Prozesse im Menschen das Potenzial vergrößern, sie zu kriegerischen Zwecken zu nutzen. Was, wenn panische Angst oder vollständige Angstfreiheit erzeugt werden können oder die Triebkontrolle ausgeschaltet würde? Isaac Asimow hielt einem Kodex für Roboter im Umgang mit Menschen für notwendig. Richtiger wäre es, einen weltweiten Forschungskodex zu vereinbaren, damit ausgeschlossen wird, dass sich Erkenntnisse aus Forschung und Innovation gegen den Menschen richten. Wie dringlich das ist, zeigt nicht zuletzt das US-Patent 9,200,877 „Biological Active Bullets, Systems, and Methods“ aus dem Jahr 2015. Patentiert wurde ein biologisches Geschoss, bestens geeignet für verdeckte Morde. Nahezu alles, was je an scheußlichen Giften synthetisiert wurde, könnte, laut Patent, in den menschlichen Körper geschossen werden, ohne eine Spur des Eindringens zu hinterlassen: von Ricin bis zu den „Nowitschoks“.

Reviews

Recenzje

Rezensionen

Рецензии



Anna Bałamut

Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University
ORCID: 0000 0001 7300 7367

*The Influence of Sub-state
Actors on National Security.
Using Military Bases
to Forge Autonomy,*
ed. Minori Takahashi

Springer Nature Switzerland AG, 2019

Admittedly, security is a complex issue, which explains why there is no single definition in the relevant reference books and journals. Having said this, one can admit that it is a certain state or process that gives a sense of a lack of threat. Security is also an interdisciplinary concept, and this means that a number of disciplines – including sociology, political science, or legal sciences – deal with its analysis and research. One of its components is national security. On this account, it is clear to see there is no single definition of the concept. Academics agree that the state defends its internal values against external threats. The greater the skills in this area, the lower the risk of the occurrence of new unpredictable threatening incidents targeted at the state and its people.

The book has been published by Springer, a reputable international scientific publisher, in Switzerland in 2019 by Minori Takahashi, the editor. It is made up of eight sections, which can be referred to as chapters, written by numerous representatives of the Academia, as well as people who have a keen interest in security. The book has been written in English. The authors have focused on two main

issues: how to use military bases to forge autonomy, and how sub-state actors influence national security.

The reviewed book has 149 pages. In the first chapter, which is the introduction, an attempt has been made at explaining the issue at stake, i.e. the subject matter being scrutinised, and the characteristics of the ideas put forward by the individual authors. The content is concise and clear. Although the publication has been written by several authors at the same time, the individual chapters contain some common elements, such as: the abstract, the key words, the introduction, the text itself, the ending, the final conclusions, and the references.

The publication is primarily made up of book studies, research papers, documents, and Internet-based resources. There are no tables, diagrams, or charts. Including them would have significantly increased the overall value of the content, and, arguably, it would have been an interesting supplement for the reader as well. The reviewed book has two maps, but they have only been included at the introduction level, as they appear before the actual chapters. Therefore, one can assume that their purpose is merely to provide some references to the location of the subject matter at hand. The book clearly lacks a list of abbreviations, or an index of names. Having said this, for publications that do not exceed 150 pages, this is not required.

The first part, which serves as the Introduction, *The Influence of Sub-state Actors on National Security*, by Minori Takahashi, Ph.D. and Assistant Professor, affiliated at the Slavic-Eurasian Research Center and Arctic Research Center, Hokkaido University, Hokkaido, Japan, presents some information about the entire publication: the Thule Air Base in Greenland, the relationship between the big and powerful states and the smaller countries, the place for local actors (sub-national entities) to have an influence on higher-level actors (which has led to the formation of diplomacy on the national security level), the political relations between Greenland, Denmark, the US and Russia, and about Okinawa and Olongapo.

The second part – *Base Politics and the Hold-up Problem*, by Shinji Kawana Ph.D. and Associate Professor at the Institute for Liberal Arts, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, Japan, explains the key notions of vulnerability, substitutability, urgency, specificity, and integration. It looks at the importance of the relations between local entities and the government. Indeed, the bigger they are, the more dependencies can be discerned; for example: financial and/or political – cf. the case of Olongapo City (a Filipino sub-state actor), which played a big role in the withdrawal of US military bases from the Philippines. After the destruction caused by the volcanic eruption in 1991, the Americans closed the base, and the area was transformed into the Subic Bay Freeport Zone.

The chapter that follows is entitled *Greenland's Quest for Autonomy and the Political Dynamics Surrounding the Thule Air Base*, and it has also been written by Minori Takahashi. The author believes that the Thule air base will act as a node for objects and units; substitutability of the Thule base is low, but its urgency is high. This comes as no surprise, because thanks to its strategic location, Greenland offers the opportunity to control the operations held in the North Atlantic, and the flight path over the Arctic. This is why it is seen as a pivotal area for the security of several countries, including the US.

The follow-up of the considerations occurs in the next chapter titled *How Have the U.S. Interests in Greenland Changed?: Reconstructing the Perceived Value of Thule Air Base After the Cold War*, by Kousuke Saitou, Ph.D. and Associate Professor, affiliated at the Research Initiatives and Promotion Organisation, Yokohama National University, Kanagawa, Japan. The author pays particular attention to the end of the 1990s, when the US recognised the increased missile capabilities of North Korea and Iran, the so-called “rogue states”, which enhanced the significance of Thule Air Base. The author attempts to provide an answer to the question of how the US interests in Greenland have changed. During the Cold War, it was a part of the strategy for countering the Soviet Union. Nowadays, it is part of a missile defence-system or keep an eye on Russia’s policy and strategy in this region.

The next chapter – by Yu Koizumi, M.A. Researcher at The Institute for Future Engineering, Tokyo, Japan – completes the previous chapter and is entitled *Russia’s Military Build-Up in the Arctic: Russia’s Threat Perception and its Military Strategy in the Arctic Region*. It looks at Russia’s interest in the region – not only a merely military interest, but also the issue of natural resources based on a strategy geared towards securing nuclear deterrence.

The next part is entitled *Okinawa’s Search for Autonomy and Tokyo’s Commitment to the Japan-U.S. Alliance*, and it has been written by Shino Hateruma, M.A. and Ph.D. Candidate at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan. The author discusses the problem of Okinawa residents protesting against the US military presence, and indications of how the maintenance of the base affected the locals, the local economy, and the economy and politics. The manifestations were people’s voices expressed through direct democracy. Okinawa’s quest for autonomy stood in clear opposition to Japan’s interests, based on the desire to provide the US with access to the bases. The Japanese government is currently moving the US bases from the densely populated part of Okinawa.

The subsequent part – by Ayae Shimizu, Ph.D. Researcher at The Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, Japan – is entitled *The Political Dynamics and Impacts Surrounding Subic Naval Base in the Philippines*. The US maintained its military bases in the Philippines until 1992. One example of their negative impact is the Olongapo issue, whose inhabitants repeatedly protested against American bases and their negative influence in the region. Olongapo City was exposed to numerous accidents and crimes as a result of the presence of Subic Bay Naval Base. The author proves that the anti-base movements that occurred in Olongapo had an impact on the negotiations held between the US and the Philippines.

The final chapter, also by Minori Takahashi, serves as a conclusion, and it is called *The Political Choices of Sub-state Actors and the Politics Surrounding U.S. Military Base*. Here, the author states that all the statements and considerations put forward in the publication revolve around three main points: 1) the relationship between American policy and the host country – susceptibility to influence, and coping with the factor; 2) the correlation between autonomy and military bases - Greenland, Okinawa and Olongapo; and 3) the issues of political relations in the Arctic environment, including the influence of the Cold War period on current relations. The book also pinpoints the relationship between sub-state actors and

national security, pointing to the issue of how much the actions taken by smaller entities can influence government decisions.

The variety of issues that have come under scrutiny is extensive and shows how important individual stakeholders are for national security. Including all these research papers has an unquestionable effect on the nature and overall value of the book that is being offered to the reader. To sum up, the addressees of the publication are not only people interested in security issues, but also those who have a keen interest in a wide array of current issues related to the contemporary world. The book is a valuable supplementation to the publications that are already available on the Polish publishing market, thanks to the interesting materials and scientific insight it offers.

On the whole, the book can be a perfect source of knowledge not only for students of International Relations, but also for the people who want to expand their knowledge on how national security is shaped in different parts of the globe. The variety of the content that has been featured here encourages the readers not only to familiarise themselves with the whole publication, but also to go beyond and search for additional information on websites and in the books and papers listed in the relevant reference sections.

Etyka wydawnicza

Publication ethics

Ethik-Richtlinien für die Publikation
von Zeitschriftenartikeln

Издательская этика



Publication ethics

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- decyduje, które materiały zostaną opublikowane w proponowanym przez niego wydawnictwie zbiorowym;
- bierze na siebie odpowiedzialność za przestrzeganie zasad etyki wydawniczej oraz wartość naukową wydawnictwa;
- w przypadku podejrzenia plagiatu lub fałszowania badań przez jednego z Autorów, redaktor jest zobowiązany podjąć decyzję o wycofaniu tekstu z publikacji zbiorowej i poinformować o tym wydawcę.
- ma obowiązek upewnić się, że osoby mające wkład w powstanie wydawnictwa zbiorowego akceptują jego kształt po pracach redakcyjnych wykonanych przez wydawcę.

POWINNOŚCI I UPRAWNIENIA RECENZENTA

- jest zobowiązany do obiektywnej oceny materiału zgłaszanego do wydania;
- jeśli zachodzi taka potrzeba, recenzent powinien wskazać odpowiednie prace związane z tematyką tekstu niezacytowane przez autora;
- powinien wskazać i zgłosić wydawcy wszelkie istotne podobieństwa recenzowanego tekstu do innych prac;
- nie może wykorzystywać recenzowanej pracy do swoich osobistych potrzeb i korzyści. Nie powinien również oceniać tekstu, w przypadku gdy może występować konflikt interesów z autorem;
- jest zobowiązany dostarczyć recenzję w ustalonym terminie, opatrując ją oświadczeniem o nie zachodzeniu konfliktu interesów z autorem.
- Wydawca ocenia zgłoszone do wydania materiały według ustalonej i transparentnej procedury.



Ethik-Richtlinien für die Publikation von Zeitschriftenartikeln

Verlag der Krakauer Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Akademie lässt sich von den vom Komitee für Publikationsethik (Committee on Publication Ethics, COPE) in den Richtlinien zur Publikationsethik und guten Wissenschaftlichen Praxis (Codes of Conduct and Best Practice Guidelines) bearbeiteten Grundsätzen leiten.

PFLICHTEN UND BEFUGNISSE DES HERAUSGEBERS

- beaufsichtigt die Beachtung der Publikationsethik und ergreift alle zugänglichen Maßnahmen, damit es zu Plagiaten, Missbräuchen und anderen unlauteren Praktiken wie ghostwriting und guest authorship nicht kommt;
- entscheidet, welche Beiträge publiziert werden aufgrund der Begutachtung des Redaktionsteams und der zwei, zu diesem Ziel eingesetzten unabhängigen Gutachter (siehe Karteikarte- Informationen für Autoren);
- beurteilt die zur Veröffentlichung eingereichten Materialien nach einem festen, transparenten Verfahren;
- bei der Entscheidung über die Veröffentlichung lässt sich der Herausgeber ausschließlich nach der Originalität des eingereichten Beitrags, seinem wissenschaftlichen Wert und der Bedeutsamkeit für die Entwicklung der Forschung in Polen und in der Welt leiten, kommerzielle Gründe und Gebühren für die Publikation des Beitrags sollen keine Rolle spielen;
- gibt unbefugten Personen keine Informationen über eingereichte Beiträge,
- ist befugt die Publikation nach ihrer Veröffentlichung zurückzuziehen, wenn es sich bewahrheitet, dass die Untersuchungen unglaubwürdig oder verfälscht sind, im Falle eines Plagiats oder eines Verstoßes gegen die Publikationsethik, als auch wenn es infolge der Ermittlung ernste methodologische Fehler festgestellt wurden.

PFLICHTEN DER AUTOREN

- sind verpflichtet sich mit den vom Herausgeber festgelegten Grundsätzen der Publikationsethik, mit dem Verfahren der Zulassung zum Veröffentlichen des Bei-

trags und den Regeln für die Zusammenarbeit des Herausgebers mit dem Autor und technischen Leilinen bekannt zu machen;

- sollen nur eigenständige, originelle Beiträge einreichen. Jegliche im Artikel benutzten Entlehnungen, Zitate, Tabellen und Kommentare sollen mit entsprechender Fußnote versehen werden;
- sind verpflichtet die durchgeführten Forschungsarbeiten exakt darzustellen und die Resultate objektiv zu interpretieren;
- bei der Einreichung eines Artikels, der viele Autoren hat, sind die Autoren verpflichtet den Beitrag jedes einzelnen Autors zu bestimmen;
- sind verpflichtet die Bibliographie beizulegen, in der alle, bei dem Verfassen des Artikels benutzten Publikationen genannt werden;
- falls Autoren signifikante Fehler und Ungenauigkeiten im eingereichten Text entdecken ist es ihre Pflicht die Herausgeber der Zeitschrift unverzüglich zu benachrichtigen um diese Fehler im Laufe der Redaktionsarbeiten zu korrigieren.

PFLICHTEN UND BEFUGNISSE EINES WISSENSCHAFTS – REDAKTEURS EINES KOLLEKTIVVERLAGS

- er entscheidet, welche Beiträge in einem von ihm vorgeschlagenen Kollektivverlag veröffentlicht werden;
- trägt alleinige Verantwortung für Beachtung der Grundsätze der Publikationsethik und für den wissenschaftlichen Wert des Verlags;
- falls er verdächtigt, dass einer der Autoren einen Text nachgeahmt oder verfälscht, hat ist er verpflichtet die Entscheidung über die Zurückziehung des Textes von der kollektiven Publikation zu treffen und darüber den Herausgeber zu benachrichtigen.
- hat die Pflicht sicherzustellen, dass die Personen, die sich zu der Gründung des Kollektivartikels beigetragen haben seine Form nach den vom Herausgeber durchgeführten redaktionellen Änderungen akzeptieren.

PFLICHTEN UND BEFUGNISSE DES GUTACHTERS

- er ist verpflichtet den eingereichten Beitrag objektiv zu beurteilen;
- wenn es nötig ist, soll der Gutachter entsprechende mit dem Thema des Textes verbundenen, vom Autor nicht zitierten Arbeiten angeben;
- er soll den Herausgeber über alle wesentliche Ähnlichkeiten des begutachteten Texts zu anderen Beiträgen benachrichtigen und diese Ähnlichkeiten nennen;
- er kann den begutachteten Text für seine persönliche Bedürfnisse und sein persönliches Nutzen nicht verwenden. Die Gutachter sollen Beiträge, bei denen sie in Interessenkonflikt mit Autoren kommen, ablehnen;
- er ist verpflichtet seine Begutachtung innerhalb der gesetzten Frist mit der Erklärung abgeben, dass es kein Interessenkonflikt mit Autor vorliegt
- Der Herausgeber beurteilt die eingereichten Beiträge nach einem festgelegten und transparenten Verfahren.



Издательская этика

Редакционная политика Издательства Краковской академии им. Анджея Фрыча Моджевского руководствуется принятыми международным сообществом принципами публикационной этики, отраженными, в частности, в рекомендациях «Комитета по этике научных публикаций» (Committee on Publication Ethics, COPE) и в «Кодексе поведения и руководящих принципов наилучшей практики» (Codes of Conduct and Best Practice Guidelines).

ОБЯЗАННОСТИ И ПРАВА ИЗДАТЕЛЯ

- Издатель несет ответственность за исполнение этических обязанностей и использует все доступные средства для исключения публикаций, содержащих плагиат и недостоверные данные, злоупотребления, а также старается избегать явлений «guest authorship» (указание авторства человека, не участвовавшего в исследовании и написании статьи) и «ghost authorship» (отсутствие указания авторства человека, внесшего заметный вклад в исследование и написание статьи).
- Издатель определяет, какие тексты будут опубликованы, на основании мнения редакционной коллегии и мнения независимых рецензентов (см. раздел Информация для авторов);
- Издатель оценивает предоставленные материалы, в соответствии с установленной и явной процедурой;
- Принимая решение о публикации статьи, издатель руководствуется исключительно самобытностью работы, ее научной ценностью и значением для развития исследований в Польше и в мире; коммерческие соображения и платы за публикацию статьи не имеют влияния на принятие решения;
- Издатель не разглашает посторонним лицам сведений о материалах, предоставленных к публикации.
- Издатель имеет право отозвать публикацию после ее выпуска, в случае если появятся доказательства, свидетельствующие о неправдивости или фальсификации исследований, о плагиате или нарушении этики издательства, а также в случае совершения серьезных методологических ошибок.

ОБЯЗАННОСТИ И ПРАВА АВТОРА

- Автор обязан ознакомиться с издательской этикой, процедурой отбора материалов, правилами сотрудничества издателя с автором и техническими инструкциями оформления статьи;
- Автор может предоставить издателю только собственные, оригинальные статьи. Все заимствования, цитаты, таблицы и комментарии, используемые в статье, должны сопровождаться соответствующими примечаниями;
- Автор обязан надлежащим образом описать выполненные научно-исследовательские работы и предоставить объективную интерпретацию результатов;
- Соавтор, который предоставляет издателю статью нескольких авторов, обязан указать вклад отдельных авторов в данную работу;
- Автор обязан приложить к статье библиографию, содержащую все публикации, которые были использованы в процессе написания работы;
- В случае выявления серьезных ошибок и неточностей в ранее предоставленной издателю работе, автор должен немедленно уведомить об этом издателя для исправления ошибок на этапе редакции статьи.

ОБЯЗАННОСТИ И ПРАВА НАУЧНОГО РЕДАКТОРА СБОРНИКА НАУЧНЫХ СТАТЕЙ (ЖУРНАЛА)

- Редактор принимает решение, какие материалы будут опубликованы в данном сборнике научных статей (журнале);
- Редактор берет на себя ответственность за соблюдение принципов издательской этики и научную ценность сборника научных статей (журнала);
- В случае подозрения плагиата или фальсификации исследований одного из авторов, редактор обязан исключить данную работу из публикации и уведомить об этом издателя;
- Редактор обязан убедиться, что лица, имеющие вклад в создание сборника статей (журнала), принимают его форму после проведенных редакционных работ.

ОБЯЗАННОСТИ И ПОЛНОМОЧИЯ РЕЦЕНЗЕНТА

- Рецензент обязан дать объективную оценку работы, предназначенной к печати;
- Если есть необходимость, рецензент должен указать какие труды, связанные с тематикой статьи, были не учтены автором;
- Рецензент должен указать и сообщить издателю о всех существенных сходствах рецензируемой статьи с другими работами;
- Рецензент не может использовать рецензируемую работу для своих личных нужд и пользы. Рецензент также не должен оценивать текст, если может возникнуть конфликт интересов с автором;
- Рецензент обязан предоставить рецензию в установленный срок, и подать заявление об отсутствии конфликта интересов с автором.