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BEZPIECZEŃSTWO

TEORIA I PRAKTYKA

SECURITY

THEORY AND PRACTICE

THE AGE OF FEAR. 20 YEARS LATER

edited by
Marcin Lason, Maciej Klisz

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SECURITY

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BEZPIECZEŃSTWO

TEORIA I PRAKTYKA

WYZWANIA DLA BEZPIECZEŃSTWA
W DWUDZIESTĄ ROCZNICĘ ZAMACHU NA WORLD TRADE CENTER

redakcja
Marcin Lasoń, Maciej Klisz

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Contents

Marcin Lason, Maciej Klisz: The Age of Fear. 20 Years Later: Introduction 13

ARTICLES AND MATERIALS

Robert Reczkowski, Andrzej Lis: 'The Day that Changed the World':
The Security Environment 20 Years after the WTC Attacks 19

Sondre Lindahl: 20 Years with the Global War on Terror: A Critical
Evaluation and Thoughts on How to Prevent Future Terrorism 35

Krzysztof Kubiak, Roman S. Czarny: War in the Era of the Sum
of All Fears and the Monopolization of the Information Space 47

Kazimierz Kraj: Why Should Poland Not Be Afraid of a War with Russia? 59

Michał Strzelecki: Terrorism in the Russian Federation: Fear
and Threat or Tool and Opportunity? 71

Łukasz Gacek: China: Paving the Way to Carbon Neutrality 85

Rajmund Mydel: The Regional Security Environment of Japan 101

Negar Partow: War on Terror and Islamisation of Brunei 115

Raymond John Buemberger: Post-9/11 Transnational Threats
in Colombia: The Risk to National and Regional Security and Stability 129

Terry Johanson: *Kua Takoto Te Manuka*: Meeting the Challenges
of New Zealand's Contemporary Strategic Environment 141

Felipe Quero: From Fear to Disorder. A Vision from Spain 155

Alex Issa: The Fragmented Middle East: Persistent Insecurity,
Rising Instability 169

Tomasz Białas: Fear as a Determining Factor in the Development
of Special Forces and the Territorial Defence Forces in Poland
in the 21st Century 179

VARIA

- Ray Wojcik:** The US post-1989 Strategy: Revisionist Powers and NATO's East Flank 195
- Elmer Suderio:** The Philippines' Painful and Sluggish Journey Towards External Defence 205

REVIEWS

- Jarosław Wiśnicki:** Paweł Semmler, *Rosja we krwi. Terroryzm dwóch dekad* [*Russia in Blood. Terrorism over two decades*] (in Polish) 219
- Karolina Kuśmirek:** Mirosław Banasik, *Rywalizacja, presja i agresja Federacji Rosyjskiej. Konsekwencje dla bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego* [*Rivalry, Pressure and Aggression of the Russian Federation. The Consequences for International Security*] (in Polish) 221

BULLETINS, REPORTS

- Tomasz Marcinkowski, Juliusz Sikorski:** Discussion meetings at the Jakub of Paradies University in Gorzow Wielkopolski 227

PUBLICATION ETHICS

229



Spis treści

| | |
|--|----|
| Marcin Lasoń, Maciej Klisz: Wyzwania dla bezpieczeństwa w dwudziestą rocznicę zamachu na World Trade Center. Wprowadzenie | 13 |
|--|----|

ARTYKUŁY I MATERIAŁY

| | |
|--|-----|
| Robert Reczkowski, Andrzej Lis: Dzień, który zmienił świat: środowisko bezpieczeństwa 20 lat po ataku na WTC | 19 |
| Sondre Lindahl: 20 lat globalnej wojny z terroryzmem. Krytyczna ocena i uwagi na temat zapobiegania terroryzmowi | 35 |
| Krzysztof Kubiak, Roman S. Czarny: Wojna w epoce sumy wszystkich strachów i monopolizacji przestrzeni informacyjnej | 47 |
| Kazimierz Kraj: Dlaczego Polska nie powinna obawiać się wojny z Rosją? | 59 |
| Michał Strzelecki: Terroryzm w Federacji Rosyjskiej: obawy i zagrożenie czy narzędzie i sposobność | 71 |
| Łukasz Gacek: Chiny: w drodze do neutralności węglowej | 85 |
| Rajmund Mydel: Regionalne środowisko bezpieczeństwa Japonii | 101 |
| Negar Partow: Wojna z terrorem i islamizacja Brunei | 115 |
| Raymond John Buemberger: Zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa w Kolumbii po zamachach na World Trade Center: ryzyko dla narodowego i regionalnego bezpieczeństwa i stabilności | 129 |
| Terry Johanson: <i>Kua takoto te manuka</i> : mierzenie się z wyzwaniami ewolucji środowiska bezpieczeństwa Nowej Zelandii po 11 września 2001 roku | 141 |
| Felipe Quero: Od strachu do chaosu. Spojrzenie z Hiszpanii | 155 |
| Alex Issa: Podzielony Bliski Wschód: trwała niepewność, rosnąca niestabilność | 169 |

Spis treści

| | |
|---|-----|
| Tomasz Białas: Strach jako czynnik determinujący rozwój Wojsk Specjalnych oraz Wojsk Obrony Terytorialnej w Polsce w XXI wieku | 179 |
|---|-----|

VARIA _____

| | |
|--|-----|
| Ray Wojcik: Amerykańska strategia po 1989 roku: mocarstwa rewizjonistyczne, a wschodnia flanka NATO | 195 |
| Elmer Suderio: Bolesna i krwawa droga Filipin do bezpieczeństwa | 205 |

RECENZJE _____

| | |
|---|-----|
| Jarosław Wiśnicki: Paweł Semmler, <i>Rosja we krwi. Terroryzm dwóch dekad</i> | 219 |
| Karolina Kuśmirek: Mirosław Banasik, <i>Rywalizacja, presja i agresja Federacji Rosyjskiej. Konsekwencje dla bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego</i> | 221 |

KOMUNIKATY, SPRAWOZDANIA _____

| | |
|--|-----|
| Tomasz Marcinkowski, Juliusz Sikorski: Spotkania dyskusyjne w Akademii im. Jakuba z Paradyża w Gorzowie Wielkopolskim | 227 |
|--|-----|

| | |
|------------------------|-----|
| ETYKA WYDAWNICZA _____ | 229 |
|------------------------|-----|



Inhaltsverzeichnis

| | |
|--|----|
| Marcin Lasoń, Maciej Klisz: Das Zeitalter der Angst. 20 Jahre später: Inhaltsverzeichnis | 13 |
|--|----|

BEITRÄGE UND MATERIALIEN

| | |
|--|-----|
| Robert Reczkowski, Andrzej Lis: ‚Der Tag, der die Welt veränderte‘: Das Sicherheitsumfeld 20 Jahre nach den Anschlägen auf das WTC | 19 |
| Sondre Lindahl: 20 Jahre globaler Krieg gegen den Terror: Kritische Betrachtungen und Überlegungen, wie Terrorismus in der Zukunft verhindert werden kann | 35 |
| Krzysztof Kubiak, Roman S. Czarny: Krieg in der Ära der Summe aller Ängste und die Monopolisierung des Informationsraums | 47 |
| Kazimierz Kraj: Warum muss Polen keine Angst vor einem Krieg mit Russland haben? | 59 |
| Michał Strzelecki: Terrorismus in der Russischen Föderation: Angst und Gefahr oder Instrument und Chance? | 71 |
| Łukasz Gacek: China: Weichenstellung für die Klimaneutralität | 85 |
| Rajmund Mydel: Das regionale Sicherheitsumfeld Japans | 101 |
| Negar Partow: Krieg gegen den Terrorismus und Islamisierung von Brunei | 115 |
| Raymond John Buemberger: Transnationale Gefahren in Kolumbien nach dem 11. September: Risiko für nationale und regionale Sicherheit und Stabilität | 129 |
| Terry Johanson: <i>Kua takoto te manuka</i> : Die Herausforderungen des Strategiejumfelds in Neuseeland nach dem 11. September | 141 |
| Felipe Quero: Von der Angst zum Chaos. Eine Vision aus Spanien | 155 |
| Alex Issa: Der zersplitterte Nahe Osten: anhaltende Unsicherheit, zunehmende Instabilität | 169 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| Tomasz Białas: Angst als entscheidender Faktor für die Entwicklung von Spezialeinheiten und der Armee zur Territorialverteidigung in Polen im 21. Jahrhundert | 179 |
|--|-----|

VARIA _____

| | |
|--|-----|
| Ray Wojcik: Die US-Strategie nach 1989: revisionistische Mächte und die NATO-Ostflanke | 195 |
| Elmer Suderio: Der schmerzhaft und stockende Weg der Philippinen zur territorialen Verteidigung | 205 |

REZENSIONEN _____

| | |
|---|-----|
| Jarosław Wiśnicki: Paweł Semmler, <i>Rosja we krwi. Terroryzm dwóch dekad</i> | 219 |
| Karolina Kuśmirek: Mirosław Banasik, <i>Rywalizacja, presja i agresja Federacji Rosyjskiej. Konsekwencje dla bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego</i> | 221 |

MITTEILUNGEN, BERICHTE _____

| | |
|--|-----|
| Tomasz Marcinkowski, Juliusz Sikorski: Diskussionspanels an der Jakob-von-Paradies-Universität in Gorzów Wielkopolski | 227 |
|--|-----|

| | |
|---|-----|
| ETHIK-RICHTLINIEN FÜR DIE PUBLIKATION VON ZEITSCHRIFTENARTIKELN _____ | 229 |
|---|-----|



Содержание

| | |
|--|----|
| Marcin Lason, Maciej Klisz: Век страха. 20 лет спустя. Введение | 13 |
|--|----|

СТАТЬИ И МАТЕРИАЛЫ

| | |
|--|-----|
| Robert Reczkowski, Andrzej Lis: День, изменивший мир: сфера безопасности 20 лет после атаки на Всемирный торговый центр | 19 |
| Sondre Lindahl: 20 лет глобальной войны с терроризмом. Критическая оценка и замечания на тему предотвращения терроризма | 35 |
| Krzysztof Kubiak, Roman S. Czarny: Война в эпоху суммы всех страхов и монополизации информационного пространства | 47 |
| Kazimierz Kraj: Почему Польше не следует опасаться войны с Россией? | 59 |
| Michał Strzelecki: Терроризм в Российской Федерации: опасения и угрозы или инструмент и возможность | 71 |
| Łukasz Gacek: Китай: на пути к углеродной нейтральности | 85 |
| Rajmund Mydel: Региональная среда безопасности Японии | 101 |
| Negar Partow: Война с террором и исламизация Брунея | 115 |
| Raymond John Buemberger: Угрозы безопасности после 11 сентября в Колумбии: риск для национальной и региональной безопасности и стабильности | 129 |
| Terry Johanson: <i>Kua takoto te manuka:</i> решение проблем эволюции среды безопасности в Новой Зеландии после 11 сентября 2001 года | 141 |
| Felipe Quero: От страха до беспорядка. Взгляд из Испании | 155 |
| Alex Issa: Раздробленный Ближний Восток: сохраняющееся опасное положение, растущая нестабильность | 169 |

Содержание

| | |
|--|-----|
| Tomasz Białas: Страх как определяющий фактор развития Войск специального назначения и Войск территориальной обороны в Польше в XXI веке | 179 |
|--|-----|

VARIA _____

| | |
|--|-----|
| Ray Wojcik: Стратегия США после 1989 года: ревизионистские силы и восточный фланг НАТО | 195 |
| Elmer Suderio: Долгий и кровавый путь Филиппин к созданию системы безопасности | 205 |

РЕЦЕНЗИИ _____

| | |
|---|-----|
| Jarosław Wiśnicki: Paweł Semmler, <i>Rosja we krwi. Terroryzm dwóch dekad</i> | 219 |
| Karolina Kuśmirek: Mirosław Banasik, <i>Rywalizacja, presja i agresja Federacji Rosyjskiej. Konsekwencje dla bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego</i> | 221 |

СООБЩЕНИЯ, ОТЧЕТЫ _____

| | |
|---|-----|
| Tomasz Marcinkowski, Juliusz Sikorski: Встречи-дискуссии в Академии им. Якобуса из Парадиза в Гожуве-Велькопольском | 227 |
|---|-----|

| | |
|--------------------------|-----|
| ИЗДАТЕЛЬСКАЯ ЭТИКА _____ | 229 |
|--------------------------|-----|



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The Age of Fear. 20 Years Later: Introduction

This issue is different from all previous ones. Thus, an introduction to it needs to be different from earlier ones. There has to be a place for reflection, which used to be included in an interview preceding academic articles. Clever readers will find out soon why this is so if they only think about the professional path of one of the editors. However, it is not the only reason. A special character of this issue is also due to the anniversary, the 20th already, of the September 11, 2001 attacks which have changed the world around us. They led it onto a new path which became the global war on international terrorism, or rather with terrorists and organisations bringing them together. The fight was joined by many states whose governments reached for armed forces, regarding this as the best tool for winning the war. They forgot that this was a way to eliminate only one generation of terrorists, but not the sources of the phenomenon which would motivate a generation after generation. For example, according to the wave theory of terrorism, those who did not participate directly in the struggle watched it carefully, and everybody felt its consequences, both as ongoing wars and their aftermath, changes in internal legislature perceived as limiting civil liberties, and terrorist attacks happening in various places. Attacks which were tragic and spectacular, but not with as many casualties as on September 11.

Twenty years after the event, it is worth considering whether now terrorism is still perceived as the major threat to security. Is it the main generator of fear,

anxiety, and social concerns? Was it used instrumentally? Or, perhaps, other phenomena have taken its place? These problems are worth examining by adopting a regional and national perspective through referring to the knowledge and expertise of specialists from all over the world. This will make it easier to answer the question whether the role of military threats has increased. Or, maybe, we attach greater importance to threats connected with the environment? These and other questions are tackled by the Authors who have joined us in this issue. Traditionally, they include theorists and practitioners whose strong voices can be heard in the *Varia* part. The reader can look at the world through the lens of the results of many scientists' research, and through the knowledge and expertise of those whose work and service for the last 20 years have been fighting terrorist, depriving them of their safe houses, and helping local authorities in providing security in terrorist-ridden areas. This trademark of *Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka* (BTiP) is impossible to give up. Thanks to it, we can understand what plagues nations all over the world.

It is similarly impossible not to share reflection concerning September 11, and thus, to complete the introduction with what could be written in an interview, as that day has changed not only the fate of individual people, but also the shape of armed forces and security strategies of the most important states of the world.

On 9 September 2001, as an young airborne infantry officer, I started the RANGER school at Fort Benning, Georgia, USA. During an introduction to the course, the instructors mentioned terrorism and other threats to national security. However, only two days later, on September 11, 2001, the training took a wholly different and more practical turn. The instructors' attitudes changed diametrically, and so did the attitudes of Rangers who lost their family members in the attack. Immediately upon completing school, many of my colleagues were directed to units preparing to leave for Afghanistan. All those images came back to me onboard a C-17 transport aircraft when a few years later, I was landing at the airport in Kabul to become the Chief of Staff of the NATO Special Operations Component Command in Afghanistan (NSOCC-A). However, that day, September 11, 2001, has not only changed the life of the single officer of the 6th Airborne Brigade, it has also entirely changed the entire Polish Armed Forces.

From this perspective, the recollections of an academic may be considered trivial. After all, many people remember what they were doing when they found out about the attacks. I was in a meeting just then and, passing by a shop, we heard the news on the radio. As a student of International Relations at the Jagiellonian University, I had a chance to shine with my presumptions about who stood behind that attack. All this can be considered as something everybody has experienced. However, going back to university and the first MA seminar in the last year of studies were utterly original. Our eminent supervisor Prof. Erhard Cziomer, Ph.D., asked us one question: 'How have the September 11 attacks influenced the problems you are examining in your MA theses?'. Each of us, irrespective of whether we were interested in the Kosovo conflict, the foreign policy of Germany, or other detailed issues, needed to analyse and answer the question without preparation. That question, like the research of the late Prof.

Cziomer, was visionary. This excellent specialist in international relations knew that the events of September 11 would define everything what was going to happen and be important in the coming years.

We have endeavoured to indicate what might be important in the future, in the next 20 years, or rather, we have given our Authors space to do it. We hope that here our readers will find texts attracting their attention and encouraging reflection on that problem. The moment this issue of BTiP comes into the hands of readers, there will be no soldiers of the multinational antiterrorism coalition in Afghanistan. And the National September 11 Memorial and Museum in Ground Zero will host millions of more visitors profoundly pensive over the 11 September 2001 tragedy. Nevertheless, the world is facing new challenges and threats to security.

Articles and Materials
Artykuły i materiały
Beiträge und Materialien
Статьи и материалы



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'The Day that Changed the World': The Security Environment 20 Years after the WTC Attacks

Introduction

The September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon are considered to be one of the milestones in modern history. September 11, 2001 was 'the day that changed the world' and shaped the contemporary security environment. For the first time in its long history, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty after the attack against one of its Member States. Poland, which joined NATO two years earlier (12 March 1999), responded together with other Allies to fulfil the obligations of the collective defence. Since that moment, the world has experienced numerous incidents which have significantly impacted the security environment, such as the Russian aggression against Georgia (2008), the illegal annexation of Crimea (2014), the ongoing armed conflict in Donbas (since 2014), the Arab Spring (2010–2012), the war in Syria (since 2011), the economic crisis (2008–2009) or recently the COVID-19 pandemic (2020). Simultaneously, we have observed a variety of forces and processes shaping geopolitical, economic, social, technological and environmental aspects of the security

environment. Thus, the upcoming twentieth anniversary of the September 11 attacks fosters reflexion on the past shifts and possible future trends in the security environment.

The aim of the paper is to identify and explore the key forces and trends¹ within the security environment, which have taken place in the last two decades and are likely to shape the future. The research process is focused on the following study questions: (1) What have been the key forces and trends within the security environment in the last two decades? (2) What are potential impacts of these forces and trends on the future security environment?

Data collection included both primary data (from unstructured interviews) and secondary data (from security environment reports and statistical data). In the research process, the authors benefited from their expertise acquired through participating in security environment analysis under the umbrella of the New Polish Battle Order [Nowe Urządzenie Polskie] NUP 2X35 campaign, led by the Doctrine and Training Centre of the Polish Armed Forces. NUP 2X35 is an inclusive project of the Polish Armed Forces aimed at forecasting future security and operational environments as well as developing new concepts of the conduct of military operations.² Unstructured interviews with the members of the NUP 2X35 communities of interest, focused around the aforementioned study questions, as well as the analysis of the reports from the NATO Strategic Forces Analysis (SFA)³ and Polish NUP 2X35,⁴ enabled the authors to identify leading forces in each of the themes of the security environment. Then, the analysis of data published by such organizations as NATO, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Meteorological Organization, in combination with the narrative literature review, were employed to study the changes related to each of the identified forces over the last two decades. The analysis process was structured around the segments/themes of the security environment used for the purposes of strategic foresight analysis. We followed the segmentation of the security environment applied in the NATO SFA and the Polish NUP 2X35, including the following themes: geopolitics, economy, society, technology and the natural environment. To validate our findings, we compared and contrasted them with the opinions of scholars and experts participating in research seminars conducted by the Doctrine and Training Centre of the Polish Armed Forces, as part of the NUP 2X35 campaign, under the umbrella of the 'The world after the COVID-19 pandemic' project.⁵

¹ Forces are the factors and processes in the security environment shaping national security systems, while trends indicate direction of the identified forces (i.e., increase, stabilization, or decrease). Cf. G. Gierszewska, M. Romanowska, *Analiza strategiczna przedsiębiorstwa*, PWE, Warszawa 2001, pp. 66–75, 265–266.

² J. Mokrzycki, A. Lis, 'Kampania NUP 2X35 narzędziem transformacji Sił Zbrojnych RP w organizację wiedzy', *Przegląd Sił Zbrojnych* 2020, no. 6, pp. 10–15.

³ *Strategic Foresight Analysis 2017 Report*, Allied Command Transformation, Norfolk 2017.

⁴ J. Mokrzycki, R. Reczkowski and S. Cieśla (eds.), *Security Environment Out To 2035 – NUP 2X35: The Polish Perspective*, Doctrine and Training Centre of the Polish Armed Forces, Bydgoszcz 2020.

⁵ NUP 2X35, 'Dyskutujemy o wpływie pandemii COVID-19 na wymiar geopolityczny środowiska bezpieczeństwa', 19 February 2021, <https://nup.wp.mil.pl/pl/articles6-aktualnosci/dyskutujemy-o-wplywie-pandemii-covid-19-na-wymiar-geopolityczny-srodowiska-bezpieczenstwa> [ac-

While discussing the developments in the security environment in the last two decades, the limitations of the study should be taken into account. Firstly, due to the qualitative character of the analysis, there were no quantitative assessments or rankings of the analysed forces. Thus, the selection of the major forces was made on the basis of the authors' experience gained during the NUP 2X35 strategic foresight analysis. In consequence, such a choice may be flawed with subjectivity of assessment. Secondly, although the study analyses global forces, all the respondents contributing to the study through interviews as well as experts participating in the NUP 2X35 seminars represented the perspective of Poland, which may result in bias towards some trends, in particular in regard to the geopolitical theme.

Results

Geopolitics

The September 11 attacks, considered to be a volatile beginning of the 21st century, revised the post-Cold War global order and triggered weakening of the unflagging hegemony of the United States.⁶ Such an observation is confirmed in reports of security environment analysis conducted in the Alliance.⁷ Similarly, the report from the Polish NUP 2X35 strategic analysis campaign⁸ indicates the shift from the unipolar world, characterized by the dominant position of the United States, towards the multipolar model, marked with regaining the position of global powers by China, Russia and India. Consequently, the role of the United States as the 'world policeman' is slowly fading away, and more and more countries are questioning the American dominance. In spite of its economic, technological and military advantage, the United States faces strengthening position of other competitors. On the one hand, emerging powers e.g., China, benefit from the existing global order (especially in the economic dimension), while on the other hand, questioning its principles.⁹ Interestingly, some state actors, officially declaring the ideas of harmonious development, peaceful cooperation and global security, in fact seek to

cessed: 25.05.2021]; NUP 2X35, 'Świat po pandemii – wymiar ekonomiczny', 10 March 2021, <https://nup.wp.mil.pl/pl/articles6-aktualnosci/webinarium-swiat-po-pandemii-wymiar-ekonomiczny> [accessed: 25.05.2021]; NUP 2X35, 'Jak pandemia COVID-19 wpłynie na społeczny wymiar środowiska bezpieczeństwa?', 19 April 2021, <https://nup.wp.mil.pl/pl/articles6-aktualnosci/jak-pandemia-covid-19-wplynie-na-wymiar-spoleczny-srodowiska-bezpieczenstwa> [accessed: 25.05.2021]; NUP 2X35, 'Webinarium nt. nowych technologii w świecie postpandemicznym', 12 May 2021, <https://nup.wp.mil.pl/pl/articles6-aktualnosci/webinarium-nt-nowych-technologii-w-swiecie-postpandemicznym> [accessed: 25.05.2021].

⁶ S. Koziej, *Między piekłem a rajem: szare bezpieczeństwo na progu XXI wieku*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2006, p. 178.

⁷ *Strategic Foresight Analysis 2017 Report*, op. cit.

⁸ J. Mokrzycki, R. Reczkowski and S. Cieśla, p. 10.

⁹ L.E. Armijo, C. Roberts, 'The Emerging Powers and Global Governance: Why BRICS Matter', *Handbook of Emerging Economies*, Routledge, London 2014, pp. 503–524.

undermine the international order and return to the multipolar world, while operating on various levels: political, economic, financial, cultural and even military.¹⁰

In recent years, Russia has been trying to exploit the weakening hegemony of the United States to strengthen its geostrategic position in the new international order. Today, Russia's activities show an increasingly assertive global power policy, with a tendency to regain its former zones of influence. The examples of this policy are e.g., the massive cyber-attack on Estonia (2007), the military intervention in Georgia (2008), the annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of eastern Ukraine (2014), Russia's military involvement in Syria (2015), Libya (2019) and, most recently, Nagorno-Karabakh (2020). The shift from cooperation to confrontation in Russia's relations with NATO¹¹, which has been observed over last 20 years, as well as cooling of relations with the European Union due to the EU sanctions imposed as a consequence of Russia's annexation of Crimea and strengthened in reaction to breaching international and human rights, may be considered another manifestation of self-assertive behaviours of the Russian Federation.

The changing role of NATO has been another force observed in the last two decades. In this context, for the first time in its more than 70-year history, NATO is forced to deter and defend against external competitors and cope with intra-organizational challenges. As Jamie Shea from the University of Exeter claims, so far, the Alliance has been in a relatively advantageous position for most of the past decades because it has had to face one challenge in one place at a time. For example, during the 50th anniversary (1999), the Alliance's activities focused on the military operation in Kosovo, and the 60th anniversary (2009) was dominated by discussions about a surge in the number of forces in Afghanistan. Today, having celebrated its 70th anniversary, NATO has to deal not with one, but three strategic fronts, not only geographically diverse, but also presenting different types of threats and requiring different responses. In the East, a resurgent and aggressive Russia has raised the alert in the eastern Allies and the situation requires the Alliance, after a nearly 30-year hiatus, to return to its original roots, to develop capability of deterring, defending and defeating an equivalent competitor with capable armed forces, extensive military experience and technologically advanced armaments. In the South, extremism, militias and criminal gangs permanently generate a range of security threats, from terrorist attacks to humanitarian crises and uncontrolled migration. Moreover, deepening polarisation has been experienced by some of Western societies, and access to new technologies has given sinister actors a new set of hybrid tools to spread confusion or influence¹². In addition to strategic overload, the Alliance needs to cope with some intra-organizational challenges. Politics of Turkey and its relations with Greece may be provided as an example. In spite of the increase in the number of threats, there is further resistance among some Member States to spending 2% of their GDP on defence. Moreover, the ability to deal with provocations below the

¹⁰ *Strategic Foresight Analysis 2017 Report, op. cit.*

¹¹ R. Reczkowski, 'Russkije igry z NATO – od współpracy do konfrontacji', *Przegląd Sił Zbrojnych* 2020, no. 6, pp. 26–33.

¹² J. Shea, '70. Rocznica NATO – Szansa na nowe "wzorcowanie"', 5 April 2019, *NATO Review*, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/pl/articles/2019/04/05/70-rocznica-nato-szansa-na-nowe-wzorcowanie/index.html> [accessed: 2.03.2021].

threshold triggering collective defence (Article 5 of the Washington Treaty) procedure seems to be another challenge.

Summing up, the geopolitical theme of the security environment over the last 20 years has become more complex, multidimensional, and volatile. In consequence, the well establish post-Cold War world order is being replaced by a multipolar system, most likely without one dominating superpower, which is difficult to clearly define and predict. The new international order will also require a new architecture for the global security system, the revised role of NATO, which will allow the international community to deal with new challenges and threats.

Economy

The decades of the 2000s and 2010s have witnessed both the periods of economic growth and crisis. Analysing the GDP data provided by the International Monetary Fund¹³, in the last 20 years, the four following stages in the world economic development may be observed: (1) growth (2001–2007), (2) economic crisis (2008–2009), (3) recovery and stabilization (2010–2019), and (4) the COVID-19 crisis (2020). Another challenge for the economic situation has been an increase in debt. As noticed in the NATO SFA '[t]he growth in global debt in all sectors (government, corporate and household) is at unprecedented levels as a percentage of Gross National Product (GNP).'¹⁴ In 2019, total debt reached the level of 197 trillion USD i.e., 226% of the world GDP. It seems to be a very serious problem, as a debt surge is expected due to the governmental assistance programmes supporting their economies in the pandemic and the level of the total debt before the pandemic was significantly higher comparing to 2007 i.e., the eve of the global financial crisis.¹⁵

For the decades of 1990s and 2000s, globalization has been one of the major forces driving the global economy and enhancing cooperation among nations. Nevertheless, in advanced economies, globalization has resulted in losing jobs, increasing social inequality and moderating nations' capabilities to generate tax revenues, which may lead to attempts to avert further globalization processes.¹⁶ In the 2010s, interesting shifts have been noticed in global value chains. As reported by McKinsey, the five following trends have been observed: (1) decline in trade intensity of goods value chains, (2) growth in cross-border services, (3) decline in trade based on labour cost arbitrage, (4) growth of knowledge intensive value chains, (5) regionalization of value chains.¹⁷ On the one hand, globalization of value chains enables companies to increase cost efficiency and contributes to strengthening international economic cooperation; however, on the other hand, associated risks,

¹³ International Monetary Fund, 'Real GDP Growth', 2021, https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD [accessed: 22.03.2021].

¹⁴ *Strategic Foresight Analysis 2017 Report*, op. cit., p. 58.

¹⁵ X. Han, P. Medas and S. Yang, 'The Pre-Pandemic Debt Landscape – and Why It Matters', 2021, IMFBlog, <https://blogs.imf.org/2021/02/01/the-pre-pandemic-debt-landscape-and-why-it-matters> [accessed: 23.03.2021].

¹⁶ *Strategic Foresight Analysis 2017 Report*, op. cit., p. 57.

¹⁷ S. Lund et al., *Globalization in Transition: The Future of Trade and Value Chains*, 16 January 2019, McKinsey & Company, <https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/innovation-and-growth/globalization-in-transition-the-future-of-trade-and-value-chains> [accessed: 27.02.2021].

vulnerabilities and potential disruptions to security of supplies must be taken into account. The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted these challenges. The McKinsey's study on 'Risk, resilience and rebalancing in global value chains' indicates, among others, the following implications: (1) 'shocks that affect global production are growing more frequent and more severe'; (2) 'value chains are exposed to different types of shocks based on their geographic footprint, factors of production, and other variables'; (3) 'value chains disruptions cause substantial financial losses'.¹⁸ Similar observations regarding the shifts in global value chains in the 2010s are provided by the UNCTAD. Nevertheless, as highlighted in the World Investment Report 2020, '[t]he 2010s were only the quiet before the storm. The crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic arrived on top of existing challenges to the system of international production, arising from the new industrial revolution (NIR), growing economic nationalism and the sustainability imperative. These challenges were already reaching an inflection point; the pandemic looks set to tip the scales. The decade to 2030 is likely to prove a decade of transformation for international production'.¹⁹

Globalization has been a strong force influencing competitive positions of nations. As noticed in the NATO SFA report '[g]lobalization has shifted economic power. While globalization has opened markets and intensified economic integration, it also has increased the economic influence of emerging countries'.²⁰ In consequence, BRICs nations are nowadays listed among the countries with the highest value of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the global scale. As of 2017, they ranked respectively as the second (China), the fifth (India), the eight (Brazil), and the eleventh (Russia) nations with the highest GDP value.²¹ The strengthening positions of emerging markets and developing economies is manifested in growth of their share in the GDP based on purchasing power parity (PPP). According to the International Monetary Fund, between 2001 and 2020, this measure increased from 43.7% to 57.51%, while the share of advanced economies declined from 56.3% to 42.49%.²² Taking into account purchasing power parity, China became the largest economy in 2014. Nevertheless, its integration with the global economy remains at a lower level than expected. What is interesting, the ratio of China's exposure to the world (in regard to trade, technology and capital) decreased between 2000 and 2017 from 0.8 to 0.6, while the total exposure of other countries to China increased from 0.4 to 1.2.²³ The shift in global competitive positions between advanced and emerging economies is likely to continue. According to a forecast of the UK's Development,

¹⁸ S. Lund et al., *Risk, Resilience, and Rebalancing in Global Value Chains*, 6 August 2020, McKinsey & Company, <https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/operations/our-insights/risk-resilience-and-rebalancing-in-global-value-chains> [accessed: 24.03.2021].

¹⁹ *World Investment Report 2020: International Production Beyond the Pandemic*, 2020, UNCTAD, p. xii, <https://unctad.org/webflyer/world-investment-report-2020> [accessed: 22.03.2021]

²⁰ *Strategic Foresight Analysis*, op. cit., p. 57.

²¹ Worldometer, 'GDP by Country', <https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/gdp-by-country> [accessed: 14.03.2021].

²² International Monetary Fund, 'GDP Based on PPP, Share of World', 2021, <https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PPPSH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD> [accessed: 24.03.2021].

²³ J. Woetzel et al., *China and the World: Inside the Dynamics of a Changing Relationship*, 1 July 2019, McKinsey & Company, <https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/china/china-and-the-world-inside-the-dynamics-of-a-changing-relationship> [accessed: 23.03.2021].

Concepts and Doctrine Centre '[b]y 2050, the combined size of the Emerging 7 (E7) economies (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and Turkey) are likely to have surpassed the Group of Seven (G7) (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US)).'²⁴

Summing up, the economic theme of the security environment in the last two decades has been marked by economic cycles of growth and recessions, debt increase, shifts in global value chains and strengthening competitive positions of emerging economies. These changes have recently been catalysed by the COVID-19 pandemic which is expected to have a significant impact on the global economy in the nearest future.

Society

Demographics has been one of the major forces shaping the security environment in the last two decades and it is expected to play an important role in the future. According to the World Bank's data²⁵, the population increased from 6.194 billion in 2001 to 7.674 billion in 2019, although the global fertility rate decreased from 2.66% in 2001 to 2.41% in 2018.²⁶ Nevertheless, distribution of the population growth has been uneven, as very significant differences in fertility have been noted. As of 2018, the highest rates were achieved by African nations, with Niger (6.1%), Somalia (6.1%), the Democratic Republic of Congo (5.9%), and Mali (5.9%) as leaders. The lowest rates were reported in majority of European, North American, and some Asian nations. The World Bank's ranking is closed by Puerto Rico (1.0%) and the Republic of Korea (1.0%). The variations in the fertility rate seem to correlate with the income differences e.g., the average value in low-income countries is 4.6%, in middle-income countries – 2.3%, and in high-income countries – 1.6%.²⁷ Consequently, in the Euro-Atlantic area the processes of ageing and decrease in the amount of labour force have been observed, while African nations have been struggling to provide education and employment for growing ranks of the youth. Such inequalities combined with political instability and military violence in Africa and the Middle East have been catalysing migration processes, which were experienced as a great challenge by the European Union in the mid-2010s.

Political tensions, as well as growing economic and social inequalities, result in social polarization. Social polarization should be considered from two perspectives. On the one hand, polarization between countries is observed. In the global scale, in the last two decades the gap between the wealthy North and the poor South has remained valid in spite of strengthening the competitive positions of emerging economies. Simultaneously, some state actors have been behaving in a confrontational way, which leads to polarization in international relations. On the other hand, social

²⁴ *Global Strategic Trends: The Future Starts Today*, 2018, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, p. 83, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-strategic-trends> [accessed: 25.02.2021].

²⁵ World Bank, 'Population, Total', 2021, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=2019&start=2001> [accessed: 26.02.2021].

²⁶ World Bank, 'Fertility Rate, Total (births per woman)', 2021, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?end=2018&start=2001> [accessed: 16.03.2021].

²⁷ *Ibidem*.

polarization within nations is becoming a thorny issue in the security environment. As noticed in the NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis '[w]idening inequality within nations is one of the most pressing trends that will continue to fracture and polarize societies.'²⁸ Intra-nation polarization 'can gradually cause a lack of cohesion and disagreement within society, which might eventually lead to civil unrest and benefit terrorist recruitment.'²⁹ In some Western democracies a widening gap between the elites and the mass society has been observed.

Urbanization has been another significant force driving the human theme of the security environment for the last two decades. Between 2001 and 2019, the share of urban population in the total population of the world increased from 47.1% to 55.7%.³⁰ As urban areas are of paramount importance both for national economies³¹ and the conduct of military operations³², urbanization processes are considered to be a crucial component of the security environment. Under the umbrella of urbanization processes, two tendencies are worth noting i.e., an increase in the number and size of megacities³³ and the emergence and development of the concept of a smart city.³⁴

To sum up, the major forces shaping the human theme of the security environment in the 2000s and 2010s include demographic changes resulting in ageing Western societies and challenges to support rapidly growing population in developing countries, which leads to migration processes, an increase in political, economic and social polarization between and within the nations, as well as urbanization processes.

Technology

The last two decades have witnessed rapid technological development which has had a significant impact on human activities and behaviours. The emerging and disruptive technologies, identified by McKinsey Global Institute, include mobile internet, knowledge work automation, the Internet of Things (IoT), cloud technologies, advanced robotics, autonomous vehicles, genomics, energy storage,

²⁸ *Strategic Foresight Analysis 2017 Report, op. cit.*, p. 62.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 40.

³⁰ World Bank, 'Urban Population (% of total population)', 2021, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS> [accessed: 26.03.2021].

³¹ J.V. Henderson, 'The Urbanization Process and Economic Growth: The so-What Question', *Journal of Economic Growth* 2003, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 47–71, DOI: 10.1023/A:1022860800744; J.C. Davis, J.V. Henderson, 'Evidence on the Political Economy of the Urbanization Process', *Journal of Urban Economics* 2003, vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 98–125, DOI: 10.1016/S0094-1190(02)00504-1; R.L. Moomaw, A.M. Shatter, 'Urbanization and Economic Development: A Bias toward Large Cities?', *Journal of Urban Economics* 1996, vol. 40, no. 1 pp. 13–37, DOI: 10.1006/juec.1996.0021.

³² *Framework for Future Alliance Operations 2018 Report*, Allied Command Transformation, Norfolk 2018; J. Mokrzycki, A. Lis and D. Szymańska, 'Urbanizacja a środowisko bezpieczeństwa: Wiodące tematy badawcze, trendy, implikacje', Paper Presented at GlobState II Conference, 13–14 November 2019, Centrum Doktryn i Szkolenia Sił Zbrojnych, Bydgoszcz 2019.

³³ D. Szymańska, M. Wylon, 'Macropolization in the People's Republic of China, 1950–2015', *Miscellanea Geographica* 2020, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 161–75, DOI: 10.2478/mgrsd-2020-0018.

³⁴ D. Szymańska, M. Korolko, *Inteligentne miasta: Idea, koncepcje i wdrożenia*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, Toruń 2015.

3D printing, advanced materials, advanced technologies of oil and gas exploration, and renewable energy sources.³⁵

The technological development has been a force shaping the global economy, triggering the emergence of new industries and business models. Contributing to building relationships among customers and markets, the technological development has enabled nations and regions to achieve higher rates of economic growth and improve their competitive positions in global value chains. In consequence, this has resulted in an increase of political and military potential of some countries, their international position and the ability to influence other actors in the security environment.³⁶ Technological advances have resulted in the emergence of the Industry 4.0 concept, which assumes changes in manufacturing systems driven by information technologies (IT).³⁷ 'Industry 4.0 is a concept relating to the use of automation in industries, data processing and data exchange. The concept also encompasses artificial intelligence, the digitalization of the production process and introducing new technologies.'³⁸

Besides the positive outcomes of technological development and access to advanced technologies, some related threats for nations and societies are worth mentioning, e.g., increasing intensity of crimes as well as espionage and cyberattacks in civilian, industrial and military domains. Another threat from the security perspective is the weakening technological advantage of state actors over non-state actors or potential adversaries resulting from easier access to advanced technologies.³⁹

Summing up, in the technological sphere, emerging and disruptive technologies have contributed to the technological development and the rise of the Industry 4.0 concept. Nevertheless, from the security perspective, these changes should be perceived both as opportunities and challenges.

Natural Environment

The natural environment theme of the security environment in the last two decades has been mainly driven by the climate change and its global, regional and local consequences. According to the World Meteorological Organization⁴⁰, with the global average temperature 1.1°C higher comparing to the pre-industrial age, 2019 was the second warmest year in the history of recorded measurements. Similarly, the 2010s were reported as the warmest decade on record. In 2019, the second lowest sea ice extent was noticed in the Arctic and the Antarctic. In 2018, the highest level of greenhouse gases was reported. The increase in absorption of carbon dioxide

³⁵ J. Manyika et al., *Disruptive Technologies: Advances That Will Transform Life, Business, and the Global Economy*, McKinsey Global Institute, Washington 2013.

³⁶ *Digital Globalization: The New Era of Global Flows*, McKinsey Global Institute, Washington 2016.

³⁷ H. Lasi et al., 'Industry 4.0', *Business and Information Systems Engineering* 2014, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 239–242, DOI: 10.1007/s12599-014-0334-4.

³⁸ A. Zakrzewska-Bielawska, I. Staniec (eds.), *Contemporary Challenges in Cooperation and Competition in the Age of Industry 4.0*, Springer, Cham 2020, p. v.

³⁹ *Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2035*, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington 2016.

⁴⁰ World Meteorological Organization, *WMO Statement on the State of the Global Climate in 2019*, 2020, https://library.wmo.int/doc_num.php?explnum_id=10211 [accessed: 12.03.2021].

by oceans reduces its amount in the air, but such a process leads to warming up ocean waters and rising the sea level. In 2019, the average sea level achieved its maximum value since measurements began.

Climate change results in increasing frequency and scale of extremely violent weather phenomena and natural disasters (droughts, floods), as well as in hunger and shortfalls of drinkable water. As a consequence of climate change and natural disasters, the intensity of economic, social and political tensions is increasing, which leads to migrations, terrorism and local conflicts. What is more, global warming and melting the Arctic ice enhance rivalry for access to natural resources and transportation routes. Climate change is more and more often perceived as a threat multiplier increasing the intensity of rivalries, tensions and instability. Negative consequences of climate change for countries and regions, both of humanitarian and political character, may lead to a greater risk of conflicts and hampering growth and development.⁴¹

Thus, due to its impact on international security, climate change requires a comprehensive political response. For instance, mitigating negative consequences of climate change is considered to be a prerequisite for achieving millennium development goals.⁴² Climate change forces governments to undertake initiatives aimed at increasing their capabilities to cope with the challenges in the natural environment. These efforts have changed the structure of public spending as rising amounts of financial resources are needed to mitigate negative outcomes of climate change, e.g., violent storms, whirlwinds, droughts, and floods damaging infrastructure, natural habitats and agriculture and creating threats for life and health of citizens. Moreover, due to growing intensity of natural disasters, the armed forces have been more and more often engaged in providing humanitarian assistance and assistance to civilian administration.⁴³ The armed forces may be also exposed to extreme weather conditions while conducting operations. Due to the global warming effect, the armed forces are under pressure to invest in the most up-to-date technologies in military equipment, which increases the costs of modernization.⁴⁴

To summarize, climate change, which has recently been gaining intensity, should be perceived as a threat multiplier increasing the risk of rivalries, tensions and instability in the security environment. Climate change results in growing frequency and scale of extremely violent weather phenomena and natural disasters.

Discussion and Conclusions

In response to the first research question, in all five themes of the security environment under analysis significant changes have been observed since 2001. The following forces have shaped the geopolitical theme: the shift from the unipolar global

⁴¹ B. La Shier, J. Stanish, 'The National Security Impacts of Climate Change', *The Journal of National Security Law & Policy* 2018, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 27–43.

⁴² European Commission, *Climate Change and International Security*, Brussels 2015.

⁴³ J. Mokrzycki, R. Reczkowski and S. Cieśla, *op. cit.*

⁴⁴ W. Lorenz, 'NATO wobec zmian klimatu – oczekiwania i możliwości', 2020, PISM, https://pism.pl/publikacje/NATO_wobec_zmian_klimatu_oczekiwania_i_mozliwosci [accessed: 2.04.2021].

order characterized by the dominance of the United States to the multipolar model, the rising political and military activity of Russia, as well as growing external and intra-organizational challenges faced by NATO. The economic theme in last two decades has been marked by economic cycles of growth and recessions, debt increase, shifts in global value chains and strengthening competitive positions of emerging nations. The major forces shaping the human theme in the 2000s and 2010s include demographic changes resulting in ageing Western societies and challenges to support a rapidly growing population in Africa, which leads to migration processes, an increase in political, economic and social polarization between and within nations, and urbanization processes. In the technological theme, emerging and disruptive technologies have contributed to the technological development and the rise of the Industry 4.0 concept. Nevertheless, from the perspective of security, these changes should be perceived both as opportunities and challenges. In the natural environment theme, climate change, which has recently been gaining intensity, should be perceived as a threat multiplier increasing the risk of rivalries, tensions and instability in the security environment. Climate change results in growing frequency and scale of extremely violent weather phenomena and natural disasters.

In response to the second research question, potential impacts of the identified forces and trends on the future security environment should be discussed. Increasing multipolarity is likely to strengthen the intensity of international rivalry and competition. This may result in shifts in strategic interests and creating short-term alliances aimed at contesting competitive positions of global and regional powers by non-content nations or groups of them. Such objectives may be achieved by activities increasing polarization of societies, and thus imposing political or economic concessions. The threats are expected not only within the military segment of the security environment but also in the political, economic and social themes. Hybrid activities are likely to strongly influence the dynamics of the security environment. The phenomena, processes, concepts, and technologies making the foundation of the security environment may be used to construct instruments of influence based on combining the most vulnerable factors in various segments and areas. This new reality might increase effectiveness of achieving such objectives as: (1) questioning fundamental values of democratic societies, (2) undermining public trust in national and international democratic institutions, (3) deepening social polarization both at the national and international levels, (4) gaining political power through undermining other actors, and (5) influencing decision processes made by political leaders.⁴⁵ The aforementioned activities may gain strength, even achieving the level of an overt or covert low-intensity conflict. Due to multidimensionality of such a conflict, existing mechanisms of international de-escalation may become insufficient and ineffective. In conducive conditions, these low-intensity activities may become

⁴⁵ G. Giannopoulos, H. Smith and M. Theocharidou (eds.), *The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A Conceptual Model*, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg 2021; Multinational Capability Development Campaign, *Countering Hybrid Warfare*, March 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/784299/concepts_mcdc_countering_hybrid_warfare.pdf [accessed: 3.03.2021].

replaced by high-intensity warfighting of a limited geographical scope, conducted both by state and non-state actors.⁴⁶

To sum up, September 11, 2001 was certainly 'the day that changed the world'. It may be considered a symbolic beginning of an era of dynamic changes in the relatively stable post-Cold War security environment. As already mentioned, in response to the September 11 attacks, for the first time in its history, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty after the attack against one of its Member States, which proved the unity of the Alliance. Twenty years later, this unity remains an unflagging promise for all democratic nations protecting their strategic interests in the more and more uncertain security environment.

Keeping in mind the conclusions from the analysis and the study limitations identified in the introduction section, recommendations for further research may be provided. Firstly, as regional aspects of the security environment more and more often have a global impact, it is suggested to perform the study again and discuss regional perspectives on global forces shaping security issues. Secondly, due to high volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity of the security environment, its analysis should be conducted on a continuous basis.

The study contributes to mapping and understanding of the multidimensional security environment. It also generates added value for both military analysts and executives. Its findings may be useful for strategic foresight analysis projects such as the NATO SFA, the UK's Global Strategic Trends or the Polish NUP 2X35. The study may also be found a source of valuable expertise supporting defence planning processes.

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⁴⁶ The Authors are grateful to Col. Jarosław Mokrzycki, Director of the Doctrine and Training Centre of the Polish Armed Forces, for his comments to the draft of the manuscript concerning potential impacts of the identified forces and trends on the future security and operational environments.

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Dzień, który zmienił świat: środowisko bezpieczeństwa 20 lat po ataku na WTC

Streszczenie

Celem artykułu jest zidentyfikowanie oraz zbadanie kluczowych zjawisk i trendów w środowisku bezpieczeństwa, jakie wystąpiły w ciągu ostatnich dwóch dekad, a także mają wpływ na jego przyszłość. Proces badawczy został skoncentrowany na poszukiwaniu odpowiedzi na następujące pytania problemowe: (1) Jakie były kluczowe zjawiska i trendy w środowisku bezpieczeństwa w ciągu ostatnich dwóch dekad? (2) Jakie są potencjalne skutki tych zjawisk i trendów w przyszłym środowisku bezpieczeństwa? Całość została opracowana na podstawie zebranych danych z wywiadów ekspertów, przeglądu literatury i danych statystycznych opublikowanych przez organizacje międzynarodowe w następujących obszarach środowiska bezpieczeństwa: geopolityka, gospodarka, społeczeństwo, technologia i środowisko naturalne.

Słowa kluczowe: środowisko bezpieczeństwa, analiza strategiczna, geopolityka, ekonomia, społeczeństwo, technologie, środowisko naturalne

'The Day that Changed the World': The Security Environment 20 Years after the WTC Attacks

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to identify and explore the key forces and trends within the security environment, which have taken place in the last two decades and are likely to shape the future. The research process is focused on the following study questions: (1) What have been the key forces and trends within the security environment in the last two decades? (2) What are potential impacts of these forces and trends on the future security environment? The analysis includes such issues as: geopolitics, economy, society, technology, and the natural environment. It is based on the data collected from unstructured expert interviews, narrative literature review and statistical data published by international organizations.

Key words: security environment, strategic analysis, geopolitics, economy, society, technology, natural environment

„Der Tag, der die Welt veränderte”: Das Sicherheitsumfeld 20 Jahre nach den Anschlägen auf das WTC

Zusammenfassung

Das Ziel dieses Textes ist es, die treibenden Kräfte und Trends im Sicherheitsumfeld in den letzten beiden Jahrzehnten zu identifizieren und zu erörtern, die aller Voraussicht nach auch Einfluss auf die Zukunft haben werden. Die Studie basiert auf folgenden Forschungsfragen: (1) Was waren die treibenden Kräfte und Trends im Sicherheitsumfeld in den letzten beiden Jahrzehnten? (2) Welche potenziellen Folgen werden diese Kräfte und Trends auf das Sicherheitsumfeld in der Zukunft haben? Die Analyse umfasst Aspekte,

wie Geopolitik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft, Technologie und Natur. Sie stützt sich auf Daten aus unstrukturierten Experteninterviews, einem Literaturüberblick und statistischen Daten, die von internationalen Organisationen veröffentlicht wurden.

Schlüsselwörter: Sicherheitsumfeld, strategische Analyse, Geopolitik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft, Technologie, Umwelt

*День, изменивший мир: сфера безопасности
20 лет после атаки на Всемирный торговый центр
Резюме*

В статье указаны и рассмотрены ключевые явления и тенденции в области безопасности, которые произошли в последние два десятилетия, а также влияют на обеспечение безопасности в будущем. Исследовательский процесс был сосредоточен на поиске ответов на следующие проблемные вопросы: (1) Каковы были ключевые явления и тенденции в сфере безопасности за последние два десятилетия? (2) Какими будут потенциальные последствия этих явлений и тенденций в будущей сфере безопасности? Исследование основано на данных, полученных во время интервью с экспертами, обзора литературы и анализа статистических данных, опубликованных международными организациями в следующих областях безопасности: геополитика, экономика, общество, технология и окружающая среда.

Ключевые слова: сфера безопасности, стратегический анализ, геополитика, экономика, общество, технология, окружающая среда



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20 Years with the Global War on Terror: A Critical Evaluation and Thoughts on How to Prevent Future Terrorism

Introduction

20 years have passed since the 9/11 attacks in 2001, and the beginning of the ensuing Global War on Terror (GWOT). There is little that has dominated the security discourse more than terrorism these past 20 years, and states have spent billions of dollars on countering terrorism. For example, since 2001 the US has appropriated and is obliged to spend an estimated US\$6.4 trillion in budgetary costs related to and caused by the GWOT.¹ The number of killed, injured and displaced people is staggering. Conservative estimates in Iraq alone suggest that several hundred thousand people have been killed in result of this violence.² These figures rise fast when Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria and Pakistan are added to the list, and there is no doubt that the death toll as a consequence of the GWOT has been enormous. The obvious question then is: has the GWOT worked? Has it allowed states to prevent and reduce the threat of terrorism? After all, 20 years is a substantial amount of time, and one should expect to see results in such a long period. The simple answer is that the GWOT has largely failed to achieve the stated goals of preventing future terrorism and reduce the threat of terrorism. In fact, it is clear now that the war in Iraq did a lot more to intensify terrorism rather than prevent it. Not only has it torn the

¹ C. Neta Crawford, *United States Budgetary Costs and Obligations of Post 9/11 Wars through FY2020: \$6.4 Trillion*, Watson Institute, Brown University, Boston 2019.

² *Iraq Body Count*, 2021, Iraq Body Count, <https://www.iraqbodycount.org> [accessed: 12.01.2021].

fabrics of countries apart, in a fashion that weaving those fabrics together again seems almost impossible. It has also created a social environment in which a group like ISIS could establish itself and thrive. Moreover, Western states are still engaged in the same countries today with the same declared goal of preventing and countering terrorism, but no tangible results of the effort can be seen. The very fact that the US engaged in peace talks with the Taliban in Afghanistan is evidence that the use of violence can only go so far. The solution to a complex political situation and conflict seems to be an intricate and nuanced peace deal which includes negotiations with the enemy.

This article focuses on the key reasons for the GWOT failure on its own terms to counter and prevent terrorism. It will be argued that this is largely due to the theoretical and epistemological crises of counterterrorism that make it one-dimensional and incapable of identifying and understanding the nuances of the complex realities that acts of terrorism, for the most part, are situated within. The chapter does not, however, argue that the use of violence is never permitted, or that non-violent means are the only way to prevent and counter terrorism. Instead, the main argument is that the over-reliance on violence has, in large part, closed down other options of dealing with terrorism, and by so doing, made terrorism a self-fulfilling prophecy: violence begets violence and there is seemingly no way to break the cycle of violence and counter-violence.

Evaluating the Global War on Terror

There are several ways to evaluate the efforts and policies known as the GWOT. Firstly, and perhaps the most important measure of evaluation would be whether it has been successful in countering terrorist groups and, subsequently, in preventing new terrorist groups from organising and perpetrating attacks. The GWOT began with the express purpose of defeating al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and later expanded to alleged sponsors of terrorism, such as Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. However, 20 years later the two countries are marred by violence and political instability, and Western military forces are still deployed there. In 2018, the US started negotiations with the Taliban, seemingly because the US had realized that the group could not be militarily defeated and eliminated as a political actor. The situation is perhaps even worse in Iraq. The invasion in 2003 helped create the conditions that were conducive to the emergence of terrorist groups such as ISIS, and the chaos and cycles of violence that marked Iraq from 2003 continued. As such, the very fact that groups like the Taliban and al-Qaida still operate indicates that the GWOT has failed on its own terms to reduce the threat of terrorism, and with the advent of ISIS it indicates a failure to prevent future terrorism. Secondly, it is possible to evaluate the GWOT based on the various costs associated with it. Trying to count casualties is always a difficult endeavour, but a report from 2016 concluded that the war in Iraq had resulted in one million civilian casualties, the displacement of approximately three million people, as well as the death of 4,800 coalition soldiers.³

³ 'Blood and treasure: The costs of the Iraq war', 2016, Middle East Eye, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/blood-and-treasure-costs-iraq-war-1660190585> [accessed: 12.01.2021].

In addition, several hundred thousand people have been killed in countries like Yemen, which have been drawn into the GWOT. At any rate, the human costs connected with the GWOT dwarfs the death toll from the 9/11 attacks. Another important aspect are the financial costs, and since 2001 the US has appropriated and is obliged to spend an estimated US\$6.4 trillion in budgetary costs related to and caused by the GWOT.⁴ In their straight-forward break-even analysis, Mueller and Stewart calculated how many otherwise successful attacks would have to take place to justify the risk-reducing investments on terrorism after 9/11. This sum totals \$75 billion, and they calculated that the authorities would have to deter, prevent, foil, or protect against 333 very large attacks what would otherwise have been successful every year.⁵

All in all, it is clear that the human and financial costs of the GWOT have been staggeringly high, and yet, the incurred expenses have been largely incapable of reducing the threat of terrorism, or to prevent future terrorism. Thirdly, a critical evaluation of the GWOT would look at the effectiveness of the methods used. For example, in recent years there have been studies on the effectiveness of targeted killing of terrorists by drone strikes, or so-called leadership decapitation strategies. These studies, perhaps because they are often based on different metrics, data and methods, have produced contrasting and overall inconclusive findings. A good example of this is Micah Zenko's reporting that Obama had, as of 2016, authorised 506 strikes that have killed 3,040 alleged terrorists and 391 civilians.⁶ The term 'alleged' has been used when it comes to claims about how many terrorists are killed, because President Obama embraced a disputed method for counting civilian casualties. In effect, this 'counts all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants, according to several administration officials, unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent.'⁷ Some scholars, such as Byman, argue that drone strikes can be a useful counterterrorism tool while a larger number of studies find that they are either ineffective, or counterproductive.⁸ Abrahms and Mierau argue that leadership decapitation leads to greater indiscriminate violence by militant groups.⁹ More methods could be included, such as the use of torture, mass-surveillance, counter-radicalization programmes and indefinite detention. The material point, however, is that there are few studies on the effectiveness of counterterrorism, and the

⁴ C. Neta Crawford, *op. cit.*

⁵ J. Mueller, M.G. Stewart, *Terror, Security, and Money. Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011, p. 107.

⁶ M. Zenko, 'Do Not Believe the U.S Government Official Numbers on Drone Strike Civilian Casualties', 2016, Foreign Policy, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/05/do-not-believe-the-u-s-governments-official-numbers-on-drone-strike-civilian-casualties> [accessed: 12.01.2021].

⁷ J. Becker, S. Shane, 'Secret "Kill List" Proves a Test of Obama's Principles and Will', *New York Times*, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?_r=0 [accessed: 12.01.2021].

⁸ T. Bolland, J. Andre Lee Ludvigsen, '"No Boots on the Ground": The Effectiveness of Us Drones against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula', *Defense and Security Analysis* 2018, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 127–43, DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2018.1478184.

⁹ M. Abrahms, J. Mierau, 'Leadership Matters: The Effects of Targeted Killings on Militant Group Tactics', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 2017, vol. 29, no. 5, pp. 830–51, DOI:10.1080/09546553.2015.1069671.

GWOT in particular.¹⁰ It should be in the public interest to know as accurately as possible what works and what does not work when it comes to countering and preventing terrorism. In 2016, the Norwegian government was presented with an evaluation of Norway's contribution to making Afghanistan a stable and peaceful democracy that did not serve as a safe haven of recruiting ground for international terrorism. The main conclusion was that Norway's efforts had largely been in vain, and the only goal the country achieved was to be a good ally for the NATO partners.¹¹ Overall, however, the dearth of research on these questions, and the unwillingness by governments to evaluate their own policies, methods and tactics should be of huge concern.

The theoretical failures of counterterrorism

The cursory review and evaluation of the GWOT reveals a flawed counterterrorism paradigm. However, the GWOT was not initiated and sustained in a vacuum, and it is thus of great interest to investigate and explore the theoretical failures that have contributed to this situation. It is obviously easy to argue with the benefit of hindsight that the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing global war on terror could have been handled differently. At the time, the attacks were described by the Bush administration as an extraordinary attack on civilisation itself.¹² The media contributed to the response with *The Economist* declaring that:

[...] the appalling atrocities of September 11th – acts that must be seen as a declaration of war not just on America but on all civilised people – were crueller in conception and even more shocking than what happened in Hawaii. [...] This week has changed America, and with it the world, once again.¹³

The country was quickly put on a war footing, and President Bush declared that: 'The search is under way for those who are behind these evil acts. [...] We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbour them.'¹⁴ Indeed, as Jackson documented four meta-narratives were employed

¹⁰ T. van Dongen, 'Mapping Counterterrorism: A Categorisation of Policies and the Promise of Empirically Based, Systematic Comparisons,' *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 2010, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 227–241, DOI: 10.1080/17539150903306170; K.T. Kattelman, 'Assessing Success of the Global War on Terror: Terrorist Attack Frequency and the Backlash Effect,' *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward Terrorism and Genocide* 2020, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 67–86, DOI: 10.1080/17467586.2019.1650384.

¹¹ *A Good Ally: Norway in Afghanistan 2001–2014*, 2016, NOU, <https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/09faceca099c4b8bac85ca8495e12d2d/nou/pdfs/nou201620160008000dddpdfs.pdf> [accessed: 21.01.2021].

¹² *Transcript of Bush's Address*, 2001, CNN, <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript> [accessed: 12.01.2021]; R. Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, Manchester University Press, Manchester 2005.

¹³ The Day the World Changed, *The Economist*, September 2001, <http://www.economist.com/node/780341> [accessed: 12.01.2021].

¹⁴ S. Schmemmann, 'U.S. ATTACKED; President Vows to Exact Punishment for "Evil"', *New York Times*, 2001, <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/12/us/us-attacked-president-vows-to-exact-punishment-for-evil.html> [accessed: 12.01.2021].

to explain the attacks: *World War II and the attack on Pearl Harbour, The Cold War, civilisation versus barbarism, and globalisation*.¹⁵ The attack on Pearl Harbour is an event that lives on in the American psyche, and is an example that most Americans know, and which invokes specific feelings. These meta-narratives helped establish an impression of the attacks as part of a long and heroic struggle by the US against totalitarian and murderous ideologies. Terrorists were 'endlessly demonised and vilified as being evil, barbaric and inhuman',¹⁶ and in direct opposition to the narratives of Americans as generous, kind, resourceful and brave.¹⁷

In academia, the attacks were met with shock, and an impression that the world was faced with a new and unprecedented threat. Bruce Hoffman, a leading terrorism expert, claimed that, 'on 9/11, of course, Bin Laden wiped the slate clean of the conventional wisdom on terrorists and terrorism, and, by doing so, ushered in a new era of conflict – as well as a new discourse about it.'¹⁸ As such, it was not uncommon to see the 9/11 attacks discussed as 'new' terrorism, 'superterrorism' or even 'megaterorism'.¹⁹ Thus, 9/11 changed everything,²⁰ as it were. The 'new' terrorism was seen to be marked by its religious and apocalyptic nature, and the view that this form of terrorism not only had lethality as its ultimate goal, but it also eschewed political goals.²¹ In the publishing frenzy that followed in the wake of the attacks in 2001, at one point a book on terrorism in English was published every six hours²², almost all of this literature was found by a scholarly review to be mostly think pieces, and only a handful could be considered to be methodologically rigorous.²³

Surely, it is impossible to be completely correct in assumptions and knowledge claims even in the easiest situations, and this quick review serves to provide the context in which the war on terror was waged. The post-9/11 understanding of terrorism, therefore, was shaped by the view that it represented an unprecedented evil

¹⁵ R. Jackson, *op. cit.*, pp. 40–58.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 59.

¹⁷ G.W. Bush, *President's Remarks at National Day of Prayer and Remembrance*, The National Cathedral, Washington, D.C., 14 September 2001, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010914-2.html> [accessed: 12.01.2021].

¹⁸ B. Hoffman, 'Foreword.' In: *Research on Terrorism. Trends, Achievements & Failures*, ed. A. Silke, Abingdon, Frank Cass, 2004, p. xvii.

¹⁹ G. Allison, *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*, 2004, Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/nuclear-terrorism-ultimate-preventable-catastrophe/p7410> [accessed: 12.01.2021]; L. Freedman, 'Introduction.' In: *Superterrorism. Policy Responses*, ed. *idem*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford 2002, pp. 1–6; J. Gearson, 'The Nature of Modern Terrorism', *Superterrorism...*, pp. 7–24; M. Ignatieff, 'It's War, but It Doesn't Have to Be Dirty', *The Guardian*, 1 October 2001, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/01/afghanistan.terrorism9> [accessed: 12.01.2021].

²⁰ Ch. Townshend, *Terrorism. A Very Short Introduction*, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011, p. 122.

²¹ M. Stohl, 'Don't Confuse Me with the Facts : Knowledge Claims and Terrorism', *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 2012, vol. 5, no. 1, p. 36.

²² A. Silke, 'Contemporary Terrorism Studies: Issues in Research', *Critical Terrorism Studies. A New Research Agenda*, eds. R. Jackson, M. Breen-Smyth and J. Gunning, Routledge, Abingdon 2009, pp. 34–48.

²³ C. Lum, L.W. Kennedy, A. Sherley, 'The Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism Strategies', *Campbell Systematic Reviews* 2006, no. 2, p. 3, DOI: 10.4073/csr.2006.2.

that could only be eradicated with force. As such, the *exceptional* was adopted as the norm.²⁴ Zulaika has described this as a *crisis of knowledge*. It begins 'with the placement of the entire phenomenon in a context of taboo and the wilful ignorance of the political subjectivities of the terrorists.'²⁵ One consequence of this crisis is that the counterterrorist becomes preoccupied with reacting against an utterly dangerous and sinister actor that is not known. Thus, what *could* happen weighs as much, if not more, as what is actually the case. In this setting, governments are inclined to focus on worst case scenarios, and may very well find themselves looking and preparing for what Rumsfeld famously labelled the 'unknown unknowns'.

A key part of this crisis is also that previous knowledge about terrorism was ignored, among them a report from 1998, ordered by the Pentagon, which documented a strong correlation between terrorist attacks against the US and US military intervention abroad.²⁶ In addition, John Mueller, a renowned terrorism scholar, argued in 2002 that the 9/11 attacks were more likely an aberration, rather than a harbinger.²⁷ Based on empirical research at the time, his argument was that terrorists would find it hard to match or top the spectacular attacks and concluded with a warning that, 'a vastly exaggerated U.S. global military response to September 11, however, could inadvertently produce enough fear and resentment abroad to increase the possibility of this happening. No chance of that, is there?'

As the previous section of this article documented, the US and a coalition of the willing did respond with a vastly exaggerated military response, and that has proven to be detrimental to the efforts to counter and prevent terrorism. What is clear, however, is that the global war on terror was made the dominant counterterrorism paradigm in an intellectual and political context that deliberately ignored certain knowledge about terrorism and political violence, and subsequently precluded certain options and strategies. This point is perhaps best made by Gomis, who concluded his study on counterterrorism since 2001 with the following summary:

There is extensive evidence that the war on terror has often led to oversimplifications of challenges that were in fact much more complex and multifaceted. This flawed analysis has repeatedly given way to inadequate, disproportionate, and ineffective policies, often supporting dictatorial and repressive regimes in the name of countering international terrorism.²⁸

²⁴ J. Wolfendale, 'The Narrative of Terrorism as an Existential Threat', *Routledge Handbook of Critical Terrorism Studies*, ed. R. Jackson, Routledge, Abingdon 2016, pp. 114–23.

²⁵ J. Zulaika, *Terrorism. The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2009, p. 2.

²⁶ I. Eland, *Does U.S. Intervention Overseas Breed Terrorism?*, CATO Institute, Washington, D.C. 1998.

²⁷ J. Mueller, 'Harbinger or Aberration? A 9/11 Provocation', *The National Interest*, 2002 (Fall), pp. 45–50, <https://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/NIHARB.PDF> [accessed: 12.01.2021].

²⁸ B. Gomis, *Counterterrorism: Reassessing the Policy Response*, CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL 2015, p. 116.

Where from here?

Over the past 20 years, Western countries have used vast resources to counter terrorism by waging a global war on terror. However, as the above paragraphs have shown, it seems reasonable to argue that the GWOT has failed on its own terms to control, reduce and prevent terrorism. Political chaos, violence and terrorism still plague Afghanistan and Iraq, and through the GWOT, Western countries have employed illiberal and violent means that are contrary to the stated ends of achieving peace and stability. When we take stock of the GWOT, therefore, there are a few points that stand out.

Firstly, the most important lesson to be learnt from the GWOT is that violent means are ill-suited to produce or bring about peaceful and non-violent ends. The GWOT has been marked by an illusion that 'good' violence can be employed to achieve 'good' ends. However, the reality is that violence tends to result in more violence, thereby creating and perpetuating cycles of violence.²⁹

Secondly, it is of the utmost importance that the gathered knowledge about terrorism and counterterrorism is critically and rigorously examined, questioned and analysed. This includes highlighting and focusing on the knowledge and voices that are often subjugated and ignored. Successful counterterrorism depends, in large part, on correct and accurate information, and this could be extended to the knowledge that is gathered.

Thirdly, the failures of the GWOT are an invitation to reconceptualise counterterrorism. Instead of reacting to various terrorist groups with violent and suppressive means, or what we might call a *negatively* defined condition of counterterrorism, there should be an emphasis on preventing terrorism through means that are conducive to the ends we want to achieve. This latter approach is a *positively* defined condition of counterterrorism. It puts a premium on understanding and dealing with acts of terrorism within their contexts, and employing ordinary politics means creating conditions that will make populations, countries or regions resistant to terrorist groups. Some scholars, such as Stephan, have shown how non-violent resistance has worked against ISIS,³⁰ and lessons on how Norway has dealt with terrorist groups in peace negotiations³¹ indicate how important it is to support peaceful and non-violent political processes and movements in countries plagued by terrorism.

A *cliché* says that we ought to learn from history. Often that is not the case. As this brief article has shown, when we evaluate the GWOT, it is clear that it has failed on its own terms. It seems clear to me that if the goal is to successfully counter and prevent terrorism, states and organisations need to think and act differently. As we enter the third decade of the GWOT, the goal should be to reconceptualise counterterrorism to a more realistic and humane approach which recognises and deals with

²⁹ S. Lindahl, *A Critical Theory of Counterterrorism: Ontology, Epistemology, Normativity*, Routledge, Abingdon 2018.

³⁰ M.J. Stephan, Reflections Civil Resistance vs. ISIS, *Journal of Resistance Studies* 2015, vol. 1, no. 2, p. 127–50, <https://resistance-journal.org/product/civil-resistance-vs-isis/2015> [accessed: 12.01.2021].

³¹ S. Lindahl, A CTS Model of Counterterrorism, *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 2017, p. 1–19 [accessed: 12.01.2021].

the political causes conducive to terrorism in the first place. Critical evaluations are a good first step in that process.

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20 lat globalnej wojny z terroryzmem. Krytyczna ocena i uwagi na temat zapobiegania terroryzmowi

Streszczenie

Od ataków z 11 września 2001 r. mija 20 lat. W odpowiedzi Stany Zjednoczone rozpoczęły globalną wojnę z terroryzmem, która zdominowała ostatnie dwie dekady stosunków międzynarodowych. Misje wojskowe w Afganistanie i Iraku, błyskawiczny rozwój programu użycia dronów, powszechne stosowanie tortur i masowa inwigilacja to tylko niektóre z aspektów tej wojny. Globalna wojna z terroryzmem stała się dominującym paradygmatem kontrterroryzmu, a stosowanie przemocy zostało uznane za podstawowy sposób przeciwdziałania i zapobiegania terroryzmowi. Teraz, kiedy mijają dwie dekady od rozpoczęcia tej wojny, zagrożenie terroryzmem jest tak samo aktualne jak w 2001 r. W artykule podsumowano globalną wojnę z terroryzmem i oceniono ją z dwóch perspektyw: pierwszej, która obejmuje empiryczny wynik zapobiegania i zwalczania terroryzmu, oraz drugiej, opartej na teoretycznych założeniach leżących u podstaw paradygmatu tejże wojny. Z oceny wynika, że globalna wojna z terroryzmem zakończyła się porażką w dużej mierze ze względu na teoretyczny i epistemologiczny kryzys walki z terroryzmem. W ostatniej części tekstu zaprezentowano możliwe sposoby naprawy popełnionych błędów, tak aby państwa mogły przyjąć bardziej realistyczną i humanitarną formę walki z terroryzmem.

Słowa kluczowe: kontrterroryzm, wojna, terroryzm, przemoc, ocena

20 Years with the Global War on Terror: A Critical Evaluation and Thoughts on How to Prevent Future Terrorism

Abstract

20 years have passed since the 9/11 attacks in 2001. In response to the attacks, the US initiated a Global War on Terror which has dominated international relations for 20 years. The military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, a rampant drone programme, widespread use of torture, and the mass surveillance of people are some of the aspects of this war. The Global War on Terror has become the dominant counterterrorism paradigm, and the use of violence has been taken for granted as the primary tool to counter and prevent terrorism. Yet, 20 years have passed since 2001, and the threat of terrorism is as prevalent now as it was then. This chapter evaluates the Global War on Terror along two main axes: first, on its empirical record on countering and preventing terrorism; and second, on the theoretical assumptions that underlie the paradigm. The evaluation concludes that the GWOT has failed on its own terms to counter and prevent terrorism, and this is largely due to a theoretical and epistemological crisis of counterterrorism. The last part of this chapter presents possible ways forward to remedy these failures so that states may adopt a more realistic and humane form of counterterrorism.

Key words: Counterterrorism, War, Terrorism, Violence, Evaluation

20 Jahre globaler Krieg gegen den Terror: Kritische Betrachtungen und Überlegungen, wie Terrorismus in der Zukunft verhindert werden kann

Zusammenfassung

Seit den Terroranschlägen vom 11. September 2001 sind 20 Jahre vergangen. Als Reaktion auf die Angriffe begannen die USA einen globalen Krieg gegen den Terror, der die internationalen Beziehungen in den letzten 20 Jahren beherrscht hat. Die

Militärkampagnen in Afghanistan und dem Irak, ein ausuferndes Drohnenprogramm, der weit verbreitete Einsatz von Folter und die Massenüberwachung von Menschen sind einige Aspekte dieses Kriegs. Der globale Krieg gegen den Terror ist zum dominierenden Anti-Terror-Paradigma geworden, und der Einsatz von Gewalt wurde ganz selbstverständlich als Mittel der Wahl zur Bekämpfung und Verhinderung von Terrorismus angesehen. Seit 2001 sind mittlerweile 20 Jahre vergangen, und die Terrorismusgefahr ist heute genauso groß wie damals. Dieses Kapitel wertet den globalen Krieg gegen den Terror anhand von zwei Hauptachsen aus: erstens auf Grundlage der empirischen Daten zur Bekämpfung und Verhinderung von Terrorismus, und zweitens mit Blick auf die theoretischen Annahmen, die dem Paradigma zugrunde liegen. Der letzte Teil des Kapitels stellt mögliche Wege vor, um die Fehler der Vergangenheit wett zu machen, damit die Staaten eine realistischere und humanere Form der Terrorismusbekämpfung finden können.

Schlüsselwörter: Terrorismusbekämpfung, Krieg, Terrorismus, Gewalt, Betrachtung

20 лет глобальной войны с терроризмом. Критическая оценка и замечания на тему предотвращения терроризма Резюме

Прошло 20 лет с момента терактов 11 сентября 2001 года. В ответ Соединенные Штаты начали глобальную войну с терроризмом, которая продолжалась последние два десятилетия и имела огромное влияние на международные отношения. Военные миссии в Афганистане и Ираке, стремительное развитие программы использования беспилотных летательных аппаратов, применение пыток и тотальное наблюдение – это только некоторые аспекты этой войны. Глобальная война с терроризмом стала доминирующей парадигмой этой борьбы, а применение насилия было признано основным способом противодействия и предотвращения терроризма. Не смотря на это, спустя два десятилетия с начала этой войны, угроза терроризма остается столь же актуальна, как и в 2001 году. В статье дано оценку глобальной войны с терроризмом с двух точек зрения: первая включает эмпирический результат предотвращения терроризма и борьбы с ним; вторая, основанная на теоретических предпосылках, лежащих в основе парадигмы этой войны. Оценка показывает, что глобальная война с терроризмом закончилась провалом в значительной степени из-за теоретического и гносеологического кризисов борьбы с терроризмом. В последней части исследования представлены возможные способы исправления допущенных ошибок, которые позволят государствам начать более реалистичную и гуманную форму борьбы с терроризмом.

Ключевые слова: контртерроризм, война, терроризм, насилие, оценка



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War in the Era of the Sum of All Fears and the Monopolization of the Information Space

Introduction

Even on a general level, forecasting the nature of future armed conflicts is an extremely complex task. Just like attempts to develop a comprehensive peace agreement for the Middle East for politicians, so intentions to capture key elements of the armed struggles of the future have become a graveyard of good intentions for forecasters and analysts. For the risk of making a mistake is great, and the infamy heaped on the author of a missed forecast is difficult to describe. Nonetheless, efforts aimed at even sketching the specific features of confrontations between states, coalitions, but also between states and societies¹ should be undertaken because

¹ This follows the apt notion introduced by General Rupert Smith. It should be noted, however, that Smith was writing at a time when the transregional effects of the US interventions and Iraq had yet to spread, and general assessments were built on the generally positive results of the involvement of external forces in the Balkans. Moreover, one of the most serious mistakes was considered to be the late commencement of combat operations aimed at forcing peace. Cf. R. Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, TPB, Johannesburg 2012, pp. 382–385.

the density of the probabilistic fog shrouding the future events will turn out to be even greater, and our actions even less rational.

The environment for waging wars (including technical instrumentation) has been constantly evolving, but this process, starting from the first industrial revolution, has increased its dynamics. One can assume that the next acceleration will be brought by research on artificial intelligence, genetics and nanotechnologies, as well as on new energy sources. However, the authors of this text intend to focus on, treated in general terms, the relationship between the ability of society to act under conditions of threat and the phenomenon of information space, exemplified by the so-called social media (new media) managed by several supra-state decision-making centres.

Changing social environment of war – information space

In analysing the volatility of the war environment, the authors wish to draw attention to the factors that have already occurred after the end of the Cold War, yet were not associated with a simple change in the architecture of global and regional security systems. Perhaps the most significant changes in the war environment, which elude both recapitulation and forecasting efforts, are related to the phenomenon called the infosphere, virtual space, and the interpenetration between physical reality and virtual reality. It should be emphasized that the virtual space is not quite the expected child of the US projects to increase the resilience of the command system under conditions of nuclear war.² The result, judged from the perspective of three decades, generally exceeded the expectations of the creators. The HyperText Markup Language (HTML), developed and released to the public in the early 1990s, combined with an extremely dynamic multiplication of links, generated not only an extremely powerful communication tool, but in fact, a distinct dimension of modern civilization.³ The defence implications of the digitalization of many aspects of reality and national security were recognized relatively early on, but attention focused primarily on the possibility of directly impacting the physical dimension using digital space. This was expressed in a very heated discussion, only a few years ago, about the so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA).⁴

² This issue has lived to see an abundance of literature covering it, to mention for example: J. Abbate, *Inventing the Internet*, MIT Press, Cambridge 1999; J. Gillies, R. Cailliau, *How the Web was Born: The Story of the World Wide Web*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007; J. Ryan, *History of the Internet and the Digital Future*, Reaktion Books, London 2013. This is, of course, only the tip of the proverbial iceberg.

³ Cf. J. Wasilewski, 'Zarys definicji cyberprzestrzeni', *Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego* 2013, no. 9, pp. 225–234. Terminological (and other) issues are more broadly addressed in: T. Aleksandrowicz, *Świat w sieci. Państwa, społeczeństwa, ludzie. W poszukiwaniu nowego paradygmatu bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, Difin, Warszawa 2018; *idem*, *Kluczowe megatrendy w bezpieczeństwie państwa w XXI wieku*, Difin, Warszawa 2020.

⁴ In the Polish literature, this phenomenon, but also the consequences of uncritical submission to certain intellectual fashions and uncritical duplication of content generated in centers considered to be leading, was widely discussed by J. Maroń, *Wokół teorii rewolucji militarnej. Wybrane problemy*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 2011.

The next step was to implement scenarios of using the digital space to conduct intelligence activities or attacks on key elements of critical infrastructure (from the proliferation of widespread dysfunctions in banking networks, to the hostile takeover of control over energy transmission systems, air traffic, etc.). This is how the issue is attempted to be covered, among others, by the Tallinn Manual, which is, in fact, an attempt at taming fear or uncertainty by describing it rather than actually solving the problems.⁵ In the shadow of the approach named the engineering one, which in essence just defined narrow areas of risk and counteraction by means of expansion of security systems, which was a rightly justifiable but also a simpler procedure, there remained a broad dimension of social changes generated by cyberspace in the feedback system.⁶ The thesis can be put forward that, in principle, until the emergence of information about the impact of activities in the information space (specifically, in social media) on the results of the 2016 US presidential election, the topic was treated in strictly niche terms. This was largely due to a rift resulting from mutual misunderstanding between engineers and hard security specialists solving very specific problems, and representatives of social sciences (sociologists, media scholars, and social psychologists), active mainly at universities. As a result, the area of experience shared by both trends in the approach is quite modest.

Information and, through it, the psychological impact on the enemy since the dawn of wars has been an integral part of confrontation. So, what has changed with the emergence of the information space and, particularly, the phenomenon euphemistically called the new media or the social media? First of all, the density of information distribution networks has increased dramatically, and thanks to mobile devices, the impact on the recipients has become almost continuous. The time it takes for the distributor of information (or rather the message) to react to situation changes has also shortened. Finally, thanks to the systems of algorithmization, mass data processing, psychological profiling, and capacity of bandwidth, the recipient receives an individualized message that corresponds to their preferences, and thus is also capable of activating their fears, phobias, and strengthening resentments – in general, of reassuring them that there is a whole community of people who perceive the world in a very similar, if not identical, manner.

New or social media are an instrument of influence aimed primarily at civilian communities and it is less effective in relation to the armed forces, including soldiers on long-term or permanent duty. The personnel of the armed forces are necessarily much more socialized, motivated, and subjected to strong executive and formal discipline, which makes information infiltration more difficult and facilitates its counteraction by administrative methods. This does not mean, however, that soldiers,

⁵ *Tallin Manual 2.0 of the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2017.

⁶ The authors' diagnosis is confirmed by Lawrence Freedman's opinion. In 2017, he wrote that the term 'information warfare' entered circulation in the early 1990s. It had two meanings that were easily confused. The first referred to attempts to influence public opinion by manipulating the content of information, and the second – to measures designed to disrupt systems of communication and information transmission. The former fell within the competence of propagandists, while the latter – within that of engineers. Cf. L. Freedman, *The Future of War: A History*, Public Affairs, New York 2019, p. 306.

including those from formations regarded as select or elite, do not suffer from Facebook disease.⁷ In their case, though, the treatment seems to be simpler and more effective. Looking at it from another angle – professional military personnel live in their own information bubble and are generally not interested in breaking its walls. The power of social media to influence conscripts and reservists is a separate issue, but it defies easy generalization and seems to need to be treated individually for each country using the aforementioned mechanisms to replenish the armed forces.

Therefore, the scale of threats generated by social media seems to be much greater in the case of civilian communities.⁸ Given a strongly atomized society, which is gaining momentum, the psychological impact of animating and activating information bubbles is, as practice shows, highly effective and, most importantly, burdened with neither high financial costs nor political risk. Internet users no longer have to wait for a word of mouth, the grapevine, an inspired agitator, a leaflet distributor, or to laboriously track down a radio signal in a sea of background noise and intentional interference. For they receive the rumour, the created fact, the cheap sensation (generally post-truth) immediately after its generation; moreover, they receive it in the form they desire and expect. The message is professionally prepared, visualized and embedded in the language of emotions to such an extent that its falsification after being assimilated by the recipient is very difficult, if at all possible.⁹ One more circumstance should be pointed out: post-truth is not subject to verification with the help of rational instruments, because these have been drained by mass culture for decades.

Fairy-tale, magical, fantastic universes were initially treated as an element of widely understood entertainment. Along with the blurring of the line between entertainment and information, there began slow but constant merging of the real world¹⁰ with fantastic entities. In the case of socially and educationally neglected groups from the generation born with a smartphone, an almost amorphous image

⁷ In general, however, in such a case social media are not so much used to infiltrate soldiers, but the careless use of them by military personnel leads to the publication of sensitive or potentially sensitive data. A particular form of fighting the 'Facebook disease' has been noted in the Russian Federation sub-units deployed in Syria. On the assembly square in Latakia, a box of transparent plastic filled with shot/executed, in the most literal sense of the word, cell phones was placed. Complementing the message are special plaques nailed with unauthorized mobile devices confiscated from soldiers.

⁸ The role of social media in military operations has not, apart from the image dimension, become the subject of in-depth analysis. The issue was initially presented by Agnieszka Węglińska ('Nowe media w sytuacji zagrożenia i konfliktu', *Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego* 2007, vol. 2, pp. 202–210), but if only because of the date of publication, the text has a mainly historical dimension.

⁹ The phenomenon of emotionalization and visualization of the message, of departure from the written word, is examined in a very broad context by Jacek Dukaj, *Po piśmie*, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Kraków 2020.

¹⁰ Fantastic creation has for centuries been, for example in the form of satire, an element of political discourse. It seems that for the first time the convention of the fantastic was used consciously in order to arouse controversy over defense issues by George Tomkyns Chesney in a short story (of dubious literary value) published in 1871, *The Battle of Dorking: Reminiscences of a Volunteer or Reminiscences of a Volunteer by an Eye Witness in 1925* (Porter and Coates, Philadelphia, <http://static.torontopubliclibrary.ca/da/pdfs/37131054487996d.pdf> [accessed: 10.01.2021]).

of reality has developed, which is a combination of reality and fantastic creations. This needs to be complemented with a particular oversupply of dystopian, apocalyptic and post-apocalyptic visions, which can psychologically underpin the social conviction of the inevitability and imminence of the collapse of the 'known world'. The depth and importance of these interactions for society's overall immunity to change and challenges (especially unexpected and beyond the catalogue of typical, 'domesticated' threats) is the subject of detailed research by social psychologists, but it does not seem that in strictly defensive forecasts this element can be neglected.

Such actions can be long-term in nature, aimed at lowering the coherence of the community subjected to psychological and informational influence, destroying rudimentary social ties based on minimal trust between the rulers and the ruled.¹¹ They are conducted in a routine manner, not to achieve a clearly defined goal, but rather to create the desired state of social emotions, making it possible to move on to other projects if necessary. Well-planned and professionally conducted activities of this kind should blend in with other streams of activity that are absolutely natural for civil society, but in such a way as to expose opposites, increase polarization, and make agreement as difficult as possible. The subject of the activities should remain absolutely unaware, as long as it is possible, of the organiser's intentions. It seems that generating the situation sketched above is possible, and it cannot be ruled out that such projects are already underway. The main threat to the effectiveness of efforts aimed at exploding open societies from within is the desire to achieve the assumed goals in too short a time and the lack of in-depth knowledge of the object of influence. This results in adopting overly aggressive, identifiable rhetoric, committing cultural awkwardness and even linguistic errors.

It is possible to put forward a hypothesis that interaction in the information space is currently, in most cases, rather aimed at achieving a long-term effect: slowly breaking social bonds, perpetuating and widening divisions over all possible issues, widening the range of differences that are known to be socially important (and thus animating the creation of new information bubbles and strengthening existing ones). The problems generated by this kind of activity of both states and non-state organizations is currently the subject of active studies and exchange of ideas conducted from different positions,¹² but it does not seem to translate into an increased ability to conduct effective counteraction.

¹¹ This mechanism, sometimes not obvious, illustrates the phenomenon of the anti-vaccine movements. Their final message boils down to the fact that the state is corrupt and in the name of the interests of pharmaceutical companies it risks our health and lives as well as those of our children. Thus, generalizing – the state is an institutionalized enemy of citizens, or actually not citizens, because this kind of narration is not present in the message, but it is an institutionalized enemy of people. A very similar logic appears in the message of other entities, for example, radical environmental and climate groups. Based on a similar message, there are information bans of leader-racist movements, whose basic thesis boils down to the belief that the state has been taken over by international plutocracy (or other equally dark forces).

¹² A current overview of social media activities by states and organizations has been provided by P.W. Singer, E.T. Brooking, *LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media*, Mariner Books, Boston 2019. The book has the character of an emotional report and is burdened with a preconceived thesis. The authors, who come from ultraliberal backgrounds, fiercely follow content attributed to the far right, which flattens the narrative and brings them closer to the conspiracy theories

The question about possible effectiveness of planning and conducting in the information space a campaign aimed at causing mass panic, manifested, for example, by spontaneous and massive evacuation of large cities remains open. There is no experience in this matter on the one hand, or reliable research on the other. After all, the most comprehensively described case of causing socially dangerous results by a radio broadcast dates back to 1938.¹³ It is worth noting, however, that a reflection on this event, including a possible repetition of the general mechanism used then, takes place on the level of science of cognition and communication, media studies, social psychology, and political science.¹⁴ Security sciences also seem to notice this dimension of activities in the information space as it is even described as extremely dangerous and... this is basically all of it, followed by a rapid retreat to considerations on critical infrastructure, with a discussion of the Stuxnet example; although from the information systems development point of view it is already distant prehistory. However, it is hard not to see the opportunity presented by an attack on critical infrastructure conducted simultaneously with a social media panic campaign¹⁵ and actions (such as diversions) in real space.

they seek to disavow. A much more balanced approach is presented by A. Jungherr, G. Rivero, D. Gayo-Avello, *Retooling Politics: How Digital Media Are Shaping Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK – New York, NY 2020. On the other hand, a highly professional, analytical approach to the issue is presented by publications produced at the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence: *Social Media as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare*, eds.: S. Svetoka and A. Reynolds, Riga: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence 2016; K. Giles, *The Next Phase of Russian Information Warfare*, Riga: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence 2016; *DAESH Information Campaign and its Influence*, ed. Z. Zgryzewicz, Riga 2016. They have retained the timeliness of the essential content. Particularly noteworthy are the centre's recent works such as K. Allen, *Communicating Threat in an Era of Speed and Fetishized Technology*, Riga 2020; *Falsification of History as a Tool of Influence*, ed. M. Varna, Riga 2021, as well as the periodical publication *Robotrolling*.

¹³ Orson Wells' radio play aired in California on 30 October (based on George Herbert Wells' *The War of the Worlds*). Cf. M.K. Ntahonsigaye, *Fake News Hysteria: How an analysis of Orson Welles' War of the Worlds broadcast can inform the issue of 'fake news'*, University of Windsor, Windsor 2018, <https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1062&context=major-papers> [accessed: 22.03.2021]; J. Pooley, M. Socolow, 'War of the Words: The Invasion from Mars and Its Legacy for Mass Communication Scholarship', in: *War of the Worlds' to Social Media: Mediated Communication in Times of Crisis*, eds. J. E. Hayes, K. Battles, W. Hilton-Morrow, Peter Lang, New York 2013, pp. 35–56.

¹⁴ Cf. *Słowa jak kamienie. Mowa nienawiści, kłamstwo, agresja w sieci. Kompendium wiedzy o języku w życiu publicznym*, eds. A. Kasińska-Metryka, R. Dudała, T. Gajewski, ToC, Kraków–Nowy Targ, 2019.

¹⁵ An interesting and very recent example of an action that can be treated as a kind of testing safeguards and reactions is in the posting of information about the increase in radiation levels in Lithuania on the State Atomic Energy Agency website and the zdrowie.gov.pl website. Earlier, the the Lithuanian Nuclear Energy Safety Inspectorate website had been hacked. In order to make the disinformation credible, the Twitter account of Marek Budzisz, who is actively involved in Russian affairs, was taken over. The events took place on 17 March 2021.

Changing environment of war – custodians of the information space

The shutting down or termination of Donald Trump's accounts by the social media sites Twitter and Facebook, in conjunction with the incursion of his supporters into the Capitol, has been received by many circles with nearly ecstatic satisfaction. However, this is certainly not a singular case and such occurrences, with various degrees of importance, are probably found on a daily basis. A special English neologism 'de-platforming' has even been coined¹⁶ which, however, due to its rather obvious political, connotations does not function in Poland.¹⁷ A little later, a reflection came, although regrettably only a partial one. It turned out that the digital space, identified by many users as an area of unbridled expression and almost complete freedom, is subject to control, and that control is not only relatively restrictive, but also exercised arbitrarily. This was pointed out by Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor (who cannot be suspected of any sympathy for the former American president), who said that only the state, not the medium,¹⁸ can interfere with the right of citizens to express their opinions. The opinion of the European Commissioner for the Internal Market, Thierry Breton, should be regarded as highly significant. Aware of the importance of the phrase and the significance of the comparison, he wrote: The unrest in Washington is proof that a powerful yet unregulated digital space – reminiscent of the Wild West – has a profound impact on the very foundations of our modern democracies. [...] Just as 9/11 marked a paradigm shift for global security, 20 years later we are witnessing a before-and-after in the role of digital platforms in our democracy.¹⁹

The most powerful actors active in the digital space have grown to be monsters in three decades, taking the long road from innovative start-ups to global corporations, wrapping the globe in a web of visible and invisible connections. The remark above refers primarily to the so-called Big Five companies, namely: Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple and sometimes Microsoft. It is primarily their services that have given the information space its current shape, while the possibilities they have created for widely understood consumption shape the basic content of the Internet. The domicile of all these entities is the United States, generally and formally understood, but their resources and means are dispersed all over the world. The level of independence of entities called, not without a reason, custodians of digital space,

¹⁶ 'The action or practice of preventing someone holding views regarded as unacceptable or offensive from contributing to a forum or debate, especially by blocking them on a particular website;' Lexico.com (Dictionary.com/Oxford University Press).

¹⁷ Civic Platform (Polish: Platforma Obywatelska, PO) is a center to center-right political party in Poland. In November 2015, Civic Platform government stepped down after 8 years in power, defeated by the Law and Justice Party.

¹⁸ Cf. B. Jennen, A. Nussbaum, *Germany and France Oppose Trump's Twitter Exile*, 11 January 2021, Bloomberg, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-11/merkel-sees-closing-trump-social-media-accounts-problematic> [accessed: 23.03.2021].

¹⁹ T. Breton, *Thierry Breton: Capitol Hill-- the 9/11 moment of social media*, 10 January 2021, Politico, <https://www.politico.eu/article/thierry-breton-social-media-capitol-hill-riot> [accessed: 22.03.2021].

have for several years aroused growing concern of countries, initially for fiscal reasons, then also for security reasons, and related to the exponentially increasing dependence not only of economies, but also of the entire sphere related to administration, public security, and even defence against products provided by actual monopolists. Then came the realization of the importance of metadata obtained by information service providers and the potential impact of algorithms prepared on their basis on large social groups.²⁰ It should be emphasized that this results in the possibility of shaping the behaviour of populations (public opinion, Internet users) both in the non-kinetic, but characterized by a simultaneous impact of multidimensional confrontation phase (in journalism called 'hybrid warfare'), and during an open armed conflict.²¹

In view of the above circumstances, growing doubts are raised by the lack of coordinated control from any representative bodies (national or international) and the fact that the activities of the Big Five, to a limited extent, are subject to legal regulations of the countries in which they operate. The key issues here are not the security challenges exemplified directly, but fiscal and treasury problems, the issue of collection, processing and sharing of personal data, and the scope of influence of these entities on the flow of information.

From the point of view of states, especially non-power states threatened by entanglement in conflict, hybrid or kinetic, this is a factor that must be taken into account in both offensive and defensive planning. For in the information space, another player has emerged in the form of the Big Five, and it is a highly unpredictable player. The example of animating and dynamizing protests against ACTA regulations²² has already shown that information corporations are guided by their specific understanding of reality, in which the key element is profit generation. The power of social media was then used to instil in millions of Internet users the conviction that the Web means freedom, and that any attempts to subject activities in the information space to any regulations (including those protecting the interests of such overlooked minority groups as, for example, creators) constitute a fascist threat to that freedom. The vast majority of those propagating this narrative fail to see its fundamental contradiction. In the real space, we perceive democratic representative systems as guarantees of freedom, while in the virtual space, which is becoming an increasingly important part of our reality, we are inclined to put it under the power of network giants. Therefore, are we to expect representative democracy in physical reality or rather enlightened absolutism in virtual reality?

²⁰ The impact of a message built on the basis of metadata obtained through the analysis of preferences revealed online was first practically exploited by the Cambridge Analytica company during the 2016 presidential election in the United States. The problem is interestingly presented, from the constitutional law point of view, by Kamil Stępnia, 'Algorytmy priorytezuujące w świetle zasady wolnych wyborów', *Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego* 2019, no. 4 (50), pp. 47–71.

²¹ The issue is discussed at length by C. Castillo, *Big Crisis Data: Social Media and Time-Critical Situations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2019. The problem with the literature on the issue is that developments in technology on the one hand, and the dynamics of events on the other, make significant portions of text quickly obsolete. This is true for both articles and monographic works. In turn, most of the publications written on an ad hoc basis do not address the analytical challenges, and they, too, rapidly become outdated.

²² *Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, ACTA*.

By taking action against Trump, the digital giants, or rather their undefined executive bodies, have made it clear that they are naturally guided by political preferences based on their worldview. Claiming that this was an objective decision is a bald attempt to usurp the wisdom of the Absolute. From the point of view of our considerations, it is significant that such motives would also undoubtedly work in the case of interstate conflicts. One can assume that the amalgam of the pursuit of profit (justifying, for example, the Big Five's far-reaching compromises with the authoritarian Chinese State), the conviction about one's own particular mission and ability to make things happen, but also the arrogance rooted in the American (and even earlier the British) imperial model can result in extremely surprising decisions. Should it come to reaching a compromise between the Big Five and the People's Republic of China, for example, banning Taiwan in cases of confrontation with the PRC is just one possibility.

Conclusion

The above text does not aspire to be exhaustive or even to tackle the subject in any depth. The authors outlined the title phenomena in a way that would allow for a broader discussion. It appears that, in most cases, interaction in the information space is currently aimed at achieving a long-term effect: slowly breaking social bonds, perpetuating and widening divisions over all possible issues, and widening the range of differences known to be socially important (and thus animating the creation of new information bubbles and strengthening existing ones). The problems generated by this kind of activity of both states and non-state organizations is currently the subject of lively studies and exchange of ideas conducted from different positions, but it does not seem to translate into an increased ability to conduct effective counteraction.

Further analyses should, on the one hand, exceed administrative and thus artificial boundaries of fields and disciplines;²³ on the other hand, they contain a quantum of practical recommendations. There is no doubt that the challenge of the media is not only a fascinating research area, but also a field of ongoing confrontation, with very high stakes. The issue of the Internet custodians has an even more dramatic dimension. The exchange of views, comments and, most importantly, suggestions between media researchers and representatives of security sciences and, above all, practitioners in this field, is not only desirable but absolutely necessary. Theory cannot keep up with the challenges of practice; as a result, the latter operates intuitively, if not completely in the dark, in many dimensions. Only a broad yet targeted exchange of views stands a chance for changing this state of affairs. Obviously, this holds true if we intend to build comprehensive²⁴ not segmented-departmental security.

²³ These findings, however, are only an exemplification of the way in which the administration and academia attempt to organize the enterprise called science and have little to do with the substance of the phenomenon itself. In many ways, this approach is useful and desirable, but it also carries the risk of generating grotesque divisions and micro-divisions which prevent an overall view of the essence of the phenomena and processes.

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Wojna w epoce sumy wszystkich strachów i monopolizacji przestrzeni informacyjnej

Streszczenie

Artykuł zawiera rozważania dotyczące wpływu dwóch wymiarów rewolucji informacyjnej na przebieg konfliktów zbrojnych. Autorzy poddają refleksji teoretycznej dynamiczny rozwój mediów społecznościowych oraz dominującą pozycję kilku ponadnarodowych korporacji. Zwracają uwagę również na zacieranie się różnic między światem cyfrowym i rzeczywistym, co generuje interakcję wpływającą na gotowość obronną społeczeństw otwartych państw demokratycznych. Tekst nie aspiruje do wyczerpania tematu, ale zakończony jest apelem o budowę dialogu poświęconego szeroko rozumianemu bezpieczeństwu między specjalistami o kompetencjach inżynierskich, badaczami społecznego wymiaru rewolucji informacyjnej oraz osobami zajmującymi się problematyką bezpieczeństwa.

Słowa kluczowe: wojna, ewolucja, media społecznościowe, monopolizacja Internetu

War in the Era of the Sum of All Fears and the Monopolization of the Information Space

Abstract

The article attempts to consider the impact of two dimensions of the information revolution on the course of armed conflicts. The authors present a theoretical reflection on the dynamic development of social media and the dominant position of various transnational corporations. They also draw attention to the blurring of distinctions between the digital and the real world, which generates interaction affecting the defensive readiness of democratic states open societies. The text does not aspire to exhaust the topic; it is concluded with an appeal to build a dialogue dedicated to security in a broad sense between specialists with engineering competences, researchers of the social dimension of the information revolution and people working on security issues.

Key words: war, evolution, social media, Internet monopolization

*Krieg in der Ära der Summe aller Ängste und die
Monopolisierung des Informationsraums*
Zusammenfassung

Der Text versucht, den Einfluss zweier Dimensionen der Informationsrevolution vor dem Hintergrund bewaffneter Konflikte aufzuzeigen. Die Autoren präsentieren eine theoretische Betrachtung der dynamischen Entwicklung der sozialen Medien und der dominierenden Rolle verschiedener transnationaler Großkonzerne. Sie weisen außerdem auf die verschwimmenden Grenzen zwischen der digitalen und der realen Welt hin, was zu Interaktionen führt, die die Verteidigungsfähigkeit demokratischer Staaten und offener Gesellschaften beeinflussen. Der Text beabsichtigt nicht, das Thema erschöpfend zu behandeln; er endet mit einem Aufruf, einen Sicherheitsdialog im weiteren Sinne zwischen Experten mit technischen Kompetenzen, Sozialforschern mit Interesse an der Informationsrevolution und Sicherheitsexperten zu initiieren.

Schlüsselwörter: Krieg, Entwicklung, soziale Medien, Monopolisierung des Internets

*Война в эпоху суммы всех страхов и монополизации
информационного пространства*
Резюме

В статье рассматриваются вопросы влияния двух измерений информационной революции на ход вооруженных конфликтов. Авторы приводят теоретические размышления над динамическим развитием социальных сетей и доминирующим положением нескольких транснациональных корпораций. Они также обращают внимание на стирание различий между цифровым и реальным мирами, что порождает взаимодействие, влияющее на обороноспособность открытых обществ демократических государств. Статья не исчерпывает рассматриваемую тему и заканчивается призывом к построению диалога на тему широко понимаемой безопасности, между специалистами-инженерами, исследователями социального измерения информационной революции и специалистами, занимающимися вопросами безопасности.

Ключевые слова: война, эволюция, социальные сети, монополизация Интернета



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Why Should Poland Not Be Afraid of a War with Russia?

Introduction

The relations between Poland and the Russian Federation have been influenced by centuries of complicated interactions involving numerous conflicts (of a military nature) and finalised with the Partitions. As a result of the First Partition of Poland, which divided the Commonwealth among three partitionists, a part of the Polish land fell under the Romanov Empire rule. For those territories, the following years were marked by unsuccessful uprisings which led to restricting the autonomy of the Congress Kingdom of Poland, as well as to increasing russification activities. At the same time, Poles were establishing themselves among the political and military elites of the Tsardom of Russia. Within the premises of the Russian partition territory, political movements and parties were formed with the aim to claim independence (e.g., PSP). Other emerging parties supported solving the social and political matters in collaboration with Russian organisations (e.g., SDKPiL). Poles were active participants in the 1905 revolution and both 1917 revolutions.

The fall of the Tsardom of Russia and the other two partitioning powers resulted in a chance for Poland to re-establish itself as a country. Without further details, this brought about another Polish-Russian clash, a war with the Bolshevik Russia and the emergence of yet another myth – this time about the defence and salvation of Europe and the world from the Bolshevik invasion.¹ This article does not at-

¹ This corresponds to a similar myth formed in the First Commonwealth times and the Polish victory in the Battle of Vienna in 1683, which created an image of Poland as a frontline of Christianity and helped the Austro-Hungarian Empire (one of the later partitionists). We forget about

tempt to reflect on the national mythomania² that, unfortunately, has a significant, if not enormous, influence on the politicians and the policy they conduct. A contemporary example of this influence can be one of the Polish myths claiming that Poland should expect an upcoming invasion of the Russian Federation, despite our membership in the North-Atlantic Treaty and the emphasised unique (sic!) alliance between Poland and the USA.

In this study, the Author uses the chronological-problem method to analyse and synthesise documents related to the foreign and security policies of the Russian Federation and Poland. Questions are posed and answered. The objective of this article is to present a short synthesis of the issue stated in the title, yet, in a narrative different from the one prevailing in the messages from Polish science, media and politics. The multiplicity of perspectives, judgements, opinions, and approaches to the discussed issue can only bring us closer to the correct diagnosis. A scientist from the security field of science, or social sciences in general, should act like a doctor – make a diagnosis which is accurate and, most importantly, based on facts rather than myths. In other words – a truthful diagnosis. Such an approach allows to solve the problem or, at least, to attempt at finding a solution in a factual, not stretched, manner. In Poland, only a small number of scientists and publicists (not to mention politicians) dares to express their rational and knowledge-backed stands and their reasonable, logical thinking. They include Stanisław Bieleń, Ryszard Łagowski, the late Ludwik Stomma, Natasza Duraj and Piotr Mickiewicz. They are researchers and publicists who are not, so to say, *Russiasfreaks*, as named accurately by the Cracovian political scientist Rafał Matyja.

Russia and the Polish national security strategy

As mentioned in the introduction, the formation of the Polish-Russian relations is influenced by a relentless stream of mythologised historical events. Following Ryszard Zięba, it may be argued that when it comes to the relations between our countries, we tend to consider only the martyr and heroic side of the Polish nation's history.³ Another matter of great significance for the Polish-Russian relations is our stand on the international security of our continent. The stand is that the approach should be highly focused on NATO, with the USA being included in the process, and on extending the North Atlantic Treaty as well as the European Union to the East. Nevertheless, it should be done without including Russia in any of these processes. Finally, according to Zięba, the third issue in the relations with Russia is energy security – a concern which Poland intends to address by eliminating the Russian

a more important issue which is the loss of sovereignty, connected with the lack of financial and monetary systems, a mint, etc. Conf. W. Terlecki, 'Moneta zabytkowa', *Ochrona zabytków* 1957, 10/2 (37), pp. 123–139.

² A. Skrzypek, 'Polska – Rosja – stereotypy', in: *Polska na tle procesów rozwojowych Europy w XX wieku*, ed. S. Sierpowski, IH UAM, Poznań 2002, pp. 154–169.

³ R. Zięba, 'Główne problemy w stosunkach polsko-rosyjskich', *Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations* 2018, no. 3, p. 9.

monopoly position on energy resources supplies.⁴ The Author points out one additional problem which is a lack of knowledge and understanding of the Russian contemporary military concepts and thinking, and perceiving the Russian ruling classes as those who do not use reason, logic, or a correct assessment of the situation and possibilities of Russia. In the Author's opinion, it is only a projection of a subjective and individual perception of the world and Russia, especially given the assumption that the opposite side also, rather than Realpolitik categories, uses myths and impressions to think. Such perception is further sustained due to the lack of actual knowledge about Russia's foreign and security policies.

The implied knowledge follows from the national mythomania about Russia, the Russians and the stereotypes that are not only no longer valid but also likely to have only been our misperceptions of the *Muscovites*⁵ in the past. A lack of interest or a fresh view on the partner, stronger in the international arena than us, is irresponsible. Moreover, allowing the perception to be distorted by experiences accumulated throughout centuries is foolish and the consequence might resemble our earlier 'accomplishments' in relations with Russia.

At present, Poland acts as if it was either at war with Russia or as if it was facing upcoming military aggression from Russia.⁶ An emanation of this argument is the content of the current national security strategy approved and published last year.⁷ It is worth mentioning that the strategy was released during the presidential election campaign in Poland and, thus, was probably meant to play a specific part in it.⁸ Unable to completely investigate this document in the article, I am quoting Piotr Mickiewicz, an expert on the subject:

The anachronistic nature of this approach lays mainly in the assumption that the current threats to the security of Poland are primarily of a political and military character. The problem of the economic, social and other threats to the safety of Poland has been constructed in such a way as to emphasise the success of the ruling party, rather than highlighting the real presence and meaning of such threats.⁹

Such a description of Poland's safety environment with respect to Russia is presented:

The most serious threat is the Russian Federation authorities' neo-imperial policy which is also realised using force. The aggression towards Georgia, the illegal annexation of Crimea, and the military actions in eastern Ukraine have all breached the basic rules of international law and undermined the pillars of the European safety system. The Russian Federation is actively expanding its offensive military potential (including

⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵ A. Skrzypek, *op. cit.*

⁶ R. Zięba, *op. cit.*, p. 33. It is hard not to agree with this statement from such an expert on foreign policy that Prof. Ryszard Zięba is.

⁷ *Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, Warszawa 2020. The strategy was approved on 12 May 2020, by the President of Poland.

⁸ P. Mickiewicz, 'O co tu chodzi? O Strategii Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego 2020', *Raport Wojsko – Technika – Obronność* 2020, no. 9, p. 36.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 38.

the Western strategic direction); improving its anti-access systems, among others in the Baltic Sea region (including the Kaliningrad Special Region); and conducting large-scale military training based on scenarios of possible conflicts with countries belonging to the North Atlantic Alliance, fast transfer of big troop groups, and even the use of the nuclear weapons. The Russian Federation is also conducting operations below the threshold of war (of a hybrid nature) that carry a risk of a conflict outbreak (also unintended, resulting from a rapid escalation following an incident, especially a military one), as well as undertaking miscellaneous and complex actions by non-military means (including cyberattacks and disinformation), aiming to destabilise the structures of Western countries and societies as well as to create disagreement among the allied countries. It must be noted that the Russian Federation will continue its policy of undermining the current international order based on international law to reconstruct its powerful position and its areas of influence.¹⁰

The struggle for influence is nothing new in international politics and has never really stopped. The participants are the EU countries, NATO, the USA, and China. Poland also attempts to play this game (the Three Seas Initiative) but unfortunately, we do not have much leverage (economic, financial, political, cultural, or ideological). Moreover, Poland's partners, such as Hungary under the leadership of Viktor Orban, are much more skilful in terms of politics and diplomacy. They carry out a multi-vector policy, playing with imaginary projections of our relations from the past.¹¹ As the aforementioned Piotr Mickiewicz writes, "[...] this simple message is clearly dividing international players into allies and rivals without taking into consideration neither the meanders of international politics nor the long-term consequences for Poland. Moreover, this division is more of a dream than a possible reality."¹² It is hard not to agree with such an observation and therefore, it is worth giving thought to the thesis that the Polish-Russian relations are an arrangement between an object and a subject of the political game, and that Poland has become a subject in a game on the international arena following its accession to NATO and the EU, especially in relations with the Russian Federation. According to the author, the thesis can easily be refuted. There is an imbalance and complete asymmetry in the relations between both countries. Poland has virtually no tools or advantages to conduct an effective Eastern policy.¹³

¹⁰ *Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego...*, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

¹¹ One example is the famous 'victory' over Donald Tusk's candidacy for President of the European Council in 2017, in which Tusk received 27 out of 28 votes, and the one vote against him came for the Prime Minister of Poland. In the voting, Hungary did not support Poland and pursued its own political interest rather than stand up for its ally.

¹² P. Mickiewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

¹³ A clear example is provided by our relations with Belarus, where the attempts to use a part of our minority in the game of Belarusian politics are only a source of trouble for the Belarusian Poles and do not have any real impact on the policy of President A. Lukashenko and his political team, as shown by the recent events including the arrest of members of an illegal, according to the Belarusian law, Union of Poles in Belarus. The foolish reaction of Polish authorities who are openly calling for freedom for the detainees is contradictory to the diplomatic actions and, furthermore, demonstrates a lack of any arguments supporting Poland that could cause a change of Belarussian authorities. Therefore, let us look at the potentials of Belarus and Russia – and what we could possibly accomplish in Russia.

There is no doubt that the Polish-Russian relations are difficult and very complicated. Being the stronger partner, Russia has all the necessary tools which it uses to play the game with Poland.¹⁴ Poland, however, does not have resources equal to those of Russia, as the example of Belarus demonstrates. It is clearly visible in the current governance that the Polish authorities treat Russia as the main threat to the countries of Middle Eastern Europe and perceive Poland as the frontline of civilisation whose task is to save Europe, or even the whole world, from the consequences of the Russian foreign and security policy. In short, we are obliged to stop Russia. Polish politicians, followed by academics and the army, see these relations in a drastically simplified way – in black and white. They fail to notice that our partners, especially within the European Union, are divided and ambiguous on that matter. This is because they save themselves some space to manoeuvre when it comes to their policy towards Russia. In Poland, on the other hand, politicians and all political options are outdoing one another in presenting the most radical stand.¹⁵ Such stands, incompetence, a lack of vision and a lack of realistic policy towards our neighbour are all sources of our newest National Security Strategy. When looking at and analysing the Polish policy towards Russia, it is hard not to notice that the Polish-Russian relations and their evaluation are carried out by politicians manipulating facts and stereotypes through mass media. It can be argued that such an approach becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Given that Poland and Russia differ in their political goals (which was demonstrated in the 2014 conflict in Ukraine), the rivalry, any changes in the geopolitical arena, as well as the wish to stay in power, are only fuelling domestic political conflicts between the ruling party and the opposition. Such a race makes it inevitable for the Polish-Russian relations to be shaped by our shared history.¹⁶

Poland in the Russian security strategy

As already mentioned, the modern Polish-Russian relations are strongly influenced by the past, history, myths, and stereotypes. According to the Russian opinion, normalisation of the Polish-Russian relations is hampered by the interpretation of two key events of the Second World War – the Katyn case and the foundation of the People's Republic of Poland under the influence of the Soviet Union. Those two events combined have had a significant and increasing impact on the current Polish-

¹⁴ S. Weremiuk, 'Polska wobec Rosji w latach 1992–2014. Od zależności postimperialnych do trudnych relacji. Analiza wybranych aspektów', *Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego* 2015, no. 13, p. 135.

¹⁵ R. Zięba, *op. cit.*, p. 31. Due to the academic, rather than a journalistic nature of the article, the author will not quote a Russian saying about a tiger which accurately describes our policy towards Russia.

¹⁶ See: M. Wódka, 'Relacje polsko-rosyjskie, czyli manipulacja faktami i narzucanie stereotypów przez media i polityków', *Polska – Rosja w świecie globalnych przeobrażeń*, eds. D. Jarnicki, A. Pi-skorz, INoB UPH, Warszawa – Siedlce 2018, pp. 42–58.

Russian relations.¹⁷ As Daria Zwiagina writes, Russia, being Poland's biggest neighbour, has always had a substantial and real influence on Polish politics. In her opinion, any difficulties which occur in the Polish-Russian relations are a result of having a common Slavic origin; different approaches to some political and social phenomena which occurred during the development of both countries have resulted in similarities as well as differences. Such ambivalence is thus fundamental to the competition of Poland with Russia. Therefore, we can state that the historical rivalry between Poland and Russia, especially in Middle Eastern Europe, has not lost its topicality. According to Daria Zwiagina, the concept of separating Russia from Poland by a strip of independent and loyal to Poland countries is still popular among Polish authorities who dream about Intermarium.¹⁸ In other words, Polish politics, being a part of the politics of other EU and NATO countries, has been taken into account in the Russian security strategy in force since 31 December 2015. In chapter 2 of the strategy, entitled *Russia in the contemporary world*, it reads:

12. The consolidation of Russia is accompanied by new threats to national security, which have a complex and mutually bound character. Conducting independent internal and foreign policy by Russia is met with resistance from the USA and their allies seeking to maintain their dominance in global affairs. Their realised policy of deterring Russia assumes exerting political, economic, military and information pressure on it.

13. The process of forming a new polycentric model of the world order is accompanied by an increase in global and regional instability. There is a rise of contradictions related to imbalanced global development, a widening gap between the levels of countries' prosperity, as well as a struggle for resources, access to markets, and control over trade routes. The competition among countries is becoming more and more related to the values and models of social, human resources, scientific and technological development. Being a leader in the deployment of the oceans and the Arctic's resources is becoming of significant importance in this process. A whole spectrum of political, financial, economic, and informational tools has been activated for the power struggle in the international arena. The potential of intelligence agencies is becoming exploited with greater intensity.

14. The power factor does not lose significance when it comes to international relations. The quest for creating, modernising, and expanding offensive weapons is causing a weakening of not only the global safety system but also the one responsible for agreements and negotiations about armament control. Within the Euro-Atlantic, Euro-Asian, and Asian-Pacific regions there are breaches of equal and undivided safety rules. Regions bordering Russia are developing processes of militarization and arms race.

15. Reinforcing the strength potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and passing onto it global functions performed with a violation of international law norms, starting military activity of the Bloc countries, further expanding the alliance, and bringing its military infrastructure closer to the Russian borders – all

¹⁷ С.А. Сухинина, *Фактор исторической памяти в современных польско-германских и российско-польских отношениях: сравнительный анализ*, Санкт-Петербург 2017, р. 3.

¹⁸ Д.А. Звягина, *Внешняя политика Польши: власть традиций*, Москва 2019, pp. 154–156; see: eadem, 'Политика Польши в Восточной Европе: возрождение концепции междуморья?', *Россия и мир. Вестник Дипломатической академии МИД России* 2018, no. 1, pp. 78–86.

these elements are posing a threat to the national security. A significant limitation to the possibilities of supporting global and regional stability is building elements of the US missile defence system in Europe, Asia, the Pacific region, and the Middle East. The conditions allow for the realisation of the 'global strike' concept, development of the strategic non-nuclear, highly precise weapon systems, as well as in the case of weapon placement in space.

16. The ongoing Bloc approach to solving international problems does not support counteracting the whole spectrum of current challenges and threats. The streams of migration from African and Middle Eastern countries into Europe prove that the regional security system in the Euro-Atlantic region, based on NATO and the European Union, is insufficient.

17. The Western stand on counteracting the integration processes and creating conflict hotspots is producing a negative impact on the realisation of Russian national interests. The American and the EU support for the unconstitutional *coup d'état* in Ukraine has led to a great division among Ukrainian society and to a military conflict. Increased far-right nationalistic ideology, purposeful creation of Russia's image as an enemy among Ukrainian society, clear support for the use of force in resolving internal conflicts, and a serious socioeconomic crisis are all changing Ukraine into a place of long-term instability in Europe and right at the border with Russia.

18. The practice of overthrowing legal-political regimes and provoking instability and internal conflicts is gaining popularity. In addition to the ongoing hotspots in the Middle East, Africa, Southern Asia, and the Korean Peninsula, new flashpoints and zones appear outside of the local authorities' control. Moreover, the areas of military conflicts are becoming bases for the spread of terrorism, international contradictions, religious discrimination and other signs of extremism. The emergence of the terrorist organisation calling itself 'Islamic State' and the consequent strengthening of its influences was the outcome of the double standards policy conducted by some countries within the fight with terrorism domain.¹⁹

The quoted excerpt from the chapter describing Russia's situation in the modern world (the RF's security environment) demonstrates particular challenges for the national safety of this country and their complex and holistic nature. Moreover, according to the policy makers, the United States and their allies are aiming to maintain (their crumbling – author's note) dominance in global affairs. They point at new areas for competition, including the development of the World Oceans and the Arctic resources. According to Russia, the power factor is not losing its significance, and the regions bordering with Russia are experiencing an arms race and militarization. The RF expresses its concern about NATO, which began to operate on a global scale, violating the international law norms. The North Atlantic Treaty military infrastructure is being brought closer to the Russian borders. Moreover, Russia argues that neither NATO nor the European Union supports the resolution of escalating problems, given their approach to international problem-solving. Neither of the organisations is effective, as shown by the example of African and Middle Eastern emigration processes. Yet, the practice of overthrowing legal-political regimes as well as provoking instability zones and new flashpoints is popular – as exemplified by

¹⁹ Dekret Prezydenta Federacji Rosyjskiej, *O Strategii bezpieczeństwa narodowego Federacji Rosyjskiej*, no. 683, 31 December 2015, Chapter 2, pp. 12–18.

the support for the *coup d'état* in Ukraine, which led to divisions and, essentially, to a military conflict as well as economic and social crises. These transformed Ukraine into an area of instability near the Russian borders.

When analysing both the Polish and the Russian strategies, we can notice certain analogies from the security environment (the positions of Poland and Russia in the modern world) perspective. The key difference is that the Russian strategy does not portray Poland as the major threat. In addition to that, the records of the Russian strategy are not unequivocal or, as Piotr Mickiewicz stated, straightforward, and they do not create a barrier for negotiations with partners. The Security Strategy of Poland from 2020 refers to the Foreign Policy Strategy of Poland 2017–2021, which emphasised the destructive role of the Russian policy aiming at creating a buffer zone out of the CIS countries and their regions. Not having anything to offer when it comes to politics and economy, Russia conducts a policy of disinformation, political and economic pressure, and ultimately – calls for war.²⁰ A Russian expert Andriej Kondratow, following an analysis of that strategy, points out that Poland is treating Russia as a long-term threat to its safety. It portrays Russia as an enemy. Any counteraction is to be in cooperation with the European Union, NATO, and the USA. The broad spectrum of stated theses in the mentioned document is related to a negative opinion on the foreign policy of Russia. Therefore, according to Kondratow, systematic and scientific studies of the organisation and tactical form of the Polish foreign policy are of utmost importance. The objective is to develop means of reaction to the possible threats to the safety and interests of the Russian Federation.²¹

Conclusion

The editorial assumptions of this article (volume) do not allow for detailed references to other documents or for opinions, analyses, or evaluations. Two key political documents – national security strategies – were quoted. In reference to them as well as other, not quoted sources and the Author's previous research, several conclusions are presented. The aim is for the conclusions to have an incentivising nature that would inspire a non-standard, non-mythologized, and non-stereotypical evaluation of the threats and possibilities of the Polish–Russian war. The Author attempts to answer the question posed in the title.

1. An attack of a military nature on Poland would certainly lead to a global conflict, given the assumed reaction of the North Atlantic Treaty.
2. The clash would be concluded with a Pyrrhic victory, and the winners would be the nuclear powers absent from the conflict (China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea).

²⁰ Strategia Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2017–2021, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, p. 9, <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKewiKvZXpj93xAhUmIIsKHRC3BtYQFnoECAIQAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.gov.pl%2Fattachment%2F8196524f-687b-40e6-aca8-82c53ff8e6db&usg=AOvVaw0g8VYclZAhWYSq-MMsfZdE> [accessed: 12.07.2021].

²¹ A.I. Кондратов, 'Стратегия внешней политики Польши до 2021 года', *Обозреватель – Observer* 2018, no. 8, pp. 55, 64.

3. In the past (during the Partitions) Poland did not belong to the so-called inner circle of the empire, in contrast to the post-Soviet republics. Moreover, Poland is not indispensable for Russia's reconstruction of the position of power. We are perfectly fit to become a helper in the destruction of the oneness of the European Union, which would also impact the functioning of NATO. We are also an excellent so-called entrance window for conducting special operations against the members of the EU and NATO²², given the weak position of Poland.
4. The president of Russia and the ruling class (including the militation²³) are predictable and rational in their actions, contrary to what journalists believe. Nevertheless, it does not mean that they would abandon actions meant to expand the broadly defined political or other influences, or actions aimed at preserving the national interest of their homeland.
5. There is undoubtedly a game of influences and a new form of the world order being played – without the weakening United States' dominance. Poland is only a subject in this game, and not even the most important one.
6. Since the collapse of the bipolar world, many ongoing clashes have become different from military conflicts or *proxy* conflicts. These clashes are not kinetic but rather based on disinformation and deception, a form of what we call a hybrid war or *Myatezhevoyna* (*Subversion Warfare*). Their effectiveness is relatively high so there is no need to carry out traditional military operations.
7. The actions to push Russia out of Europe, in which Poland has taken an active part, have been met with Russia's resistance undertaken counteractions. In my opinion, these responses are incorrectly interpreted as Russia's aggressive moves.²⁴
8. The outbreaks of colour revolutions (including the so-called Arab Spring), especially in areas of Russian influence, and supporting them by Western countries have been interpreted as hostile actions and as such have been met with a decisive response from the RF.
9. Research into the problem presented in the title should focus on the original state documents (written in the Russian language, not translated into English).
10. In-depth research should be conducted on any Russian academic writing dealing with the perception of Poland.
11. Scholars should, above all, bear in minds that both sides (I do not only mean Poland and Russia) carry out against each other informational operations in which all means are used, including troll factories and institutions such as Bellingcat, the Krasnaya Zvezda holding, and Russia Today.

²² K. Kraj, 'Czy Rosja zagraża Polsce? Polska w polityce bezpieczeństwa i zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej', in: *Państwo, prawo, bezpieczeństwo, ekonomia i edukacja w obliczu zagrożeń XXI wieku*, eds. A. Piędel, J. Pomiankiewicz, A. Żebrowski, WSBiO, Nisko 2014, pp. 209–210.

²³ *Idem*, 'Rola i znaczenie służb specjalnych w polityce bezpieczeństwa narodowego Federacji Rosyjskiej', in: *Wymiary bezpieczeństwa na progu XXI wieku Między teorią a praktyką*, eds. A. Zarembo, B. Zapała, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2010, pp. 117–123.

²⁴ *Idem*, 'Kryzys ukraiński. Nowe spojrzenie na wojnę – z rosyjskiej perspektywy', *Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe* 2015, no. 2, pp. 37–38.

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Dlaczego Polska nie powinna obawiać się wojny z Rosją? *Streszczenie*

Artykuł został poświęcony rozważaniom nad możliwościami starcia wojskowego Rosji z Polską. Opierając się na przedstawionych kluczowych strategicznych dokumentach, na podstawie ich analizy oraz prowadzonych wcześniej badań, autor odpowiada na pytanie postawione w tytule. Odpowiedź brzmi: Polska nie powinna się obawiać wybuchu wojny z Rosją. Jako podstawowe w artykule wykorzystano metody chronologiczno-problemową oraz analizę i syntezę dokumentów związanych z polityką bezpieczeństwa Federacji Rosyjskiej oraz Polski. Opracowanie zostało podzielone na cztery części. Obrazy Polski i Rosji zostały przedstawione w cytowanych strategiach bezpieczeństwa obydwu państw. Artykuł otwiera wstęp, a kończy podsumowanie, będące wynikiem prac nad tematem artykułu oraz wynika z poprzednich badań autora związanych z ewentualnymi zagrożeniami dla Polski płynącymi z Rosji. Pierwszym celem artykułu jest próba odejścia od mitów, utartych wyobrażeń oraz stereotypów dotyczących stosunków pomiędzy Polską i Rosją. Drugim celem artykułu jest skłonienie do rozważań nad polsko-rosyjskimi stosunkami, pozostawiając багаż historycznych uwarunkowań na boku.

Słowa kluczowe: wojna, strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego, mity, stereotypy, polityka zagraniczna, polityka bezpieczeństwa

Why Should Poland Not Be Afraid of a War with Russia? *Abstract*

This article aims to reflect on the possibilities of a military clash between Russia and Poland. Based on the presented key strategic documents, their analysis and the research conducted earlier, the Author addresses the question posed in the title. The answer appears that Poland should not be afraid of an outbreak of war¹²⁵ with Russia. The article uses the chronological-problem method, as well as analysis and synthesis of documents related to the security policies of the Russian Federation and Poland. The essay is divided into four parts. Both Poland and Russia are described in the quoted security strategies of the countries. The article begins with an introduction and ends with a conclusion, the latter being the effect of work on the article topic as well as previous research conducted by the Author about possible threats to Poland coming from Russia. The first objective of the article is an attempt to step away from myths, general beliefs, and stereotypes about the relations between Poland and Russia. The second one is to encourage reflections on Polish-Russian relations while forgoing any historical prejudices.

Key words: war, national security strategy, myths, stereotypes, foreign policy, security policy

Warum muss Polen keine Angst vor einem Krieg mit Russland haben? *Zusammenfassung*

Der Text enthält Überlegungen zu möglichen militärischen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Russland und Polen. Auf Grundlage der präsentierten zentralen Strategiepapiere, eigener Analysen und früherer Forschungsvorhaben greift der Autor die Titelfrage auf. Er kommt zu dem Schluss, dass Polen keine Angst vor dem Ausbruch eines Kriegs mit

²⁵ War in the sense of a military clash, followed by legal, diplomatic and trade consequences for the countries in conflict.

Russland haben muss. Der Artikel basiert auf der chronologischen Problemethode und einer Analyse und Synthese von sicherheitspolitischen Dokumenten Russlands und Polens. Der Essay ist in vier Teile unterteilt. Sowohl Polen als auch Russland werden in den erwähnten Sicherheitsstrategien beschrieben. Der Text beginnt mit einer Einführung und endet mit einer Schlussfolgerung, die auf der Arbeit zum Thema und früheren Forschungsvorhaben des Autors zu möglichen Gefahren für Polen im Zusammenhang mit Russland basiert. Das erste Ziel des Texts ist es, Mythen, allgemeine Überzeugungen und Stereotypen über die polnisch-russischen Beziehungen auszuräumen. Zweitens sollen Überlegungen zu den Beziehungen beider Länder angeregt werden und existierende historische Vorurteile abgebaut werden.

Schlüsselwörter: Krieg, nationale Sicherheitsstrategie, Mythen, Stereotypen, Außenpolitik, Sicherheitspolitik

Почему Польше не следует опасаться войны с Россией?

Резюме

В статье рассмотрены возможности военного столкновения между Россией и Польшей. На основе анализа представленных ключевых стратегических документов и предыдущих исследований автор дает следующий ответ на вопрос поставленный в заглавии статьи: Польше не следует опасаться начала войны с Россией. Основными методами, использованными в статье, являются хронологический и проблемный методы, а также анализ и синтез документов, касающихся политики безопасности Российской Федерации и Польши. Исследование разделено на четыре части. Позиции Польши и России были представлены в цитируемых стратегиях безопасности обеих государств. Статью открывает введение и заканчивают выводы, в которых представлены итоги работы над темой статьи, основанные также на результатах предыдущих исследований автора, связанных с возможными угрозами Польше со стороны России. Первой целью статьи является попытка отойти от мифов, устоявшихся стереотипов в отношениях между Польшей и Россией. Второй – склонить читателя к размышлениям о польско-российских отношениях, оставив в стороне устоявшиеся исторические детерминанты.

Ключевые слова: война, стратегия национальной безопасности, мифы, стереотипы, внешняя политика и политика безопасности



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Terrorism in the Russian Federation: Fear and Threat or Tool and Opportunity?

Introduction

9/11, 2001 opened a new world era. By bringing terror to the USA, Osama bin Laden infected the Americans with a fear too well known to many nations around the world. As the new conflict broke out, the USA and NATO had to accept that the day they declared the Global War on Terrorism, the Russians had already been waging their own, intense and cruel war against violent extremism for a decade. Nonetheless, terrorism was not a new phenomenon for the Russian population because even if the official propaganda claimed otherwise, the Soviet Union was not free of terrorism: since its creation, there were people ready to apply violence against the Soviet regime. The pro-tsardom veterans of the Civil War or the last resistance members of the nations forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union after World War II were recognised by Soviet regime as terrorists. When the post-WWII period was over and the last resistance insurgents captured or eliminated, modern terrorism appeared in Russia. Oppressed Soviet citizens were looking for any opportunity to leave the country; for some of them the last resort was airplane hijacking. Between 1954-1991, at least 107 plane hijacking attempts in the Soviet Union were reported. Since 1958, hijackers killed 120 people, and wounded 200¹. To fight with modern terrorism, the Soviet regime had to develop forces with a capability comparable to Western counter-terrorist units, like the most famous German GSG-9 or British SAS.²

¹ K. Kraj, *Rosyjski system antyterrorystyczny*, Krakowska Fundacja Badań Wschodnich, Kraków 2017, p. 30

² L. Neville, *European Counter-Terrorist Units 1972-2017*, Osprey Publishing, Oxford 2017, pp. 35-37, 48-50.

As a result, inside the Soviet internal security service KGB 'Alpha' unit was created.³ But Soviet citizens were not afraid of terrorism: informed only via the official mass media they were just not aware of it.

Terrorist activity, originated mainly on the North Caucasus, has been affecting the Russian population for years even if only a small part of it was exposed to acts of terror. Russians are fed with terrorism-oriented propaganda, especially in times of political crisis when consolidation around the government is required. To deal with modern terrorism, the Russian Federation developed legal acts which determined the responsibilities and tasks of various levels of the Russian state administration in order to effectively prevent and, should they occur, combat acts of terror. In 2006, the last edition of such a document was published as Federal Law No. 35-Fz of 6 March 2006 on counteraction against terrorism.⁴

When the GWOT started, Vladimir Putin could not have missed the chance to combine his efforts with the new struggle of the Western world. On the eve of the invasion of Afghanistan, Putin offered the Coalition the much-needed support to gain justification for his activity in the post-Soviet region where 'chasing terrorists' authorized various operations against any of his opponents. He learned to use the war against terrorism, fear of terrorism, and terrorism itself as a tool for gaining influence on the Russian internal as well as the world opinion. The Author has researched open data sources available in the English and Polish languages: printed and internet publications, to compare declarations of the Russian Federation's leaders with the actions of their administration.

Terrorism in the Russian Federation 1991–1999, 'trouble' in the North Caucasus

The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the world and began a new era in history. For some of the former Soviet citizens, this event provided the opportunity to regain independence as all former Soviet Republics became independent countries. For ethnic Russians and other citizens of the now-independent Russian Federation, experiencing tremendous crises in every aspect of their everyday life was a tragedy. On 11 April 2005, Vladimir Putin called the Soviet Union collapse 'the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.'⁵ But the option given to the former Soviet Republics was not valid for autonomous republics and districts the Russian Soviet

³ The unit eventually merged with another FSB unit 'Vypmel', evolved into FSB Special Purpose Center with 'Alpha' and 'Vypmel' as separated Directorates and is still the Russian Federation's premier hostage rescue force for domestic operations. M. Galeotti, *Russian Security and Paramilitary Forces since 1991*, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2013, p. 35; L. Neville, *European Counter-Terrorist...*, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

⁴ Федеральный закон от 06.03.2006 № 35-ФЗ «О противодействии терроризму», Russian Federation Ministry of Emergency Affairs website, <https://www.mchs.gov.ru/dokumenty/729> [accessed: 4.06.2021].

⁵ 'Putin: Soviet collapse a "genuine tragedy"', *NBC News*, 25 April 2005, <https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wnbn7632057> [accessed: 3.04.2021].

Federative Socialist Republic was composed of. Boris Yeltsin, the then-head of the RSFSR, advised the leaders of the regions to 'take as much sovereignty as they can swallow.'⁶ Among the nations making up the Russian Soviet Republic population only the Chechens dared to fight for freedom; their struggle eventually led to armed conflicts, known as the 'Chechen wars.'⁷

Recognition of the Chechen fighters was different all over the world, at least in the early 1990's. Many nations, especially the ones which had the opportunity to experience Russian or Soviet domination as part of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, or one of the so-called 'satellite states', tended to treat them as freedom fighters standing up against the too well-known Russian oppression. The situation started to change once the Chechens chose terrorist methods of warfare.⁸ On 14 June 1995, a Chechen party led by Shamil Basayev seized a hospital in Budyonnovsk, Stavropol Krai, taking some 1800 hostages, including about 150 children. Basayev demanded termination of the Russian military operation in Chechnya and opening peace negotiations with the Chechen government. He declared they would execute hostages in the case of the Russian forces assault, a rejection of his demands, or prevention of his access to the mass media. Russian negotiators, led by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, eventually agreed, even though there were a few attempts to free the hostages, all of them fought off by Basayev's group. When on 19 June the terrorists were allowed to go back to Chechnya, more than 100 hostages volunteered to join them. As a result, 147 people died, some of them from Russian fire; the terrorists lost only 12 people.⁹ The successful operation made Basayev a hero of the Chechen insurgency and soon followers of his cause were found. Russian citizens, having experienced the horror of the terrorist attack themselves or having watched it in the media, realized the seriousness of the threat.

On 14 December 1995, another Chechen warlord Salman Raduyev, driven by Basayev's idea, sized Gudermes, Chechnya's second largest city. Although not able to take control over military and law enforcement facilities, he and his group sized large parts of the city and controlled it for two weeks. The federal forces, unable to repel the insurgents, eventually accepted a ceasefire and let the invaders out of the city. Two weeks later, on 9 January 1996, Raduyev and 200 terrorists struck a Russian air base at Kizlyar, Dagestan Republic. Surprised by the Russians' quick response, the terrorist moved to the nearest city and following Basayev's template, sized a local hospital and another building, taking more than 1000 hostages. The agreement was

⁶ N. Buckley, 'Russia's regions are next battleground', *Financial Times*, 2012, <https://www.ft.com/content/f382bb26-6dd9-11e1-b98d-00144feab49a> [accessed: 27.02.2021].

⁷ The First Chechen War started on 28 November 1994 with the federal force invasion and ended on 31 December 1996 with the Russian contingent's full withdrawal. The second war started on 1 October 1999 and was declared over on 16 April 2009. M. Galeotti, *Russia's Wars in Chechnya 1994–2009*, Osprey Publishing, Oxford 2014, pp. 34–48, 55–79.

⁸ A. Stopczyński, 'Czeczenia w polskiej prasie w latach 90. XX wieku na przykładzie analizy wybranych opiniotwórczych tygodników', in: *Świat islamu w perspektywie współczesnej i historycznej*, eds. I. Kończak, M. Lewicka, A.S. Nalborczyk, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2020, p. 174, DOI: 10.18778/8220-219-9.15.

⁹ M. Galeotti, *Russia's Wars...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 40–41.

negotiated to let the Raduyev group withdraw to Chechnya, taking 150 hostages as human shields. The Russian forces ignored the agreement and engaged the insurgents just before they crossed the border; Raduyev decided to take more hostages and sized the village of Pervomayskoye. The federal forces tried to engage the terrorists, suffering heavy casualties. Russian commanders even ignored hostages, claiming they had already been dead. After an eight-day siege, Raduyev and some of his men eventually found their way out of Pervomayskoye into Chechnya, escaping the pursuit.¹⁰ Since the Russian forces left Chechnya, the Republic became a land of anarchy, turning into a scene of criminal acts like clashes among rivaling clans, extortions and kidnappings.¹¹ In the meantime, a process of deep changes in the Chechen population began. Brutality and cruelty of the fights deeply affected combatants of both sides, as well as civilians. Some Chechens, traditionally Sunni Muslims, radicalized. Some members of the global jihadist network, many of them veterans of the mujahedin movement of the Afghan war, joined the Chechen insurgency. The most known among them was Saudi-born Emir Khattab, who soon became an icon of the Chechen jihad and Shamil Basayev's close partner. The presence of foreign volunteers, mainly Arabs, helped the Russians to present the Chechens as terrorists taking part of international jihad.¹² According to some sources, the Chechen insurgents' radicalization process was driven by other Russian government agencies, and many of the warlords, including Shamil Basayev, were Russian intelligence services assets at least since the beginning of the 1990's.¹³ On 7 August 1999, Khattab and Basayev led a group of 1500 Chechen, Dagestani and Arab terrorists to Dagestan to support a local insurgency started in April that year. They failed to ignite a strong revolt and soon were forced back to Chechnya by combined force of federal troops and even armed locals. On 5 September, Khattab and Basayev made another attempt and were repelled again.¹⁴

The Second Chechen War

The threat of terrorism became real for the Russian citizens, but until 1999, terrorist acts were affecting mainly people living in some specific regions of this vast country. Russians living outside the North Caucasus were more afraid of criminal activities than jihadists terror; yet it was to be changed soon. September 1999 brought Russian series of bomb attacks in a few locations including deep interior; two of them

¹⁰ In 2000, Raduyev was detained by FSB and after a trial imprisoned in federal jail where he died in December 2002. M. Galeotti, *Russian Security and Paramilitary Forces...*, op. cit., p. 42. idem, *Russia's Wars...*, op. cit., pp. 41–43.

¹¹ Idem, *Russia's Wars...*, op. cit., pp. 48–50.

¹² Ibidem, pp. 50–51.

¹³ According to M. Van Herpen, Shamil Basyev was a Russian military intelligence service GRU asset. He fought alongside Abkhaz separatists during the war in Abkhazia in 1992, providing deniable force to reach the Russia goals without directly exposing the regular Russian Federation troops. M. Van Herpen, *Putin's Wars. The rise of Russia's new imperialism*, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, 2014; Polish Edition: Prószyński Media, Warszawa 2014, pp. 279–280.

¹⁴ M. Galeotti, *Russia's Wars...*, op. cit., pp. 51–52.

occurred even in Moscow. The first bomb exploded on 4 September in Buynaksk, a town in the Dagestan Republic, in a building occupied by Russian armed forces servicemen and their families, killing 83 people. On 8 and 13 September, two bombs exploded in a block of flats located in Moscow's southern districts resulting in 283 dead. On 16 September, a truck exploded in the city of Volgograd, Rostov Oblast. More than 300 people, mostly civilians, were killed; all of the attacks were carried out in the early morning to increase the number of casualties. Ordinary Russians were terrified.¹⁵ On 22 September, a strange incident occurred in the city of Ryazan: a man planting bombs in the basements of a block of flats was spotted and arrested. He turned out to be an FSB officer and the whole situation was explained as the security services' counter-terrorism drill. However, the time of the incident which occurred almost simultaneously with recent acts of terror and similar *modus operandi* raised suspicions. According to some sources, all of these acts of terror were executed by FSB officers or their assets to provide *casus belli* for another war in Northern Caucasus.¹⁶ The new war, waged by federal forces in a much more professional manner than the First Chechen War, helped the new leader Vladimir Putin win the presidential election in March 2000.¹⁷ Regardless of this conspiracy theory, the Ryazan incident proved that other Russian government agencies were familiar with the tactics, techniques, and procedures of terrorists and had the capabilities to apply them – at least during military exercise. On 1 October 1999, Putin officially declared the beginning of a campaign to re-establish the federal authority over Chechnya. Fighting terrorism, including international jihadists, was announced as the main goal. The public opinion in the West, outraged by the brutality of the conflict, demanded peace talks. Everything changed on 11 September 2001: the USA, shocked by the unprecedented attack, were eager to accept any support in the newly announced Global War on Terrorism, and Putin was ready to be part of the new struggle. He was among the first state leaders who contacted the US president George W. Bush after the terrorist attack and offered his support. He also addressed the Russians on TV to convince them that Russia's fight against terrorism was the same war the USA was taking part in.¹⁸ Russia, at least at the beginning of the GWOT, gained the reputation of a valuable partner and was invited to the coalition; previous accusation of being too harsh on the Chechen insurgents, civilians and other opposition to the Russian government were quickly forgotten. Russia's diplomatic support helped the USA develop a network of logistic bases in the post-Soviet countries necessary to launch a campaign in Afghanistan. The US Army Special Forces teams infiltrated to Afghanistan in the early days of the campaign were operating from the Forward Operations Base K2, located in the former Soviet air base in Karshi-Khandabad, Uzbekistan.¹⁹ Manas air base, Kyrgyzstan, used by the US forces since 2001 and later developed into the main transfer airport for troops heading to or out of Afghanistan, was another

¹⁵ M. Van Herpen, pp. 281–282.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 282–283. Alexander Litvinenko and Yuri Felshtinsky wrote a book about the September 1999 acts of terror indicating the Russian FSB as the perpetrators: *Blowing Up Russia: Terror from Within*, Gibson Square Publishers, London 2007.

¹⁷ M. Galeotti, *Russia's Wars...*, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 71.

¹⁹ L. Neville, *Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan*, Osprey Publishing, Oxford 2008, p. 6.

post-Soviet facility used by the Coalition.²⁰ All of them were available to the US and Coalition Forces due to the Russian diplomatic support.

Terrorism in Russia since 9/11 – globalization of the domestic war on terrorism?

With the beginning of the Second Chechen War, the Chechens lost hope for the recognition of their cause by the world opinion and, eventually, accepted terrorism as the main method of warfare. Some of them left Chechnya and joined international jihadist movement: soon they were found among the Taliban fighting with the US-led Coalition in Afghanistan. Chechens took part in the battle against the US SOF teams atop Takur Ghar mountain in February-March 2002, in the early phase of the 'Anaconda' Operation.²¹ By fighting members of the US and Coalition armed forces, Chechen Al-Qaeda members earned respect as die-hard fighters but also affirmed the Chechen insurgents' reputation as ruthless terrorists rather than freedom fighters in the Western world, even if they represented just a part of the Chechen diaspora. Chechen terrorists also increased the number of acts of terror in the Russian Federation. On 23 October 2002, 40 Chechen terrorists, led by Movsar Barayev, sized the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow during a musical performance, taking 750 hostages.²² Their main demand was the withdrawal of the federal forces from Chechnya. Since the fiasco of the negotiations didn't allow to solve the crisis situation peacefully, on the early morning of 26 October, the FSB Special Purpose Centre, supported by the Moscow Police SOBR (SWAT) unit, started a hostage rescue operation. When the mission was over, all the terrorists were eliminated, but 129 hostages did not survive the operation.²³ The terrorists' ability to reach a target in the heart of Moscow, just 5 km from the walls of Kremlin, was another shock for Russians. Once again, the siege was broadcast by many TV stations offering the Russians an opportunity to watch the nightmare live. Two years later, on 1 September 2004, Chechen terrorists struck again, this time targeting a primary school in Beslan, North Ossetia, during a new school year opening ceremony. The terrorists had taken some 1200 hostages,

²⁰ 'Manas: Kyrgyzstan backs closure of US airbase', *BBC News*, 20 June 2013, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22988967> [accessed: 3.04.2021]. In 2014, President of Kyrgyzstan Almazbek Atambayev demanded that the USA close their air base in Manas, while Russia kept their military installations in the country. The Russian influence over these decisions is clearly noticeable.

²¹ L. Neville, *Takur Ghar. The SEALs and Rangers on Roberts Ridge, Afghanistan 2002*, Osprey Publishing, Oxford 2013, p. 20; J.G. Meek, 'The Secret Battles Between US Forces and Chechen Terrorists', *ABC News*, 19 February 2014, <https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/secret-battles-us-forces-chechen-terrorists/story?id=22580688> [accessed: 3.04.2021].

²² Other sources estimate the number of hostages taken at 912.

²³ K. Kraj, pp. 51–53. The main reason for civilian casualties was a nerve agent used by FSB to reduce terrorists' awareness before the assault was initiated. The gas proved effective in knocking out both terrorists and hostages unconscious. Unfortunately, due to OPSEC regulations information about the specification of the nerve agent could not be passed to medical teams present on the scene; therefore, the proper antidote could not have been applied and some of the hostages overdosed with the gas died.

mostly children. Again, their demands were the withdrawal of the Russian forces from Chechnya and release of the terrorists detained during a recent raid in Ingushetia in June 2004. To prevent the law enforcement forces from using nerve gas like during the Dubrovka siege, the terrorists had broken the glass in all the windows in the school buildings. The FSB Special Purpose Centre was called, and the local law enforcement forces tactical units were activated. On the third day of the siege a disaster started: the terrorists opened fire to the personnel trying to remove the dead bodies of the people killed during the early stage of the siege. The law enforcement members returned fire; some of the hostages attempted to flee. A few of them were shot down by the terrorists. The situation turned into a hasty assault without any control, with armed locals acting on their own, and with quite uncommon for the hostage rescue operations weapon systems like grenade launchers, flame throwers and even tanks used. In consequence, 331 people were killed, among them 186 children.²⁴ In addition to major attacks such as the ones on the Dubrovka theatre and the Beslan school, the Chechen terrorists carried out several acts of terrorism lesser known in the West. They targeted subways, airplanes, music concerts, and other soft targets in many locations throughout the Russian Federation, including the capital. What is worth noticing is the fact that Chechen terrorists, even if labelled as radical Sunni extremist by the Russian propaganda, are more politically than religiously inclined. The main factor that distinguishes the Chechen rebels from ISIS or Al-Qaeda terrorists is the use of the so-called 'Black Widows': wives, mothers, sisters, and daughters of Chechen 'martyrs' who gave their lives in battles with the Russians or died from their hands.²⁵ At the end of second decade of the GWOT and the third of the Chechen Wars, due to the involvement of some members of the Chechen diaspora in terrorist attacks in the Western world, the world opinion lost all interest in supporting the Chechen struggle for freedom. The Chechen diaspora, once considered political refugees, came to be described as radical Muslims with a low capacity for assimilation among a democratic society, raising hard-core terrorists and questioning the principles of the free world. Chechens were the perpetrators of the Boston Marathon massacre on 15 April 2013,²⁶ they stabbed passers-by, killed one and injured four more on 12 October 2018 in the Opera District of Paris,²⁷ they beheaded history teacher Samuel Paty on 16 October 2020 in Conflans-Sainte-Honorine, a suburb of Paris.²⁸ By 2002, with the Dubrovka theatre siege, terrorism had become a real threat for Russian citizens; even if attacks affected just a small part or the Russian population, everyone had an opportunity to watch the horrors of the

²⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 53–55.

²⁵ Thair Shaikh, 'Attacks bear hallmarks of Chechen "Black Widows"', *CNN*, 29 March 2019, <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/03/29/russia.moscow.suicide.bombers/index.html> [accessed: 3.04.2021].

²⁶ 'Boston Bombing Suspects Put Chechnya in Spotlight', *National Geographic*, 20 April 2013, <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/130419-chechnya-russia-caucuses-boston-marathon-bombing-suspects-world-militants> [accessed: 3.04.2021].

²⁷ 'Paris knife attack: Suspect "French citizen born in Russia's Chechnya"', *BBC*, 13 May 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44098615> [accessed: 3.04.2021].

²⁸ T. Adamson, 'Suspect in teacher's beheading in France was Chechen teen', *The Associated Press*, 17 October 2020, <https://apnews.com/article/france-teacher-beheading-suspect-chechen-e91953f5c9fa0a4d52e51327d11a47fb> [accessed: 3.04.2021].

most dreadful attacks and was fully aware of the risk. President Putin frequently addressed the Russian Federation's citizens to reassure them that the threat was serious and real, and to provide himself with an excuse to act against his opponents.²⁹ In January 2021 Putin, called pro-Alexiei Navalny protesters 'terrorists';³⁰ while one month later, in February 2021 the FSB warned of a possible jihadist terrorists attack on a pro-Navalny demonstration to prevent people from joining the event.³¹ If the pro-Navalny movement becomes a real challenge to Putin's regime, the terrorist factor can be used by security services to cause chaos and allow the government to resolve the problem and thus regain control over frightened people.

Fighting terrorism abroad in the Russian Federation's foreign policy

Russia used its own struggle with domestic terrorism to present itself as state on the frontline of fighting global threats. Putin learned that pursuing real or hypothetical terrorists abroad could be a perfect justification for missions in foreign countries. In 2002, Russia accused the Georgians of not attempting to neutralize Chechen terrorists' safe heavens in the Pankisi Gorge. The Russians eventually bombed one village on the Georgian territory.³² The accusation of supporting Chechen rebels was a constant element of the Russian propaganda against Georgia until the final outbreak of war between the two countries. In 2014, during the Russian operation of the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, no charges of Ukraine supporting terrorists were raised; however, since Crimea was declared part of the Russian Federation, the situation changed. The Russians regularly recall alleged terrorist acts prepared by the Ukrainians to be committed in Crimea.³³ These activities should be regarded as the information warfare phase of a contingency plan for the next clash between Russia and Ukraine, which – should an opportunity arise – will develop into a full-scale conflict or never exceed the non-kinetic phase. Since the Russian Federation forcibly took control of the peninsula, the accusation of being a terrorist has fallen on the Crimean Tatars - an ethnic minority that has lived there for centuries and enjoyed great autonomy under the Ukrainian administration. As a pro-Ukrainian and traditionally Sunni Muslim community, they were a natural and easy target for the

²⁹ 'Putin warns IS plans to destabilize southern Russia and Central Asia', *TASS*, 9 June 2017, <https://tass.com/politics/950688> [accessed: 3.04.2021]; 'Putin calls for new tactics to fight terrorism', *TASS*, 6 March 2019, <https://tass.com/politics/1047664> [accessed: 3.04.2021].

³⁰ T. Merz, J. Crisp, 'Putin calls pro-Navalny protesters "terrorists", rejects claims about Black Sea "palace"', *The Telegraph*, 25 January 2021, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2021/01/25/putin-calls-pro-navalny-protesters-terrorists-rejects-claims/> [accessed: 3.04.2021].

³¹ U. Botobekov, 'How Putin's Russia is Exploiting Jihadists Against pro-Navalny Protesters?', *Modern Diplomacy*, 20 February 2021, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/02/20/how-putins-russia-is-exploiting-jihadists-against-pro-navalny-protesters/> [accessed: 3.04.2021].

³² M. Galeotti, *Russia's Wars...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 72–73.

³³ S. Walker, 'Putin raises stakes over alleged Ukrainian terror plot in Crimea', *The Guardian*, 10 August, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/10/russia-accuses-ukraine-of-armed-crimea-incursion> [accessed: 3.04.2021].

Russian propaganda.³⁴ Fighting global terrorism was also the main official reason for the Russian armed forces commitment in Syria, officially started on 30 September 2015. The operation in Syria was the first in the history of the Russian Federation troops' deployments to a country beyond the borders of the Soviet Union.³⁵ What is worth noting, Chechens were among ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria.³⁶ To effectively combat terrorism abroad, the Russian Armed Forces had to develop new capabilities, created inside their new branch of the *Sily spetsial'nykh operatsiy* – SSO (special operation forces), whose skills, competences, and even equipment far exceed those of the 'traditional' SOF units of the Russian military – Spetsnaz GRU.³⁷

Conclusions

A terrorist attack is a real threat in Russia and even if the possibility of becoming a victim is relatively small, it should be taken into consideration. The fight against terrorism – domestic and international – has become an important factor in the Russian politics since 9/11, although every researcher on the subject must be aware that the Russians had begun fighting violent extremism a decade before the Western world's Global War on Terrorism even started.

An analysis of Russia's involvement in the fight against terrorism leads to several conclusions:

1. The threat of a terrorist attack, even if acts of terrorism do not occur very often, is real in the Russian Federation.
2. The Russian Federation has forces capable of dealing with terrorism at home and abroad, even if the Russian approach to fighting terrorists can be considered strange or unusual in the West.
3. Vladimir Putin's administration has learned to manage the Russians' fear of terrorism in order to control the population and achieve their national and international goals.
4. Over the past three decades, the Russian Federation has used actual or alleged support for organizations it considers violent extremists as a pretext for starting open conflicts with opponents. This has to be taken into consideration by countries which have a history of supporting organizations or communities considered terrorist by the Russians.

³⁴ 'Crimean Tatars Face Unfounded Terrorism Charges Raids, Arbitrary Arrests, Torture of Activists', *Human Rights Watch*, 12 July 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/12/crimean-tatars-face-unfounded-terrorism-charges> [accessed: 3.04.2021].

³⁵ J. Daher, 'Three years later: the evolution of Russia's military intervention in Syria', *Atlantic Council*, 27 September 2018, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/three-years-later-the-evolution-of-russia-s-military-intervention-in-syria/> [accessed: 3.04.2021].

³⁶ N. Hauer, 'Chechen and north Caucasian militants in Syria Terrorists', *Atlantic Council*, 18 January 2018, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/chechen-and-north-caucasian-militants-in-syria/> [accessed: 3.04.2021].

³⁷ M. Strzelecki, "Uprzejmi Ludzie" czy "Zielone Ludziki"? Siły operacji Specjalnych Ministerstwa Obrony Federacji Rosyjskiej, *Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka* 2017, no. 3, pp. 383–413, <https://btip.ka.edu.pl/pdf/bezpieczenstwo-teoria-i-praktyka-2017-nr3.pdf> [accessed: 3.04.2021].

5. During the recent international conflicts in which the Russian Federation has participated, the Putin administration has used the fight against international terrorism as a factor in gaining support and partnership with countries strongly involved in the GWOT. This should be taken into account by countries which base their security mainly on international treaties with states strongly engaged in the fight against international terrorism.
6. There are indicators suggesting that other Russian government agencies can control violent extremist organizations to provoke them to commit acts which can be used in the Russian Federation foreign policy. This should be considered by states at risk of conflict with the Russian Federation.
7. Other Russian government agencies have proven capable of emulating *modus operandi* of terrorists group to achieve goals of Russia's national interest. This should also be taken into consideration by states threatened by conflict with the Russian Federation.

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Terroryzm w Federacji Rosyjskiej: obawy i zagrożenie czy narzędzie i sposobność

Streszczenie

Federacja Rosyjska boryka się ze zjawiskiem terroryzmu od trzech dekad, tj. od chwili jej powstania jako samodzielnego państwa wyłonionego po rozpadzie Związku Radzieckiego. Spektakularne zamachy terrorystyczne, chociaż relatywnie rzadkie, wywarły głęboki wpływ na rosyjskie społeczeństwo, w którym obawa przed zamachem terrorystycznym oraz ograniczenia motywowane walką z terroryzmem stały się czynnikami wpływającymi na codzienne funkcjonowanie obywateli. Głównym źródłem ekstremistów dokonujących zamachów na terenie Rosji są przede wszystkim mieszkańcy wchodzących w jej skład autonomicznych republik położonych na Północnym Kaukazie. Czynniki, które motywują północnokaukaskich terrorystów, są: dążenie do pełnej niepodległości, postrzegane przez stronę rosyjską jako separatystyczne, oraz sunnicki islam. Według niektórych źródeł niebagatelny wpływ na działalność terrorystów w Rosji mają również jej służby specjalne, przede wszystkim FSB. Przez lata wojny z terroryzmem administracja Władimira Putina wypracowała metody wykorzystania terroryzmu oraz walki z nim jako narzędzie wykorzystywane w polityce zagranicznej, a także do wywierania wpływu na rosyjską opinię publiczną.

Słowa kluczowe: Rosja, terroryzm, Północny Kaukaz, FSB, Putin

Terrorism in the Russian Federation: Fear and Threat or Tool and Opportunity?

Abstract

The Russian Federation has been struggling with the phenomenon of terrorism for three decades, since its creation as an independent state emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Spectacular terrorist attacks, although relatively rare, had a profound impact on Russian society, where fear of a terrorist attack and combating-terrorism-driven constraints have become a factor influencing the daily functioning of citizens. The main source of extremists who carry out attacks in Russia are primarily the inhabitants of its autonomous republics in the North Caucasus. The factors that motivate North Caucasus terrorists are the aspiration for the full independence, regarded by the Russian side as separatism, and Sunni Islam. According to some sources, its other government agencies, primarily the FSB, also have a significant impact on the activities of terrorists in Russia. Over the years of the war on terrorism, the administration of Vladimir Putin has developed methods of using terrorism and combating it as a tool in foreign policy and to influence Russian public opinion.

Key words: Russia, terrorism, North Caucasus, FSB, Putin

Terrorismus in der Russischen Föderation: Angst und Gefahr oder Instrument und Chance?

Zusammenfassung

Die Russische Föderation kämpft seit drei Jahrzehnten mit dem Terrorismusphänomen, seit das Land nach dem Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion als unabhängiger Staat gegründet wurde. Spektakuläre Terroranschläge waren bisher zwar relativ selten, haben die russische Gesellschaft aber stark erschüttert. Die Angst vor Terroranschlägen und durch die Terrorismusbekämpfung motivierten Auflagen hat den Alltag der Bürger

beeinflusst. Bei den Extremisten, die für die Anschläge in Russland verantwortlich sind, handelt es sich vornehmlich um Einwohner der autonomen Republiken im Nordkaukasus. Motiviert werden die nordkaukasischen Terroristen durch das Streben nach der vollen Unabhängigkeit, was von russischer Seite als Separatismus betrachtet wird, sowie durch den sunnitischen Islam. Einigen Quellen zufolge haben auch andere Regierungsbehörden (vorwiegend der FSB) wesentlichen Einfluss auf die Aktivitäten von Terroristen in Russland. Im Laufe des jahrelangen Kriegs gegen den Terrorismus hat die Regierung von Wladimir Putin eigene Methoden entwickelt, um den Terrorismus und dessen Bekämpfung als außenpolitisches Instrument zu nutzen und die öffentliche Meinung in Russland zu beeinflussen.

Schlüsselwörter: Russland, Terrorismus, Nordkaukasus, FSB, Putin

Терроризм в Российской Федерации: опасения и угрозы или инструмент и возможность

Резюме

Российская Федерация борется с явлением терроризма уже на протяжении трех десятилетий, то есть с момента становления России как независимого государства, возникшего после распада Советского Союза. Трагические теракты, хотя и относительно редкие, оказали глубокое влияние на российское общество, в котором страх перед терактами и ограничения, мотивированные борьбой с терроризмом, стали факторами, влияющими на повседневную жизнь граждан. Основным источником экстремистов, совершающих теракты на территории России, в первую очередь, являются жители автономных республик Северного Кавказа, входящих в состав Российской Федерации. Факторами, мотивирующими северокавказских террористов, являются: стремление к полной независимости (которую российские власти считают проявлением сепаратизма) и суннитский ислам. По некоторым данным, немалое влияние на деятельность террористов в России оказывают ее спецслужбы, в первую очередь ФСБ. За годы войны с терроризмом администрация Владимира Путина разработала методы использования терроризма и борьбы с ним как инструмента, применяемого во внешней политике, а также для воздействия на российское общественное мнение.

Ключевые слова: Россия, терроризм, Северный Кавказ, ФСБ, Путин



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China: Paving the Way to Carbon Neutrality

Introduction

The paper describes the current decarbonization process in accordance with the targets of the 14th Five-Year Plan regarding climate and energy. It also discusses how the measures of the 14th FYP are connected with China's ambition to become carbon-neutral by 2060. The research tests two main hypotheses. One is that China had set a decarbonization date far away enough not to lose its advantage in industrial production. At the same time, this is a less ambitious goal, compared to climate neutrality. The other hypothesis is that China's pledge to become carbon-neutral by 2060 is not limited by its borders and directly affects climate policies of countries that are engaged in the Belt and Road Initiative. The research methods adopted in the paper are quantitative and qualitative. Hypotheses were verified on the basis of official documents in Chinese and on China's energy data and statistics.

In September 2020, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that China would aim to hit CO₂ peak emissions before 2030 and attain carbon neutrality by 2060, addressing the United Nations General Assembly in New York through a video connection. On this occasion, he called for global efforts to launch a green revolution. He underlined the need for green recovery of the world economy in the post-Covid-19 era and for efforts to achieve sustainable development in all countries.¹ For the first time, China has set a concrete long-term target of carbon neutrality and it is seen

¹ *Xi Jinping zai di qishiwu jie lianheguo dahui yiban xing bianlun shang de jianghua* (习近平在第七十五届联合国大会一般性辩论上的讲话), Xinhua (新华), 22 September 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2020-09/22/c_1126527652.htm [accessed: 15.04.2020].

as a significant step towards combating climate change and its impacts. The announcement was widely welcomed as the most important commitment since the Paris Agreement that came out of the COP21, the 21st Conference of Parties of the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) and was adopted on 12 December 2015. With China accounting for almost one third of the global CO₂ emissions, its carbon neutrality pledge is crucial to achieving worldwide net-zero emissions. The CO₂ emission peak target and carbon neutrality have been incorporated into the overall layout of building an ecological civilization.²

It is worth mentioning that China has declared its target to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060, not climate neutrality which was adopted by the European Union by mid-century. Oliver Geden of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs argues that it takes between 10 to 20 years longer to reach climate neutrality than carbon neutrality. This is because some non-CO₂ emissions i.e., nitrous oxide or methane are hard to mitigate and need to be offset by removing CO₂ from the atmosphere.³ It seems that China's long-term plan does not take non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gases into consideration. There is no doubt that carbon dioxide is the most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas in the atmosphere. It alone accounts for approximately 66% of the radiative forcing by long-lived greenhouse gases (LLGHGs). However, methane, nitrous oxide, and fluorinated gases deserve more attention in the climate debate. After carbon dioxide, methane CH₄ is responsible for about 16% of climate change, followed by nitrous oxide N₂O (7%), dichlorodifluoromethane CFC-12 (5%), trichlorofluoromethane CFC-11 (2%), and others (4%).⁴

Actions and challenges for climate protection in China

Since the country initiated reform and opening-up policies in 1978, the economy has experienced tremendous growth. China's gross domestic product surged from 149.5 billion USD in 1978 to 14.3 trillion USD in 2019.⁵ Meanwhile, primary energy consumption in China increased rapidly from 16.6 exajoules in 1978 to 141.7 exajoules in 2019. China remains the world's largest energy consumer, currently accounting for 24.3% of world energy consumption, compared to 6% forty years ago.⁶

² On the concept of ecological civilization see: Ł. Gacek, *Cywilizacja ekologiczna i transformacja energetyczna w Chinach*, WN FNCE, Poznań 2020; J.W. Tkaczyński, Ł. Gacek, *China's Environmental Protection Policy in the Light of European Union Standards*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Verlage Unipress, Göttingen 2021; Pan Jiahua, *China's Environmental Governing and Ecological Civilization*, Springer, Heidelberg 2016; Hu Angang, *China: Innovative Green Development*, Springer, Singapore 2017.

³ O. Geden, Twitter, 23 September 2020, https://twitter.com/Oliver_Geden/status/1308703148723367936 [accessed: 15.04.2020].

⁴ World Meteorological Organization, 'The State of Greenhouse Gases in the Atmosphere Based on Global Observations through 2019', *WMO Greenhouse Gas Bulletin*, no. 16, 23 November 2021.

⁵ The World Bank, *GDP (current US\$) – China*, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=CN> [accessed: 15.04.2020].

⁶ *Statistical Review of World Energy – all data, 1965–2019*, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2020, <https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html> [accessed: 15.04.2020].

During the last four decades China has experienced rapid urbanization from 17.92% in 1978 to 60.60% in 2019.⁷ In 2019, more than 848 million people lived in urban regions, in comparison to 552 million in rural ones. That year, the population on the Chinese mainland reached 1.4 billion.⁸ The urbanisation rate is projected to reach 65% in the 2021–2025 period.⁹ This issue is particularly important due to the fact that cities contribute 85% of the total CO₂ emissions in China. They also account for 75% of the country's total GDP and 80% of its energy consumption. Therefore, cities are considered to be the key areas for implementing climate policies on greenhouse gas emissions and encouraging investment in low-carbon infrastructure.¹⁰ High levels of air pollution in urban areas are becoming a serious public health concern in China.

Currently, China is the largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world. Its annual CO₂ emissions in 2017 were estimated at 10.9 Gt, about 29% of the world's total, compared to 6.3 Gt in 2005 and 2.4 Gt in 1990.¹¹ At present, China is also becoming the highest sulphur dioxide (SO₂), nitrogen oxide (NO), and particulate matter (PM) emitter in the world. On the one hand, China is a major cause of global warming, but on the other, it has a unique chance to redirect the course of global emissions. The Climate Action Tracker estimates that if China meets the target of net-zero CO₂ emissions by 2060, it could reduce global warming by about 0.2 to 0.3 degrees by the end of the century.¹²

PM2.5 and PM10 concentrations in each of 31 province-level regions of China still exceed the WHO Air Quality Guideline.¹³ China faced about 1.24 million premature deaths in 2017 as a result of air pollution, including 851 thousand of ambient PM2.5 pollution, 271 thousand of household air pollution from solid fuels, and 178 thousand of ambient ozone pollution.¹⁴

⁷ *Population, China Statistical Yearbook 2020*, National Bureau of Statistics of China, <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2020/indexeh.htm> [accessed: 15.04.2020].

⁸ *Statistical Communiqué of the People's Republic of China on the 2019 National Economic and Social Development*, National Bureau of Statistics of China, 28 February 2020, http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/202002/t20200228_1728917.html [accessed: 15.04.2020].

⁹ Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shisi ge wu nian guihua he 2035 nian yuanjing mubiao gangyao (中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要), Xinhua (新华), 12th March 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2021-03/13/c_1127205564.htm [accessed: 15.04.2020].

¹⁰ Liu Zhu, Cai Bofeng, *High-resolution Carbon Emissions Data for Chinese Cities*, Environment and Natural Resources Program Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School, June 2018.

¹¹ M. Muntean et al., *Fossil CO₂ emissions of all world countries – 2018 Report*, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg 2018, p. 70.

¹² Climate Action Tracker, *China going carbon neutral before 2060 would lower warming projections by around 0.2 to 0.3 degrees C*, 22 September 2020, <https://climateactiontracker.org/press/china-carbon-neutral-before-2060-would-lower-warming-projections-by-around-2-to-3-tenths-of-a-degree> [accessed: 15.04.2020].

¹³ L. Myllyvirta, *Air pollution in China 2019*, Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, January 2020.

¹⁴ Peng Yin et al., 'The effect of air pollution on deaths, disease burden, and life expectancy across China and its provinces, 1990–2017: an analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2017', *Lancet Planet Health* 2020, vol. 4, pp. e386–e398.

China's air pollution still remains a serious problem, even though Beijing adopted more systematic and intensive national and regional control measures. On 10 September 2013, the State Council issued an action plan for preventing pollution and conducting air quality control in China for the 2013–2017 period. The plan envisaged reducing coal consumption and shutting down selected industrial plants. These measures were meant to contribute to significant improvements in urban air quality. The target for 2017 was to reduce PM_{2.5} emissions in Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei province by 25%, in the Yangtze River delta by 20%, and in the Pearl River delta by 15% from the 2012 levels. In the remaining areas, the concentration of PM₁₀ was to fall by about 10%.¹⁵ In December 2017, China presented a five-year plan to promote clean heating in the north of the country, which forecast an increase in such heating solutions from 34% in 2017 to 50% in 2019 and 70% from 2021 onwards. The target in the most polluted areas like Beijing, Tianjin, and the 26 cities in Hebei, Shanxi, Shandong, and Henan was set for 100% by 2021.¹⁶ In July 2018, the State Council introduced the 2018–2020 Three-year Action Plan for Winning the Blue Sky War (or Three-Year Action Plan). It mainly focused on the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei area, the Yangtze River delta, and the Fen-Wei Plain in Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Henan provinces, where air pollution was the highest.¹⁷

Over the last few years, China has enacted a law targeting not only air pollution (amendment to the Law on Prevention and Control of Air Pollution, 2015), but also water (amendment to the Law on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, 2017) and soil (Soil Pollution Prevention and Control Law, 2018). Decoupling economic growth and pollution has become the focus in developing the concept of ecological civilization. Since taking office in 2013, President Xi Jinping has been trying to link ecological civilization with realizing 'the dream of a great revival of the Chinese nation.' It emphasises the need to concentrate on protecting resources and the environment, as well as promoting green and low-carbon development.¹⁸ The concept of ecological civilization has been recognized in the Party's statute as part of the Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. Its significance is supported by the fact that it was also included in the content of the Basic Law of 4 December 1982, as amended in 2018. References to ecological

¹⁵ Guowuyuan guanyu yinfa daqi wuran fangzhi xingdong jihua de tongzhi (guofa [2013] 37 hao) (国务院关于印发大气污染防治行动计划的通知 (国发 [2013] 37号), Zhongyang zhengfu menhu wangzhan (中央政府门户网站), 10 September 2013, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-09/12/content_2486773.htm [accessed: 15.04.2020].

¹⁶ Beifang diqu dongji qingjie qunuan huihua (2017–2021) (北方地区冬季清洁取暖规划 (2017–2021), Guojia fazhan he gaige weiyuanhui (国家发展和改革委员会), December 2017, <http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-12/20/5248855/files/7ed7d7cda8984ae39a4e9620a4660c7f.pdf> [accessed: 15.04.2020].

¹⁷ Guowuyuan guanyu yinfa daying lantian baowei zhan san nian xingdong jihua de tongzhi (guofa [2018] 22 hao) (国务院关于印发打赢蓝天保卫战三年行动计划的通知 (国发 [2018] 22号)), Zhongyang zhengfu menhu wangzhan (中央政府门户网站), 3 July 2018, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2018-07/03/content_5303158.htm [accessed: 15.04.2020].

¹⁸ *Shengtai wenming guiyang guoji luntan 2013 nian nianhui kaimu. Xi Jinping zhi hexin* (生态文明贵阳国际论坛2013年年会开幕. 习近平致贺信), Xinhua (新华), 20 July 2013, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-07/20/c_116619686.htm [accessed: 15.04.2020].

civilization have also appeared in the amendment to the Environmental Protection Law of 26 December 1989 and the Law of 24 April 2014, which entered into force on 1 January 2015.

Another important change was the decision to reform the Ministry of Environment Protection. It was replaced by two new ministries which were set up in March 2018. The first, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment was entrusted with the task of enforcing environmental and climate change legislation. It took responsibility for managing greenhouse gas emissions and combating the negative effects of climate change. The second, the Ministry of Natural Resources is responsible for managing domestic natural resources, like water, soil, and minerals.

China's 14th Five-Year Plan on climate targets

On 11 March 2021, the National People's Congress at the Two Sessions in Beijing approved the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025) and long-term targets for 2035. The document outlines the direction of the country's economic and social development. It also provides several important climate and energy targets for the next five years. This is the first Five-Year Plan published since China's pledge to be carbon-neutral by 2060. In September 2020, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that China would aim to peak carbon emissions by 2030 and reach carbon neutrality by 2060. Unlike in the previous two FYPs, this time China did not meet a five-year GDP target. The 14th FYP only included a GDP target for 2021 at the level of 6%.¹⁹ The decision to eschew a five-year GDP growth target will most likely positively impact the future climate policy, as it should reduce the pressure from local governments which until now have emphasized the importance of achieving growth targets at all costs.

The current plan is based on the approaches of previous FYPs to setting energy intensity and carbon intensity targets (Table 1). For the 2021–2025 period, China has set a goal of reducing energy intensity per unit of GDP by 13.5% and carbon emissions by 18% from the 2020 levels.²⁰ The new target of reducing energy use is slightly lower than the 15% goal the country aimed for in its previous FYP.

China also intends to increase the share of non-fossil fuel in primary energy to 'around 20%'. This is important for at least two reasons. Firstly, it clearly indicates that the increase remains at a similar level to the two previous FYPs. Secondly, the energy mix was not included in the section of the 'binding targets' in the current FYP.

¹⁹ Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shisi ge wu nian guihua he 2035 nian yuanjing mubiao gangyao, *op. cit.*

²⁰ *Ibidem.*

Table 1. China's Five-Year Plans climate related targets

| Target | 13 th FYP Target (2016–2020) | 14 th FYP Target (2021–2025) |
|---------------------------|--|--|
| Energy intensity | -15% | -13.5% |
| Carbon intensity | -18% | -18% |
| Share of non-fossil fuels | 15% in 2020 | around 20% in 2025 |
| Forest coverage | 23.04% in 2020 | 24.1% in 2025 |
| GDP growth | on average 6.5% annually from 2016–2020 | annual target only 2021 at least 6% |

Source: own work based on: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shisi ge wu nian guihua he 2035 nian yuanjing mubiao gangyao (中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要), Xinhua (新华), 12 March 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2021-03/13/c_1127205564.htm [accessed: 15.04.2020]; Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shisan ge wu nian guihua gangyao (中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要), Xinhua (新华), 17 March 2016, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-03/17/content_5054992.htm [accessed: 15.04.2020].

The transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources should be seen in a long-term perspective. During the 13th Five-Year-Plan period, China appeared to be making some progress towards reducing its dependence on fossil fuels, mainly coal. On the consumption side, coal use declined by 8% in the past five years to 56.8% in 2020. According to the data released by China's National Bureau of Statistics, the share of clean energy consumption in China rose from 19.1% in 2016 to 24.3% in 2020.²¹ On 12 December 2020, at the UN Climate Ambition Summit, Xi Jinping announced that China would achieve over 1,200 GW solar and wind power installed capacity by 2030 and increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 25% by 2030.²² By the end of 2020, China had more than 281 GW of wind generation capacity and more than 253 GW of solar generation capacity. It amounts to about 24% of its total power generation capacity of 2,200 GW (Table 2). In 2020, only China added 71 GW of new wind power capacity and 48 GW of new solar power capacity.²³

²¹ Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 2020 nian guomin jingji he shehui fazhan tongji gongbao (中华人民共和国2020年国民经济和社会发展统计公报), Guojia tongji ju (国家统计局), 28 February 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2021-03/01/c_1127152023.htm?utm_source=CD+bilingual+newsletter_Outside+China&utm_campaign=c831726f9f-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_05_23_03_03_COPY_02&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_fea4a231d4-c831726f9f-46922770&mc_cid=c831726f9f&mc_eid=bd1786cd4f [accessed: 15.04.2020].

²² Xi Jinping zai qihou xiongxin fenghui shang de jianghua. Jiawang-kailai, kaiqi quanqiu yingdui qihou bianhua xin zhengcheng (习近平在气候雄心峰会上的讲话. 继往开来, 开启全球应对气候变化新征程), Xinhua (新华), 12 December 2020, https://www.ccps.gov.cn/xxsxk/zyjs/202012/t20201213_145612.shtml [accessed: 15.04.2020].

²³ Guojia nengyuan ju fabu 2020 nian quanguo dianli gongye tongji shuju (国家能源局发布2020年全国电力工业统计数据), Guojia nengyuan ju (国家能源局), 20 January 2021, http://www.nea.gov.cn/2021-01/20/c_139683739.htm [accessed: 15.04.2020]; 2020 nian quan shehui yong dian liang tongbi zengzhang 3.1% (2020年全社会用电量同比增长3.1%), Guojia nengyuan ju (国家能源局), 20 January 2021, http://www.nea.gov.cn/2021-01/20/c_139682386.htm [accessed: 15.04.2020].

Table 2. Installed power generation capacity in China


| | Gigawatts (GW) | Percent (%) |
|---------------------------------|----------------|-------------|
| Total power generation capacity | 2,200.58 | +9.5 |
| Hydro | 370.16 | +3.4 |
| Thermal | 1,245.17 | +4.7 |
| Nuclear | 49.89 | +2.4 |
| Wind | 281.53 | +34.6 |
| Solar | 253.43 | +24.1 |

Source: own work based on: Guojia nengyuan ju fabu 2020 nian quanguo dianli gongye tongji shuju (国家能源局发布2020年全国电力工业统计数据), Guojia nengyuan ju (国家能源局), 20 January 2021, http://www.nea.gov.cn/2021-01/20/c_139683739.htm [accessed: 15.04.2020].

Despite these promising results, China approved a number of new coal power plants last year, raising questions about its commitment to the limitation of its greenhouse gas emissions in order to reach the goals of the Paris Agreement.

Is China returning to coal-fired power?

There is no doubt that coal is the driving force of the Chinese economy. The country's energy system is still reliant on coal in more than half (Graph 1). Currently, China has more total installed capacity of coal power than the rest of the world combined.



Source: own work based on: *Energy, China Statistical Yearbook 2020*, National Bureau of Statistics of China, <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2020/indexeh.htm> [accessed: 15.04.2020].

It is a promising sign that in its coal industry development strategy, the China National Coal Association proposes to limit China's coal output up to 4.1 billion

tonnes and consumption to 4.2 billion tonnes by 2025. In comparison to the 13th FYP released by the China Energy Administration, the targets were to cap the annual coal consumption to around 4.1 billion tonnes and coal output to 3.9 billion tonnes by 2020. Coal will still play a crucial role in balancing the domestic energy supply. Therefore, its consumption will continue to grow. CNCA also suggested reducing the number of domestic coal mines to 4,000 by the end of 2025 through closures, mergers and acquisitions, from about 4,700 at the end of 2020 and 5,300 in 2019. More than 1000 coal mines will be equipped with smart mining technology.²⁴ This target should be included in the energy sector plan for the second half of 2021. It also indicates that the government could target peaking coal consumption before 2025. However, peaking and declining CO₂ emissions requires stopping the growth of coal consumption in absolute terms. China is facing great challenges to accomplish coal phaseout in the next three decades.

The *China Low-Carbon Development Strategy and Transformation Pathways* report, released on 12 October 2020 by the Institute for Climate Change and Sustainable Development at the Tsinghua University (ICCSU) and 18 other major Chinese research organizations, indicated that immediate cuts to total energy consumption were required to achieve carbon neutrality. In the low-carbon development pathway, coal would provide less than 5% of the country's energy and less than 10% in the power sector. This would mean closing down most of the existing coal-fired power units and coal mines operating in China.²⁵ According to a report published by Global Energy Monitor, in order to meet the goal of net-zero carbon emissions by 2060 goal, China should significantly reduce the number of its existing coal plants. However, this number is likely to increase during the 14th FYP period, as a total of 247 GW of coal power is now being planned or developed. In 2020, China commissioned 38.4 GW of new coal-power plants.²⁶ Unsurprisingly, Zhejiang, Anhui, and Shandong provinces, as well as province prefectures located within Shanxi, including Jinzhong, Yuncheng and Luliang, failed to meet coal consumption reduction targets set in the 13th FYP.²⁷ Overall coal consumption targets were not set under the 14th Five-Year Plan. Without setting very ambitious decarbonization goals China could try to extract concessions on the international stage, which was increasingly mentioned as existential threats to its power, including its core

²⁴ 2020 meitian hangye fazhan niandu baogao (2020煤炭行业发展年度报告), Zhongguo meitan gongye xiehui (中国煤炭工业协会), March 2021, <https://www.cctd.com.cn/uploadfile/2021/0304/20210304104603452.pdf> [accessed: 15.04.2020].

²⁵ L. Myllyvirta, *Influential academics reveal how China can achieve its 'carbon neutrality' goal*, Carbon Brief, 14 October 2020, <https://www.carbonbrief.org/influential-academics-reveal-how-china-can-achieve-its-carbon-neutrality-goal> [accessed: 15.04.2020].

²⁶ *China Dominates 2020 Coal Plant Development*, Global Energy Monitor, Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air, February 2021, <https://globalenergymonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/China-Dominates-2020-Coal-Development.pdf> [accessed: 15.04.2020].

²⁷ *Guojia fagaiwei: Zhe Wan Lu deng di "shisanwu" meitan xiaofei jian liang mubiao wei dacheng* (国家发改委: 浙皖鲁等地“十三五”煤炭消费减量目标未达成), Pengpai xinwen (澎湃新闻), 10 February 2021, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_11306259 [accessed: 15.04.2020].

interests related to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, Xinjiang, and its claims in the South China Sea, as well as trade and technology negotiations with the United States.²⁸

The Covid-19 downturn might prompt Chinese provinces to encourage investment in traditional infrastructure such as coal power plants. It still seems to be the easiest way to stimulate local economies in the wake of a deep economic recession triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic. Currently, China is concentrating its post-pandemic recovery on high carbon energy investments. This scenario would likely duplicate the well-known solutions from the past. As a response to the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, China introduced the largest stimulus package worth 4 trillion RMB (586 billion USD) by the end of 2008.²⁹ The crisis was the worst economic disaster since the Great Depression of 1929. Over the next two years, the money was spent on upgrading infrastructure, particularly on building new roads, railways, subways, airports, and power grids; and on rebuilding the central mountainous regions of Sichuan province in southwestern China, devastated by the so-called Great Wenchuan Earthquake on 12 May 2008. However, it seems that repeating the record growth in CO₂ emissions after the 2008–2009 crisis is unlikely. The current scale of China's Covid-19 stimulus package is far smaller than the previous one. On 22 May 2020, the central government launched a 3.6 trillion RMB (506 billion USD) fiscal stimulus package. It differs from the 2008 package in both size and target. The current package includes local government bonds for Covid-19 control and business tax cuts. The government emphasized the priority of new infrastructure including the development of next-generation information networks and new energy vehicles battery charging stations. The plan might stimulate new consumer demand and industrial upgrading. It also promotes building a new type of urbanization through improving public facilities and services in county seats, renovating old urban residential communities, supporting the upgrade of plumbing and wiring and installation of elevators in old residential buildings, and encouraging the development of community services. Additionally, the recovery plan stresses the need to develop major transportation and water conservation projects.³⁰ A key question in the Chinese climate policy is how provinces, especially those heavily reliant on fossil fuels, can get ready for the transition of their economies and the growth of investments in renewable energy and advanced energy storage technologies.

The future colour of BRI: green or black?

The debate on China's impact on climate change should include its investments in various energy projects in other countries in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

²⁸ M. Standaert, *Despite Pledges to Cut Emissions, China Goes on a Coal Spree*, Yale Environment 360, 24 March 2021, <https://e360.yale.edu/features/despite-pledges-to-cut-emissions-china-goes-on-a-coal-spree> [accessed: 15.04.2020].

²⁹ Woguo caizheng he huobi zhengce tongshi tiaozheng 4 wan yi zijin li qiao neixu (我国财政和货币政策同时调整 4 万亿资金力撬内需), Zhongyang zhengfu menhu wangzhan (中央政府门户网站), 10 November 2008, http://www.gov.cn/jrzq/2008-11/10/content_1143810.htm [accessed: 15.04.2020].

³⁰ Zhengfu gongzuo baogao (政府工作报告), 22 May 2020, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2020/content_5517495.htm [accessed: 15.04.2020].

Chinese investment in energy, transport, and other sustainable infrastructure may hold back the development of new technologies for decades to come and is affecting the development paths of many countries that are part of the BRI, particularly China's neighbouring countries.³¹ The Belt and Road Initiative, first proposed by China in 2013, has opened the door to expansion abroad for domestic companies in the clean and renewable energy sector. China has begun to emphasize the importance of building high-quality, sustainable, resilient, environment-friendly, and inclusive infrastructure. This approach was signalled at the 1st Belt and Road Forum in 2017, when the idea of creating an international coalition for green development within the BRI was launched.³² During the 2nd Forum in 2019, China committed to launching green infrastructure projects in the countries participating in the initiative. However, the proposals put forward by China did not identify concrete pathways to gradually reducing funding for high-pollution projects.³³ Since its announcement in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative has prioritized energy projects. Today, many of the participant countries are facing serious energy shortages and they require significant investment in the sector in the coming years. Chinese developers have so far given primacy to 'dirty energy' investments, making considerable use of the state support.

According to the Global Coal Plant Tracker data, in 2018, China was engaged in financing a quarter of coal plants under development overseas, with a total capacity of 102 GW. The parties involved in carrying out the projects are state-owned banks, i.e., the China Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank of China, the Bank of China, and Industrial Bank of China, as well as mostly large state-owned enterprises, including the State Grid Corporation of China, China Energy Engineering Corporation, State Power Investment Corporation, and China Huadian Corporation.³⁴ Moreover, China has emerged as the largest provider of official development finance (ODF) for projects in the energy sector. Most of the projects were funded by the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China and built by Chinese enterprises. Bo Kong and Kevin Gallagher pointed out that the Chinese ODF for the power sector has mainly been poured into coal-fired power (45.3%) and hydropower (33.8%) overseas. In contrast, it was only 2.6% for realisation of wind and solar projects. In the years 2000–2017, China's two policy banks loaned over 251.3 billion USD to overseas energy sector projects. At the time, they financed a total of 11 wind and solar projects in seven different countries, worth over 2 billion USD.

³¹ R. Kwieciński, 'Zmiana w polityce zagranicznej Chin w erze Xi Jinpinga', *Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe* 2020, no. 1, pp. 95–98.

³² Xi Jinping zai 'yadai yilu' guoji hezuo gaofeng luntan kaimu shi shang de yanjiang (习近平在“一带一路”国际合作高峰论坛开幕式上的演讲), Xinhua (新华), 14 May 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2017-05/14/c_1120969677.htm [accessed: 15.04.2020].

³³ Xi Jinping zai di er jie "yadai yilu" guoji hezuo gaofeng luntan kaimu shi shang de zhuzhi yanjiang (习近平在第二届“一带一路”国际合作高峰论坛开幕式上的主旨演讲), Xinhua (新华), 26 April 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/silkroad/2019-04/26/c_1124420187.htm [accessed: 15.04.2020].

³⁴ Ch. Shearer, M. Brown and T. Buckley, *China at a Crossroads: Continued Support for Coal Power Erodes Country's Clean Energy Leadership*, Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, January 2019.

On the one hand, the loan applications are evaluated on the basis of their profitability, risk assessment, and compatibility with the local development strategies. On the other, requests for loans for clean energy development projects, set by other governments, have a very low priority.³⁵ According to Bo Kong and Kevin Gallagher, overseas clean energy projects financed through Chinese ODF 'are the result not just of a "push" from China but also a "pull" from host countries.' However, the 'pull' is too weak to incentivize more Chinese ODF in the field of renewable power abroad.³⁶

Conclusions

The transition from fossil fuels to electricity and renewable energy sources is essential for both the climate and the environment. Since China announced the ratification of the Paris Agreement, it has made progress in its fight against climate change and also taken on a larger climate role on the global stage. The new targets in the 14th FYP signal further transition towards a more sustainable growth model. In recent years, China has continued a structural transformation based on shifting the mix of its fuel consumption. Even though coal is still the principal domestic energy source, and it plays a crucial role in the economic growth, Beijing prioritizes investing in renewable energy. China reduces coal output as a result of the government's simultaneous initiatives to curb carbon emissions. Currently, China has the world's largest installed capacity of hydro, wind and solar power. It now produces more solar, wind and hydro power than the United States and the European Union combined, and it has also become a major source of investment for the clean energy sector globally.

Other fuels, such as renewables, natural gas, and nuclear power, are expected to become more important in China's electricity generation. China needs to increase that share in its electricity generation, as well as to reduce burning fossil fuels which release large amounts of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere.

One of the challenges to energy reform is visible in northern China's strong reliance on fossil fuels and heavy industry. Therefore, the reform should concentrate on limiting the growth potential of conventional energy sources. Renewables will be far from replacing fossil fuel sources as long as the energy storage problem is not solved. However, the main barrier for the implementation of energy policies is the centralized mode of governing which requires the compliance of local governments. This explains why local governments have introduced more preferential policies for the coal sector and have provided subsidies for fossil fuels extraction operations so far. It is alarming that China is still building new coal-fired power plants. Although China's economic blueprint signals more investment in the coal power sector in the nearest

³⁵ Bo Kong, K. Gallagher, 'Chinese development finance for solar and wind power abroad', *GCI Working Paper 009*, Global Development Policy Center, Boston University, January 2020.

³⁶ *Idem*, 'Inadequate demand and reluctant supply: The limits of Chinese official development finance for foreign renewable power', *Energy Research & Social Science* 2021, vol. 71, pp. 101838.

future, it should be treated as a response to the recession triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic. In the past, local governments placed priority on investing in traditional infrastructure required to stimulate economic growth. Nevertheless, there are many indications that this can only be a temporary solution. China's leaders have already recognized renewable energy industries as one of the most important driving forces of economic growth. China's carbon neutrality pledge is crucial for international efforts to limit global warming and its related effects. To meet this goal China must continue further expansion of non-fossil fuel (renewables and nuclear energy), take action to improve energy efficiency, develop hydrogen industry, and accelerate the removal of CO₂ emissions from the atmosphere using carbon capture and storage technology. China also needs to address the issue of non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gases, even though long-term targets did not include it.

Moreover, the declared target must be considered in the context of the Chinese overseas investments in the Belt and Road Initiative countries. After all, China's commitment to become carbon-neutral by 2060 may negatively affect environmental conditions in these countries, as Chinese companies can export their emissions abroad. Chinese investment in energy, transport, and other sustainable infrastructure may potentially hamper the development of new technologies for decades to come and is already affecting the development paths of many countries that are part of the BRI, particularly China's neighbouring countries in Central and Southeast Asia. In response to global climate changes, these countries are currently drawing up independent strategies for the development of the energy sector. As part of the Paris Agreement, Chinese partners define their own programmes to reduce national emissions and combat climate change, with consideration given to the Agreement's targets and priority sectors. Therefore, choosing the right type of infrastructure to invest in is crucial if the BRI countries aim to eradicate poverty and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals set by the United Nations for 2030. Yet, the question remains: how does China's ambition to become a global climate leader correlate with the investment policy in the BRI?

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Chiny: w drodze do neutralności węglowej

Streszczenie

Zmiany klimatu to jedno z największych wyzwań, przed jakim stanęła ludzkość w XXI w., wpływają bowiem na różnorodność biologiczną, oddziałują na wiele sektorów gospodarki i społeczeństwo. Te zagrożenia wymagają w długiej perspektywie czasowej podjęcia międzynarodowej współpracy w walce z globalnym ociepleniem, przy jednoczesnym dążeniu państw do zapewnienia zrównoważonego rozwoju. Zmieniająca się rola Chin w globalnych mechanizmach zarządzania klimatem w coraz większym stopniu przykuwa uwagę społeczności międzynarodowej. W marcu 2021 r. Chiny przedstawiły 14. Plan Pięcioletni na lata 2021–2025, który określił, w jaki sposób ta największa światowa gospodarka i jednocześnie największy światowy emitent gazów cieplarnianych zamierza zrealizować cel osiągnięcia zerowej emisji netto do 2060 r. W artykule skonfrontowano obecny proces dekarbonizacji z celami energetyczno-klimatycznymi uwzględnionymi w 14. Planie Pięcioletnim. Analizie poddano środki działania, jakie Chiny zamierzają podjąć w związku z realizacją celu neutralności węglowej do 2060 r.

Słowa kluczowe: Chiny, neutralność węglowa, zmiany klimatyczne, energetyka węglowa, energia odnawialna, Inicjatywa Pasa i Drogi, urbanizacja, zanieczyszczenie powietrza

China: Paving the Way to Carbon Neutrality

Abstract

Climate change is one of the biggest challenges facing our planet in the 21st century, having a significant impact on ecosystems, economies, and communities. It poses a significant long-term threat which demands international cooperation to combat global warming, while achieving sustainability. In this regard, the changing role of China in the

global climate governance mechanisms has increasingly become a focus of international attention. In March 2021, China released its 14th Five-Year Plan for 2021–2025, which presented few details on how this global economic superpower and the largest global greenhouse gases emitter would meet its target of reaching net-zero emissions by 2060. The paper describes the current decarbonization process in accordance with the targets of the 14th FYP regarding climate and energy. It also discusses how the measures of the 14th FYP are connected with China's ambition to become carbon-neutral by 2060.

Key words: China, carbon neutrality, climate change, coal-fired power, renewable energy, Belt and Road Initiative, urbanization, air pollution

China: Weichenstellung für die Klimaneutralität *Zusammenfassung*

Der Klimawandel ist eine der größten Herausforderungen unseres Planeten im 21. Jahrhundert und hat signifikante Auswirkungen auf Ökosysteme, Wirtschaftssysteme und Gesellschaften. Er stellt eine beträchtliche langfristige Gefahr dar, die die internationale Zusammenarbeit erfordert, um die globale Erwärmung zu bekämpfen und Nachhaltigkeit zu erreichen. Diesbezüglich ist die im Wandel begriffene Rolle Chinas im Zusammenhang mit den globalen Klima-Steuerungsmechanismen immer stärker in den Fokus der Öffentlichkeit gerückt. Im März 2021 hat China den 14. Fünfjahresplan für 2021–2025 veröffentlicht, in dem nur wenige Details bekannt gegeben wurden, wie diese globale wirtschaftliche Supermacht und gleichzeitig der weltweit größte Treibhausgasemittent das selbst gesetzte Netto-Nullemissionsziel bis 2060 erreichen will. Der Text beschreibt den laufenden Dekarbonisierungsprozess nach Maßgabe der Klima- und Energieziele des 14. Fünfjahresplans. Außerdem wird erörtert, wie die Maßnahmen des 14. Fünfjahresplans mit Chinas Ambitionen einhergehen, bis 2060 klimaneutral zu werden.

Schlüsselwörter: China, Klimaneutralität, Klimawandel, Kohlestrom, erneuerbare Energien, Neue Seidenstraße, Verstädterung, Luftverschmutzung

Китай: на пути к углеродной нейтральности *Резюме*

Изменение климата является одной из самых серьезных проблем, с которой столкнулось человечество в XXI веке, поскольку это влияет на биоразнообразие и затрагивает многие секторы экономики и общества. В долгосрочной перспективе существующие угрозы требуют развития международного сотрудничества в борьбе с глобальным потеплением, а также должны учитывать стремление государств обеспечить устойчивое развитие. Меняющаяся роль Китая в глобальных механизмах управления климатом все больше привлекает внимание международного сообщества. В марте 2021 г. Китай представил 14-й пятилетний план на 2021–2025 гг., в котором излагается, как эта крупнейшая мировая экономика и в то же время крупнейший мировой производитель парниковых газов, намерен добиться чистых, нулевых выбросов к 2060 г. В статье процесс декарбонизации сопоставляется с возможностями достижения целей в области энергетики и климата, включенными в 14-й пятилетний план. Анализируются меры, которые Китай намерен предпринять в связи с достижением цели углеродной нейтральности к 2060 г.

Ключевые слова: Китай, углеродная нейтральность, изменение климата, угольная энергетика, возобновляемые источники энергии, инициатива «Пояс и дорога», урбанизация, загрязнение воздуха



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The Regional Security Environment of Japan

Introduction

Since the end of World War II to the present day, East Asia has proven to be a region of enormous political and economic changes of a global nature. Until the 1990s, these were marked primarily by the dynamic economic growth of Japan, a country which, after losing the war, became the third economic superpower in the world (after the US and the USSR). Since the turn of the 21st century, the position of the regional leader with great political and economic ambitions has been taken by the People's Republic of China (China). Since 2010, unprecedented economic development, which has made this country the second economic superpower in the world, and the accompanying open rivalry with the US, which, by the end of the mid-21st century will lead to China assuming the position of the world economic leader, have accelerated the process of political expansion on a global scale. The consistently implemented strategy aims to make the Middle Kingdom a global superpower with modern armed forces, whose military potential is second only to that of the US. The above circumstances determine a permanent weakening of Japan's position in the region and a fundamental disturbance of the current *status quo* in the regional security environment, which is particularly distressing from the Japanese interests' point of view.

This paper analyses the actual situation of Japan's regional security environment with a special focus on the rapid rise of China's military power in the Asia Pacific Region, a potential conflict over the disputed territories (Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands), and the development of nuclear and modern ballistic missile programmes by North Korea. Additionally, some general remarks will be made about relations with Russia

in the light of the development of military facilities in the Japanese Northern Territories. All in all, the paper aims to identify and answer the question of what have been the main driving forces for changing Japan's security policy.

The redefinition of Japan's security policy in the third decade of the 21st century is the main objective of the article. Since the second decade of the 21st century, Japan has taken extensive measures to redefine its national security policy. These actions have both organisational and institutional character, as well as consist in strengthening the country's defence capabilities and increasing its involvement in political and territorial problems of the countries in the region. This was reflected in the formulation of a new doctrine by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe; this policy is known as 'active measures for peace' (or 'active pacifism')¹ and includes extensive plans for rebuilding, modernization and technological leap in modernization of the Japan Self-Defence Forces (Japanese: *Jieitai*). An institutional expression of Japan's new approach to international policy and national security issues was the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) on 4 December 2013. The NSC, with its secretariat, constitutes the central organizational structure for the country's foreign policy activities. It approved Japan's first post-war National Security Strategy (NSS)² as early as 14 December 2013. It provided the basis for defining the latest threats, challenges and directions for the country's defence activities. These were included in two documents accepted by the NSS and the Japanese government on 18 December 2018, namely: *National Defence Programme Guidelines for FY 2019 and beyond* and *Medium-Term Defence Programme (2019–2023)*.³

This analysis is based on qualitative research. The desk research of academic sources developed by academic organisations, think tanks and available online sources is supported by an analysis of official documents, including national defence policies, strategies and reports.

Military rise of China and a potential conflict for disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

Above all, this is evidenced by the 11-fold increase in China's defence expenditure over the 2000–2019 period, from \$22.9 billion to \$261.1 billion. China was second only to the US defence spending (\$731.8 billion) in 2019, outpacing Russia's spending 4 times (\$65.1 billion) and Japan's defence budget more than 5 times (\$47.6 billion).⁴

¹ Prime Minister of Japan, *National Security Strategy*, 17 December 2013, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/documents/2013/_icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/17/NSS.pdf [accessed: 15.01.2021].

² *Ibidem*.

³ Ministry of Defence of Japan, *National Defence Programme Guidelines for FY 2019 and beyond*, 18 December 2018, https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2019/pdf/20181218_e.pdf [accessed: 16.01.2021]; Ministry of Defence of Japan, *Medium Term Defence Programme (FY 2019–FY 2023)*, 18 December 2018, https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2019/pdf/chuki_seibi31-35_e.pdf [accessed: 16.01.2021].

⁴ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Trends in world military expenditure 2019*, April 2020, <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex> [accessed: 12.01.2021].

The unprecedented rate of growth in China's military spending, aimed at creating a world-class military force, is causing Japan a growing concern about its security. According to Japanese politicians, the rise of China's military power is systematically upsetting the *status quo* in the East Asian region, fundamentally changing the regional security environment, including notably Japan.⁵ Its most glaring manifestation is the rise of tension over the disputed Senkaku (Chinese: *Diaoyu*) Islands located in the southern part of the East China Sea. It is manifested, among other things, by the growing activity of the Chinese air and naval forces in the region, increasingly violating airspace and territorial waters. The rising number of provocative incidents in the disputed area of the so-called 'grey zone' is regarded as the most serious threat to Japanese sovereignty. The second, no less serious, threat to Japan's security is North Korea's implementation of its nuclear programme and the development of modern missile technologies, which North Korea in its military doctrine directs against South Korea, the US and Japan.

China's taking over and strengthening its position as an economic leader in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as an exceptionally high level of political activity, combined with integration initiatives, including the so-called 'Belt and Road Initiative'⁶ implemented since 2015, is accompanied by a dynamic increase in military expenditure, aimed at making the Middle Kingdom one of the world's leading military powers by the mid-21st century. An explicit testimony to the enormous pace of building modern, world-class armed forces in China, treated as one of the priorities of the government, is the fact that in the 2010–2019 period, the expenditures for this purpose increased by as much as 1128% (from 22.9 billion to 261.1 billion dollars). It should be noted that in the same period, Japan's defence spending oscillated around 46.0 billion annually. In its superpower strategy, China places particular emphasis on the development of its air and naval forces, as evidenced by, among other things, an increase in the number of modern fighters from 90 to 1080, and destroyers and frigates from 15 to 67 over the 2001–2020 period. A symbolic

⁵ Conf.: A. Whyte, *Interpreting the Rise of China*, February 2013, <https://www.e-ir.info/2013/02/13/interpreting-the-rise-of-china> [accessed: 13.05.2020].

⁶ The Belt and Road Initiative is a Chinese concept, implemented since 2015, of long-term international infrastructural, economic, political, scientific, research, and socio-cultural development and international cooperation of countries located within the so-called development corridors (land routes: China-Asian countries and sea routes: countries in the region of the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea). China is the crucial logistics and business centre from which development corridors run. This multifaceted integration project is supported by numerous government agencies and a group of Chinese and Asian banks. It places great emphasis on such areas as joint implementation of large-scale projects and extensive economic, scientific, and research cooperation. A notable example of the Belt and Road Initiative success is the fact that in 2020, 140 countries signed a memorandum of understanding with China on research and development cooperation. In practice, the Belt and Road Initiative is a testament to China's global expansion, which will make the country a new type of global power. Mainly based on: OECD, *China's Belt and Road Initiative in the Global Trade. Investment and Financial Landscape*, 3 September 2018, OECD Business and Financial Outlook 2018, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/oecd-business-and-finance-outlook-2018/the-belt-and-road-initiative-in-the-global-trade-investment-and-finance-landscape_bus_fin_out-2018-6-en [accessed: 4.01.2021].

and, at the same time, significant manifestation of China's military ambitions is the fact that since the second decade of the 21st century, the country has been building a fleet of aircraft carriers. They are represented by the *Liaoning* aircraft carrier – in service since 2012, and *Shandong* – a domestically built aircraft carrier, put into service in 2019. It should be stressed that two other aircraft carriers, including the first nuclear-powered one, are under construction at the Shanghai shipyard.⁷

Taking advantage of the latest technological achievements, China is making efforts to get the upper hand in such areas as cyberspace defence and operational activities in space. The above examples, coupled with the opinions of international experts that by 2030 China's military expenditure might surpass that of the US⁸, prove that the Chinese government's determination to build a modern global military force seems to be fully realistic. China's increasingly strong military position in the East Asian region raises concerns about the prospects of maintaining the current relative *status quo* not only in Japan, but also in a number of Asian-Pacific states and the US. Most notable in this regard is the increased activity of the Chinese navy and air force in the waters and airspace of the East China Sea, the South China Sea, the Sea of Japan, and even the Western Pacific.

This is particularly visible in China's demonstrative military presence in the southern part of the East China Sea, including the eight uninhabited and disputed Senkaku (Chinese: *Diaoyu*) Islands, which have been an integral part of Japan since 1895.⁹ The islands remain the main object of territorial dispute between China and Japan, which has taken the form of a sharp conflict since 1971. In recent years, this has become clear with the escalation of provocative and destabilizing actions of various kinds on the part of China. These include, for instance, China's designation of new boundaries of the so-called East China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ: Air Defence Identification Zone) on 23 November 2013. It covered, in the context of Japanese interests, the areas of the Senkaku Islands and their vicinity, overlapping in a number of cases with parts of zones previously designated by Taiwan and South Korea.¹⁰

⁷ M. Szopa, *Drugi chiński lotniskowiec w służbie*, 19 December 2019, <https://www.defence24.pl/drugi-chinski-lotniskowiec-w-sluzbie> [accessed: 11.01.2021].

⁸ E. Ioanes, *China's military power may surpass the US's faster than you think, thanks to 6 shrewd strategies*, 26 August 2019, Insider, <https://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-military-power-surpass-the-us-faster-than-you-think-2019-8?IR=T> [accessed: 13.05.2021].

⁹ Senkaku Shoto (Chinese: *Diaoyu*) is a group of eight currently uninhabited islets with a total area of 5.53 km² (the largest: Uotsuri 3.81 km², Kuba 0.91 km², Minamikojima 0.40 km²), located in the southern part of the East China Sea (450 km west of Okinawa, 330 km south of mainland China, and 170 km to the north). Since 14 January 1895, partly inhabited by Japanese settlers engaged in fishing and processing skipjack tuna, were incorporated into Japan. Between 1945 and 1972, the islands were under the administration of the US occupation authorities, in 1972 returned under the administration of Japan. In the early 1970s, official territorial claims were made by China and Taiwan, originally prompted by the fact of determining the potential existence of oil and gas deposits in the adjacent shelf within the designated Exclusive Economic Zone. Their strategic location in terms of maritime and military transport was also acknowledged. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Senkaku Islands*, 2015, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/index.html> [accessed: 30.05.2021].

¹⁰ Japan delimited the boundaries of the ADIZ in 1969, which coincides with the boundaries of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). According to the Convention on the Law of the Sea, it extends

The years 2012–2013 also mark the beginning of a blatant and strong increase in violations by Chinese military aircraft and naval vessels of Japanese airspace and territorial waters, with particular intensity in the Senkaku Islands zone.

The number of violations of Japan's ADIZ by Chinese aircraft surged between 2009 and 2019 from 38 to 675, i.e., by a whopping 1676.3%. This was accompanied by a tremendous increase in trespassing by Chinese maritime forces on Japan's territorial waters from 79 days in 2012 to 282 days in 2019, involving 407 and 1097 vessels, respectively.¹¹ For example, on 30 March 2019, 4 Chinese bombers, together with 2 fighters and an electronic intelligence aircraft, flew from the East China Sea between Okinawa and Miyako-jima Island to the Pacific Ocean, returning by the above route that day to the base in China. Furthermore, on 10 June 2019, 6 Chinese ships, including the *Liaoning* aircraft carrier, sailed from the East China Sea between Okinawa and Miyako-jima Island to the Pacific.¹² China's provocative actions of this kind always result in the announcement of a state of full alert and specific actions by Japanese units. The provocative violations of Japan's airspace and territorial waters are both a demonstration of China's military power and precisely planned tactical tasks aimed, among other things, at providing electronic intelligence on the tactics and efficiency of actions taken by the Japanese and the US military units stationed in Japan. It should be stressed that this area of airspace and sea waters, located within the Japanese ADIZ zone and EEZ, is treated by China as the primary air and sea route for the transport of air and maritime forces from the area of the Yellow Sea and East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean. It is, therefore, of great strategic importance since it currently remains under full Japanese control.

The unregulated legal status of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, together with the surrounding waters of the East China Sea (within the borders of the Japanese EEZ), and under the conditions of increased activity of the Chinese air and sea forces is perceived by the Japanese government as treading a fine line between war and peace. Some members of the government are considering a scenario involving the landing of Chinese special forces troops on Senkaku/Diaoyu, disguised as fishermen, which would lead to a military confrontation between the two countries and the US.¹³ According to the Chinese authorities, it is Japan's unfounded territorial claims to the disputed islands along with the adjacent area of the East China Sea, as well as the US military presence in the region, that pose the main threat to regional security. The latter is particularly inconvenient for the implementation

370 km from the country's land areas, covering a total area of 4,479.6 thousand km²; M.J. Mazarr, et al., 'Deterring China's Gray Zone Aggression Against the Senkaku Islands. What Deters and Why: Applying a Framework to Assess Deterrence of Grey Zone Aggression', 2021, RAND Corporation, 2021, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3142.html [accessed: 30.05.2021].

¹¹ Ministry of Defense of Japan, *Defense of Japan 2020 (Annual White Paper)*, 2021, https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/wp2020/pdf/index.html [accessed: 15.01.2021].

¹² *Ibidem*, pp. 566–567.

¹³ A. Sakaki, *Japan's Security Policy: A Shift in Direction under Abe?*, SWP Research Paper, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, March 2015, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2015_RP02_skk.pdf [accessed: 13.10.2020].

of Chinese plans to strengthen the political and military position of the Middle Kingdom in the region.¹⁴

One of the most recent instances confirming the fact of limiting China's military and provocative activity was the US's immediate reaction to the violation of Taiwan's ADIZ zone by a Chinese military aircraft on 23–24 January 2021. It consisted in the US Navy directing a group of warships to the South China Sea, led by the *USS Theodore Roosevelt* aircraft carrier, with the simultaneous appeal of the US State Department to China for dialogue with Taiwan and refraining from aggressive actions in the Indo-Pacific region.¹⁵

The increasingly more realistic vision of the Asia-Pacific region with the growing position or even dominance of China is a direct threat to the security of Japan. On the other hand, Japan's military actions of 1894–1910 and 1931–1944, aimed at creating the Empire of the Pacific or Greater Nippon and tragic in their consequences, are still vivid.¹⁶ They are also, with varying intensity, used by China to create anti-Japanese sentiments countries in the region.

North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes

As regards Japan's increasing security threat, the steady development of nuclear technology and the high rate of successful implementation of North Korea's missile programme are of growing concern. The former is mainly related to the reduction in the size of nuclear warheads with which ballistic missiles of various ranges can be armed.

As part of its missile programme which has been underway since 2016, North Korea has launched more than 70 missiles of numerous types. The degree and scale of commitment to this project is evidenced by the fact that in the year 2019 alone, North Korea launched 14 solid-fuelled medium- and long-range ballistic missiles flying at lower altitudes compared to conventional ballistic missiles in seven tests (from May to October). Among them was the 'Hwansong-15' which, with a low trajectory, can reach targets up to 13,000 km away. Like other types of this group of missiles, they are capable of reaching targets anywhere on the Japanese islands and the American military bases in Guam. Tests on the latest model of submarine-launched ballistic missile called 'Pukguksong-3' with a range of 1900–2000 km were also successful. The last test of this missile in October 2019, which completed a controlled flight in the waters of the Sea of Japan (at the height of Shimane Prefecture), was to make Japan aware of the new capabilities and scale of the threat from North Korea.¹⁷

Japanese experts agree that one of the integral objectives of North Korea's missile programme development is also a desire to cripple Japan's missile defence

¹⁴ Compare: Hui-Yi Katherine Tseng, China's Territorial Disputes with Japan, *The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies* 2014, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 71–95, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26664006?seq=1> [accessed: 13.05.2020].

¹⁵ Radio TOK FM news on January 24, 2021.

¹⁶ R. Mydel, *Japonia*, PWN, Warszawa 1983.

¹⁷ Ministry of Defence of Japan, *National Defence Program...*, *op. cit.* and *idem*, *Defence of Japan 2020...*, *op. cit.*

system. A real sense of threat is growing in this regard under the circumstances of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces having to declare a state of alert not only in terms of military readiness but also among the civilian population in various regions of the country. Thus, for example, the test flight of a missile launched on 28 August 2017, whose trajectory passed over the Tsugaru Strait (the strait between the island of Hokkaido and the northern part of the island of Honshu), and which reached this region of Japan in the 9th minute of its flight, only to fall in the waters of the Pacific Ocean, about 1,250 km east of Hokkaido, caused not only the declaration of an anti-missile alert, but also the suspension of the movement of more than a dozen super-fast trains of the Hokkaido Shinkansen line in the northern part of the island of Honshu.¹⁸

Creeping militarization of the Japanese Northern Territories by Russia

As a wide array of factors influence the Japanese assessment of the country's regional security environment, it is significant that nowadays the potential threat from the military presence of the Russian Federation (Russia) is not generally considered to be a serious one. It is also remarkable because it takes place at the time of the longest territorial dispute connected with the occupation of the Japanese islands located in the southern part of the Kurile archipelago by the Soviet troops between 28 August and 9 September 1945. Referred to by Japan as the Northern Territories, the area consists of a group of 14 islands and islets located northeast of the island of Hokkaido, covering a total area of 5003 km² and inhabited by approximately 17,300 people.¹⁹

¹⁸ Ch. Sang-Hun, D.E. Sanger, 'North Korea Fires Missile Over Japan', *The New York Times*, 28 August 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/28/world/asia/north-korea-missile.html> [accessed: 13.01.2021].

¹⁹ The Japanese Northern Territories (JNT) is a group of 14 islands and islets with a total area of 5003 km², inhabited by 17,300 people, located to the north-east of Hokkaido. Among the largest are Etorofu (3167 km² – 3.6 thous. inhabitants), Kunashiri (1489 km² – 7.4 thous.), and Shikotan (249 km² – 1.0 thous. inhabitants). Since 7 February 1855 it was part of the Japanese territory on the basis of the Treaty of Shimoda between Russia and Japan. In the period of 20 August–3 September 1945 it was annexed by the Soviet Union. Since 1951, due to the lack of formal territorial rights to the islands of the USSR and the failure to sign a peace treaty between Japan and the USSR–Russia, they are the subject of dispute under the Japanese name of the Northern Territories. At the same time, the Russian side has identified all territorial claims of Japan to the southern Kurile Islands (JNT) as unfounded – unchangeably for 70 years. It should be emphasized that in 1956, 2004 and 2006, the Russian side offered to return to Japan part of the annexed (occupied) islands (the so-called Little Kurile Arc including Shikotan Island and Hobomai Shoto Islands) in exchange for the renunciation of claims to the remaining islands. The Japanese side rejected these proposals, demanding the return of all the islands comprising the Northern Territories. Russia's recent declarations, however, leave no doubt as to the country's intentions: on 14 August 2019 in Moscow, during a meeting of the foreign ministers of the two countries, S. Lavrov stated that 'Russia's sovereignty over the islands is undisputable' and that 'they are an integral part of the territory of the Russian Federation': Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Northern Territories Issue*, 1 March 2011, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/overview.html> [accessed: 13.01.2021].

They have been the subject of dispute and permanent diplomatic efforts of Japan for 76 years. In the context of diplomatic efforts and the involvement of Japanese prime ministers, today the strongest reactions in the form of diplomatic protests are caused by the 'creeping' militarization of the disputed islands, including the largest of them – Etorofu (Russian: *Iturup*). For instance, in 2014, Yasny military airport capable of receiving modern SU-35S multi-role fighters was put into operation.²⁰ Another case in point is the fact that in December 2020, the latest S-300V4 mobile surface-to-air missile defence system, designed to defend against ballistic missile attacks, was deployed there.²¹ The S-300V4s are complementary to the existing missile defence systems on Etorofu, which are designed to defend against ballistic missile attacks. They complement the Tor-M2 short-range anti-aircraft missile systems deployed there. This has always provoked strong diplomatic protests and forced a review of the defence strategy for part of Japan.

According to the data from *Defence of Japan 2020*, a Russian military aircraft breached Japan's airspace an average of about 300 times per year between 2010 and 2019, forcing Japan Air Self-Defence Force aircraft into the air. In 2019, there were 268 such incidents, which accounted for 28.7% of the total number of violations of Japan's ADIZ (out of a total of 947). It is important at this point to emphasize the fact of a marked decrease in the number of such incidents by the Russian Air Force, which peaked in 2014 (473 cases). This was accompanied by an increasing number of incidents involving aircraft of the Chinese Air Force, from 464 in 2014 to 675 in 2019.²²

Another source of concern for Japan is the developing military cooperation between China and Russia. It is worth pointing out that since 2012, Russia and China have been conducting regular naval exercise under the code name 'Joint Sea'. The first, organized by China, took place in the Yellow Sea ('Joint Sea 2012'). 7 Chinese warships (including 2 submarines) and 5 Russian vessels (including submarines) participated in the 'Joint Sea 2019' manoeuvres which lasted from 29 April to 4 May, started in the Yellow Sea and ended in the East China Sea.²³

Undeniably, a new development of the Sino-Russian military cooperation in the region are joint bomber patrol flights. Just one example of this is the fact that in June 2019, Russian Tu-95 long-range bombers made a patrol flight with two Chinese H-6 bombers on a route from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea.²⁴

The rise of the economic and military potential of China, who, since the beginning of the 21st century, has made no secret of its great power ambitions, constitutes, from the perspective of Japanese interests, a fundamental threat to the country's security. China's territorial claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are commonly pointed to as

²⁰ *Russian fighter jets land on disputed island*, 26 March 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/26/c_137067150.htm [accessed: 9.01.2021].

²¹ *S-300V4 Deployed in Disputed Kuril Islands to Deter US Missiles*, 2 December 2020, <https://www.defenseworld.net/news/28438/S-300V4-Deployed-in-Disputed-Kuril-Islands> [accessed: 9.02.2021].

²² Ministry of Defence of Japan, *Defence of Japan 2020...*, *op. cit.*

²³ M. Paul, 'Partnership on the High Seas: China and Russia's Joint Naval Manoeuvre', *SWP Comment* 2019, no. 26, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2019C26_pau.pdf [accessed: 31.01.2021].

²⁴ Ministry of Defence of Japan, *Defence of Japan 2020...*, *op. cit.*

a source of possible military conflict between the two countries. They are the main area of the increasing provocative actions of the Chinese air force and navy.²⁵

Japan Self-Defence Forces and the Japan-US Security Arrangements as the pillars of Japan's defence

Given the above circumstances, a decision was made in 2012 to amend the 1951 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, revised in 1960, which confirms the Senkaku Islands belong to Japan and obliges the US to defend them.²⁶ In the National Security Strategy²⁷ presented by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2013, the need to rebuild, modernize and expand the 247,100-strong Japan Self-Defence Forces (Japanese: *Jieitai*) was strongly emphasized, mainly to prepare for a potential armed conflict with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and to strengthen the Forces' presence in the whole area of the adjacent Japanese islands of Sakishima-Shoto. The aforementioned measures taken by Japan are a kind of a message and a warning to China, that a change in the existing *status quo* will not be allowed.

This position of Japan is confirmed by recent organizational activities within the Japan Self-Defence Forces.²⁸ These include, first and foremost, forming of the first in the history of post-war Japan Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (Japanese: *Suririkukidodan*) within the Japan Land Self-Defence Forces, which took place on 7 April 2018.²⁹ The brigade, which currently has 2,100 servicemen,

²⁵ *Idem*, *National Defense Programme Guidelines for FY 2019...*, *op. cit.*

²⁶ *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and United States of America*, 19th January 1960, http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/japan/mutual_cooperation_treaty.pdf [accessed: 11.02.2021].

²⁷ Prime Minister of Japan, *National Security Strategy*, 17 December 2013, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/documents/2013/_icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/17/NSS.pdf [accessed 3.02.2021].

²⁸ The Japan Self-Defence Forces (abbreviated: JSDF, Japanese: *Jieitai*) were created on 1 July 1954, after the post-World War II American occupation of the country ended. According to Article 9 of the new constitution of 3 November 1946, Japan is forbidden from using force as a means of settling matters involving other states and from having land, sea and air forces capable of waging war. JSDF are defensive in nature, remaining, as stated in the National Security Strategy (2013), the primary guarantor of security and protection against threats. JSDF currently consist of 247.1 thousand soldiers (active uniformed personnel) who are organized into 3 components: Japan Ground Self-Defence Force (JGSDF – 154.9 thousand), Japan Air Self-Defence Force (JASDF – 45.3 thousand) and Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF – 46.9 thousand servicemen). Despite the limitations arising from the provisions of the constitution, the Japanese armed forces are among the most modern militaries in the world in terms of weaponry and level of training. They are ranked fifth military force in the world after the US, Russia, China, and India (according to the 2021 *Military Strength Ranking. Global Firepower*). Since 1 July 2014, the use of JSDF is possible under the so-called 'collective self-defence', i.e., in the event of an armed attack on a country that has close ties with Japan, which may threaten Japan's survival and the lives and freedom of its citizens. Ministry of Defence of Japan, *Defence of Japan 2020...*, *op. cit.*

²⁹ *Japanese Self-Defence Forces lunch 1st amphibious fighting unit*, 7 April 2018, Kyodo News, <https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2018/04/2f3bb80eb01b-japan-holds-kick-off-ceremony-for-1st-full-fledged-amphibious-force.html> [accessed: 23.02.2021].

is modelled on the US Marines and is tasked with conducting amphibious landing operations.

It is needs to be pointed out that 54,000 US military personnel are stationed on the Japanese islands in accordance with the provisions of the treaty.³⁰ It is also worth noting that the cost of their deployment, which, in 2020, amounted to approximately \$3.5 billion, is not included in Japan's defence budget of \$48.5 billion.³¹ American troops stationed in the country since the end of World War II constitute one of the most important pillars of Japan's defence strategy, playing a fundamental role in maintaining peace and security both in Japan and in the entire Asia-Pacific region.

Conclusions

The turn of the 21st century brought new qualitative changes in Japan's regional security. In the domestic and foreign policy of the government, in addition to economic or demographic problems associated with a highly advanced process of society's aging, a special place is occupied by growing threats to the security of the country. Apart from detailed identification and analysis of the types and scale of threats, numerous steps of political and practical nature are undertaken in order to maintain regional *status quo* in this regard. Consequently, new threats compel the Japanese government to verify the existing and form a new regional security policy of the country.

In politicians' opinions³⁰ reflected in the official government documents on defence policy, the economic and political expansion of China has a fundamental impact on the current state and prospects for security in the region. This expansion is accompanied by the construction of modern armed forces as one of the key elements aimed at making China a global power in the mid-21st century.

From the perspective of Japan's security, its greatest current threat is the considerable increase in provocative activity by the Chinese naval and air forces in the zone of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, located in the southern part of the East China Sea. Perceived by Tokyo as treading a fine line between war and peace, these actions greatly impact Japan's long-term defence policy. It is also a flashpoint in this part of East Asia from the perspective of the regional security environment of the countries in the region, due to the growing aspirations of the government of the Republic of China (Taiwan) to declare independence. This has provoked fierce opposition from the People's Republic of China, reflected in the heightened activity of its armed forces in the free area of the Republic of China and Beijing firmly declaring that 'Taiwan is an integral part of China, and Taiwan's independence means war.'

The issue of control and protection of the sea waters of the Japanese Exclusive Economic Zone remains important for Japan's defence policy. With its 4,479,674 square kilometres, which is almost 12 times the size of Japan's land territory, and

³⁰ Ministry of Defence of Japan, *Defence of Japan 2020...*, *op. cit.*

³¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Host Nation Support (HNS)*, 8 March 2021, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/hns.html> [accessed: 14.02.2021].

with China's growing ambitions to become a superpower, it may become a place not only of potential, but also of real conflicts between these countries.

The second key factor which significantly influences Japan's regional security environment is the development of North Korea's nuclear technology and the implementation of the country's missile programme with particular emphasis on ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The increase in their accuracy, variability of their trajectory and range, in view of the declared purpose of their use (against South Korea, Japan and the US bases in that part of the Asia-Pacific), constitute one of the most important challenges in Japan's defence policy and strategy.

It ought to be pointed out that the most serious territorial dispute between Japan and Russia over the occupied Northern Territories after World War II does not pose a real threat to Japan's security. Attempts to solve the dispute have been made solely through diplomatic efforts as the 'creeping' militarization of Etorofu does not have an offensive character.

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Regionalne środowisko bezpieczeństwa Japonii *Streszczenie*

Z japońskiej perspektywy największym współczesnym zagrożeniem dla bezpieczeństwa państwa jest wzrost prowokacyjnych zachowań chińskich sił powietrznych i morskich w regionie spornych Wysp Senkaku/Diaoyu, położonych w południowej części Morza Wschodniochińskiego. Oceniane przez Tokio jako balansowanie na granicy pomiędzy pokojem a wojną, stanowią główną determinantę aktualnej oraz perspektywicznej polityki

obronnej Japonii. Drugim, nie mniej ważnym czynnikiem, mającym fundamentalny wpływ na regionalne środowisko bezpieczeństwa Japonii, jest rozwój technologii nuklearnej Korei Północnej oraz realizacja od 2016 r. programu rakietowego tego kraju, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem rakiet balistycznych, zdolnych do przenoszenia głowic nuklearnych. Deklarowany cel ich wykorzystania przeciw Korei Południowej, Japonii oraz amerykańskim bazom wojskowym w tej części Azji i Pacyfiku stanowi jedno z najważniejszych wyzwań w polityce i strategii obronnej Japonii.

Słowa kluczowe: środowisko bezpieczeństwa, wydatki na obronność, Wyspy Sankaku/Daioyu, Japońskie Terytoria Północne

The Regional Security Environment Of Japan

Abstract

From the Japanese perspective, the greatest present-day threat to the country's security is the rise of provocative behaviour by the Chinese air and naval forces in the region of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, located in the southern part of the East China Sea. Deemed by Tokyo as treading a fine line between war and peace, it is the main determinant of Japan's current and future defence policy. The second, no less important, factor which has a fundamental impact on Japan's regional security environment is the development of North Korea's nuclear technology and the implementation, since 2016, of that country's missile programme, with particular emphasis on ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The declared purpose of their use against South Korea, Japan, and US military bases in this part of the Asia-Pacific, constitutes one of the most significant challenges in Japan's defence policy and strategy.

Key words: security environment, defence expenditures, Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Japan's Northern Territories

Das regionale Sicherheitsumfeld Japans

Zusammenfassung

Aus japanischer Sicht besteht die aktuell größte Gefahr für die Sicherheit des Landes im zunehmend provokativen Verhalten der chinesischen Luftwaffe und Marine in der Region der umstrittenen Senkaku/Diaoyu-Inseln im südlichen Teil des ostchinesischen Meers. Von Tokio als Gratwanderung zwischen Krieg und Frieden betrachtet, stellt dieser Aspekt die Determinante der aktuellen und zukünftigen japanischen Verteidigungspolitik dar. Der zweite, nicht weniger wichtige Faktor mit fundamentalen Auswirkungen auf das regionale Sicherheitsumfeld Japans ist die Entwicklung der nordkoreanischen Nukleartechnologie und die Implementierung des Raketenprogramms dieses Landes seit 2016. Dabei spielen ballistische Raketen, die mit nuklearen Sprengköpfen ausgerüstet werden können, die größte Rolle. Das erklärte Ziel, diese gegen Südkorea, Japan und US-amerikanische Militärstützpunkte in diesem Teil der asiatisch-pazifischen Region einzusetzen, stellt eine der wichtigsten Herausforderungen für die Verteidigungspolitik und -strategie Japans dar.

Schlüsselwörter: Sicherheitsumfeld, Verteidigungsausgaben, Senkaku/Diaoyu-Inseln, japanische Nordgebiete

Региональная среда безопасности Японии

Резюме

С точки зрения Японии, наибольшая угроза для безопасности государства – это рост провокационных действий военно-воздушных и морских сил Китая в регионе спорных островов Сенкаку/Дяюйдао, расположенных в южной части Восточно-Китайского моря. Такие действия Токио расценивает как балансирование на границе между миром и войной и они являются основным фактором, определяющим текущую и долгосрочную оборонную политику Японии. Вторым, не менее важным фактором, оказывающим фундаментальное влияние на региональную среду безопасности Японии, является развитие ядерных технологий Северной Кореи и реализация с 2016 г. ракетной программы этого государства, в том числе создание баллистических ракет, способных нести ядерные боеголовки. Заявления Северной Кореи, что они будут использованы против Южной Кореи, Японии и американских военных баз в этой части Азиатско-Тихоокеанского региона – это один из важнейших вызовов оборонной политики и стратегии Японии.

Ключевые слова: среда безопасности, расходы на оборону, острова Сенкаку/Дяюйдао, японские Северные территории



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War on Terror and Islamisation of Brunei

'Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make.
Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.'
George W. Bush, 21 September 2001

Introduction

The September 11 attacks set a new scene in the bilateral and multilateral engagements between the US and the world. They moved the international political environment to a security-orientated environment in which relations, political ties and economic interactions were reduced to by-products of security. As security became the hegemonic global narrative, states and regions attempted to respond or react. This was particularly more problematic for the Muslim majority countries. One of the regions that has been impacted significantly by this change is Southeast Asia and one of the very interesting cases in this region is Brunei. As a small absolute monarchy in the region, Brunei is situated on the Island of Borneo, neighbouring Malaysia and is surrounded by the South China Sea.¹ With the population less than a million, Brunei was one of the last countries that became independent in 1984 as the British colonial period ended². During its contemporary history, Brunei has gone through two periods of Islamisation, both instigated by the US politics in the region. This article argues that the post-September 11 security environment instigated

¹ M. Cleary, F.J. Lian, 'On the geography of Borneo', *Progress in Human Geography* 1991, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 163–177.

² N. Mukoyama, 'Colonial origins of the resource curse: endogenous sovereignty and authoritarianism in Brunei', *Democratization* 2020, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 224–242.

the second wave of Islamisation and has resulted in fundamental changes in the politics of the country.

The first of these periods was during the Cold War, when the US contained the pressure of communism by promoting Islam as an alternative. The second time was as the result of the US 'War on Terror' in the region, which created an unwanted competition over Islam between the regional states and the Islamic groups.³ By drawing on Brunei history and the ways in which national and religious identity have been formed, this paper states that there is a significant difference between the first term and the second term of Islamisation in Brunei in terms of centralisation and distribution of political power in the country.⁴ While during the Cold War period the Islamisation period assisted the Sultan to further centralise and hegemonise political power, the second phase forced him to present a transformed image of himself as a religious figure and share his power with the religious institutions that he had built during the Cold War in order to secure his position. Exploring the dynamics between Brunei colonial history, Islamisation, and the 'War on Terror' is the foundation for explaining how the second wave of Islamisation transformed the legal system and consequently politics in Brunei.

The Background

The development of the dominant narrative of national identity in Brunei has its roots to its pre-colonial and colonial times. The early 20th century anthropologists like David Brown who wrote about Brunei history, linked a specific ethnic and religious group in the geographical region of Borneo to the dominant political and religious power in Brunei by highlighting specific voices and undermining others. According to this narrative, the first king of Brunei – who was partly human partly divine – was converted to Islam when he married a daughter of the Sultan of Johor in Indonesia. By establishing this narrative as the foundation of the modern political culture of Brunei, the colonial period forged a strong tie between ethnic identities and social systems of alliances between Islam and the central political power. This constructed alliance presented Brunei a society with a hereditary ranking system that advantaged one ethnic group (Malay) over others (such as the Iban or Sea Dayak). During the colonial time, the national myth of Brunei further strengthened the absolutist characteristics of the Brunei monarchy and instigated a patriarchal political system that traces back the genealogy of the monarchy to a divine father and an earthly mother.⁵ The combination of this genealogical narrative of ethnicity and religious affiliation defined the modern Brunei politics around a Sultan's figure and has made Brunei one of the very few countries with an absolute monarchy.

³ A. Rashid, *Taliban: The Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond*, Bloomsbury Publishing, London 2010.

⁴ *Brunei-History, Islam, Society and Contemporary Issues*, ed. O.K. Gin, Routledge, London 2015.

⁵ D.E. Brown, 'Hereditary rank and ethnic history: An analysis of Brunei historiography', *Journal of Anthropological Research* 1973, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 113–122.

From 1839, when James Brooke arrived from Britain to Kuching, it only took the British empire less than 20 years to make Brunei its protectorate. This was due to the increase in piracy and crime, the poor political management of Brunei and the ability of the British to give the Sultan the assurance that their presence could protect their rule. In 1847, the Sultan signed a treaty with Great Britain on economic growth and anti-piracy actions, and in 1888 another treaty which gave the right to determine foreign affairs of Brunei to the British.⁶

Brunei became a British protectorate in 1911 and continued to be until the end of the WWII (1947). Brunei experienced war, poverty, poor standards of living, and a lack of modern healthcare system and education. As the colonisation period ended in Southeast Asia, the Cold War cast its shadows on the region. Brunei was not immune to the pressure of the bipolar security system of the Cold War.⁷ While the Sultanate of Brunei was a close ally of the West, it witnessed the rise of a dissent group who criticised Brunei's absolute monarchy and manifested in the form of a communist party. The party was originally a branch of the Malaysian People's Party (MPP) and was developed as a result of cooperative meetings between its members and Bruneians. In the 1950s, the Brunei People's Party (Malay: Parti Rakyat Brunei, PRB) was established as a left-leaning party.⁸ They announced their goals to end the corrupt monarchy, to make Brunei fully independent, and to democratise the political system of the county. What made the group more attractive in Brunei was their opposition to the Malay-British proposal which suggested the establishment of a federation including Brunei and Malaysia. By 1961, the PRB gained so much popularity that it won all 16 of the elected seats in the 33-seat legislature in the August 1962 election.⁹

To counter his dissents, the Sultan of Brunei began his first wave of Islamisation in the country. The Islamisation attempts in this period brought the Bruneian religious elites closer to Malaysia. In 1956, the Sultan changed the destination of Bruneian religious students whom he sent abroad from Singapore to Malaysia.¹⁰ This was a move towards promoting more conservative teachings that focused on religious attempts in the promotion of Islam in social life. While it paved the ground for the post September 11 Islamisation period, it was radically different in terms of the agency of religious forces in politics. As I discuss in this paper, the long-term consequence of the 'War on Terror' has given religious forces power in politics and legal systems of Brunei, while the first wave made them an ally of the Sultan and legitimised his decision. As the number of religious students grew during the 1950s and 1960s, the Sultan developed religious institutions that were fully submitted to

⁶ H. Hughes-Hallett, 'A Sketch of the History of Brunei', *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 1940, vol. 18, no. 2 (137), pp. 23–42.

⁷ R. Kershaw, 'The Last Brunei Revolt? A Case Study of Microstate (In-) Security', *Internationales Asienforum* 2011, vol. 42, no. 1–2, pp. 107–134.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ N.S. Talib, 'Refashioning the monarchy in Brunei: Sultan Omar Ali and the quest for royal absolutism', in: *Monarchies and decolonisation in Asia*, eds. R. Aldrich, C. McPherry, Manchester University Press, Manchester 2020.

¹⁰ I.A. Mansurnoor, 'Formulating and Implementing a Sharia-Guided Legal System in Brunei Darussalam: Opportunity and Challenge', *Sosiohumanika* 2008, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 219–248.

his rule and in effect became his tool in countering communism or alternative Islamic ideas. In addition to these institutions, the Sultan developed a Department of Religious Affairs whose responsibilities were to pass religious instruction, promote Islam and articulate applications of Shari'a, all of which were fully controlled by the Sultan. To fully control religious institutions and the department, the Sultan developed a Religious Council (Majlis Ugama Islam dan Adat Istiadat Negeri) to be the highest authority in religious affairs for these institutions and the Sultan. All members of this council were appointed by him.¹¹

The process of Islamisation of Brunei continued during the 1980s and as the result of two factors. First was the ending of the colonisation period. Brunei became completely independent in 1984 but remained a very close ally of the West until the end of the Cold War. Like many other post-colonial states, Brunei struggled for a narrative of national identity. The focus of Islamisation in this period was the centralisation of power rather than democratic decentralisation or developing a modern nation state in which citizens have some degree of a right to negotiate their demands with the state. Developing a narrative that connects this new postcolonial identity to a precolonial identity and could be considered authentic and continuous, however, remained a challenge. In the context of the first Islamisation period, the myth that connects the lineage of the Brunei sultans to a divinely father and a Muslim mother provided the ground for such a narrative.

Secondly, Islamisation, was a suitable strategy for the Cold War security environment and Brunei's alliance with the West. During the Cold War period, the US was a major supporter of Islamic parties, groups, and Islamisation in general as an ideology countering communism.¹² The US praised any attempts of Islamisation across the Muslim world. For instance, the US recognised the government of the Taliban in Afghanistan as legitimate and invited them to the United Nations in the early 1980s. They also strongly supported them in their fight against Russia. To the US, the danger of communism and its spread was graver than Islamisation. This was also the main strategy in Southeast Asia. The influence of communism and the number of people who were attracted to communist parties around the Muslim world made Islamisation a viable strategic option. Huge investments in Islamic parties and groups, as well as providing significant support to those states who undertook draconian measures to counter communism were part of these attempts.¹³

Domestically, the first wave of Islamisation significantly assisted the Sultan of Brunei in consolidating and extending his power to manage and order the dynamics between Islam and politics and monitor and control religious forces in Brunei. As the Cold War replaced the WWII security environment, the centralisation and bureaucratisation of Islam made it a tool for the state. The Sultan remained the highest religious figure in the country and all the clergy worked under his supervision and instructions. During this period, the Sultan focused exclusively on the institutionalisation of Islamic ideals in the state, which resulted in the formation of many Islamic

¹¹ *Idem*, 'Islam in Brunei Darussalam: Negotiating Islamic Revivalism and Religious Radicalism', *Islamic Studies* 2008, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 65–97.

¹² A. Rashid, *op. cit.*

¹³ B.A. Salmoni, 'Islamization and American policy', in: *Critical Issues Facing the Middle East*, ed. J. Russel, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2006, pp. 103–123.

institutions who were to report to the Sultan. Probably the most significant action at the first stage of Islamisation was the establishment of a department responsible only for bureaucratising Islam.¹⁴

Brunei finally changed its status from a British Protectorate to an independent state in 1984. Roger Kershaw notes that even after attaining full independence, the country maintained its absolute monarch and its priority in protecting the sultanate. He argues that the modern state of Brunei only 'pretends' to be traditional and that the focus of the centralisation of the role of the Sultan is in fact gaining legitimacy.¹⁵ The discourse of security plays a central role in this narrative and that is why understanding history is important in addressing the impact of the 'War on Terror' discourse on Brunei.

The War on Terror and the change of the US policies in Southeast Asia, accordingly, have had significant impacts on the politics of Brunei and have pushed the country to Islamisation. The 'War on Terror' is a binary narrative that categorises people into two camps of those who are 'with us' and those who are 'against us'. When the US pushed its Southeast Asian allies to cooperate in the 'War on Terror', they were placed in a politically very difficult situation. Allegedly, the discourse of the 'War on Terror' targeted 'extremist Muslims' but they were very difficult to identify in Muslim majority countries. Determining who an extremist Muslim is could not be based on their appearance or the degree of their religiosity. None of the Muslim majority states of Southeast Asia, either desired or was able to employ heavy intelligence in many Islamic groups or assess their ideologies without alienating them. Nonetheless, these states were concerned about the rise of an extremist group who would threaten their rule. As the case of Brunei demonstrates, these states became increasingly and hastily security-orientated and that has resulted in the erosion of democracy.

The first step toward success in convincing their Muslim audience was to prove that the state's narrative of Islam is authentic. Under the pressure from the US and the hegemonising discourse of the 'War on Terror', Muslim countries of Southeast Asia entered a frenzied competition over owning Islam. This competition had two distinct but interlinked dimensions. The first was a competition between the Southeast Asian Muslim states and the Islamic groups and parties who lived within their boundaries or in neighbouring states. Monthly conferences on terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, webinars, lectures, political statements, and state-owned media were all geared up to ensure that the states were winning the battle of narratives with the Islamic parties and groups. In Brunei, the Sultan's propaganda machine was in full motion as the result.¹⁶ The second step was to present a different picture of the Sultan who his public image from a western-educated, secular, and modern monarch who enjoyed playing polo and drinking whiskey, to a pious and religious sultan fully committed to Shari'a establishing the dominance of Islam in the country. *The Brunei Times*, the country's official newspaper which was closed by the Sultan

¹⁴ I.A. Mansurnoor, 'Islam in Brunei Darussalam...', *op. cit.*

¹⁵ R. Kershaw, 'Constraints of History: the Eliciting of Modern Brunei', *Asian Affairs* 1998, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 312–317.

¹⁶ *Brunei Times Archive*, <https://thewheat.github.io/brunei-times-archive/index.html> [accessed: 10.04.2021].

in 2018, printed pictures of the Sultan in prayers, paying Islamic charity, opening a mosque and celebrating the contribution of religious leaders in Brunei on a daily basis.¹⁷ There was always a quote from the Sultan about ownership of Islam and what 'true Islam' was supposed to mean. His orders, advice and royal creeds were focused solely on this competition. His pictures in the newspaper showed him praying, with a group of clerics, or in the process of giving gifts to the students of the theological centre in Brunei. At an increasing rate since 2001, the 'War on Terror' pressured the Sultan to launch a full campaign of Islamisation of Brunei. More and more women were encouraged to wear hijabs, all businesses and government departments were to be closed from 12:00 to 2:00 p.m. on Fridays, Muslim men were obliged to participate in prayers regardless of their religious affiliation, every building had to be within the 'hearing distance' of a mosque and pressure on religious education at school has intensified significantly.¹⁸

The Sultan, Islam, and the legal system

During the period of colonisation and until the post-September 11 era, most laws in Brunei were either directly adopted from British laws or were derived from them. In the early 1908, Brunei set up an Islamic judiciary system, but their power was very limited. Quoting Brown, Mansournoor argues that in most cases the Sultan's demands for upholding Islamic laws and indigenous legal traditions were often turned down.¹⁹ According to Bruneians, the British disdained Islamic laws and connected them to injustice and disorder.²⁰ Brunei's pre-colonial legal system was criticized for its laws and implementation methods by some colonial figures who believed the aim of a legal system was to implement justice rather than submit to religious rules.²¹ This happened particularly in cases where the protection of women and people from religious fundamentalism was required. As the colonial period ended, the Muslim clergy in Brunei began to discuss returning to the Islamic Shari'a in the 1990s. This was the result of the first wave of Islamisation. However, this wave of Islamisation, as Powers argues, did not aim to eradicate the existing legal system but rather to reform it to ensure that Brunei's legal codes were not contradictory to Islam.²² This was not the case in the post-September 11 era which set up the second wave of Islamisation.

As the bipolar security architecture of the Cold War broke down, smaller states who had had ties with one of the powers found themselves without any support and often worried about attacks from their neighbours. Pressure from the US on

¹⁷ *Ibidem.*

¹⁸ *Ibidem.*

¹⁹ I.A. Mansournoor, 'Re-establishing Order in Brunei: The Introduction of the British Legal System during the Early Residential Period', *Islamic Studies* 2013, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 155–182.

²⁰ *Ibidem.*

²¹ D.S. Powers, 'Orientalism, Colonialism and Legal History: The Attack on Muslim Family Endowments in Algeria and India', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 1989, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 535–571.

²² *Ibidem.*

its allies in the region to promote Islam during the Cold War period became a blueprint for future challenges. The Muslim countries in Southeast Asia were struggling to find a balance between the secular political and legal systems they inherited from the colonial period and their religious identities. Now that new states were coming out of the shadow of their main ally from the Cold War, the question of the role of Islam, Shair'a, and its institutionalisation in their modern political states became dominant.

The post-September 11 era in Southeast Asia further exacerbated the countries' confusion and the complexities of the dynamics between secular and religious politics. As a result of this national identity crisis in the region, many Islamist groups who had been empowered during the 1990s began either claiming territories (like the southern Philippines) or launching attacks against their state (like Indonesia)

While it is difficult to decipher the true intellectual intentions of Bruneian academics who write in a totalitarian state, most of their writings consider the totalitarianism of the Sultan as the 'safeguard' for Brunei and its counter-extremism policies. In his article on Islam in Brunei, Mansurnoor writes, 'The control, and perhaps influence, of the palace on religious matters continued to be a crucial factor in making religious ideas uniform and less prone to harmful external influences. From quite an early period a religious bureaucracy emerged.'²³ What he is missing in his assessment is that the security environment that allowed Brunei to Islamise during the Cold War period became the utility for the Sultan to establish his hegemony over religion and become the ultimate religious authority. To the contrary, the post-September 11 discourse took the power and agency of him and transferred to religious authorities by giving them power over the judiciary system.

Bruneian scholars insist on the religiosity and individual commitments of Bruneians to Islam; however, none answers the questions why so many rebelled against the absolute monarchy that made the Islamisation necessary. This round of Islamisation allowed the Sultan to call all religious and non-religious groups who questioned him as un-Islamic. He vehemently pushed Bruneians to adopt an Islamic way of life, marginalised the secular, encouraged religious gathering and lectures to replace social gatherings, and connected Brunei with other Muslim countries more strongly.²⁴ The post-Cold War era in Brunei saw a transformation of Islam to a tool for the state to develop connections with other Muslim countries. Until the post September 11 era, Brunei used Islam to develop strategic bonds and was very proud of its Malay roots. In the post-September 11 era, Brunei academics further intensified their attempts to create a link between the religious authority of the Sultan and the authenticity of the form of Islam they practiced. They connected the early colonial history of Brunei to its ties with the Muslim world, particularly the Arab Sunni world from which the authenticity of Islam stems.

This competition over authenticity is another major impact of September 11. This is not particular to Brunei and has become a problematic symptom that spread across the non-Arab Muslim world of southeast Asia. Millions of dollars were spent on regional and national conferences on terrorism and counterterrorism, in which

²³ I.A. Mansurnoor, 'Islam in Brunei Darussalam...', *op. cit.*, p. 63.

²⁴ *Ibidem*.

the focus was to establish a narrative identifying the state's approach to Islam as authentic. In the meantime, financial resources were dedicated from Saudi Arabia to establish religious education, Islamic schools and narratives that advertised Wahhabi Islam as the authentic narrative. Competition over authenticity and the question of 'who owns Islam' pushed the region towards Islamisation. In Brunei, the image of a secular, whiskey drinking, fun loving Sultan needed to change dramatically. The Sultan soon presented himself as the pious man who was to safeguard Brunei with his prayers. He was filmed praying before flights, after flights, in military parades, at university graduation ceremonies, and all these shows of religious devotion were broadcast every day in all types of media. Soon, all unveiled photos of the Sultan's wife were replaced with a photo of her in full hijab and in a modest pose. She was also shown encouraging girls to be good Muslims, to wear hijab and be submissive to Shari'a. Schools intensified their religious education, and the University of Brunei Darussalam expanded its Islamic studies programmes and made Islam the cornerstone of the university's ideology.

Brunei, who was a full member of the Organization of the Islamic Conferences (OIC), held an international seminar on 'Islamic Civilization in the Malay World' in 1999, only two years before September 11.²⁵ However, the narrative on the 'War on Terror' made the Sultan send more students to Saudi Arabia to be educated in the Wahhabi tradition as a move to win the authenticity contest. It was to show the Sultan's narrative was the true Islam and that any other Islamic movement in the region was to be silenced. This was specifically the impact of the 'War on Terror' discourse that identified the region as the 'second front in war on terrorism'.²⁶ By calling the Southeast Asia a front, the US administration further pressured the government into the authenticity competition. Not only did this alienate the Muslim majority countries in the region, but it also made the 'War on Terror' the central discourse in security and the regional politics.²⁷ Those who wrote on the topic at the time, warned the US about the use of a particular discourse and words that at times equated war on terror with war on Islam.²⁸ As the region was identified to be the second front in the war on terror, the regional states were to cooperate with the US, out of fear of either losing their strategic and economic ties or changing the regime by the US – as in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq. These concerns caused another complicated situation for the regional states, whereby they needed to identify the criteria for distinguishing a terrorist from a conservative Muslim. Were the criteria to be committed to Islam? Or the way one dressed? Or their focus on Islamic education? As these questions became central for the state, they adopted more security-orientated policies focusing on intelligence, surveillance and pressuring Islamic groups to take a clear position. This was the beginning of the erosion of democracy in the region.

The US administration was not only pressuring the states in words, it was also pursuing its goals with actions. In 2004, George Bush, the US president at the time,

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

²⁶ A. Acharya, A. Acharya, 'The Myth of the second front: Localizing the 'war on terror' in southeast Asia', *Washington Quarterly* 2007, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 75–90.

²⁷ *Ibidem*.

²⁸ S.P. Limaye, 'Minding the Gaps: The Bush Administration and U.S.–Southeast Asia Relations', *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 2004, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 73–93.

attended the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit and visited Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Indonesia.²⁹ During that trip, he declared the 'War on Terror' and security of the region to be as important as trade and economic growth. Since the 2004, this annual summit has spent a considerable amount of time and resources on the matter. While the focus of any regional discussion prior to September 11 was the rise of China as an economic pole and managing the regional countries' political ties with the US and China, the 'War on Terror' discourse placed terrorism in the centre of the region's security discourse. As the states securitised their approach to Islam and national identity, they faced more security threats from Islamic groups. By 2004, the CIA had more intelligence officers in the region than at the time of the Vietnam war.³⁰ The ever-growing presence of the US and the securitisation of the region allowed Islamisation in the region to silence any secular discourse and constrained the region's policy to Islamisation to the point of no return. This is where this form of Islamisation differs from the Cold War period. What happened in Brunei during the 2010s is a great example of this transformation.

As the competition over authentic Islam and religious legitimacy continued in Southeast Asia, the Sultan of Brunei changed the reference of Brunei law from secular law to Shari'a law in a desperate attempt to win the authenticity competition, to rule in the post-September 11 regional security environment, and to remain a US ally. The Sultan of Brunei announced a radical change to the penal law in Brunei by declaring that Shari'a would be the reference of the law.³¹ In 2013, he passed the Shari'a Penal Code Order which changed the penal laws in the country to Shari'a laws, and in 2014 he added legal amendments to three other laws for the Islamic Religious Council Act, the Shari'a Court Act, and the Shari'a Court Classification Order to make them more in ordinance with Shari'a. He also stated that his decision had been made to use Shari'a as a sign of adhering to Allah's commands, to protect the country, and to allow the public to get familiar with Shari'a. Furthering his order, he declared that it was intended to restore a Shari'a based system in Brunei to preserve its identity as a Malay Islamic Monarchy concept.³² His emphasis on the monarchical political model and placing himself at the heart of Islamisation was the aim of Islamisation of this period.

Conclusion

The 'War on Terror' narrative triggered a unique wave of Islamisation in Brunei, which instigated fundamental changes in its legal system. The Sultan's mission became to Islamise Brunei instead of ensuring progress and prosperity. This wave

²⁹ S.W. Simon, 'President Bush Presses Antiterror Agenda in Southeast Asia', *Comparative Connections* 2004, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 67–77.

³⁰ *Ibidem*.

³¹ T. Lindsey, K. Steiner, 'Islam, the monarchy and criminal law in Brunei: the Syariah Penal Code Order, 2013', *Griffith Law Review* 2016, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 552–580.

³² *Implementation of the Shari'ah Penal Code Order 2013*, 2014, <http://www.pmo.gov.bn/Lists/Announcements/NewDispform.aspx?ID=30> [accessed: 10.04.2021].

of Islamisation has been planned meticulously and supported by the Sultan's allies. The Sultan's aim is to develop a homogeneous narrative to compete and superposes the Saudi version of Islam. His attempt has resulted in a competition over authenticity and ownership of Islam. The policies which have developed since the 'war on Terror' became globalised have resulted in the erosion of democracy and centralised participation in Islamic rituals and their promotion in the public space. The Islamisation of Brunei legal system further restricted religious and political freedoms and undermined theological discussions and development. It focused on traditionalism and historical narratives and thus pressured Brunei to adopt an amalgamated conservative version of Islam which limited public and political discussions to a monarchical theocracy, undermining democracy and obliging the Sultan to demonstrate strong religious commitment in public.

As the case of Brunei demonstrates, the post-September 11 discourse and pressure from the US on Muslim majority countries in Southeast Asia have had a fundamental impact on the Islamisation of their legal and political systems and have transformed their national identity narrative from the post-Colonial, post-Cold War periods. While the 'War on Terror' discourse was designed to create a binary security environment in which the US allies were to take a clear side, it ironically further pressured the region towards Islamisation. If George W. Bush's aim in his 'you are either with us or against us' was to create a global campaign in which countries were supportive of values such as democracy and secular politics, his narrative certainly had a radically opposite impact on Southeast Asia.

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Wojna z terrorem i islamizacja Brunei

Streszczenie

Narracja, jaką przyjęto w czasie wojny z terroryzmem, doprowadziła państwa muzułmańskie Azji Południowo-Wschodniej do sytuacji, na którą wiele z nich nie było przygotowanych. Państwa te, powstałe z popiołów kolonializmu, walczyły o wypracowanie pragmatycznego podejścia do religijnej i narodowej tożsamości. Wśród nich szczególnie interesującym przypadkiem jest Brunei, państwo zbudowane na tożsamości malajskiej i islamie. Od końca zimnej wojny i kolonizacji do wejścia w erę rozpoczętą przez ataki z 11 września Brunei uważało się za malajskie państwo muzułmańskie, przestrzegające kodeksów prawnych i systemów politycznych odziedziczonych po brytyjskich czasach kolonialnych. Jednak już presja Stanów Zjednoczonych podczas zimnej wojny sprzyjała pierwszej fali islamizacji Brunei, mającej na celu scentralizowanie władzy politycznej i religijnej w rękach sułtana. „Wojna z terrorem” zmieniła dynamikę tego procesu, osłabiła świeckie idee i siły polityczne w kraju, dając siłom religijnym większe znaczenie i władzę w państwie. Artykuł ten pokazuje, w jaki sposób „wojna z terrorem” zwiększyła rywalizację sił religijnych z sułtanem o znaczenie religii w państwie. Ta walka zapoczątkowała drugą falę islamizacji, różniącą się od pierwszej celami oraz rodzajem promowanego islamu.

Słowa kluczowe: islamizacja, wojna z terrorem, Brunei, Azja Południowo-Wschodnia, demokracja

War on Terror and Islamisation of Brunei

Abstract

The 'War on Terror' narrative placed the Muslim countries of Southeast Asia in a complex situation for which many of them were not prepared. Rising from the ashes of colonialism, Southeast Asian states with Muslim majorities had been struggling to develop a pragmatic approach towards religious and national identities of their states. Amongst the many Muslim states in the region, Brunei offers an interesting case. Brunei considered its national identity to be based on Malay identity and Islam. From the end of the Cold War and colonisation until the September 11 era, it considered itself a Malay Muslim country but followed the legal codes and political systems they inherited from the British colonial times. Pressure from the US during the Cold War encouraged the first wave of Islamisation in Brunei aiming to centralise political and religious powers in the hands of the Sultan. The 'War on Terror', however, transformed this dynamic in Brunei. This transformation has weakened secular ideas and political forces in the country by giving more power to religious forces in Brunei's legal system. By studying Brunei, this paper demonstrates how the 'War on Terror' empowered religious forces politically by igniting a competition between the Sultan and religious forces over the degree of their religiosity. This competition has ignited the second wave of Islamisation that is different from the first one in terms of its goals, agency and the version of Islam they promote.

Key words: islamisation, war on terror, Brunei, Southeast Asia, democracy

Krieg gegen den Terrorismus und Islamisierung von Brunei

Zusammenfassung

Der Diskurs des 'Kriegs gegen den Terror' hat die muslimischen Länder in Südostasien in eine komplexe Lage gebracht, auf die viele der Staaten nicht vorbereitet waren. Nach dem Wiederaufstieg aus der Asche des Kolonialismus hatten die südostasiatischen Länder mit muslimischen Bevölkerungsmehrheiten lange zu kämpfen, um einen pragmatischen Umgang mit den religiösen und nationalen Identitäten ihrer Staaten zu finden. Unter den zahlreichen muslimischen Ländern in der Region stellt Brunei einen interessanten Fall dar. Brunei sieht die eigene nationale Identität als auf der malayischen Identität und dem Islam begründet. Nach Ende des Kalten Krieges und der Kolonialzeit und bis zur Ära des 11. Septembers sah man sich in Brunei als malayisch-muslimisches Land an, hielt aber die Gesetze und politischen Systeme aufrecht, die man als Erbe der britischen Kolonialzeit übernommen hatte. Der Druck seitens der USA während des Kalten Krieges führte dazu, dass die erste Welle der Islamisierung in Brunei bestrebt war, die politische und religiöse Macht in den Händen des Sultans zu zentralisieren. Der 'Krieg gegen den Terrorismus' dagegen verursachte einen Wandel dieser Dynamik in Brunei. Dieser Wandel schwächte säkulare Ideen und politische Kräfte im Land und verschaffte religiösen Einflüssen mehr Macht im Rechtssystem von Brunei. Anhand der Fallstudie Brunei zeigt dieser Text, wie der 'Krieg gegen den Terrorismus' religiöse Kräfte politisch gestärkt hat, indem ein Wettstreit zwischen dem Sultan und religiösen Entscheidungsträgern über den Grad ihrer Religiosität angefacht wurde. Dieser Wettstreit hingegen hat eine zweite Islamisierungswelle ausgelöst, die sich hinsichtlich der Ziele, Handlungsmacht und unterstützten Version des Islam von der ersten unterscheidet.

Schlüsselwörter: Islamisierung, Krieg gegen den Terrorismus, Brunei, Südostasien, Demokratie

Война с террором и исламизация Брунея

Резюме

События, связанные с войной с терроризмом, привели мусульманские государства Юго-Восточной Азии к ситуации, к которой многие из них не были готовы. Эти государства, возникшие в результате распада колониальной системы, боролись за формирование прагматического подхода к религиозной и национальной идентичностям. Среди них особенно интересным случаем является Бруней – государство, основанное на малайской идентичности и исламе. С момента окончания холодной войны и колонизации до вступления в эру, начатую терактами 11 сентября, Бруней считался малайским мусульманским государством, которое придерживается правовых кодексов и политических систем, унаследованных со времен британского колониального правления. Однако давление США во времена холодной войны способствовало первой волне исламизации Брунея, направленной на централизацию политической и религиозной власти в руках султана. «Война с террором» изменила динамику этого процесса, ослабила светские идеи и политические силы в стране, придав религиозным силам значимость и большую власть в государстве. В статье показано, как «война с террором» усилила соперничество между религиозными силами и султаном о значении религии в государстве. Эта борьба положила начало второй волне исламизации, отличавшейся от первой, целями и типом ислама.

Ключевые слова: исламизация, война с террором, Бруней, Юго-Восточная Азия, демократия



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Post-9/11 Transnational Threats in Colombia: The Risk to National and Regional Security and Stability

Introduction

Colombia's geography and location in the Southern Hemisphere greatly enables the illegal drug industry. Colombia is located on the equator between latitudes 12°N and 4°S. It is the only South American country with coastlines stretching between two oceans: the Atlantic and the Pacific. Although Colombia's climate is described as tropical, 33% of the territory lies in the Andean mountains and as a result, the climate is also defined as isothermal.¹ Colombia also has vast amounts of freshwater and ranks third in the world in this regard. The combination of plentiful freshwater and fluctuating temperatures create in Colombia conditions which are conducive to growing almost any kind of crop all year long.² Colombian farmers can yield four harvests per year.

The purpose of this essay is to examine the consequences of 9/11 for the Colombian state through two different perspectives. First, the government's response

¹ Isothermal means that 0-1000 MASL (meters above sea level) the average temperature is 36°: from 1000 to 2000 MASL 23° – 18°C, from 2000 to 3000 MASL 18°C to 7°C, from 3000 to 4000 MASL 7°C to 4°C, and finally from 4000 to 5000 MASL 4°C to -5°C. Colombia.co, FAQ: *The Climate and Weather in Colombia*, 2020, <https://www.colombia.co/en/colombia-travel/faq-climate-weather-colombia> [accessed: 10.11.2020].

² United Nations, *Executive Summary Conclusions and Policy Implications: 2018 World Drug Report*, 2018, https://www.unodc.org/wdr2018/prelaunch/WDR18_Booklet_1_EXSUM.pdf [accessed: 12.11.2020].

to neutralize terrorism; and second, from the perspective of illegally armed groups who, as a result of 9/11, were labelled as terrorists. This research effort will also examine how terrorism is intertwined with other illegal activities in Colombia and the associated security and stability implications for Latin America. Finally, this analysis demonstrates how organized crime turned into a transnational threat and one of the greatest security challenges in the region.

Over the past 5 decades, the government of Colombia and the vast majority of its citizens have considered the FARC, ELN, M-19, EPL, and their surrogates to be terrorists. However, at the international level, these organizations were recognized as guerrilla or insurgent organizations. Whether guerrillas or terrorists, these groups caused significant security problems for the government. Unfortunately, ambiguity in defining and classifying these groups caused challenges in developing policies and regulations to address the problem of insecurity stemming from violence perpetrated by these groups.

During the 1980s and 1990s, terrorism carried out by drug cartels was so significant that it caused the government of Colombia to lose focus on groups like the FARC, ELN, M-19, and EPL. However, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the confusion and widespread fear these attacks caused, the focus on terrorism expanded and encompassed much of the global environment. On September 28, 2001, the United Nations (UN) resolution 1373 condemned the attacks,³ and the UN Security Council established a solid political base against terrorism.

In this international context, former Colombian president Andrés Pastrana (1998–2002), and Álvaro Uribe Vélez, who at that time was a presidential candidate, emerged as solid leaders. In fact, Uribe redefined the conflict in Colombia as terrorism in contrast with internal armed conflict and named the operation against these groups ‘Plan Patriota’. Because the plan centred on terrorism⁴, it was financed by the US and included a military offensive directed against the FARC. Labelling the FARC and other armed groups as terrorists allowed Uribe to garner support from the international community, and he became president for two terms from 2002 to 2010. This labelling also resulted in the FARC being included on the UN list of terrorist organizations, after Colombia petitioned the European Union and the US to ratify the inclusion of that group on the list of terrorist groups. During Uribe’s two terms as president, the FARC was significantly degraded and witnessed a decline in their membership. This success provided Uribe with the impetus to negotiate a solution to the conflict.

³ Naciones Unidas Biblioteca Digital, Resolution 1373 (2001) / adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting, on 28 September 2001, 2001, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/449020?ln=es> [accessed: 12.11.2020].

⁴ *Plan Patriota: It was a Colombia Army's plan for joint conduction of irregular warfare 2003–2008 developed by the Chairman Joint Chief of Staff General Mora Rangel Jorge Eduardo*, https://publicacionesejercito.mil.co/recurso_user/revista_ejercito/Revista_191/el-plan-patriota-plan-para-la-conduccion-conjunta-de-la-guerra-irregular.html [accessed: 1.11.2020].

Government Response after 9/11

From the point of view of the Colombian government, prior to 9/11, the civilian population had a certain soft spot for Colombian guerrillas, even though they engaged in criminal activity such as kidnapping, extortion and other terrible practices. Many Colombians and civilian population outside the country viewed these illegal groups as altruistic because they sought to rebuild social order. As such, the FARC actually managed to establish international ties in countries which were friends of Colombia, and who viewed FARC officers as goodwill ambassadors.

According to an investigation by the Colombian Attorney General, following the combat death of one of FARC's top leaders in Ecuador, the International Commission of the FARC was expanded to European countries⁵ such as Sweden, Germany, Norway, Russia, Denmark, Switzerland, Italy, France, Greece, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom. In North and South America, the FARC garnered support from citizens and groups in the US, Mexico, Canada, Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Brazil, Ecuador, Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. In Europe, some NGOs also funded the war in Colombia with financial resources for the FARC. In Denmark, a private company⁶ sold T-shirts with the FARC logo for 23 euros and donated 5 of the 23 euros to promote radio stations favouring the FARC. It is also important to note that prior to the events of 9/11, the FARC had had the ability, nationally and internationally, to produce a romantic image of a guerrilla group that sought to restore equality by removing wealth from the rich and distributing it to the poor, like the Robin Hood of Colombia. However, 9/11 made terrorism visible as a real threat to nation states across the globe, and governments immediately reacted to combat terrorist groups. Colombia was no exception.

On May 2, 2002, the European Union included the FARC on the list of terrorist organizations, with the AUC (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia), Sendero Luminoso of Peru, the Kurdistan PKK Workers' Party, the Iranian group MKO Organization of the Mujahideen, and ETA of Spain among others. However, on the occasion of the signing of the peace process in December 2016, the European Council decided to remove the FARC from the list of terrorist organizations.

To better understand what has happened in Colombia in the aftermath of 9/11, it is necessary to briefly recount events dating back to 1994–1998 which took place under the leadership of the then-President Ernesto Samper Pizano. First of all, Samper was under the authorities' scrutiny due to connections with drug trafficking.⁷ Furthermore, there was pessimism among Colombian citizens because the US

⁵ L. Trejos, *FARC-EP in Europe and Central America. A view from the Non-State Actor Perspective*, 2013, <https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/opera/article/view/3767/4143> [accessed: 18.11.2020].

⁶ One-Minute World News, *Danish T-shirts, to fund rebels*, 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4632578.stm> [accessed: 5.12.2020].

⁷ L. Sogamoso, *Proceso 8000, verdad inconclusa*, 1995, <https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-463046> [accessed: 10.12.2020].

decertified the Colombian government,⁸ and according to the 1998 world security index, Colombia was a failed state. Likewise, according to Stephen Johnson of the conservative *Heritage Foundation* magazine, Colombia was very close to becoming 'the first drug-state' in the world; just three hours from the United States. In short, the situation was quite critical.

The FARC alliance and other actors who generated violence through drug trafficking provided financial muscle to support other operations, and grew to become a formidable force, gaining in excess of 27,000 combatants in 1998⁹ alone. Therefore, the country's outlook was very gloomy and pessimistic when Andrés Pastrana took office and initiated his 'Change to Build Peace' National Development Plan 1998–2002. The main axis of the plan was aimed to rebuild trust within the country and with the international community.

Supported by the US, a modernization plan for Colombia's military forces began before peace talks with the FARC were initiated in a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) known as the 'Zona de Distensión' which lasted for 3 years. Following the kidnapping of a plane crew which was crashed by the FARC, the government stopped dialogue with the FARC and re-established control of the DMZ on February 21, 2002. By that time, 9/11 had already materialized, the security environment in the region had already transformed due to terrorist acts, and acts perpetrated by the FARC became visible to the eyes of all those who thought that these events were isolated cases.

By the early 2002, terrorism was already present in cities and was a latent and terrifying threat. When the new president of Colombia Álvaro Uribe Velez took office, he initiated his National Development Plan called 'Towards a Community State'. The strategy of the government was to re-establish governance of the territory and ensure security for all Colombians. From a diplomatic point of view, Uribe was able to include the FARC and other illegally armed groups on the list of terrorist groups. From the point of view of information operations, there was an aggressive campaign to regain the confidence of Colombian citizens through television and the radio with the slogan 'Live Colombia, travel for it', which managed to make citizens feel comfortable again, recover local economies and, above all, cause criminal actors to move away from populated areas into the jungles, isolating themselves from the civilian population. The latter was made possible through a strong military effort.

For the military, the 'Plan Colombia' war plan was implemented, which basically sought through special operations to attack the FARC leadership and their strategy using special operations forces and counter-guerrilla units to attack the FARC'S Eastern Bloc, the strategic centre of gravity of their criminal organization. From a macro standpoint, the inclusion of the FARC as a terrorist group by the international community, populace support for the government and military forces, and economic-military support from the US through 'Plan Colombia' brought about the

⁸ D. Farah, *US – Bogota: what went wrong? This is a decertification not of Colombia, but of President Samper*, 1996, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/03/03/us-bogota-what-went-wrong-this-is-a-decertification-not-of-colombia-but-of-president-samper/d46219cd-2c84-4eef-b041-632121cddab0> [accessed: 22.12.2020].

⁹ M. Aguilera, *Las FARC: auge y quiebre de su modelo de guerra. FARC: Rise and decline of a war model*, 2012, <https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/anpol/article/view/44005/45253> [accessed: 6.01.2021].

creation perfect harmony between the trinity of Clausewitz's variables: 'the government, the population, and the military.' Finally, there were many actions implemented by the Colombian government to counter terrorist organizations. For example, 12 groups of Urban Counterterrorism Special Forces units were created, and the Office of the Attorney General established the National Counterterrorism Office. By 2010, in the final years of the Uribe presidency, these types of efforts resulted in the FARC losing its military capacity to control land and being degraded to just 3,000 combatants.

Post-9/11 Implications: Guerrilla Forces

From the point of view of terrorist groups operating in Colombia in the aftermath of 9/11, the attacks on the Twin Towers led to many different consequences, especially moral ones. The moral order, as Clausewitz suggests, is the foundation of war. Clausewitz also places great value on moral forces in their traditional sense. The interaction of moral forces with other physical forces is fundamental in the development of war but regulating them in a scientific way when considering them together with other factors is very difficult. In the case of Colombia, there were three salient consequences.

Firstly, in the eyes of terrorist groups, 9/11 legitimized their armed actions against the government of Colombia. Although most Colombians rejected this assertion, members of terrorist insurgent groups, especially the FARC, viewed their actions against the state as legitimate. In this context, legitimization can be identified with solidarity, and despite some cultural differences, revolution is a common cause that seeks the same objectives and attacks the same enemies. Hence, whoever attacks what is considered the greatest enemy, has the solidarity, support and sympathy of all those who are engaged in a similar struggle. This type of feeling is precisely what constitutes the legitimization of the action, since it implies that it is accepted and supported by all terrorist insurgent groups in Colombia. In turn, this feeling generated a kind of obligation to fight for power and to be faithful to Marxist-Leninist guiding principles, just as Al-Qaeda launched its attacks by following the guidelines of their interpretation of Islam or 'violent extremism'. It is interesting to note that despite this legitimization of terrorism within the FARC and other groups of lesser importance in Colombia and in South America in general, there was no substantial increase in the recruitment or incorporation of new militants into their ranks.

Secondly, in the modern times, the idea of a nation state being defeated, despite all the electronic and cyber capabilities at its disposal, became credible. The way Al-Qaeda carried out the attacks by infiltrating into the US became an inspiring model particularly for small groups with great capacity for infiltration. In fact, on November 7, 2003, the FARC carried out an attack of lesser proportions in comparison to 9/11, but used similar methods to attack El Nogal¹⁰, a social club located in the northern part of Bogotá, the capital of the Republic, which caters to prestigious clients. The FARC decided to carry out an attack against the club, on the one

¹⁰ El Nogal (Spanish word that means Walnut Tree Club).

hand, to punish the elites, and on the other, to intimidate the government. Similarly to the methods used by Al-Qaeda, the FARC managed to place one of its members disguised as a tennis teacher who gradually became known and was appreciated by both managers and clients of the club. This allowed the FARC the means to smuggle explosives into the club in the tennis teacher's vehicle thanks to the confidence he had earned. On the day of the attack, the tennis teacher calmly entered the premises in his vehicle, in plain view of the security guards, he parked it in his normal parking space, activated the explosive device, and continued towards his office. Minutes later, there was a terrible explosion that not only destroyed most of the club's facilities but also killed 36 people and injured more than 200. Among those who died was the perpetrator of the attack and one of his accomplices.

Initially, the FARC did not claim responsibility for the attack but soon after, they were identified as being responsible for it. Although they did not achieve the political aims they wanted to because the attitude of the President of the Republic was so firm, the FARC realized they could overcome a technological disadvantage to inflict serious damage on the government's security apparatus credibility.

Thirdly, the Foquismo revolution theory (FOCO)¹¹ applied by Ernesto Che Guevara said that just a small group of people is necessary to start a revolution and in this modern world the recent technological advances in the information domain (environment) have significantly intensified globalization and have increased the interconnected nature of the world today.¹² Not only can information be shared between people across the globe in just a few seconds, but also many commerce barriers have fallen and international agreements between many nations have further created an international environment where collaboration, cooperation, and competition combine to describe and characterize relationships between nation states, non-state actors, and other entities, including Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs). For example, Al-Qaeda has links with insurgent groups in Venezuela,¹³ the Gulf Clan (Clan del Golfo – the biggest TCO in Colombia) has links with Los Zetas in Mexico,¹⁴ and the ELN in Colombia has connections with Hezbollah. While these varied organizations are driven by different ideologies, religious beliefs, and political motives, the need to generate finance encourages interactions between these groups. Criminal organizations across the world operate within a complex web (system) of communication, funds and cooperation, which is not easy to follow or deter. Deeply entrenched in this complex system is the illegal drug industry, which

¹¹ The French intellectual and government official Régis Debray proposed a theory in which a very small group of people can start a revolution. This theory is known as Foquismo (Spanish word that means a starting point) and it inspired the Marxist revolution in Cuba by Ernesto Che Guevara in 1959. R. Borja, *Revolutionary FOCO theory*, 2018, <https://www.enciclopediadelapolitica.org/foquismo> [accessed: 10.01.2021].

¹² E. Ortiz, *What's the impact of globalization on wages, jobs and the cost of living?*, 2018, <https://our-worldindata.org/trade-wages-cost-living> [accessed: 10.01.2021].

¹³ V. Neumann, *The New Nexus of Narco Terrorism Hezbollah and Venezuela*, 2011, <https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/publications/publication.html/150634> [accessed: 12.01.2021].

¹⁴ C. Woody, *Mexico's Cartels Appear to Be Shaking up the Cocaine Trade*, 2019, <https://www.businessinsider.com/mexican-cartels-shipping-cocaine-out-of-colombia-refining-in-mexico-2019-6> [accessed: 20.01.2021].

provides an array of TCOs and other illegal organizations with financial means to conduct their operations.

In Latin America, and particularly in Colombia, terrorism and transnational threats are now fuelled by the Venezuelan crisis. For example, massive violent protest took place last year in different countries like Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador and Colombia, in which thousands of Venezuelans participated. This have leveraged and enabled the illegal drug industry, which centres on cocaine production and trafficking involving many different criminal organizations. Cocaine trafficking alone provides enough economic resources to support illicit groups which have control over different phases of cocaine production. These illicit groups use their power and influence in undeveloped and underdeveloped regions of Colombia by taking advantage of remote locations which are difficult to access for governmental agencies, including military and police forces. These criminal groups also exploit marginalized groups, such as indigenous displaced populations and displaced immigrants. TCOs force indigenous populations to work in support of illegal mining activities, and they use displaced immigrants to serve as drug mules to transport illegal drugs across the border.¹⁵

In addition to undeveloped and underdeveloped regions of Colombia, TCOs also take advantage of porous national borders with limited governmental presence and other resources available to monitor and control the flow of people and goods. Colombia shares land borders with five countries: Panama, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, and Venezuela. Among these bordering nations, Venezuela is unique due to the ongoing civil and political unrest, which compounds the challenges of an extensive porous border.

According to the 2019 Colombia migration report, the Venezuelan crisis has forced thousands of families to flee to other South American countries, mainly to Brazil and Colombia.¹⁶ Colombia has hosted more than 1,102,000 Venezuelans, and at least 250,000 Venezuelans remain on the Colombian territory working illegally. Portions of these illegal immigrants work for and with TCOs and are involved in drug trafficking, smuggling, and human trafficking.¹⁷ One of the primary factors associated with the influx of Venezuelans into Colombia is that nation's desperate economic situation.

The crisis has also brought Venezuelan illegal groups to Colombia. These illegal organizations have developed reciprocal relationships with TCOs in Colombia, and exploit displaced Venezuelans by using them to support illicit activity. Many of these displaced persons serve as mules to transport cocaine through the Darien Mountains to Central America using the technique known as 'hormigueo' (resembling an ant trail).

¹⁵ *Global Illegal Aliens Trek Panama Jungle to Reach America*, Limits to Growth, 2015, <https://www.limitstogrowth.org/articles/2015/05/29/global-illegal-aliens-trek-panama-jungle-to-reach-america> [accessed: 22.01.2021].

¹⁶ Lorenzo Morales, *Border Closures Strand Migrants in Colombia*, 2016, <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/256254> [accessed: 3.02.2021].

¹⁷ *Todo lo que Quiere Saber Sobre la Migración Venezolana y No Se lo Han Contado*, Migración Colombia, 2019, <https://www.migracioncolombia.gov.co/infografias/todo-lo-que-tiene-que-saber-sobre-la-migracion-venezolana> [accessed: 20.02.2021].

Recently, the Colombian and Venezuelan border has witnessed an increase in TCOs crossings between the two countries under the protection of illegal groups in Venezuela. Traditionally, Venezuelan authorities have been hesitant to engage in armed conflict with TCOs and some military units and personnel even co-ordinate and partner criminal organizations as is the case with the well-known 'Soles Cartel'. This term refers to a group of individuals inside the Venezuelan military that functions as drug trafficking organization.¹⁸

Conclusion

Terrorism became visible worldwide with the attack on the Twin Towers. This unprecedented terrorist act caused the world to wake up, and nation states began to implement comprehensive counterterrorism efforts. In countries like Colombia terrorism has always been present, sometimes justified by political tendencies from both the right and the left. Criminal organizations in Colombia have used terrorist tactics in attempts to control certain population groups that otherwise would have resisted their presence. To achieve this, financing is needed, and those funds come from other criminal activities such as illegal mining, drug trafficking, money laundering, smuggling, and irregular migration. The challenge for the state and the region is to integrate and synchronize their efforts and capabilities to counter each of the methods used by terrorist groups, and now TCOs.

For the government of Colombia, the need to implement a whole-of-government approach to counter illegally armed groups is paramount. Equally important is the need to partner and coordinate efforts with regional partners, as these groups are not constrained by national borders. Through a whole-of-government approach and in partnership with other like-minded regional nations, the government of Colombia can comprehensively defeat the criminal systems that enable illegally armed groups.

There is no government agency in the world which desires to be controlled by another agency, particularly the military. At times, this dynamic is an impediment preventing governments from achieving the type of unity of effort and synergy needed to exploit the unique capabilities that each agency possesses. When governments fail to address this challenge, criminal groups exploit this weakness by attacking gaps in coordination between governmental agencies.

Finally, in the modern context where certain minorities seek to change the ethics of what they perceive as correct, such as gender ideologies and progressivism, illegal immigration and even terrorism become acceptable. As a result, the state response must be to act in coordination with neighbours and allies. This anonymous thought frames the strongest challenge that all countries currently face; no one is so strong that they can do it alone, and no one is so weak that they cannot help.

¹⁸ *Cartel of the Suns*, InSight Crime, 2016, <https://www.insightcrime.org/venezuela-organized-crime-news/cartel-de-los-soles-profile> [accessed: 10.03.2021].

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Zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa w Kolumbii po zamachach na World Trade Center: ryzyko dla narodowego i regionalnego bezpieczeństwa i stabilności

Streszczenie

Kolumbia w okresie ostatnich pięćdziesięciu lat doświadczyła długiej i krwawej walki politycznej, w ramach tzw. pełzającej wojny domowej. W tym okresie komunistyczna partyzantka reprezentowana przez różne ugrupowania – Ruch 19 kwietnia (M-19), Narodowa Armia Wyzwolenia (ELN) czy wreszcie Rewolucyjne Siły Zbrojne Kolumbii (FARC), wielokrotnie próbowały obalić demokratycznie wybrany rząd, stosując brutalne metody walki, takie jak porwania dla okupu czy wymuszenia. Zamach terrorystyczny na Centrum Handlu Światowego we wrześniu 2001 roku był dodatkowym wzmocnieniem dla tych organizacji w ich krwawej walce z rządem. Autor charakteryzuje związane z atakiem na WTC konsekwencje dla bezpieczeństwa Kolumbii, wykorzystując dorobek Clausweitz'a czy Che Guevary. W zakończeniu wskazuje na współpracę regionalną w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa jako jedną z metod walki z terroryzmem.

Słowa kluczowe: przestępczość zorganizowana, terroryzm, partyzantka, FARC, organizacje kryminalne, Kolumbia

Post-9/11 Transnational Threats in Colombia: The Risk to National and Regional Security and Stability

Abstract

Colombia has experienced a long and difficult political struggle for over 50 years. During this time, communist guerrillas such as the 19th April movement (M-19), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) have sought to overthrow the government of Colombia and have engaged in illicit activities such as kidnappings and extortion to finance their operations. During the 1990s, these groups became involved in the cocaine trade, and engaged in drug trafficking which significantly increased their financial revenue, access to weapons, and the overall size in terms of membership. As these organizations witnessed the tragic events of September 11, 2001 take place in New York City and in other locations in the United States, they became emboldened and began to envision themselves overthrowing and defeating the government of Colombia. Through Al-Qaeda's example, armed

groups in Colombia imagined themselves as the biblical character David, who defeated the giant Goliath with a sling and a stone. After 9/11, Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) operating in Colombia began to extend their reach beyond national borders and became a major threat to national and regional security. For decades, these groups were embedded and nested with insurgent groups, right wing paramilitary groups, and other illegally armed groups involved in the nation's armed conflict. However, after the 2016 signing of the peace accord between the Colombian government and the political arm of the FARC, transnational criminal organizations now work in concert with each other, or opposing each other for control of the illegal drug industry in Colombia.¹⁹ This new criminal paradigm in Colombia is, in many ways, far more complex than the construct in place prior to 2016, and has created new security challenges for the government.

Key words: Transnational Crime Organizations, transnational crime, Communist Guerrillas, Paramilitary Groups, FARC Peace Agreement

Transnationale Gefahren in Kolumbien nach dem 11. September: Risiko für nationale und regionale Sicherheit und Stabilität Zusammenfassung

Kolumbien ist seit mehr als 50 Jahren in einen langen und schwierigen politischen Kampf verwickelt. Seitdem haben kommunistische Guerillagruppen, wie die Bewegung des 19. April (M-19), die Revolutionären Streitkräfte Kolumbiens (FARC), die nationale Befreiungsarmee (ELN) und die Volksarmee der Befreiung (EPL) versucht, die kolumbianische Regierung zu stürzen und sich zur Finanzierung ihrer Operationen illegaler Aktivitäten bedient, wie Geiselnahmen und Erpressungsversuche. In den 1990er Jahren begannen die o.g. Gruppen, sich im Kokain- und Rauschgifthandel zu betätigen, was die finanziellen Einnahmen, den Zugang zu Waffen und ihre Mitgliedszahlen stark erhöhte. Als die Guerilla-Formationen Zeuge der tragischen Ereignisse am 11. September 2001 in New York City und andernorts in den Vereinigten Staaten wurden, fühlten sie sich ermutigt und malten sich aus, die kolumbianische Regierung zu stürzen und zu besiegen. Nach dem Vorbild von Al-Quaida sahen sich die bewaffneten Aufständischen in Kolumbien in der Rolle des biblischen David, der den Riesen Goliath alleine mit einer Schleuder und einem Stein besiegt hatte. Nach dem 11. September begannen transnationale kriminelle Vereinigungen in Kolumbien, ihren Einflussbereich über die Staatsgrenzen hinweg auszuweiten und wurden zu einer ernsthaften Gefahr für die nationale und regionale Sicherheit. Jahrzehntlang waren diese Gruppen in Vereinigungen Aufständischer, rechte paramilitärische Gruppierungen und andere illegale bewaffnete Gruppen eingebettet, die in den bewaffneten Konflikt der Nation verwickelt waren. Nach der Unterzeichnung des Friedensabkommens im Jahr 2016 zwischen der kolumbianischen Regierung und dem politischen Arm der FARC arbeiten transnationale kriminelle Vereinigungen aktuell jedoch entweder Seite an Seite oder kämpfen um die Kontrolle über die illegale Drogenindustrie im Land. Dieses neue kriminelle Paradigma in Kolumbien ist in vielerlei Hinsicht weitaus komplizierter als das Konstrukt vor 2016 und hat neue sicherheitspolitische Herausforderungen für die Regierung zur Folge.

¹⁹ J. Abrams, *Colombia's fragile peace deal threatened by the return of mass killings*, 2021, <https://theconversation.com/colombias-fragile-peace-deal-threatened-by-the-return-of-mass-killings-154315> [accessed: 5.10.2020].

Schlüsselwörter: transnationale kriminelle Vereinigungen, transnationale Kriminalität, kommunistische Guerillakämpfer, paramilitärische Gruppierungen, FARC-Friedensabkommen

*Угрозы безопасности после 11 сентября в Колумбии:
риск для национальной и региональной безопасности
и стабильности*

Резюме

В течение последних пятидесяти лет Колумбия пережила долгую и кровопролитную политическую борьбу вызванную длительной гражданской войной. В течение этого периода коммунистические партизаны, представленные различными группировками, такими как Движение 19 апреля (М-19), Армия национального освобождения (ELN), или Революционные вооружённые силы Колумбии (FARC) неоднократно пытались свергнуть демократически избранное правительство, используя насильственные методы борьбы, такие как похищение людей с целью получения выкупа или вымогательства. Атака террористов на здания Всемирного торгового центра (ВТЦ) в сентябре 2001 года стала дополнительным толчком для этих организаций в их кровавой борьбе с правительством. В статье дана характеристика последствий нападения на ВТЦ для безопасности Колумбии. В заключении рассмотрен один из методов борьбы с терроризмом, каким является региональное сотрудничество в области безопасности.

Ключевые слова: организованная преступность, терроризм, партизаны, FARC, преступные организации, Колумбия



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Kua Takoto Te Manuka: Meeting the Challenges of New Zealand's Contemporary Strategic Environment

Introduction

The Maori component of this article's title is a *whakatauki*, or proverb, which refers to the formal welcoming of visitors to a village. Part of this welcome is to challenge (wero) the peaceful intent of the visitors before they enter the walls. The key element of this challenge is expressed through the laying of leaves at the entrance way, and the answer to the challenge is seen in the way the leaves are picked up. The wero has its origins in times when the security of the tribe, or a sub-tribal group, relied upon knowing whether a visiting party came in peace, or as an enemy.¹ This proverb is used when being challenged, or a challenge arises ahead of you. Given the uncertainty and complexity of the contemporary international system, this proverb is an appropriate reflection of the challenges to traditional paradigms of national security brought about by the September 11 attacks and the ripples that have permeated the global security environment ever since.

The purpose of this article is to introduce the national security framework New Zealand uses for responding to significant security events. The discussion will examine how New Zealand's strategic context influences the country's approach to national security, how the government defines the scope of activities included within the field of security, and how agencies are coordinated within security responses.

¹ Hirini Moko Mead, *Tikanga Maori: Living by Maori Values*, Huia Publishers, Wellington, New Zealand 2003.

Once the framework has been introduced, discussion will turn to the major national security events that have occurred in New Zealand since September 2001, and explore the impact the lessons from these individual events have had in refining the national security system as a whole. Finally, the article will conclude with an analysis of the benefits to be found in the production of a consolidated national security strategy.

New Zealand's National Security Coordination

Articulating the national security aims and interests of the New Zealand government is difficult as the country has no national security strategy. To determine the New Zealand government's approach to national security, a number of different sources must be examined to construct an idea of the risks and threats likely to undermine New Zealander's sense of security.² The closest presentation of a centralised concept for national security operations is the *New Zealand's National Security System Handbook* (*National Security Handbook*). The *National Security Handbook* is the architectural framework that guides New Zealand government agencies in response to national security crises. The current iteration was published in 2016 and superseded the original *New Zealand's National Security System* document released in 2011.³ Although not previously laid out in formal documentation, the structures and principles of the National Security System described in these documents have been the framework for New Zealand's security responses since 2000.⁴ The events of the 9/11 attacks, rather than having a transformative effect on national security in New Zealand influenced very little change in how citizens went about their daily lives. The attacks did highlight the potential for national security threats to originate domestically; however, the most obvious impacts of increased security measures for air travel and greater suspicion towards Middle Eastern ethnicities were seen as an annoying inconvenience and xenophobic scaremongering respectively. The publication of the *New Zealand's National Security System* document came a decade after the World Trade Centre attacks, a period during which global instability, globalisation and rapid technological advancement changed the fabric of

² Ministry of Defence, *New Zealand Strategic Defence Policy Statement* (New Zealand Government, Wellington, New Zealand 2018); Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, *New Zealand's National Security System* (New Zealand Government, Wellington, New Zealand 2011); Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, *National Security System Handbook* (New Zealand Government, Wellington, New Zealand 2016); Ministry of Defence, *Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000* (New Zealand House of Representatives, Wellington, New Zealand 1999); Ministry of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2016* (New Zealand Government, Wellington, New Zealand 2016); Ministry of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2010* (New Zealand Government, Wellington, New Zealand 2010).

³ Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, *New Zealand's National Security System* (New Zealand Government, Wellington, New Zealand 2011); Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, *National Security System Handbook* (New Zealand Government, Wellington, New Zealand 2016).

⁴ Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, *Securing Our Nation's Safety: How New Zealand Manages Its Security and Intelligence Agencies* (Domestic and External Security Group, Wellington, New Zealand 2000).

the international system. Despite these changes in the international security environment, the broader interests and outcomes expressed in these documents remain consistent with ideas surfaced within New Zealand's security sector at the turn of the millennium.⁵

The traditional influences on New Zealand security policy have arguably been its geographic isolation and the lack of a clear physical threat to the country's sovereignty and resources. The lack of a military threat pushes the risk of conventional warfare far from the minds of most New Zealand citizens. Their security concerns are more attuned to natural disasters, loss of primary resources, or severe environmental damage due to industrial accidents. Unsurprisingly, the New Zealand government's description of national security encompasses risks that have not been traditionally included in this field.

The New Zealand government defines national security as:

[...] the condition which permits the citizens of a state to go about their daily business confidently free from fear and able to make the most of opportunities to advance their way of life. It encompasses the preparedness, protection and preservation of people, and property and information, both tangible and intangible.⁶

This definition broadens the traditional orientation of national security from focusing on the use of intelligence, police and armed forces in protection of the state, to an all-encompassing whole of society approach.

The broad definition of national security proposed by the New Zealand government is reflective of the strategic context in which the country sits. The *New Zealand's National Security System* document describes New Zealand's security context in twenty-three themes ranging from risks to individuals such as criminal activity and traffic accidents to global security issues such as arms proliferation and interstate conflict.⁷ This discourse highlighted the environment's absence of an existential military threat and reinforced the inherent vulnerabilities linked to New Zealand's geographic isolation and volatile natural environment.⁸ The *National Security Handbook* did not contextualise New Zealand's strategic environment and was content to simply reinforce that all risks 'whether internal or external, human or natural,' are included within its national security structures and that the concept of national security goes beyond 'the preserve of defence, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies.'⁹

⁵ Ministry of Defence, *Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000* (New Zealand House of Representatives, Wellington, New Zealand 1999).

⁶ Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, *New Zealand's National Security System* (New Zealand Government, Wellington, New Zealand 2011), p. 3; Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, *National Security System Handbook* (New Zealand Government, Wellington, New Zealand 2016), p. 7.

⁷ T. Johanson, *The Emperor's New Clothes: New Zealand's Whole of Government Approach to National Security*, Massey University Press, Manawatu, New Zealand 2014.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, *National Security System Handbook* (New Zealand Government, Wellington, New Zealand 2016), p. 9.

To achieve its broad approach to national security, the New Zealand government presents seven national security objectives in the *National Security Handbook*:¹⁰

- ensuring public safety,
- preserving sovereignty and territorial integrity,
- protecting physical and virtual lines of communication,
- strengthening international order to promote security,
- sustaining economic prosperity,
- maintaining democratic institutions and national values, and
- protecting the natural environment.¹¹

These objectives allow New Zealand's government agencies to identify potential contributions to national security operations and develop the appropriate capabilities to fulfil government and public expectations during a security response. Responsibility within central government for the governance of New Zealand's national security system lies with the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, which leads a three-tiered national security architecture.

New Zealand's National Security System operates at three levels. At the ministerial level, the Prime Minister chairs the Cabinet National Security Committee which coordinates and directs national responses to security crises affecting national security. This committee is the primary decision-making body of the National Security System. The second tier is the Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (Governance) [ODESC (G)] which is responsible for the identification and governance of national security risk, and that the appropriate capabilities and processes for mitigating and managing this risk are in place.¹² To support the ODESC (G) operationalisation of the National Security Committee's decisions, the Security and Intelligence Board and Hazard Risk Board focus specifically on external threats and domestic contingencies respectively.¹³ These boards are in turn supported by watch groups and working groups that are formed in response to potential, emergent or actual issues to provide 'situational clarity'.¹⁴

The New Zealand National Security System was developed in the post-9/11 international environment and as such reflects the expansive idea of security espoused in this era. The latest iteration, the *National Security Handbook*, provides broad guidance for officials involved with the system; however, it avoids stipulating a template for national security response. The deliberate avoidance of standard operating procedures has been validated by the unexpected and unprecedented security events that New Zealand has experienced in recent years.

¹⁰ Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, *New Zealand's National Security System* (New Zealand Government, Wellington, New Zealand 2011); Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, *National Security System Handbook* (New Zealand Government, Wellington, New Zealand 2016).

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

¹² Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, *New Zealand's National Security System* (New Zealand Government, Wellington, New Zealand 2011); Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, *National Security System Handbook* (New Zealand Government, Wellington, New Zealand 2016).

¹³ Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, *National Security System Handbook* (New Zealand Government, Wellington, New Zealand 2016).

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

New Zealand's National Security responses

Most of New Zealand's security risks originate from its volatile natural environment. Flooding, bush fires, minor earthquakes and tsunamis occur frequently and are most often managed at local or regional government level with the resources at their disposal. At times, central government may provide additional resources or national level capabilities to support these operations, but command and control of the response remains with the local authorities. Other security issues such as biosecurity risks or maritime accidents may require a specialised response and sit firmly within the expertise of a single government agency. In these cases, an appropriate agency such as Ministry of Primary Industries or Maritime New Zealand, will lead the response with support from other agencies when required.¹⁵ However, for security events of unusual magnitude, high complexity, or that present a systemic risk to New Zealand, central government will assume command to ensure the best outcome for its citizens.¹⁶ Four such events have occurred in New Zealand in the preceding decade: 2010/2011 Christchurch Earthquakes, 2019 Christchurch Mosque Shootings, 2019 Whakaari/White Island Volcanic Eruption, and 2020 COVID-19 Pandemic.

As one of New Zealand's nicknames, the Shaky Isles, suggests seismic activity is the national security issue that is most commonly experienced by its citizens. Whilst tremors are commonplace, the magnitude of a numerous recent earthquakes centred in the South Island have drawn national concern. The 7.1 magnitude earthquake which struck Christchurch at 4.35 a.m. on 4th September 2010 was the largest such event to strike an urban area since 1931.¹⁷ Fortunately, no fatalities were reported during this quake; however, significant damage to buildings and infrastructure did occur. Five months later, New Zealand's second largest city would not be so lucky. On 22nd February 2011, a 6.3 magnitude earthquake struck closer to the city centre itself and at a shallower depth which had a catastrophic effect on buildings already damaged in the September event. One hundred and eighty-five people lost their lives, with several thousand receiving injuries. Most casualties occurred during the collapse of the Canterbury Television and Pyne Gould buildings with the other deaths resultant of falling masonry, bricks, and rocks.¹⁸ The government declared a national state of emergency the following day and due to the continued risk, authorities used the New Zealand Defence Force to cordon off Christchurch's central business district. This cordon remained manned by the military and was in place until June 2013.¹⁹ Just as the physical and psychological impacts of the earthquakes were receding, Christchurch was again the location of a mass casualty event, this time manmade.

¹⁵ Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, *New Zealand's National Security System* (New Zealand Government, Wellington, New Zealand 2011); Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, *National Security System Handbook* (New Zealand Government, Wellington, New Zealand 2016).

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷ *September 2010 Canterbury (Darfield) Earthquake*, New Zealand History, September 2020, <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/culture/canterbury-earthquake-september-2010> [accessed: 16.03.2021].

¹⁸ *Christchurch Earthquake Kills 185*, New Zealand History, 22 February 2021, <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/page/christchurch-earthquake-kills-185> [accessed: 16.03.2021].

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

New Zealand's sense of security from violent terrorism was shattered on Friday 15th March, 2019, when Australian citizen, Brenton Tarrant, entered the Masjid Al Noor and Linwood mosques in Christchurch during Friday prayers and proceeded to kill 51 worshippers, leaving another 40 people wounded.²⁰ The killings, which were live streamed by Tarrant via Facebook, shocked most New Zealanders and much of the world. The New Zealand Police force and government responded quickly, arresting Tarrant at the scene and enacting gun reform legislation that severely restricted access to handguns and other weapons.²¹ On the day following the shootings, Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern announced that New Zealand's firearms laws would change.²² Less than a week after the Mosque attacks, Governor General, Dame Patsy Reddy, signed an order banning military style semi-automatic and assault rifles as well as large capacity magazines. The rapid introduction of these law changes was viewed by its opponents as an emotive overreaction that lacked the appropriate consultation of a democratic society.²³ Gun owners, however, have supported the Government's actions and participated in the buyback events that have occurred. New Zealand's firearms law changes remain a contentious issue and the prospect of further amendments will ensure the debate continues. The ever-present national security risk posed by New Zealand's natural environment became evident less than six months after the tragic events at the two mosques in Christchurch.

Whakaari/White Island, an active volcano in the Bay of Plenty, erupted on 9th December 2019 showering forty-seven tourists and guides with rocks and volcanic gases.²⁴ Twenty-two people died immediately or later in hospital from severe burns or respiratory damage, and many other survivors suffered extensive burns or significant injuries.²⁵ The surprising nature of the event meant the immediate rescue was ad hoc and undertaken by local resources. National level coordination was activated as the magnitude of the disaster became apparent, particularly as a number of international visitors were identified as victims. Once the initial rescue had been completed, the operational focus became the recovery of six bodies remaining on the island and two missing victims. A New Zealand Defence Force/New Zealand Police combined operation recovered the bodies from the Whakaari three days later; however, the missing bodies were never found.²⁶ Four months after this disaster, Coronavirus and COVID-19 were new words added to the New Zealanders' vocabulary.

Unlike other parts of the world, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on New Zealand has been limited. Only 22 deaths have been attributed to the virus and although there have been a number of citizens effected by the illness, most have been contained and treated successfully. The New Zealand government's strategy

²⁰ R. Azizian, T. Johanson, 'Finding the Democratic Balance', in: *Routledge Handbook of Democracy and Security*, eds. L. Weinberg, E. Francis, E. Assou, Routledge, London 2020.

²¹ *Ibidem*.

²² *Ibidem*.

²³ *Ibidem*.

²⁴ *Whakaari / White Island Eruption Kills 22*, New Zealand History, 9 December 2019, <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/page/whakaari-white-island-eruption-kills-22> [accessed: 16.03.2021].

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

²⁶ *Ibidem*.

has been one of elimination.²⁷ This approach has taken the form of strict border measures at international ports and airports as well as a series of national and regional lockdowns to isolate the virus and prevent widespread contamination. To support New Zealand's response, the National Security System was activated as the government determined that the 'scale, complexity and long-term nature of the impacts of COVID-19 have created a need for strong system leadership and governance to ensure that the response is well integrated, comprehensive and balanced.'²⁸ Initially, the response was controlled from the National Crisis Management Centre; however, in July 2020, the COVID-19 Group was established which 'provides central coordination and leadership across government.'²⁹ Despite not having any legislative or statutory responsibilities, the COVID-19 Group provides similar functions to ODESC but remains focussed on this particular security risk.³⁰ The biggest challenge in New Zealand's COVID-19 response has been the establishment and maintenance of Managed Isolation and Quarantine facilities (MIQ) as a mechanism for preventing external strains of the virus from entering the population. Whilst this has been largely successful, a number of outbreaks have occurred which have subsequently been traced to MIQ contacts unwittingly becoming infected; however, these have been quickly contained through an effective contact tracing system. In June 2020, Air Commodore Darryn Webb was appointed Head of Managed Isolation and Quarantine to address issues surrounding breaches of security at the facilities, and the New Zealand Defence Force assumed responsibility for MIQ sites after a significant personal data breach by a private security contractor.³¹ This level of NZDF commitment has been the organisation's largest deployment since stabilisation operations in East Timor in 1999.³²

The use of New Zealand's national security architecture in responding to the significant security events discussed above was largely successful. The centralised

²⁷ Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, *Brief to Incoming Ministers: Covid-19 Overview*, New Zealand Government, Wellington, New Zealand 2020.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 10.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 11.

³⁰ *Ibidem*.

³¹ M. Woods, *Next Steps for Managed Isolation and Quarantine Facilities*, news release, 19 June 2020, <https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/next-steps-managed-isolation-and-quarantine-facilities> [accessed: 7.05.2021]; *eadem*, *Government Strengthens Managed Isolation System*, news release, 28 June, 2020, <https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/government-strengthens-managed-isolation-system> [accessed: 7.05.2021]; *eadem*, 'Boosting Security Support at Managed Isolation Facilities and Maritime Border', news release, 19 August 2020, <https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/boosting-security-support-managed-isolation-facilities-and-maritime-border> [accessed: 7.05.2021]; *Managed Isolation and Quarantine Facilities to Get Boost in Defence Force Support*, Radio New Zealand, 19 August 2020, <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/423911/managed-isolation-and-quarantine-facilities-to-get-boost-in-defence-force-support> [accessed: 17.03.2021]; *Military Not Long-Term Fix for Border Problems*, newsroom, 24 August 2020, <https://www.newsroom.co.nz/military-not-a-long-term-fix-for-border-problems> [accessed: 20.03.2021].

³² M. Woods, *Next Steps for Managed Isolation and Quarantine Facilities*, news release, 19 June 2020, <https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/next-steps-managed-isolation-and-quarantine-facilities> [accessed: 7.05.2021]; *eadem*, *Government Strengthens Managed Isolation System*, *op. cit.*; *eadem*, *Boosting Security Support at Managed Isolation Facilities and Maritime Border*, *op. cit.*

nature of the national security system within the office of the Prime Minister allowed the multiagency responses to be formed and coordinated under clear lines of command and control. Although during the Mosque shootings and Whakaari eruption the ability for providing a national level response was limited due to their fleeting nature, the government efforts in the aftermath of the events was seen as key in mitigating the negative impacts on affected communities. Less satisfaction has been apparent in the responses to the Christchurch Earthquakes and management of COVID-19 MIQ.³³ This begs the questions of whether publication of a national security strategy by the New Zealand government would bring greater consistency to national security operational performance.

A New Zealand National Security Strategy?

The *New Zealand's National Security System* and *National Security Handbook* documents seek to enable a whole of government approach to national security operations across a broad spectrum of risks and threats.³⁴ These documents provide a clear explanation of New Zealand's national security architecture and provide the basis for multiagency cooperation during crisis responses.³⁵ The focus on clarifying proper processes comes at the expense of a clear definition of New Zealand's unique national security context and the articulation of the government's expectations of its security agencies within this environment.³⁶ The problems this lack of specificity creates for New Zealand's security orientated agencies was identified in the 2016 *Report of the First Independent Review of Intelligence and Security in New Zealand*.³⁷ The review concluded that an 'all hazards' approach to national security was too broad, and should be more focused towards 'protecting New Zealand's interests, including its economic and international security'.³⁸

³³ *Christchurch Five Years On: Have Politicians Helped or Hindered the Earthquake Recovery?*, The Conversation Australia, 19 February 2016, <https://theconversation.com/christchurch-five-years-on-have-politicians-helped-or-hindered-the-earthquake-recovery-53727> [accessed: 23.03.2021]; 'Christchurch: After the Earthquake, a City Rebuilt in Whose Image?', *The Guardian International Edition*, 27 January 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/jan/27/christchurch-after-earthquake-rebuild-image-new-zealand#:~:text=The%20government's%20response%20was%20to,responsible%20for%20managing%20the%20rebuild> [accessed: 23.03.2021]; *MIQ Website Crashes as People Try to Snag Vouchers to Come Home*, stuff, 5 March 2021, <https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/124446001/miq-website-crashes-as-people-try-to-snap-vouchers-to-come-home> [accessed: 23.03.2021].

³⁴ T. Johanson, 'New Zealand's National Security Coordination,' in: *New Zealand National Security: Challenges, Trends and Issues*, eds. W. Hoverd, N. Nelson, and C. Bradley, Massey University Press, Auckland, New Zealand 2017.

³⁵ *Ibidem*.

³⁶ *Ibidem*.

³⁷ Hon Sir Michael, Cullen KNZM and Dame Patsy Reddy DNZM, *Intelligence and Security in a Free Society: Report of the First Independent Review of Intelligence and Security in New Zealand*, New Zealand Government, Wellington, New Zealand 2016.

³⁸ *Ibidem*.

The lack of definitive strategic guidance inhibits security agencies' ability to reduce risk and enhance response readiness, which in turn leaves New Zealand's national security system largely reactionary in nature.³⁹ The breadth of potential security issues that are not specifically linked to particular department's accountabilities leaves room for misinterpretation and misunderstanding of the government's expectations of them in this area.⁴⁰ In the absence of an appropriate definition and direction from central government to develop unified understanding of their national security environment, New Zealand security agencies will operate in isolation and perceive security issues through their particular institutional lens. Operating in this way, it diverges from the New Zealand government's intent for applying the whole of government approach to national security presented in the national security system documentation.

The development and publication of a consolidated *national security strategy* document may be an appropriate bureaucratic device for enhancing coordination and efficiency with New Zealand's national security apparatus.⁴¹ The use of strategy documents to guide operational approaches is not without precedent in New Zealand's security sector; and the national Counterterrorism and Cyber Security strategies can be found on the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet's website. However, an overarching national security strategy from the central government would enhance New Zealand's national security system by providing clarity for security agencies around their required contributions to risk identification and pre-emption, as well as identify departmental responsibilities during specific crisis response events.

A national security strategy would be the articulation of the central government's conception of New Zealand's national security context to create common understanding of the country's particular security problem space. Additionally, specific strategic guidance to agencies within the document as to their priorities and responsibilities as part of the national security system would permit resources to be dedicated to identifying emergent security risks, thereby enabling a more effective response when, or if, they manifest. It is acknowledged that a degree of informal multiagency coordination occurs, and the successful national security responses to recent significant events indicate a strong commitment at the ground level to achieve the best possible result for affected communities. A centralised national security strategy would allow greater efficiency and coordination by addressing the command-and-control responsibilities and jurisdictional tensions that inevitably occur within high stress situations, prior to commencing an operation.

The explicit statement of central government's expectations within a consolidated strategy document should also drive greater prioritisation of national security responsibilities in relevant agencies. Being held accountable for specific national security objectives should persuade departments to critically analyse the national security implications within their sector in more depth to proactively identify emerging risks as early as possible to prevent or mitigate their impact. This

³⁹ T. Johanson, *op. cit.*

⁴⁰ *Ibidem.*

⁴¹ *Ibidem.*

change in approach should discard the current reactionary system for a more proactive methodology that identifies risks and threats earlier, thereby allowing increased preparation time and permitting the strongest possible response to be activated. The latter point will become increasingly important in the near future, as national security challenges continue to grow in complexity, uncertainty and volatility.

Conclusion

New Zealand has traditionally benefitted from its isolation to protect it from threats to its sovereignty and territory. The distance an actor would need to travel to threaten New Zealand would either have provided significant time for an effective defensive response to be prepared or made the cost of the undertaking far greater than potential benefits that could be accrued. The changes in the post-9/11 international system that see greater connectivity, and the capacity to impact national security without having to deploy large numbers of conventional capabilities, have removed New Zealand's façade of the 'tyranny of distance' as a defensive mechanism. External influences were the origins of the Christchurch Mosque shootings and COVID-19 pandemic that were two of New Zealand's most significant national security responses in the past two decades. This fact has not been lost on the New Zealand public and its government, and a greater interest in national security operations has developed in response to these incidents as well as the significant natural disasters that have also occurred. The national security system's response to the four events discussed in this article was overall a success; however, could it have been better? The absence of a consolidated national security strategy means that command and control issues and other tension points must be clarified, or crucial decisions made during the stress and uncertainty of a crisis. These circumstances can lead to delayed responses or suboptimal decision making in situations where citizens survival may be time-critical. This begs the question, should the New Zealand government meet the challenge and strengthen its national security system with a national security strategy?

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Kua takoto te manuka: mierzenie się z wyzwaniami ewolucji środowiska bezpieczeństwa Nowej Zelandii po 11 września 2001 roku

Streszczenie

W artykule przedstawiono ramy systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego Nowej Zelandii w obszarze reagowania na najważniejsze wydarzenia związane z zagrożeniami dla bezpieczeństwa państwa. Autor analizuje, w jaki sposób kontekst strategiczny polityki Nowej Zelandii wpływa na jej podejście do bezpieczeństwa narodowego oraz jak rząd definiuje bezpieczeństwo narodowe. Główne wydarzenia związane z bezpieczeństwem narodowym, takie jak trzęsienia ziemi w Christchurch w latach 2010–2011, zamachy na meczety tamże, erupcja wulkanu Whakaari na wyspie White oraz reakcja na COVID-19, zostały tak przedstawione, by podkreślić złożoność środowiska bezpieczeństwa narodowego Nowej Zelandii od września 2001 r. Artykuł zakończono wskazaniem korzyści wynikających ze skonsolidowania strategii bezpieczeństwa narodowego dla systemu bezpieczeństwa Nowej Zelandii.

Słowa kluczowe: koordynacja polityki bezpieczeństwa narodowego, Nowa Zelandia, bezpieczeństwo narodowe

Kua takoto te manuka: Meeting the challenges of New Zealand's post 9/11 strategic environment

Abstract

This article introduces New Zealand's national security framework for responding to significant security events. It examines how New Zealand's strategic context influences its approach to national security and how the government defines national security. The major national security events of 2010/2011 Christchurch Earthquakes, Christchurch Mosque Shootings, Whakaari/White Island eruption and COVID-19 Response are introduced to demonstrate the complexity of New Zealand's security environment since September 2001. Finally, the article concludes by examining the benefits of a consolidated national security strategy to New Zealand's national security system.

Key words: national security coordination, New Zealand, national security

Kua takoto te manuka: Die Herausforderungen des Strategiemfelds in Neuseeland nach dem 11. September *Zusammenfassung*

Dieser Text erläutert den nationalen Sicherheitsrahmen in Neuseeland, um das Land gegen wesentliche Sicherheitsbedrohungen zu wappnen. Er untersucht, ob der strategische Kontext Neuseelands den Umgang mit der nationalen Sicherheit beeinflusst und wie die Regierung nationale Sicherheit definiert. Die wichtigsten nationalen Zwischenfälle im Bereich der Sicherheit, d.h. die Erdbeben in Christchurch 2010/2011, den Terroranschlag auf zwei Moscheen in Christchurch, der Whakaari/White Island-Ausbruch und die Reaktion auf die COVID-19-Pandemie werden erörtert, um die Komplexität des neuseeländischen Sicherheitsumfelds seit September 2001 zu veranschaulichen. Der Text endet mit einer Erläuterung der Vorteile einer konsolidierten nationalen Sicherheitsstrategie für das nationale Sicherheitssystem Neuseelands.

Schlüsselwörter: Koordination der nationalen Sicherheit, Neuseeland, nationale Sicherheit

Kua takoto te manuka: решение проблем эволюции среды безопасности в Новой Зеландии после 11 сентября 2001 года *Резюме*

В статье изложена структура системы национальной безопасности Новой Зеландии в области реагирования на наиболее важные события, связанные с угрозами государственной безопасности. Автор анализирует, каким образом стратегический контекст политики Новой Зеландии влияет на ее подход к национальной безопасности и как правительство определяет национальную безопасность. Основные события, связанные с национальной безопасностью, такие как землетрясения в Крайстчерче в 2010–2011 гг., взрывы в мечетях, извержение вулкана Вакари на острове Уайт и меры реагирования на КОВИД-19, были изложены таким образом, чтобы подчеркнуть многогранность проблем национальной безопасности Новой Зеландии после 11 сентября 2001 года. В итогах статьи были указаны преимущества консолидации стратегии национальной безопасности для системы безопасности Новой Зеландии.

Ключевые слова: координация политики национальной безопасности, Новая Зеландия, национальная безопасность



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From Fear to Disorder. A Vision from Spain

Introduction: escaping Spain's peripheral syndrome

In 2001, *El País* was a daily newspaper with the highest circulation in Spain and, on 11th September, had two issues. The first, delivered before the terrorist attacks in the US, stressed on its front cover that Spain's Prime Minister Aznar organised a meeting with the 97 Spanish Ambassadors accredited by Spain across the world. This meeting aimed to direct and coordinate diplomatic activities in support of the future European Union Council Presidency that Spain was about to hold during the first half of 2002.

At that moment, Spain was involved in the challenge of consolidating her deserved place in international institutions, especially the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). After decades of Spain's peripheral syndrome¹, the purpose of increasing the Spanish presence and influence at the centre of those institutions was always on the Spanish governments' agendas, most of the times pursuing great ambitions but producing moderate tangible outcomes.

This paper will review the evolution of Spain's national security since 2001. Even with different approaches, depending on the political party in power, Spain's national security has had a common element. Spain has always wanted to be a relevant security actor, with a global reach, protecting her national interests through the main multilateral organizations. Therefore, enhancing Spain's role and influence

¹ E. Barber, *La Política Europea de España*, Ariel, Barcelona 1999, p. 19.

in each of these organizations has always been a strong national priority and the best option to protect her citizens.

Before the terrorist attacks of 11th September 2001, Spain had focused on trying to find outside a solution to the problems at home. It has been the philosophical discussion since Ortega y Gasset opened the debate at the beginning of the 20th century: Spain is the problem; Europe – the solution.² It was the time when Spain was trying to link the country's modernisation with the process of European integration. The main priorities were to gain credibility as a reliable partner, enhance the presence at every European institution according to Spain's relevance, and build the capacity to exercise leadership to promote and defend her national interests.³

The EU Council rotatory Presidency exercise is one of the best opportunities to 'satisfy the national preferences within the confines of its formally designated institutional role.'⁴ Spain would try to develop more significant influence in the EU that could support her potential growth in political and military stature within NATO. That was why Prime Minister Aznar organised the Ambassadors' meeting on that day.

As one of top priorities, Prime Minister Aznar's outline for the EU Council Presidency included fight against terrorism – a threat that, unfortunately, was not new to Spain as she was suffering terrorist attacks for many decades, especially by the terrorist group ETA.⁵ Spain's plan for this Presidency included the possibility to enlarge the EU with new members in Central and East Europe, an option that was strongly supported and promoted by Spain at that moment.

One of the main political effects of the terrorist attacks on 11th September 2001 and the US response in self-Defence was the disappearance of consensus both in NATO and the EU. The EU and NATO members' political stability changed as a result of the domestic tensions that emerged due to the different perceptions about how to prevent and fight against terrorist attacks. Spain was about to take the responsibility of the EU Council Presidency in a radically new political scenario, with a substantial impact on security and Defence.

Suppose we could paint a picture of Spain's security situation before the terrorist attacks would show the transformational moment the country was immersed in. Spain was coming from a military organisation only focused on territorial Defence, where the national Defence was only a matter of military concern. The globalisation process and the accession to NATO and the EU presented new opportunities and challenges for Spain's national security: opportunities to engage with allies and partners; and the challenges created by the asymmetric globalisation and the limitations to use conscription as the primary source of recruitment while engaging with allies and partners outside Spain. The greatest opportunity was the military contribution

² J. Ortega y Gasset, 'La pedagogía social como programa político', *Obras Completas, Tomo II*, Revista de Occidente, Madrid 1966, pp. 503–521.

³ O. Elgström (ed.), *European Union Council Presidencies: A Comparative Analysis*, Routledge, London 2003, Chapter 11.

⁴ *Ibidem*, Introduction.

⁵ Real Instituto Elcano, *Basque Terrorist Group ETA Disbands After 60 Years*, 2018, <https://blog.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/basque-terrorist-group-eta-disbands-after-60-years> [accessed: 29.03.2021].

to the UN-backed peace support operations which presented an excellent chance to help close the gap between civil society and the armed forces in Spain and rebuild trust and mutual civil-military understanding still weak at the time.

When the terrorist attacks in the US took place in 2001, Spain was involved in a profound transformational process to review her security and Defence frameworks and align them with the new security requirements faced by Spain as a member of NATO and the EU.

One of the most relevant documents Spain developed to transform and reorganise her national security was the 'Defence White Paper', published in 2000.⁶ The White Paper represented an unusual phenomenon because it was a product of an agreement between the two main political parties, the PP (People's Party) and the PSOE (Spanish Socialist Worker's Party), which included 308 out of the 350 representatives at the Congress of Deputies. Its purpose was to present a realistic and transparent outline of the Defence Policy in Spain, based on a solid political consensus within the Parliament. This consensus would allow the Government to define and execute long-term policies to transform the Spanish armed forces into a professional service, opening the door to a full access for women, and modernising the equipment to close the transformational gap between her allies and partners. It also delivered guidance on implementing the commitment to participate in the European Defence and Spain's full integration into NATO.⁷

The relevance of the White Paper stemmed from the broad national political agreement on the strategic environment and the security challenges, noting that globalisation was one of the essential characteristics of this environment, especially since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Globalisation was supposed to be a stabilising factor through free trade and economic interdependence, but in reality, it was a process that was not risk-free.⁸ The White Paper predicted a more stable global security environment because of the end of the antagonistic bipolarity, yet it identified new security challenges for the European security. This document also acknowledged Spain as an integrated element of the European collective security for the first time. The most relevant security challenges identified in this document, approved in 2000, were not limited to territorial Defence but to the potential conflicts Spain could be involved in together with allies and partners to defend their common values and shared national interests.

Finally, the White Paper proposed a strategic framework for the way-ahead, emphasising developing several strategic documents to tackle threats and challenges more comprehensively. The approval of successive National Security Strategies followed the White Paper and revealed different governments' views of the national security challenges and the prioritised options for response. The White Paper was a milestone in modern Spain's Security and Defence Policies, but it was not the only one. It was fully integrated and coordinated with the Foreign Policy defined in accordance with the guidelines of Spain's External Action Strategy.⁹ With strong

⁶ Spain's Ministry of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2000*, Madrid 2000.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 24.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 29.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 56.

leadership of the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, this comprehensive framework included the elements which would shape the first modern intent to define a National Grand Strategy, fully integrated with our allies and partners' strategies.

The age of fear. Spain after 11th September 2001

The terrorist attacks against the US eroded all the political consensus and long-term agreements to develop Spain's Grand Strategy. The attacks produced a violent impact on the collective psychology and the perception of security. The most visible consequence was the opening of an intense domestic political debate on who, how and where should respond to such attacks. This internal debate weakened the possibility of achieving consensus, as a polarisation process, seriously affecting the national stability, started in the nation and among political parties. The Age of Fear, characterised by the lack of a clear threat and the feeling that terrorists were now capable of attacking everybody at their homes, had now begun.

For Spain and her allies and partners, the fight against terrorism became a top priority. Consequently, the strategic option to use the military forces in ways broader than peace-keeping or peace-enforcing operations emerged on the national security agenda.

With the intention to follow the consensus path opened by the White Paper, the Spanish Ministry of Defence took the lead to develop a collective reflection process designed to help identify and develop the military capabilities required to meet Spain's Defence needs, to accomplish the Armed Forces mission and those shared with allies and partners. This initiative was published as the Strategic Defence Review (RED) in 2003.¹⁰ RED included a summary of Spain's vital national interests, aligned to her national values established in the Preamble to the Spanish Constitution from 1978. Moreover, it identified security challenges and stated that the national security was intrinsically and primarily linked to the security of the European continent, supporting a united Europe with the capability for autonomous decision-making and action in military affairs.¹¹ It was clear support for the EU continuous search to achieve the required strategic autonomy.

RED also anticipated most of today's security challenges (among others terrorism, climate change, environmental attacks, uncontrolled migrations and weapons of mass destruction) and called for a comprehensive and integrated approach to fight them. However, the domestic and international tensions caused by the political support and military contribution to the US operations in response to the terrorist attacks blocked many possibilities to intensify cooperation and fuelled domestic radicalisation.

In their book *Thinking the Twentieth Century*, Tony Judt and Timothy Snyder defined this period as the Age of Fear, characterised by a 'fear of an unknown future, and a fear that our current governments cannot any longer control the circumstances of

¹⁰ Spain's Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Defence Review*, Madrid 2003.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 42.

our lives.¹² Fear produces paralysis and the feeling of insecurity. Terrorism is just one element of this fear. In the end, it deteriorates a political consensus, both national and international, and can be used to exacerbate political and social radicalisation. One of the sources of such fear was citizens' difficulty to understand the threats, especially terrorism, and the disconnection between their views, the political and military definitions of such threats, and the ways to fight them. It is easier to understand the threat in a bipolar global competition, but in the transition to a unipolar moment, the threat perception blurs, and a lack of trust fuels the growth of political extremism.

During this Age of Fear, Spain developed additional security framework elements and approved several national laws and strategic documents. The first and most urgent step was to redefine the Government responsibilities on National Defence. The Parliament approved the Organic Law on National Defence 05/2005 to limit the Government's capacity to agree and launch military operations abroad without the approval of the National Congress.

As we have read in the previous paragraphs, the Age of Fear marked a turning point for Spain and broke the political consensus which was hard to reach. Prime Minister Aznar was one of the prominent political supporters of the US fight against terrorism, and many citizens did not fully understand this support. The path just opened by the White Paper and RED suffered a blow. During that time, the development of security and Defence policies and strategies was not supported by the same solid political consensus in Spain as within the leading security organisations in Europe.

Paradoxically, because of the political disagreement and the need to refine processes, that period was very productive for the development of documents assigning responsibilities and clarifying a strategic framework. Between 2013 and 2015, the National Security Council was established and made responsible for approving policies and strategies related to national security. Two other documents were also approved: the State External Action and Service, and the National Security Law 36/2015 which defines the concepts of National Security and National Security Policy, establishes the National Security System, and describes a new concept: 'the culture of National Security.' During that period, Spain revitalised the relevance of geography to exercise her global aspirations,¹³ as stressed in the National Security Strategy 2017 (NSS 2017). This document states that

Spain's national security is conditioned by its singular geostrategic position. The country's European, Mediterranean and Atlantic profile determines the importance of these regions for her security, stability, and prosperity. However, beyond its geostrategic environment, in the new international scenario, the contingencies and developments that arise in areas at a great distance from Spain's borders and its areas of immediate interest can also have an impact on its national security.¹⁴

¹² T. Judt with T. Snyder, *Thinking the Twentieth Century*, The Penguin Press, New York 2012, p. 613.

¹³ Government of Spain, *National Security Strategy 2017, A Shared Project by All and for All*, Departamento de Seguridad Nacional, Madrid 2017, pp. 37–51, https://www.dsn.gob.es/sites/dsn/files/2017_Spanish_National_Security_Strategy_0.pdf [accessed: 30.03.2021].

¹⁴ *National Security Strategy 2017, A Shared Project by All and for All*, p. 9.

Spain's National Security Strategies during the Age of Fear tried to combine, balance, and make sense of the different perspectives: to enhance her role in the new emerging Europe and to fulfil her ambition to achieve strategic autonomy; to lead and promote NATO to embrace a 360° security approach distributing the Alliance's centres of gravity also to the Mediterranean and the South; to support any multilateral cooperation in support of freedom, peace and security especially under the UN leadership; to emphasise that the transatlantic partnership with the US is vital for security in Spain and Europe; and finally, to be a bridge for cooperation with the Spanish American countries.

Nevertheless, the NSS 2017 also stresses the need to integrate many different elements and instruments of power to provide the appropriate level of security demanded by Spanish citizens. This is why this document calls to integrate all the actors to develop and implement a national strategy due to the multidimensional composition of the current threats and challenges. The Government of Spain considers that

National Defence, public security, and external action, supported by the State intelligence and information services, constitute key components of national security. However, many of the areas of special interest included in the Strategy, such as cybersecurity or energy security, require the action of not only these key components, but also of all levels of administration, and of society in general.¹⁵

At the end of the Age of Fear, Spain has a well-developed strategic framework and a strong position in international organisations related to European security. Yet, Spain has not fully developed the concept of 'security culture'. Changing a country's culture is a complex process which requires efforts and resources, but which could be the cornerstone of national security during the coming Age of Disorder.

Age of disorder. Building security culture and resilience

We don't know when the Age of Disorder started. However, it is characterised by a period of growing entropy, with the emergence of a new global system which Sean McFate defines as a 'durable disorder',¹⁶ which contains rather than solves problems. It is a transition from a unipolar world to another that could be multipolar, with the risk of non-polar gaps between those shifts, and the exacerbated uncertainty and volatility of security during the transition between phases. McFate tries to describe the main characteristics of this period when he writes

This condition will define the coming Age. The world will not collapse into anarchy; however, the rules-based order we know will crumble and be replaced by something more organic and wild. Disorder has taken over the Middle East and Africa, significant portions of Asia and Latin America, and is creeping into Europe. Soon it may be in North America.¹⁷

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 14.

¹⁶ S. McFate, *The New Rules of War*, William Morrow, New York 2019, p. 15.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

Strategic atrophy of the West also characterises this new Age. An inadequate focus on the military solutions to problems that may have many other dimensions produced a degree of strategic incompetence.¹⁸ The trees, representing the conflicts Western countries engaged in during the Age of Fear, made us unprepared to see the forest, which is the modern non-conventional conflict. During the Age of Fear, Western countries, including Spain, were not able to develop real Grand Strategies with full integration of the instruments of power, especially diplomatic, military, economic and information ones.¹⁹ The chief reaction against the fear was prompt application of the military tool to solve the problem. It is a natural reaction as the military is an ever-ready machinery which sometimes is the only tool available. Nonetheless, last decades have shown that today, the most effective weapons are not bullets, but non-kinetic elements like information, refugees, ideology, and time; and these elements are being weaponised by adversaries.²⁰

According to the Deutsche Bank 2020 report on the Age of Disorder,²¹ we are at the end of the second era of globalisation and the beginning of a new 10-year structural super-cycle that may shape everything from economies to asset prices, politics, to our general way of life. In terms of geopolitics, the tension between the US and China will increase, as China continues on the path to restoring its historic role as a global economic superpower while not willing to incorporate the values offered by Western liberalism, preferring its own set of values instead.

It could also be 'a make-or-break decade for Europe', with potential for further integration and post-COVID-19 stress effects that may increase economic and political divergences.²²

It is difficult to predict how Spain will go through this new Age. Based on the current process to update two fundamental documents of the National Security framework, we can try to anticipate some of the main guiding principles. These documents are the future External Action Strategy and the future National Security Strategy.

The External Action Strategy will encourage 'a more federal European Union' with greater strategic autonomy, competence over more policy areas, and an increase in the use of qualified majorities rather than unanimous votes.²³ The four main guiding principles of Spain's future external action will be: 'More Europe', with a more integrated and autonomous Europe that plays a leading role in world affairs; 'Better Multilateralism', with Spain as a facilitator of better global governance and a manager of interdependence; 'Strategic Bilateralism', which is selective in prioritising our bilateral relations; and a 'Commitment to Solidarity' through a new vision of development cooperation.²⁴

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 13.

¹⁹ H. Lasswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*, MacGraw-Hill, New York 1958, p. 204.

²⁰ S. McFate, *The New Rules of War...*, p. 16.

²¹ J. Reid, et al., *The Age of Disorder – the new era for economics, politics and our way of life. Summary*, Deutsche Bank, 9 September 2020, https://www.dbresearch.com/servlet/reweb2.ReWEB?rwsite=RPS_EN-PROD&rwbj=ReDisplay.Start.class&document=PROD000000000511857 [accessed: 29.03.2021].

²² *Ibidem*.

²³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation, *Press Release 09*, 26 January 2021, http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/en/SalaDePrensa/NotasdePrensa/Paginas/2021_NOTAS_P/20210126_NOTA009.aspx [accessed: 29.03.2021].

²⁴ *Ibidem*.

Similarly, the National Security Department started a process to update Spain's National Security Strategy. The process will include the participation of many different institutions, trying to achieve a solid consensus on where to build the future national Grand Strategy. The Joint Parliamentary Commission participates in the process, bringing on board a majority of the Parliamentary political groups, and many other institutions are invited to contribute.

Together with the development of the future National Security Strategy, an Integral Plan for the National Security Culture will be developed for the first time, incorporating citizens as well as regional and local authorities into a debate on national security issues, and promoting mutual trust and better understanding.

At the same time, Spain will participate in the development of strategies by NATO and the EU, aimed at influencing their strategic thinking in a way that they are better aligned with her national strategic security perimeter. This perimeter must consider initiatives such as the NATO 360° approach to expand the allied focus resourcefully to the South, and the EU Strategic Compass which the EU is developing through a multidimensional and comprehensive process. Spain will defend the security of the Mediterranean Sea, North of Africa and the Middle East as the key regions for the future European security; and will try to include these regions in the front line of any strategy with her allies and partners.

Conclusions. Spain's commitment to the European security will prevail during durable disorder

Strong leaders are essential to progress and survive in the global disorder. Yet, no leaders can be strong if they are not fully accountable to their citizens. Today, there is an urgent need to develop new frameworks which help develop strategic leaders' capability to understand and analyse the features of complex and adaptive systems. Undoubtedly, this will help define strategies that can prevail in highly competitive strategic environments defying permanent solutions.²⁵

Spanish leaders will face dangerous environments collaboratively, trying to lead or promote cooperation to solve domestic and international problems. The need for a Grand Strategy will be more present today as the complexity of future international relations will require strategic guidance and well-defined long-term political goals which are not always instantly apparent.

Spain might need to be ready to play dual-track approaches to face complex security challenges. This dual-track approach means that Spain ought to be prepared to cooperate, compete and even tolerate some level of hybrid confrontation, below the level of armed conflict, and all this with other international actors, state or non-state. It will have to be possible to anticipate or, at least, to manage the consequences of the global, collective challenges of this new kind of multidimensional, asymmetric international relations.

²⁵ T. Galvin and D. Watson (eds.), *Strategic Leadership. Primer for Senior Leaders*, 4th ed., US Army War College Carlisle, p. 13.

Spain's future Grand Strategy will probably include all the available tools to produce statecraft. The traditional Spanish means of Diplomacy and Military will be complemented by enlargement of the frequently smaller instruments of power, Information and Economic. All of them combined (DIME) will be fully integrated into the strategic approaches that the EU and NATO will take to find efficient ways to deter or respond to hybrid interferences. Spain will be a significant actor in developing future strategies by both organisations, ensuring that national interests and prioritised regions are adequately considered in the joint efforts.

Spain is a key security actor with a global reach.²⁶ Most of the times, dialogue and strategic empathy allow finding common grounds to collaborate with others and to anticipate the danger of global challenges. Soft power, the power of attraction and influence, is a source of resilient dynamism. Using this national power component wisely could be more potent than coercion, reducing the risk of conflict escalation. But the use of soft power alone may not be enough in an environment of continuous hybrid interferences. How to deter such behaviours will be a crucial part of a future security debate. New concepts, such as democratic deterrence, must be explored to define how democratic values cannot be just the vulnerabilities of the system but can also work as opportunities and strengths.²⁷

Resilience will be one of the magical words in Spain's strategic documents. Resilience can only be achieved if based on the broadest consensus and it will require adapting national and international frameworks to the new requirements. The future European security must be built on a resilient foundation which will need very creative formulas to adapt the European security architecture. It means that all the relevant actors sit around the same table with a firm voice to express their concerns and to listen and accommodate others' concerns.

Under the US security umbrella and through gradual European integration, the last decades of peace and prosperity helped Spain forget her peripheral syndrome and isolationism. Today, Spain has no fear of the future but has to learn how to live in a world of durable disorder produced by the transition of global power and the unstoppable force of various forms of globalisation. Spain cannot escape the Age of Disorder. A new world order is probably growing, with plenty of durable disorders, but it might develop into a more predictable and stable equilibrium.

Spain is a strong supporter of the progressive European integration and autonomy, synchronising the security component with NATO and preferring multinational solutions to complex and adaptive security challenges. New security challenges do not recognise physical borders, and joint efforts to fight those challenges will be indispensable, including collaborative efforts with potential economic or military adversaries. Nevertheless, geography still matters, and Spain's privileged position as a bridge between Europe, Africa and America must be taken into consideration when defining new security strategies. Spain will play her leadership role to reinforce those geographical and historical connections.

²⁶ *National Security Strategy 2017. A Shared Project by All and for All*, pp. 38–53.

²⁷ M. Wigell, 'Democratic Deterrence: How to Dissuade Hybrid Interference', *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2021, pp. 49–67.

To summarise the main components of the Spanish approach to security during the Age of Disorder, we can stress three key priorities: to transform the culture of security to allow citizens to understand the challenges of the new era; to extensively use strategic empathy in her international interactions, always finding a place to accommodate the others' interests and priorities when developing joint strategies; and to support and promote further European integration to enable the EU to be a key political actor with the autonomy to protect its security requirements. The Age of Disorder will create tensions among allies and partners. Those three priorities can only be effective when the transatlantic connection is based on a solid alliance of understanding and trust. The partnership with the US has allowed Spain and Europe to grow and live in peace for many decades. The discrepancies between Europe and the US are natural amid competition, but the shared values that frame their respective Grand Strategies are strong and must allow them to face the challenges posed to democracies in the Age of durable Disorder.

The Age of Disorder, characterised by the decline of the international liberal order aggravated by the COVID19 pandemic effects, could produce the Westlessness²⁸ and the end of the US as the only superpower. Spain is in the front line of European security and will continue her commitment to achieving the level of security required by her citizens, even during a durable disorder.

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²⁸ Munich Security Conference, *Munich Security Report 2020. Westlessness*, February 2020, https://securityconference.org/assets/user_upload/MunichSecurityReport2020.pdf [accessed: 29.03.2021].

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Od strachu do chaosu. Spojrzenie z Hiszpanii

Streszczenie

Po wielu dekadach pozostawania na uboczu głównego nurtu politycznego w ramach NATO oraz Unii Europejskiej, na początku XXI wieku w Hiszpanii przyjęto tzw. Białą Księgę Bezpieczeństwa (The Defence White Paper). Jej głównym przesłaniem było określenie możliwości realizacji dalekosiężnych celów w sferze bezpieczeństwa, co pozwoliłoby na transformację hiszpańskich Sił Zbrojnych i zmniejszenie dystansu między sojusznikami i partnerami. Atak na Centrum Handlu Światowego był wielkim szokiem dla społeczeństwa hiszpańskiego, efektywnie wpływając na zaburzenie procesu zmian środowiska bezpieczeństwa w Hiszpanii. Autor charakteryzuje wysiłek hiszpańskiego rządu na drodze do przezwyciężenia wyzwań w tzw. Okresie Chaosu (Age of Disorder). Wskazuje także na przyjęte w Hiszpanii rozwiązania pozwalające na uporządkowanie i kontrolę sytuacji w sferze bezpieczeństwa narodowego.

Słowa kluczowe: Hiszpania, Biała Księga Bezpieczeństwa, bezpieczeństwo, chaos, WTC, Westnessless, DIME

From Fear to Disorder. A Vision from Spain

Abstract

After decades of Spain's peripheral syndrome, Spanish authorities tried to increase her presence and influence in NATO and the European institutions. In 2000, the Government approved the Defence White Paper, opening a path of political consensus to allow the Government to define and execute long-term policies to transform Spain's armed forces and close the transformational gap with her allies and partners. The attacks on 11th September 2001 caused a terrible shock to the Spanish population. The fear created by

terrorism, and the proper way to react against such a threat, broke the successful consensus achieved just one year before. The growth of global powers candidates, with an opposed set of values and interests, results in a transition to the Age of Disorder. Spain is facing this Age without fear. She is strongly committed to European integration and will prioritise finding common grounds with allies and partners to have a stronger joint European position to overcome the turbulence of the unstable transition of power and face together the global challenges such as COVID-19. Spain is reviewing her security strategy. NATO and the EU are also in similar processes. Spain will use her leadership and strategic empathy to secure her national interests, allowing others to accommodate their interests as well. A substantial element of the future National Security Strategy will be to enhance the security culture among the citizens, to help them better understand the threats and the options to deter or respond against aggression or hybrid interferences.

Key words: Spain, White Paper, Mediterranean Sea, Europe, Resilience, DSN, ESN

Von der Angst zum Chaos. Eine Vision aus Spanien *Zusammenfassung*

Nach einem Jahrzehnte lang währenden Peripheriesyndrom war die spanische Regierung bestrebt, ihre Präsenz und ihren Einfluss in der NATO und den europäischen Institutionen zu erhöhen. Im Jahr 2000 verabschiedete die Regierung das Weißbuch der Verteidigung und ebnete so den Weg zu einem politischen Konsens, um langfristige Politikstrategien zur Transformation der spanischen Armee zu definieren und umzusetzen und die transformationsbedingte Kluft zwischen Spanien und seinen Verbündeten und Partnern zu schließen. Die Terroranschläge vom 11. September 2001 erschütterten die spanische Bevölkerung sehr. Die Angst vor dem Terrorismus und die geeignete Reaktion auf diese Gefahr brachen den erfolgreichen Konsens, der erst im Vorjahr erzielt worden war. Der Aufstieg von potenziellen Weltmächten mit entgegengesetzten Werten und Interessen führte zum Übergang ins Zeitalter des Chaos. Spanien steht dieser Ära ohne Angst gegenüber. Das Land unterstützt die europäische Integration kompromisslos und wird die Suche nach Gemeinsamkeiten mit Verbündeten und Partnern vorantreiben, um eine stärkere gemeinsame europäische Position zu erreichen, die Turbulenzen des instabilen Wandels der Machtverhältnisse zu überwinden und gemeinsam globale Herausforderungen (z.B. COVID-19) anzugehen. Spanien überarbeitet aktuell seine Sicherheitsstrategie. Auch NATO und EU durchlaufen derzeit ähnliche Prozesse. Spanien wird seine Führungsposition und strategische Empathie nutzen, um eigene nationale Interessen zu sichern und auch anderen die Verfolgung ihrer Interessen zu ermöglichen. Ein wesentliches Element der zukünftigen nationalen Sicherheitsstrategie wird sein, eine Sicherheitskultur in der Bevölkerung zu verankern, damit die Menschen Gefahren besser verstehen und Optionen einschätzen können, um gegen Aggression oder hybride Einflussnahmen vorzugehen oder zu reagieren.

Schlüsselwörter: Spanien, Weißbuch, Mittelmeer, Europa, Belastbarkeit, DSN, ESN

От страха до беспорядка. Взгляд из Испании *Резюме*

После многих десятилетий пребывания в стороне от политического мейнстрима НАТО и Европейского Союза, в начале XXI века в Испании была принята так называемая «Белая книга безопасности» (The Defence White Paper). Ее основной посыл заключался в указании возможности достижения долгосрочных целей в области

безопасности, что позволит трансформировать испанские вооруженные силы и привести к более тесному сотрудничеству с союзниками и партнерами. Нападение на Всемирный торговый центр (ВТЦ) было большим потрясением для испанского общества и значительным образом повлияло на процессы изменения среды безопасности в Испании. В статье дана характеристика усилий испанского правительства, направленных на преодоление проблем в так называемый «период хаоса» (Age of Disorder), а также рассмотрены принятые в Испании решения, позволяющие упорядочить и контролировать ситуацию в сфере национальной безопасности.

Ключевые слова: Испания, Белая книга безопасности, безопасность, хаос, ВТЦ, Westnessless, DIME



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The Fragmented Middle East: Persistent Insecurity, Rising Instability

Introduction

Twenty years after 9/11, the Middle East, at the heart of international security issues since the Twin Towers attack, looks more fragmented, unstable and insecure than ever. The War on Terror launched by the Bush administration, regional and international rivalries, local turmoil and the proliferation of non-states actors turned the Middle East into the Balkans of the 21st century.

Samuel Makinda defines security as 'the preservation of the norms, rules, institutions and values of society'.¹ He argues that all the institutions, principles and structures associated with society and its people should be protected from military and non-military threats. National security can be characterized as the ability of a state to ensure the protection and defence of its citizens. This description should not be limited to physical security, but it also needs to include human security, defined by the General Assembly resolution 66/290 as an 'approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people'.² Twenty years after 9/11, these challenges seem far from being addressed by local governments in the Middle East.

Thus, in this chapter and through case studies, we will analyse how Middle Eastern states perceive their national security and how they are struggling to cope with various challenges since the 9/11 attack.

¹ S. Makinda, 'Sovereignty and Global Security', *Security Dialogue* 1998, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 281–292.

² United Nations, *Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 10 September 2012*, 2012, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/476/22/PDF/N1147622.pdf?OpenElement> [accessed: 19.02.2021].

Iraq: Perpetual Violence

By invading Iraq in 2003, the US government hoped to install a contagious democracy in the region. Soon after the invasion, Iraq started to witness the emergence of a sectarian conflict. In January 2005, for the first time in fifty years, multipartite elections took place. A Kurdish president was elected, and a sectarian quota system was installed: a Kurdish President of the Republic, a Shia Prime Minister and a Sunni President of the Parliament.³

The Sunni-Shia conflict which emerged took a territorial speed, the Shia won the Bagdad battle and expelled the Sunni populations from mixed districts: the capital became mostly inhabited and dominated by the Shia. From the very beginning, this sectarian conflict was accompanied by continuous bomb attacks that remain a main characteristic of the Iraqi daily life until today. Unemployment, corruption, nepotism and insecurity became inherent to the Iraqi society, as poverty and chaos turned into another security challenge for the government.⁴ Combined with these factors, the marginalization of the Sunni population played a big role in the territorial and recruitment expansion of ISIL who took control of many oil-rich areas and established itself as a competitor to the Iraqi state, with its own rules and economic policies, by expanding its territory towards the rest of Iraq and Syria. The recruitment policy and terrorist attacks of ISIL became not only a national security issue for Iraq, but an international one given the transnational nature of this actor, its actions all over the world and its violation of Human Rights.⁵

Even though ISIL was declared defeated in 2019, it has found a safe haven in an ungoverned part of Iraq. Moreover, Al-Qaeda and affiliates still remain a threat, as in some regions there has been a resurgence in their presence, due to a common ideology.⁶

Fragilized by its internal divisions and by the disastrous consequences left by ISIL, Iraq is today a battlefield of regional powers, mainly the Shia Iran and the Sunni Saudi Arabia, both of whom are able to mobilize the Iraqi population to act according to their interests. Hence, the Iraqi national security faces many challenges. From human security to terrorism, to regional interference and national disintegration, the Iraqi government, accused by its own society of corruption and nepotism, has to define a strategy that encompasses the various elements threatening its national security. Nevertheless, it's the disintegration of the Iraqi state itself that played a big role in the emergence of these security issues, and it would be an impossible mission to the Iraqi state to face these matters with concrete and efficient measures.

³ P.J. Luizard, 'Irak: une décennie de violence (2003–2014)', in: B. Badie and D. Vidal, *Nouvelles guerres : comprendre les conflits du XXI^e siècle*, Paris 2016, pp. 265–274.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵ S. Houck, et al., 'Understanding What Makes Terrorist Groups' Propaganda Effective: An Integrative Complexity Analysis of ISIL and Al Qaeda', *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 2017, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 105–118.

⁶ FATF, *FATF Monitoring of Terrorist Financing Risks and Actions Taken to Combat ISIL, Al-Qaeda and Affiliates Financing*, 2018, <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/methodsandtrends/documents/isil-alqaeda-affiliates-financing-update.html> [accessed: 3.03.2021].

Syria: A Decade of Civil and Proxy Wars

In March 2011, on the walls of Deraa in the south of the country students and teenagers wrote the slogan chanted in all Arab streets in the Arab Spring context: 'The people want the fall of the regime'. They were arrested by the security services and tortured. As a result of this act, demonstrations spread across the country. Rapidly, these demonstrations transformed into a civil war opposing pro- and anti-regime fractions. Fragilized, the Syrian state rapidly became a battlefield for other regional and international powers.⁷

On the regional level, the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia found its way to the Syrian territory. Pro-Assad, Iran got heavily involved in the war by sending its guards and through the Iran-financed Lebanese Hezbollah. Saudi Arabia decided to get involved by financing Islamist groups fighting against the Syrian regime. Turkey took advantage to invade the north of the country, with the US permission, against the Kurdish population.⁸ By supporting the regime militarily and politically, Russia saw in the war an opportunity to affirm its presence in the Middle East.⁹

Like its Iraqi neighbour, the fragilization of the Syrian state led to the proliferation of non-state actors. The chaotic situation was seized by ISIL in its territory expansion, leading to many crimes against humanity and to a partial destruction of Palmyra, one of the world's heritage sites.¹⁰ Between ISIL's expansion and the consequences of the war, many Syrians had to flee their country, leading to the largest refugee and displacement crisis of our time.¹¹ In a country where the population is either getting massacred or has to flee, the territory getting invaded and shared between the regional and international powers, and the infrastructure and sites getting destroyed, it becomes impossible to define one national security issue. The regime's main security issue is to remain in power and ensure control and sovereignty over the territory. The population wants to get back home without having to worry about being tortured or killed by any of the war protagonist. However, the refugee crisis has created another security dilemma not only for Syria, but also for the countries hosting refugees.

Twenty years after 9/11, Syria became an epitome of the proliferation of terrorism, crimes against humanity, territory expansionism and proxy wars. Given the crisis' impact on neighbouring countries, it becomes clear that one country's national security can impact other countries' national security. As a neighbouring country, Lebanon has had to adapt to a new reality threatening its national security, already shaken by other factors.

⁷ H. Moodrick-Even Khen, N.T. Boms and S. Ashraph, 'Introduction: An Overview of Stakeholders and Interests', in: *The Syrian War: Between Justice and Political Reality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2020, pp. 1–8.

⁸ *Ibidem*, 'The Syrian Neighbourhood', pp. 163–240.

⁹ R. Hinnebusch, A. Saouli, *The War for Syria: Regional and International Dimensions of the Syrian Uprising*, Routledge, London 2020, 326 p.

¹⁰ United Nations, *UN News*, 2017, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/01/549902-alarmed-destruction-palmyra-security-council-reiterates-need-stamp-out-hatred> [accessed: 24.02.2021].

¹¹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Syria Emergency*, 2017, <https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html> [accessed: 24.02.2021].

Lebanon: The 'De-statization' of the National Securities

The Syrian crisis has direct repercussions on Lebanon. The arrival of a massive number of refugees fragilized a country already struggling with its own identity.

After the Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in 2000, Lebanon enjoyed quite a calm and stable situation until the assassination of Rafic Hariri, former Prime Minister, in 2005. The assassination, followed by a series of bomb attacks, led to the reappearance of sectarian tensions, once between Christians and Muslims, but this time, it was predominantly the Shia to the Sunni populations¹² opposing each other. A new national security dilemma emerged: for some, mostly the Sunni, the main culprit was the Syrian government, for others, mainly the Shia, it was Israel. As a matter of fact, the Israeli threat reappeared in 2006 with the July War in which Israel opposed Hezbollah.¹³ Hezbollah also got involved in the Syrian war along with the Syrian regime, raising the question of a non-state actor acting on behalf, and without the consent, of the government.

These wars have shown that the Lebanese government is not the only national actor who decides peace and war, leading to the de-statization of the Lebanese foreign policy and of the perception of threat.¹⁴ Thierry Balzacq argues that it is hard to define a threat while talking about national security¹⁵ and the Lebanese case is a concrete example. With Syria and Israel both considered as threats, the securitization discourses have divided the Lebanese populations and political leaders into two main camps: those who are pro-Syrian and consider Israel to be the main threat against national security; and those who are anti-Syrian and therefore view the Syrian government, obliged to withdraw its army from Lebanon under the 2005 UNSC resolution 1559, as the main menacing actor against the Lebanese sovereignty.

With Syria and Israel perceived as main threats to the national security, the division of the Lebanese political scene is also due to the Iranian Saudi rivalry in the region. Consequently, in its official discourse, Lebanon avoids treating any of these regional powers as threats to its national security because the Lebanese populations have not reached a consensus about this national security concept itself: the Shia and their allies would consider an alliance with Iran as a guarantee to Lebanon's national security, while the Sunni and their allies would see Saudi Arabia as the regional power whose policy aligns with the Lebanese national security.

With the Syrian civil war and the flood of Syrian refugees, a new security dimension has been added: how would a country in an already tough economic situation respond to the influx of almost two million refugees? Do some of them represent a terrorist threat and are part of ISIL or other extremist groups? The refugee

¹² A. Issa, 'Le PNUD au Liban: l'impossible gouvernance', Master's Thesis, Sciences Po Paris, 2015, pp. 49–50.

¹³ H. Wilkins, 'The 2006 war in context', in: *The making of the Lebanese foreign policy. Understanding the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli war*, Routledge, London 2013, pp. 59, 64–65.

¹⁴ A. Issa, 'La Force intérimaire des Nations Unies au Liban : essai d'explication de la pérennité institutionnelle', PhD Thesis, Sciences Po Paris, 2019, pp. 125–131.

¹⁵ T. Balzacq, 'Qu'est-ce que la sécurité nationale ?', *Revue internationale et stratégique* 2003/4, no. 52, pp. 33–50.

crisis created tensions between the host society and refugees, the latter becoming a national security issue for the Lebanese society who already experienced the impact of the Palestinian refugees whose role was determinant in the Lebanese wars (1975–1990) and who caused another threat to national security in 2007 when the Lebanese army had to interfere against an extremist group in the Nahr el Bared refugee camp.¹⁶

If the different threats mentioned above are external, the current economic crisis accompanied by the 4th August 2020 explosion in Beirut gave rise to an internal threat to national security, caused by political leaders' negligence towards their population. Therefore, the sectarian structure of the Lebanese society makes it quite complicated to define what is and what is not a threat to the national security, both the population and the political leaders being divided and unable to devise a common definition of their national security strategy.

Other countries in the region might not have the sectarian characteristic of the Lebanese society, but also need to deal with both international and external threats. Such is the case of Egypt.

Egypt: Internal and External Threats

Egypt was one of the first countries to be impacted by the Arab Spring. After thirty years in the office as president, Hosni Mubarak had to step down. In June 2012, Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, was elected president. However, a year later, driven by his attempt to pass an Islamic-leaning constitution, mass protests took place and a coup d'état, led by General Abdel Fattah el Sisi, deposed Morsi.¹⁷

In 2014, Sisi was elected president and promptly established a military dictatorship. Since then, national security became more endangered by both national and regional threats. On the local level, the Muslim Brotherhood threat, accompanied by terrorist activities in the Sinai, steered the security policy towards repressing the opposition, mostly the Muslim Brotherhood, and acting against the terrorist groups in the Sinai.¹⁸

This national security strategy also applies to Egypt's regional preoccupations. With both Qatar and Turkey supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt has had to form an alliance with Saudi Arabia and the UAE who both consider the organization to be a terrorist group. In relation to this alliance and this threat, the Libyan neighbour causes a security concern for Egypt, as Islamist groups, supported by Turkey, threaten the western borders.

Not only does Egypt need to secure the borders from the west and the east, but it also has to face a problem in the south, with Ethiopia building the Grand Ethiopian

¹⁶ A. Ramadan, 'Destroying Nahr el-Bared: Sovereignty and Urbicide in the Space of Exception', *Political Geography* 2009, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 153–163.

¹⁷ B. De Smet, 'Revolution and Restoration', *Gramsci on Tahrir: Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Egypt*, Pluto Press, London 2016, pp. 205–223.

¹⁸ L. Herman, 'Sisi, the Sinai and Salafis: Instability in a Power Vacuum', *Middle East Policy* 2016, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 95–107.

Renaissance Dam and threatening Egypt's allocations of the waters of the Nile River. Apart from the dispute between the two countries, with Sudan supporting Egypt on this matter, Egypt might suffer from water problems, which could, in turn, lead to other security issues, if no agreement can be reached. A potential water war cannot be excluded if the actors involved are not able to find a solution and it is in this context that Egypt is increasing its military activities, as demonstrated by the 'Sword of Arabs' and the 'Nile's Eagles – 1' military exercises with its allies.¹⁹

Needing to cope with both internal and external security issues, Egypt has to rely on its military capacities, regional alliances and repressing any opposition to the government. The last issue, however, has become the ground for accusing the Egyptian government of violating human rights and the question whether human rights violation can be tolerated to ensure national security remains debatable in the Egyptian case, as the Egyptian government is still ignoring all the accusations against its methods.

Recommendations on the upcoming security threats within the next 10–25 years

It's hard to give concrete recommendations to states suffering from internal and external threats. In the Lebanese, Syrian and Iraqi cases, we have noticed a lack of national cohesion among the populations, which makes it complicated to establish a national security strategy. In the Egyptian case, to ensure what it perceives as national security, the government is committing numerous human rights violation acts.

Nevertheless, it is beyond doubt that such a strategy should be devised for the long term. In fact, the states' national interests are disconnected from their populations', as the perception of threat and security, focusing on the physical and military aspects in general, is mostly related to human security and basic needs of the populations. Hence, development policies and human security should be privileged, as the main threat to national security comes from the lack of satisfying basic needs. Populations in need turn to other actors who are able to fulfil these needs, such as non-state actors and warlords, which can lead to a massive recruitment for terrorist and para-state groups. Building competent national institutions able to cope with various challenges is a must. Therefore, this institutions-building needs more international cooperation from actors such as the UN, the EU and the World Bank in order to ensure lasting impacts and transparency, as those countries suffer from enormous corruption and clientelism, and don't seem capable of implementing such reforms without international support.

Another important aspect to improve is civil and civic education so people could learn to accept each other and avoid being manipulated by internal and external actors based on their religious or political beliefs or any other consideration that can

¹⁹ L. Seleshie, *Is Egypt's army adapting to growing regional and domestic threats?*, 3 December 2020, <https://www.theafricareport.com/52787/is-egypts-army-adapting-to-growing-regional-and-domestic-threats> [accessed: 28.02.2021].

endanger national security. The Middle Eastern states need to work on both their state and nation building processes.

Conclusion

To sum up, twenty years after 9/11, the Middle East is more fragmented and divided because of regional and national rivalries. The Arab Spring's demonstrations didn't have the impact they intended, resulting in either the consolidation or the establishment of dictatorships, a massive refugee crisis, a tougher social and economic situation, as well as the proliferation of terrorism and non-states actors that endanger national security even more. The transnational aspect of these threats creates an interdependence between these countries, as one's internal security issues can widely affect the others.

Needing to cope with many challenges, Middle Eastern states are yet to find a proper strategy to ensure their national security but have to think about a long-term plan in a state and nation-building context to limit the impacts of the state's disintegration from both up and down.

The national institutions' fragility, combined with a lack of human security and efficient development policies, may lead to further political instability and social unrest. Middle Eastern states have to increase their cooperation with international institutions who should ensure that their projects and public policies are adequate to the populations' needs and are being correctly and efficiently implemented in the region in accordance with recommendations.

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Podzielony Bliski Wschód: trwała niepewność, rosnąca niestabilność

Streszczenie

Po ataku na Centrum Handlu Światowego (World Trade Center – WTC) we wrześniu 2001 r. Bliski Wschód stał się centralnym punktem amerykańskiej interwencji woj-skowej. Chaos powiększyła kolejna interwencja amerykańska w Iraku w ramach operacji „Iracka Wolność” w 2003 r. W swoim artykule autor podkreśla, że obecnie, dwadzieścia lat po ataku na WTC, region Bliskiego Wschodu pozostaje regionem niebezpiecznym, ze zdestabilizowaną architekturą bezpieczeństwa narodowego i bezpieczeństwa regionalnego. Analizując sytuację w czterech wybranych krajach: Iraku, Syrii, Libanie oraz Egipcie, udowadnia tezę postawioną na początku artykułu. Wskazuje wyraźnie, że wielotysięczne demonstracje z okresu tzw. Arabskiej Wiosny nie przyniosły zamierzonego efektu, przyczyniając się do kryzysów humanitarnych, masowej migracji czy wręcz umocnienia władzy autorytarnych liderów.

Słowa kluczowe: terroryzm, Bliski Wschód, migracja, uchodźcy, aktorzy niepaństwowi, wojna domowa, bezpieczeństwo narodowe

The Fragmented Middle East: Persistent Insecurity, Rising Instability *Abstract*

After the 9/11 attacks, the Middle East became the centre of the American military interventions. After Afghanistan in 2001, the US decided to invade Iraq and depose Saddam Hussein in order to bring democracy to the country. In 2021, Iraq is still suffering from a number of problems – social, economic, but also political and security-related – as foreign interference and terrorist attacks have become inherent to the Iraqi daily life. In the Arab spring context, Syria and Egypt saw massive demonstrations, leading firstly to civil and proxy wars and to the proliferation of terrorist groups; and secondly, to the re-establishment of a dictatorship facing many security challenges. The Lebanese case is more complex. The fragility of the state and the predominance of sectarianism and the states within a state phenomenon, to which we can add two major refugee issues with the Palestinians and the Syrians, as well as an aggressive neighbour in the South and constant foreign interference, make the national security concept debatable among the population and political leaders, preventing a concrete national security strategy from being established. With the current economic crisis, a new dimension of national security is added to the state which is already struggling to ensure its duties towards its population. Through these case studies, this article aims to present how each of these countries perceives its national security and the problems it is facing in order to suggest some recommendations for long-term sustainable responses to some of these challenges.

Key words: Middle East, Terrorism, Non-State Actors, Proxy Wars, Rivalries, Instability, Refugees, Human Security

Der zersplitterte Nahe Osten: anhaltende Unsicherheit, zunehmende Instabilität *Zusammenfassung*

Nach den Anschlägen vom 11. September wurde der Nahe Osten zum Zentrum der amerikanischen Militärkampagnen. Nach Afghanistan im Jahr 2001 entschieden sich die USA, in den Irak einzumarschieren und Saddam Hussein zu stürzen, um das Land zu demokratisieren. Im Jahr 2021 leidet der Irak noch immer an einer ganzen Reihe von gesellschaftlichen, wirtschaftlichen, aber auch politischen und sicherheitsbezogenen Problemen, da fremde Einflussnahmen und Terroranschläge Teil des Alltags der Menschen im Irak geworden sind. Im Zuge des arabischen Frühlings kam es zu massiven Demonstrationen in Syrien und Ägypten, die erstens zu Bürger- und Stellvertreterkriegen und zur Ausbreitung terroristischer Gruppen führten, und zweitens die Wiedereinsetzung der Diktatur und zahlreiche Sicherheitsprobleme zur Folge hatten. Der libanesischen Fall ist noch komplexer. Die Instabilität des Staates und das vorherrschende Sektierertum und das Privatstaat-Phänomen (einschließlich zweier großer Flüchtlingswellen von Palästinensern und Syrern) sowie ein aggressiver Nachbar im Süden und die konstante Fremdeingriffe machen das nationale Sicherheitskonzept in der Bevölkerung und der politischen Führung umstritten, so dass keine konkrete nationale Sicherheitsstrategie erarbeitet werden kann. Angesichts der aktuellen Wirtschaftskrise kommt eine neue Dimension der nationalen Sicherheit hinzu, obwohl der Staat bereits damit zu kämpfen hat, seinen Pflichten gegenüber der Bevölkerung nachzukommen. Anhand dieser Fallstudien versucht der Text, die Sichtweise der beiden Staaten auf die nationale Sicherheit und die jeweils vorhandenen Probleme zu erörtern, um Empfehlungen für

langfristige und nachhaltige Reaktionen auf einige der Herausforderungen zu geben.

Schlüsselwörter: Nahost, Terrorismus, nichtstaatliche Akteure, Stellvertreterkriege, Rivalitäten, Instabilität, Flüchtlinge, menschliche Sicherheit

*Раздробленный Ближний Восток: сохраняющееся
опасное положение, растущая нестабильность
Резюме*

После нападения на Всемирный торговый центр (World Trade Center – WTC) в сентябре 2001 года, Ближний Восток стал центром военной интервенции Соединенных Штатов. Хаос усугубился после очередного вмешательства США в Ирак, в рамках операции «Иракская свобода» в 2003 году. В статье подчеркивается, что в настоящее время, спустя двадцать лет после нападения на ВТЦ, Ближний Восток остается опасным регионом с дестабилизированной структурой национальной и региональной безопасности. Анализируя ситуацию в четырех отдельных государствах: Ираке, Сирии, Ливане и Египте, автор обосновывает тезис, поставленный в заглавии статьи. Указывает на тот факт, что многотысячные демонстрации периода так называемой Арабской весны не принесли ожидаемого эффекта, способствовали гуманитарным кризисам, массовой миграции и укрепили власть авторитарных лидеров.

Ключевые слова: терроризм, Ближний Восток, миграция, беженцы, негосударственные субъекты, гражданская война, национальная безопасность



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Fear as a Determining Factor in the Development of Special Forces and the Territorial Defence Forces in Poland in the 21st Century

Introduction

According to the Oxford English Language Dictionary, the word 'fear' is defined as 'an unpleasant emotion caused by the belief that someone or something is dangerous, likely to cause pain, or a threat.'¹ The concept of fear is related to, among others, the conduct of hostilities and it actually is a natural phenomenon which is known not only to soldiers in a battle but also to societies directly exposed to warfare. In his work entitled *On War*, a general and a military thinker Carl von Clausewitz identifies four elements which coalesce to form the atmosphere of war, including:

- danger,
- physical exertion,
- case (friction),
- uncertainty.²

As the first mentioned factor, 'danger' is inextricably linked to the feeling of fear. A natural reaction of every human being is to avoid danger. When it is impossible, fear and anxiety arise. If a person can overcome their fear and take control over it,

¹ *The New Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford 2001.

² C. Clausewitz, *O wojnie. Podręcznik strategii*, Wydawnictwo Mireki, Kraków 2010, p. 48.

courage is born.³ Therefore, it can be said that courage is nothing else than maintaining the ability to act rationally and effectively despite the fear you feel. Moreover, it is the ability to use fear as a constructive factor of action, from which you can create something new and innovate. Just like an individual human being, entire societies and even states react. Fear and danger can make people feel overwhelmed or push them towards some new and original solutions in the field of defence.

In the last twenty years, world security has had to face new non-military threats such as:

- global Islamic terrorism with its most spectacular cases – the World Trade Centre attacks, and
- the SARS-CoV-2 virus pandemic.⁴

These two cases, at different times, had a decisive impact on the development and even the continual existence of the two formations of the Polish Armed Forces: Special Forces in relation to global terrorism and the Territorial Defence Forces in relation to the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. Therefore, it is worth tracing back how the fear of global terror and the fight against it in the last twenty years has affected the Special Forces, particularly, the JWK⁵ SOF Unit based in Lubliniec (former 1st Special Forces Regiment). Further on, it should be examined how new incidents such as Russia's aggressive policy and the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic have influenced the Territorial Defence Forces. The answer to these questions is based on available unclassified sources and literature on the subject, as well as participant observation. Neo-realistic research is also used for the purpose of this article. It is worth mentioning that during his military career, the Author commanded SOTU⁶ in Iraq and SOTG⁷ in Afghanistan. Currently, he is a Brigade Commander of the Territorial Defence Forces.

An outline history of special operations in Poland

In order to present the changes which have taken place in the Polish Special Forces, it is necessary, first, to briefly describe their tradition and the state before September 2001. In the Polish armed tradition, Special Forces have had a long history. Lisowski's 'Zagończycy', Hetman Stefan Czarniecki's strategy during the Swedish invasion of 1655–1660, and the Wawelberg Group in the Silesian uprising are some of their oldest and greatest examples.⁸ The units conducting special operations in the interwar period were:

- the 1st Independent 'Commando' Company – operating within the Polish Military Forces in the West during WW II;⁹

³ *Ibidem*, p. 85.

⁴ R. Borkowski, 'Terroryzm międzynarodowy', in: E. Cziomer (ed.), *Zagrożenia i instytucje bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego*, Oficyna Wydawnicza AFM, Kraków 2016, pp. 65–69.

⁵ JWK – former 1 Special Forces Regiment, the oldest Polish SOF Unit located in Lubliniec city.

⁶ SOTU – Special Operations Task Unit.

⁷ SOTG – Special Operations Task Group.

⁸ P. Witkowski, *Polscy komandosi. No. 10 Commando*, Wydawnictwo Garmond, Częstochowa 2020, pp. 27–31.

⁹ J. Rybak, *Nieznana historia 62 Kompani Specjalnej WP*, Creatio PR, Warszawa 2017, pp. 9–20.

- the AK Battalions – operating under the Home Army Diversion Headquarters, 'Miotła', 'Parasol', and 'Zośka',¹⁰
- Polish Independent Special Battalion – as part of the Polish Military Forces in the East during WW II.

After the Second World War, the development of special units was continued under the Communist regime. Among the most significant ones of that time were:

- the 1st Assault Battalion stationed at Dziwnów (based in Lubliniec since 1986),
- the 62nd Special Forces Company stationed at Bolesławiec,
- the 56th Special Forces Company stationed at Szczecin,
- the 48th Special Forces Company stationed at Cracow.

After the fall of Communism and signing of the Warsaw Pact, the Polish Army faced great changes also affecting the special units. Everything had to be changed from doctrines to the structure, to the training system. The most important task was to define who should be treated as a potential opponent. On 21 February 1990, the National Defence Committee issued a resolution of the Republic of Poland's new defence doctrine. It provided for a significant reduction of the armed forces, liquidation of the political branch and the defensive character of the army.¹¹ The new conditions also had an impact on the operation of the special forces units. The decision was made to form one large special forces unit and so, in 1993, the 1st Special Forces Regiment was created based on the 1st Assault Battalion, and at the same time, independent special companies were disbanded. Additionally, the formation of the SOF GROM Unit as part of the MSW (the Mistry of the Interior) and the SOF FORMOZA Unit in the structures of the Polish Navy began. It is best to present the development of the Polish SOF units taking size and subordination into consideration, on the example of the 1st Special Forces Regiment.

At the time of its formation, the 1st Special Forces Regiment was subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff, precisely to the Board of the 2nd Reconnaissance and Radio-electronic Warfare SG. The Special Operations Department functioning within the Management Board planned the development and specified the tasks to be performed by the special unit. Such a solution had a negative impact on the development of the unit which, ignoring the word 'special' in its name, carried out tasks related to reconnaissance. 'The Special Actions' manual, the main document determining training and planning of their use, was created in 1985, and until the end of the 1990s, it was classified. According to the manual, special operations are

[...] one of the types of military reconnaissance having an impact on the enemy – directly inside its ORBAT – in order to weaken the combat capabilities and morale of troops [...] The main goal of special operations is reconnaissance (obtaining credible, accurate, and timely information about the enemy and the area) and, in specified situations, subversive influence (destruction or incapacitation of important objects or disorganisation of their functioning). Moreover, sometimes the purpose

¹⁰ L. Niżyński, *Batalion Miotła. W dywersji, sabotażu i Powstaniu Warszawskim*, Instytut Wydawniczy Pax, Warszawa 1992, pp. 7–70.

¹¹ J. Rybak, *Lubliniec.pl: cicho i skutecznie. Tajemnice najstarszej jednostki specjalnej Wojska Polskiego*, Creatio PR, Warszawa 2011, p. 39.

of these activities is an intended psychological impact on the army and even the civilian population, especially hostile towards us.¹²

Until the end of the 1990s, the 1 PSPEC (1st Special Forces Regiment) had in its structures two special battalions and one diversionary battalion which included a company of divers. In the special battalions, one special company was fully professional, the rest were composed mostly of conscripts (only the command staff were made of professional soldiers). The main combat elements were the special operation sections of six soldiers. As for the equipment, there was a lack modern observation devices, there were only a few pairs of night-vision goggles, the communication equipment was very unreliable, and there was practically no individual gear provided by the army. It was common practice to buy things at the civilian market, for example boots, sleeping bags, mats, backpacks, and later also tactical vests and even elements of the armament (picatinny rails, tactical flashlights, etc.). The archaic training system left much to wish for. Fire training was based on general instructions, there was no situational shooting, allocation of ammunition was limited. Tactical training, according to the mentioned manual, focused on operation in wooded terrain, use of observation posts, penetration and, occasionally, ambushes. The so-called adventure activities were popular, involving landings of a special group, a long distance from its mother unit, with the task of conducting reconnaissance, e.g., an industrial facility, and returning stealthily afterwards. That type of exercise undoubtedly shaped the desired character traits such as independence in decision-making, the ability to improvise, and creativity, but tactically, they were better suited for reconnaissance than for special units.

A very significant negative factor was a lack of a dedicated command able to properly prepare and command special operations. Logistically, the 1 PSPEC was under the command of the Land Forces, but in operational terms, the planning and managing activities were carried out by the General Staff. This lack of a specialized commanding structure was the main factor hindering the development of an individual. In addition, the subordination of JW GROM to the Ministry of the Interior (from 1999 directly to the Minister of National Defence) and JW FORMOZA to the Navy, made the exchange of experience, particularly with JW GROM (already at a much higher level of training), virtually impossible.

As far as the human factor was concerned, the situation was different. Professional soldiers serving in the unit (extended or contract military service included) belonged to the elite of the Polish Army. Good physical prowess, creativity and, above all, an open attitude to new trends were to bring results in the future and to show the decision-makers what important tasks could be performed by these units.

The possibility of cooperating with the US Army Special Forces had a very positive impact on the development of the 1 PSPEC. In 1994, the first Polish officers visited the base of the 'Green Berets' (the 10th Special Forces Group). In 1993, the soldiers of the 1 PSPEC together with the 'C' Company soldiers of the 10th Special Forces Group participated in joint army exercise code-named 'Two Eagles'. The next joint army exercise code-named 'Dagger 1' and 'Dagger 2' took place in 1997 and

¹² Sztab Generalny WP, *Działania Specjalne*, Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 1985, p. 13.

1998. In 1999, Poland joined NATO, and that year the Polish commandos from Lubliniec, together with the GROM soldiers and the British 22nd SAS Regiment, were able to participate in joint military exercise code-named 'Artist Ulan' and organized in the south-eastern part of Poland. During the exercise, the soldiers of the 1 PSPEC and GROM formed mixed military teams alongside with the 22nd SAS Regiment. Thanks to several days of the joint actions, they obtained first-hand experience of the modern special operations and could see how much they were lacking in terms of the command system, military communications, and the modern approach to training. Despite all, these international contacts remained a kind of window on the world. The soldiers of the 1 PSPEC had an opportunity to observe operations of NATO's leading special units. Steps were taken to obtain instructions, especially from the Americans, such as the 'Ranger Combat Manual'. All of that, combined with observing the allies on the joint training courses, affected the training process tremendously. However, the main factors hindering the development were a lack of appropriate equipment and incomprehension from the superiors. There was also no possibility of participating in foreign missions with a compact subunit. Naturally, individual soldiers took part in the missions in the Balkans or in the Middle East, which were then taking place; however, the homogenous special tasks sub-unit was never dispatched.

The fear of global terrorism and the transformation of the Polish Special Forces: the impact of the events of 11 September 2001

The attack on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, and the fear of global terrorism were a turning point in the development of the 1 PSPEC and the entire Polish Special Forces in the following years. At the NATO summit in Prague, in November 2003, the Member States had to answer another question: What steps should be taken to adapt the Alliance to the changing reality and, in particular, to the 'new face' of global terrorism? It was decided that there was a need to develop a rapid reaction force in the NATO's areas of responsibility. The Polish Government declared that, by the end of 2003, it would set up a special operational task force to support NATO operations. A dedicated group was assigned to operate under the leadership of the Joint Special Operations Forces Group (JFSOC) and had the possibility to develop functional task units such as:

- command of the special operations task force, combat readiness of 10 days;
- task unit (Land Forces) with a force of a company for special operations, combat readiness of 10 days;
- task unit (Air Forces) with a force of six special operation aircrafts, combat readiness of 10 days;
- task unit (Navy) with a force of one patrol for special operations, combat readiness of 10 days;
- Staff Personnel as staff for the JFSOC Headquarters.¹³

¹³ Author's archive.

The above-mentioned forces were to meet the requirements of the MC437 NATO Special Operations Act and to have operational capabilities including:

- the task force – to operate independently and imperceptibly behind the lines and deep in the areas of NATO's responsibility and places remote from operational bases;
- the communication system – to ensure an exchange of voice and data information by radio, telephone and/or satellite communication over long distances;
- the aircrafts – to be demonstration-capable, providing fast supply at night and under all takeoff and landing conditions (VTOL) or during short takeoff and landing (STOL).
- vessels – to be the demonstrative and providing coastal transport within a range of 100 m;
- the operating bases – to function independently and invisibly.¹⁴

By the decision of the General Staff Chief, the Land Forces Commander was obliged to prepare forces, meeting the above requirements. The 1 PSPEC was indicated as one of the executors. The first steps towards achieving this goal were the initiation of an intensive language training with a priority on the English language, and the acquisition of modern communication equipment. The battalion structures were re-organised, and their name changed to Special Operation Task Group. Additionally, the staff structure was unified according to the NATO standards. In terms of planning and managing special operations at the tactical and operational level, it was planned to implement the procedures compliant with NATO (STANAG 2022).

These key changes coincided with other events important for the future of the Polish Special Forces. In September 2001, shortly after the attacks on the World Trade Centre, the 1 PSPEC unit set off on the 'Amber Fox' mission in Macedonia, and in August 2003, several dozen more soldiers of that unit flew to Iraq as part of the Polish Army Military Contingent. The GROM military unit, which had been within the structures of the Ministry of National Defence since 1999, also continued its engagement in the missions. In March 2002, in Afghanistan, and then in April of that year, in Iraq, there began a period when the soldiers of the 1 PSPEC and the GROM military unit had an opportunity to gain practical experience in conducting special operations under war conditions. Unfortunately, the development of training and the command at the tactical level were not accompanied by building the skill of planning and managing the activities of special units. While during their mission the GROM soldiers were within the structures of the allied special forces, where they could count on their involvement in the actions typical for special forces, the 1 PSPEC soldiers were commanded by the unprepared subsequent shifts of the Polish Military Contingent. The lack of proper command and control structure of the special forces resulted in improper allocation of tasks and wasting the soldiers' potential. For example, at the beginning of the 5th shift of the PKW Iraq (Polish Military Contingent Iraq), officers planning to use the Special Group, which in the case of the PKW was the district of the MND CS commander, used to send the group to carry out patrol tasks or to escort planned logistic convoys if conventional forces were not available. Fortunately, the efforts of Deputy Commander of the MND CS

¹⁴ Author's archive.

Brigade General Włodzimierz POTASIŃSKI (who would, in the future, prove to be the most charismatic commander of the newly formed Polish Special Operation Command) along with the special forces' commander of the MND CS division, General Piotr Czerwiński, led to sending the special unit patrol to the base in Al-Kut where ODA, of the 5th US Special Forces Group, was stationed. As a result, that was one of the most active Polish specialists' shifts.

The situation in Poland was even worse. The lack of specialized command negatively influenced the development of the 1 PSPEC (due to direct subordination to the MOD, the situation of the JW GROM was way better). The unit suffered from the lack of modern equipment, the soldiers' attempts to introduce a new type of training and operation planning based on the mission experience were not met with understanding, and a necessity to conduct selection was denied on account of having a negative impact on the unit completion rate. There were no doctrinal documents that would contain a catalogue of tasks performed by special units and define their place in the command-and-control system. Back in 2006, the Command of the Land Forces recognized the 1 PSPEC as a long-range reconnaissance unit, not a SOF unit.

In 2007, the Polish Government, fulfilling the commitments made at the NATO summit in 2003 and drawing conclusions from the activities of the special units in Iraq and Afghanistan, established the independent Special Forces Command which was modelled on what the US Government did 20 years earlier. It was a response to threats related to terrorism and clearly visible ineffectiveness of the existing structures being tested in the first years of the so-called wars against global terrorism. The examples given above are the best proof of that. On 15 August of the same year, General Włodzimierz Potasiński¹⁵, an officer who perfectly understood the specificity of special operations and a visionary open to foreign experience, was appointed commander of the newly established Command. Until January 2008, the newly created structure included all the special units: the 1 PSPEC (currently the JWK SOF Unit), GROM, and FORMOZA. From the beginning of creating a new type of troops, cooperation with the most experienced NATO forces in that field, i.e., the United States Special Forces, was already decided. As a result of this close cooperation, the new formation started to develop rapidly. In February, the last shift of the 1PSPEC left Iraq. It was the last time the Polish special forces were not under a dedicated command. In 2011, the first Polish doctrinal document, D.D.3 – 5 'Special Operations', was issued. It described tasks, structures, the rules of cooperation, as well as planning and organising the command of the special forces. In autumn 2013, at the largest training of NATO's special forces that year with over 2,000 soldiers from 15 countries participating, the Special Forces Command was the first Polish Command to confirm the ability to plan and manage special operations as part of the allied special operations in accordance with the NATO standards. Poland obtained the status of a framework nation in commanding special operations. A certain stage in the history of the Polish Special Forces came to an end. In the case of the Polish Armed Forces, the fear caused by threats related to global terrorism became a direct factor behind that rapid development of the Special Forces in response to the new challenge. Thanks to the right decisions, Poland was made a local leader in the field

¹⁵ The first commander was Brigadier General Edward Gruszka.

of special operations, and other countries such as Hungary and Croatia were able to benefit from our experience.¹⁶

The development of the Territorial Defence Forces as a result of the fear of Russia's aggression and the SARS-CoV-2

The idea of territorial defence is not new in the history of the Polish military thought. The examples of it can be found in:

- Medieval mass levy,
- the January Uprising during the Partitions of Poland,
- the national defence in the interwar period,
- Poland's Territorial Defence Army during the Communist era and the first years after regaining full independence.¹⁷

The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the general situation in Ukraine made the Polish decision-makers aware that building Poland's military security only on a professional army and the alliance with NATO may not be sufficient to effectively defend the integrity of the state. Moreover, a professional army has many undoubted advantages but several fundamental disadvantages as well. The enemy can easily measure its potential, it does not expand its reserves, and most importantly, it is unable to do that due to the costs it generates in order to fully use its potential. Owing to these difficulties and concerns about Russia's policy, a decision was made in 2017 to form a new type of troops and call them the Territorial Defence Forces (TDF). The concept assumed the creation of Territorial Defence brigades, one in each voivodeship and two in the voivodeship capitals. They were to be led by a specialized Command. The number of forces was estimated at around 50,000 soldiers. Within the implemented concept, professional soldiers constituted 10 percent of the personnel, the remaining part was a new type of service – military territorial service which made it possible to combine professional work with military service. At the time of writing this article, there are 15 TD Brigades (TDB) operating in Poland plus the TDF Training Centre in Toruń and the Command of the Territorial Defence Forces in Zegrze. For the purposes of the functioning of the new type troops, doctrinal documents have been developed which indicate the area of operations and define the basic tasks. Apart from strictly combat training, great emphasis is placed on building the ability to support local communities in case of various natural disasters and non-military events. Additionally, in 13 TDBs a new project is being implemented to use dogs in search operations for missing people. The dogs are trained to operate in wooded and urbanized areas and support the Ground Search and Rescue Teams operating in case of air crashes. During military operations the dogs will be used to assist in search of sabotage groups or hostile militants.

¹⁶ The author several times has led combined POL, HUN, and CRO SOF task groups during international exercise.

¹⁷ W. Sokół, 'Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej w historii Polski (wybrane problemy)'. *Bezpieczeństwo – Teoria i Praktyka* 2017, vol. 28, no. 3, p. 325.

Despite a widespread agreement among experts on the need to build in Poland structures capable of giving support to operational troops, the Territorial Defence Forces triggered a lot of negative reactions in the military environment and in some parts of society. The effectiveness of the adopted training system was questioned, as well as the possibility of the Brigade's operational use. The legitimacy of allocating modern equipment directing to the newly formed units was also disputed. The first opportunity to test the new type of troops was the flood in May 2019. The system created by the Territorial Defence Forces for anti-crisis purposes passed the exam. It is identical for each Brigade and consists of the same elements including:

- a support assessment team whose task is to assess, in cooperation with the local civilian authorities, the needs for military involvement;
- a company support module – the basic 'executive' module dispatched to the location of the incident with the force up to 150 soldiers equipped with, among others, light engineering equipment, boats and a generation unit (there is one mobile Container Field Power Plant of the 900KW capacity in each TD Brigade);
- a reconstruction support team – an element operating after the operation has ended in order to assess the military potential required to restore the state before the incident.

When in March 2020 the first case of CoV-19 infection was confirmed in Poland, in every voivodeship there were TD sub-units able to cooperate closely with the local authorities in order to counteract the threat. The course of the TDF involvement in the fight against the pandemic will be presented on the example of the 13 TDB. On 9 March 2020, the soldiers of the Brigade, together with the Police and the State Fire Brigade, supported the Border Guard in organising sanitary control points, and from 15 March that year, in border protection in the Silesian and Opole voivodeships. Similarly, in March, the airport in Pyrzowice was supported in accepting compatriots returning by air transportation. Another task was to support nursing homes in the evacuation of infected residents and to help the staff with patient care. In May, the soldiers began to participate in the screening of miners by organizing Drive Thru points for several mines with the efficiency of up to 1,300 samples taken daily. Over the next months, the range of activities began to expand and at the time of writing the article the results were as follows:

- hospitals supported – 98,
- medical facilities with support provided – 10,
- oxygen cylinders transported to hospitals – 195,
- swabs taken – 65500, including, 15516 in nursing homes,
- airports supported – 1,
- patrols carried out as part of the quarantine compliance control – 2853,
- food delivered – 91 tonnes,
- DPS / nursing homes supported – 23,
- sanitary and epidemiological stations supported – 17.
- Brigade soldiers donated over 517 litres of blood.
- 19 transports were made in support of the Material Resource Agency. The soldiers of the Brigade, for over two months, supported warehouses in repacking and preparing transports.
- Brigade soldiers supported 3 field hospitals, one in Opole and two in Katowice.

- A webinar focusing on preparation for a secondary school certificate of compliance with sanitary procedures was organized for over 1,500 teachers.¹⁸

As part of expanding their competences, soldiers were trained and are still being trained in lying patient care, driving emergency vehicles, providing qualified first aid, and taking smears. At the same time, improvement classes are organized in accordance with sanitary requirements to maintain the skills of combat training. Currently, a sight of a soldier in an olive uniform in a hospital, a nursing home does not surprise anyone, and the criticism of creating the new type of formation has weakened and is not considered by the most significant experts. Moreover, at the initiative of the Territorial Defence Forces commander, two international conferences of commanders of the territorial defence formation have already taken place under the name: 'The ETC-2 European Territorial Cooperation'. They are an excellent platform for exchanging experiences, sharing training resources, and exchanging information on threats.

Conclusion

The Chief of the General Staff, General Rajmund Andrzejczak, likes to say that only by leaving your comfort zone can you create something new and innovative.¹⁹ For many decision-makers and Polish officers, the creation of Special Forces and the Territorial Defence Forces was, and for some still is, a step out of their comfort zone. When I went to Afghanistan as the TF50 commander in 2010, many the PKW officers tried to lead to a situation which was similar to that in Iraq. Fortunately, I was assigned to a great commander, the then-Brigadier General Andrzej Reudowicz who understood perfectly well that only by supporting our actions, even those surprising ones, will we be able to achieve the goal of improving the security of the local population and the allied forces. Our efforts were appreciated by the ISAF command. When after a year and a half I was sent back to Afghanistan, even the commanders at the battalion level knew that the presence of special forces troops had brought measurable benefits in terms of improving the security of their subordinates.

At the time of writing this article, several thousand soldiers of the Polish Army across the country are supporting local communities in the fight against the SARS-CoV-19 pandemic. Among them there are the soldiers of Special Forces and the Territorial Defence Forces, the two types of troops described here. The new threats and the fear associated with them are responsible for their rapid development and the reinforcement of their military position. However, care should be taken not to let those changes in the command-and-control system destroy their achievements. These depend on political decisions based, among others, on the fear of the sovereign willing to provide resources for development and create tools to ensure more safety.

¹⁸ Based on an unclassified internal report.

¹⁹ J. Sabak, *Gen. Andrzejczak: Chcę wyprowadzić wojsko ze „strefy komfortu”* [RELACJA], 2018, <https://www.defence24.pl/gen-andrzejczak-chce-wyprowadzic-wojsko-ze-strefy-komfortu-relacja> [accessed: 21.03.2021].

For the Territorial Defence Forces, the time of the pandemic is an excellent opportunity to prove that the decision to create them was well-grounded. Unfortunately, concentrated effort to support local communities negatively affect maintaining the appropriate level of combat training; therefore, it will be of prime importance to start gradual withdrawal of the forces as the pandemic subsides, bearing in mind that the Territorial Defence Forces are focused on supporting, not replacing civil institutions.

The modern world is a rapidly changing system full of opportunities and new challenges and this also concerns the field of security. Further development of new formations such as Special Forces, the Territorial Defence Forces, or the latest project of the Cyber Forces, will show what the place of Poland in the contemporary world is.

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Strach jako czynnik determinujący rozwój Wojsk Specjalnych oraz Wojsk Obrony Terytorialnej w Polsce w XXI wieku *Streszczenie*

Celem artykułu jest analiza wpływu strachu przed nowymi zagrożeniami w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa na rozwój polskich Wojsk Specjalnych oraz Wojsk Obrony Terytorialnej. Została ona przeprowadzona chronologicznie z uwzględnieniem zmian, jakie zachodzą w Siłach Zbrojnych RP. W artykule wskazano zasadnicze efekty osiągnięte w rozwoju obydwu formacji, a które zostały wywołane w odpowiedzi na strach i poczucie zagrożenia. Wspomina się również o wyzwaniach, jakie ciągle stoją przed Wojskami Specjalnymi i Wojskami Obrony Terytorialnej. Przyjęto, że pojawiające się w ostatnich 20 latach zagrożenia wywołujące uczucie strachu wśród jednostek i całych społeczeństw spowodowały podjęcie przez polski rząd decyzji dotyczących szczególnego rozwoju dwóch rodzajów sił zbrojnych – Wojsk Specjalnych i Wojsk Obrony terytorialnej. Analizy dokonano w oparciu o dostępne źródła i literaturę przedmiotu oraz obserwację uczestniczącą.

Słowa kluczowe: globalny terroryzm, pandemia SARS COV-2, strach, Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej, Wojska Specjalne

Fear as a Determining Factor in the Development of Special Forces and the Territorial Defence Forces in Poland in the 21st Century *Abstract*

The aim of this article is to analyse the impact of a fear of new threats in the field of security for the development of the Polish Special Forces and the Territorial Defence Forces. The study was conducted in a chronological order taking into account the changes still taking place in the armed forces of the Republic of Poland. The article indicates the main results achieved in the development of both formations and brought by fear and threat. It also points out to the challenges still faced by Special Forces and the Territorial Defence Forces. It has been assumed that the threats of the last 20 years, causing a sense of fear among individuals and entire societies, prompted the Polish Government to make decisions regarding detailed development plans for two types of armed forces – Special Forces and the Territorial Defence Forces. The analysis was based on the available sources and literature on the subject, as well as participant observation.

Key words: fear, global terrorism, SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, Special Forces, Territorial Defence Forces

Angst als entscheidender Faktor für die Entwicklung von Spezialeinheiten und der Armee zur Territorialverteidigung in Polen im 21. Jahrhundert *Zusammenfassung*

Das Ziel dieses Texts ist eine Analyse des Einflusses der Angst vor neuen Sicherheitsgefahren auf die Entwicklung der polnischen Spezialeinheiten und der Armee zur Territorialverteidigung. Die Studie wurde chronologisch durchgeführt, um auch die aktuellen Veränderungen in der Armee der Republik Polen zu berücksichtigen. Der Text zeigt, dass die wichtigsten Fortschritte bei der Entwicklung beider Formationen durch Angst und Gefahr impliziert wurden. Außerdem werden die Herausforderungen erläutert, die aktuell vor den Spezialeinheiten und der Armee zur Territorialverteidigung stehen. Es ist

davon auszugehen, dass die Gefahren der vergangenen 20 Jahre, die den Einzelnen und ganze Gesellschaften in Angst versetzten, die polnische Regierung dazu bewogen haben, Entscheidungen zu detaillierten Entwicklungsplänen für zwei Arten von bewaffneten Einheiten zu treffen – Spezialeinheiten und die Armee zur Territorialverteidigung. Die Analyse basiert auf den verfügbaren Quellen, der Fachliteratur und teilnehmender Beobachtung.

Schlüsselwörter: Angst, globaler Terrorismus, SARS-CoV-2-Pandemie, Spezialeinheiten, Armee zur Territorialverteidigung

*Страх как определяющий фактор развития
Войск специального назначения и Войск территориальной
обороны в Польше в XXI веке
Резюме*

В статье проанализировано влияние страха перед лицом новых угроз в области безопасности, его влияние на развитие Войск специального назначения и Войск территориальной обороны Польши. Анализ проведен на хронологической основе с учетом изменений, происходящих в Вооруженных силах Польши. В статье указаны основные эффекты, которые были достигнуты в развитии этих видов войск и которые были ответом на чувства страха и угрозы. В работе также упоминаются проблемы, с которыми до сих пор сталкиваются Войска специального назначения и Войска территориальной обороны. Предполагается, что угрозы, возникшие в последние 20 лет вызывающие чувство страха у отдельных людей и целых обществ, вынудили польское правительство принять решения о специальном развитии двух типов вооруженных сил – Войск специального назначения и Войск территориальной обороны. Анализ был основан на доступных источниках, научной литературе и личных наблюдениях.

Ключевые слова: глобальный терроризм, пандемия SARS COV-2, страх, Войска территориальной обороны, Войска специального назначения Польши

VARIA



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The US post-1989 Strategy: Revisionist Powers and NATO's East Flank

Introduction

On 23 April 2014, standing on Swidwin Polish Air Force (PLAF) base, we scan the pristine sky. Suddenly, 'Sky Soldiers' from the elite 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) storm in linking up with Polish counterparts of the storied 6th Airborne 'Gen. Sosabowski' Brigade. A US Air Force (USAF) F16 squadron arrives weeks earlier integrating with the PLAF and the regional allies. With the Army on the ground, the US European Command's (USEUCOM) 'OPERATION ATLANTIC RESOLVE' (OAR) officially commences in Poland, quickly spreading across NATO's eastern flank. It is a new chapter in the US engagement in the region, Poland is at the centre of America's regional strategy and there is a clear message to Russia: 'Hands off of America's allies!' The US National Security Strategy (NSS, required annually by the US law, but in practice published sporadically), the National Defence Strategy (NDS), and the National Military Strategy (NMS) organise America's strategic thinking. Reviewing a historical selection provides insights, as the new administration articulates America's future strategy.

Strategy Continuity and Change

The 1992 NMS is hopeful as the US chart a new relationship with Russia: 'The community of nations has entered into an exciting and promising era. Global war is

now less likely, and the US National Security Strategy reflects that fact.¹ The initial post-Cold War period is punctuated by rapid downsizing of NATO military establishments, while positive steps are taken by the Russian Federation. The United States begin a significant reduction of their military posture in Europe from ~315,000 troops in 1989, to ~75,000 troops today. Opportunities emerge for integration of former Warsaw Pact nations into Western institutions – NATO is likely the first step to security and stability, and then EU membership, for economic betterment of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) – the recipe is genius. Poland leads the way among the former Warsaw Pact nations, and alongside the Czech Republic and Hungary, accedes to NATO in 1999. The whole region follows, including several Western Balkans nations. With NATO membership, and its Article V guarantees, including the US-backed nuclear shield, things move in a very positive direction as the United States lead and expand global stability.

Meanwhile, Russia seems to be on the road to building a democratic society. It revises its military doctrine to be more pacifist. It withdraws forces from CEE on an unprecedented scale, retrograding its nuclear weapons to Russia. The Kremlin commits to deep reductions in its conventional and nuclear forces and accepts the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).² The 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and 1991 START 1 Treaty – significantly reducing deployed nuclear warheads – are all part of this new positive era. As CEE nations join NATO, they are full alliance members, under NATO's nuclear umbrella; however, no NATO infrastructure, bases, or forces are positioned on NATO's eastern flank, as is the norm during the Cold War.

The 1992 NMS context is after the brilliant US-led Gulf War victory. It cautions about potential conflict with North Korea or in Southwest Asia, but not with Russia. It notes the major threat of the time: 'The real threat we now face is the threat of the unknown, the uncertain'³ – prescient thinking when reviewing the next decade: the US homeland is brazenly attacked; NATO invokes Article V for the first time; the United States and their allies are embroiled in two major counterterrorism wars; a former KGB agent, Vladimir Putin, ascends to power in Russia; North Korea declares its nuclear potential; and China begins its unprecedented 'rise'. Yet, based on the 1992 outlook, the NMS continues: 'By far, the most consequential change is occurring within the former Soviet Union. The hammer and sickle no longer flies in Moscow, having been replaced by the Russian tricolour [...], we are heartened, encouraged, and optimistic about the future.'⁴ In 1997, the NATO-Russia Founding Act (NRFA) heralds more: 'NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. They share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and

¹ C. Powell General, *National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States of America (USA)*, Historical Office of the Secretary of Defense (HOSD), 1992, <https://history.defense.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=U2yb8zyjllg%3d&tabid=9116&portalid=70&mid=20232> [accessed: 28.01.2021].

² P. Doran, R. Wojcik, *Unfinished Business*, CEPA, 2018, <https://cepa.org/unfinished-business> [accessed: 28.01.2021].

³ C. Powell General, *National Military Strategy...*

⁴ *Ibidem*.

competition, and of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation.⁵ With this incredible foundation, the 1999 NSS continues: 'We must continue leading efforts to mobilize international economic and political resources, as we have with Russia, Ukraine and other countries in Eastern Europe and Eurasia and with Southeast Europe.'⁶

The 9/11 Attacks on the US homeland dramatically redirect a preponderance of the US strategic and operational attention on the global counterterror campaign. For the United States, the unthinkable occurs: a determined enemy executes a horrific attack on the homeland. During WWII, limited attempts were made to attack the continental United States, but this was another Pearl Harbour. Hence an urgent turn of strategy to counterterrorism – the 'Global War on Terror' (GWOT), which includes hope that Russia might be an ally. As 9/11 ushers in a new 'Age of Fear,' America and its allies wonder if terrorists can so easily hijack commercial airliners and use them as weapons of mass destruction against strategic targets, then is a nuclear attack on the US or their allies possible? Over time, hundreds of thousands of US troops deploy, alongside tens of thousands of allies in response. Yet, the GWOT continues – on a smaller scale – requiring allied troops and resources. The 9/11 attacks lead to the establishment of two new US strategic organisations: Northern Command and the Department of Homeland Security. Meanwhile, no consideration is given to the positioning of US forces closer to NATO's eastern flank. Instead, the withdrawal of the US forces, primarily from Germany, continues unabated.

The 2002 NSS is absorbed with countering terrorism globally: 'The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration.'⁷ At peak, the GWOT spans 30 nations and 21 different operations.⁸ Regarding Russia, the NSS remains positive, not considering forward deployments on NATO's eastern flank:

Having moved from confrontation to cooperation as the hallmark of our relationship with Russia, the dividends are evident: an end to the balance of terror that divided us; an historic reduction in the nuclear arsenals on both sides; and cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism and missile defence that until recently were inconceivable.⁹

China is highlighted: 'Several potential great powers are now in the midst of internal transition – most importantly Russia, India, and China. In all three cases, recent developments have encouraged our hope that a truly global consensus about basic principles is slowly taking shape.'¹⁰ China expands aggression in the South China Sea, continues its long process to diminish and ultimately cancel democracy in Hong Kong, threatening the US Pacific allies along the way.

⁵ NATO and Russia, *NATO Russia Founding Act*, NATO, 1997, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm [accessed: 28.01.2021].

⁶ White House, *National Security Strategy (NSS) of the USA*, HOSD, 1999, <https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1999.pdf?ver=SL0909OTm5IAh0LQWBrRHw%3d%3d> [accessed: 10.02.2021].

⁷ White House, *NSS of the USA*, HOSD, 2002, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss2002.pdf?ver=oyVN99aEnrAWijAc_O5eiQ%3d%3d [accessed: 10.02.2021].

⁸ Global Security, *Overseas Contingency Operation*, 2018, Global War on Terrorism / GWOT (globalsecurity.org) [accessed: 10.02.2021].

⁹ White House, *NSS of the USA...*, 2002

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

The 2005 NDS is cautiously optimistic: 'While remaining alert to the possibility of renewed great power competition, recent developments in our relations with states like Russia and China should encourage a degree of hope.'¹¹ In 2006, Poland decries the Russian-German undersea Nordstream (NS) gas-pipeline agreement as undermining CEE security, remaining sanguine about trusting any Russian commitment. Since the 1990s, Poland has urged US forces deployment on its territory for visible reassurance. The United States do not hold the same threat view but offer ideas about US basing aligned with American strategy which features Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) interceptors in Poland. It is not a combat unit, yet a strategic win for Poland seeking even further defence cooperation. This leads to forming a bilateral defence modernization group and plans to rotationally deploy the Patriot Air and Missile Defence (AMD) systems to Poland.

By 2008, things improve in Iraq, and allies begin troop reductions and transfers to Afghanistan (AFG). Among east flank allies, Poland is a standout, fighting in day-one combat (only two other US allies do so). Poland leads 33 nations in the multinational division reducing a major US burden. In AFG, challenges grow, and the United States and their allies increase troops levels. Poland is also one of three allies in day-one combat, and the only CEE ally which takes on responsibility for an entire province in AFG. The NDS continues to focus on the GWOT, but concerns grow about China and its increasing military power and aggression: 'China continues to modernize and develop military capabilities primarily focused on a Taiwan Strait conflict, but which could have application in other contingencies.'¹² As for Russia, the NDS paints a concerned view about the Kremlin's direction towards regional disorder: 'Russia's retreat from openness and democracy could have significant security implications for the United States, our European allies, and our partners in other regions.'¹³ Two months after the NDS ink is dry, Russia and Georgia are at war. The war occurs just four months after a NATO summit where France and Germany block the United States, Poland, and other CEE allies from offering Georgia and Ukraine NATO's Membership Action Plans (MAP) – the roadmap to NATO.

In 2009, the now infamous failed US-Russia 'Reset' occurs, and the United States cancel the BMD plans in Poland and the Czech Republic, greatly disappointing their allies who staked political reputations on the effort. Russia does allow access to the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a vital NATO logistics route to AFG. The 2010 NSS indicates recalibration: 'We seek to build a stable, substantive, multidimensional relationship with Russia, based on mutual interests.'¹⁴ Surprisingly, there is no mention of Russia's occupation of Georgia, or of Georgia at all. Instead, the United States remain determined to chart a cooperative course on key issues focused

¹¹ Pentagon, *National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the USA*, HOSD, 2005, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nds/2005_NDS.pdf?ver=tFA4Qqo94ZB0x_S6uL0QEg%3d%3d [accessed: 10.02.2021].

¹² Pentagon, *NDS of the USA*, HOSD, 2008, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nds/2008_NDS.pdf?ver=WEYyBjnf6UkNioPqfkSr3Q%3d%3d [accessed: 19.03.2021].

¹³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴ White House, *NSS of the USA*, 2010, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rssviewer/national_security_strategy.pdf [accessed: 19.03.2021].

on the GWOT, Iran and North Korea. The United States organise a substantial Georgia 'Train-Equip' programme for military support to the weakened NATO partner.

In 2010, Patriot AMD rotations begin in Poland; meanwhile, things heat up in the Pacific and allies need reassurance – 2010 NSS: 'We will encourage continued reduction in tension between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan. We will not agree on every issue, and we will be candid on our human rights concerns and areas where we differ.'¹⁵ By 2012, with an increasingly aggressive China, the US promulgates the 'Asia-Pivot', focusing strategic and operational attention in the Pacific including increased US Navy (USNAV) and USAF activity, and a US Marine Task Force positions in Australia. The Army Patriot deployments to Poland cease due to global commitments, but a new opportunity arises assigning a permanent USAF Aviation Detachment (AVDET). Poland's F16 and C-130 acquisitions make the AVDET perfect to deepen the PLAF cooperation. The AVDET proves crucial when the USAF rushes aircraft to the region after Russia invades Ukraine.

With Poland's help, the AVDET could be expanded to include international partners. In spite of concerns about Russia, the US force reductions in Europe continue. By 2013, the United States have zero tank brigades, and only two infantry brigades in Europe. In 2014, Russia invades Ukraine, illegally annexes Crimea, and sponsors an ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine. Russia threatens CEE allies, partners and beyond, using a range of tools: hard power, hybrid warfare, intimidation, energy coercion, disinformation, and cyber warfare. In immediate response to the invasion of Ukraine, America's Sky Soldiers begin operations rapidly shaping OAR expanding to the vulnerable Baltic states. OAR units sequence back-to-back deployments, including Special Operations Forces (SOF). Almost immediately, difficult Military Mobility (MM) challenges arise: infrastructure, C2 for MM, and non-interoperable procedures. Tank MM is particularly vexing as the United States urgently return armour to Europe – to Poland in particular. The MM problem elevates to nations, NATO, and the EU to address – much work remains to be done. However, Germany, the Baltic States, and Poland significantly assist in the task, including Poland's future plan for a massive airport, and rail and road transport hub – Solidarity Transport Hub (STH) – which increases MM capability.

America's full OAR response includes the Army, the Navy, Air Force, Marines, and SOF. The US State National Guards (NG) play vital roles with their CEE partners under the EUCOM's state Partnership Program (SPP). The Illinois NG supports Polish exercise and training, and its new Territorial Defence Forces (TDF). Poland stands up its 45,000 member TDF in response to Russia's aggression, as a force-multiplier to support operational forces including hybrid capabilities. During this period, Poland commits significant defence expenditures for the Patriot AMD; HIMARs Long Range Precision Artillery (LRPA); F35 5th-generation fighter, Aermacchi trainer, and additional CASA transport aircraft; upgrades T72s, and acquires additional Leopard tanks. Poland also acquires indigenously produced Rosomak Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs), 155mm self-propelled howitzers, and 120 mm mortar systems. Poland establishes a NATO multinational division HQ and adds a new mechanized division – the 18th Mechanized 'Żelazna' (Iron) Division.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

In 2015, Russia shuts down the vital US/NATO access to the NDN, and the 2015 NSS is on a decidedly new tack:

Shifting power dynamics create both opportunities and risks for cooperation. In particular, India's potential, China's rise, and Russia's aggression all significantly impact the future of major power relations [...]. We will deter Russian aggression, remain alert to its strategic capabilities, and help our allies and partners resist Russian coercion over the long term, if necessary.¹⁶

The US demonstrates significant commitment increasing the size of OAR deployments providing \$30 billion via the 'European Defence Initiative' to support OAR and the allies. The response recognizes Russia's negative direction. Russia is an authoritarian kleptocracy, revising its official military doctrine to explicitly treat NATO as its main threat. Its society is in a state of constant warfare with the West – the 'Gerasimov doctrine.' It re-militarizes the Baltic and the Black Sea littorals including significant 'Anti-Access Area Denial' (A2AD) capabilities. It very likely re-deploys nuclear weapons back to Kaliningrad (and possibly into Crimea). It attacks and seizes Ukrainian ships imprisoning its sailors, falsely claiming 'Russian territorial waters.' Moreover, Russia breaks covenants including the CFE and INF Treaties. It uses a chemical weapon for a targeted assassination inside of NATO, and the same more recently against the opposition leader Aleksey Navalny, who remains locked up in a notorious penal colony east of Moscow – likely undergoing torture.

The EU and United States apply tough sanctions on Russia, while ironically, Germany and Russia announce the 'NS 2' project – near completion – further undermining CEE's security. NATO's 2014-2018 summits drive major decisions to strengthen NATO's eastern flank, including troop presence, major exercise, upgrading MM, Command and Control, and response capabilities. The United States lead deployments in the region and codify presence in Poland, embracing Poland's proposal for a new agreement – the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), including enduring presence of 5000-6000 US armour, logistics, army-aviation, USAF, Navy, and SOF troops plus equipment in Poland.

China's aggression expands well beyond Asia. The country competes for economic, political, and even military influence in Europe, notably with its 5G offers and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which the CEE-led Three Seas Initiative (3SI) can counter. The United States have to compete globally with China, less so with Russia, but either competition can lead to a costly kinetic war. As NATO strengthens its response, the 2017 NSS and the 2018 NDS feature the looming threat of China and Russia. The 2018 NDS: 'The central challenge to US prosperity and security is the *re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition* by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers.'¹⁷ In March 2021, a new presidential administration publishes an 'Interim' NSS – what a contrast to 1992. It underlines: 'Both Beijing and Moscow have invested heavily in efforts meant to check US strengths and

¹⁶ White House, *NSS of the USA*, 2015, (nssarchive.us) [accessed: 19.03.2021].

¹⁷ Pentagon, *Summary of the 2018 NDS of the USA*, 2018, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=807329> [accessed: 24.03.2021].

prevent us from defending our interests and allies around the world.’¹⁸ The new administration must grapple with the renewed great power competition.

Conclusions and Recommendations

After the Cold War, the US strategy seems clear: with allies, consolidate the victory. Though continuities in strategy are seen, challenges force divergence. Important lessons can be highlighted: (1) an urgent crisis (GWOT) distracts the US strategic attention from revisionist Russia and China; (2) Georgia and Ukraine are invaded and, along with Moldova, remain illegally occupied; (3) Poland is the Centre of Gravity (CoG) for the United States on NATO's eastern flank; (4) the great power competition is back – the United States need allies and partners more than ever. President Biden plans to deliver his first NSS by summer 2021. The stakes are high. As of this article's writing, USEUCOM continues on high alert after multiple aggressive Russian air sorties occur near NATO airspace, including provocative ground force deployments threatening Ukraine. Biden's team should review previous strategies considering outcomes and lessons. These recommendations can help:

1. The NSS Law: produce the NSS annually to ensure strategic coherence and continuity of government, and so that emerging threat trends are not missed. Since 1987, the US law has required an annual NSS, which Presidents failed to produce 17 times in 33 years.
2. The Allies: the great power competition means allies are more important than ever – the United States are defeated alone. Promoting allied coherence and cohesion, the United States can lead the Western alliance in a necessary campaign to defend the rules-based international system against revisionist powers of Russia and China, and other threats. In Europe, this means strong support to the 3SI, and pushback on NS2 and China's BRI.
3. Poland CoG: Poland is a major asset to the US strategy in Europe, and a leader on NATO's eastern flank. Its strategic location, political will, military size, and capabilities are clear. Its assessments of Russia are borne out in Russia's aggression, illegal occupations, and soft-power coercion. During the Ukraine crisis, the United States and NATO scramble, and Poland provides essential support. The next NSS should articulate how the United States lead NATO to regain the initiative, stressing Poland's strategic role.
4. The US and NATO should increase east flank deployments, including the AMD, LRPA, Engineers, Logistics, and Intel. The United States should deploy to Poland the full Army Vth Corps HQ, continue a rotational ABCT, but add a permanently assigned ABCT. Under the US Army's doctrine of Dynamic Force Employment (DFE), all deployed US forces should operate 'dynamically' across NATO's eastern flank, particularly to vulnerable areas: the Baltic States, the Black Sea, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.

¹⁸ J. Biden, *Interim NSS Guidance*, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf> [accessed 24 March 2021].

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Amerykańska strategia po 1989 roku: mocarstwa rewizjonistyczne, a wschodnia flanka NATO *Streszczenie*

W okresie zimnej wojny amerykańską strategię w stosunku do Związku Radzieckiego można scharakteryzować określeniem – „powstrzymywanie” (Containment). Upadek Muru Berlińskiego, wyznaczający symbolicznie koniec okresu zimnej wojny, pozostawił

Stany Zjednoczone jako hegemon światowego bezpieczeństwa oraz najsilniejsze militarnie państwo na świecie. Atak na Centrum Handlu Światowego był dla Amerykanów wielkim zaskoczeniem, nie tylko pozostawiającym ślady na losach indywidualnych osób w Stanach Zjednoczonych, ale trwale zmieniającym politykę amerykańską. Globalna Wojna z Terroryzmem (Global War on Terrorism – GWOT), rozpoczęta po zamachach we wrześniu 2001 r., zmieniła amerykańską strategię bezpieczeństwa oraz przyczyniła się do rozwoju nowych technologii czy środków walki. W artykule autor skupił się na zmianie polityki amerykańskiej w stosunku do wschodniej flanki NATO, a także strategicznej roli Polski w architekturze bezpieczeństwa regionu.

Słowa kluczowe: NATO, Polska, Operacja Atlantic Resolve, Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, Strategia Wojskowa, Strategia Obronności, GWOT, wojna, terroryzm

The US post-1989 Strategy: Revisionist Powers and NATO's East Flank

Abstract

During the Cold War the American strategy is clear – to 'contain' the Soviet Union and the spread of communism globally. After 1989, the organising question becomes: what is the best direction for the US strategy to ensure that democratic gains are expanded? The fall of the Berlin Wall heralds the end of the Soviet domination of Central and Eastern Europe and reduces Russia's influence globally. The US, NATO, and the greater Western alliance stand as victors of a protracted campaign which often heats up as proxy wars: Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Latin America, the Middle East. These wars are costly, but the pressure released reduces the chance of direct nuclear confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. The strategy of containment guiding the US policy proves imperfect, and bloody proxy wars confirm it. Ultimately, the strategy is successful, and by the 1990s, America is the lone superpower leading an optimistic Western alliance. The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US homeland cause significant damage and loss of life, devastating America psychologically. They usher in a period of fear and dramatic response. America must retool its strategy on the fly, and the Global War on Terrorism consumes strategic attention. The distraction leaves space for a revisionist Russia and rising China. Tracing a selection of US post-Cold War strategy documents, this article explores US strategic thinking, until today's global inflexion point of the renewed great power competition. The article particularly examines the developments on NATO's eastern flank, and Poland's role in the US strategy in the region, offering future strategy recommendations.

Key words: NATO, Russia, Poland, Great Power, Operation Atlantic Resolve, National Security Strategy, National Defence Strategy, National Military Strategy

Die US-Strategie nach 1989: revisionistische Mächte und die NATO-Ostflanke

Zusammenfassung

Während des Kalten Krieges war die amerikanische Strategie klar – die Sowjetunion und die globale Ausbreitung des Kommunismus mussten eingedämmt werden. Nach 1989 lautete die Organisationsfrage: welche Richtung sollte die US-Strategie einschlagen, um die Ausbreitung der demokratischen Errungenschaften zu gewährleisten? Der Fall der Berliner Mauer kündigte das Ende der sowjetischen Dominanz von Mittel- und Osteuropa an und beschränkte den globalen Einfluss Russlands. USA, NATO und das große westliche Bündnis standen als Sieger einer langwierigen Kampagne fest, die häufig

Stellvertreterkriege mit sich brachte: Korea, Vietnam, Kuba, Lateinamerika, Nahost. Die Kriege waren kostspielig, aber der abgelassene Druck hielt die Gefahr einer direkten nuklearen Konfrontation zwischen der Sowjetunion und den Vereinigten Staaten in Grenzen. Die Eindämmungsstrategie der US-Politik erwies sich als unvollkommen, und die blutigen Stellvertreterkriege stellten den Beweis dafür dar. Letztendlich war die Strategie aber erfolgreich und in den 1990ern avancierte Amerika zur einsamen Supermacht an der Spitze eines optimistischen westlichen Bündnisses. Die Terroranschläge vom 11. September 2001 auf die USA verursachten große Schäden und zahlreiche Todesopfer und führten zu einer psychologischen Verwüstung des Landes. Sie läuteten eine Zeit der Angst und dramatischen Reaktionen ein. Amerika musste seine Strategie spontan umrüsten und der globale Krieg gegen den Terrorismus nahm die strategische Aufmerksamkeit in Anspruch. Diese Ablenkung ließ Raum für das revisionistische Russland und das aufstrebende China. Auf Grundlage einer Reihe von Strategiepapieren der USA aus der Zeit nach Ende des Kalten Krieges erläutert dieser Text das strategische Denken in den USA bis zum heutigen Wendepunkt eines erneuten Kampfes der Supermächte. Der Text befasst sich insbesondere mit den Entwicklungen an der NATO-Ostflanke und Polens Rolle in der US-Strategie für die Region und gibt Empfehlungen für die zukünftige Strategieplanung.

Schlüsselwörter: NATO, Russland, Polen, Großmacht, Operation Atlantic Resolve, nationale Sicherheitsstrategie, nationale Verteidigungsstrategie, nationale Militärstrategie

Стратегия США после 1989 года: ревизионистские силы и восточный фланг НАТО

Резюме

Во время холодной войны стратегию Соединенных Штатов по отношению к Советскому Союзу можно было охарактеризовать термином «сдерживание» (Containment). Падение Берлинской стены, символически ознаменовавшее конец периода холодной войны, сделало Соединенные Штаты гегемоном мировой безопасности и самым могущественным, в военном плане, государством в мире. Нападение на Всемирный торговый центр стало большой неожиданностью для американцев, оставило след не только на судьбах отдельных граждан, но и навсегда изменило политику Соединенных Штатов. Глобальная война с терроризмом (Global War on Terrorism – GWOT), начавшаяся после терактов в сентябре 2001 года, изменила стратегию безопасности США и способствовала развитию новых технологий и средств борьбы. В статье сосредоточено внимание на изменениях политики США в отношении восточного фланга НАТО, а также на стратегической роли Польши в архитектуре безопасности региона.

Ключевые слова: НАТО, Польша, операция Atlantic Resolve (Атлантическая решимость), Стратегия национальной безопасности, Военная стратегия, Стратегия обороны, GWOT, война, терроризм



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The Philippines' Painful and Sluggish Journey Towards External Defence

Introduction

For more than five decades, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) have been immersed in their task of addressing internal security problems and mitigating the impact of the regular onslaught of natural calamities. While the primary mandate of the AFP is to secure the sovereignty of the state and prepare for external defence, they cannot move forward due to several systemic challenges like political, economic, social, and security constraints.

Location

The Republic of the Philippines is an archipelago in the West Pacific Ocean. Officially, it is part of Southeast Asia, and one of the member states of the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN. It is bounded in the north by Taiwan, in the east by the Pacific Ocean, in the south by the Celebes Sea, Malaysia, and Indonesia, and in the west by the South China Sea or the West Philippine Sea.

Historical Milestones

The Pre-colonial Period. Recent scientific findings reveal that humans inhabited the Philippines through the small-bodied hominin named *Homo luzonensis*, who lived

on the island of Luzon at least 50,000 to 67,000 years ago.¹ Evidence shows that in the 12th century Malays from Borneo migrated to the Philippines. In the 14th century, Islam was introduced to the archipelago. Some evidence also indicates that there was a dynamic business connection between the early Philippine inhabitants and Chinese people. Archaeologists found a deposit of Chinese ceramics, shells, and animal bones alongside human burials from approximately 1000 A.D.²

The Spanish Period (1521–1898). In 1521, Ferdinand Magellan, a Portuguese working for the King of Spain, accidentally reached the Philippine Islands while looking for the Spice Islands. Although his voyage proved that the world was round as his contingent circumnavigated the earth by reaching the same point while sailing continuously westward, Magellan was not able to claim the credit because he was killed by one of the natives popularly known as Lapu-lapu in the Philippines. Spain colonized the archipelago for 377 years and named it the Philippines after the Spanish King Phillip II.

The American Period (1898–1945). Through the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States in 1898. The Philippine-American War broke out in 1899 and eventually ended in 1902. From 1937 to 1941, President Manuel Quezon welcomed the Jews who escaped from the Holocaust in Europe by issuing 10,000 visas. Being under the protectorate of the United States, the Philippines joined the Second World War against Japan that resulted in the death of 900,000 civilians, 57,000 Filipino soldiers, and 15,000 US servicemen in the Philippines alone.

Post-World War II (1946–1986). With a difference of only one vote, the US Congress decided to grant the Philippines its independence in 1946; however, the two countries continued to have a warm relationship by forging a Mutual Defence Treaty in 1951. With this treaty, the Philippines sent troops to Korea from 1950 to 1955, sent security and medical personnel to Vietnam from 1964 to 1968, and troops to Iraq as part of the 'Coalition of the Willing.'

Contemporary Philippines (1987–Present). After the Marcos era, President Corazon Aquino became President; however, her presidency was marred by nine coup d'état attempts. In 1992, the Philippine Congress decided to discontinue the military presence of the United States in the Philippines with the vote of 12 to 11. The Philippines requested the United States to withdraw from the Subic Bay naval base by the end of 1992, ending a vast American military presence which began with the capture of the islands from Spain in 1898.³ To continue the US-Philippine military engagement, the two countries inked the RP-US Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement in 2014.

¹ M. Greshko, M. Wei-Haas, 'New species of ancient human discovered in the Philippines,' *National Geographic*, 11 April 2019, <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/new-species-ancient-human-discovered-luzon-philippines-homoluzonensis#:~:text=The%20small%2Dbodied%20hominin%2C%20named,ancient%20and%20more%20advanced%20features> [accessed: 10.03.2021].

² E. Bacus, *The Archaeology of the Philippine Archipelago, Southeast Asia: From Prehistory to History*, ed. I. Glover, Psychology Press, East Sussex 2004, p. 270.

³ D.E. Sanger, 'Philippines Orders U.S. to Leave Strategic Navy Base at Subic Bay,' *New York Times*, 28 December 1991, <https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/28/world/philippines-orders-us-to-leave-strategic-navy-base-at-subic-bay.html> [accessed: 28.01.2021].

Systemic Challenges

While China is aggressively claiming almost the entire West Philippine Sea, including the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone, the AFP is watching helplessly because it is not ready yet to provide any semblance of military deterrence. The Philippines' capability to focus on external defence is contingent upon some political, economic, social, and security factors. The tug of war between having external defence capabilities and being tasked to perform internal security operations prevents the Philippine Armed Forces from accomplishing their constitutional mandate of securing the territory.

Political Challenges

From the political perspective, the Philippines is confronting several systemic challenges including the weakness of democracy, the dubious and wrong concept of public service, and an irresponsible political opposition system. These challenges also have a major influence on the Philippine's military and defence readiness.

The Weakness of the Philippine Democracy. Although democracy is the most popular and is considered as the leading political system around the world, its inherent weaknesses have been the Philippines' 'Achilles' heel'. The liberal conferment of rights to the people without corresponding responsibility and respect for the rights of others has created a lot of tension. Furthermore, the communist movement in the Philippines has been exploiting the freedom to organize and assemble which allows them to freely operate in the country. This is alongside their deceitful communist scheme aimed at destroying the duly established government. In the Philippines, everyone is free to express their thoughts; however, nobody cares about their responsibility to respect the rights of others. The enemies of the state use this freedom to discredit the government by using false allegations and propaganda not only locally but also internationally. Moreover, the Philippine democracy allows every citizen who can read and write to run for public office, as manifested by several lawmakers in the Congress who are affiliated with the New People's Army (NPA) and the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).

The Distorted Concept of Public Service. Philippine oligarchs are usually elected for public offices because they have the resources to support political campaigns; however, many of them use their positions to protect their business interests, to obtain influence, and to exploit the poor. In the Philippines, 'oligarchs' are few very rich businessmen with strong political influence. Although there are some good, sincere, and service-oriented and public officials, many of them are still corrupt, especially in the law enforcement, the tax administration, the customs administration, the public procurement, and public services.⁴ Because the objectives of the pro-poor programmes of the government are not in the best interest of the oligarchs, these programmes cannot gain momentum.

⁴ *The Philippines Corruption Report*, Gan Business Anti-Corruption Portal, <https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/the-philippines> [accessed: 18.01.2021].

Irresponsible Opposition System. The Philippines holds a Presidential election every six years. As the President embarks on his programmes starting day one, the opposition party also starts to exert efforts to discredit the incumbent government to have a better chance of winning the next election. Although some consider this as a 'checks-and-balances' mechanism, the six-year demolition job is not helping the Philippine government move forward. Instead of working together to improve the country, the opposition politicians are pulling the country down by discrediting the government in the guise of human rights watchdogs or social development advocates.

Economic Challenges

Amidst the impact of COVID-19 on the world economy, the overall economic foundation of the Philippines has been relatively stable; however, the disparity of wealth distribution and the destruction caused by natural calamities hamper a more inclusive and sustained economic prosperity. This challenge significantly impacts on the Philippine military institution because its modernization programme is highly dependent on the economy and a strong economy can alleviate poverty and ease down discontent.

Sustained Economic Growth Benefits Only for the Rich. Amidst lingering global and local uncertainties, the Philippine economy is poised to grow at 6.4 percent in 2019 and 6.5 percent in 2020 and 2021.⁵ Although this projection has slowed down due to the impact of COVID-19, the economic growth is still one of the fastest in Asia. This growth, however, is seen by many as benefiting only a few oligarchs, as seventeen Philippine tycoons and their families are among the wealthiest on the planet with an estimated combined fortune of \$47.7 billion, or about 14 percent of the country's GDP⁶, while almost 23 million Filipinos are still living below the poverty line. If the disparity of wealth distribution lingers on, the internal security problem will continue to haunt the Philippine defence sector.

Natural Calamities. Due to its location along the 'Ring of Fire,' or 'Typhoon Belt,' the Philippines has been suffering from an inexhaustible number of deadly typhoons, earthquakes, volcano eruptions, and other natural disasters.⁷ The Asian Development Bank Institute reports that the socio-economic damage brought by natural calamities in the Philippines was about \$20 billion with average annual damages

⁵ D. Llorito, *The Philippines to Sustain Strong Growth amidst Local and Global Uncertainties*, The World Bank, 1 April 2019, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/04/01/philippines-to-sustain-strong-growth-amidst-local-and-global-uncertainties> [accessed: 2.02.2021].

⁶ N.S. Poblador, 'Income inequality in the Philippines: Do family-owned firms play a moderating role?', *Inquirer.net*, 15 July 2019, <https://business.inquirer.net/274684/income-inequality-in-the-philippines-do-family-owned-firms-play-a-moderating-role> [accessed: 2.02.2021].

⁷ J. Wingard, A. Brändlin, 'Philippines: A country prone to natural disasters', *DW Made for Minds*, 11 October 2019, <https://www.dw.com/en/philippines-a-country-prone-to-natural-disasters/a-17217404> [accessed: 1.02.2021].

of \$1.2 billion.⁸ This persistent occurrence of natural calamities is one of the Philippines' hindrances towards sustained development, which has drained the national coffers relegating the defence spending to a mere minimum.

Social Challenges

The Philippines is also confronting several social challenges including the following most glaring issues which need immediate intervention: a) poverty and social inequality, b) a lack of formal education, and c) the exodus of Filipinos to become Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW).

Poverty and Social Inequality. According to the ASEAN Trade Union Council, the Philippines has the highest rate of economic and social inequality in Southeast Asia, which is not only limited to personal wealth, but it also applies to land distribution, educational and vocational opportunities, as well as basic welfare programmes.⁹ This corroborates the fact that more than 23 million Filipinos are living below the poverty line. This disparity of wealth distribution is one of the most potent drivers of insurgency, therefore, addressing poverty would also address insurgency.

Education. Another social challenge of the Philippines is education. The number of children out of school has reached 2.8 million.¹⁰ Although the Philippine literacy rate is 97.95 percent, there is still a lot to be done to give millions of Filipino children on the fringes their rightful access to quality education. Education is the greatest social equalizer and its lack is also one of the drivers of insurgency. In places where there is no education, rebels enter the areas to train and recruit these uneducated, directionless children.¹¹

Overseas Filipino Workers. Due to the lack of employment opportunities in the country, millions of Filipinos venture to work abroad. The Philippine Central Bank reports that personal remittances from overseas Filipinos totalled \$33.5 billion in 2019.¹² These remittances are coming from approximately 12 million Filipinos around the world. Although it provides a badly needed boost to the Philippine economy to remain afloat and stable, this phenomenon has negative social impacts on the country: a) it weakens the Filipino family as the basic unit of society because a high percentage of marriages break up among OFWs; b) it promotes 'brain-drain'

⁸ S. Jha, A. Martinez, P. Quising, et al, *Natural Disasters, Public Spending, and Creative Destruction: A Case Study Of The Philippines*, ADB Institute, March 2018, <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/408351/adb-wp817.pdf> [accessed: 2.02.2021].

⁹ *Closing the Social Inequality Gap in the Philippines*, Child Fund International, <https://www.childfund.org/Closing-the-Social-Inequality-Gap-in-the-Philippines/?noredirect=true> [accessed: 2.02.2021].

¹⁰ *Education*, UNICEF Philippines, <https://www.unicef.org/philippines/education> [accessed: 2.02.2021].

¹¹ 'You Can Help Rescue Child Soldiers in Mindanao', *Project AK47*, 5 October 2012, <https://www.projectak47.com/blog-all-posts/you-can-help-rescue-child-soldiers-in-mindanao> [accessed: 29.03.2021].

¹² *Overseas Filipino Remittances*, Philippine Central Bank, <http://www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics/keystat/ofw.htm> [accessed: 18.03.2021].

as many skilled workers and professionals are lured to leave the country; and c) it makes OFWs susceptible to physical, financial and sexual abuse, especially those working as housekeepers.

Security Challenges

There are two major challenges in the Philippine security sector. The first of them are the persistent threats from the communist insurgency and Islamic extremism, the second is the stagnated modernization of the AFP due to insurgency, fiscal control of the Congress, and the restrictions of the Constitution.

The Philippine Communist Insurgency. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) was organized by Jose Maria Sison on 26 December 1968.¹³ Sison subsequently allied with Bernabe Buscayno to organize the New People's Army (NPA) on 29 March 1969, which established the armed component of the movement.¹⁴ The CPP/NPA aims at replacing the current economic and political order in the Philippines with a socialist system, and its main function is to wage a protracted people's war to destroy the Philippine government.¹⁵ From its highest strength of 25,200 in 1987, insurgent numbers fell to 11,920 in 1992.¹⁶ In December 2019, the number dropped more significantly to 3,789.¹⁷ Although the insurgency trend has noticeably gone downwards, the CPP/NPA remains to be a major security challenge for the Philippines, hampering the country's stable economic development.

Islamic Extremism. Another security challenge that haunts the Philippines is Islamic violent extremism. In 2017, the Abu Sayyaf Group and other local terrorist groups aligned themselves with ISIS and attempted to establish a caliphate in the city of Marawi, the only Islamic city in the Philippines. The government defeated them after five months of fierce fighting which killed more than a thousand terrorists, including 32 identified foreign fighters. Although the Philippine military defeated the terrorists in Marawi, terrorism continues to thrive in the country as there are still sleeper cells identified all over the Philippines,¹⁸ posing a serious security challenge to the country.

¹³ L. Suerte, 'Philippines 2010 and Beyond: The Need for Institutional Peace-Building,' *Shedden Papers, Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies Australian Defence College*, 2010, p. 7, https://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/Shedden/2010/Publctns_ShedPaper_100924_Philippines2010andBeyond.pdf [accessed: 2.02.2021].

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ F. Domingo, 'Explaining the Sustainability of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army,' *Small Wars Journal*, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/explaining-the-sustainability-of-the-communist-party-of-the-philippines-new-people%E2%80%99s-army> [accessed: 9.10.2019].

¹⁶ L. Suerte, 'Philippines 2010...', p. 8.

¹⁷ NPA Strength, *National Threat Situation Update from the Philippine Army Intelligence Regiment, Philippine Army*, 15 January 2020.

¹⁸ Marawi Campaign Briefing, *Office of the Commanding General, Philippine Army*, 15 December 2018.

Military Modernization. To address the emerging security threats to the country, the Philippines needs to modernize its armed forces. The AFP force structure stagnated after more than 52 years of fighting the communist insurgents. To shift its role from counterinsurgency to territorial defence, the AFP needs to modernize, overhaul its force structure, and improve its readiness, all of which needs a considerable amount of additional funds. This fund requirement would certainly create intense tension between the AFP and the Congress, considering that there is a constitutional restriction on defence spending, which states that the defence spending shall never exceed that of education because the Philippine Constitution requires that education should be the top priority in the budget.¹⁹ Military modernization is also restricted by the current average defence spending of 1% of the Philippine GDP due to national policy of prioritizing other equally important concerns such as poverty, infrastructure, social services, education, mitigation of the impact of natural calamities, and currently, the onslaught of the COVID19 pandemic, which needs a considerable amount of funds.

Conclusion

Almost twenty years after the 9/11 attacks, the Philippine military is still struggling to shift its focus towards external defence, while China is flexing its muscles to aggressively claim almost all of the West Philippine Sea. The political, economic, social, and security landscapes in the Philippines have significantly influenced this laggard shift of the Philippine Armed Forces from internal security towards external defence. While it is true that some of these challenges have merely a second-order effect on the problem, failure to address them effectively would continue to pull the AFP's attention towards internal security functions. It is also obvious that the economic, political, social and security dynamics are evidently interconnected as they overlap in several issues.

Among these major challenges, the economic dilemma of the Philippines has proven to be the most influential as almost everything boils down to economics. A strong economic standing could address poverty, unemployment, social inequality, and discontent, which are the main drivers of insurgency. In the same manner, a robust economy would provide resources for the military modernization programme which could capacitate the AFP in performing its task of providing a modest but effective deterrent posture against probable external aggressors. Although various other factors may affect military strength, 'the vast majority of international relations studies and defence analyses assumes that military power is a direct product of material resources, often measured in terms of the size of a state's defence budget, military forces, or gross domestic product (GDP).'²⁰

¹⁹ F. Mangosing, 'Defense budget needs 2% of GDP to be at par with Asean – military,' *Inquirer.net*, 27 November 2019, <https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1187019/defense-budget-needs-2-of-gdp-to-be-at-par-with-asean-military#ixzz6og0PrWTS> [accessed: 10.03.2021].

²⁰ M. Beckley, 'Economic Development and Military Effectiveness,' *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 2010, p. 1, DOI: 10.1080/01402391003603581.




Figure 1. AFP's Shift to External Defence Framework

While other factors are equally important, the Author believes that the Philippine leadership should focus more on strengthening, revitalizing, and maximizing its economic potential to allow the government to slowly address various challenges. Considering that economic prosperity cannot be achieved overnight, especially in the aftermath of the COVID 19 pandemic, the AFP's goal of transitioning towards external defence is expected to stagnate for some time, and the Philippine defence sector will continue its painful and sluggish journey towards external defence.

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Bolesna i krwawa droga Filipin do bezpieczeństwa Streszczenie

Po uzyskaniu niepodległości w 1946 r. Filipiny pozostawały przez wiele dziesięcioleci wiernym sojusznikiem Stanów Zjednoczonych. Kryzys w stosunkach obu państw nastąpił na początku lat 90. XX wieku, gdy decyzją parlamentu filipińskiego Stany Zjednoczone musiały zamknąć bazę morską w Subic Bay. W dwadzieścia lat po zamachu na

Centrum Handlu Światowego i ponownym uregulowaniu stosunków ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi w 2014 r., Filipiny nadal nie są krajem bezpiecznym. Agresywna polityka Chin wobec państw leżących w basenie Morza Południowochińskiego wyznacza strategiczne kierunki rozwoju systemu bezpieczeństwa Filipin. Równolegle rząd zмага się z istotnymi zagrożeniami bezpieczeństwa ze strony islamskich grup ekstremistycznych, partyzantki komunistycznej, a także biedą, znacznymi nierównościami społecznymi czy masową emigracją zarobkową Filipińczyków.

Słowa kluczowe: Filipiny, wojna domowa, modernizacja, bezpieczeństwo, ekstremizm, islam, komunistyczna partyzantka

The Philippines' Painful and Sluggish Journey Towards External Defence

Abstract

During the 9/11 attacks, the Philippine defence sector was already experiencing capability drawbacks as it had been a decade since the United States Military left the country. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were having problems sustaining itself due to many systemic challenges as it tried hard to stand on its own after so many years of dependence on the United States. After another decade, the improvement in the Philippine defence sector is not significant, especially in the AFP's external defence capabilities, while China is aggressively claiming almost the entire West Philippine Sea, including the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone. The AFP is watching helplessly, not yet ready to provide any semblance of military deterrence. The Philippines' capability to focus on external defence is contingent upon some systemic challenges including political, economic, social, and security predicaments. The tug of war between having external defence capabilities and being tasked to perform internal security operations prevents the Philippine Armed Forces from accomplishing its constitutional mandate of securing the territory and deter external aggressors. Among the major systemic challenges, the Philippine economic dilemma has proven to be the most influential as almost everything boils down to economics. A strong economic standing could address poverty, unemployment, social inequality, and discontent, which are the main drivers of insurgency. In the same manner, a robust economy could provide resources for a military modernization programme which would capacitate the AFP in performing its task of providing a modest but effective deterrent posture against a probable external antagonist. Hence, the Author is leaning on recommending that the Philippine leadership should focus more on strengthening, revitalizing, and maximizing its economic potential to allow the government to slowly address various systemic challenges.

Key words: Philippines, AFP, Social, Political, Economic, Security, Modernization, External Defence, Internal Security

Der schmerzhafte und stockende Weg der Philippinen zur territorialen Verteidigung

Zusammenfassung

Während der Anschläge vom 11. September war der Verteidigungssektor der Philippinen bereits mit Kapazitätsschwierigkeiten konfrontiert, nachdem das US-Militär das Land bereits ein Jahrzehnt zuvor verlassen hatte. Die Armee der Philippinen (AFP) hatte aufgrund zahlreicher systemisch bedingter Herausforderungen mit Erhaltungsschwierigkeiten zu kämpfen, da man nach langjähriger Abhängigkeit von den Vereinigten Staaten darum

bemüht war, selbstständig zu funktionieren. Ein weiteres Jahrzehnt später hat sich der Verteidigungssektor in den Philippinen nicht wesentlich erholt (insbesondere bezüglich der Verteidigungskapazitäten der AFP nach außen), während China aggressiv Anspruch auf fast das komplette Südchinesische Meer erhebt, einschließlich der ausschließlichen Wirtschaftszone der Philippinen. Die AFP schaut hilflos zu und ist noch nicht in der Lage, auch nur den Hauch eines militärischen Abschreckungsmanövers zu fahren. Die Fähigkeit der Philippinen, sich auf die Territorialverteidigung zu konzentrieren, wird durch systemische Herausforderungen bedingt, darunter u.a. politische, wirtschaftliche, gesellschaftliche und sicherheitsrelevante Zwangslagen. Das Tauziehen zwischen territorialen Verteidigungskapazitäten und der Beauftragung mit internen Sicherheitsoperationen macht es der philippinischen Armee unmöglich, ihr verfassungsrechtliches Mandat auszuüben und damit das Staatsgebiet zu schützen und fremde Aggressoren abzuschrecken. Unter den wichtigsten systemrelevanten Herausforderungen hat sich das wirtschaftliche Dilemma der Philippinen als zentrales Problem erwiesen, da fast alles auf die Wirtschaft hinausläuft. Eine stabile Wirtschaftslage könnte Armut, Arbeitslosigkeit, soziale Ungleichheit und Unzufriedenheit eindämmen, die als wichtigste Antriebskräfte für Aufstandsbewegungen gelten. Ebenso würde eine robuste Wirtschaft die Ressourcen für ein Modernisierungsprogramm der Armee bereitstellen, um die AFP in die Lage zu versetzen, die von ihr erwartete maßvolle, aber effektive abschreckende Haltung gegen mutmaßliche externe Feinde einzunehmen. Deshalb empfiehlt der Autor der philippinischen Führung, sich intensiver auf die Stärkung, Revitalisierung und Maximierung des Wirtschaftspotenzials des Landes zu konzentrieren, damit die Regierung die verschiedenen systemrelevanten Herausforderung der Reihe nach angehen kann für die Region und gibt Empfehlungen für die zukünftige Strategieplanung.

Schlüsselwörter: Philippinen, AFP, gesellschaftlich, politisch, wirtschaftlich, Sicherheit, Modernisierung, externe Verteidigung, interne Sicherheit

Долгий и кровавый путь Филиппин к созданию системы безопасности

Резюме

После обретения независимости в 1946 году Филиппины, на протяжении многих десятилетий, оставались верным союзником Соединенных Штатов. Кризис в отношениях двух государств произошел в начале 90-х годов XX века, когда решением филиппинского парламента США пришлось закрыть военно-морскую базу в Субик-Бей. Спустя двадцать лет после нападения на Всемирный торговый центр и после возобновления отношений с Соединенными Штатами в 2014 году, Филиппины по-прежнему не являются безопасной страной. Агрессивная политика Китая в отношении государств бассейна Южно-Китайского моря, определяет стратегические направления развития системы безопасности Филиппин. Сегодня правительство Филиппин сталкивается с серьезными угрозами безопасности со стороны исламских экстремистских группировок, коммунистических партизан, а также ведет борьбу с бедностью, социальным неравенством и массовой эмиграцией филиппинцев.


Ключевые слова: Филиппины, гражданская война, модернизация, безопасность, экстремизм, ислам, коммунистические партизаны

Reviews

Recenzje

Rezensionen

Рецензии



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Paweł Semmler, *Rosja we krwi. Terroryzm dwóch dekad*

[Russia in Blood. Terrorism over two decades]
(in Polish)

[Wydawnictwo Czarne, Wołowiec 2020, ss. 216]

The book is a successful attempt at characterising contemporary terrorist threats in the Russian Federation. Not only is the title of the book unique, but also its content: separate chapters contain descriptions of terrorist attacks which took place in Russia. Well-organised information provides the readers with an opportunity to learn about the main terrorist organizations and their leaders. Paweł Sammler identifies socio-political and frequently military events acting as triggers. Thus, he focuses on the greatest threats to Russia, which are the North Caucasus, Syria, and Uzbekistan. The Author outlines the causes of the conflict and indicates potential sources of danger. He pays special attention to the assassins' experience acquired at training camps for terrorists, and through direct involvement in preparing and carrying out terrorist attacks outside Russia's borders. By doing so, he points to the sources of new combat techniques, skills in operating state-of-the-art equipment, but also to the terrorist underworld connections.

Worthy of attention are logical presumptions considered by the Author and suggesting other, often surprising, leads. Precise and detailed descriptions of the struggle undertaken at the frontlines of the fight against terrorism point to close

connections between that struggle and the Russian secret services and the military in this respect. This paradox perfectly fits into Moscow's policies frequently leading to sacrificing its citizens in pursuit of the planned success; it also serves as an explanation of a kind as to why a veil has been drawn over such affairs which have no place in the media. Owing to this, the book is an invaluable piece of work filling the existing gap in the wholistic approach to the issue of terrorism in the Russian Federation.

Paweł Semmler's book makes us realise that despite the seemingly uncontrolled flow of information in the 21st century, there is the biggest country in the world, in which information can travel across its borders extremely rarely. By meticulously reconstructing the most insolent terrorist attacks, the Author searches for the answers to a question about their grounds and circumstances. He sets them in a peculiar mosaic of ethnic disagreements, cultural differences, and not infrequently, the border delineation, connecting the last issue with the Kremlin's policy.

The text contains basic statistical data and a description of the types of the terrorist attacks carried out in the past two decades in the Russian Federation. One of the strongest points of the reviewed book is a wide array of facts which allow us to place the behind-the-scenes struggle for power, prestige, and public opinion's acceptance in the context of contemporary history. Paweł Semmler makes an in-depth analysis of the last two decades, urging the reader to think about the future.

The book is of high scientific and academic merit and can be used as a valuable textbook in educating (and self-educating) anyone interested in worldwide terrorism. The issue of terrorist attacks in Russia is still a largely uncharted area in specialist literature about fighting terrorism and provides both an excellent research subject for experts in Security Sciences, as well as a topic for academic conferences. Paweł Semmler's work is one of the few publications telling the untold stories, and despite the fact that it is not the easiest, it reads with pleasure because the Author encourages us to reflect upon and critically evaluate the described events, which is the most essential skill in academic education.

Not only should this book be read by academic teachers and students, but also by readers who find combating terrorism and behind-the-scenes plotting close to their hearts, and those who are interested in events over which a veil has been drawn. What is particularly important is the fact that the problems outlined in this work are still relevant, and they can develop in horrible ways the human race cannot foresee.



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Mirosław Banasik, *Rywalizacja, presja i agresja Federacji Rosyjskiej. Konsekwencje dla bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego*

[Rivalry, Pressure and Aggression of the Russian Federation. The Consequences for International Security] (in Polish)
[Wydawnictwo Difin, Warszawa 2021, ss. 348]

In today's world, the rivalry among the great powers is increasingly being conducted just below the threshold of an all-out war, as demonstrated by the activities of the Russian Federation in the international security environment. The publication *Rywalizacja, presja i agresja Federacji Rosyjskiej (Rivalry, Pressure and Aggression of the Russian Federation)* brings up an interesting though difficult issue of the Russian Federation's rivalry in the international arena, in both theoretical and practical terms.

The monograph was written by Professor Mirosław Banasik, Safety Sciences Ph.D., Colonel of the Polish Army, whose scientific career focuses on activities of the Russian Federation and potential threats to global security.

The publication in question deserves attention for several reasons. Firstly, the name of the Author is a guarantee of the book's excellence, and its subject matter is still relevant. The content of the work reflects the Author's extensive military

experience (service at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and at the Polish Ministry of National Defence Operational Centre), as evidenced by the complexity and scope of the analysis regarding the military craft. Secondly, the Author discusses a wide range of instruments used by Russia to achieve its strategic objectives, including building new governance and exercising influence on society, as well as explains the mechanisms behind them, and attempts to assess their relevance for international security. Thirdly, the book points out that the Russian Federation's rivalry in the international arena does not need to be based on direct involvement of the armed forces but can rely on conducting next-generation wars. In this context, the Author draws his own conclusions regarding the rivalry of the great powers in the future.

As mentioned in the introduction, the monograph is intended for those interested in the subject of the Russian Federation's international rivalry and the subsequent threats to international security, including potential use of nuclear weapons. It should be highlighted that the multifaceted nature of the deliberations and the rich bibliography make for a remarkable reading experience for the scientific community.

Since it is an outcome of a research project, the publication has a clear and logical structure and constitutes a significant contribution to the development of scientific reflection on the issues listed in its title.

In the introduction, the Author guides the reader step by step through a broad spectrum of strategic actions taken by the Russian Federation. He draws attention to the fact that information operations, cyberspace, and outer space activities are as important as kinetic military operations and can be carried out from any region of the world. The introduction refers to hypotheses about the activities undertaken by the Russian Federation to achieve its international rivalry goals. The Author's research tool kit deserves to be commended: the presented material is based on theoretical and empirical methods, and the limitations of studies conducted in this field are pointed out.

The first chapter, *Preparation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for International Rivalry Challenges in the Third Decade of the 21st Century*, offers a holistic description of the Russian Armed Forces' transformation and discusses the milestones on the way for a new strategy aimed at achieving military and political objectives, e.g., separating from the legacy of the USSR and focusing on the concept of next-generation wars. The material presented in this chapter enables the reader to understand the Russian Federation of today and its imperialist aspirations by discussing, among others, the increasing influence of the Russian Federation in the Arctic. These deliberations are supported with examples of armed conflicts, e.g., in Syria and Ukraine, demonstrating their impact on the effectiveness of the Russian Armed Forces' activities and gaining an advantage in the 21st century.

The second chapter, *The Rivalry of the Russian Federation in the International Arena Conducted Below the Threshold of an All-Out Armed Conflict*, shows the mechanisms of changing strategic thinking and tendencies to blur the lines between war and peace. While discussing examples of achieving long-term strategic goals, the Author presents the undoubtedly hostile activities of the Russian Federation against Central and Eastern Europe in a vivid and accessible manner.

The subsequent chapters describe the tools employed by the Russian Federation to compete in the international arena. The third chapter, *Information War in the International Rivalry of the Russian Federation*, presents the issue of information as a weapon as dangerous as kinetic military actions and often decisive for the result of battlefield operations. Understanding the difference in perception of information war between the Russian Federation and the West enables the readers to avoid any misconceptions about the large-scale use of information by Russia. The fourth chapter, *Strategic Deterrence as Employed by the Russian Federation in International Rivalry*, identifies the origin and types of strategic deterrence employed by Russia. In order to strengthen the message, the Author draws some original conclusions, stating e.g., that in the future conventional weapons of precise destruction will be regarded equal to nuclear weapons (p. 184).

The next part of the book aims at describing nuclear weapons, non-strategic nuclear weapons, and weapons of precise destruction (Chapter 5: *Nuclear Weapons as Employed by the Russian Federation in International Rivalry*, Chapter 6: *Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons as Employed by the Russian Federation in International Rivalry*, and Chapter 7: *Weapons of Precise Destruction as Employed by the Russian Federation in International Rivalry*), their origin, evolution, and the current deployment strategy used by the Russian Federation. Political, military and economic threads woven on the pages of this book create a coherent picture of the Russian Federation's supremacy and associated threats. China is referenced as an example of a state becoming increasingly important and seeking to impose its own order in the international arena.

The conclusions at the end of each chapter are a particularly valuable part of this publication, as they provide yet another look at the research material and capture the Author's main thought. At the same time, they encourage reflection and can serve as a starting point for further exploration of the subject matter.

A rich bibliography with up-to-date source material including monographs, articles, and magazines in several languages completes the book. The Author carried out an extremely in-depth analysis of normative documents, articles, and publications of think tanks. He has managed to capture different perspectives of politicians, scientists, and military people in an enthralling manner.

The subject matter is ambitious, broad and complex, and even though the publication is written in an accessible way, the language could have been clearer at times, e.g., in the chapter on weapons of precise destruction, which is dominated by military jargon.

To sum up, the work *Rywalizacja, presja i agresja Federacji Rosyjskiej* (*Rivalry, Pressure and Aggression of the Russian Federation*) is impossible to ignore. It takes the reader out of the comfort zone and encourages a thorough analysis of the surrounding reality.

This book is worth reading as a tool for exploring Russia's geopolitical viewpoint and the evolution of the Russian strategic thinking. It brings us one step closer to understanding how the Russian Federation is striving to achieve its strategic goals and maintain its position as a great power in the 21st century.

Bulletins, Reports
Komunikaty, sprawozdania
Mitteilungen, Berichte
Сообщения, отчеты



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Discussion meetings at the Jakub of Paradies University in Gorzow Wielkopolski

In the spring of 2019, the Polish Political Science Association and the Polish Society of European Studies at Jakub of Paradies University in Gorzow (AJP) launched monthly discussion meetings. Their purpose was to create a platform for stimulating creative debate among the staff.

At first, the debates took place in the conference hall of the AJP Main Library. The speakers were mainly staff members, guest from outside the University were rare. The topics of the first meetings were Brexit and the socio-political conditions of the European Parliament elections. There was a discussion about the political situation in Poland following the general election, as well as a debate on the role of the Russian secret service in the making of Russia's imperial policy and the consequences of Russian and Belarussian relations for Poland.

In January, the winter term meetings concerned challenges for the European Commission and associations of the Russian secret service officer retirees.

The summer term opened in March 2020 with a discussion about women's rights in Poland. Due to the pandemic, the subsequent face-to-face meetings were put on hold and meetings moved online from May. The subject of the first two online meetings was the new Covid reality and a question whether the post-pandemic world would be different. At the next meeting, the influence of the pandemic on

migration was explored. After the summer holidays, debates about Poland's place in the EU¹ were held and discussions about Russia returned (sparked by the promotion of a book regarding its transformation).²

In January 2021, Daria Zviagina Ph.D., was invited to participate in a meeting, and she was asked about the directions Russia was going (that debate was met with unprecedented interest: for the first time there were participants from Estonia and Ukraine). Equally popular was the February meeting regarding the contemporary determinants of the Baltic states' safety, led by Colonel Zdzisław Sliwa, Ph.D. (Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia). In March, Katarzyna Dospiał-Borysiak, Ph.D. (University of Łódź) discussed the dilemmas of climate policies, and in April, Anna Masłon-Oracz, Ph.D. (Warsaw School of Economics), Aleksandra Szczerba Ph.D. (AJP) and Małgorzata Dziembala, Ph.D. (University of Economics in Katowice) talked about wage discrimination.

Between April 2019 and April 2021, there were 16 discussions: 11 online and 5 face-to-face meetings. The attendance varied from a dozen to several dozen, and the talks provoked animated debates, some of them lasting for over two hours.

Anyone interested in participating in the future meetings can visit the fan page of the Polish Political Science Association in Gorzów Wielkopolski on Facebook. The previous online meetings can be also watched on the website of the Regional Centre for International Debate in Gorzów Wielkopolski.

¹ By that point, among the speakers at the Gorzów discussion meetings there were: Jacek Barcik, Ph.D., Prof. at the University of Silesia; Łukasz Budzyński, Ph.D. (AJP); Prof. Zbigniew Czachór, Ph.D. (AJP); Natalia Gorzkiewicz, Ph.D. (Lubuskie Museum); Prof. Tomasz Grosse, Ph.D. (the University of Warsaw); Ewa Kocińska-Lange, Ph.D. (National Centre for Research and Development, Office in Brussels); Kazimierz Kraj, Ph.D., Prof. at AJP; Paweł Leszczyński, Ph.D., Prof. at AJP; Joanna Lubimow, Ph.D. (AJP); Tomasz Marcinkowski, Ph.D. (AJP); Beata Orłowska, Ph.D., Prof. at AJP; Marta Pachocka, Ph.D. (the Warsaw School of Economics); Beata Piskorska, Ph.D., Prof. at the Catholic University of Lublin; Juliusz Sikorski, Ph.D. (AJP); Andrzej Skwarski, Ph.D. (AJP); Aleksandra Szczerba, Ph.D., Prof. at AJP; and Marta Witkowska, Ph.D. (the University of Warsaw).

² J. Tymanowski, A. Skwarski, N. Moch (eds.), *Rosja w procesie wyzwań – między demokracją a autorytaryzmem*, Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, Warszawa 2020.

Publication ethics

Etyka wydawnicza

Ethik-Richtlinien für die Publikation
von Zeitschriftenartikeln

Издательская этика



Publication ethics

OUR CODE OF CONDUCT AND BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES The Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University Press observes the principles and guidelines that have been developed by the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) in the Codes of Conduct and Best Practice Guidelines.

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE EDITOR

The Editor shall

- make sure that the publishing ethics is duly observed and shall take all the available and appropriate measures to prevent plagiarism, abuse and other unfair practices, including ghostwriting and/or guest authorship;
- decide which papers will be published, based on the opinions expressed by the editorial board, and the relevant reviews provided by external reviewers who have been duly appointed for this purpose (for more information, go to the Information for Authors tab);
- evaluate the materials submitted for publication in accordance with an agreed and transparent procedure;
- upon taking a decision to publish, consider exclusively the original nature of the submitted material, its overall academic value, and its significance for the development of research in Poland and worldwide; no commercial aspects or fees paid for publication shall have an impact on this decision;
- refrain from disclosing any information to third parties concerning the materials submitted for publication;
- have the right to withdraw a given publication after it has been published if there is evidence to prove a possible lack of reliability or falsification of research data, plagiarism, or a breach of the editorial ethics, as well as where major methodological flaws have been made.

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AUTHOR

The Author shall

- familiarise him/herself with the principles of publishing ethics that have been set by the Editor, as well as the procedure applied for qualifying materials sub-

mitted for publication, the principles of cooperation of the Editor and the Author, and any other technical guidelines provided;

- have the right to submit for publication only his/her individual and original texts. All borrowings, quotes/citations, tables and comments/notes used in the text should be followed by a relevant reference/footnote;
- provide a reliable and accurate description of the studies conducted, and an impartial interpretation of the research findings obtained;
- provide detailed information about the contribution of individual authors where a material that has been submitted for publication has multiple authors;
- enclose a relevant bibliography that includes all the publications that have been used throughout the preparation of the material;
- in the event that major flaws and/or discrepancies are revealed in his/her text, without undue delay notify the Editor of this fact in order to allow for corrections of these mistakes at the editing stage.

DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE SCIENCE EDITOR OF A JOINT STUDY

The Science Editor shall

- decide which materials will be published in the joint study that has been proposed by him/her;
- bear responsibility for observing the principles of publishing ethics and the overall academic value of the publishing house;
- in the event of suspected plagiarism or falsification of research data by any of the Authors, take necessary decisions to withdraw the text from the joint study and notify the Editor thereof;
- make certain that the persons who have contributed to the creation of a joint study have accepted and acknowledged its form, once the editing process conducted by the Editor has been completed.

DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE REVIEWER

The Reviewer shall

- carry out an impartial assessment of the material submitted for publishing;
- if need be, point to the relevant books or papers connected to the subject matter of the text that have not been quoted or referred to by the author;
- report to the Editor any and all major similarities of the reviewed text with other works;
- not be allowed to use and enjoy the reviewed text for the purposes related to his/her individual benefits; s/he shall not assess the text in the event of a possible conflict of interest with the author either;
- submit his/her review within the agreed deadline, adding a statement that there is no conflict of interest with the author;
- evaluate the materials submitted for publishing in line with an established and transparent procedure.



Etyka wydawnicza

Oficyna Wydawnicza Krakowskiej Akademii im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego kieruje się zasadami, które zostały opracowane przez Komitet ds. Etyki Publikacyjnej (Committee on Publication Ethics, COPE) w Kodeksie Postępowania COPE (Codes of Conduct and Best Practice Guidelines).

POWINNOŚCI I UPRAWNIENIA WYDAWCY

- czuwa nad przestrzeganiem etyki wydawniczej i stosuje wszelkie dostępne środki w celu zapobiegania plagiatom, nadużyciom i innym nieuczciwym praktykom, takim jak ghostwriting i guest authorship;
- decyduje, które teksty zostaną opublikowane, opierając się na opinii zespołu redakcyjnego oraz na opiniach powołanych w tym celu zewnętrznych recenzentów (zob. zakładka Informacje dla Autorów);
- ocenia zgłoszone do wydania materiały według ustalonej i transparentnej procedury;
- podejmując decyzję o wydaniu, wydawca kieruje się wyłącznie oryginalnością zgłaszanego materiału, jego wartością naukową oraz znaczeniem dla rozwoju badań w Polsce i w skali światowej; względy komercyjne oraz opłaty za wydanie publikacji nie mają wpływu na decyzję;
- nie ujawnia osobom nieupoważnionym informacji na temat zgłaszanych do publikacji materiałów.
- ma prawo wycofać publikację po jej wydaniu, gdy pojawią się dowody świadczące o niewiarygodności bądź sfałszowaniu badań, o popełnieniu plagiatu bądź naruszeniu zasad etyki wydawniczej, a także w przypadku popełnienia poważnych błędów metodologicznych.

POWINNOŚCI I UPRAWNIENIA AUTORA

- jest zobowiązany zapoznać się z ustalonymi przez wydawcę zasadami etyki wydawniczej, procedurą kwalifikowania materiałów do wydania oraz zasadami współpracy wydawcy z autorem i wskazówkami technicznymi;

- może zgłaszać do publikacji wyłącznie własne, oryginalne teksty. Wszystkie założeń, cytaty, tabele i komentarze użyte w tekście jest winien opatrzyć odpowiednim przypisem;
- jest zobowiązany do rzetelnego opisu wykonanych prac badawczych oraz obiektywnej interpretacji wyników;
- zgłaszający do wydania materiał autorstwa wielu osób jest zobowiązany określić wkład poszczególnych autorów w jego powstawanie;
- jest zobowiązany załączyć bibliografię zawierającą wszystkie publikacje, które zostały przez niego wykorzystane w trakcie tworzenia materiału;
- w przypadku ustalenia poważnych błędów i nieścisłości w zgłoszonym już tekście, autor jest winien natychmiast powiadomić o tym wydawcę w celu skorygowania tychże błędów na etapie prac redakcyjnych.

POWINNOŚCI I UPRAWNIENIA REDAKTORA NAUKOWEGO WYDAWNICTWA ZBIOROWEGO

- decyduje, które materiały zostaną opublikowane w proponowanym przez niego wydawnictwie zbiorowym;
- bierze na siebie odpowiedzialność za przestrzeganie zasad etyki wydawniczej oraz wartość naukową wydawnictwa;
- w przypadku podejrzenia plagiatu lub fałszowania badań przez jednego z Autorów, redaktor jest zobowiązany podjąć decyzję o wycofaniu tekstu z publikacji zbiorowej i poinformować o tym wydawcę.
- ma obowiązek upewnić się, że osoby mające wkład w powstanie wydawnictwa zbiorowego akceptują jego kształt po pracach redakcyjnych wykonanych przez wydawcę.

POWINNOŚCI I UPRAWNIENIA RECENZENTA

- jest zobowiązany do obiektywnej oceny materiału zgłaszanego do wydania;
- jeśli zachodzi taka potrzeba, recenzent powinien wskazać odpowiednie prace związane z tematyką tekstu niezacytowane przez autora;
- powinien wskazać i zgłosić wydawcy wszelkie istotne podobieństwa recenzowanego tekstu do innych prac;
- nie może wykorzystywać recenzowanej pracy do swoich osobistych potrzeb i korzyści. Nie powinien również oceniać tekstu, w przypadku gdy może występować konflikt interesów z autorem;
- jest zobowiązany dostarczyć recenzję w ustalonym terminie, opatrując ją oświadczeniem o nie zachodzeniu konfliktu interesów z autorem.
- Wydawca ocenia zgłoszone do wydania materiały według ustalonej i transparentnej procedury.



Ethik-Richtlinien für die Publikation von Zeitschriftenartikeln

Der Verlag der Krakauer Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Akademie lässt sich von den vom Komitee für Publikationsethik (Committee on Publication Ethics, COPE) in den Richtlinien zur Publikationsethik und guten Wissenschaftlichen Praxis (Codes of Conduct and Best Practice Guidelines) bearbeiteten Grundsätzen leiten.

PFLICHTEN UND BEFUGNISSE DES HERAUSGEBERS

- beaufsichtigt die Beachtung der Publikationsethik und ergreift alle zugänglichen Maßnahmen, damit es zu Plagiaten, Missbräuchen und anderen unlauteren Praktiken wie ghostwriting und guest authorship nicht kommt;
- entscheidet, welche Beiträge publiziert werden aufgrund der Begutachtung des Redaktionsteams und der zwei, zu diesem Ziel eingesetzten unabhängigen Gutachter (siehe Karteikarte - Informationen für Autoren);
- beurteilt die zur Veröffentlichung eingereichten Materialien nach einem festen, transparenten Verfahren;
- bei der Entscheidung über die Veröffentlichung lässt sich der Herausgeber ausschließlich nach der Originalität des eingereichten Beitrags, seinem wissenschaftlichen Wert und der Bedeutsamkeit für die Entwicklung der Forschung in Polen und in der Welt leiten. Kommerzielle Gründe und Gebühren für die Publikation des Beitrags sollen keine Rolle spielen;
- gibt unbefugten Personen keine Informationen über eingereichte Beiträge;
- ist befugt die Publikation nach ihrer Veröffentlichung zurückzuziehen, wenn es sich bewahrheitet, dass die Untersuchungen unglaubwürdig oder verfälscht sind, im Falle eines Plagiats oder eines Verstoßes gegen die Publikationsethik, als auch wenn infolge der Ermittlung ernste methodologische Fehler festgestellt wurden.

PFLICHTEN DER AUTOREN

- sind verpflichtet sich mit den vom Herausgeber festgelegten Grundsätzen der Publikationsethik, mit dem Verfahren der Zulassung zum Veröffentlichenden des

Ethik-Richtlinien für die Publikation von Zeitschriftenartikeln

Beitrags und den Regeln für die Zusammenarbeit des Herausgebers mit dem Autor und technischen Leinien bekannt zu machen;

- sollen nur eigenständige, originelle Beiträge einreichen. Jegliche im Artikel benutzten Entlehnungen, Zitate, Tabellen und Kommentare sollen mit entsprechender Fußnote versehen werden;
- sind verpflichtet die durchgeführten Forschungsarbeiten exakt darzustellen und die Resultate objektiv zu interpretieren;
- bei der Einreichung eines Artikels, der viele Autoren hat, sind die Autoren verpflichtet den Beitrag jedes einzelnen Autors zu bestimmen;
- sind verpflichtet die Bibliographie beizulegen, in der alle, bei dem Verfassen des Artikels benutzten Publikationen genannt werden;
- falls Autoren signifikante Fehler und Ungenauigkeiten im eingereichten Text entdecken ist es ihre Pflicht die Herausgeber der Zeitschrift unverzüglich zu benachrichtigen um diese Fehler im Laufe der Redaktionsarbeiten zu korrigieren.

PFLICHTEN UND BEFUGNISSE EINES WISSENSCHAFTS – REDAKTEURS EINES KOLLEKTIVVERLAGS

- er entscheidet, welche Beiträge in einem von ihm vorgeschlagenen Kollektivverlag veröffentlicht werden;
- trägt alleinige Verantwortung für Beachtung der Grundsätze der Publikationsethik und für den wissenschaftlichen Wert des Verlags;
- falls er verdächtigt, dass einer der Autoren einen Text nachgeahmt oder verfälscht, hat ist er verpflichtet die Entscheidung über die Zurückziehung des Textes von der kollektiven Publikation zu treffen und darüber den Herausgeber zu benachrichtigen.
- hat die Pflicht sicherzustellen, dass die Personen, die sich zu der Gründung des Kollektivartikels beigetragen haben seiner Form nach die vom Herausgeber durchgeführten redaktionellen Änderungen akzeptieren.

PFLICHTEN UND BEFUGNISSE DES GUTACHTERS

- er ist verpflichtet den eingereichten Beitrag objektiv zu beurteilen;
- wenn es nötig ist, soll der Gutachter entsprechende mit dem Thema des Textes verbundene, vom Autor nicht zitierten Arbeiten angeben;
- er soll den Herausgeber über alle wesentliche Ähnlichkeiten des begutachteten Textes zu anderen Beiträgen benachrichtigen und diese Ähnlichkeiten nennen;
- er kann den begutachteten Text für seine persönlichen Bedürfnisse und zu seinem persönlichen Nutzen nicht verwenden. Die Gutachter sollen Beiträge, bei denen sie in Interessenkonflikt mit Autoren kommen, ablehnen;
- er ist verpflichtet seine Begutachtung innerhalb der gesetzten Frist mit der Erklärung abgeben, dass kein Interessenkonflikt mit dem Autor vorliegt;
- Der Herausgeber beurteilt die eingereichten Beiträge nach einem festgelegten und transparenten Verfahren.



Издательская этика

Редакционная политика Издательства Краковской академии им. Анджея Фрыча Моджевского руководствуется принятыми международным сообществом принципами публикационной этики, отраженными, в частности, в рекомендациях «Комитета по этике научных публикаций» (Committee on Publication Ethics, COPE) и в «Кодексе поведения и руководящих принципов наилучшей практики» (Codes of Conduct and Best Practice Guidelines).

ОБЯЗАННОСТИ И ПРАВА ИЗДАТЕЛЯ

- Издатель несет ответственность за исполнение этических обязанностей и использует все доступные средства для исключения публикаций, содержащих плагиат и недостоверные данные, злоупотребления, а также старается избегать явлений «guest authorship» (указание авторства человека, не участвовавшего в исследовании и написании статьи) и «ghost authorship» (отсутствие указания авторства человека, внесшего заметный вклад в исследование и написание статьи).
- Издатель определяет, какие тексты будут опубликованы, на основании мнения редакционной коллегии и мнения независимых рецензентов (см. раздел Информация для авторов);
- Издатель оценивает предоставленные материалы, в соответствии с установленной и явной процедурой;
- Принимая решение о публикации статьи, издатель руководствуется исключительно самобытностью работы, ее научной ценностью и значением для развития исследований в Польше и в мире; коммерческие соображения и платы за публикацию статьи не имеют влияния на принятие решения;
- Издатель не разглашает посторонним лицам сведений о материалах, предоставленных к публикации.
- Издатель имеет право отозвать публикацию после ее выпуска, в случае если появятся доказательства, свидетельствующие о неправдивости или фальсификации исследований, о плагиате или нарушении этики издательства, а также в случае совершения серьезных методологических ошибок.

ОБЯЗАННОСТИ И ПРАВА АВТОРА

- Автор обязан ознакомиться с издательской этикой, процедурой отбора материалов, правилами сотрудничества издателя с автором и техническими инструкциями оформления статьи;
- Автор может предоставить издателю только собственные, оригинальные статьи. Все заимствования, цитаты, таблицы и комментарии, используемые в статье, должны сопровождаться соответствующими примечаниями;
- Автор обязан надлежащим образом описать выполненные научно-исследовательские работы и предоставить объективную интерпретацию результатов;
- Соавтор, который предоставляет издателю статью нескольких авторов, обязан указать вклад отдельных авторов в данную работу;
- Автор обязан приложить к статье библиографию, содержащую все публикации, которые были использованы в процессе написания работы;
- В случае выявления серьезных ошибок и неточностей в ранее предоставленной издателю работе, автор должен немедленно уведомить об этом издателя для исправления ошибок на этапе редакции статьи.

ОБЯЗАННОСТИ И ПРАВА НАУЧНОГО РЕДАКТОРА СБОРНИКА НАУЧНЫХ СТАТЕЙ (ЖУРНАЛА)

- Редактор принимает решение, какие материалы будут опубликованы в данном сборнике научных статей (журнале);
- Редактор берет на себя ответственность за соблюдение принципов издательской этики и научную ценность сборника научных статей (журнала);
- В случае подозрения плагиата или фальсификации исследований одного из авторов, редактор обязан исключить данную работу из публикации и уведомить об этом издателя;
- Редактор обязан убедиться, что лица, имеющие вклад в создание сборника статей (журнала), принимают его форму после проведенных редакционных работ.

ОБЯЗАННОСТИ И ПОЛНОМОЧИЯ РЕЦЕНЗЕНТА

- Рецензент обязан дать объективную оценку работы, предназначенной к печати;
- Если есть необходимость, рецензент должен указать какие труды, связанные с тематикой статьи, были не учтены автором;
- Рецензент должен указать и сообщить издателю о всех существенных сходствах рецензируемой статьи с другими работами;
- Рецензент не может использовать рецензируемую работу для своих личных нужд и пользы. Рецензент также не должен оценивать текст, если может возникнуть конфликт интересов с автором;
- Рецензент обязан предоставить рецензию в установленный срок, и подать заявление об отсутствии конфликта интересов с автором.