^^u(U/iâÂôe^a ■n iw Motto Trzymam się zasady, która mówi, że „prawdziwa radość obywa się bez radości, a prawdziwa chwała bez pochwał”. Pytacie: „co powinno i czego nie powinno się robić”, żeby na świecie było więcej szczęścia? Na to pytanie nie ma odpowiedzi. Nie da się rozstrzygnąć takich rzeczy. Zarazem jednak jest tak, że gdy przestaję gonić za szczęściem, wtedy samo z siebie staje się jasne, co jest „dobre", a co „złe*. Zhuangzi, Radość doskonała, w: Thomas Merton, Droga Chuang Tzu, przekł. M.Godyń, s.109, Wydawnictwo WAM, Kraków 2005. Spis treści (目錄) Słów kilka od Wydawcy do czcigodnego Jubilata........................................9 Władysł^^ Góralski Roman Sławiński z bliska............................................................21 Marianne Bastid-Bruguière L'origine polonaise de l'enseignement universitaire du chinois moderne en Europe: Michel Alexandre Kleczkowski (1818-1886).............................29 Li Chang Enlightening Women in Chinese Rural Reconstruction Movement: A Case Study of Jiangxi Rural Welfare Centers.......................................61 Wilja Gdaliwicz Gielbras Mni pauM», MMeioiiui^ MCTopu'iccKoe 'jHancHiic /ina KiïTaa n Bcero Mitpa............73 Juan Ch，ang-rue The Aborigines of Taiwan............................................................93 Liu Zwd On the Cultural Characteristic of Poland...........................................105 Izabella Łabędzka Absurd and Grotesque in Plays by Gao Xingjian......................................117 Kenneth Olenik The international phase: Deng Yanda's Theory and Practice, 1923-1928...............141 Jolanta Sierakowska-Dyndo Dialogue of Cultures: The Polish Commonwealth and the Safavid Persia...............161 Roman Sławiński Secret Societies and the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom..................................173 Wojciech Szymczyk O sztuce negocjacji z Chińczykami..................................................193 8 Spis treści Stanisiaw Tokarski Tygrys i smok. Mit Szaolinu w tradycji i symbolice chińskiej.......................211 Karin Tomala Diskurs über eine „gute Gesellschaft” in der Welt - Menschenbild in der chinesischen Zivilisation...................................................231 Jerz;y Zdanowski The 1933 and 1937 Rebellions in Sinkiang...........................................251 Adina Zemanek Confucianism, Communism and Liberal Democratic Values in China. Continuity and Change..............................................................271 Bogdan Zemanek The Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism in the Light of E. Gellner’s Theory 295 Wybrane publikacje prof. dr. hab. Romana Sławińskiego..................................323 Noty o autorach .......................................................................335 Słów kilka od Wydawcy do czcigodnego Jubilata Niełatwo jest dokonać oceny ogromnego dorobku i działań tak wszechstronnego Uczonego, jednego z najwybitniejszych polskich znawcó^w Chin. Zawierają je zresztą adresy okolicznościowe przedstawicieli Władz Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego i Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego - instytucji, z którymi związał swoje naukowe życie Profesor Roman Sławiński. Dlatego dodam tylko jedno zdanie. W imieniu wszystkich, którzy zamieszczają swoje studia w tym tomie, dedykowanym Profesorowi z okazji 50-lecia Jego pracy naukowej， w imieniu uczniów i współpracowników Jubilata，dziękujemy Ci Profesorze za przybliżenie Polakom wspaniałej historii i cywilizacji Chin, za liczne publikacje naukowe na ten temat, za wykłady i seminaria, za wyedukowanie rzeszy studentów i doktorantów. Zaczynałeś Profesorze swoje uniwersyteckie ż^cie w Krakowie, cieszymy się, że ten piękny jubileusz możemy Ci organizo^wać w grodzie Kraka, do którego pono^wnie zawitałeś. Sławiński教故按受我农心f叫射:并顺:的敬 Proszę przyjąć, Profesorze, moje serdeczne podziękowania oraz w^raz^ najwyższego uznania. Prof, dr hab. Andrzej Kapiszewski A brief address to the honourable Professor from the publishers It is not easy to appraise the vast achievements, body of works，and activities of as versatile a Scholar as Professor Roman Stawiński, and one of the most eminent Polish authorities on Chinese affairs. Not incidentally indeed is such a high judgment contained in the commemorative addresses by the representatives of the Authorities of Polish Academy of Sciences, the Jagiellonian University, and the Warsa^w University and Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Kraków College (KSW): the institutions the Professor has devoted his life to. I shall let myself share but a single thought. On behalf all who have contributed their papers to this volume dedicated to the Professor on the 50th anniversary of his academic work, as well as on behalf of the students and colleagues of the Professor, we would like to thank you, Dear Professor, for introducing Poles to the remarkable history and civilisation of China, for the multitude of scientific publications on this subject, for the lectures and seminars, for the education of throngs of students. You started your academic life in Kraków, Professor, and we are more than glad to be able to organise your magnificent jubilee in the Royal Capital City of Krakow you have returned to. Sławiński教故按受我农心f叫射:并顺:的敬 Professor Sławiński, please receive my heartfelt gratitude and m^ deepest respect. Professor [Andrzej Kapiszewskj, Ph.D. Editor-in-Chief of the AFM Publishing House Jest wiele przyczyn, dla których Polska Akademia Nauk, a w szczególności jej Wydział I Nauk Społecznych, pragnie dołączyć s^wój głos do Księgi poświęconej Profesorowi Romanowi Sławińskiemu. Pierwszą z nich jest potrzeba wyrażenia gorącej wdzięczności za twórczość badawczą Profesora，otwierającą szerokie perspektywy poznawcze dla polskich językoznawców, historyków i antropologów kultury. Dzieje Chin, jednego z najważniejszych „ś^iató^w cywilizacji” na ziemskim globie, dzięki pracom Profesora Sławińskiego stafy się lepiej i powszechniej z^a-ne. Nie trzeba udowadniać, że w czasach powszechnej globalizacji gospodarki, polityki i kultury jest to szczególnie potrzebne i dla elit rządzących, i dla szerokich kręgów społecznych. Drugą przyczyną, za sprawą której należy się Dostojnemu Jubilatowi szczera wdzięczność, jest udostępnianie naszym rodakom przekładów tych ut^oró^w literackich, które ukazują piękno i finezję twórczości oraz sposoby myślenia ludów zamieszkujących „Państwo Środka”. Bardzo dla nas trudna do przejścia bariera, jaką stanowi tak obcy nam język, została pokonana. Pozwoliło to nie tylko na lepsze poznanie Chin, lecz także sprowokowało wielu do podejmowania trudu samodzielnego poszerzania wiedzy o tym kraju. Profesor Roman Sławiński jest uczonym, którego działalność nie w^znacza^^ ani nie zakreślały wąskie granice polityczne. Stąd też bierze się kolejna przyczyna jego znaczenia we wspólnocie ludzi nauki, za którą w^^^^śm^ Mu wdzięczność: Jego prace są znane, cenione i cytowane w piśmiennictwie międzynarodowym. Jeśli, jak chciał poeta, „czyny ludzi dają blask krajowi，，，to na pewno dokonania Jubilata dają ów blask nauce uprawianej w Polsce, Polskiej Akademii Nauk, wreszcie naszej Ojczyźnie. Życząc wielu dalszych osiągnięć i sukcesów, dziękujemy Mu za dotychczasowy dorobek Jego życia. Ad multos annos Szanowny i Drogi Panie Profesorze! Prof. dr. hab. Henryk Samsonowicz Przewodniczący Wydziału I Polskiej Akademii Nauk Profesor Roman Sławiński należy do grom najwybitniejszych znawców dziejów Chin. Problematyce tej poświęcił cały swój dorobek naukowy: od doktoratu obronionego na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim, traktującego o Wyprawie Północnej, czyli unifikacji kraju przez Kuomintang, przez rozprawę habilitacyjną poświęconą jednemu z tradycyjnych, choć działających jeszcze w latach trzydziestych XX wieku, tajnych stowarzyszeń chińskich (La Société des Piques Rouges et le movement paysan en Chine en 1926-1927, Warszawa 1975), po liczne książki, rozprawy, artykuły pisane w kolejnych latach, w tym takie fundamentalne opracowania, jak Geneza Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej z 1987 roku cz^ Historia Tajwanu z 2001 roku oraz wydana rok później Historia Chin i Tajwanu. Spod Jego pióra w^szł^ też liczne przekłady wybitnych prac autorów chińskich. Karierę naukową rozpoczętą na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim kontynuował w Polskiej Akademii Nauk, gdzie do dziś pełni funkcję członka Komitetu Nauk Orientalistycznych. Od kilku lat związał się z Krakowem, miastem swej młodości, gdzie wykłada w Instytucie Studiów Regionalnych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego oraz od 2004 roku w Krakowskiej Szkole Wyższej im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego. W tej młodej uczelni Profesor Roman Sławiński zaangażował się szczególnie w proces prz^goto^^^^wania przyszłej kadry niezbędnej Polsce do rozwijania relacji z Dalekim Wschodem. Czyni to, pro^wadząc erudycyjne wykłady na Wydziale Stosunków Międzynarodowych poświęcone takim ważnym tematom, jak: Chiny a Europa, Stany Zjednoczone a Azja (dla studentów Amerykanistyki), czy Globalizacja a rozwój regionu Bliskiego Wschodu oraz APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) dla słuchaczy Studiów Wschodnich. Swą głęboką wiedzę przekazuje studentom także podczas cieszących się dużym zainteresowaniem zajęć seminaryjnych. Jest dla nas - społeczności akademickiej Krakowskiej Szkoły Wyższej im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego wielką radością i zaszczytem udział w edycji Księgi Jubileuszowej tego wybitnego Uczonego, który przyczynił się do pogłębienia naszej wiedzy o „Państwie Środka”, ukazania szerokim kręgom piękna literatury chińskiej, wreszcie podniesienia znaczenia pozycji polskiej nauki na arenie międzynarodowej. Czcigodnemu Jubilatowi życzymy wielu dalszych lat owocnej pracy, kolejnych sukcesów wydawniczych, a przede wszystkim zdrowia i wszelkiej pomyślności. Liczymy, że będzie nas nadal wspierał w dziele kształcenia młodzieży. Prof. dr hab. Jerzy Malec Rektor Krakowskiej Szkoły Wyższej im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego Obchodzimy jubileusz 50-lecia pracy naukowej profesora Romana Sła'wiń-skiego w imieniu władz Wydziału Studiów Międzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Alma Mater profesora. To w murach krakowskiej wszechnicy zaczął Sławiński, rodem z Tarnowa，swoje studia w 1950 roku. To stąd wyjechał na początku 1951 roku na stypendium do Chin, które zapoczątkowało trwającą już ponad pół wieku Jego fascynację ”Państwem Środka，，. Po studiach w Pekinie związał się na długie lata z Warszawą, z tamtejszym uniwersytetem i Polską Akademią Nauk. Zdobywał kolejne stopnie naukowe, ukoronowane tytułem profesorskim w 1985 roku. Intensywnie pracował naukowo, stając się jednym z najwybitniejszych polskich sinologów，autorem licznych książek i artykułów na temat historii i kultury Chin. Z nowym wiekiem postanowiłpo^wrócić do miasta swojej młodości. W2002 roku został zatrudniony na naszym Wydziale w Katedrze Bliskiego i Dalekiego Wschodu Instytutu Studiów Regionalnych, gdzie, poproszony przez nas, zapoczątkował „studia chińskie” w ramach no^wo utworzonych interdyscyplinarnych studiów kulturoznawczych. Z pasją oddał się temu zajęciu. Prowadzi wykłady z historii Chin，seminaria magisterskie i przewody doktorskie. Dziś, dzięki Jego pracy, Uniwersytet Jagielloński zaczyna być uzna^wan^ za centrum studiów i badań sinologicznych. Szanowny Profesorze! ^^cz^m^ Ci dalszych sukcesów w pracy naukowej, dydaktycznej i życiu prywatnym. Wszystkiego najlepszego. Prof. dr hab. Wiesław Kozub-Ciembroniewicz Dziekan Wydziału Studiów Międzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego Jubileusz Profesora Romana Sławińskiego jest znakomitą okazją do wspomnień i do przypomnienia początków Jego długiej i owocnej drogi naukowej. Rozpoczęła się ona w 1955 roku w Instytucie Orientalistycznym Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, gdzie wykładał historię Chin i prowadził zajęcia jęz^ko^we. W ciągu tylu lat pracy jako nauczyciel akademicki w^cho^wał wiele pokoleń polskich sino-logów interesujących się nowszą historią Chin i Azji Wschodniej. Profesor Sławiński jest współtwórcą szkoły sinologicznej w Polsce. Pracę badawczą w Instytucie Orientalistycznym rozpoczął od udziału w przełożeniu na język polski znanej pracy Szang Jue Historia Chin. Specjalizował się w mało zbadanym zagadnieniu historii tajnych stowarzyszeń chińskich i z tego tytułu brał udział w międzynarodowym projekcie badawczym pod kierownictwem prof. Jeana Chesneaux z Sorbony. W ramach tego projektu napisał pracę o Stowarzyszeniu Czerwonych Pik. Było to pierwsze opracowanie tego tematu w literaturze światowej. Weszło ono do tomu opublikowanego w Paryżu i Stanfordzie. W ostatnich 10 latach interesował się szczególnie historiografią chińską tworzoną zarówno przez historyków kontynentalnych, jak i tajwańskich. Na kanwie badań historiograficznych podjął się, już jako pracownik Polskiej Akademii Nauk, ambitnego zadania przedstawienia czytelnikowi polskiemu i zachodniemu współczesnych osiągnięć historiografii chińskiej w zakresie historii Chin XX i XX w^ekó^. Księga pamiątkowa skupiła plejadę specjalistów z wielu krajów. Ś^wiadcz^ to o pozycji naukowej prof. Romana Sławińskiego oraz Jego dobrej współpracy z naukowcami zarówno Wschodu,jak i Zachodu. Szanowny Jubilacie! Gratulujemy Ci sukcesów i składamy najlepsze życzenia pomyślności oraz dalszych osiągnięć naukowych w ciągu wielu przyszfych lat, przy- ♦ ♦ ♦ J / ' fTr ♦ t ♦ 1 ✓ ♦ J y 1 pominając jednocześnie Iwoje słowa, że, aby uporać się z ogromem zadań badawczych w orientalistyce, trzeba ż^ć lat 200. Prof. dr hab. Jolanta Sierakowska-Dyndo Dyrektor Instytutu Orientalistycznego Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego WŁADYSŁAW GÓRALSKI Roman Sławiński z bliska Romana Sławińskiego poznałem w Instytucie Orientalistycznym UW w końcu 1964 roku w dość szczególnych dla mnie okolicznościach. W Instytucie tym, który jak wiadomo ma charakter filologiczny, rozpocząłem cykl wykładów politologicznych pod tytułem „Współczesne zagadnienia polityczne Dalekiego Wschodu”. Obejmowały one studentów czwartego roku Sinologii, Indologii i Japonistyki. Stosunek ówczesnej kadry Instytutu do tych wykładów był zróżnicowany: przeważała pewnego rodzaju powściągliwość, tylko nieliczni odnosili się do nich ze zrozumieniem i aprobatą. Wśród nich był dr Roman Sławiński. Stanowisko takie oznaczało dla mnie swojego rodzaju zachętę do kontynuowania wykładów. Dodam nawet, że było ono jednym z powodów, które sprawiły, że zajęcia w Instytucie Orientalistyki prowadziłem 49 lat. Przez dłuższy czas dr. Romana Sławińskiego znałem tylko „z widzenia”. Przy różnych okazjach mówiliśmy sobie dzień dobry, wymieniając kilka grzecznościowych zdań. Robił wówczas na mnie wrażenie człowieka skromnego i spokojnego, nieco skrytego lub, mówiąc inaczej, „zamkniętego w sobie”. Po bliższym poznaniu przekonałem się, że to ostatnie wrażenie było mylne. Do naszego pierwszego spotkania doszło dopiero w następnym roku akademickim. Mieliśmy do załatwienia sprawy związane z udziałem studentów Sinologii w moich wykładach. Ale krótkie robocze spotkanie przekształciło się w nieco przydługą rozmowę. Stało się to za sprawą dwóch okoliczności. Po pierwsze, okazało się, że byliśmy swego rodzaju kolegami, podobnie uderzonymi „pałką bambusową” w Chinach, z tym że ja - w 1950 r., a on rok później i trochę mocniej. Ale moje też wystarczyło na ponad pół wieku i mniemam, że starczy do końca życia. Po drugie, wyjaśnialiśmy sobie, że nasze badania naukowe w pewnym stopniu zazębiają się. Pasją Romana Sławińskiego była i jest historia Chin; ja od dłuższego czasu zajmowałem się historią nowożytną i najnowszą Azji Wschodniej, której pewną cząstkę stanowią Chiny. Było więc o czym rozmawiać. Ku mojemu zaskoczeniu dr Sławiński okazał się „otwartym” rozmówcą i wdzięcznym, chociaż nie bezkrytycznym słuchaczem. Spotkanie to zapoczątkowało nasze bezpośrednie kontakty. Miały one przeważnie luźny charakter (z wyjątkiem lat 1976-1981, kiedy pracowaliśmy 24 Władysław Góralski w jednym Zakładzie Instytutu Orientalistycznego UW). W tym miejscu chciałbym też wyrazić zadowolenie, że przetrwały one mimo burzliwych wydarzeń w Polsce i na świecie oraz wiążących się z nimi zmianami. W znanym mi już okresie czołowe miejsce w działalności naukowej Romana Sławińskiego (od 1985 - profesor dr habilitowany) zajmowały badania, przekłady i publikacje dotyczące historii i współczesnych zagadnień Chin. Od 1970 do 2004 roku ukazało się ponad 150 pozycji z jego podpisem, w różnej formie: książek autorskich, udziału w pracach zbiorowych, przekładów przybliżających wiedzę o Chinach, artykułów, recenzji i różnych opracowań. Znaczna część tych prac poznałem dość dobrze nie tylko z lektury „na własny użytek”, ale w pewnym sensie z „obowiązku”，gdyż na prośbę instytucji naukowych opracowałem w 1985 i 1993 r., charakterystykę jego dorobku. W części dotyczącej publikacji wskazałem w szczególności na ich duże walory poznawcze, wszechstronność, krytyczny dystans wobec analizowanych zagadnień oraz korzystanie z bogatych źródeł, nie tylko oficjalnych. Tutaj chciałbym uwypuklić jeszcze inne elementy zasługujące moim zdaniem na uwagę. W pierwszym rzędzie mam na myśli trafność wyboru tematów badawczych oraz ich konsekwentne „drążenie w czasie i przestrzeni”. Podjęcie badań dotyczących działalności tajnych stowarzyszeń „Czerwonych Pik” i „Białego Lotosu” było strzałem w dziesiątkę. Zapoczątkowały one szersze badania nad najnowszą historią Chin, uzyskując uznanie w kraju i zagranicą. Fragmenty wyników tych badań pt. Les Piques Rouges et la revolution chinoise de 1925-1927 zostały opublikowane w pracy zbiorowej w Paryżu w 1970 r., a dwa lata później wydano ją w języku angielskim w Stanford University. Temat ten wzbudził również zainteresowanie w Instytucie Vostokoviedienija w Moskwie. Po ukazaniu się w Polsce w 1975 książki pt. La Societe des Piques Rouges et movement paysant en Chine en 1926-1927, czasopismo tego Instytutu 一 „Narody Azji i Afryki” -zamieściło obszerną recenzję wskazującą na jej dużą aktualność, wysoki poziom naukowy oraz wykorzystanie bogatych źródeł. W recenzji tej czytamy m.in.: „R. Sławiński jest inicjatorem naukowego wyjaśniania tego słabo jeszcze zbadanego aspektu historii Chin, pozostającego przez długie lata w zapomnieniu. W sposób krytyczny przeanalizował on w praktyce wszystkie dostępne materiały w języku chińskim, rosyjskim i innym. Szczególnie głęboko przeanalizowana została prasa chińska lat dwudziestych”1. Badania nad tajnymi stowarzyszeniami w Chinach Roman Sławiński kontynuował w następnych latach, co znalazło m.in. wyraz w referacie wygłoszonym na konferencji międzynarodowej w Rzymie w 1978 roku na temat stowarzyszenia „Białego Lotosu”, który został opublikowany w pracy zbiorowej pt. 1 „Narody Azji i Afryki” 1977, nr 1, s. 194-195. Roman Sławiński z bliska 25 Understanding Modern China (Rzym 1979) oraz w artykule pt. Z badań nad dziejami chińskich tajnych stowarzyszeń opublikowanym w kwartalniku „Problemy Dalekiego Wschodu” (1983, nr 1-2). W artykule tym, wskazując na znaczenie tajnych stowarzyszeń w historii Chin, Roman Sławiński stwierdza m.in., że „odegrały one niemałą rolę wspomagając ruch republikański Sun Yatsena. Wielu działaczy Kuomintangu, a później Partii Komunistycznej należało do tradycyjnych tajnych stowarzyszeń, choć temat ten pozostał tabu”. Wśród publikacji prof. Sławińskiego ważne miejsce zajmuje Geneza Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej wydana w 1987 r. Poproszony przez wydawnictwo o jej recenzję wskazałem, że jest to pierwsza praca w Polsce poświęcona w całości temu zagadnieniu, podkreślając, że autor „z dużym znawstwem przedmiotu przedstawił w niej główne wydarzenia i etapy rewolucji od I wojny światowej, których ukoronowaniem było proklamowanie 1 października 1949 roku Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej”. Z perspektywy minionych już blisko 20 lat pragnę dodać, że ta niewielkich rozmiarów, bezpretensjonalna książka weszła na trwałe do literatury polskiej dotyczącej Chin, przybliżając wiedzę o złożonych problemach tego kraju. Na marginesie uwag dotyczących tej książki chciałbym także wskazać na dbałość prof. Sławińskiego oto, aby jego publikacje były zrozumiałe nie tylko dla specjalistów, ale również dla ludzi niezajmujących się na co dzień Chinami. Jest to oczywiście istotne dla każdej publikacji, ale w odniesieniu do Chin, ze względu na ich specyfikę, ma szczególne znaczenie (rozległe terytorium; licząca kilka tysięcy lat historia, różniące się od europejskich źródła cywilizacyjne, blisko 1,3 mld mieszkańców i mnogość problemów). Na ogół nasz Kowalski wie, że Chiny to duży kraj, w którym żyje dużo Chińczyków, ale rzadko kojarzy, że jego terytorium jest 30 razy większe od Polski, a liczba naszej ludności to zaledwie 3% mieszkańców Chin. Prof. Sławiński, pisząc prostym i zrozumiałym językiem, większość znanych mi prac kończy wypunktowaną refleksją. Należy oczywiście zakładać, że niektóre opinie zawarte w nich mogą być dyskusyjne. Nie zmienia to jednak faktu, że ułatwiają przyswajanie treści. Dodam również, że publikacje prof. Sławińskiego są dobrze udokumentowane i w zależności od charakteru wzbogacone załącznikami (stosowne dokumenty, mapy, wykresy, tabele, zdjęcia, chronologie, zestawienia statystyczne). W publikacjach prof. Sławińskiego na uwagę zasługuje szeroki zakres tematyczny oraz różnorodność ujęć; od monografii po syntezy; od wątków historycznych po zagadnienia współczesne. W swych pracach, odnosząc się z sympatią do bezspornych sukcesów Chin, ofiarności i poświęceń społeczeństwa, dostrzega także negatywne zjawiska, błędne koncepcje i decyzje oraz frakcyjną działalność na szczytach władzy. Dochodziło do nich w okresie re- 26 Władysław Góralski wolucji i po proklamowaniu ChRL, hamując i komplikując jej rozwój. Pisząc o takich zjawiskach sporo miejsca poświęcił negatywnym skutkom „wielkiego skoku” i „rewolucji kulturalnej”, wskazując jednocześnie na ich uwarunkowania historyczne i inne, a także na kroki podejmowane w celu ich przezwyciężenia. Zdaniem prof. Sławińskiego, obok jednorazowych decyzji duże znaczenie w tej dziedzinie mają długofalowe procesy, które w końcu XX w. znalazły wyraz w reformach ekonomicznych. W przybliżaniu wiedzy o tych reformach profesor ma znaczny udział. Uczestniczył w przetłumaczeniu wyboru prac Deng Siaopinga, wydanych pt. Chińska droga do socjalizmu w 1988 roku. Opublikował też własne prace i tłumaczenia na ten temat. Ciekawe uwagi dotyczące tych reform zwarte są także w jego pracy Historia Chin i Tajwanu, wydanej w 2002 roku (rozdział: Półwiecze Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej) W działalności naukowej prof. Sławińskiego na uwagę zasługuje jego aktywność zagraniczna. Jest członkiem Europejskiego Stowarzyszenia Badań dotyczących Chin (European Association of Chinese Studies). Bierze udział w sympozjach i sesjach naukowych organizowanych w różnych krajach, najczęściej w Chinach, prezentując na nich dorobek badań dotyczących nieraz także Polski. W referacie wygłoszonym na sesji w Moskwie w 1979 roku zwrócił m.in. uwagę na jednostronne przedstawienie w ostatnim dziesięcioleciu w Pekinie historii Polski. W 1999 roku na Sympozjum Międzynarodowym w Pekinie wygłosił referat (w języku chińskim) dotyczący stosunków polsko-chińskich w XIX i XX w. Dwa lata później na podobnym Sympozjum w Pekinie przedstawił stosunki Polski z Republiką Chińską do 1949 roku (chodziło o stosunki z Chinami pod władzą Chiang Kai-sheka). W ogólnym dorobku naukowym prof. Sławińskiego na uwagę zasługuje dydaktyka, troska o rozwój młodych pracowników oraz działalność organizacyjna w tej dziedzinie. Po uzyskaniu odpowiednich uprawnień prowadził wykłady w Instytucie Orientalistycznym. Jako wicedyrektor tego Instytutu w latach 1974-1975, a później przez dwie kadencje prodziekan Wydziału Neofilologii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, wykazał wiele troski o rozwój polskiej orientalistyki. Odnosił się ze zrozumieniem do modernizacji jej programu. Doprowadził do utworzenia (proponowanego wcześniej) Zakładu Współczesnych Zagadnień Azji i do 1981 roku był jego kierownikiem. W programie Zakładu obok zajęć filologicznych znalazły się również wykłady dotyczące problemów społeczno-ekonomicznych w Azji. Prowadzono tam także seminarium magisterskie. W codziennych kontaktach i rozmowach poznałem niezwykle życzliwy stosunek Profesora do studentów, łączony jednak z odpowiednimi wymaganiami. W latach 1970-1981 wypromował w Instytucie Orientalistyki 18 magistrów. W drugiej połowie lat siedemdziesiątych prowadził także seminarium doktoranckie. Jako recenzent rozprawy jednego z doktorantów Romana Sławińskiego, mogę powiedzieć, że Roman Sławiński z bliska 27 była ona napisana na dobrym poziomie. Nie ujmując wkładu samego doktoranta, można było w niej dostrzec także „oko promotora”. Dodam, że inni recenzenci ocenili pozytywnie rozprawę, która na posiedzeniu Rady Instytutu Orientali-stycznego w grudniu 1983 roku została obroniona. Do tego dorobku zaliczy trzeba również sześć recenzji rozpraw doktorskich i habilitacyjnych, napisanych na prośbę wyższych uczelni w Warszawie, Poznaniu i Krakowie, oraz opracowanie o szczególnym charakterze, a mianowicie ocenę rozprawy habilitacyjnej obronionej w Uniwersytecie Nankińskim (w j. chińskim) nostryfikowanej na Wydziale Filozofii Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego w 2002 roku. W działalności prof. Sławińskiego dostrzegam jeszcze jeden aspekt, który na własny użytek nazywam „pasją wydawniczą”. Jest ona zapewne pochodną zrozumienia, że wyniki badania, zwłaszcza dotyczące obszarów pozaeuropejskich, należy udostępniać szerszym kręgom ludzi zainteresowanych. Temu celowi dobrze służą periodyki specjalistyczne. Pośrednio mają one także znaczenie dla kształcenia młodych pracowników naukowych, zaczynających przeważnie od niewielkich opracowań, których publikacja jest właściwie warunkiem awansu i dalszego rozwoju. Dodam, że przy obronie rozpraw doktorskich opublikowane artykuły są dobrze widziane. W tym kontekście pragnę przypomnieć, że z inicjatywy prof. Sławińskiego w 1983 roku zaczął ukazywać się kwartalnik „Problemy Dalekiego Wschodu” i przez dwa lata był jego naczelnym redaktorem. W pierwszym numerze tego czasopisma na pięć artykułów autorami trzech byli młodzi pracownicy naukowi. W następnych latach zachowywano zbliżone proporcje. Po rezygnacji z funkcji redaktora naczelnego współpracował z nową redakcją kwartalnika, który ukazywał się jeszcze przez cztery lata. W 1988 roku prof. Sławiński został redaktorem naczelnym rocznika „Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia”, którego był również współtwórcą. Od tego czasu rocznik ten ukazuje się regularnie, stając się swego rodzaju forum prezentacji dorobku naukowego przybliżającego wiedzę o krajach Azji (czasem również Afryki). W siedemnastu kolejnych numerach opublikowano ponad 130 artykułów, recenzji i różnych omówień. Ich autorami byli doświadczeni oraz początkujący pracownicy nauki, a także ludzie niezajmujący się zawodowo badaniami naukowymi. Znaczenie tego forum podnosi fakt wydawania rocznika - od trzynastego numeru - w języku angielskim, dzięki czemu stał się on naszą zagraniczną wizytówką. Ocena treści, propozycji tematycznych i innych spraw z tym związanych wybiega poza ramy naszych uwag. Tutaj chciałbym tylko poruszyć kwestię organizacyjną. Jak wiadomo, od przysłowiowego pomysłu do przemysłu bywa zwykle długa droga, nierzadko wyboista. W różnych wydawnictwach prace te wykonują redakcje. W roczniku „Acta Asiatica...” zadanie to od początku jego istnienia wykonuje redaktor naczelny i, jak wskazuje doświadczenie, radzi 28 Władysław Góralski sobie z tym dobrze. Prawdopodobnie polubił tę pracę. Można się spodziewać, że w następnych latach wychodzić będą kolejne numery „Acta Asiatica Var-soviensia”. Kończąc te refleksje, chciałbym podzielić się z czytelnikami pewnym odkryciem. Nie jest ono zbyt nowatorskie, ale cieszy, a zarazem smuci. Otóż, zapoznając się bliżej z dorobkiem prof. Sławińskiego, doszedłem do wniosku, że jest on człowiekiem niezwykle wytrwałym i pracowitym. W tym kontekście pragnę zupełnie dobrowolnie „zeznać”, że chociaż sam uważam się również za człowieka pracowitego, nie chciałbym w tej dziedzinie walczyć z nim o palmę pierwszeństwa. Panie Profesorze. Tak trzymać! Mocno. Jak „Chińcyki” w dialogu z dramatu Wesele Stanisława Wyspiańskiego. Władysław Góralski Marianne bastid-bruguière l'origine polonaise de l'enseignement universitaire du chinois moderne en Europe: Michel Alexandre Kleczkowski (1818-1886) Parmi l'émigration des élites polonaises chassées vers la France par la répression des autorités tsaristes au milieu du XIXe siècle, ce sont surtout les grandes figures artistiques et littéraires, celles de Chopin, Mickiewicz ou Norwid, dont le public conserve le souvenir. On oublie trop souvent la contribution éminente que des personnages moins en vue ont apportée, dans la deuxième moitié du siècle, au renouvellement de la puissance française, comme à l'essor d'une culture européenne moderne. Le comte Michel Alexandre Kleczkowski (1818-1886) appartient à ces cohortes des héros demeurés obscurs. J'ai choisi de le sortir de l'ombre à l'occasion d'un hommage au Professeur Roman Sławiński car ce noble polonais s'est mis au service des relations françaises et européennes en Extrême-Orient dans une période de l'histoire chinoise que les travaux de mon savant ami ont étudiée, mais surtout parce que Kleczkowski devint le véritable fondateur de l'enseignement universitaire du chinois «moderne» en Europe. Très injustement, ce titre ne lui a guère été reconnu, ni par ses contemporains ni par la postérité.1 Le malheureux comte a en effet durement souffert en France du «terrorisme 1 Sa carrière diplomatique fait l'objet d’une notice dans N. Bensacq-Tixier, Dictionnaire du corps diplomatique et consulaire français en Chine (1842-1914), Paris, Les Indes savantes, 2004, pp. 332-337. Sa nomination de professeur à l'École des langues orientales, à Paris, son enseignement et son manuel de chinois sont commentés dans l'article de Paul Demiéville, «Chinois (1843)», in Cent-cinquantenaire de l’École des langues orientales, Histoire, organisation et enseignements, Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1948, pp. 154-158, et dans plusieurs contributions du recueil de M.-C. Bergère et A. Pino éds., Un siècle d’enseignement du chinois à l’École des langues orientales 1840-1945, Paris, LAsiathèque, 1995, pp. 17-19, 58-92, 131-137, 144-154, 220-223, 237-244, 249-255, 260, 289-294, 323-327. Les ouvrages, d'ailleurs peu nombreux et déjà anciens, sur l'histoire des relations franco-chinoises entre 1844 et 1885 ne prêtent guère attention à Kleczkowski, car leur récit est centré sur l'action des chefs de postes : cf. H. Cordier, Histoire des relations de la Chine a^vec les puissances occidentales, (Paris, 1902), C. Maybon et A. Frédet, Histoire de la concession française de Shanghai, (Paris, 1929). Louis Wei Tsing-sing, La politique missionnaire de la Firance en Chine, 1842-1854, (Paris, 1960). 32 Marianne Bastid-Bruguière intellectuel» exercé par le sinologue officiel Stanislas Julien, d’une carrière atypique et de son origine étrangère. Dans l’histoire chinoise, le Professeur Roman Sławiński s’est volontiers penché sur les «redresseurs de torts». Peut-être verra-t-il sans déplaisir cet aperçu critique sur la vie et l’activité d’un compatriote qui partageait avec lui une merveilleuse connaissance de la langue française, un savoir vivant et concret sur la Chine de son époque, comme une vision sympathique et optimiste des Chinois. Michel Alexandre Kleczkowski devint d’abord un des premiers agents permanents de la diplomatie française en Chine. Dans ces fonctions de pionnier, il acquit, par ses propres moyens, une connaissance originale de la langue, de la culture et du terrain chinois, qu’il mit au service des intérêts qu’il avait l’obligation de seconder. Exil en France, étude du chinois, entrée aux Affaires étrangères Il était né le 18 février 1818 à Stara Wieś, en Mazovie. Les archives renseignent peu sur son origine familiale et sa jeunesse polonaise. Dans un document de 1848, il déclare être le chef de famille et détenteur du titre de comte, ce qui indique qu’à cette date il était orphelin de père.2 Son faire-part de décès, en 1886, mentionne un beau-frère, William Tudor, et un neveu, Alfred Kleczkowski, ce qui laisse penser qu’il avait une sour et un frère qui avaient également quitté la Pologne.3 Son séjour privé à Boston, en 1863-1864, pour «des intérêts de famille», indique que des membres de sa parenté étaient alors établis aux États-Unis.4 Mais rien ne suggère que la famille fût puissante ou riche, au contraire. Michel Alexandre Kleczkowski s’enfuit de Pologne en août 1842 et gagne la France, ou il est enregistré comme réfugié politique à la préfecture de police, à Paris, en octobre 1842.5 Il s’est installé à Rueil, dans la banlieue de Paris, 2 Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères (Paris), Personnel, 1e série, 2226, Michel Alexandre Kleczkowski (cité ensuite AE, Kleczkowski), Lettre de Kleczkowski au ministre de la Justice, Shanghai, 31 août 1848. 3 Id., Faire-part de décès de Michel Alexandre Comte Kleczkowski du 26 mars 1886. Le neveu Alfred avait été admis à l’examen d’entrée dans la carrière consulaire en 1880, il était alors consul de France à Alexandrie, il fut plus tard en poste à Québec. 4 Id., Lettres de Kleczkowski à Drouyn de Lhuys, ministre des Affaires étrangères, Boston, 27 novembre 1863 et 2 janvier 1864. 5 Id., Lettre de Kleczkowski au ministre de la Justice, Shanghai, 31 août 1848, et copie de son décret de naturalisation du 16 novembre 1849. L'origine polonaise de l'enseignement universitaire du chinois moderne en Europe. 33 à mi-chemin entre l’hôtel Lambert, siège du parti conservateur du prince Czartoryski, et Versailles, où est établie la Société démocratique de la noblesse polonaise pauvre. Mais il ne semble pas qu’il ait jamais été actif dans les cercles politiques de l’émigration ou ait entretenu des liens étroits avec eux. Il continue des études de droit et de langues. Il se met ainsi à l’apprentissage du chinois, probablement en suivant le cours de chinois moderne que Bazin professe à l’École des langues orientales depuis janvier 1840.6 Il voyage en Belgique et en Angleterre.7 Il cherche surtout à obtenir un poste qui lui permette de gagner sa vie régulièrement. Son excellente maîtrise de plusieurs langues européennes -anglais, russe et allemand, outre un français parfait - le pousse à explorer la voie de la diplomatie, que ses relations mondaines lui rendent accessible.8 En novembre 1846, il est introduit par Desmousseaux de Givré (1794-1854), ancien diplomate, député de l’Eure-et-Loire, auprès de Guizot, alors ministre des Affaires étrangères. Guizot, qui doit pourvoir en personnel les postes permanents que la France va ouvrir en Chine, à la suite du traité de Whampoa, se déclare vivement intéressé par les rudiments de chinois que possède Kleczkowski. Il encourage ce dernier à redoubler ses efforts linguistiques, pour être à même d’assumer les fonctions d’interprète auprès des missions diplomatiques que la France se prépare à envoyer en Chine.9 C’est alors avec Callery (1810-1862), un ancien prêtre italien de la Société des missions étrangères devenu interprète officiel du gouvernement français à Paris, après de longues années de service en Chine, que Kleczkowski étudie le chinois. Callery utilise le manuel en portugais de Gonçalves, l’Arte China10, recueil de phrases usuelles et de dialogues de chinois courant, qu’il oblige son élève à apprendre par cour, avec des explications caractère par caractère, mettant l’accent sur leur polysémie et leurs règles de combinaison, selon la méthode 6 Sur Antoine-Pierre-Louis Bazin (1799-1862) et cet enseignement, voir A. Pino et I. Rabut, «Bazin aîné et la création de la chaire de chinois vulgaire à l’École des langues orientales», in M.-C. Bergère et A. Pino éds., Un siècle d’enseignement du chinois à l，École des langues orientales 1840-1945, pp. 30-51. 7 AE, Kleczkowski, copie du passeport délivré le 14 août 1846. 8 Son origine aristocratique paraît lui avoir toujours ouvert les salons de la bonne société parisienne. Sous le second empire, il a des relations personnelles avec les Lesseps, les Walewski. 9 AE, Kleczkowski, Lettre de Kleczkowski à Guizot, ministre des Affaires étrangères, Paris, 13 février 1847. 10 Joaquim Affonso Gonçalves, 1781-1841. Arte china constante de alphabet。e gram-matica comprehendendo modelos das differentes composiçoens. Macao : Real Collegio de S. José, 182. 34 Marianne Bastid-Bruguière chinoise. Kleczkowski apprécie cette pédagogie. Elle lui donne le sentiment de progresser et deviendra le fondement de sa propre méthode.11 Dès le 13 février 1847, apprenant la création d’un consulat français à Shanghai, il pose sa candidature au poste d’interprète qui y sera attaché. Les concurrents ne paraissent pas avoir été nombreux. Sa nomination est décidée le 19 mars 1847. On lui accorde une rémunération annuelle de 4 000 francs.12 Plein de zèle, il demande à partir aussitôt avec le nouveau chargé d’affaires en Chine Forth-Rouen et son personnel. Il veut se mettre au courant des affaires à Canton et Macao pendant quelques semaines, avant l’arrivée de son chef, le consul Charles de Montigny (1805-1868).13 Il embarque le 25 avril 1847. Débuts périlleux en Chine À son arrivée à Macao, le 13 janvier 1848, il demeure quatre mois à la légation de France, auprès de Forth-Rouen, qu’il accompagne ou supplée souvent à Canton. Celui-ci apprécie beaucoup le jeune Polonais, qu’il trouve de meilleure compagnie, et plus fiable, que le métis sino-portugais accablé de dix enfants, qui avait jusque-là servi d’interprète local aux envoyés français. C’est à regret qu’il voit Kleczkowski gagner son poste de Shanghai en avril 1848.14 Les conditions d’existence des agents français en Chine à cette époque étaient des plus précaires. Contrairement aux Anglais et aux Américains, la France était dépourvue de l’appui logistique d’une communauté commerçante installée sur place, et ne disposait d’aucun local pour loger ses bureaux et son personnel. Les représentants français se trouvaient obligés d’assumer à leurs frais les dépenses de location et de représentation nécessaires pour affirmer un statut comparable à celui de leurs collègues étrangers. Si la situation était encore gérable à Macao, ou la première légation française préféra s’installer à 11 AE, Kleczkowski, Lettre de Kleczkowski à Guizot, ministre des Affaires étrangères, Paris, 13 février 1847 ; et comte Kleczkowski, Cours graduel et complet de chinois parlé et écrit, Paris, 1876, p. LXII. 12 AE, Kleczkowski, Lettre de Kleczkowski à Guizot, ministre des Affaires étrangères, Paris, 13 février 1847, et lettre de Guizot à Kleczkowski, Paris, 23 mars 1847. 13 Id., Lettre de Kleczkowski à Guizot, Paris, 26 mars 1847. 14 Id., Lettres de Forth-Rouen à Kleczkowski, Canton, 23 mars 1848, et Macao, 15 avril 1848; dépêche de Forth-Rouen à la direction politique du ministère des Affaires étrangères, n°183, Macao, 20 août 1849; sur l’interprète de la légation à Macao, dépêche de Codrica, chargé d’affaires par intérim, à la direction des affaires commerciales du ministère des Affaires étrangères, n°11, Macao, 28 janvier 1851, et lettre de Kleczkowski au chef de cabinet du ministre Drouyn de Lhuys, Macao, 19 août 1854. L'origine polonaise de l'enseignement universitaire du chinois moderne en Europe. 35 la fin de 1847, parce que les missions religieuses portugaises louaient volontiers des demeures à des coreligionnaires protecteurs du catholicisme, il n'en allait pas de même à Shanghai. Aussi, dès le 4 avril 1848, avant même l'arrivée de Kleczkowski, le consul Montigny écrivait-il au ministre des Affaires étrangères que son collaborateur ne pourrait vivre avec 4 000 francs d'appointements, qui, en pouvoir d'achat, équivalaient à seulement 1 000 francs en France.15 Il obtint que l'indemnité fût doublée. Cette mesure fut loin de favoriser la fortune de Kleczkowski. L'augmentation était insuffisante pour couvrir les dépenses du jeune agent, certainement hospitalier, qui souhaitait tenir dignement son rang et recevait libéralement chez lui expatriés étrangers et officiers de l'escadre française. Il rentra de Chine avec 123 000 francs de dettes, qu'il n'avait pas terminé de payer à la fin de sa vie.16 Mais surtout, l'avantage financier qui lui était accordé attisa les jalousies contre lui, d'autant plus qu'il était d'origine étrangère. Le premier à dénoncer aigrement cette faveur auprès des services administratifs du ministère du quai d'Orsay fut d'ailleurs, dès son arrivée à Macao, le remplaçant de Forth-Rouen, Codrika, lui-même d'origine grecque.17 Il s'indignait vertueusement des prétentions supposées d'«un jeune homme qui, dès le début de sa carrière, a atteint une position et des émoluments que bien d'autres n'ont obtenus qu'au prix de longues années de travaux».18 Si bien excitée, la fureur sournoise des agents des bureaux parisiens ne fit que croître lorsque Drouyn de Lhuys, devenu ministre des Affaires étrangères, et plein de sympathie pour la cause polonaise, nomma Kleczkowski «attaché payé», le 10 février 1854, intégrant ainsi le jeune homme au corps diplomatique proprement dit. Ce corps était géré par la Direction politique du ministère, non par la Direction commerciale dont dépendaient les interprètes.19 A cette date, Kleczkowski était devenu citoyen français. Il en avait fait la demande en juillet 1848, renonçant même personnellement à son titre de comte, pour obéir à la loi républicaine d'alors, qui venait d'abolir les titres de noblesse.20 Chaleureusement appuyé par Montigny et Forth-Rouen, qui écrivait: «Il est déjà Français et par le cœur et 15 Id., Lettre de Montigny au ministre des Affaires étrangères, Shanghai, Ier août 1848, et lettre de Kleczkowski au même, Shanghai, 31 juillet 1848. 16 Id., Lettre du banquier Flury-Hérard à Kleczkowski, Paris, 7 novembre 1867, et lettre de Kleczkowski à Freycinet, ministre des Affaires étrangères, Paris, 2 mai 1882. 17 C'était le fils d'un drogman du sultan ottoman, passé au service de Napoléon en Égypte. 18 AE, Kleczkowski, Codrika à MAE, Direction commerciale, n°11, Macao, 28 janvier 1851. 19 Id., Relevé de carrière, sans date. 20 Id., Lettre de Kleczkowski au ministre des Affaires étrangères, Shanghai, 31 juillet 1848. 36 Marianne Bastid-Bruguière par les habitudes»21, il avait obtenu son décret de naturalisation le 16 novembre 1849.22 Cependant, très vite, Kleczkowski souffrit des rancœurs attisées par sa promotion rapide. Il est possible aussi que son tempérament expansif et parfois un peu hâbleur ait suscité certaines préventions. Toute sa vie, il a pensé que la Direction politique du ministère des Affaires étrangères ne lui avait jamais pardonné ses débuts atypiques. Il s’en est exprimé souvent avec amertume, en se reprochant d’avoir eu le tort de ne pas revenir à Paris effectuer humblement une besogne de subalterne dans les bureaux du ministère.23 Tout en attribuant ses infortunes de carrière à des vengeances purement administratives, ses doléances, toujours empreintes de beaucoup de dignité et de retenue, insistent invariablement sur la sincérité de son patriotisme français et sur son dévouement zélé au service. Une fois seulement, cinq ans avant sa mort, Kleczkowski désigne nommément, mais simplement en passant, ce qui, de toute évidence, fut la cause première de ses déboires dans l’administration française: son origine étrangère.24 L’usage dépréciatif du terme de «polyglotte» dans les notes administratives de son dossier personnel au quai d’Orsay, l’omission de son nom et l’attribution systématique aux agents de souche française de mérites qui lui revenaient par certaines dépêches de la Direction politique, le ton des lettres de Stanislas Julien à son égard ne laissent malheureusement guère d’illusions sur la xénophobie dont il fut victime en France. Sans doute estimait-il imprudent de nourrir ce sentiment xénophobe en le dénonçant ouvertement. Mais il tenait autant à affirmer, et c’est tout à son honneur, sa foi dans une image plus généreuse de son pays d’adoption et sa reconnaissance envers les Français qui, dans le milieu politique, diplomatique ou savant, l’avaient malgré tout protégé et soutenu. À vrai dire, la qualité des services rendus par Kleczkowski à son arrivée en Chine justifiait pleinement les distinctions dont il fut d’abord l’objet. Il redoubla d’efforts dans l’étude du chinois, en s’appliquant à fréquenter le milieu lettré et à maîtriser le dialogue oral et écrit. Anticipant à sa manière l’usage moderne du magnétophone, il se faisait lire chaque jour à haute voix des pages de textes administratifs et de dialogues qu’il répétait, phrase après phrase, pendant deux ou trois heures, jusqu’à les savoir par cour, en en maîtrisant tout le sens et les allusions, ainsi que les intonations.25 Par cette méthode, il acquit une 21 Id., Forth-Rouen à MAE, Direction politique, n°183, Macao, 20 août 1849. 22 Id., Copie du décret du président de la République du 16 novembre 1849. 23 Id., nombreuses lettres, dont une lettre privée au comte Walewski, Shanghai, 15 juillet 1860, une lettre au cabinet de l’empereur Napoléon III de la fin 1867. 24 Id., Lettre personnelle au comte de Choiseul, sous-secrétaire d’État aux Affaires étrangères, Paris, 3 novembre 1880. 25 Kleczkowski, Cours graduel et complet de chinois parlé et écrit, (Paris, 1876), p. 34. L'origine polonaise de l'enseignement universitaire du chinois moderne en Europe. 37 compétence d’interprète qui surpassait avantageusement celle des métisses de Macao, des missionnaires ou de leurs convertis chinois, que la diplomatie française utilisait jusque-là dans ses négociations avec les autorités chinoises, mais qui étaient peu avertis des subtilités juridiques ou des allusions littéraires. En 1849, au passage de l’escadre française à Shanghai, Kleczkowski était en mesure de traduire tout le long dialogue technique entre le daotai et les officiers sur la construction et la mécanique des navires européens.26 Les capacités linguistiques du jeune homme et ses manières courtoises facilitèrent à Montigny les contacts avec les autorités de Shanghai et contribuèrent beaucoup à l’estime personnelle que le consul finit par gagner auprès d’elles durant son séjour, malgré sa fougue souvent brutale. Kleczkowski assume patiemment la navette des négociations sur la création de la concession française de Shanghai, qui aboutissent à la première délimitation du 6 avril 1849. Avec Callery à Paris, puis avec Forth-Rouen à Macao, le jeune Polonais avait été mis en garde très tôt contre les embarras causés par les prétentions excessives ou l’imprudence de certains missionnaires français et étrangers. Callery résumait le problème d’une formule: «Il faut que notre diplomatie protège les missionnaires français, mais il ne faut pas qu’elle se mette à leur remorque».27 Kleczkowski seconde efficacement l’action de Montigny dans cette ligne, qui répond aux instructions officielles de Paris et satisfait plutôt les autorités chinoises.28 Le Saint-Siège n’en est pas mécontent non plus, puisqu’il confère au jeune homme le titre de chevalier de l’Ordre de Saint Grégoire le Grand en 1853.29 Montigny et son interprète sont seuls au consulat de Shanghai, «une masure à laquelle on n’arrivait qu’à travers un dédale de cloaques, de bouges et de sépultures»30, jusqu’à l’arrivée d’un chancelier en août 1850. Les tempéraments chevaleresques du consul et de son interprète s’accordent alors assez bien. Kleczkowski aide son chef à distribuer des secours aux victimes de la famine en 1849. Il accompagne Montigny en Corée, au secours des marins du Narval. Ce baleinier breton a fait naufrage sur les côtes de Corée en juin 1850. Son 26 Lettre de l’amiral Jurien de la Gravière, de 1849, citée dans ibid” p. LXIII. 27 AE, Personnel, 1e série, Callery, Note de Callery, 1846. 28 Plusieurs rapports de Kleczkowski sur ce sujet se trouvent dans AE, Mémoires et documents, Chine, tome 17. De 1848 à 1854, le consulat de Shanghai eut à régler l’expulsion, conformément aux traités, d’une dizaine de missionnaires arrêtés par les autorités chinoises en dehors des ports ouverts : Louis Wei Tsing Sing, op. cit., pp. 522-523. 29 Louis Wei Tsing Sing, op. cit., p. 557, citant les archives de la Congrégation de la propagande à Rome. 30 Kleczkowski, Cours libre de chinois vulgaire et pratique. Discours d’ouverture du 7 décembre 1869，(Paris, 1870), p. 15. 38 Marianne Bastid-Bruguière équipage a été emprisonné par les autorités locales. Huit matelots réussissent à s'évader et, sur une barque, échouent à bout de forces à Shanghai, dix mois plus tard. Montigny loue aussitôt une lorcha. Guidé par les rescapés, avec son interprète et un équipage chinois, il gagne la Corée. Il obtient la libération des captifs, qui allaient être mis à mort. Après avoir été remerciés et traités au champagne, les mandarins locaux s'excusèrent de très bonne grâce. L'aventure eut un énorme retentissement dans la presse européenne. En décembre 1852, à la demande de Montigny, Kleczkowski fut décoré chevalier de la Légion d'honneur. Rentré en congé à Paris l'année suivante, le ministre Drouyn de Lhuys lui propose de repartir en Chine avec le plein statut diplomatique d'attaché payé, pour occuper les fonctions de secrétaire à la légation à Macao.31 Très flatté de ces honneurs, Kleczkowski est à son poste dès le 12 mai 1854.32 Il assiste désormais le ministre de France Bourboulon (1809- ?) avec lequel il s'entend fort bien. Avec le souci de répondre au besoin criant de la diplomatie française en Chine, il suggère au ministère l'idée de créer des postes pour des élèves-interprètes, qui seront formés sur le terrain, sous la tutelle d'agents ex-périmentés.33 Paris finit par exécuter la proposition, six mois plus tard.34 Pendant plus de cinquante ans, elle a fourni aux intérêts français en Extrême-Orient un réservoir d'agents dont les compétences chinoises ne le cédaient plus à celles de leurs collègues anglais et russes. Mais sans attendre l'aval du ministère, Kleczkowski avait payé de sa poche la traversée d'un orphelin de quinze ans, Gabriel Lemaire, qu'il formait au chinois et à l'anglais à Macao, tandis qu'il avait fait envoyer à Shanghai, pour apprendre le français auprès du consul Edan, un fils de Marquès, l'interprète sino-portugais de la légation.35 Lui-même s'était mis à l'étude du japonais. Après le passage à Shanghai du négociateur américain, le commodore Perry, au retour de la signature du traité de Kanagawa de mars 1854, le jeune diplomate prévoyait, en effet, l'envoi d'une première mission française à Edo. Il traçait au cabinet du ministre la ligne 31 AE, Kleczkowski, Lettres de Kleczkowski à Drouyn de Lhuys, Paris, 17 janvier 1853, et de Drouyn de Lhuys à Kleczkowski, Paris, 2 mars 1854. 32 Id., Lettre de Kleczkowski à Marchand, à la Direction commerciale du MAE, Macao, 19 août 1854. 33 Id., Lettre de Kleczkowski au chef de cabinet du ministre des Affaires étrangères, Macao, 19 août 1854. 34 Six postes furent institués en 1855: AE, Correspondance politique, Chine (cité ensuite AECPC), vol. 35, fol. 212-216, Note de la direction des affaires politiques au ministre des Affaires étrangères, mars 1861. 35 AE, Kleczkowski, Lettre de Kleczkowski à Marchand, à la Direction commerciale du MAE, Macao, 19 août 1854. AE, Personnel, 1e série, n°2562, dossier Lemaire. Lemaire fut ministre de France à Pékin de 1887 à 1894. L'origine polonaise de l'enseignement universitaire du chinois moderne en Europe. 39 politique qu’il convenait d’adopter, et qui finalement prévalut dans les relations franco-japonaises. Il fallait éviter au Japon la fâcheuse erreur commise en Chine, jugeait Kleczkowski. La France ne devait pas y apparaître la protectrice attitrée du catholicisme, mais défendre son avenir commercial, gage d’une puissance véritable. Il conseillait aussi sur les cadeaux à apporter: de petites montres émaillées, des pendules, des cristaux, des tapis, plutôt que le simple portrait du chef de l’État, offert par Perry, que les Japonais avaient trouvé mesquin.36Ses avis furent suivis, mais il fut déçu de constater que la mission au Japon était confiée à d’autres.37 Au cours de ces années, Kleczkowski faisait pourtant la preuve de ses capacités. Il seconde seul Bourboulon, qui ne sait pas du tout le chinois, dans toutes les ingrates négociations pour la révision des traités à Canton, puis à Shanghai. C’est lui qui représente la France, aux côtés des ministres anglais et américain, Bowring et McLane, quand ils se rendent à l’embouchure du Beihe pour tenter, en vain, d’entrer en relations directes avec la cour de Pékin, en octobre 1854. En octobre 1857, c’est sur la côte du Tonkin qu’il abordait, avec deux bateaux de guerre, pour exiger la libération d’un évêque espagnol et déposer, au nom de la France et de l’Espagne, une protestation qui servit de prologue à la conquête française de la Basse-Cochinchine. Il avait ouvré pour convaincre le ministre et la Marine de l’utilité de l’expédition et obtenir la coopération espagnole38 L’année précédente, en congé à Paris, Bourboulon avait protesté énergiquement en découvrant que Kleczkowski était le seul attaché dont Thouvenel, le directeur des affaires politiques, avait omis le nom sur la liste de promotion au grade de secrétaire. «Au moment où les relations avec la Chine se compliquent de manière si grave, écrivait-il, et où le gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale paraît vouloir, de concert avec le gouvernement britannique, entamer avec le gouvernement chinois des négociations dont on a déjà pu entrevoir toutes les difficultés, la connaissance approfondie que M. Kleczkowski possède non seulement de la langue, mais aussi de l’esprit et des usages de la diplomatie chinoise, rend ses services d’une valeur inappréciable, je dirais presque d’un secours indispensable, pour le Ministre qui sera chargé de conduire ces 36 AE, Kleczkowski, Lettre de Kleczkowski au chef de cabinet du ministre des Affaires étrangères, Macao, 19 août 1854. 37 Après plusieurs tentatives infructueuses de la marine pour amorcer des négociations, le baron Gros reçut mandat pour établir des relations et signa un traité à Edo le 9 octobre 1858, après sa première ambassade à Tianjin. 38 AE, Kleczkowski, Relevé de la carrière, sans lieu ni date; lettre personnelle de Kleczkowski au comte de Choiseul, sous-secrétaire d’État aux Affaires étrangères, Paris, 3 novembre 1880. 40 Marianne Bastid-Bruguière négociations».39 En s’adressant à Walewski, qui n’aimait guère Thouvenel et éprouvait plutôt de la sympathie pour le malheureux comte polonais, Bour-boulon obtint gain de cause. Mais l’arrivée en Chine du baron Gros, commissaire extraordinaire de l’Empereur, avec l’expédition franco-anglaise de la seconde guerre de l’opium, en octobre 1857, entame pour le secrétaire une période de tribulations.40 En l’absence de Bourboulon, qui ne revint de congé que le 25 février 1857, Kleczkowski avait mené avec le chargé d’affaires de Courcy toutes les tractations sur l’affaire de l’abbé Chapdelaine, mis à mort au Guangxi en février 1856. L’information n’était d’ailleurs parvenue à la légation qu’en juillet 1856, et c’est alors qu’avaient commencé les réclamations auprès des autorités de Canton. Le gouverneur général Ye Mingzhen avait d’abord répondu qu’il avait «mieux à faire que s’occuper de la vie ou de la mort d’un Français».41 Les rapports à Paris de Kleczkowski et de Courcy soulignaient l’inquiétude suscitée par l’attitude du sous-préfet local au Guangxi, qui avait arrêté, torturé et exécuté un étranger sans rien notifier à ses supérieurs, au mépris des traités. Mais ils observaient qu’en s’aventurant hors des ports ouverts dans une région troublée par les rébellions, le prêtre n’avait respecté ni les traités ni les consignes répétées aux missionnaires par la légation. Ils disaient la nécessité d’exercer une pression constante sur les autorités chinoises pour obtenir l’exécution des traités, mais, en l’occurrence, ne réclamaient nullement l’usage effectif de la force militaire, et estimaient que l’extension de l’insurrection des Taiping exigeait une prudence redoublée de la part des missionnaires. Pour sa part, Kleczkowski jugeait totalement illégitime la prétention du ministre britannique Bowring de s’établir dans la cité murée de Canton, puisque le texte chinois des traités, établi par l’interprète anglais lui-même, ne portait pas le terme de cheng. Il exprimait de sérieuses réserves sur la tactique de confrontation adoptée par le ministre d’Angleterre, dans laquelle celui-ci voulait entraîner la France.42 39 Id., Lettre de Bourboulon au comte Colonna-Walewski, ministre des Affaires étrangères, Paris, 4 octobre 1856. 40 Sur les événements des relations sino-étrangères de la période 1854-1863, on peut se reporter à H.B. Morse, The International relations of the Chinese Empire, (Shanghai, 1910-1918), vol. 1, pp. 414-437, 453-617, et à H. Cordier, L’Expédition de Chine， 1857-58, (Paris, 1905), L’Expédition de Chine，1860, (Paris, 1906), Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidentales, 1860-1900, (Paris, 1901-1902), vol. 1, pp. 1-151. 41 Kleczkowski, Cours libre de chinois vukgaire..., p. 13. 42 Ces rapports sont conservés aux Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères dans la série de la Correspondance politique et celle des Mémoires et documents. L'origine polonaise de l'enseignement universitaire du chinois moderne en Europe. 41 La douloureuse épreuve des ambassades en Chine du baron Gros C'est à Paris, par la volonté de prolonger l'entente franco-anglaise inaugurée par la guerre de Crimée, pour tirer de cette alliance d'autres bénéfices en Asie, et sous l'effet aussi de la pression intense des congrégations missionnaires sur l'opinion catholique et les milieux politiques, que le gouvernement de Napoléon III décida d'ajouter la réparation du meurtre de Chapdelaine à ses réclamations contre le gouvernement chinois et de l'utiliser pour justifier la guerre devant l'opinion nationale et européenne. Toutefois, dans les instructions du baron Gros, les réparations pour le meurtre de Chapdelaine étaient confondues avec celles exigées pour les pertes commerciales subies à divers titres, la promotion des intérêts religieux ne venait qu'en quatrième position. Mais, arrivé par Hong Kong, le baron fut aussitôt pris en main par le P. Libois, procureur des Missions étrangères, en charge de toute leur gestion financière en Extrême-Orient. Spéculateur passionné et fort habile, Libois rêvait, pour sa congrégation, d'un immense empire vers lequel afflueraient sûrement les aumônes de la France pieuse, bien entendu pour le salut des âmes et la gloire de Dieu, mais en accroissant aussi ses moyens d'action et son importance personnelle. Gros, plutôt dévot, fut totalement gagné par l'éloquence de Libois. Il s'appliqua dès lors à donner la priorité aux intérêts religieux, en mettant en avant le «déni de justice» que constituait la mort de Chapdelaine. Jugeant Kleczkowski et Bourboulon trop tièdes envers les missionnaires et trop conciliants envers les Chinois, il les tint tout à fait à l'écart de ses démarches. Comme interprète, il choisit Marquès, de capacités médiocres et méprisé par les Chinois. Ses encouragements aux audaces intempestives du consul à Shanghai Montigny ne tardent pas à aigrir les rapports de celui-ci avec la légation: Kleczkowski en fait les frais.43 Pourtant, rentré à Paris, de Courcy défend son ancien collègue: «L'infatigable activité de son zèle, le dévouement de ses services, l'étendue de ses connaissances, la spécialité de ses études, 43 C'est à cette date seulement que Montigny émet contre son ancien subordonné les plaintes signalées par J. Frédet, Quand la Chine s’ouvrait…Charles de Montigny, consul de France, (Shanghai, 1943), p. 40, dont l'authenticité est mise en doute par la norice de N. Bensacq-Tixier, op cit., p. 333. Las des incartades de Montigny, Bourboulon l'envoya au consulat de Canton en avril 1859, une fois le baron Gros parti. Ultérieurement, dans une lettre privée, Kleczkowski laisse libre cours à son sentiment envers l'ancien consul en demandant, «comme une grâce», son rappel, voire sa destitution, au cas où Montigny remplacerait Bourboulon à la tête de la légation, ainsi que le bruit en court : AECPC, vol. 35, fol. 202, Lettre de Kleczkowski au directeur des affaires commerciales, Pékin, 26 mars 1861. 42 Marianne Bastid-Bruguière son expérience et son aplomb le recommandent tout particulièrement à la bienveillance du Ministre. J’ai déjà dit de vive voix au Comte Walewski le vœu que M. Kleczkowski me remplaçât en Chine comme secrétaire de 2e classe lorsque mon poste actuel serait vacant.»44 Bourboulon le soutient aussi, si bien que Kleczkowski est promu par Walewski le 6 mars 1859.45 Après le retour en Europe du baron Gros et de Lord Elgin, il revenait au ministre Bourboulon et à son collègue anglais Bruce de se rendre à Pékin pour échanger les ratifications des traités signés l’année précédente. Bourboulon y emmena Kleczkowski, qui prit en charge tous les contacts avec les autorités chinoises. À l’arrivée aux forts de Dagu, l’escadre qui escortait les deux ministres fut accueillie au canon, le 25 juin 1859. Faute de forces suffisantes pour risquer le combat, les ministres retournèrent à Shanghai. Kleczkowski fut alors envoyé à Paris, à la fin de juillet, pour expliquer la situation au gouvernement et demander des moyens. Dès le 10 novembre 1859, Lord Russell informait le ministre anglais en Chine, Bruce, qu’une «force militaire considérable» serait envoyée au printemps suivant pour appuyer son action. Mais ce n’est qu’au début de mars 1860 que Bourboulon fut avisé des intentions similaires de Paris. Pendant son séjour en France, Kleczkowski s’était dépensé sans compter pour obtenir, non un coup de force, mais une démonstration navale conséquente et le maintien permanent d’une escadre française plus importante dans les eaux chinoises. L’envoi de l’escadre en Cochinchine aussitôt après l’ambassade de Gros à Tianjin avait laissé les intérêts français gravement démunis, aussi bien en Chine qu’au Japon. Le diplomate fut reçu en audience par Napoléon III et Walewski à Étioles en septembre 1859. L’Empereur approuva ses vues, lui promit appui et protection, renouvela ses assurances lors d’une audience de départ, en janvier 1860.46 Mais Thouvenel, l’ancien directeur des affaires politiques au quai d’Orsay, devint ministre des Affaires étrangères, en remplacement de Walewski, le 4 janvier 1860. Lorsque le baron Gros est nommé ambassadeur extraordinaire en Chine, le 7 mars 1860, il met ce dernier en garde contre les services du personnel de la légation. Les missionnaires ont du reste pris leurs précautions: ils offrent l’abbé Duluc comme interprète au général 44 AE, Kleczkowski, Note de de Courcy du début 1859. 45 Id. , Lettre de Bourboulon à Walewski, ministre des Affaires étrangères, Macao, 7 janvier 1859; décret impérial du 6 mars 1859, et Lettre de Kleczkowski à Walewski, Macao, 3 mai 1859. 46 Id., Lettre privée de Kleczkowski à Walewski, Shanghai, 15 juillet 1860. Kleczkowski avait même cru bon d’avancer son départ, en «sacrifi[ant] à [ses] devoirs un mariage avantageux pour [lui] sous tous les rapports». L'origine polonaise de l'enseignement universitaire du chinois moderne en Europe. 43 Montauban, chef du corps expéditionnaire, et, pour les mêmes fonctions, l'abbé Delamarre à l'ambassadeur.47 En arrivant à Shanghai le 28 juin 1860, Gros s'adjoint encore Eugène de Méritens et Lemaire, le très jeune interprète du consulat de Shanghai, tous deux élèves de Kleczkowski. Ce dernier, qui pourtant, «à lui seul valait dix interprètes»48, est ulcéré. Il propose de renoncer à son titre de secrétaire pour suivre l'ambassadeur et assurer les traductions qui risquent d'excéder les compétences des interprètes désignés.49Gros le récuse sèchement, par une lettre humiliante qui commence par «Mon cher M. Kleczkowski», traitement qu'un baron réserve à son domestique, au lieu de «Mon cher Comte», comme l'écrivent tous les supérieurs de l'intéressé.50 Kleczkowski enrage de voir ses talents bafoués une seconde fois par Gros, alors qu'il a milité pour l'envoi de l'expédition qui vaut à Gros d'être ambassadeur. Il s'épanche auprès de Walewski : «Je m'abstiens de réflexion sur ce qui va se faire à [Tianjin] ou Pékin. C'est superflu, car vous êtes convaincu à l'avance, j'ose le croire, que la nouvelle œuvre de M le Baron Gros ne saurait différer beaucoup de celle que cet ambassadeur a produite déjà en 1858. Elle aura seulement coûté à peu près six fois autant ; en rehaussant dans la même proportion, l'éclat du nouveau succès de Lord Elgin. Il est vrai que le diplomate britannique croit à la grandeur du rôle de l'Angleterre dans ces parages».51 la gloire du séjour à Pékin et sa fin amère Sa revanche d'amour-propre vient enfin, après le départ de Gros pour la France en décembre 1860. Bourboulon, resté chef du poste, doit installer la légation à Pékin, comme son collègue anglais Bruce, selon la convention de Pékin signée le 25 octobre 1860. Il arrive à Tianjin avec son personnel au milieu de novembre. Mais, pour ménager la cour mandchoue, et parce que la santé de sa femme, très gravement malade, l'empêche de poursuivre sa route, il envoie Kleczkowski prendre possession du Qinggongfu, le palais attribué à 47 C'est, semble-t-il, Delamarre qui ajouta dans la version chinoise du traité de 1860 une phrase, que le gouvernement chinois récusa avec constance et qui fut la source d'innombrables difficultés, selon laquelle les missionnaires français avaient le droit d'acquérir des terrains et de construire des maisons dans toutes les provinces. 48 Selon un des participants de l'expédition, le Comte d'Hérisson, Journal d，un interprète en Chine, (Paris, 1886), p. 110. 49 Id., Lettre de Kleczkowski à Gros, Shanghai, 29 juin 1860. 50 Id., Lettre de Gros à Kleczkowski, Shanghai, 3 juillet 1860. 51 Id., Lettre privée de Kleczkowski à Walewski, Shanghai, 15 juillet 1860. 44 Marianne Bastid-Bruguière la légation de France, et y faire les réparations et travaux indispensables avant son arrivée, prévue au printemps suivant. Kleczkowski a donc l’immense fierté d’entrer le premier à Pékin, au nom de la France et en toute légalité, le 6 février 1861. Il est accrédité auprès du prince Gong et reste seul jusqu’à l’arrivée de Bourboulon le 25 mars 1861. Son témoignage et son action personnelle dans ces premiers moments des relations régulières sino-étrangères à la capitale sont d’un intérêt particulier. Réactions spontanées et expressions de bon-vouloir qui s’y reflètent de part et d’autre rappelleront à Roman Sławiński d’autres phases des relations sino-européennes qu’il a lui-même vécues. Kleczkowski effectue le trajet depuis Tianjin «sans la moindre difficulté, objet partout de beaucoup de prévenances de la part des autorités comme des populations».52 Sa petite troupe, formée des trois interprètes, ses élèves, Huber, Blancheton et Devéria, d’un capitaine du génie, chargé de pourvoir aux réparations de la légation, de 2 sapeurs, 2 gendarmes et un gros convoi de bagages accompagné de nombreux domestiques chinois, a fait le voyage en deux jours.53 En ville ne se «manifeste absolument aucune haine, tout au plus, quand on se promène, on excite la curiosité des passants et des boutiquiers».54 Le lendemain de son arrivée, Kleczkowski reçoit la visite de Chong Lun et Heng Qi. Le premier, qui l’avait durement accueilli aux forts de Dagu en 1854, se répand en flatteries. Le second, qu’il avait longuement pratiqué à Canton, lui adresse d’un air docte une «leçon de convenances» sur la tenue et le comportement qu’il faudrait avoir en présence du prince Gong.55 Le 8 février, il se rend chez Wenxiang. Le dialogue s’établit instantanément. L’intelligence du ministre, la pertinence de ses questions sur la France, sa dignité bienveillante éblouissent et conquièrent le diplomate.56 Cependant, le premier souci de Kleczkowski pour consolider les bons rapports qu’il a toujours espérés avec la Chine est de contenir les missionnaires. Il signale tout de suite que la restitution de la Cathédrale du Beitang exigera encore des démarches diplomatiques, et surtout des sommes considérables pour la remise en état. S’appuyant sur des consignes de Bourboulon, il signifie immédiatement à l’évêque de Pékin, Mgr Mouly, qu’il doit désormais renoncer, 52 AECPC, 35/96, Lettre de Kleczkowski à Bourboulon, Pékin, 10 février 1861. 53 Id., 35/56-66, Dépêche n°94 de Bourboulon à MAE, Tianjin, 5 février 1861. 54 Id., 35/100, Lettre de Kleczkowski à Bourboulon, Pékin, 10 février 1861. 55 Ibid., folio 96. Le document utilise le terme cité. Les «leçons» n’étaient donc pas à sens unique, comme le prétend à tort le livre récent de J. L. Hevia, English Lessons. The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth Cen^^^ China, (Durham et Londres, 2003). 56 Ibid., folios 97-99. L'origine polonaise de l'enseignement universitaire du chinois moderne en Europe. 45 lui et tous les évêques, à l’usage de la chaise verte, réservée, selon le protocole chinois, à un agent officiel responsable de gouvernement. «Le désir de jouer aux mandarins, écrit-il, est une maladie de beaucoup de nos missionnaires en Chine. Si la Légation n’y prend pas garde dès le principe, le Gouvernement de l’Empereur aura fait tous les sacrifices qu’il s’est imposés, non pas au profit de l’influence légitime de la France dans ce pays, mais à l’avantage exclusif des coteries religieuses. Les rôles se trouveraient ainsi bientôt intervertis. Nos dignes missionnaires au lieu de nous servir,…d’être les agents involontaires de la politique du Gouvernement de l’empereur dans ces contrées, absorberaient indubitablement pour eux seuls tous les profits de nos persévérants efforts en ne nous léguant que les graves embarras qui ne manqueraient pas de naître de l’abus de leur influence.»57 Pour mieux barrer l’évêque, dès le premier dimanche, il organise à la légation une réception des chrétiens de Pékin, à laquelle il fait venir des espions du prince Gong, et leur tient en chinois un discours sur la «sainteté de la civilisation chinoise», leurs devoirs de sujets chinois et la loyauté envers leur gouvernement légitime, en marquant fermement les limites de la protection française au catholicisme. Il en fait largement distribuer le texte imprimé. En effet, à son arrivée il avait reçu une «une avalanche de demandes d’intervention officielle de notre part dans des affaires qui, dans aucun cas, ne sauraient être du ressort officiel des Autorités Étrangères dans aucun pays». À la messe solennelle du matin au Nantang, il avait trouvé abusif que l’évêque fasse entonner à 1500 Chinois un Domine, salvum fac imperatorem nostrum destiné à Napoléon III, même si les fidèles chantaient de bonne grâce. Il souhaitait convaincre la cour et les lettrés chinois que les missionnaires français ne fomentaient pas la rébellion comme leurs confrères anglo-saxons et que la France n’était pas le satellite de l’Angleterre, ainsi que beaucoup le croyaient en Chine.58 Personnellement, avec trente ans d’avance sur la diplomatie française, il pense que la Russie est «l’alliée naturelle» de la France en Chine, pour éviter que la Chine centrale ne devienne à court terme «un autre appendice en Asie de l’Empire Britannique».59 Sa connaissance du russe lui a permis d’établir les meilleures relations avec l’archimandrite Goury. Il lui a été amer de boire à la santé du tsar, mais l’archimandrite lui offre l’usage de la poste russe par 57 Ibid., folios 101-102. 58 Id., 35/245-252, Lettre de Kleczkowski à Bourboulon, Pékin, 26 février 1861. Le passage est souligné dans l’original. Une version française de l’allocution aux chrétiens de Pékin du 24 février 1861 est conservée dans le même volume, folios 253-258. 59 Ibid. , folio 248. 46 Marianne Bastid-Bruguière Kiakhta jusqu'à Saint-Pétersbourg. Elle permet dès lors à Paris de recevoir les nouvelles de Pékin plus rapidement que Londres.60 Thomas Wade (1818-1895), qui a précédé Kleczkowski à Pékin dès le 3 janvier 1861, est son exact pendant, du même âge que lui, à la légation anglaise. Jusqu'à l'arrivée de leur ministre respectif, la compétition est vive entre les deux secrétaires-interprètes pour gagner les faveurs du Zongli yamen, le ministère des Affaires étrangères chinois qui vient d'être institué par un décret du 23 janvier 1861. Au moment ou Wade prédit partout la chute prochaine de la dynastie Qing, Kleczkowski, lui, est résolument optimiste. Il veut voir dans les mesures prises par le prince Gong malgré l'opposition de la cour «une sorte de développement continu d'un système qui pourrait n'être pas sans avenir».61À la différence de Wade, «a rare old boy», dit de lui Robert Hart62, mais plutôt empesé et austère, Kleczkowski plaît au jeune prince Gong par son tempérament enjoué, sa courtoisie élégante et l'agrément d'une conversation cultivée et amusante.63 Wenxiang apprécie les échanges avec lui. La distinction aristocratique et le charme du comte polonais retrouvent dans le raffinement de la cour comme un milieu naturel, alors qu'il les avait sentis si longtemps en porte-à-faux dans l'entourage mercantile de Canton. Wenxiang ne rend sa visite à Wade, qui s'impatiente depuis le début janvier, qu'après celle qu'il rend à Kleczkowski, le 27 février. Ce dernier avait été prévenu deux jours auparavant, par une lettre très polie : il n'en avait «jamais reçu de pareille d'aucun Chinois». Wade est avisé la veille, par une simple carte de visite. Wenxiang reste deux heures à la légation de France, aborde très franchement de nombreux sujets de politique intérieure et les relations avec les étrangers, en reconnaissant que son interlocuteur et, en général ses compatriotes, ne méprisent pas la civilisation chinoise. Il demande qu'un des élèves-interprètes de la légation enseigne le français au Tongwenguan, le collège des langues qu'il vient de créer. Wenxiang ne reste ensuite que 60 Id., 35/103, Lettre de Kleczkowski à Bourboulon, Pékin, 10 février 1861. 61 Id., 35/251, Lettre de Kleczkowski à Bourboulon, Pékin, 26 février 1861, et 35/131, Lettre de Kleczkowski à Bourboulon, Pékin, 16 février 1861. 62 J. K. Fairbank éd., The I. G. in Peking. Letters of Robert Hart，Chinese Maritime Customs, 1868-1907, (Cambridge Mass., 1975), Letter n°45 to Campbell, 21 novembre 1872, p. 93. 63 Les conventions officielles interdisent au prince Gong de faire état de ses sympathies personnelles dans ses mémoires au trône, mais elles percent parfois, comme dans ses mémoires du 11 mars, du 6 et du 29 avril 1861, Zhongguo shixuehui (Société historique chinoise) éd., Di erciyapian zhanzheng (La deuxième guerre de l'opium), (Shanghai, 1978), vol. 5, p. 399, 435, 449-451. 64 AECPC, 35/259-266, Lettre de Kleczkowski à Bourboulon, Pékin, 2 mars 1861. L'origine polonaise de l'enseignement universitaire du chinois moderne en Europe. 47 quinze minutes chez Wade.64 Le scénario se répète lors de la visite du prince Gong aux deux ministres étrangers, le 4 avril. Le prince reste deux heures chez Bourboulon. En buvant le champagne, il avoue que c’est sa boisson européenne préférée. Bruce n’a droit qu’à un quart d’heure.65 À la surprise de leur entourage, le prince et Wenxiang goûtent les rencontres avec Kleczkowski. Il sait les mettre à l’aise et susciter quelques confidences plus intimes. Le prince lui avoue son angoisse de voir l’empereur Xianfeng retarder son retour à Pékin, et le conjure de parler à ses conseillers mandchous Duanhua et Sushun pour les faire changer d’avis sur les étrangers et les rapports avec eux. Il lui donne sans hésiter 250 exemplaires des articles religieux du traité et de la convention d’octobre 1860 revêtus de son sceau, destinés aux missionnaires, alors que jusque-là les affiches ne portaient que le sceau du préfet de Pékin. Il lui demande des officiers français et des armes modernes pour entraîner les troupes mandchoues.66 Il sollicite ses conseils et son aide secrète pour l’accueil de l’envoyé prussien Eulenburg, venu demander un traité pour son gouvernement et les États du Zollverein. Kleczkowski encourage à refuser à la Prusse une légation à Pékin. «Il nous serait préjudiciable qu’il y ait une légation de Prusse dans cette capitale, car, ne fût-ce qu’à titre de protestant, l’agent prussien se joindrait toujours, dans toute affaire sérieuse, à nos rivaux les Anglo-saxons, contre nous et notre influence» commente-t-il confidentiellement à Paris.67 La Chine suit son avis. Mais sa prévention, trop polonaise, contre la Prusse lui vaut par ailleurs des désagréments. À Paris, la direction politique du ministère la réprouve.68 Eulenburg, qui a sollicité la légation de France de lui fournir un interprète, récuse très vite les services de Kleczkowski, pour recourir à Marqués et Méritens. C’est finalement grâce à l’hospitalité offerte par Bourboulon qu’il peut séjourner à Pékin et signer un traité à Tianjin le 2 septembre 1861, mais la légation prussienne ne s’installe à la capitale que cinq ans plus tard.69 65 Id., 35/229, Postscriptum du 5 avril 1861 à la dépêche de Bourboulon au MAE, n°98, Pékin, 3 avril 1861. 66 Id., 35/201-202, Lettre particulière et confidentielle de Kleczkowski au directeur des affaires commerciales du MAE, Pékin, 26 mars 1861; 35/229, Postscriptum du 5 avril 1861 à la dépêche de Bourboulon au MAE, n°98, Pékin, 3 avril 1861. 67 Id., 35/201-202, le terme est souligné dans le texte. 68 Le directeur politique Benedetti note sur la lettre citée plus haut (35/202-202): «Les instructions de 1859 prescrivent à la Légation de seconder et non de contrarier les négociations du Comte d’Eulenbourg». 69 Lettre de Robert Hart à C. Hannen du 9 août 1861, citée par H.B. Morse, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 51. H. Cordier, Histoire des relations.…,pp. 138-139. 48 Marianne Bastid-Bruguière Avec l’aval du prince Gong, Kleczkowski prête aussi son concours au Portugal pour la négociation d’un traité qui fut signé à Tianjin le 13 août 1862 par le gouverneur de Macao. Le but était de régler la situation de Macao qui tentait de s’affranchir de la tutelle chinoise pour assurer la liberté du commerce. Le traité ne fut jamais ratifié. En effet, lorsque le nouveau gouverneur vint un an plus tard pour l’échange des ratifications, il découvrit que la version chinoise, qui au terme du traité faisait foi pour la partie chinoise, différait légèrement du texte portugais et pouvait être interprété comme le maintien de la souveraineté chinoise sur Macao. C’est à Wade que le Portugais s’était adressé pour vérifier le texte. Pour des raisons aussi bien politiques que personnelles, il se fit évidemment un plaisir de souligner les défauts du texte chinois de Kleczkowski, lequel était déjà rentré en France. Le prince Gong déclara d’ailleurs formellement que la Chine n’avait jamais renoncé à sa souveraineté sur la presqu’île et s’était bornée à abandonner la perception du loyer dû pour son affermage perpétuel. Le Portugal resta sans traité, et la situation de Macao incertaine, jusqu’en 1887. Il semble bien que dans cette affaire, aucune insuffisance sinologique ne soit en cause, mais seulement la volonté délibérée de Kleczkowski de ménager les intérêts chinois et d’empêcher une liaison commerciale trop étroite entre Portugais à Macao et Anglais à Hong Kong. Son traité ne comportait non plus aucune clause de protectorat du christianisme en Chine.70 Les relations de confiance avec le prince Gong et Wenxiang permettent à Kleczkowski de régler sans trop de heurts les nombreuses affaires de restitution ou concession de terrain aux missions catholiques, notamment pour la construction de la cathédrale de Canton. Il règle les difficultés religieuses qui se multiplient au Guizhou, au Hunan, au Jiangxi. Il établit les concessions françaises à Zhifu, à Dagu, à Tianjin. Il obtient à Canton un bon terrain dans la citadelle pour y construire le consulat.71 Il prévoit une organisation solide du service à la légation, qui est acceptée par le ministère. Elle comporte deux secrétaires, un interprète en titre et 4 élèves-interprètes, assistés par 4 commis chinois, dont deux lettrés bien payés et deux aspirants. Ainsi la fonction d’interprétariat occupe désormais une place dominante et réellement opération nelle.72 Le 18 mai 1862, au retour en France de Bourboulon, Kleczkowski a même été nommé chargé d’affaires. 70 Ibid., pp. 141-147. 71 Sur ces négociations, outre ses dépêches dans AECPC, vol. 36-42, les documents des archives chinoises dans Di erciyapian zhanzheng, vol. 5, pp. 449-545. 72 Id., 35/212-216, Note de la direction politique au ministre des Affaires étrangères, mars 1861. L'origine polonaise de l'enseignement universitaire du chinois moderne en Europe. 49 Ces pleins pouvoirs, tant désirés, ne durent guère. Le 20 octobre 1862, en arrivant à nouveau au ministère des Affaires étrangères, Drouyn de Lhuys le nomme secrétaire-interprète à Paris, en remplacement de Callery, mort l'année précédente. Il croit sans doute répondre au souhait plusieurs fois exprimé par le diplomate de revenir en France réparer sa santé éprouvée par un long séjour en Chine. Il veut aussi lui épargner des déconvenues avec le successeur de Bourboulon, Berthémy, nommé le 14 octobre 1862, par son prédécesseur Thouvenel. À son corps défendant, le nouveau ministre doit préparer un nouveau tournant de la politique française en Chine. Pour ménager l'opinion catholique irritée de la tiédeur de Napoléon III à protéger les États pontificaux contre les ambitions du royaume d'Italie, on veut lui donner des satisfactions en Chine, en appuyant vigoureusement les missionnaires, dont les défenseurs s'agitent beaucoup en chaire et dans les salons parisiens. Kleczkowski est prévenu de sa nouvelle affectation par une lettre du 27 octobre 1862, qui lui enjoint de rester en Chine jusqu'à l'arrivée du nouveau ministre.73 Mais avant le courrier du ministère, la nouvelle parvient en Chine par le journal Le Moniteur, que la presse anglaise se hâte de reproduire, si bien que le Zongli yamen hésite désormais à traiter avec lui. Berthémy est à Pékin le 16 avril 1863. Sans ménagement pour la fille du chargé d'affaires, qui n'a que six semaines, il exige que celui-ci regagne aussitôt la France.74 Kleczkowski est profondément humilié d'une nomination qu'il ressent comme un retour au statut subalterne d'interprète. En fait, sa position est fort honorable, lui laisse beaucoup de loisirs et lui permet quand même d'être confirmé dans le grade diplomatique de premier secrétaire, de passer consul général en 1869, et ministre plénipotentiaire en 1880.75 En 1870-1871, c'est lui qui escorte la mission de Chonghou venue apporter les excuses du gouvernement chinois pour le massacre de Tianjin.76 Mais son intérêt principal se porte désormais vers l'enseignement du chinois et de la connaissance de la Chine. C'est une deuxième carrière qui s'ouvre pour lui, au cours de laquelle il s'ingénie 73 AE, Kleczkowski, Lettre du ministre des Affaires étrangères à Kleczkowski, Paris, 27 octobre 1862. 74 Id., Lettre de Kleczkowski à Freycinet, ministre des Affaires étrangères, Paris, 2 mai 1882. 75 Id., Lettre du ministre des Affaires étrangères à Kleczkowski, Paris, 28 décembre 1869; Lettre de Choiseul, sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires étrangères à Kleczkowski, Paris, 6 décembre 1880. 76 Sur cette mission subsiste, du côté chinois, le témoignage du journal de Zhang Deyi, Sui shi Faguo ji (Journal d'une ambassade en France), (Changsha, Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1982), qui évoque souvent Kleczkowski, mais sans commentaires personnels. 50 Marianne Bastid-Bruguière à créer un enseignement universitaire du chinois moderne. «Il ne s’agit plus, écrit-il, d’étudier la Chine, uniquement pour en rêver, pour en disserter à perte de vue et acquérir ainsi, à peu de frais, le renom de grand savant. Il s’agit de nous la rendre familière, de nous mettre en état de vivre avec elle de la vie quotidienne, et de lui apprendre, à notre tour, par des moyens à sa portée, ce que nous sommes, ce que nous voulons, ce que nous pouvons.»77 Une nouvelle carrière de professeur La chaire de chinois vulgaire de l’École des langues orientales est vacante, par suite du décès de Bazin, en décembre 1862.78 Il demande à Drouyn de Lhuys d’appuyer sa candidature.79 Le ministre fait aussitôt prendre contact avec le ministère de l’Instruction publique et est informé que Stanislas Julien s’est déjà emparé du poste. A. Pino a parfaitement mis au jour les manœuvres odieuses et sordides grâce auxquelles l’illustre sinologue avait ajouté la chaire et ses revenus à ses nombreux autres emplois et salaires.80 D’abord, pour éliminer ses rivaux parisiens, Julien suggère le nom de Kleczkowski, et offre d’assurer l’enseignement jusqu’au retour de ce dernier, sans le prévenir d’ailleurs. Lorsque Kleczkowski revient de Chine et sollicite le poste, Julien s’ingénie à démolir le candidat, au motif qu’il n’a rien publié. Il conserve le poste, au mépris de la règle qui interdit son cumul avec ses fonctions de conservateur à la Bibliothèque impériale et professeur au Collège de France, et se fait reverser la pension qui doit être prélevée sur le salaire de cette chaire au profit de la veuve de Bazin, au titre du loyer d’un appartement ou il loge cette dernière, au prix fort. Cependant, grâce à l’appui de ses relations personnelles, Kleczkowski finit par obtenir l’autorisation d’ouvrir un cours libre de «chinois vulgaire et pratique» dans les locaux de la Sorbonne. La séance inaugurale a lieu le 7 dé- 77 Kleczkowski, Cours graduel et complet de chinois parlé et écrit, (Paris, Maisonneuve, 1876), p. XI. 78 Cette chaire de chinois vulgaire, créée en 1843 à l’École des langues orientales, était alors rattachée administrativement à la Bibliothèque impériale. 79 AE, Kleczkowski, Lettre de Kleczkowski à Drouyn de Lhuys, ministre des Affaires étrangères, Boston, 27 novembre 1863. 80 A. Pino, «Stanislas Julien et l’École des langues orientales à travers quelques documents», in M.- C. Bergère et A. Pino éds., op. cit., pp. 52-94. Les documents cités ne mentionnent pas l’incompatibilité avec les fonctionsà la Bibliothèque impériale, élément supplémentaire qui apparaît dans la correspondance administrative entre les Affaires étrangères et l’Instruction publique du dossier personnel de Kleczkowski aux Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères. L'origine polonaise de l'enseignement universitaire du chinois moderne en Europe. 51 cembre 1869, devant une assemblée ou figurent des personnalités éminentes, dont Drouyn de Lhuys et plusieurs membres de l’Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres hostiles à Julien, des hauts fonctionnaires de plusieurs services, des philologues, des étudiants.81 En effet, on s’alarme alors dans la haute administration du préjudice que l’ignorance de la Chine et de la langue chinoise cause aux intérêts politiques et économiques de la France en Extrême-Orient. Le ministre des Affaires étrangères écrit à son collègue de l’Instruction publique, le 2 juillet 1870, pour lui proposer de créer à Paris une école de langue chinoise, «confiée non pas à un savant théorique, mais à un homme rompu pratiquement à ce genre d’études, à un homme qui ayant vécu dans ce milieu sans analogue dans le monde, y ayant traité d’importantes affaires, fût en état d’apprendre à ses auditeurs non seulement le chinois mais encore la Chine elle-même.» Il souligne aussi que le cumul de fonctions exercé par Julien soulève les critiques dans la presse et à la Chambre des députés.82 Le ministère de l’Instruction publique décide donc de déclarer la vacance de la chaire de chinois vulgaire de l’École des langues orientales, que Julien n’occupait qu’à titre «provisoire», depuis huit ans. Julien n’hésite pas à s’y présenter, en faisant étalage de ses titres, ainsi qu’Hervey Saint-Denys (1822-1892), qui le suppléait en cas d’absence pour le cours de chinois vulgaire. Kleczkowski fait de même. L’assemblée des professeurs de l’École classe Julien en première ligne, les deux autres candidats à égalité. Mais l’Académie des inscriptions et le Conseil de perfectionnement de l’École, ou siègent des délégués de plusieurs ministères, mettent en tête Kleczkowski. Charles Schefer, son collègue secrétaire-interprète de persan aux Affaires étrangères, qui était administrateur et professeur à l’École, et d’autres voix autorisées l’appuient auprès du ministre de l’Instruction publique. Ils soulignent tous que le nouveau professeur doit «connaître et parler la langue orale de la Chine».83 Kleczkowski est nommé à la chaire le 10 décembre 1871. Il se voue avec cœur à ses nouvelles fonctions. C’est lui qui met effectivement en place le système des répétiteurs chinois. L’institution de «répétiteurs ou lecteurs étrangers, chargés d’assister les professeurs pour interroger les élèves et les exercer à la conversation et à la lecture à haute voix» avait été 81 Kleczkowski, Cours libre de chinois vulgaire et pratique, p. 5. Les «cours libres» étaient des enseignements sous le contrôle du ministère de l’Instruction publique, mais ne conduisant pas à des diplômes d’État. 82 Archives nationales, F17/13553, Collège de Firance, Chaire de chinois et tartare-mandchou, Extrait d’une dépêche du ministre des Affaires étrangères au ministre de l’Instruction publique, 2 juillet 1870. 83 Les termes sont de Paul Perny, qui briguait la succession prochaine de Julien au Collège de France. Voir A. Pino, «Stanislas Julien...», pp. 88-92. 52 Marianne Bastid-Bruguière créée à l'École des langues orientales par un décret du 8 novembre 1869. Pour le chinois, Hervey Saint-Denys s'était fait assister quelque temps par un Chinois qu'il payait de sa poche. Julien n'avait personne.84 Kleczkowski fait venir de Tianjin un excellent lettré, Liu Xiuchang, avec une rémunération publique avantageuse. Liu Xiuchang arrive à Paris en novembre 1873. Il exerce les élèves quotidiennement, deux heures par jour, jusqu'à sa mort en novembre 1879.85 une nouvelle pédagogie du chinois Kleczkowski donne à l'enseignement un nouveau profil, axé sur la maîtrise de l'oral et du style écrit de l'administration et des affaires. À partir du second semestre de l'année 1871-1873, le cours s'intitule sur l'affiche «Cours de chinois moderne».86 Kleczkowski utilise comme matériaux de base l'Arte China de Gonçalves et les Colloquial Series de Thomas Wade, ainsi que le Saint-Édit et des documents choisis. Mais il les remanie pour composer un manuel d'enseignement gradué, adapté à des élèves francophones, et fondé sur son expérience pratique de l'apprentissage du chinois. Le premier tome de ce manuel paraît en 1876.87 Il lui vaut un prix du ministère de l'Instruction publique et la rosette d'officier de la Légion d'honneur en février 1878.88 L'originalité de ce manuel par rapport à ses devanciers89 est d'abord de tourner le dos aux catégories et classifications de la grammaire européenne 84 A. Pino, «Trois répétiteurs indigènes: Ly Hing-fang, Ly Chao-pée et Ting Tun-ling, 1869-1870», in M.-C. Bergère et A. Pino, op. cit., pp. 271-286. 85 L. Galy, «Les «répétiteurs indigènes pour la langue chinoise», 1873-1925», in ibid., pp. 287-295. La rémunération de Li Xiushang, qui atteignait 5 400 francs par mois en 1879, fut cause de nombreux problèmes. 86 À partir de l'année suivante, le titre devient simplement «cours de chinois»: A. Pino et I. Rabut, «La chaire de chinois à l'affiche de l'Ecole des langues O'», in ibid., pp. 323-327. 87 Comte Kleczkowski, Cours graduel et complet de chinois parlé et écrit. Volume I. Phrase de la langue parlée tirées de l’Arte China du P. Gonçalves, Paris, Maison neuve,1876, (Partie 1, française, LXXII, 102 p., Partie 2, chinoise, reliée à l'envers, 116 p.). 88 AE, Kleczkowski, Relevé de carrière sans date; Lettre de Kleczkowski à W.H. Wad-dington, membre de l'Institut, président du Conseil, ministre secrétaire d'État aux Affaires étrangères, Paris,14 mai 1879. 89 Pour la description des manuels de chinois antérieurs: P. Demiéville, «Chinois, (1843)», in Cent-cinquantenaire de l’École des langues orientales，Histoire，organisation et enseignements, Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1948, pp. 129-161, et I. Rabut, «Un siècle d'enseignement du chinois aux Langues O'. Éléments d'une enquête sur la didactique de la langue chinoise en France du milieu du XIXe siècle à la fin de la Seconde guerre mondiale», in M.-C. Bergère et A. Pino, op cit., pp. 213-269. L'origine polonaise de l'enseignement universitaire du chinois moderne en Europe. 53 des langues, pour faire saisir d’emblée le fonctionnement de la langue chinoise. Elle est aussi de choisir comme illustration de la langue actuellement usitée des dialogues et textes contemporains, et non des extraits de roman ou théâtre, d’un style toujours plus ou moins littéraire et ancien. De savants sinologues et linguistes ont pu reprocher à l’auteur de n’avoir point formulé de théorie de la langue chinoise, d’avoir utilisé dans l’introduction à son cours des expressions parfois «naïves» ou «lyriques» pour décrire le génie de cet idiome.90 Mais la réflexion théorique n’était ni sa prétention ni son but. En revanche, comme le souligne du reste I. Rabut, il dégage de manière très claire et pertinente les principes de la langue. Son résumé de ces principes en treize points essentiels destinés à guider l’étudiant débutant mériterait de figurer encore en tête de nos manuels d’aujourd’hui.91 Sa didactique part de l’usage des mots, non de celui de la grammaire. Mais là ou il se montre pionnier par rapport à ses prédécesseurs et successeurs dans cette approche, jusqu’à une époque très récente, c’est qu’il a l’idée de définir un corpus des caractères les plus usuels (4 000 au plus), par lequel doit débuter l’apprentissage.92 Son choix n’a sans doute pas la rigueur scientifique à laquelle on est parvenu progressivement au XXe siècle par les comptages systématiques et l’ordinateur93, mais il montre qu’il est le premier à observer la manière dont les Chinois apprennent leur propre langue et à appliquer cette réflexion à la pédagogie du chinois langue seconde. Un des éléments particulièrement novateur de sa pédagogie est la priorité temporelle qu’il donne à l’apprentissage de la lecture et à la mémorisation, sur l’apprentissage de l’écriture. Il est aussi le premier à porter une attention spécifique à l’apprentissage de la prononciation. Sur la phonétique, il opte pour inculquer méthodiquement celle du dialecte de Pékin et pour entraîner les gosiers français à une pratique parfaite des aspirées, leur grande faiblesse, comme il l’a constaté sur le terrain. En matière de tons, il répudie, avec ironie, le culte des quatre tons, cher à tant de sinologues européens passés et futurs. Il est vain de s’époumoner à hurler les quatre tons, avec des contorsions, durant des heures. La méthode aboutit, dit-il, à «faire crier grâce aux malheureux dignitaires chinois qui se trouvent condamnés à 90 P. Demiéville, op. cit., p. 158; I. Rabut, op. cit., p. 239-241. Ces critiques laissent percer parfois le préjugé invétéré des universitaires contre les spécialistes formés hors du giron de l’Université. 91 Kleczkowski, Cours graduel, pp. 21-23. I. Rabut, op. cit., pp. 243-244. 92 Kleczkowski, Cours graduel, pp. LXV-LXVI. 93 Sur ce sujet: B. Allanic, Les corpus de caractères et leur dimension pédagogique dans la Chine ancienne et contemporaine, thèse de doctorat, Paris, Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales, 2003. 54 Marianne Bastid-Bruguière entendre ce par fait langage tonique.»94 Il professe que le ton est secondaire par rapport à l’intonation de la phrase. C’est la doctrine que m’a soutenue aussi Roman Sławiński un jour où, l’accompagnant dans un marché à Pékin, j’admirais comment son éloquence chinoise avait pu, en quelques minutes, faire baisser à dix fois moins le prix d’une théière «coquille d’ouf», qu’il voulait acheter à un brocanteur. Demiéville fustige l’indifférence de Kleczkowski envers les tons, mais lui-même observait un certain dépérissement des tons dans le chinois du Nord et «l’importance croissante que prend dans ce parler l’accent de force».95 En 1879, Kleczkowski avait prêts pour l’impression deux autres volumes de son manuel de chinois, qui devait en compter six. La publication était trop onéreuse pour que l’éditeur ou lui-même en assume les frais. Le premier volume lui avait coûté 10 000 francs en plus des aides reçues. Il pensait aussi que les caractères disponibles à l’Imprimerie nationale, - soit trop gros, soit trop petits, beaucoup moins beaux que ceux alors disponibles en Angleterre et en Autriche -, ne convenaient pas pour les textes chinois à composer. Il aurait voulu en faire graver et fondre deux types (de 16 et de 22) d’après un jeu de caractères écrits par un des meilleurs calligraphes chinois, qu’il avait rapporté de Chine. La dépense s’élevait à environ 20 000 francs. Il faisait valoir que ces matrices pourraient servir à imprimer d’autres publications pour l’Université et les Affaires étrangères. Ses démarches auprès du ministre des Affaires étrangères Waddington restèrent vaines.96 La suite du cours ne fut jamais publiée. Il ne semble pas, malheureusement, que le manuscrit en soit conservé. Contrairement au reproche que Demiéville adresse à Kleczkowski sur la lecture du seul volume paru, les volumes suivants faisaient une part à la langue littéraire et classique, et l’intégraient progressivement au bagage de l’apprenti sinologue. La conviction de Kleczkowski était que: «Si on ne parle pas, on ne comprend pas vraiment la littérature.»97 En plus de son enseignement de la langue moderne, le professeur s’applique à communiquer à ses étudiants et à un large public une connaissance exacte de la Chine de son temps et de sa culture. Depuis 1873, il assure à l’École des langues orientales le cours complémentaire d’histoire, géographie et législation de l’Extrême-Orient, qui venait d’être créé et se trouvait sans enseignant à la suite du décès de Guillaume Pauthier. Il le conserve jusqu’à la fin de 1881, ou 94 Kleczkowski, Cours graduel, partie française, p. 33. 95 P. Demiéville, op. cit., pp. 132-133, 158. 96 AE, Kleczkowski, Lettres de Kleczkowski à Waddington du 14 mai et du 9 octobre 1879. 97 Kleczkowski, Cours graduel, p. LV. L'origine polonaise de l'enseignement universitaire du chinois moderne en Europe. 55 Henri Cordier, le bibliographe, prend la relève. Il ne faut pas négliger non plus son influence dans les cercles officiels et mondains ou il est reçu. Les idées que Kleczkowski développe dans ses cours de civilisation et les milieux parisiens nous sont connus par sa correspondance, par le texte de sa leçon inaugurale de 1869 et la copieuse introduction à son Cours graduel. Elles prolongent une réflexion déjà exprimée dans ses rapports diplomatiques. la défense de la Chine moderne devant l'opinion Le comte n'est pas révolutionnaire ni socialiste. Sans ferveur excessive, il est bon catholique. En Chine et à Paris, il a été blessé de voir vilipendé le développement des relations françaises avec la Chine auquel il s'est consacré dans des conditions difficiles, sans songer à en tirer un profit matériel. Il ne faut donc pas s'étonner si, devant un parterre parisien, il qualifie la guerre de l'opium de «guerre aussi humainement conduite que juste dans ses causes», et s'il évoque volontiers «nos infatigables missionnaires».98 Cependant, là n'est point l'essentiel. Dans une approche ou l'on sent l'influence des idées de Saint-Simon, il veut détruire les préjugés et la désinformation, causés à son avis par l'ignorance, qui obscurcissent la vision européenne de la Chine et entravent l'essor de relations pacifiques et d'échanges mutuellement profitables avec elle. Il lutte contre toutes les formes d'exclusion à l'encontre de la Chine : l'exotisme comme l'ostracisme. Il démythifie la difficulté de la langue chinoise, non par «désinvolture», comme l'insinuent ses critiques modernes, mais parce qu'il sait que l'échange verbal direct est indispensable aux rapports de confiance entre les individus. Le chinois doit être «un instrument usuel et à la portée de tous»99, non le domaine jalousement réservé de sinologues de cabinet qui ne s'intéressent pas à dialoguer avec les Chinois vivants. Il ne prétend pas pourtant, comme d'autres, que cette langue peut d'apprendre en quinze jours ou trois mois. Sa position est raisonnable et pratique : «La vérité, c'est que le chinois, n'ayant presque rien de commun avec les autres langues vivantes, est par cela même très difficile à apprendre et exige un travail incessant de trois ou cinq années». Mais, ajoute-t-il, ce n'est pas un effort plus long et pénible que l'entrée à l'École polytechnique, or un jeune homme intelligent et actif, connaissant très bien le chinois et l'anglais, et acceptant de passer quinze à vingt ans en Extrême-Orient, a un meilleur avenir qu'en sortant en bon rang de Polytechnique.100 98 Kleczkowski, Cours libre de chinois vulgaire et pratique, p. 11-12. 99 Ibid. , p. 5. 100 Kleczkowski, Cours graduel, p. LV. 56 Marianne Bastid-Bruguière Il combat avec énergie la vision raciste et pessimiste des Chinois et de leur empire. Il la voit gagner en Chine et en Europe et veut l’empêcher. Il peint donc la Chine comme un pays «riche et prospère par le travail de ses habitants», comparable à la France, à la Belgique, à l’Italie ou à l’Allemagne. «L’industrie est partout jusque dans les plus petits hameaux, le commerce intérieur sans rival au monde…Telles sont les aptitudes des Chinois pour les affaires, qu’il ne serait pas surprenant qu’un jour ils ne vinssent faire une rude concurrence aux Anglais jusque sur les marchés de l’Europe. La raison de tout cela est bien simple. L’organisation fondamentale de la société chinoise, telle qu’elle est aujourd’hui, date de près de vingt siècles, et le travail, au lieu d’être considéré comme une peine nécessaire, est au contraire, en Chine, un honneur. On n’y méprise que l’oisiveté, partout ou elle se montre. Aussi le Chinois travaille-t-il avec joie. La sueur a beau lui couler du front, qu’il porte un palanquin ou qu’il conduise sa charrue, le sourire ne quitte jamais ses lèvres ni la gaieté son esprit. Son visage ne trahit aucun sentiment mauvais ou amer ; la basse envie lui est inconnue, car, à ses propres yeux, comme aux yeux de ses pareils, le travail, et surtout le travail utile, ne dégrade point. Bien au contraire. Le travail anoblit sans distinction de classes, puisque le premier principe de la constitution sociale et politique de la Chine est que l’étude constatée par les examens et le mérite personnel sont et doivent être le seul chemin des honneurs et des dignités.»101 Il nie la xénophobie qu’on prête aux Chinois: «On parle constamment de la cruauté des Chinois à l’égard des étrangers, de leur haine invincible pour les barbares, de leur dédain pour tout ce qui ne ressemble point à leur civilisation, à leurs idées, à leurs mours, - de la répugnance qu’ils auraient à voir des étrangers installés chez eux... Vous allez en juger vous-mêmes. Les Anglais ont fait trois guerres à la Chine, - la France y a envoyé deux expéditions. Pendant que l’on se battait sur la côte, nos vaillants, nos infatigables missionnaires parcouraient comme d’habitude l’intérieur de toutes les provinces; pas un n’avait déserté son poste d’honneur, et pas un n’a été inquiété à cette époque…Il y a eu, il y a des persécutions et martyrs. Mais cela a toujours tenu, tient toujours à des causes toutes locales».102 Sur la deuxième guerre de l’opium, il déclare: «Nous avions le motif le plus juste et le plus légal pour notre guerre contre la Chine dans le meurtre juridique de l’abbé Chapdelaine, commis en violation de notre traité…Mais il faut se rappeler aussi quelle outrageante conduite les étrangers venaient de tenir en Chine, à l’égard de la formidable insurrection des Tai-ping. Les États-Unis et l’Angleterre ont acclamé ce «mouvement chrétien.»103 101 Kleczkowski, Cours libre de chinois vulgaire et pratique, p. 19-20. 102 Ibid. , p. 22-23. L'origine polonaise de l'enseignement universitaire du chinois moderne en Europe. 57 Il admet, après le massacre de Tianjin de 1870, qu’il existe certains groupes irréductibles, mais on peut circonscrire leur influence: «Il est des classes en Chine dont rien peut-être, pas même leur intérêt personnel, n’adoucira les sentiments hostiles. Mais si on étudie bien la Chine et les Chinois, on arrivera à discerner ces ennemis irréconciliables et à trouver le moyen de neutraliser leurs agissements haineux. On peut utiliser l’influence des autres classes en les rendant propices.»104 Il réfute les arguments sur l’incapacité politique des Chinois et leur goût de la tyrannie. La Chine est, écrit-il «une monarchie appuyée sur des lois, des idées et des mœurs plus démocratiques que chez aucun autre peuple... L’administration chinoise paraît, comme chez nous, centralisée à l’extrême. Et cependant, - chose merveilleuse! - en Angleterre même, les communes et les municipalités ne jouissent pas de plus de droits et de privilèges que celles du pays des [Han], - tant la tradition et l’indépendance du caractère en Chine, se maintiennent vivaces, malgré le sentiment profondément unitaire et égalitaire de la nation. »Quant à ses lois: «Le code chinois, œuvre admirable d’une longue suite de sages...».105 Il fustige l’idée du conservatisme chinois: «Qu’on ne s’y trompe pas…La Chine marche, et peut-être même plus vite qu’il ne conviendrait pour les intérêts exclusifs de l’Occident.»106 Et de même la notion d’une décadence nationale «C’est un jugement superficiel d’attribuer exclusivement à l’assistance étrangère l’anéantissement des Taiping…ce sont surtout les populations elles-mêmes, les [Hunanais] en particulier, groupés autour de leur compatriote [Zeng Guofan], qui, les premières, ont enrayé la marche jusqu’alors irrésistible des Taiping… La Chine, - on ne saurait trop le dire, - est une nation dans toute l’énergie de ce mot; et ses hommes d’État ont beaucoup plus de valeur qu’on ne l’admet généralement en Europe.»107 Il prône au contraire la coopération avec les Chinois, qui ont des capitaux et dont la force s’affirme, maintenant que la paix est revenue: «On accuse les Chinois d’être stationnaires et l’on ne s’aperçoit pas que, sous bien des rapports, on l’est soi-même davantage…C’étaient les Anglais qui dominaient, maintenant les Chinois les dominent…Les conditions de réussite en Chine ont donc changé du tout au tout. Ce que des esprits jeunes et entreprenants doivent se proposer, c’est de s’assimiler, autant que possible, les idées et les 103 Kleczkowski, Cours graduel, p. XXIX-XXX. 104Ibid., p. XXX. 105 Ibid., p. IX. 106Ibid., p. XL. 107Ibid., p. LXIX-LXX. 58 Marianne Bastid-Bruguière sentiments des indigènes; car c’est désormais avec eux, par eux et auprès d’eux que l’on peut le plus sûrement réussir.»108 Or pour arriver à connaître en peu de temps un pays, deux conditions sont nécessaires, dit-il: «Il faut d’abord en estimer les habitants pour vivre au milieu d’eux, non pas d’une existence à soi, mais de leur propre vie; par là seulement on obtient leur confiance, on leur devient même nécessaire, et l’on finit par les faire coopérer, volontairement ou involontairement, à sa propre fortune. Il faut ensuite apprendre la langue du pays et arriver à la bien connaître.»109 La ligne de conduite recommandée par Kleczkowski trouva des avocats convaincus à la Chambre des députés et dans l’opinion française du dernier quart du XIXe siècle, même si elle ne dirigea pas la politique française envers la Chine. Il est cependant difficile de déterminer la part exacte d’inspiration qui revient à Kleczkowski dans ce courant. En revanche, son rôle de professeur est évident et indéniable. Il fut un excellent pédagogue, adoré de ses élèves.110 Il forma quatre interprètes en Chine, puis quinze à Paris. Tous furent d’admirables praticiens, capables non seulement d’écrire, mais de penser en chinois, de rédiger séance tenante un document pendant un entretien au Zongli yamen. Kleczkowski avait axé sa pédagogie non plus uniquement sur la traduction du chinois en français, comme on le pratiquait jusque-là, mais sur le passage, beaucoup plus difficile, du français au chinois. Nulle part ailleurs en Europe ou aux Etats-Unis, il n’existait encore d’enseignement universitaire du chinois moderne de cette qualité. L’enseignement du chinois à l’Université de Cambridge ne fut ouvert qu’en 1888. Plusieurs des disciples de Kleczkowski, dont Vissière, Devéria, Imbault-Huart et Courant, furent aussi de grands érudits et occupèrent comme lui des chaires universitaires, après un long séjour diplomatique en Chine. Déjà du vivant du maître, le gouvernement avait commencé à reconnaître la valeur de ce nouveau personnel en choisissant des chefs de poste parmi les anciens interprètes. Depuis 1864, l’Angleterre avait décidé de confier tous les postes en Chine et au Japon à d’anciens interprètes, sauf celui de premier secrétaire.111 108 Ibid. , p. XLIII. 109 Ibid. , p. XLIV. 110 On en trouve un témoignage dans l’ouvrage de son élève Léon Caubert, Souvenirs chinois, (Paris, 1891), qui lui est dédié. L’ouvrage comporte une gravure du maître avec le lettré Liu Xiuchang et sept de ses élèves. Une lettre personnelle d’un autre élève, Dautremer, datée de Bangkok, 1er juillet 1879, conservée dans AE, Kleczkowski, manifeste aussi le sentiment des disciples. Dans le même dossier, une lettre chinoise de Vissière, admirablement rédigée et calligraphiée par lui, après moins de trois ans d’études, en octobre 1879, donne la preuve des résultats atteints. 111 Kleczkowski, Cours graduel, p. LII. 112Ibid., p. XVIII. L'origine polonaise de l'enseignement universitaire du chinois moderne en Europe. 59 un avenir européen Le comte Kleczkowski mourut à Paris le 26 mars 1886, au lendemain de la guerre franco-chinoise, sur laquelle il ne s'est pas exprimé publiquement. Les conditions insalubres ou il avait vécu de longues années en Chine avaient éprouvé sa résistance physique. Ses dernières années furent assombries par la maladie. Il laissait une veuve et quatre enfants, dont l'aînée, ramenée en France précipitamment quelques semaines après sa naissance à Pékin, était de santé précaire. Ce pionnier de la présence française en Extrême-Orient se distingue, avec quelques autres de ses collègues, par un véritable attachement à la Chine et aux Chinois, qui s'est nourri peu à peu, grâce au dialogue avec des milieux variés, à de nombreux voyages à l'intérieur du pays, et à l'étude. Polonais de naissance et d'éducation, il percevait mieux que ses collègues français le sentiment chinois devant l'agression et les empiètements étrangers, leur humiliation face à l'arrogance et la brutalité des occupants sur leur sol, leur volonté de redresser leur pays et les contraintes qui les accablaient. Sa clairvoyance sur la politique missionnaire tient aussi à son expérience particulière des rapports entre l'Église et l'État. Sa culture et sa formation lui donnaient une vision plus européenne, moins étroitement nationaliste, des relations avec la Chine. Dans les négociations qu'il a conduites, il cherchait des accords viables. Ils devaient apaiser les litiges, plutôt qu'extorquer à toute force quelques avantages supplémentaires. Il n'était cependant pas utopiste. Même si les Européens pouvaient critiquer les guerres perpétrées en Chine et le contenu des traités, ils étaient désormais «engagés par le passé»112, pensait-il. Le mieux qu'ils avaient à faire maintenant était d'essayer de comprendre la Chine réelle, celle de leur temps, pour vivre avec elle en bonne intelligence, en partageant les profits du commerce des marchandises et de celui de l'esprit. En fondant l'enseignement universitaire du chinois moderne en Europe, Kleczkowski ouvrait vraiment les portes de l'avenir, si sombre qu'il ait trouvé le sien au retour de Chine. 張力 (Li CHANG) 鄉村建設運動中的婦女啟蒙: 江西農村服務區的個案研究 (Enlightening Women in Chinese Rural Reconstruction Movement: A Case Study of Jiangxi Rural Welfare Centers) 中國是一個以農立國的國家，其文化的基礎植根於農業社會之中，百分之七十以 上的人口居住在農村，依賴農業為主；因此自古以來，歷代中央或地方政府對於農村 或與其相關設施的維護，大都十分重視。然而農業發展的良窳，在傳統時期往往與自 然條件關係密切，因此承平時日，農民維生尚不困難；若在動亂時代，再加上天災， 就很容易造成農村的破產。 十九世紀以來的中國，國勢已不若清初時強盛，然而人口倍增，農業技術並無太 多的改良，因此農村的生活每下愈況；加以動亂時起，又有列強侵凌，帶給中國社會 極大的衝撃。因此在十九世紀末二十世紀初，中國的農民往往在饑餓和死亡線上掙扎 。清末民初時期，農村所受的各種威脅，大致包括了水旱災和蟲災的頻仍，農產品的 產量及輸出日漸減少，輸入反而增加：再加上內政不修，使得農民面臨極為苛重的田 賦。天災與人禍的結果，農民被迫離鄉背井，造成田地荒蕪，農村人口流失。1凡此 種種，均使農民的生活瀕臨絕境。 當此危急存亡之秋，不少有識之士紛紛高呼救國，提出各種改革方案，並身體力 行以求實現。二十世紀的最初三十餘年，漸有一批人重視農村的改進，意圖從中國的 立國之本救起；這批人一般被稱為鄉村建設派，他們大多得到某些公私團體的支持， 選擇一個特定的農村，進行建設工作：由於原始史料和有關記載不多，大部分鄉村建 設（簡稱鄉建）工作的實際情形依然鮮為人知。 雖然如此，鄉建工作大概離不開改善農作技術與啟迪農民知識。農村之中，婦女 人口約占一半，但在傳統時代，農村裡重男輕女的觀念頗為嚴重，女性在家庭中的地 位甚為低落，平日除負責家務之外，也要參與田間工作。而婦女接受教育的機會不多 ,無法提高自身地位，遑論運用知識來改善自身或家庭的生活。2那麼鄉建工作者在 從事農村建設工作時，是否對約占一半人口的婦女加以特殊考慮，而所考慮的重點為 何，就是本文即將探討的重點。 江西農村服務區是1934年成立的鄉建組織，前後歷時約十一年。根據主其事的農 村服務區管理處專員張福良所言，農村服務經過多年的努力，「已初步提高農村婦女 之生活和地位，將於快樂家庭中，建立健全社會之基礎。」3顯然他所從事的農村重 1莊澤宣編，《鄉村建設與鄉村教育》（昆明：中華書局，1939年11月再版),頁26-32。 2劉芾仙，《農村民眾教育》（上海：大華書局，1934年9月再版），頁16-20。 3張福良，〈江西之農村服務〉，《贛政十年》（南昌：1941年12月），頁37。 64 張力（Li Chang ) 建工作中，曾經注意到當地婦女地位的改善，以及如何運用婦女人力資源，以提高農 村的生活水平。本文擬從有限的史料對此問題作一瞭解，首先探討農村服務區針對農 村婦女的工作內容，進而觀察婦女的反應，最後再與其它鄉建工作的類似情形，作一 概略比較。 二、江西農村服務區簡介 1930年代初期，國民政府展開了與國際聯盟的技術合作，事實上這主要是由國聯 派遣技術人員來華，擔任長期和短期的顧問，對中國政府所舉辦的建設事業，提出建 議，或以備諮詢。工作內容大致包括公共衛生、教育文化、農業經濟、水利工程、公 路建設等。41933年冬，全國經濟委員會（簡稱經委會）商請三位國聯專家，前往勦 共之後初收復的贛省部分地區考察農村情形。三位專家於三週考察結束後，提出了設 立農村服務區的建議，獲得經委會同意。於是邀請具有美國森林學和農學碩士學位， 且已有鄉村工作七年經驗的張福良擔任「全國經濟委員會江西農村服務區管理處」 (簡稱江西農管處)專員；並自1934年8月1日起，陸續成立以下十個農村服務區： 表一農村服務區設立時間及地點 區 別 成立時間 設置地點 戶數 戶口 第_農村服務區 1934年8月1日 臨川縣上頓渡章舍村 第二農村服務區 1934年8月15日 南城縣新豐鎮堯村 91 367 第三農村服務區 1934年9月15日 豐城縣小港口岡上村 117 628 第四農村服務區 1934年11月1日 新淦縣三湖鎮聶村 157 693 第五農村服務區 1934年11月1日 高安縣祥符觀藻塘村 84 389 第六農村服務區 1934年11月1日 永修縣涂家埠淳湖王村 180 846 第七農村服務區 1935年5月1日 南昌近郊青雲譜 第八農村服務區 1935年7月1日 吉安縣敦厚村 310 1,210 第九農村服務區 1935年8月15日 上饒縣沙溪鎮 484 2,175 第十農村服務區 1936年1月1日 寧都縣石上村 155 563 農村服務區的選擇，雖然在各個農村，但仍以交通方便，治安良好，且阻力較少 的地區為原則。每_農村服務區的工作人員包括幹事、助理幹事各一，指導員、助理 員、助產士和婦孺工作指導員，計12人至16人。1936年7月，因經委會農業處劃歸實 業部，故而江西農管處亦改隸實業部，第二次中日戰爭初期又一度劃歸經濟部 (1938年2月至1940年3月），後因農林部設立，江西農管處遂歸農林部管轄。 4見張力，《國際合作在中國：國際聯盟角色的考察，1919-1946》（台北：中央研究院近代 史研究所，1999 )。 鄉村建設運動中的婦女啟蒙：江曲農村服務區的個案研究丨Enlightening Women in Chinese Rural...) 65 分布各地的十個農村服務區原直屬江西農管處，單純從事農村建設工作。但從 1935年勦匪行營總部頒佈〈勦匪省份各縣分區設置辦法〉’以輔助縣府在區內執行管 、教、養、衛的實施，這與經委會服務區設立目標相合，乃決定以各農村服務區幹事 兼任所在地區署的區長，造成了政治與服務工作的相結合。此舉有利有弊，已有學者 為文專論，本文不再贅述。5 農村服務區的具體工作，可以從以下的成果得一梗概： 管的方面：（1)指導組織各種團體：組成村務改進委員會、新生活勞動服務團、青苗 會、壯丁義勇隊、少年團、青年勵志團、教師進修會、畢業同學會、婦 女會、少女會、牲畜防疫會、青年農藝會。（2)村容整理。（3)指導築路。 (4)調解糾紛。（5)訓練壯丁及舉辦保長講習會。 教的方面：（1)學校教育：開辦成人班、兒童班、幼童園。（2)社教方面：舉辦村民同 樂會、男女觀光團、各種紀念會和集會、展覽會、戲劇電影公演、童子 軍團、保學師資訓練班、公民訓練。 養的方面：（1)開闢農場區及特約農場。（2)選定特約農家。（3)指導造林、栽植果木。 (4)推廣種豬、種雞、種鴨。（5)成立合作社、舉辦合作講習會。 衛的方面：（1)診療、預防注射、接種。（2)改良或消毒水井、修建廁所、大掃除。 (3)訓練工作：產婆訓練班、婦嬰衛生訓練班、學校衛生隊訓練。 第二次中日戰爭爆發後，因部分服務區鄰近敵火，被迫結束業務，或撤至安全地 點，其變動情形如下表： 第二次中日戰爭時期農村服務區變動情形 區 別 變 動 情 形 1939年1月因迫近戰區，僅留一部份工作。1941年10月全部改遷 第一農村服務區 泰和縣蘇溪。 第二農村服務區 1942年6月11日被日軍攻陷,旋經我軍收復，於同年8月恢復工作。 第三農村服務區 1939年4月因戰事影響全部後撤，改遷贛縣江口圩辦理難民工廠。 第四農村服務區 1939年4月因迫近戰區，作部分撤退，尚留一部份工作。 第五農村服務區 1939年4月因戰事影響全部撤退，改遷吉安高塘墟廟前吳村辦理 第六農村服務區 難民工廠。 第七農村服務區 1938年8月撤退。1939年1月全部改遷雩都潭都墟。 第八農村服務區 1938年8月撤退。1939年1月全部改遷瑞金胡嶺背。1941年10月 第九農村服務區 因環境關係，人員遷往泰和蘇溪。 第十農村服務區 照常工作無變動。 1938年8月因迫近戰區，作部份撤退，尚留一部份工作。 照常工作無變動。 5參見呂芳上，〈抗戰前江西的農業改良與農村改進事業，1933-1937〉，《近代中國農村經濟史 論文集》（台北：中央研究院近代史研究所，1989年12月），頁517-556。 66 張力(Li Chang ) 農管處逐漸利用江西的特產苧？，進行？作改良和生產。到了 1944年1月，農管處改組為 東南？業改進所，原先之服務工作告一段落’轉而專門從事？作生產改良業務’直到中 日戰爭結束後，行政院撤銷東南？業改進所，其業務移交江西省其它機構接辦。6 三、與婦女有關的農村服務工作 從上節所述的農村服務工作，可以約略看出農村服務區所注重者，在於組織農民 ；再透過教育方法，協助農民切實改善自身的生活。農民的生活十分單純，服務的項 目，也多與農民有切身關係。而服務區所在地農村的婦女，和中國各地大多數的農村 婦女一樣，除了必須照顧家庭，在農忙時也要參加田間工作。長久以來，婦女在農村 中的角色自然十分重要，但其地位一向未受到重視，因此農村服務區也視情況擬定若 干措施，希望能對農村婦女有所幫助。 根據1937年農管處所作的報告，各服務區陸續組織了婦女會和少女會。這類團體 的性質及功能為何，尚無具體的資料可以讓我們完全瞭解，可能是動員當地婦女的一 種手段，藉以達到某種訓練的目的。如第三服務區（豐城岡上村）鑒於家政訓練之重 要，曾召集該區婦女會全體會員，舉行茶話會，討論家政講習班的籌備事宜，就是一 例。7而其他與婦女有直接關係的措施，表現在以下幾個方面： (_)提局婦女知識 中國農民居住在鄉村裡，整日忙於生產工作，加上對外連絡以及接觸外間新事物 的機會本就不多，更遑論接受教育。根據統計，中國在1930年代男文盲為49.2% ,女 文盲則高達92% ,這是因為中國婦女受重男輕女傳統思想的遺毒’無法和男子一樣享 有均等的就學機會，因此年長失學的婦女較年長失學的男子要多。8能夠接受教育者真 如鳳毛麟角。 農村服務區的工作對於教育本就十分重視，除正常之小學教育外，更設有各種成 人和兒童班級，教育失學民眾。各區大都設有婦女識字班，授課內容大約包括國語、 衛生、習字、常識、唱歌、活動等。9有時這類課程並未專門開班講授，而是透過其它 類型的訓練班一併介紹。如第二區（南城堯村）為推廣婦女手工職業，設立了婦女縫 紉織襪訓練班，課程除縫紉織襪外，另有國語、珠算、公民、衛生、救護等。1°為了 配合全民抗戰，課程內容有時會加上政治常識、防毒常識、防空常識、戰時生產、戰 時常識等。" 6以上簡介，參見張力，〈江西農村服務事業（1934-1945 ) > ,《抗戰建國史研討會論文集， 1937-1945》(台北：中央研究院近代史研究所，1985年12月），頁1035-1036。 7〈江西農村服務區工作報告〉（1937年4月份），實業部檔案（中央研究院近代史研究所檔案 館藏)’ 17-21 : 35-(5)„ 3黃裳，《文盲研究》（廣州：廣東民眾教育館，1935年4月），頁31-2。 9段九青，〈十個月的婦女工作〉，《農村服務通訊》，第30期（1940年12月），頁31-2。 '°《農村服務通訊》，期32 ( 1941年6月），頁23。 "〈江西農村服務區工作報告〉（1938年3月份）' 經濟部檔案（中央研究院近代史研究所檔 案館藏),18-21 : 103-(1)。 鄉村建設運動中的婦女啟蒙：江西農村服務區的個案研究（Enlightening Women in Chinese Rural...) 67 婦女識字班所招收的失學婦女，通常是完全不識字。江西有些偏僻的村莊，過去從 未辦過學校，也沒有私塾。因此農民對於讀書，感到十分稀奇，也有些害怕。所以識字 班在招生之前，必須先作宣傳和訪問工作，不僅反覆說明識字班的意義，並解釋所有書 籍和文具一概由服務區供給，且在開學前一星期，由服務區工作人員會同村莊保長實行 按戶調查登記，再逐家勸導入學。總之為了勸使婦女入學，必須不斷宣傳，甚至給予少 量的物品誘因，方能達到目的。授課期間約為一至二個月，每日約二小時。12 另一種提出知識增進見聞的方法是出門旅遊。農民通常久居鄉村，鮮有機會出外旅遊 。各服務區遂組織男女觀光團，赴鄰近之縣城，甚至省城旅遊。觀光團之性質並非走 馬看花、觀賞風景,而是有特定的參觀訪問對象，如第一區（景德鎮里村,1935年 10月設立，原第一區臨川縣上頓渡章舍村結束）所辦之景德鎮觀光團，就安排參觀陶 業試驗所，及一些機關。13 (二）加強婦嬰衛生 中國農民謹守數千年來的生活方式，若依現代衛生標準來看，顯然不合於要求。 因此服務區工作人員不僅透過各種訓練班灌輸衛生知識，另進行水井、廁所的改良， 並有少數受過新式醫學訓練的醫護人員，為農民診治疾疫或注射疫苗。 中國農民謹守數千年來的生活方式，若依現代衛生標準來看，顯然不合於要求。因此 服務區工作人員不僅透過各種訓練班灌輸衛生知識，另進行水井、廁所的改良，並有 少數受過新式醫學訓練的醫護人員，為農民診治疾疫或注射疫苗。 農村婦女在參加識字班或各種訓練班時，通常都有機會接觸衛生課程。不過服務 區工作人員最重視者，厥為產婦懷孕期間和生產過程中相關衛生事宜，以及產後對母 親與嬰兒的照料。M江西農村地區的孕婦生產，_般是由其母親或婆婆照料，再請_位 有過多次生育經驗的年長婦女負責接生。這種舊式接生婆往往只使用一些簡單工具， 如剪刀、繩索和_些破布，而其接生代價通常只是_隻雞和幾個雞蛋。u由於產婦和接 生婆都缺乏現代衛生觀念，故在生產時容易引發傳統病，危及產婦和嬰兒的性命。 服務區的婦嬰衛生工作，大致從兩方面著手，一是對農村之中的舊式接生婆施予 訓練，以七到十天，每天兩小時的課程，傳授這些接生婆實用的新知，包括各種衛生 知識和簡單治療法。結訓之後，服務區發給每位接生婆一個裝有必要工具和藥品的接 生箱及保健箱，這對產婦的安全助益甚大。後來又供應紗布及綑紮新生嬰兒臍帶的消 毒線，以減少初生嬰兒的疾疫感染，甚至死亡。U5 第二種方法，就是由服務區主動派遣受過接生訓練的女性醫護人員挨家挨戶宣導 ,進而協助產婦接生。首先是家庭拜訪，以便瞭解孕婦的情況和其住家的環境；然後 個別勸導，回答問題。此外還需對產婦進行產前檢查、接生嬰兒、產後檢查。R '繆達聰，〈婦女識字班在洋溪口〉，《農村服務通訊》，期38 ( 1943年3月），頁21-22。 °〈江西農村服務區工作報告〉（1937年4月份），實業部檔案，17-21 : 35-(5)。 14 New Life Centers in Rural Kiangsi ( Nanchang: National Economic Council, 1936 ), p. 4. '5 Ibid., p.13.〈江西農村服務區工作報告〉（1937年3月份），實業部檔案，17-21 : 35-(5)。 16 Chang Fu-liang, When East Met West: A Personal Story of Rural Reconstruction in China (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972 )，p. 59. '7〈江西農村服務區工作報告〉（1940年2月份），實業部檔案，18-21 : 104-(3)。 68 張力（Li Chang ) 接生工作之外，如何照料初生嬰兒也不容忽視。第七區（瑞金胡嶺背）工作人員 就曾在下鄉工作時，發現嬰兒幼童「_個個都是面黃肌瘦，腹大肢細，污穢不堪言狀 的種種病態......考其原因，皆由一般婦女知識未開，固守舊習，每見兒哭，則以乳或 其他不易消化的食物哺之，甚至嬰兒生後三天，即餵以硬飯及辣子、芋頭等。」對此 問題，工作人員除依各地實際情形，印發育嬰須知傳單，並親自登門講解。18又就各 地之物產，選擇可用者製成嬰兒食物，另教導婦女縫製嬰兒衣服。19 (三）改善婦女工作條件 清末民初時期農村經濟的破產，使得農民生活方瀕臨絕境。農業改良是改善農民生 活的直接有效辦法，各服務區對此也十分重視。此外創造及改進農村副業，也有助於 提高農民所得。 江西農村地區的婦女，平日工作雖以家務事為主，但在農忙時間，仍須參加田間工 作。此時婦女或背負幼兒下田，或交由年紀稍大的孩童在家照料，因此兒女的保育就 受到很大的影響，農村服務區遂在各村設立短期的農忙托兒所。以戰時第六區（雩都 潭頭墟）為例，當地春季插秧時，婦女大多在家燒茶弄飯，可以照顧家中嬰兒，此段 期間入所者以幼童居多。到秋季收割時，婦女就得下田工作，五歲以上的幼童也要幫 忙看守曬穀場，這時入所者以嬰兒居多。農忙托兒所並不收費，但酌收食米，作為保 姆伙食。春耕時托兒時間約20天，秋收時托兒時間約30天。每期結束後舉行母親會， 展覽簡單的嬰兒衣物，並藉此交換育養心得。2°其他農村服務區的農忙托兒所情形大致 相同。 除協助解決農忙時期的婦女照顧幼兒問題，農村服務區也透過各種生計訓練，灌 輸新式農業知識和技術，以達到農業推廣的目的。舉凡家禽家畜的飼養、園藝的植作 、農產的儲藏，都是婦女平日在家需要處理者，因此服務區工作人員特別加強這方面 的新知介紹。2' 紡紗織布是中國農村裡最典型的家庭副業，雖然中國傳統的紡織工業遭遇到洋布 輸入的挑戰，發展陷於停滯，但在農村裡所織布匹主要為自用，甚少在市場出售。因 此織布方式的改良也許並無太大的經濟效益，但在農村婦女也有些許幫助。江西境內 大多數農戶都有一台或多台以手操作的織布機（每台價值5元）每日可織14吋寬56呎 長的布匹。服務區工作人員引進一種以腳操作的半自動織布機,每日可織寬32吋長 60呎的布匹。每一服務區放置若干台這類織布機，首先用於訓練農村婦女如何操作， 頗引起各區婦女興趣。經過數日訓練，婦女可織較多布匹，其額外收入也從過去的每 月2至3元，提高到8至10元，幾乎和田間工作所得相等。22 織布之外，服務區人員亦教導婦女縫製衣服。長久以來，江西農村婦女從來不自 行縫製衣服，通常是請一位裁縫，供其食宿，每0並付給兩角五分，請其縫製衣服， m萬宇影，〈育嬰工作的具體方法〉，《農村服務通訊》，期32 ( 1941年6月）,頁16-7, IJ New Life Centers in Rural Kiangsi, p. 4. 萬志良，〈江西第六農村服務區奉辦農忙托兒所報告〉，《農村服務通訊》，期33 (1941 年 8月),頁20-1。 21魏錦章，〈戰時的農業推廣〉，《農村服務通訊》，期30 ( 1940年12月），頁15。 2"Chang Fu-liang, When East Met West, p. 54. 鄉村建設運動中的婦女啟蒙：江西農村服務區的個案研究（Enlightening Women in Chinese Rural...) 69 這筆費用對農民來說是不小的負擔。因此服務區開設縫紉訓練班，教導婦女縫衣織 襪，使其能節省不必要的花費。 農村服務區所在地一項重要的經濟作物集苧？，昔日由苧？製成的夏布佔江西省出 口大宗，其後因不敵進口洋布，而漸告式微。農管處對改良夏布頗感興趣，希望能使 這種傳統經濟作物重獲生機。中日戰爭以前，第九區（上饒沙溪鎮）就曾挑選當地婦 女，指導績製標準新紗，作為改良夏布的基礎，進而推廣至農家之中，協助農民利用 此種手工業增加收入。23中日戰爭爆發後，農管處對改良夏布更加大力提倡，藉以救 濟難民，以致到了戰爭後期，農管處改組成為改良苧？生產的專責機構。 四、農村婦女的反應 鄉村建設運動通常具有崇高的理想，希望透過工作人員的熱忱，逐步改善農民的 生活。但在一向過慣傳統生活方式的農民看來，不論是外來鄉建人員的闖入，或是他 們所帶來的新知，或多或少對鄉村民眾造成一種衝撃。農村服務區的工作人員就感 覺到，農村民眾對於鄉建工作不明究理，通常需要經過「不理」、「懷疑」、「試驗 」、「接受」四個階段，方能稍見成效。24 農村服務區針對婦女所提供的服務，同樣也得到類似的反應。對於各區舉辦的識 字班，農村婦女認為自己侷促於家庭山野之間，並無識字之必要，而且認字也是一樁 苦差事，遂多方設法逃避。25部份有心向學的婦女往往又受到婆婆或丈夫的限制，無 法出來唸書。另外家庭之中的繁重工作或副業，也造成婦女不能專心讀書。26這些都 是婦女識字班進行時所遭遇的困難。 婦嬰衛生涉及現代醫藥觀念，婦女由於知識不足，對此最感懷疑；但有具體成效 後，又最易獲得婦女信賴。一般而言，農民基於傳統迷信，有病時寧願求菩薩保佑， 也不願接觸現代醫藥。27關於婦女生產之事，農村之中本有一套習慣成自然的方法， 所謂產前檢查、科學接生方法、產後檢查，對農村婦女來說，並無多大意義，因此工 作人員雖苦口婆心宣傳，卻收效甚微。23有些婦女甚至認為服務區所派遣的助產士年 紀輕輕，本身並無生育經驗，如何能夠指導別人生產。直到有些孕婦難產，醫護人員 聞訊趕去，處理得當，終於挽救了產婦的性命，方使部分農村婦女信服，譽之為「活 菩薩」，此後求診者日漸增多。29不過各區情況不一，有些婦女對新式衛生觀念仍極 端排斥；到了戰爭中期，第二區（南城堯村）和第七區（瑞金胡嶺背）仍反應了當地 婦嬰衛生不易推行。3° 23〈江西農村服務區工作報告〉（1937年4月份），實業部檔案，17-21 : 35-(5)。 24〈江西農村服務區工作報告〉（1940年8月份），農林部檔案（中央研究院近代史研究所檔 案館藏),20-47 : 14-(1)。 25〈江西農村服務區工作報告〉（1941年4月份），農林部檔案，20-47 : 13-(5)。 26傳達聰，〈婦女識字班在洋溪口〉，頁22。 27〈江西農村服務區工作報告〉（1941年4月份）.農林部檔案，20-47 : 14-(1)。 28〈江西農村服務區工作報告〉（1940年2月份），經濟部檔案，18-21 : 104-(3)。 Chang Fu-liang, When China Met West, pp. 58-9. 30〈江西農村服務區工作報告〉（1942年1月份），農林部檔案，20-47 : 20-(1)„ 70 張力(Li Chang ) 農忙托兒所的開辦，初時也未獲農民重視。服務區在進行調查時，民眾大都懷疑 天下怎會有如此善心人士，願意代為照管孩童，因而暫不登記。等到觀察托兒所之籌 備後，始稍具信心。迨至工作人員不斷勸說，並展示托兒所內設備和玩具後，始獲母 親首肯,願意送孩童入所。31 農村副業之改良訓練，比較受到婦女歡迎。可能是因為婦女原已熟悉這些工作， 而且經過訓練後，懂得使用新機器，對其副業生產裨益甚大，且能增加收入。32中日 戰爭爆發後，婦女投入手工生產機會更多，因此這類訓練班也廣受歡迎。 五、結語 江西農村服務區在從事鄉村建設工作時，除提供以上與婦女直接有關的服務外，也 曾略微注意到婦女實質地位的提高。有一位劉姓服務區幹事應邀參加當地劉氏宗親的 春季祭祖大典，並擔任主祭。他遂趁此機會指出祖先之中至少有一半為女性，因此婦 女亦應與祭，打破了一向由男子獨立的局面。33然類此事例的記載絕無僅有，顯然婦女 仍不能獲得全面提升。 同一時期中國其它地方的鄉村建設運動，又有何種婦女工作，下表可以得一梗概： 鄉村建設中的婦女工作 鄉建組織 婦女工 作內容 河北定縣平教會 成立「主婦會」、「閨女會」等組織，透過這種集會，傳播文藝、 生計、衛生、公民四種教育。34 河北清河鎮社會實 女子手工班：教育12至25歲的不識字女子，使其能取得相當知識 驗區 和生產技能，以增加收入。課程包括手工、讀書及常識三種。 母親會：請幼稚園和女子手工班學生之母親來開會，初時僅邀其 觀看學生成績，並說明各種婦女及兒童工作，以後又增加嬰兒衛 生及家庭常識演講。 家政訓練班：與婦女研究縫紉，尤其是兒童衣服、食物選擇、 烹飪、家庭布置，以及簡單的美術。35 山東歷城龍山鎮農 設有婦女家政股，於其下設：（1)婦女識字班：授以千字文為基本 村服務社 知識。（2)婦女會：有各種關於婦女問題之演講、遊藝， 並有茶話會，以連絡感情。36 "〈江西農村服務區工作報告〉（1940年8月份），農林部檔案，20-47 : 13-(2)。 32〈江西農村服務區工作報告〉（1938年3月份），經濟部檔案，18-21 : 103-(1)。 Chang Fu-liang, When China Met West, pp. 63. 34吳相湘編著，《晏陽初傳-為全球鄉村改造六十年》（台北：時報文化出版公司，1981年8 月初版），頁243。 35鄉村工作討論會編，《鄉村建設實驗》，第一集（上海：中華書局，1934年4月出版），頁82-3, 36鄉村工作討論會編，《鄉村建設實驗》，第一集，頁188。 鄉村建設運動中的婦女啟蒙：江西農村服務區的個案研究（Enlightening Women in Chinese Rural...) 71 鄉建組織 婦女工 作內容 湖南省立農民教育 婦女慎德會：就區中婦女，熱心農教，富於改進向上思想者， 館 連絡組織之。婦女職業班：縫製衣服。37 江蘇武進縣農業 婦女職業訓練班：分成衣、繡花兩部。3S 改進委員會 由上表可以發現，各鄉建組織所進行的婦女工作，和江西農村服務區的婦女服 務工作，雷同之處甚多，也就是著重於婦女傳統角色的加強。即使有機會供其接受 教育，也是為其家庭工作著想。基本上對於提高婦女地位沒有突破性的做法。 鄉建工作是民初部份知識分子救國理想的實現，多多少少為農村地區帶來一絲 生機。然而鄉建工作基礎十分脆弱，在動亂的時代中，發展十分有限，就婦女工作來 說，雖然沒有遠大的抱負，但對農村婦女的的啟蒙，也有些許的促進作用。 Summary The establishment of Rural Welfare Centers in Jiangxi was one of the projects of the League of Nations in reconstructing China's economy in the 1930s. In this project, European experts sent by the League of Nations helped local people in the improvement of the management, education, agriculture, and sanitation of rural areas. This paper focuses on its program of enlightening rural women. I also examine rural women's responses to those activities. 37鄉村工作討論會編，《鄉村建設實驗》，第二集（上海：中華書局，1935年9月出版）， 頁 355-6。 38鄉村工作討論會編，《鄉村建設實驗》，第二集，頁372。 wilja gdaliwicz gielbras MnrpauHH, HMeiouian ncTopHHecKoe 3HaneHHe ajih KnTan h Bcero MHpa B KMTae c Ha4a,ioM XXI BeKa pa3Bepny^HCb MHrpauMOiîHbïe jxBayKCHm, noao6Hb【x KOTopbïM MOBenuiafl mctopha Mnpa emë ïie 3Hajia. 3aH只Toe Hace-nenwe b 及 epeBHHX b 2003 r npeBwcHjro 487,9 mjih. ^eJiOBeK, h jim 65,6% oômefl liHCJieH-HOCTH 3aHflToro naceneHHH CTpaHbi. llo ncAcnëTaM cneunajiHCTOB MwHHCTep-CTBa cejibCKoro xû3flftcTBa KHP, (JjaKTHHCCKHe ii0Tpe6H0CTn oïpacjiH b paóo^eH cwjie He npeBbiuiaîOT 170 mjih. HejiOBeK. ripHMepHO 135 mjih. nejroBeK Ham^H ce6e paôcrry Ha 及epeBeHCKHx „npe^npHflTHHX BOJiocTefi h nocejiKOB，，. 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B pe-3yjibTaTe np0M30ine^ MaccoBbifi HanjibiB KpecTbîiH b ropoaa* B 1956 h 1957 rr, npaBHTentCTBO TpM^c^b】 npMHHMajio nocTaHOBJieHH只 o He^onymcHHH cthxhh-Horo npMTOKa ziepeseHCKHX jKM rejien b ropowa. B nocne,ayK)iHHe roaw nojiHTMKa npaBHTejibCTBa HeoAUOKpaTHO MeHajiacb. B 1964 r. roccoBeT KHP o^oôpM^ peiueHHe MHHHCTepCTBa oGmecTBCHHofi 6e30nacH0CTM KHP o KOHTpojie 3a îiepeMemeHMeM c^ejiaB aKueHT Ha jiByx „CTporwx orpaHMi[eHM只x”. flepBoe m rmx npe^ycMaTpuBajïo (fiaKTHHec- 76 Wilja (>daliwic:z Gielhrds khh 3arrper Ha ropoACKyio nponncKy ccjibCKoro HacejieHua. BTopoe 一 npeceKajio ^BM>KełiHc HacejieHH只 Me>Kay ropOAaMM cTpaiibi. flo cymecTRy, coBOKynHOOTb npHH^Tbix Mep 03E[anajia BBe^eHMe HopM cocjioBHoro oGtMecTBa: hcjiobck c momchtü CBoero po>KzieHHH oGpera;】 Ha bck> ocTaBLuyioca TKmHb npaBa w oó只sûhhocth ropoacKoro hjih cejibCKOro >KMTenfl. KMTaficKoe oômecTBo OKa3anocb pa3ZiejieHHWM Ha abc HepaBHbie nacTH. Cejibc-Koe Hace^eHHe ôbuio orpaHHHeHo b cbohx 3KOHOMHHecKHX, coixMaLibHbix h Kynh-rypHbix tipaBax. HoBbiH noBopoT b iiojiHTHKe npüM30iiJë^ nocjie np0B03rjiaiueHHH b 1992 r. Kypca Ha co3AanHe „counajiHCTHHecKOH pbiHOHHoii skohommkh，，* KpecTb>iHe 6bi-m npH3BaHi?j pa3BHBaTb pbiHOK, npHHHMaa ynacTHe b pacuiHpeHHH HeeejibCKoxo-3JiHCTB€HH0r0 np0H3B0^CTBa Ha 0CH0Be npHHunna „noKHAaTb 3eMJiio, ocTaBaacb b üepeBHe，，. 3ra noJiKTHKa cnocoócTBOBana pocTy KOJinnecTBa „npe^npMflTMR Bojiocrefi m nocë/iKOB，，h 06i>eM0B m npoH3Bo.acTBa. npe,anpHflTHH o6ecneHHJin yBejiMHeHMe 3aHflTocra KpecTLaHCTBa. Pa3BHTHe 3TOH c(J)epb】 He MeHfljro, o^Hano, niaBHoro: oómecTBo ocTaBajiocb paaaejieHHWM HepaBHbie nacTH. BæKHewmMH nopoK cwcTeMbi, kük, HanpM- Mep,nHcajiemë b i994 r. J1hhi>IoryaHb, npoflBJiHJicfl btom，hto npaBa w HHTepe-Cbl KpeCTI>aHCTBa npHHOCUHHCL B HcepTBy HHAyCTpHaJlH3aUHH mpO^OB M pa3-BHTHłO ropO^CKOfi UHBHJTH3aUMH, AnanH3Hpy5i cjio^cHBUiyiocfl CHiyauHto，KHTawcKHe cneunajiHcrbi orMenaioT MHOrOHHCJieHHbie He^OCTaTKH (})aKTHMeCKH nO>KH3HeHHOJi perHCTpaUHH O^HOM nać™ Hapo^a b KanecTBe ropozicKoro HacejieHHA, gpyroft — b Ka^ecTBe oejibCKoro, JIh Xyfi/WHb，HanpHMep, noA^ëpKHBaeT, hto b crpaHe bo3hhkjim 旦Be HepaBHO-npaBHbie coqHajibHbie oôiuhocth. H3BecTHbiłł 3kohomhct h counojiorJly Ctoen, BbicTynHB b KanecTBe 3Kcriepra l^eHTpa npo&neM pa3BHTna npn rocyzxapcTBeHHOM coBere KHR, yKa3aji Ha to, hto b CTpaHe c^o>KM^iiCb o^eHb SojibiiiHe OTJiHHHa KpeCTbHIipaÔOHHX OT rOpQUCKMX paÔOHMX H CJiy>KamHX B 3KOHOMH4eCKOM，nOJlH-THHeCKOM H COUHaJlbHOM OTHOLUeHMflX. Ha OJXHOM npeOTpłWTMH CJ105KMJ1HCŁ» ,^Be CHCTeMbl”. TojibKO b 2001-2004 rr. BbicuiMe opraHbi KI1K h roeyaapCTBa npHHfljiH pm pemeHHH, otkpwbiiimx KpecTbawaM nyTb k CBOÓo/iHOMy noncKy paóoTbi b ro-po-^ax, ycTpaHABiUHX nx ^HCKpHMHHauHio npn ycTpoficTBe Ha pa6oTy, B TpyZXOBblX OTHOUieHHaX. flpaBHTeJTtCTBO C^OpMyJIHpOBaJlO npHHUHn nOJlHTM-km b oTHOuieHMM KpecTb«Hpa6oMnx: „Tpy^jłmwecH TpyAoycTpaHBaiorcfl caM0CT0«TejTbH0, pbiHOK pei yjiHpyeT iaH«T0CTb, npaBHTe^tcrBO cnocoócTByeT TpyaoycTpofiCTBy,\ B KHTaficKoń nenaTH OTMeHaerc», mto hobobbc几eiiK只 ocymecTBJifliOTc只 Heno-cne^oBaTejibHO, HeK0T0pbie Booôme nrHopMpyKxrc只 MecTHbiMu opraHaMH BJiac-tm. npMMepHO b noJTDBHHe npoBHHUMH m ropo^QR CTpaHbi npMcrynujiH k petj)op- MHrpaiJiMS. HMCiomaji HCiopHMecicoe 3iiaHCHHC aha Kmć\s\ m bcciï) wwpa 77 Me CHCTeMbi nponucKH. Bojiee môm b 20 Tbic. iieôojibLUkx ropo^OB pe中opwa np0B04HTC« b nop^AKe 3KcnepHMeHTa. Ilo cueAeHMHM MnuncTepcTBa o6mec-TBetnfofi 6e30nacH0CTH KHP 3Ta pa6ora pacnpocTpaHaeTca łia 130 mjih. MM「pa- HTOB. 50 MJIH. H3 HHX 3aperMCTpHpC)BaHb】B ropQaaX B KaneCTBe BpeM€HHb[X )KHTe;ieH. IIpHHHHki, Bbi3BaBuiHe pa^peuieHue MaccoBott ivinrpauHH HacejieHHH Bo3HHKaK>r Bonpocb]； noMeMy KpecrbHHe Bbiny^caeHbi HCKaTb hctohhhkh jxokojxob BHe eejibCKoro xo3«ftcTBa? 4to noABHmo npaBHTejibCTBo Ha CHflTHe nperpa,a Ha nyro MHrpaqMH KpecTbHH b ropoua hmchho b 2001-2004 rr.? noneivfy OrpaHtmeHHW MHrpaUHH H .aHCKpHMMHaUMOHHbie Mepbl B OTHOUieHHH KpeCTbflH-paôoHHx cHMMałOTCH nocxeneHHo? B MMrpauMH KpecTbHH b 2000-x ro/iax 0Ka3ajiHCb 3aHHTepecoBaHbi o6e CTOpOHbl — KpeCTb只HCTBO H B^aCTH. 3aWHTepeCOBaHHOCTb KpecTbHH nOHflTHa： ohm Hy^uiaiOTCH b yBejiHHeHHH ^oxoaob. PyKOBO^HTejib U,eHTpa npo6jieM pa3BHTHH roccoBeTa KHP BaH IVbHKyfi npe乌CTaBwi oôoômeHHbiii aHaiH3 hx ^oxoaob, 3a ceMb^eT-c 1997 no 2003 rr. -.ayiueBbie ^oxo^bi KpecTbHH CTpaHbi yBejiHHH/iMCb Bcero Ha 695,9 łoaHfl (84/iojui. CLLIA), cocTaBHB okojio 1/5 pocTa JXOXOJIOB ropo)KaH. B cpe^HeM 3a rojx ^oxo^bi roponcaH poc；TH b 2 pa3a 6biCTpee5 MeM y KpecTbHH. Pa3pbTB b jxoxojxax ropo^aH w KpecTbHH HeymiOHHO yBejiHHHBæic只.B 1980-e roAbi hx cooTHOiueHHe cocTaBJi^Jio 1，8:1，b 1990-e ro^bi 一 2，5:1，a b 2003 n 一 3,2:1. ripn 3TOM ropowaHaM rocyaapcTBO BbinnaHMBaeT cyGcH^HH Ha >KHJibe, couHajibHoe o6ecneHeHne, oómecTBeHHyfO MeAnu^Hy；, npocBemeHMe h ^py-rwe Jibro丁i>【. Ec^h yHHTbiBaTb, hto KpecTb«He BbimiaHHBaioT najiorn h HecyT pacxo,abi Ha cpeACTBa np0H3B0.ii.CTBa, to (J)aKTHHecKHH pa3pi>iB b /loxoaax .aocTHraji 5:1 - 6:1. 3a 2000-2003 rr. ^oxo^w 42% KpecTbHHCKHx xo3HÎicTB CHH3MJTHOb. ComacHO MaTepHanaM BbiôopoHHbix o6cjie,aoBaHHH「ocyaapcTBeHHoro CTaTHCTHHecKoro ynpaBJieHH5i (「Cy) KHP okojio 30 mjih. KpecTbHH He peuiMJiM „npo&neMy cbiTOCTM h Teruia”，a npHMepHO 60 mjih. >KMByr b „HecTaÔHJibHbix ycjiOBM^xTenna h cwtoctm”. „CoMManbHoe pa3BHTHe, nnujeT BaH MaHKyfl, ot-CTaJTO OT DKOHOMHHeCKOrO pa3BHTH«, 0C06eHH0 3HaHHTeJlbHO B /JLepeBHe"\ PyKOBOAMTejib cneuHajibHoro opraHa「occoBeTa KHP, oTBeTCTBeHHom 3a jiMKBKaauHło HHUueTbi KpecTbHUCTBaJIio L^aHb’uonojiH只只 aHajiH：i Ban M)HKya, OTMeTMJi, kto HHCJieHHOCTb óe^Horo HacejieHH^ b ^epeBHHx, hc peuiHemero „npo6^feMy cwtocth h Tenjia'\ b 2003 r BuepBbie ronb丨 pec|)opM He coKpaTH- 78 Wilja Gdaliwicz Gielbras jiacb, a yBenHMHJiacb Ha 800 Tbic. nejioBeK1, K 3toh ^acrn >KHTejieH .aepeBHH, HacHHTbiBajomefi 30 nuih. MejroBeK, oh OTHec xcxjafic丁Ba c .ayiueBbiM ro^OBbiM .oioxoAOM MeHee 637 łoaHew (1，74 ioaH只 b c>tkm). „BcA^ioe HacejicHHe c hh3Khmh ^oxc^aMM” b TeneHHe yroro roją coKpaTHJiocb Ha 1，28 mjih. KejioBeK. CpejiHHfi ^yiueBOH nxaoBoft ^oxo^ y hmx ne npeBbiuiaeT 882 loanefi (2,42 loaH^i b cyTKM). JlK) U35iHb b 3TQÎÎ cbh3h otmctm^, hto cooTHOiiieHHe Moicay 637 loaHefi w cpe^-HHW ^yiueBbiM rOAOBbiM ^oxo^om b ce^bCKOM X03»ńCTBe b 1992 r. cocTaBJiflJio 】:2，45，ho b 2003 r. 1:4,12! HHbiMH cjnoBaMH, b KnTae npwxojxmc^ cymecTBeHHo peuiaTb HaMHOro 6o;iee ocTpwe npoójreMW HMineTbi, ne^Ke^H TaKOBafl 4>mkch-pyexcfl Ha MOKAyHapü^HOM ypoBHe. KpecTbflHe BMHyjK.aeHbi HCKaTb m ncno^b3CBaTb ^io6bic b03M0>kh0Cth yjiy4iueHH^ cBoero noJio>KeHH«. FloDTOMy mx CTpeMJieHHe HafiTM 3apa6oTOK b ropo^ax coBepuieHHO ecTecrBeHHO* Ban IVbHKyfi no^wepKHBaer, hto aoxoa^j OT Hece^bCK0X035lfiCTBeHH0H ^eHTeJlhHOCTH COCTaBJl穷POT y>Ke 50% AOXO^OB KpeCTbflH，JH3 HHX O^Hy TpeTL (|)OpMMpylOT JXQXOJXhl B (|)OpMe 3apaÔOTHOfl nJiaTbï. 3a cneT 3apa60TH0H njiaTbT o6pa3yerc« 80% npMpocTa jxoxojxob KpecTb^H2. BjiaCTH 0C03HaJIH, HTO 3KOHOMMKa CTpaHbl 3aHHTepeCOBaHa B pOCTe AOXOAOB KpecTb只HCTBa HHKaK He MeHbuie, a, mokót 6biTb, Aa>K€ 6o/ibuie, neM csmm KpecTLHHe. BHyTpeHHHK cnpoc Ha npo^yKumo KHTaflcKofl npoMbiuiJieHHOCTH, onpe^e^aeMbiH noTpeÓHOCTaMM 20% HacejieuM只 MMpa，c o^hoh CTopoHbi, ne co3AaBaji yCTofi^HBbix HMnyjibcoB HapaiuMBaHH只 np0H3B0；iCTBa，a c 只pyrofi —Bbi3biBaji couHanbHyK) Hanpa>KełiH0CTb b o6mecTBe. CraiM HeoÔxo^HMbi Mepbi no pa3BHTHK> BHyTpeHHerO pblHKa. OpHeHTaUHfl HCKJlICHHTCJlbHO Ha npOH3BOA-CTBO TOBapOB Ha 3KCn0pT CTaBMJIO CTpaHy B 3aBHCHMOCTb OT KOHtIOHKTypbl Ha MHpOBOM pbiHKe. BcTyruieHHe b BTO noTpeóoBano ot npaBHTejibCTBa npnH»Twa Mep no nOBLIIIieHHK) KOHKypeHTOCnOCOÔHOCTM KHTaftCKOH 3KOHOMHKH. MwrpauMfl，cnoco6cTBy« BOBJieqeHHK) b npoMbiuiJieHHoe npûH3BOACTBo .aepeeeHCKHX cjioëB HaceJieHWfl, cnocoÔHa cymecTBeHHo coKpaTMTb 3aTpan>r Ha np0H3B0ACTB0 3KcnopTHofi npo.ayKUHii. Ilo AaHHbiM OOH, cpe^HHH 3apnjiaTa b KuTae cocTaBJineT 1/48 raKOBOH b CLUA, 1/30b 只noHHH，1/20 HaTaiSBanc, 1/14 b lOacHofl Kopee, OHa HH>Ke，4eM b MeKCHKe, 丁ypuHH，Ha OujinnnHHax, b Mhahm， HH,aoHe3iiM3. 1 Wo guo jiejue pinkun renkou wenbao xingshi yanjiu (B Hatuew cTpaHe npwxojiHTCfl ceptë3HO peiuaTb npoôjieMu cwtocth h Tenjia ôe^Horo HacejieHHH). - Zhongguo qin-nian bao. 19 Jul. 2004. http://www.china.com.cn/Chiiiese/2004/Jul/613028.1itm 7 Wang Mengkui. Ibidem. ■ Li Lubin. Zhongguo fazhan zengzhang de shijic yiyi (Me>K^yhapoüHbih cmwcji 3K0H0MH4ecK0r0 pocTa KHTa>î). - http : //w ww.drcnet, com. en/vi ew_ncw.asp?ma i n u-nid^205311 drcnetchentectidfgdglidaA023&dn-guoyan_clrc:index l &cnt_id=0 MHrpauHfl, HMCKDUiaM Mcmpn4ecKoe 3HaMeji«e ;m« Khw h kccix> MHpa 7^ ric>3TOMy b nocjieiiHMe rojxbi np0W3B0^CTB0 mhoi hx TOBapoB npeAnpwim-MaTejiH pa3Hbix CTpaH Hanajin nepeBcwm> b KHTaR. AHanH3 cneuHanncTOB h 3KcnepT0B U[eHTpa npoGjieM pa^BUTHfl roccoBeTa KHP n03 boji un ncxaTBepziHTb Bbieo^bi, nojiyneHHbre /ipyrMMH KHTaficKHMM cneuMaiiHcraMM, o tom, hto aoxqüw Kpecri^ił o丁 3aH«TO« cejibCKHM xo3hmctbom KpaîiHe HH3KH* 00/151 paÔOTHHKOB B JieCOBO/ICTBe,水HBOTHOBODlCTBe， pwÔOHOBCTBe, COCTaBJl^eT 50% OÔUiefi MHCHeHHOCTM JTHU, 3aH只丁bix B HapO^iHOM xo3flMCTBe, RTiM 62,3% HacejieHHA CTpaHbi, ho 73,2% HacejicHk», HMeiomeio ,,cej7bCKoxo3flHCTBeHHyK) nponwcKy”4. B 2003 r. b cejibCKOM xo3flMCTBe c03^aH0 He ôojiee 15,2% BBIT. npMMepHO 27% cejibCKoro HacejieHMH paôoTaer Ha „npe^npn^TMHX bohoctch m nocejiKûB^. B pe3yni»TaTe b c丁paHe c^o>KHJiaci>, no BbipaHceHHKD BaH M3HKya, „.aByxcjioHHaa ropo^cicaH m cejibCKaa 3K0H0MHKa?\ xapaKTepHas cocymecTBOBa-HMeM OTCTanbix OTpacjiefi Tpa^HunoHHoro cejibCKoro X035ïRcTBa w nepe^oebix OTpaCJieH COBpeMeHHOM 3K0H0MHKH. „/^ByxCJlOMHa^ 3KOHOMHKa，，HBHJiaCb, C TOMKU 3peHHH BaH M3HKya, „HeH3-6e>KHOH nepexoj^HOH 中opMoft”. B ycjiOBMax ocymecTBjieHMn „ho^htmkh CTpo-roro OT^ejieHMfl ropowa OTjepeBHH，，OHa npuBe.aa k cneun^HHeOKHM counajib-HbiM nocneACTBMAM h OTCTaBaHHK>yp6aiiH3auHH ot HHAycTpHajiH3auHM. Tenepb npe^CTOHT HaHTH nyTH 及im Toro，4To6b[ „Majibie npe^npnflTOfl b AepeBHe^ OpraHHMHO BJIHJIHCb B npOUeCC HH/iyCTptiaJIH3aUHH M MO^epHH3aUMH CTpaHbL 3tm npe^npüHTHH cTaHyT npeo6pa30BbiBaTb nocejiKM b „Majibie ropc^KH，，, o6pa3y»omHe „3KOHOMHMecKHH ueHTp^ yp6aHH3anwn n npeBpamaiomKe cejibc-Koe HacejieHue b necejibCK0X03«HCTBeHH0e. B xo^eTaKon yp6aHH3aunH „KHTan-CKoro THna，，npoH3ofi/ieT „caMoe Ba>KHoe，，_yBejipiHMTc只 Kecejii>CK0-x035iHCTBeH-Haa 3aHHTOcxi> CejibCKoro HacejreHH». 4 Chen Xiwen. Cheng xi an chaju biaoming Zhongguo jingji cangqi cunzai juda zengjia kongjian (Pa3pWB Me^y ropo^oM h .aepeBHeH noKa3t>maex，hto KMTaficEcaa 3KOHOMMtca AriHTenbHOe BpeMH cymecTByeT b orpoMHOM paciuMp^EOmMMCH BaKyyMe). 24 Mar. 2003. http://drcnet.com.cn/html_document/guoyan/gybd/2003-03-24/167131 drcnetchentechd-fgdhdaA023.asp 5 Chen Xiwen. Dangqian Zhongguo de „san nong wenti” yu chulu (，，3 arpapHbix npoô/ieMb】，， coBpeMeHHoro KwTafl h hx pemeHHe). 11 Nov. 2002. http://drcnet.com.cn/New_Product/ expert/showdoc.asp?doc_id= 139477 Flo ÆaHHUM KOMHCCHÏ4 IlOCTOflHHOrO KOMHTÇTa BceKHTaHCKOrO COÔpaHMH HapOAHblX npeaoTaBHTejieîi, b CejibCKOM xo3»HCTBe b tom >Ke 2003 r. 6buio coi^aHo 14,8% BBn. Cm.: Guanyujinrong zhi nong wenti dediaoyanbaogao(Hccjie^oBaTejibCKHH ziOKnaa iio BonpocaM 4>HHaHCOBOH noAA^p/KKH CejibCKoro xo3flwciBa ). 25 June 2004. http://www/ china.cotn.cn/chinese/2004/Jun/594570.htm Wiljiî Gdüliwicz Gielbriïs „Majibie ropowa，，h MHrpaunsi BHyTpw npoBHHuitH B 2002 r. Ha，，npe及npHHTH^ix bojioctch h nocëJiKOB” paôoiajio iiohtm 133 MJIH. 4eJ1ÛBeK? B TOM HHCJie OKOilO 77 MilH. B npOMblUJ^eHHOCTH H 39,5 MJ1H. 一 b c(J>epe ycjiyr; O^HUHajrtno na hhx ôbuio npoM3BeAeno 31,6% BBI16, ho He coBceM hcho, KaKHM o6pa3üM npOM3BeAGH 3TOT no^cHeT. /J,aHHbie na cew cnëT b KHTancKOM ne^aTH npHBO^TC^ pa3Hbic. H3Hb CnB3Hb, 3aMecTHTejii> pyKOBO^HTejifl UeHTpa, yôeac^eH： „npeAnpwflTM» BOJlOCTeS M nOCëjlKOB” He MOryT C^>OKHTb MOHeJlbłO HeceJIbCK0X03HHCTBeHH0fi ^e^TejibHOCTH b 公epeBHe7. Oh npnme/i k 3aKJiłOMeHHK> o ue;iecoo6pa3hocth CKOpewmeM jiKKBM^auHM nojiHTHHecKOro OTflejieHMH ropowa ot /icpeBHH, pa3paÔOTKH eAHHOH KOHUenUHH HX 3KOHOMHHeCKOrO H COUHaJIbHOrO pa3BMTM«8. XaHb Ii,K)aHb, cneuwajiMCT U,eHTpa, nOAA^p>KHBaa 3Ty TOHKy 3penKH, roBopMT O Heoôxo只HMOCTM yTO^HHTb CTpaTeTHK) pa3BHTMa5 npe^yCMÜTpHBaa C03^aHMe e^HHOH npoMbiuiJieHHofi CMCTCMb] ropowa h jiepeBHH, 06pa30Banne e^MHoro pbiHKa Tpyaa. CymecxBOBaHHe b ^epeene ?1BTOpOH npoMbiuuieHHofi cwcTeMw，， uejiec006pa3H0 TOjibKO b paMKax neTKoro pa3^ejieHMa Tpyna9. He ocnapHBaa cooôpa^KeHH只 M3Hï> Chb3H穷，XaHb U,ioaHfl v\ .apyrwx cneuwa-J1MCTOB，Ha只O OTMeTMTb，HTO Ha 几OJ1IO 10 HaHÔOJiee 3KOHOMHHeCKH pa3BHTLIX npoBHHUHH h ropo/ioB, HrpaK)mnx Be^ymyio pojib bo BHe山 Hefl 丁oproBJie， npHxOAHTCn 54% ecex „npeAnpHATHiî Bojiocrefi h nocëiiKOB，，CTpaHbi, rae 3aH«-To 6onee 62% o6mefi qHCJîeHHOCTH pa60THHK0B 3tmx npcixnpmjm. Ha hhx b 2003 r. co：i；iaHo CBbiuie 76% /io6aBJieHHoft ctohmoctm Bcex „npc^npH^THH BOJTOCTeH h nocëJiKOB，，CTpaHbi10. ri03T0My npo6neMa Ha caMOM ^ejie hocmt ôojiee cjiOMCHbiH xapaKTep，oôycnoBJieHHbiH cneun^MKofl pa3BHTM« 3kohomhkh oxaejii>Hb【x hpobmhuhh CTpaHbi. ^ Zhongguotongjl zhaiyao, 2003 (KpaTKHM CTaTHCTM4ecKnfi cnpaBOHHHK KHTa«) (China statistical abstract). - Beijing: Zhongguo tungji chubanshe. -E 16, 124. 7 Chen Xjwen. Quanmian jianshe xiaokang shehui guanjian zai nongcun (BcecTopoHHe C03AaBaxb b üepeBHe Hanana oômecrBa cpe^Hero AOCTaTKa). 3 Dec. 2002. http://drc-net,com.cn/New_Product/expert/showdoc.asp?doc_id= 145245 8 Chen Xiwen. Cheng xiang tongchoujiejue san nong wenti (ropon v\ üepeBHa rrpn enHHOM njiaHwpoBaHHH pemaioT Tpn npoÔJieMbr ce^bCKoro X03flHCTBa). 26 Dec. 2002. http:// www.drcnet.comxn/New_Product/expert/showdoc.asp?doc_id=丨 50993 9 Han Quan. Jiejue „san nong，、wenti de zhongda zhanlue - longchou cheng xian jingji shehui fazhan (Ba>KHaH CTpaierna pemeHwa，，Tpex npo6neM cejibCKoro xo3awcTBa，，-KOOpüHHaLiHH couHajibHO-^KOHOMHHccKoro pa3BHTHfl ropojia m xiepeBHH). 24 Feb. 2003. h ttp://www. drcn et. coriLcn/New_ Product/e xpert/showdo c .a sp?doc」d二 190251 10 2003 nlan Zhongguo nongye fazhan baogao (floKJiafl o pa3BM丁hh ce^bCKoro xo3HMCTBa b 2003 ro^y). http://www.agri .gov/cn/sj zl/2003/275, htm MmpauH兄 HMeK)uia« nci\ipnHccKw ^FraneiiHC üjih Kmas h Bccro MHpa «1 Cyübôw，，npeimpM»TMH BOJiocTeH h iiocejiKOB，，bo mhofom cb习3aHi>】 c KpynHbiM KOMnjieKCOM npoSjieM, oTHocfliiinxcfl, KaK 「OBOp«T b KHTae, k ,,3KOHOMHKe ye3zioB，，. K hx petueHHK) npaBHTejibCTBo no cymecTBy tojiłko npwcTynHjio w emë ocTaeTca HCMajio BonpocoB，Tpe6yK>mnx o6cTo«TeJibHoro paccMOTpeHM5i m pemeHHH. IlHTaa nepenncb HacejieHH» KHP, npoxo^HBinayi b 2000 r.，n03B0Jin^a Bï>[^Bim> HeKOTOpbie tch只eHUMM b MwrpaqHH naceneHHH. CouHOJiorJlw FIoyjiHHb npoKOMMeHTHpoBaji ^aHHbie nepenwcn: BHe MecT nponwCKM npo>KMBajio okosio 144,4 m,ih. HfejiOBeK. 65% m3 121 mjih. MwrpaHTOB nauuiH paôory b npe^ejiax npoBHHUHH nponHCKH h 35% hjih 6ojiee 40 mjih. nejioBeK HCKaJiH eë b ixpymx npOBWHUMfllX. DiaBHblMH npOBHHUHflMH HCXO^a flBM.lHCb CblHyaHL, AHbXyM, XyHaHb, Ul^flHCH, X3HaHb, XyHaHb. FnaBHbiMM nyHKTaMH npuTOKa CTajiw Vy^HjxyH (35,5%), Mmou3ah7 UJaHxaft，L^aHcy，IleKHH, Oyu3只Hb，to ecTb HaHÔojiee 6biCTpo pa3BHBaK>mnec5i ropowa h npoBMHUHH11. CpeoM ôo^ee 40 mjih. MHrpaHTOB 52,8% COCTaBHJlH MyaCHHHLI. 82,7% M3 HHX npHOJJTOCL Ha ^OJIK) J1HU ot 16 Ao 45 ;ie丁，to ecTb jrio^en Monoaoro h 3pejioro B03pacTa12. nepenncb HacejieHHH n03B0Jinna ycTaHOBKTb, 4to b KâHyH jiH6epajiH3anHM MHrpauHH b 2001-2003 rr 6ojiee 29% nacejieHHa y水e npo>KMBajio BHe MecT nocTOAHHofi nponHCKH. IlpuMenaTe^bHO, hto HaHÔojibiuafl no^BH^CHOCTb Hace/ieHM只 ôbijia xapaKTepHa ajia ropo^can, CiieziOBaTejibHO, ynce k 2000 r. mho-rne orpaHHHeHH5ï nepe^BH>KeHHH Hace«rieHMfl 0Ka3anHCb HecoBMecTHMLiMM c noTpe6HocT5iMH ero noBceAHeBHon 5KH3HM. C tohkh 3peHHH nepcneicrMB MMrpauHM，eë couMajibHoro 3naqeHH«，Ba)KHO OTBeTHTb KaK MMHHMyM Ha TpM BOnpOCa. nepBblH： He 5BJλeTCJl JIH MMrpai^Ma B npe_aejiax coceAHHX ^epeBeHb, ^a^ce ye3Aa Bcero jihlul BpeMeHHbiM HBJieHHeM, nopoîicaeHHWM nepexo^HbiM nepno^oM, HeoôxoOTMtiM jxji^ coaaaHM» „Mauibix ropOAOB,?? BTOpOH； CKDJlb BeJFHKO MeCTHblXyCJIOBMM Ha MHrpaUHOHHblH npouecc h yp6aHH3auHio ^epeBHH? HaKOHeq, mo>kho jih CHHTaTb MHrpaunefi nepe.ziBH>KeHHe HacejieHH^ Mt^y ztepeBH^MH? C tomkm 3peHM« oÔHTaTe^efl MHornx cTpan TaKaa MOÔHJibHOCTb He HBJiaercH MHrpauHen, OcoôeHHOCTb KnTaa 3aKiiK>4aeTC5î b tom, hto na npoT只水chhh MHornx AecflTHJieTMM Riom 6lijih npMKpenjieHw chctcmoh nponHCKH k 3eMJie, k onpe- 11 U Poulin, Danqian Zhongguo shehui fazhan de wenti yu xin qushi (npoÔJieMbi m HOBwe TeH^enuMM b couHajibHOM pa3BHTHH coBpeMeHHoro KwTa只）http://china.com.cn/chine-se/zhanti/250902.htm in Blue book of Chinese society. Shehui lanpishu. 2002-2003: Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce (Chhji^ Knura o KHTancKOM o6uiecTBe. AHajiH3 h nporH03 couwajibHOH CHTyauMM b KwTae, 2002-2003), Beijing, Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe,2003. http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/zbanti/250522.htni 12 Ibidem. 82 Wiljd Gdiliwicz Ciclbrns «aejieHHOMy nyHKTy 5KHTejibCTBa. HecKOJibKO noKOJieuHH 6mjih npMHy^eHti >KHTb B T04H0M COOTBeTCTBHH C yCTaïlOB^eHHblM n0p51AK0M. Hm Tpe60BajlMCb pa3peiueHM« BjiacTen ,aa>Ke AJifl BpeMeHHOlO npeôbiBaHHJi b npyrHX MecTax. riosTOMy y>Ke cpaBHHTeiibHo KopoTKne nepe.aiBH>KeHH>i npHxû^HTCfl Ha^bïBaTb B 3TOH CTpâHe MHrpaMnew. Eme 6onee Ba>KHO to, hto Hb】He，nepeABHrancb MOKay HaceneHHbiMH nyHK-TaMH, ycTpawBa^cb na necejibCK0X03«ficTBeHHbie paóoTbi, niom ynacTByïOT B (|)OpMMpOBaHHH HOBblX HOpM HOBblX OÔlUeCTBeHHLïX OTHOlUeHHH, npO- ł(H3aHHwx MHorHMM 3JieMeHTaMM ropo^cKoro w AepcBeHCKoro ymia^OB. „flpe^-npHflTHa BonocTefl m nocë/iKcm，，h po^aiomwecji „Majibie ropoAa，，chmbojih3H-pyiOT CTaHOBJieHHe HOBoro KanecTBa /KH3HH - CBoSo^y Bbióopa Mecia pa6oTbi w MecTa >KnrejTbCTBa, CBoSo/iy nepe^BH>KeHHfl, Mchhiotch KopeHHbie ycjiOBM»，xa-paKTepH3yK>mHe KanecTBo ^kh3hh HacejieHMH. ri03T0My momcho b^bhhom c/iynae roBopHTb o MHrpauHH. 3to npocTpancTBeHHO 0rpâHM4eHHa« MHrpauHs ho bcc Me MMrpauMH. OHa aBü只eTca npoueccoM npeo-6pa3yK)iUMM KuTafi， CnpaiUMBaeTCfl, KaK ôy^yT co^aBaTbc» „Majibie ropo^a^? OTBeTa Ha 3TOT Bonpoc noKa Her AOCTaTonHoro 3MnnpnHecKoro MaTepnajia. C oahom cto-pOHbl，HÊT nOJTHOH HH^OpMaUHM O TOM, KaK Ôy^ÊT peiliaTbCH KOMHJieKC npo&neM „3KOHOMHKH ye3^0BM. C ^pyrofi CTopoubi - HeMario HejiCHOCTefi b MH(J)opMauHH 06 3KOHOMHKe „npe^npHflTHfi BOJTOCTCH h nocëüKOB，，. Hanpwwep，b 1995 r cyMMa BbiruraHeHHWX hmh HajioroB cocTaBHJia noHTH 35% hx eajiOBOH npn6biiiH, b 2000 r. - okojio 31%, a » 2002-2003 rr. - 36-37%! 3a Te 汛e row aojtw npn6burn b AûxoAax npeAnpwHTMH ot x03«HCTBeHH0k Ae^rejibHocTH coKparajiacb c 6,45% b 1995「, AO 5,84% b 2003 r" CyMMa HeB03BpameHHbix Ha KOHeu ro^a 6aH-kobckhx KpeziMTOB Ha npOTH^eHHH ^o^roro paaa Jier npeBbiuiajia cyMMy hx rouoBofi npHÓbuiH. JlMiub b 2002 r cyMMa npwQum HecKOJibKO npeBwcujia o&bëM HeB03BpameHHbIX Kpe^MTOB. „npeOTptWTOJI BOilOCTefl w nOCë/IKOB” BbiHy^aeHbi e>KeroAHO Bbi,ae^flTb MHJiJiHap^Hbie cpe/icTBa ^jih nooaep光kh CejibCKoro xo3»MCTBa w peuieHH5i couwajibHbix nyyKjx «nepeBHii】4, HaKOHeu，cymecTByeT HeMaJIO COOÔmeHHH O 门JiaMeBHOM (j)MHaHCOBOM COCTOHHHH BOJTOCTHbIX h ye3-jXHbix opraHOB BJiacTH15. CnpauJHBaeTCfl，Ha KaKke cpe_acTBa 6yayT CTpoHTbc只 „Manwe ropowa’，u M0AcpHH3Hp0BaTi>CH npejinpMflTMH? 13 Zhongguo ton^ii nianjian, 2003.- E 449-450; 2003 nian Zhongguo nongye fazhan ba-ogao (^floK/iaa o pa3BHTMH ce^bCKoro xoiaficTBa KuTaw b 2003 r.)* http://www.agri.gov.cn/ sjzl/2003/275.htm H Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 2003.- E 450. 1：s Zhao Shukai. Lishi xing tiaozhan: Zhongguo riongcun dechongtu yu zhili (McTopw^ecKMH BŁI30R： koh<{)jihkt u peuieHHc b nepeBHflx KHTafl) http://china.com.cn/chinese/7huanti/ 2004shxs/483104.htm in Blue book of Chinese society, Shehui lanpishu. 2003-2004: MHipauHH, MMeiomasr hctopmhcckoc 3naHCHHC iui« Khtîw h bccpo MHpa Pa3yMeeTCfl, b ycjiOBHHX cmib KpynHofl CTpaHbi, kskoh HBJiweTC^ ICwTafi, cyiuecTBytOT 3Man mcnbUbK counajT bH0-3K0H0M H4ecKHe h KyjibTypHbie p33nmm Me>Kny OTOejibHMMH perwOHaMH. HanpHMep, Ha K)厂e h lOro-BocToice bç^hko 3HaneHHe KJiaHOB. 3aKOHOMepHO, hto Ha lOre m IOr0-B0CT0Ke Hepe^KH c/iyqan, Koraa nepcoHain „npąanpw只tmS bojioctcm h nocejTKOB,ł CKJia^biBajic» hckjiïohh-TejibHO H3 po^CTBCHHHKDB, HJieHOB OAHOFO KJiaHa. Mmchho b 3TOM perwOHe b 2002 r HacHHTbiBajiocb okojio 30% Bcex „npeOTpwaTHH bojioctch m nocëJiKOB” H nOHTH 35% MX paÔOTHHKOB. BnOUHe B03M0>KH0, 4TO CTaHOBJieHMe „MaJlbïX 10-Poaob" 6y^eT nponcxoAHTi> no及 6onbiJUHM bjihhhmcm KJiaHOB h hx yxopenuB-uiHXca 3a CTOJieTH^ cneuM(})HMecKidx BHy rpM - m MeactcnaHOBbix OTHoiueHHM. npHMe^aTejibHo, hto H3yKeHne b 2003 r, cnpoca na KpecTb«H-pa6oMHX h mx npe/yio>KeHHH cbohx ycjiyr Ha 2783 npe^npHHTH^x 25 KpynHbix h cpe^HMx ropoaOB n03B0JiHJi0 yCTaHOBHTb, hto 42% npe/inpMHTMH HaSpipaiOT HOBbix paGûHMx b po^Hbix BOJiocTJix y>Ke paôoraïoiUHX y hhx kpeCTb«h-pa6onhx16. Murpaunii Meamy npoBHHunsiMH 3a ntpmjx c 1990 no 2003 rr hhcjio noKMHyBiiiHx po^bie npoBKHUMH MMrpaHTOB, KaK rOBOpHTC只 B 6eJ!OH KHHre O 3aHHTOCTH H nOJlMTMice B 3TOM oôJiacTH, yBenHHHJiacb c 15 mjih. ao98 m^h. nejioBeK17.6-KpaTHbiH pocT 中aicni-4ecKH Bcero 3a necKOJibKO JieT, no cyTH, 3a 2000-2003 rr. Becnpeue^eHTHbifi pa3Max! BaH M3HKyîi orwenaeT, hto b HacTonmec BpeM^ b ,aepeBH«x Hao4MTbiBaeTCa npHMepiio 800 mjih. >KHTejiefi. Hx jhojio水eHHe ocTaërcH cjio>KHbiM. HecMOTpa Ha ocTpjbift Aec|)MUHT naniHM, oôpaôaTbiBaeMbie ruioma及h coKpaumaioTCJi. 3a 1987-2001 rr. 6bmo peKBH3Hp0BaH0 ôojiee 24 mjih. My (1,6 MJiH. ra) o6pa6aTbiBaeMbix njioma/iefi. nponcxo^HT TaioKe He3aKOHHL,iH 3axBa丁 oôpaôaTbiBaeMbix 3eMe;ib. Hx jxon^ cocTaBji$îeT 20—30% Bcex yroaHH，b HeKO-Topbix MecTax ^aace 80%. BnouHe B03M0mH0, 4to yTpaTMJiw sewmio He 34 mjth., Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce (Chhîui KHHra o KHTaHCKOM oSmeciBe. AHajiH3 h nporHû3 couHajibHOH cHTyauHH b KHTae, 2003-2004). - Beijing: Shehui kexue we-nxian chubanshe, 2004. http://chitia.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/2004shxs/482018.htm ,i18, CorjracHO pe^yjibTaTaM o6cj，c^oBaHHH rCY KHP ocTaBiunxcfl 6e:$ 2942 KpeCTbHHCKHX X03AHCTB, y 46% ypOBÔHb 浓H3HM CHJH3MJ1CH. B 3TMX X03flHCTBax HacMHTbmaeTCfl 7187 paGoTHHKOB, tojii>ko 2,7% m hhx yaanocb HaHTH mccto pa6oTbi19,只cho，MHrpauHOHHJbifi noTeHUMaji b KHTaBcKOH ^epeBHe HBJifleTCA rpaHAM03Hb]M. MacuiTaôbi MHrpaunH KpecTb^H Me^K/iy npoBHHunjiMH b 2000 r. 6biJiH cpaBHHrejibHO HeôojibiiiMMH - m ] 242,6 mjih. nactncnm TOJibKO 42,4 muh. HejiOBeK hjih 3,4% noKHAanH MecTO iioctoshhoh nponncKM jyia noe3AKH b j^pyrwe npoBHHUMH20. TeM He MeHee, nepenHCb cuy^HT Ba>KHbiM hctohhmkom aHa-aHia, no3BOJia« ycTaHOBHTb CB^3b MHipauHH Hace^eHMH c peajîbHbiMH npo6iieMaMH couHajibHO> 3KOHOMHHeCKOrO HOJIO水6HH只 CTpaHLl M KCTOpHHeCKM CjTOMCHBIII HMMCH ycjioBHAMH mM3HM HacejieHHii. Cpe^M nocjie,aHHx cjieuyeT Ha3BaTb, nanpHMep， cymecTBOBaHHe AwaiieKTOB, pa3HHHHH Me»cay KOTOpbiMH nopoR crojib bcjimkh, hto «aejiafor üohtm HeB03M0>KHbiM noBce^HeBHoe oômeHHe MOKjjy npejicTaBH-TejisiMH pa3Hbix perMOHOB CTpaHw, npeoaojieHHa 3Toro npen只tctbm« npaKTHHecKH c MOMeHTa 06pa30BaHM只 KHTaScKofi HapoAHofi PecnyG^iHKH b CTpaHe 6bijia pa^sepHyTa KaMnaHHH no pacnpocTpaHeHMio e^HHoro 5i3btKa o6me«H5i {nymyuxya). He;ib35i CKü3aTb，iiTopa6crra b 3tom HanpaB/ieHMM npoxo^H-iia 6ecK0H(j)jiHKTH0, ho Bcë >Ke 3a nojiBeKa onpąaeueHHwe pesyjibTa™ y^ajiocb 旦ocTHrHyTb. BjiaroAapJi hm CTajia bo3mo>khoh MHrpauHfl HacejieHHa Meac^y MHOFHMH npOBHHl4M5ÏMH. npoaHajiH3HpoBaTb CMTyauHK) 2000 r. h bwabhtl» bjimhumc ^wajieKTHoro MHOroo6pa3MH Ha MurpauHOHHbiH oÔMeH MOicay npoBHHUH^MH oqeHb Tpy^HO. Ilepenncb npoBOUHJiacb c ynëTOM 3,jxmhhHCTpaTMbhoto cTpaHw， a ziHajieKTbi pac【ip0CTpaHCHbi Ha TeppnTopH只x，He coBna^aiomnx c rpaHHuaMH Tex mjih HHbix npoBHHUHH. IlocKOJibKy HHOTO Merona aHa;iH3a no onyÔJiH-KOBaHHbiM MaTepwajiaM nepenwcH He cymecrByer, nonpoôyeM crpynnKpoBaTb npoBHHUHH c yqëTOM pacnpocTpaHeHHA hçkotoplix Han6ojiee KpynHbix /iHajieKTOB21, ripn 3TOM npwiiiJiocb nofiTH Ha onpe^ejieHHbie ynpomeHHH H H30paTb JXJlfi aHaJ!H3a TOUbKO HaCTb npOBMHUMH，^OÔHBaflCb BbïHB^eHHH HaH6ojiee cymecTBeHHwx TeHzieHUHH, ia Wang Mengkui. Ibidem. 19 Ibidem. 20 Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 2002. - E 98; Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 2003, - E 112. 21 B 0CH0By aHajiH3a nojro>KeHw pe3yntTaTbi nccjie^OBannn: C0({)p0H0B MB.，KuTaHCKHH «3biK h KHTancKoe oÔmecTBo, - MocKBa: DiaBHaa peiiaKUHA bocto^hoh jiHTepaTypbi H3jiaTe/iŁCTBa „Hayna”，1979. - C. 47-51. Ta6jiiiua 1. MHrpauHOHHbie hotokh c vhctom c(}>epbi pacnpoc丁paHeHtia üwajieKTOB Ha3BaHite jiłia.ieKTOB npOBMHumi, ropoja, HaceiiÊHiie Ottok HaceJieHun ripHTOK HacevieHKH Bcero Ąojtii b pemoHe Bcero ■ JXojin b periiOHe (TblC. HeJlOBeK) (B %) (TbIC, HeJlOBeK) (B %) Cfcîiiepiïbm ;iHa_fieKT lleKHH，TflHbU3HHb. ]94966,5 3537,8 5869 3.0 X303ft, JlflOHHH, C enepo^an^iHLi Pi ]Ila!Jl>CH，Ui^HbCH, 98446,9 1785,7 1,8 1513.2 1.5 ünajieKT FaiiHcy, lÏMiiCfl lOi o-3anaaHbm CbinyaHb, EOHbHaHb. 190468,9 9883,6 5,2 2512,3 1.3 jinajicicr fyfiMJKoy BOCTOH HO-aH hAVUCKHH, niaHWl>:H，X )H'd»b, 403389,3 19292,7 4,8 2951J 0.7 jwajieKTM Mc>«c-iypeHi>H ÀHbxyfi, Xv6dh, XyHaHh, 53iiiui>i-XyaH?( >, Chh. U,3flHCH 1 aiib V. Ujhh-4>k：3 LUaHxaK, U,3flHC>； 135381,9 3340,8 2,5 9360.7 6,9 HjK3U3«H XaKKa, Mmib fyanayH, cD\Li3aHb, 163177,4 3682,8 23 17638.1 10,8 fvaHCH Hciohhhk: Zhongguo tun幻i nianjian, 2003. - c 112-115. 86 Wilja Gdaliwicz Gielbras 06pa6oTKa MaTepnajiOB nepenHCH n03B0JiaeT ycTaHOBHTb Henpejio^cHbifl 中 aicr: BbicoKHe TeMnti 3K0H0MHHecK0r0 pocTa npoBHHUHH lOra w K)r0-B0CT0Ka oóecneneHbi He tojibko HauHOHajibHbiMH h np只mwmh HHocTpaHHbiMH HHBec-THUHaMH, HO B HeMaJlOH CTeneHH np^TOKOM AOnOJlHHTejlbHblX paÔOHHX pyK. 3to o6cTO«TejibCTBO ,aoKa3biBaeT Taic^ce, hto BHe^peHHe nymynxya, b cboio one-pe^b, cbirpajio onpe^ejreHHyio pojib b 中opMHpoBaHHH eAHHoro KHTaHCKoro H3WKa. B pacnpocTpaHeHHH nymynxya npeACTOHT c只ejiaTb eme MHoroe, ho, KaK rOBOpHTCH, Jie^ TpOHyjlCfl. npHMenaTeJibHO, hto b perHOHax 3K0H0MHHecK0r0 pocTa MHrpau,™ no npeHMymecTBy npoTeKaeT b C(})epe pacnpocTpaHeHH 只 Toro hjih HHoro AwaneKTa. HanpHMep, b perHOHax ceBepHoro AHajieKTa, Y, a Taicie XaKKa, ICb, Mhhb MHrpauHOHHbie noTOKH MecTHbix ^cHTejiefi no npeHMymecTBy orpaHH-HHBaiOTca npoBHHUHHMH, r^e rocnoACTByioT cooTBeTCTByiomHe AHaneKTbi. B 3THX perHOHax 只a^ce TaKHe KpynHbie npoMbiuiJieHHbie h KyjibTypHbie ueH-Tpti KaK LUaHxaii h ryaH/^yH npHTarHBaiOT, npoK^e Bcero, pa60THHK0B,只 3mkom oómeHra KOTopbix 只 BJiaeTca MecTHbiH AHaneKT. HanpHMep, b IlIaHxaH HanpaBjia-Jiocb noHTH 44% MHrpaHTOB H3 npoBHHUHH U,3HHcy h 21 % - H>K3U3只h. B FyaHnyH nepeópanocb nonro 33% MHrpaHTOB H3 npoBHHOHH Oyi；3HHb h 44% - H3 U3 只 hch. CoKpameHHe nperpąa Ha nyra MHrpauHH KpecTtHH b 2001-2004 rr., Bbi3BanH He npocTO eë pocT, ho TaK^ce Ba^cHbie n3MeHeHH只 b cocTaBe MHrpaHTOB. 3aMecTHTejib npeAce^aTejia rocyqapcTBeHHoro KOMHTeTa no pe4)opMe h pa3-bhthk) BaH HyHbH^c3H OTMeTHJi no只BJieHHe HOBbix nepT b 3tom npoqecce. Bo-nepBtix, noBbiCHjiocb KanecTBO paGonefi chjibi. B 2001 r. cpe_AH cejibCKHx MHrpaHTOB non™ 77% cocTaBjiajiH jiio^h c HenojiHbiM cpeAHHM hjih 6ojiee bmcokhm ypOBHeM 06pa30BaHHH. Bo-Bxopbix, OCHOBHOH nOTOK MHrpaHTOB H3 AepeBHH HanpaBjiHeTca b boctohhwc pafioHbi. B 2002 r. 25% MHrpaHTOB OTnpaBji^jiHCb 3a npeAejibi cbohx npoBHHUHH. Cpe^H hhx 85,7% npHÔbiJiH b BOCTOHHbie npoBHHUHH22. Hhbimh cjiOBaMH, OTMeneHHaa Bbiiue TenaeHi；™ 2000 r. OKa3anacb xapaKTepHofi h jui5i nocjie^yiomHx jieT. B-TpeTbHx, óbiCTpo yBejiHHHBaeTca 3ara-TOCTb MHrpaHTOB b c中epe ycjiyr. B-neTBepTbix, B03pacTaeT bjih只HHe MurpauHH Ha pocT aoxoaob KpecTbflH. B 2002 r. no cpaBHeHHio c 2001 r. HHcrae ro^OBbie AymeBbie ^oxoaw KpecTbHH CTpaHbi yBejiHHHJiHCb 3a cneT paóoTbi BHe CBoero xo3«ficTBa Ha 43 8,2 ioara (53 ^ojui.). 3tot 3apa60T0K noBbicmi jxoxo^bi KpecTbHH CTpaHbi Ha 41,8%23! B-n匁Tbix，MHrpauH只 OKa3ana cepi>e3Hoe B03AeficTBHe Ha AepeBeHCKyio aKOHOMHKy. üocjieAHHH Te3HC BaH HyHbH^c3H He KOMMeHrapoBan. 22 Waichu wu gong nongmin chaoguo 9400 wanren cheng 5 da xin tezheng (Mhcjio KpecTLHH. pa6oTaiomHx b ^pyrnx Mecrax, npeBbiCHjio 94 mjih. BtWBHjiHCb 5 hobbix OTJiHHHTejitHbix HepT). 27 Oct. 2003. http://jjckb.xinhuanet.com/Article.asp?TempNum=41602 23 Ibidem. MHipauHM, HMeK>mafl hctophhcckoc 3HaHCHHC Kwto« h ucen) vmpa H7 Me^KayHapo^Hoe 3Ha4eHHe MHrpauHOHHoro noAtëMa b Kunrae KMTawcKafl MHrpauHH b nocne^HHe rOAb】 pacnpocTpaHHJiacb uohtu Ha Bce CTpaHbi MHpa. Emë coBceM He^aBHo 0Ha oTcyTc丁BOBajia mjih He 6biJia cymecTBeHHofi b Pocchh, Mohtojihm, Hiiohmm, nojTbuie, Beni pKH m HeKoxopwx Ztpyrwx CTpaHax. Tenepb b KwTae HacTynaeT 3noxa (He 6oioci> ynoTpeGnTL CTOUb CHJibHoe noEiarae) cBo6o_HHoro Bbie^a rpaîK^aH 3a pyôc^K. Hana^acb cboôo只Ha» Bbi^aqa 3arpaHnacnopTOB. Tojilko b 2002 r ôbuio npMHJtTo HecKOUtKO peuieHWH OTHOCMTe^bHo opraHH3aUHH TpyaoyCTpOHCTBa rpa>Kii.aH 3a npe^ejiaMM CTpaHbi h 06pa30BaHHfl 6onee 300 opraHOB, npw^BaHHbix OKa3biBaTb viMMHrpaHTaM noc-pe/iHMHecKHe ycjiyrH24. TypHCTM4ecKMe hotokh KHTanueB 3HaKOMAT MHorwe mhtijthohw jiioaeH c oKpyacaiomHMH cTpaHaMH. cotch mmjutho- hob jiłaaeM BHyTpw CTpaHbi o^HanaioT MaccoBbm arpbiB ot mcct npo^cjuBaH^H npe/iKOB, y ^ecaTKOB mmjïjimûhob-yTpajy Be^HHaniueM Ha nporfl>KeHHH CTOJie-tmh ceMefiHOH ueHHOCTH - 3eMe;ibHoro Hauejra. XapaicrepHO, hto 3a 2000-2003 rr HHCoieHHooTb jihu，BbiemaBLUMx 3a npe^eubi crpaHU, B03p0CJia noHTH b 2 pa3a. j^oji只，ornpaBJiHBiuMxcfl 3a pyôe^c c nacTHLiMH uen只mm, b hx cocTaBe B03p0c;ia c no4TM c 54 丑o ôojiee neM 73%. O^hhm H3 eaacHbix (ÿaicropoB, TOJiKaiomjnx jitoacm na noHCK iiyniuen 只ojih flBjifleicfl 6e3pa6oTMua. ComacHo oueHKe H3BecTHoro kw丁aficKoro ynëHoro Xy AHbraHa, b 及epeBHflx CTpaHbi 6e3pa6oTHbiMH flBJiflKjrcfl 31,25% Tpyaocnocoô-Horo ;iepeBeHCKoro HacejieHMH. B nenoM no CTpaHe b 2003 r. ypoBeub 6e3pa6o-TMUbi cocraBJiHJi - no mhchwio Xy AHbraHa noHTM 22,5%. no 0(})MJUHajibHWM ^aHHWM, yKHTLIBaïOlUHM B COOTBeTCTBMH C FIpOnHCKOH TOJlbKO FOpOMCaH 4,3%. Xy AHbraH, KaK nkiTJiHBbiH yneiibift, nocTapajicn nCApoÔHO nepeHHCJiHTb Bce rpynnbi 6e3pa6oTHbix, Koropwe, c ero tohkh 3peHH只，cjie^yeT y^MTbiBaTb ZUiH BbiHCHenn» peajibHoro nojio>KeHHH j\çn Ha pbiHKe paGoqefl cnjibi, B KHP b KanecTBe 6e3pa6oTHbix noajie細t perncTpau^H Tpyziocnoco6Hbie ropO)KaHe - m>9khhhw b B03pacre 16—50 JieT h >KeHmHHbi 】6~4S Tier. YHHTbiBa-KDTCfl jiHqa, He HM€K>mHe paôoTbi h ace^aiomne eë nojryHMTb, o6paTHBuiHeca b MecTHbifi opran no rpy^oycTponcTBy c cooTBercTByiomeH npocbôofi25. Ha jiojiK) jimh cTaprne 50 JieT b 2002 r npmujiocb 6onee 7% oômeM HMCJieHHOCTH ropoacKHX >KHTejieü，CTaBimix 6e3pa6oTHbiMH26. Ohh jimueHbi npaBa na perwc-TpauHK) b 3TOM KanecTBe, CJie^OBaTejibHO, Ha nojiynetine MaTepwajibHOfi no只-^ep^KH. npaBO Ha nojiyneHHe neHCHU m>okhhhi>i nonyHaio丁 no AOCTM>KeHHH 60 24 http://www. laboumet，com.cn/j i uye/ 35 Zhongguo tungji nianjian, 2003. - E 179. % Ibidem - E 175. 88 Wilja Cidaliwicz Gielbr^s jieT, >KCHmHHbï 55 jieT. Cjie及oBaTejibHo，uejian 10^en^« Koropra ropOACKHx Tpy>KeHHKOB (})aKTH4ecKH He TO^bKO He yMHTLiBaerc^ b KanecTBe 6e3pa6oTHbix, OHa jiHiueHa>KM3HeHHO Ba^KHoro npaBa Ha nojiynenne cpejo[CTB cymecTBOBaHHe Ha npOTfl}K€HHH ^OUFHX ACCflTM JieT AO 及OCTHMCeHMH neHCHOUHOFO B03paCTÜ. ComacHo 0(J)HüMajTbH0My pajt^CHeHHfo「Cy, b ropoziax ne ynHTbiBaioTCfl TaïoKe 6e3pa6oTHbie KpecTbJiHe, Hinymne pa6oiy b ropouax, pa6oTaK>mne neH-CHOHepbi, nepconan npe^npHHTHfi, yqpe>KAeHHb!X Ha cpejicTBa npe只npMHMMa-Tejiefi CHHraHa (roHKOHra), Aom3HH (MaKao) n TawBaH«, a TaïoKe nepcoHaji npe^npMflTHH, npHHa^JieMtamMx HHOCTpaHHWM MHBecTopaM27, B CTaTHCTHHec-khx eaceroAHHKax KHP npHBO^HTCH cTpyKTypa 4>aKTMHecKnx ropo^iCKHX ôe^paôoTHbix. B 2002 r. 42,7% Bcex ropo及ckhx 6e3pa6oTHbTX cocTaBJiflJiH cn?auy 29,6% - 3aperHcrpHpoBaHHbie 6e3pa6oTHbie, 21% - 6eipa6oTHbie BbinycKHH-KM yneÔHbix 3aBe,aeHHfi h 6,7% - npcnwe28. Cjie^oBaTejibHO，b cTo;ib Ba>KHOH h HyBCTBHTejibHofi cc^epe HMeeT MecTO nopa3HTeJii»Haa Henocjie^OBaTejibHocTb CTaTMCTHHecKOH CJi^ôbi. Ecmm ^onycïHTb, hto b 2003 r. CTpyioypa oômew Mac-CLi 6e3pa6oTHtix coxpaHHJiacb npHMepHo TaKofl >Ke, kük b 2002 n, to 8 mjih. o^muHajibHo npH3HaHHbix 6e3pa6oTHbix cocTasji^jrn tojilko omy Tperb CTBMTeJlbHOH HMCJieHHOCTM 3TOH KSTeropHM JllOAefi. B 3TOM CJiyHae peaJlbHblïi ypoeeHb 6e3pa6oTHUbi b ropo^ax ^ojdkch b 3 paia npesbiiuaTb 4,3%, to ecTb cocTaBJiflTb 12-14%. Emë ôojiee Hanpn)KeHHoe nonoHceHiie b ^epeBiwx cTpaHbi. HMC/ienHocTb TpyaocnocoÔHoro CejibCKoro HacejieHMîi onpe^eJieHa b 510 mjih. mcjiobck. kb HHX OT 93 MJIH,丑O nOHTH 1 1 4 M；1H. HeJlOBeK B 2003 r. MMrpHpOBaJTH B ropowa, TO ecTb or ] 8,2 Ao 22,3%. KpoMeToro，emë 150 mjih. CHMTaiOTCH H3JiHiuHefi paSoncfl chjioh, to ecTb 29,4%29. 3th AaHHLie CBHAeTejibCTByioT o nopa3HTejibHo oriTHMHCTHHHOH oucHKe Xy AHbraHOM ypoBH5i 6e3pa6oTMu,b[ b .aepeBHe. Ha caMOM ^ejie penb h丑er o KopeHHofi acH3HeHHOîf npoôneMe Maccbi HacejieHHH, npeBwuiafoinefi MHCJieHHOQTb nacejieHHJi CLUA. npo6jieMbi 6e3pa6oTHUbi cTaHOBHTca Bce 6ojiee octpwmm. KaK oTMenaKyr MHorne KHTaftcKMe wccjieAOBaTejiH, b 1980-x ro^ax, yBe;iH4eHHe BBFI Ha 1% n03B0Jlfl；I0 yBeJIHHHTb KOJIMHeCTBO paÔOMHX MeCT Ha 0,32% H TpyaoyCTpûHTb 27 Ibidem. 28 Zhongguo tongji nianjian，2002. - E 174. 29 Cm. CHOCKy 71; Laogong bao zhang bu jiuye he shehui baozhang wenti da jizhe wen (OTBÇTfeï MHHMCrepCTBaTpyaa h couHajibuoro oôecne^eHHfl Ha Bonpocbi KOppecnoHjeH-tob no BûnpocaM laHHTocTH a couwajibHoro oôecneneHHfl), Xinhua wang, 10 Mar. 2004, ]ittp://isearch.china/com/cn/cgi-bin/i; Cheng Xiwen, Jiazu WTO hou Zhongguo „san nong” mianlln de xin wenti (HoBbie Bonpocw, BCTaRUJHe nepe^ KwTaeM noc^e RCTyn/ieHHfl b BTO no „TpeM ce;ibCKHM npoSnewaM，，)，9 Jul. 2004, http://drcnet.com.cn/New Pro-duct/expert/showdoc.asp?doc_id= 198396 Mwi'pannji, MMciouuafl HcropH'iccKoe JHa^ciiMe juin Khtîw h bccpo MMpa 89 2,4 mjih. HejioeeK, ho b HacToamee BpeM« — Bcero jiMiiib Ha 0,1%, to ecrb co3-AaBaTb 0,6-1’0 mjih. hobłjx paôoHHx Mecr30. Mhi paMMH KpeüTbHH pe3Kü oCocTpw^a KOHKypeHUMio 3a paOonne MecTa b ropo/iax. ConrauiaflCb Ha paôoTy b xyaiunx ycjioBM5ix Tpy^a, Ha cymecTBeHHo 6onee HH3KMe CTaBKH ero onjia™, Ha OTcyTCTBHe counajibHbix rapaHTHÎt, Kpec-TbaHe-pa6oHHe CTa^M cepi>e3HbiMki KOHKypeHTaMH ropo>KaH. KpecTbane-MM-rpaHTbi noKa He ycTpeMJiflioTCH b nowcKax pa6oTbi 3a npe^ejibi CTpaHbi. Ohm, OAHaKO, OKa3aj7H orpoMHoe ariHSiHHe Ha ropo>KaH* B cTpaHe no^ynHjiw pa3BHTHe ^Ba counajibHbix npouecca, ecjiH HCXQaMTb m3 HHTepecyiomew HacnreMw nepBbiH npouecc CBH3aH c pe3KHM ycKOpeHHetw counajibHoro pa3MCHceBaHH5i b ropoae m ^epeBHe. IloBceMecTHO Bbi^ejiHJiHCb npeAnpHHMHMBbie m arpeccHB-ubie b cbohx ycTpeMJieHHHx 3aBo.a.HHKH, ToproBUJbi u b ccj)epe ycjiyr. B 2002 r. ôbijTo ocyuutecTBJieHO oôcjieAOBaHHe CBbirne 2 mjth. nacTHbix npe^npH-HHMaTejien b 31 npoBHHunw, aBTOHOMHOM pafioHe h ropowe ueHTpajibHoro no^HHHeHHfl. BbiflCHHjiocb, hto 17,4% jiBiiHtoTc» nenyTaTaMH coôpaHwfi HapoAHbix npeACTaBKTejiefi paiHoro ypoBHJi, 35,1% 一 H^eHaMn no^HTHHecKHX KOHcyjibraTHBHwx OpraHOB. 29,9% npe^npHHHMaTeJiefi hb^aiotcji HJieHaMH KoMnapTHH Kura». 25,8% HacTHbix npejinpHHTHM bo3hhkjih b pe3yjibTaTe 中aKTHHeCKOft npHBaTH3aii.HH rOCyAapCTB€HHbIX MJIH，，KOJUieKTHBHb【X，，3aBO^OB w 4)a6pHK31. TafijiHtia 2* Pojit npe^npHHTHH pa3Hbix 中opM coôctbchhocth bo BHeiuHeH ToproBJie KHTaa，2002 ynaCTHHKH O&bëM 丁oproarm ToproBoe cajib^o Be ero Horn Bcero J\om (MJipil. ÜOJl.) VMaCTHHKOB (MJipü. ZlOJl.) ynacTHHKOB (B%) (B°/o) rocyaapcTBCHHbie oprann3anHH 237,3 38t2 8,4 27,6 OpraHK3auKk c mrocrpaHHWM 330,2 53,2 9,6 31,8 KannTa.ioM OprafîH3anMM HauKOHa^bHoro 53,2 8,6 12,3 40,6 nacTHoro KanHTæia Bee y'iacTHHKH 620,1 100,0 30,3 100,0 Wang Mengkui. Ibidem、15 Jul. 2004. 31 Zhongguo siying qiye diaocha (06cjie,noBaHHe qacTHLix npeünpHaTHM Kht3ji). http:// www.china*com,cn/chinese/zhuanti/282306,Ktm 9ü Wilja diliwicz Giclbras ’’HoBJbie KMTawuw” Hcn0Jib3yi0T bck> cbok) 3HeprHK>，epexiCTBa, cb只3W na Be^enHe ÔH3Heca He crojibKo BHyTpH cTpaHw，CKOJibKo Ha BHemHHx pbiHKax. ripaBHTejibCTBO 6biCTpo OTpearnpoBajio Ha 3ry npez;nppiHHMaTejii>CKyK) HHHuwa-THBy，pa3peiunB Be^eHwe BHeuiHe3KOHOMHiiecKOH œaTeJibHOCTH CHanana Hau,MO-HajibHOMy nacTHOMy KanMTaj】y，a sareM w HaaHBM.ayanbHbiM npe^npHHHMarejiaM, B KwTae HauaoHajibHJbiH HacTHwfi KanHmn y>Ke oTXBaTHJi cyüxecxBeHHyio MacTb BHeiuHeToproBoń npH6biJiH. Xota Ha ero xiojik> npHxo^MTCa Menee 9% BHeuuHeroproBoro o6opOTa cTpaiibi, oh nojiy^Mjr 6o^ee 40% oômefi cyMMbi BHeLUHeToproBoii npHÔbiJiM cTpanw. 4acTHbie ripeAnpnuMMaTe^M cyMejiM onepe^HTb ^apyrnx ynacTHHKOB BHeiujieToproBOH 旦c5nre;ibHoeTM b 3Ha4HTe;ii>HOH Mepe ônarojiapH TOMy，hto C03^ajiH paóoMwe MecTa jiccsitkoe mmjijihohob KpecTbHH-MHrpaHTOB KaK b ropoaax, TaK h b ceiibCKOH mccthocth. BrapoH couHajibHbiH npouecc cB«3aH c MMMMrpautien ropo>Kan 3a npeAe/ibi CTpaHbi. Uojx xiaBJieHHeM KpecTb5ïH-pa6oHHx ropoHcane scë Mame CTajiM 3a^yMbïBaTbCH o nowcKe CBoero MecTa uojx cojiHueM 3a npe/ienaMH CTpaHbi. 3tmm ycTpeM；ieHn«M cnocoócTByeT no^tëM TypH3Ma. OMHaHCHpyeMtiM nacTO rocy-üapcTBeHHbiMM npe^npHHTHHMH, 3apy6e>KHbiH Typn3M paciUHpaeT npeACTaBjie-HMfl ropo>KaH 06 oKpy>KajouueM Müpe，cTaHOBHCb oahhm m Ba^cHbix epe^CTB HaniflAHOH ^eMOHCTpaunH ycjiOBMH ^KH3HH b npyrux CTpaHax. 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Bcë 6oJTee «BCTBeHHO Ha4HHaK>T npo5iB^»TbCiJ 4epTb】 ueftCTBMTejibHo HoBoro KHTai 編作者:阮昌親 (CH'ANG-RuE juan) 台灣的原住民 (The Aborigines of Taiwan) 一、歷史源流 台灣原住民的來源至今並沒有定論，綜合之有三種說法：其一為北來說，認為台 灣原住民來自北方；其二為西來說，認為來自中國大陸；其三為南來說，認為台灣原 住民來自南方海島。從語言體質和文化層面來看，有大部分的學者認為比較確切的為 南來說；然而從地下出土的陶片，石器及若干古文物來看，卻證明其來自西方，屬大 陸系的成分較大；至於北來說，僅少數分布在恆春瑯？一帶的移民，有學者以為是自 琉球遷來的。 台灣的考古學者發現居住在台灣最早的史前人類，是在台南線左鎮湘菜寮溪發現 的頭骨片，牙齒等化石，稱之為〔左鎮人〕，其年代大約為壹萬五千年到五萬年。而 最早的文化是台東縣長濱鄉八仙洞的〔長濱文化〕，是舊時器時期的史前文化，年代 在一萬五千年以上。 距今約七千年前繩紋紅陶文化傳入台灣。自四千五百年前又有兩種文化自大陸傳 入，其一為台灣龍山形成文化，類似中國龍山文化，有各種形式的彩陶，黒陶，主要 分布於西南沿海平原期。二為圓山文化，以台北盆地為中心，有各形陶器及磨 製石斧。另一為發現於台灣東海岸與台東縱谷的〔泰源文化〕又稱〔巨石文化〕，泰 源文化與太平洋島嶼的巨石文化似有關聯，也有學者認為巨石文化與排灣族或阿 美族有關。近年來在台灣發現〔卑南文化〕，其年代與巨石文化相當，以石板棺為 特色。 距今約二千到三千年前，有一種幾何圖形印紋傳入台灣北部和西部臨海地區。 今日台灣原住民也許是此一幾何印紋陶器文化的傳人。布農族和鄒族直到晚近製作 此種形式的陶器。距今約五百到八百年間，另有_種堅硬，光面，無花紋的新式樣陶 器在台灣出現，分布在東海岸和台灣北部。此種陶器與現代的凱達加蘭，葛瑪蘭， 及阿美等陶器相似。近年來十三行遺址的發掘，更發現了鐵器，並與凱達加蘭有密切 的關係。 以上是史前考古對史前文化與原住民間的考證所得的一些關係，但史前文化與今 日各族明確的關係尚待更多的考古學上的證據來闡明。因此，到目前為止，我們不能 說全部的台灣原住民是來自中國大陸，或來自南方海島。且其遷來的時間亦先後有差 別，但是我們或許可以說，現居於山區的泰雅族，布農族等是早期的遷入者，其文化 較接近大陸系，大約是在六千五百年前到四千五百年間自大陸遷入的，這也許可能與 繩紋陶河龍山形成其有關。至於居住在平地的諸族如阿美，卑南，葛瑪蘭族等遷入期 較晚，其文化接近南島系；然而經考古學者與民族學者的研究，南島系祖居地亦在中 國的華南地區，所以無論是自中國大陸直接來台，亦或由大陸而南洋，再由南洋遷台 灣的原住民，其祖居地仍極為可能是中國大陸。 96 編作者:阮昌銳（Ch'ang-rue Juan) 台灣原住民在文獻上尤其居住地區的不同而分為平埔族和高山族，這種分類雖缺 乏科學意義，然而始終為一班人所襲用。 平埔居住在西部平原地區，與平地漢人接觸已久，大多漢化，已失去其固有的語 言文化。高山族居住在山區及其附近，與漢人接觸較晚，漢化較淺，大部分保有其固 有文化特質，語言及其傳統習俗，現就各族之地理分佈略述於下： 平埔族可分為十族，人口約十餘萬，各族分布大致如下： 1.凱達加蘭（Katagalan):分布在淡水、台北、基隆一帶，現皆漢化，僅留下地 名如艋舺、奇里岸、大龍峒。 2.雷朗（Luilang):分佈於台北縣中和一帶，現已絕跡。 3.葛瑪蘭（Kavalan):分布在宜蘭、羅東、三星一帶以及移往花蓮市附近及東海 岸之豐濱，台東縣長濱鄉等地。豐濱鄉之新社村仍保留語言。 4.道卡斯(Taokas):分佈於桃園、新竹、苗栗_帶。 5.巴布拉或拍布拉(Papora):分布在大甲一帶。 6.貓霧揀或巴布薩族(Bapuza):分佈在彰化附近 7.八則海(Pazeh):分佈在豐原附近今之神岡一帶。 8.洪雅(Hoanya):分佈於彰化、南投、嘉義一帶。 9.西拉雅族(Siraya):分布在台南至屏東一帶，以及移往花蓮富里鄉及台東關 山、池上等地。 10.邵(Shao):分佈於日月潭附近。 高山族以其分布地區及文化差異分為九族，人口約三十二萬： 1.泰雅族（Atayal):分佈在台中、埔里、花蓮一線以北之山區，包括台中、 南投、苗栗、新竹、桃園、台北、宜蘭、花蓮諸縣境內。 2.賽夏族（Siasiat):分佈於新竹縣屬的五指山和苗栗縣屬的大東溪一帶。 3.布農族（Bunun):分佈於中央山脈兩側南投、花蓮、高雄、台中諸縣境內 4.鄒族(曹族)(Tsao):分佈於南投、嘉義和高雄縣境內。 5.排灣族 1382年，路易逝世，其女雅德蔌裔继承王位。1385 年，波兰王国和立陶宛大公国在克列沃签订协定，两国成为君合固，1386年， 立陶宛大公雅盖洛来到波兰首都克拉科夫.同雅徳薇毐结婚，接受天主教洗礼， 加冕为波兰国王，称瓦迪斯瓦夫二世•雅盖洛（丨386——1434), ÏÏ•始了雅盖洛 王朝对波兰的统治（〖386•丨572K 1387年，雅盖洛lüj到立陶宛.宦彳fi立陶宛接受 天主教.波兰.和立陶宛的联合，t要是为了艿同抗击条钟、骑士闭的栈珞。通过5关 合，立陶宛页族得到波兰赍族的所有特权，波兰的等级君主制没有形成强大的王 权，没有象西欧各fâ和俄因那样演变为君主专制，而是朝«独特的资族民卞制发 展。 责族称号米自祖先在战场上立下_的战功•>贲族称号世代相传.每个页族家庭 都有纹草》非责族出身的人只有通过战功由全ffl议会授千+ 贾族称号I能获得災族 特抆=费莰有WS的荣誉感，他们继承中世纪的骑上精神：旁敢、浃义、诚倌、 好客、慷慨。他丨门把保卫祖国看作Æ；自己的神圣职贞，勇敢作战、捎躯■场是赴 族的类德和斯拉夫人的光荣传统，胆怯怕死是资族的奇耻大岑，临阵脱逃要受到 収消货族称号的惩罚《波兰％诙占全田人n的丨/iü,是费族人数逛多的欧洲国家， 从16 tli:纪末到18 IË纪末，资族文化的特łiK、lk己形成• m民和农民争相学习+55族 的行为;1ü则和I4俗习+职，费疲的犄士褙神成为波兰民族文化特证的重要内涵„ 波兰费族的姓氏都以斯裡(,-ski)或茨堪(-cki)为后缀.，如四位国王的姓： 维希尼奥维茨基(1669-1673, Wiśniowiecki)' 索别斯苺(1674-16%, Sobieski)、 列什琴职4i U704-l7!l、1733-1736, Leszczyński),波尼3E托夭靳基(1764-1795, Poniatowski),刚获得贵族称号的人,从没有斯基f-ski)或茨准(-cki)后缀, 如恰伊卡(Czajka)变为恰伊科夫斯基(Czajkowski). 19世纪中叶，波兰从封 这社会进入资本:t义社会以后，持别是20世纪以来，许多农民、工人也都纷纷 在自己的凍姓氏之后加斯基或茨蒂•如姓科瓦尔（Kowal)的变为科瓦尔斯雄 < Kowalski).姓别尔纳特（Biernat)的变为别尔纳茨基(Biemucki)» 责族之间îi相叫潘（pan),女15+族之间叫潘尼（panih其他等级的人互相 叫蒂（ty)或韦（wy),中文意思是你或您•封建等级制度消灭以后，波兰社会 的男士彼此都称潘（pan),女士之间称潘尼（pani),中文意思是先生和女十。 波兰化的犹太人、立陶宛人、白俄罗斯人和乌克兰人也以斯基（-ski)和茨基（-cki) 为自己姓氏的后缀♦这说明贵族文化已经成为全民文化。 二、 民主自由——波兰传统文化的第一特征 民主和H由历来Æ人们渴求的，但是象波兰人那样对民主和自由的执著如是 举世罕有的。民主自由是波兰传统文化的第一特征。 16世纪仞，波兰建立丁独特的两院制议会制度，这是近代欧洲圾早的议会 制度♦根据1505年宪法，未经议会两院同意，国王不能颁布新法律、不能征税、 论波ü传统文化(ft特征（On the Cultural Characteristic of Poland) 109 不能征3民团、不能宣战和媾和》这部宪法揭开了波兰责族民.4*1制的序蓓，1569 年，为了争夺波罗的海统治权和遏制莫斯科的扩张.波兰王国和立陶宛大公国在 卢《V沐举行议会.决定两Ü实行合并，成立波.兰共和国•波兰语中的共和国“rzccz pospoliw”造共同所有之物的场:思，即共和PEliU贾族共同占有，i丨国王_人所有. 这弓"T+权神授’’和“朕即国家”的观念迥然不同《波兰共和ISI是波兰王国和立 陶宛大公田两部分组成的联邦制11家。这是“自由者同自由者、平等者冋平等者 的自愿联1S' ° 15%年，波兰苜都从兖拉科夫迁到华沙，波二政洽文化中心东 移:i 1572年.雅盖洛王朝的最后一个国王齐格蒙特二世C 1548-1572)逝世，因 无子嗣，雅盖洛王统中断.波兰幵始实行自由选王制》自由选王制成为贲族民主 制的支柱》占全W人口 10%的贵族都有权参加国王的选举，毎个5+族享有允分的 政治自由，包括人身、财产不可侵犯的权利。丨573年，波兰议会通过丁宗教倌 WÜ山的法律* 1588年的法律桀止W王和政府官员搜2贾族家驻，只有因杀人、 纵火、盜窃等罪行.经过法院判决，才能速捕资族，费族把这种特权称为“黄金 à iÜ 在丨6-18世纪，10%的公民享有选举权和被选举权，这Æ欧洲是独-无 二的《波兰无疑是欧洲最民主的国家。 波兰资•族对享有“货金自由”感到骄做。这与他们在军平上的贡献分不斤= 在1410年的格伦K；尔德战役和随后的十7_年战争（1454-1466)中，他们奋勇迮 Æ.海赴战场，打败条顿骑士团.收复东波芡瑞，使波兰审新有了波罗的海出海 I-J,为粮食出u和经济繁荣创造T条件 随葙资族民主制的发展，安族祚成r无政府主义和桀骛不驯的性格.KiT.的 权威日趋动摇》当齐洛衆特_+-世：(1506-1548)和王后、来自韋大利的丨拷娜和fil iÛ斯瓦夫ffiW ( 1632-1648)和卫后、來Èj法岡的路易.玛丽.力丁加强王权而 采取若干措施时，被认为是对55族自由的俊犯，遭到贵族议会的…致反对而俘止 A茧。1606年.兖拉科夫省长、大畏攱泽布齐多夫斯蓰在保卩••英金自由”的 n号卜'公然发动反对[Ü王齐洛蒙特三LÜ <1587-1632)的叛乱，1666年，大货肽 卢丨舆米不斯基又发动f反对国王杨二址♦卡齐米曰（1648—丨688)的叛乱•>这网 次叛乱造成了严芷的经济和政治fś果15•族民主制的消极作闷诂菇无逆„ 1652年.当全ffl议会在华沙d丌的时候，立陶宛大货族雅♦拉齐维尔的代 理人江‘西W斯基反对多数议员通过的关于延t<:议会会期的决议，他的反对遭到 许多议员的谴贞，但被认为是合法的。这样，幵创了波兰历史丄只要一个议员反 对.议栗就无法成立的先例，这就是自由否决权，自由否决权的吁使.把资族K 主制推到极点，使议会政治处-T瘫痪状态， 1569年以后，波兰不再只包括原波兰人居住的地区，而成为拥有包括立陶 宛、白俄罗斯' 乌克兰在内，北濒波罗的海、南到黑海，面积近100力平方公里-人口近1000万的多民族多宗教的欧洲大田。在新的形势下，在波兰民族文化中 出现丫新的因素，即萨尔马特主义，萨尔马特人是来自在亚洲的一个占代游牧民 族，酷爱自由，骁実畚战，居住在伏尔加河、奥卡河和顿河一带，后来迁到斯拉 夫人居住的中东欧广大地区□马*克罗梅尔（1512-1589)等波兰历史学家认为 萨尔马特人崽斯拉夫人的祖先.波兰人是斯拉夫人中诚优秀的.支.波兰贵族继 承了萨尔马特人的优秀品德•萨尔马特主义直传波兰人是上帝的选民.上帝娬予 自玛州_ ,鲍古■欠卡：《波兰文化史《到丨918 年）》(Maiia Bogucka. D2(cjc Kuliurv^ poJskicj do 1918 rokuJ 毕沙.丨987年版，染丨20 5Û 110 刘祖照(Liu Zuxi) 波兰人历史使命.要他们守卫在基督教前哨，防止伊斯兰主义的入设-保卫欧 洲基埴教文明♦萨尔气特主义具有民族fi大和封闭排外的倾向，为波兰责族向东 扩张制造历史根据， 16世纪的波兰文献，顿繁使用Śb+哨（przedmurze)和堡全(forpoczta) 二UK 157'；年，波兰第一次实行自由选工。法国瓦洛亚家族的亨利电迗为波兰11工」 为+「纪念这一事件.法H人在巴黎搭起牌楼，上写拉丁文题词： ‘‘ P0L0N1AE TOTIUS EUROPAE ADVERSUS BARBARO RUM NATION U M FIRMISSIMO PROPUÜNACULO 中文意为“波兰是全欧洲反对蛮族的最强大堡垒' 欧洲基督教文明前哨的职能是同波兰弥赛亚主义联系在一起的，16-17世纪 的波兰作家认为.波兰不只是反对伊斯兰主义的堡垒，而且是向东方传播基督教 文明，照亮东方黑暗的火把《他们技至把英斯科围家同亚洲II家并列，将其排除 it难督教国家之外，这样引起了波兰弥赛亚主义同俄罗斯弥赛亚卞义的冲突》19 Ot纪俄K著名历史学家谢尔it •索洛维约夫等人对波兰弥赛亚电义进行了抒 他们责备波兰人背弃丁自己的历史使命.没有成为西斯拉夫人的前哨.未能阻止 西斯拉夫人的R茸曼化.如在向东方扩张。只有俄罗斯才真正起了基督教府哨的 作㈩„她承受了东方游牧民族和鞑靼俊略的重负.致使自己的文明处T落后状态， 20世纪俄国思想家别尔孬耶夫以客观的态度评论说：‘•在毎个民族的灵魂中.都 序在巷È己的优点和弱点，自己的长处和短处< 需要相互苒爱谷民族的长处，原 :京它1ÎJ的短处。……公i !■:要求承认.波兰的弥赛亚主义要比俄罗斯的弥赛亚i义 £纯袢，见萏f牺牲:S:味•” v 1648年是强大的波兰和枳弱的波兰的分汴线，这年5月，3完兰哥萨兖Æ 魂格丹•烷戋尔尼茨基领异下发动反对波兰的战争。这次战争引S了波俄战争 ■•.1654-1667)、波瑞战争(1655-1660)和波士战争C1672-1699),战火从四面八 //烧向波兰共和因大泼，灾难降临波兰大地《波兰的弥赛亚±义经受严峻的考验， .在残酷的战争环垸下，波兰进族离开:家a,率领军队，奔赴战场，同入後之 敌作浴血斗争。1655年丨2月，他们在琴斯托ffi瓦明山保卫战中打敗瑞典军队. 保卫了宗教圣地。1673年11H,波兰统领杨•索别斯基军4力+军队，庄德涅斯 朽;可畔的雀齐姆战役中几乎全歼由涘赛因帕叟指挥的15乃+ 土军.1683年9月, Æ波兰危难之际，波兰人深明大义，由国王杨二世*索別斯宇2.5力'波平， 驰援维也纳，同奥革会师.指挥波奥联军，粉碎了由華相穆斯塔法指挥的h¥.的 进攻，保丄」./维也纳和欧州文明.鼓舞r巴尔干的民族解放运动◊波兰人发扬中 世纪骑士勇敢作战、不怕牺牲的精神.赶走了入«之敌。但是哿萨克、俄頃、瑞 典和士![其己经摧毁了波兰。波兰河山破碎。根据1667年的安德鲁索沃停战协 ;ii,笫iŁf!K以东的乌克兰和基辅被俄国兼并，波兰的弥赛亚主义遡受致命打击> 17世纪下末期.波兰人口减少了 25%,拼地面积减少了-半T国力消耗殆 尽气俄国沙鱼彼得一世通过波兰国工、萨克森韦丁家族的奧古斯特二世 ( 1697-1733)又把波兰拖入北方战争（丨700*1721)。在这次战争中，俄国不只 打畋了瑞典，而且彻底捣垮了波兰。S格斯说：“彼得大帝有步骤地毁坏丁波兰, .)诺受■載绝斯t《上帝的游戏;波兰史 J (Nomiün I )；ivie^. l-îo/e i«fr/y^kt> - hision;i Pülski). _々.拉科、2(KX) 版 t ?Rr 163 jîl ♦ U尔S耶夫： <俄罗斯4魂》学朴出版社，19叭年版，笫！25迈. '•玛KN •鲍古茨笮：《波兰文化史h第217贝， 论波兰传统文化的特征(On the Cultural Characteristic of Poland) 111 他的继承者只要伸手去拿就行了。” 18世纪末，在波兰行将灭亡之际T在中小贵族和新兴资产阶级推动F,在 国王斯•波尼亚托夫斯基的支持下.波兰出现了爱国革新运动，在革新派领袖 斯.斯塔希茨(1755-1826)和胡•科翁泰(1750-1812)的领导波兰召开了 四年议会（丨78_8-1792),逋过了 1791年5月3 El宪法.废除丁 É1ÉI选I制和S 由否决权，实行王位世袭制和多数衷决制，建立君电立宪国家，以此挽救垂危的 沮KL沙立俄国害怕波兰fe立强大，波兰的革新运动遭到俄国女5叶卡埯琳娜二 世的武装镇压•波兰终于被俄国、普魯士和奥地利三个邻国三次瓜分（1772、丨793、 1795年)而灭亡, 1794年3月由塔•科希秋什科（1746-1817)领导的民族起义是波兰人民的 背水一战•>克拉科夫、华沙、维尔诺先后解放。贵族骑兵和农民镰刀军联合作战， 在腊茨瓦维策打败俄军《镰刀军领袖沃*巴尔托什被授予贵族称号，改姓格沃瓦 茨难》由于力!!：.&殊，起义被禎压。11 )1,华沙被苏沃洛夫指挥的俄军攻陷， 1794年起义为19 iÜ纪波兰人民争ti山、求独立的民族解放斗卞•揭开了新的篇 法11革命和拿破仑战争给波兰人民带來了希望。1797丰，杨.亨.东布罗 夫斯基将军（ 1775-1818)在意大利勒佐建立了波兰军团。军阴诗人约.锥比茨 m (1747-1822)用民间流行的玛祖卡曲调谱写了军团战歌——“波兰还没有亡” %军团战士唱者这1Î战联.ift•仆后继，间强敌搏斗.IS07年iT、t的华沙公田是 罕fil战士流血栖牲的结品，成为波兰SS的棊地。18丨2年，10乃_华沙公IS军5人 随拿破仑人至出征戕国，时浩浩荡荡.回时残兵敗将.演出了 一部惊天地、泣 鬼神的人间悲剧《 $沙公13随拿破仑的失敗而覆灭.波兰再一次逍到瓜分，根据 1S15年维也纳会汶的决定，在平沙公㈤的大部分上地上迷立波乓王国，由俄a 沙朵担任波兰ai王。 é; 123年亡a的漫沒长夜+里，波兰人坚倍波二一定会笕兴_„耶稣《馆为了拯 敦人类被钉死在十芋架上，ii天后乜活a波竺为r掸ü堆督教文明被邻国灭亡， 岜…坦会.g兴-波兰人民对占领古桀筠不驯、宁死的民族W神19世纪w 次的民族起义中衷现得淋漓尽致，fr:lS30的H■ —月起义中，解放了华沙，废?Æ 了尼占抟一tó的王立。山于力啬恐祙，华沙在丨83丨年9 ；! 8闩Mi;客。泰命嗒守 西!二/'_沃拉的约•索文斯基将军和全体官只壮烈牺牲《在1846年克拉科夫起义时， 革命领汙人爱*邓博夫斯基把生命资之度外，力阁把民族革命和农民起义结合 起来，丰沽十芊架向被奥地利政府萦骗的农民宜传民族政府的政策时被舆¥杀 去。 波兰革命者深知，波兰的复兴是同欧洲的革命紧密不可分的。在丨}548*~ 1849年的欧洲革命中，他们战斗在所有战场——在意大利、法田' 德国、捷克、 罗马尼业和匈牙利，同欧洲各■人民并肩战斗„马克思和恩格斯说：“他们无论 是普通土兵还是指挥官，都表现得出类拔萃7+»马克思称波兰人是“欧洲不死 的勇士' ®恩格斯说：“‘波兰人’和‘革命者’两个词成了同义语，波兰人就 蠃得了全欧洲的同情这是马克思和恩格斯对波兰人在丨848年欧洲革命中建 立的伟绩的崇高评价，也是对波兰民族精神的表彰。 '.5马51 思JS格斯全*> » 22 (i. '卜)1«毕波兰独立波兰军团战歌被定为波.S共和围岡歌*立到今天* 〈马克思思格斯全电3诏【9卷笫266 d "《马克思思格斯全兔》第丨6卷第22?豇 v «马Æ思祖格斯全兔》笫6卷笫339 !ÎÂ- 112 刘祖照(Liu Zuxi) 1S63年的一月起义是波兰民族解放运动史上规模最大、持续最久的一次起 义。领导起义的是由雅•东布罗夫斯基等革命民主主义者组成的“红党”，民族 政莳祯布丁解放农奴的法令，其印韋上写着“自由、平等、独立' TT20力人氧 起武器同俄军进行战斗。起义坚持到1864年8月』1党领袖齐_i射拉科火斯 R卡itr火斯拈筇在战 '丨屮陈丨、雅■东布罗夫基起义前夕被捕,后逃离俄国來到欧 洲，成为巴黎公社将领.在1S71年5月23 Fi牺牲。他们表现出“生当为人杰， 死亦为鬼雄的革命精魂a 世纪上半期的浪漫主义文化集中反映了波兰人民争自山、求独立的民族 魂》亚•密茨凯维奇的伟大史诗《塔杜施先生》和弗♦萧邦的著名钢琴曲《C小 调钢琴练习曲》.又名《华沙的陷落》则是波兰民族魂的集中表现， 波兰人R经过斗争、失敗、再斗争、再夫败，终于在丨9IS年丨I月贏得丁独 三、开放文化是波兰传统文化的第二特征 波兰地处欧洲中部，波兰文化是欧洲东西两部分之间的文化.即中欧文化， 波兰对欧洲其他B家.实行丌放政策.外放文化是波兰传统文化的重要特征„ 很据已故华沙大学历史系教授，世界著名屮世纪史专家亚历山大•盖埃什托 尔院士（19丨6-丨999>的意见，1波兰自％6年接受拉丁基誓教后迕历T三次西 fŁ浪潮、第一次ffi 10-11世纪.波兰£室、大赍族、骑士等上S人士接受教， 迮波兰述立多级教区=迮接受拉丁莲俾教的同时，波兰接受了在加洛林土:钥时朋 形成的和随/S的徳意忐王国的国家換式(有权威的君土制）。波兰;丨•始融入拉丁+ fllRITÜ的欧洲文化。1054年欧洲东西教会分裂后，波兰成为西方拉]+文明的 -部分。 第二次_fr: 12-13 mc,电时波兰已进入封迷分裂时期，在&地公和费族的 突助？从惹大利引进的罗马式教堂到处叫见。各种西方修会（多明我会.本笃 会.力济各会，IS古斯丁会和西斯特会）和修道院的建立，使3!多的城乡居民读 受福呂教，12 lit纪初.出现了笫一部波兰编年史《加尔编年史》，作者是鲍菜斯 瓦太三世宫迂-•名本笃会修士. 13世纪初，克f、X科夫主教文•卡德SITÆ潠写 r四卷本《卡德乌贝克编年史>。民硖文化和民族意识进一步提高= 12-13 ty；纪，东方的罗沏文化也相垚发达=从基辅经克拉科夫到布拉格和西 方，从西方经布拉格、克拉科夫到棊辅的过境贸易络绎不绝，给波兰带来了罗斯 文i’.匕 13世纪.波兰各地王公和贲族招徕大批德意志移民，施疔德意志法律，使 他们享受广泛的自治权利♦德意志移民_方面给波兰带来方文化，另一方曲在 引进的北部和西部引起一定程度的日耳曼化。 14-15世纪，波兰经历了第三次西化浪潮，完成了基《教化的过程。波兰的 宗教生活和艺术生活无不从哥特文化汲取力量9大批哥特式违筑拔地而起.许多 波兰宵 +年赴窓大利大学、法国大学、德国大学留学》丨364年.国王卡齐米日创 建了中欧第二所大学^克拉科夫大学。中欧第一所大学是1348年由捷克国王 2E理创逮的布拉格大学，Æ拉科夫大学在丨400年由国王雅盖洛拨款重建，成为 15世纪中欧最著名的大学，培养了尼•哥尼这样世界顶级夭文学家，哥白尼 是在克拉科夫大学毕业，赴意大利博洛尼亚大学和帕多瓦大学深造后发明日心说 大.lift埃什托尔论文化速产J彳 Akksamlor o d/icü/iclwic kultun).华沙 2000 年•版》第 44-47 论波ü传统文化(ft特征（On the Cultural Characteristic of Poland) 113 的。他是西方文化和波兰文化融合的历史见证人， L1王雅盅洛有深厗的罗斯文化情结，他的母亲是罗斯公主，第一个妻子也足 罗斯公i。他力图使东西文化融合.把:if特艺术引入维尔诺和利沃夫，在卢布林 逑造砷特式的圣三位一体教堂，而教堂的圣像、壁画、水彩画却是拜占庭式的， 可;S东西义化之合壁雅盖洛和他的继承人卡齐米日♦雅盖洛契克和杨一世•突 尔布拉赫特，还通过罗斯画冢把拜占庭式的圣像豳从沃伦和诺夫sf•罗德传到卢布 钵和克拉科夫等城市。 16世纪.莘莘学子赴欧洲大学留学形成高潮。总大利的帕多瓦大学、博洛 尼亚大学和罗马大学是波兰留学生人数最多的大学。宗教改革促使路德宗和加尔 文宗W年赴璁国和瑞士大学学。法国的巴黎大学从中世纪起铢是波兰靑年向往 的学府》杰出的诗人和作家杨•科哈诺夫斯基(1530-1584)毕业于克拉科夫大 学.曾经周游意大利、法国和德国，他的诗歌充满爱国主义激情.呼吁民族团结 和宗数宽容，描写普通人的感情，菹岔看浓重的人文主义精神.兖拉科夫大学成 为欧洲文化交流的屮心，大批外国留学生來这里学习，众多的欧洲学者來这里从 教学和科研工作，据统汁，从1500到丨560竿，究拉科夫大学共有丨.2万外国 7生，其中以刼牙利、斯洛伐克学生居多。°甲波兰语代替拉丁语写作是16世 纪波兰文化的一个亮点，作家尼■赖伊的名ü为后世传颂：“让K•他民族知道， 波竺人不逞鹅.有É3己的语言' 庄艺术方面，文艺复兴式速筑代铎岢特式建筑》 齐格芜神一壯(1506-1548)和王后博娜（逢大利人）邀iÜ了大批意大利逮筑师， 按文艺S兴式逑筑艺术完成了对克拉科夫瓦韦尔宫的改建和扩逑X朽U大费族 m •扎英伊斯基用了 20年时间逑成了一座S大利式城市一扎莫什苛， !7肚纪下米朋和18世纪上半明的战争坏境和萨尔马特左义的排外倾甸，削 弱r波兰同西力+田家的文化联系.而更多地同东方民族接触。既然古代东方的萨 尔马特人是斯拉夫人的祖先，波兰贵族对东方文化也就fâ之若野■=他们孜孜不啳 地学习东方的穿看、装饰、菩欢丝绸、锦缎，爱佩带东力_忒器《在波兰浯中出观 r许多:hlïiîi'S•和阿拉伯语的词汇.犯语à学家尤•什韦德统计，〖7狀纪波兰 ip及坆丁 180个土邛其语W汇,140个阿拉伯语ini汇和60个鞑！iHJi&同汇,，大 批波~人进入G克兰,使C； Æ兰到波兰语的彤响。在鸟免兰浯中出现了许多 波兰IU词;[：。波兰语tlł受到乌Æ兰浯影响„ 尽诠受东方文化彩响.西方文化仍逛波兰文化的主流。巴罗克文化从S.大利 传入波兰，同萨尔马特主义结合在一起，形成萨尔马特~-巴罗克文化.山H王 杨三世*索别斯基聘请的宫廷建筑师奥古斯丁 *洛奇设计的华沙维拉诺夫宫是盛 朋巴罗克逑筑的代表。1677年初建时像一座庄园《 1680年，PIT.按意大利别幣 的式样予以扩大，增加T庭院和花园，内部按法S巴罗克风格装饰得S丽堂坌。 17 a纪末.别羝改为王宫• s王和王后玛丽.达尔甘（法闽人）i<；期在这里居 住= 18世纪下半期，随着资本主义因素的发展，贵族走向没落，市民阶组兴起》 贲族的萨尔马特——巴罗克文化为启菜文化所取代。波兰更加向西方JV•放•孟德 斯鸡、伏尔恭、卢梭的著作传入波兰•法国文化的魅力吸引r波兰知识分子》法 I吾成为最时髦的外语《启蒙学者崇尚科学和理性，宣传天赋人权，人生来是向由 1 呈缏忠：《椎盖沃人学》，湖荫教育■出版社1998年版，^ 66 >；!. “亚努什•塔兹比尔:《波兰货族文化î {Jłijmsz 1 azbir. Kultura s/ki chocka w 1\>1ücck培沙,1979年版 第 161-162 Si. 114 刘祖照(Liu Zuxi) 平等的，向封建特权和神权发出了挑战•作家把描写市民和农民作为创作的任务。 剧作家沃•鲍古斯瓦夫斯基的再歌剧《克拉科夫人和山民》第一次让农民和山民 成为戏剧舞台的主角、被誉为“诗人之王”的伊•克拉西茨基的诗歌揭Ś5费族的 残棊凶很和大主教修士的虚伪愚味，探求埋立平等和®的理想社会。波兰启蒙运 动：灭之力，未能挽救共和国大埏之倾倒.波兰虽然灭G了，但启蒙运动对Łi 由平等的追求，却教育丁亡国时期几代波兰人，激励他们为民族独立而斗争， 四、宗教宽容——波兰传统文化的第三特征 具有民主和自由传统的波兰，在宗教上实行宽容政策，这是波兰传统义化的 苽rr:特征。 1386年.当波兰王B和立陶宛大公围组成君合国后，波兰——立陶宛■家 就7T-始了 ffi督教两大派——罗马天左教和玎占庭东正教共存的局面。从这时起， 直到1S世纪末，城千西"X主教文明区的波兰人和立陶宛人同属于拜占庭一 斯拉夫文明区的西阐罗斯人（乌克兰人和白俄罗斯人的祖先），在一个国家内共 存，这在欧洲是不多见的•在立陶宛大公国，信幸东ÏE教的罗斯居民占大多数， 他们有若400年拜占庭——斯拉夫文明史。波兰人也同样有40Ó年西方天主教文 明史。立陶宛同普S.士人、拉脱维亚人同诚波罗的海语系民族，1387年水接受 天主敦》雅盏洛王朝实行宗教宽容政策，使波兰人.立陶宛人和罗斯人团结一致. 共同打败条顿骑土团的侵略：^ Æ康斯坦次公会议上（1415-1418),波兰的*教宽容政策受到条领骑士团代 表的攻波兰II王和波兰人被Æ钱为“多神教”，“异端' 波乓代表.Æ拉科 夫大学校长帕*弗沃德科维岢向会议提交的论文《论教5；.和〒.帝的权力》•文中， A)异教徙的生存权利大声疾》f,强烈®贞骑士团用丨-宇军东征的战争平段.迫洩 多神教徙接受蓰督教.强调只能用fri心说服办法促使他丨n自恧接受挫督教，捍卫 了宗教宽容原则《他还抗议用火刑处死宗教改革家胡斯》这反映丁天主教内部宗 教文容和黩武主义两种对立的宗教观= 14-15世纪，从法ffl到俄国.4欧洲各凼的绝大部分居民已经成为基S教徒 时.西方教会由于内部分裂和教会上层腐敗引发了危机，宗教改平应运而起》^ 教改革运动的先驱是英(1牛津大学教授约铕•威克里夫（ 1320-U84)和垅克布 拉格大学教授杨♦胡斯（丨369-丨415)。他们反对教阜.权威，i彳长没收教会财产g 16世纪，宗教改革运动从德国扩大到西欧和中欧各国。 15!7年10月31日，德维登堡大学教授马丁 ■路德（丨4S3-1546)发表€95 条论纲》，揭汗了宗教改革的序路德强调因信称义，要得到h帝的拯救，不 在于蕃行、组织和教规。在瑞上定居的法国人约翰•加尔文（1509-1564)除强 调因倍称义外.相信上帝预定论，教圼和任何组织都无法改变-丨6世纪50年代， 新教获得合法地位，逐渐在德II北部、东北部和瑞士、荷兰、英格兰、苏格兰、 瑞典等北欧国家取得胜利。 新教中的路德宗为波兰西部和北部各城市的市民所接受.分布在波莫瑞、大 波兰和西里西亚等日耳旻化程度较高的城市，如格但斯克、托伦和弗罗茨瓦夫， 普軎士是路徳宗的基地，哥尼斯堡火学（建于1544年）是传播路德宗的中心， 许多波兰和立陶宛胥年来这里学习。加尔文宗为波兰资族所接受，主要分布在小 波兰克拉科夫、平丘夫、散多梅什、卢布林等省和立陶宛。丨562年，加尔文宗 发生分裂，人数较少，更激进的一派建立阿里安宗，又称波兰兄弟会》波兰新教 论波兰传统文化的特征(On the Cultural Characteristic of Poland) 115 运动的最大弱点是缺乏农民群众的参与D大多数居民继续信奉天主教。据估计•， 16世纪末波兰天主教会共有3500个教区，备种新教教区只有丨000个。® 新教的传入，使波兰的宗教显得异彩纷呈，除天主教和东正教又增加r 新教备宗和从捷克被驱逐的胡斯运动的继承者——捷克兄弟会•此外，还有犹太 人.他们讲犹太语.信犹太教，居住在克拉科夫.波兹南，利沃夫等城市，但组 织在犹太公社里，李受自治权利•从丨3世纪以；^犹太人因受德国当周迫害前 来波兰定居♦波兰犹太人占欧洲犹太人的m,是世界上犹太人最多的田家， 1573年1月，在雅盖洛王统中断和王位空缺的时候，波兰议会为了维护国 内和平，通过了在宗教问S上禁止使用暴力和实行宗教宽容、宗教平等的法律。 这个法律实际上是对丨4肚纪下半期以来非天主教徙平等权利的确认》研究16 世纪欧洲宗教史的法田历史学家若瑟夫♦肋克勒尔（Joseph Leder)写道：“波兰 的宗教形势，对于丨6世纪下半期的欧洲是无法比较的。这个夭主教国家，根据 红农主教萑久什的说法.是异教徙的避难所=最激进的教派因在世界各田受驱逐 和迫害都躲藏到这里，再洗礼派和反三位一体派教徒欣幸在这个天主教国家找到 和平自由的栖身之地* 在君士坦丁堡陷落前后，东西教会合并的呼声很离》1439年的佛罗伦萨会 议就东西教会的合并原则达成了协议。君士坦丁堡陷落后.奥斯曼帝国境内的东 正教徒被禁止与丙方基馑教a家联系》P、有英斯科保持独立东FH教国家的地位a 萁斯科反对佛罗伦萨会议的决定.提出了 •‘英斯科•~•第二:罗马”的埋论，向西 Y教会挑战，1595年6月，波兰境内的东正教都牛:教和8名主教在布列斯特举 ^会议，原则上通过东ÏF教会同天主教会合并的决议，遒到大贵族' 基辅省长 康♦災斯特罗格斯基的反对，在饱的压力下，利沃夫和普热米斯尔主教撤回？•对 合汴的支择。12月，2名代表盼往罗马以S名主教的名义向教皂呈交了关于东西 教会合^和接受教盅领导的信函。教Ę发布了结束波兰教会分裂的训谕。丨5% 年〖0月，在都主教米■拉加兹主持下，正式通过东正教会和天主教会合并，保 留东ÏH教会令部礼仪的决议，布列斯特会议引起了基辅都主教区东正教会的分 裂，+费成合并的(3个主教区敦会祢为合并派教会或东仪天主教会.反对合并的两 个主教区称分裂派教会> 这次教会分裂引起了阋墙之争„ 1623年，t:张合并的 波洛次克火主教杨♦孔策维奇被维贴布斯克市民杀害.东正教徒对天主教和合 并派教徒的仇恨，为1648年乌克兰哥萨克起义埋下了火种， _特伦托公会议（丨545-1563〕发出了对新教反击的信号，开始了反宗教改革 的运动。西班牙人伊♦罗耀拉创立的耶稣会成为反宗教改革的得力_1_:具，异端裁 判所被天主教会用来锒压新教运动。在法国，天t教同新教胡格诺派之间的斗争 引起了长期的胡格诺战争( 1562-1598).新教和天主教的斗争酿成了席卷欧洲的 三十年战争(16丨8-1648)。 波兰天主教会接受特伦托会议的决议是在1579年。天主教徒力图保持宗教 宽容原则，没有挑起宗教战争，没有设置宗教戟判所，没有发生许多欧洲国家那 样的惨烈局面♦只是在17世纪下半期特殊的战争环境下，波兰的宗教形势才发 生变化。哥萨克以东正教:保卫者的身份要求取消宗教合并.疯狂杀*合并派教徒 和天主教徒，瑞典人则以新教徒保卫者自居。不少新教徒把宗教同一性置于国家 _零曰.克r夭乔•夫斯择：.波 .M:过教:t ■? Kłoc7kcMski. lVicjc clir/cśctjijńsiwa poLskic^o). %沙.別)<) 版，) 32 Ï5- 耶口 -克沃乔火斯祛：《波兰祛胬教史》，^ U7-II8 ùi 116 刘祖照(Liu Zuxi) 利益之上，为外国入侵者服务。在这种形势下.波兰议会通过一系列反对非天主 教徙的法律》1658年法律把不回归天主教的阿里安宗教徒驱逐出境《 1673年法 律禁止授予菲天主教徒贾族称号.不再授予养天主教徒外圈人波兰公民权，1718、 1736,丨764年法律禁止非天主教徒担任两院议员和政府重要职务。波兰宗教宽 容和宗教平等原则遭到破坏。 18世纪末.波兰革新运动的领袖在启蒙思想的指导F,力图通过政治改革, 逐iP消除宗教不平等现象.恢复宗教宽容和宗教平等原则/他们在四年议会 (1788-1792)期间通过法律，恢复非天主敎徒的议员资格。ÏE是在这时候，俄 IS女皇叶卡捷琳娜二世和普鲁士国工腓特烈二世却以东正教徙和新教徒的保IP 者自居，在“信教自由”和“民族原则”的幌子下瓜分了波兰。 传统文化绵延不断，历史的车轮己经跃过了第二共和凼( 1918-1939),第二 次坩界人战（1939-1944)和人民共和国（1944-丨989)三个时期，从丨989年起 进入到第三共和国（1989-)时期•波兰人民正在弘杨优秀传统文化，克服无 政府主义等消极因素.在建设民主政治、巾•场经济和提高生活水平方面取得丁显 著进少。我衷心祝逍波兰人民加强团结.克服前进道路.h的困难.取得更大的进 Sumary The iradiîiona】 culture ol' Polund evolved from a culture of nobility whose core values were embodied in medieval chivalry .The first and foremost aspect of national character of Poland was liberty and democracy, which originated from the democratic political system of the aristocracy as early as in the 16th century, Poland has always been oriented herself to the influence of other cultures» which is the second aspect of the national character Religious tolerance, as the third aspect, is deep-rooted in this country that practices religious equality with great democratic heritage, A regrettable side of Poland's past is the frequent periods of anarchy brought about by excessive pursuit of democracy and freedom (free election and liberum veto) within the contest of the aristocratic politics. izabella łabędzka Absurd and Grotesque in Plays by Gao Xingjian Absurd and grotesque become the main categories of modern art whenever awareness undergoes acute crisis. They blossom in the atmosphere of disorder and chaos and fall into decline during periods characterised by order and inclination to the typical and normal.1 Environment of the past century was particularly conducive to shaping the model of art based on absurd and grotesque. It was the 20th century which saw the ultimate defeat of the belief that there might exist any order of the world, harmonious even if most imperfect. It saw the death of the last of the Gods, the disappearance of points of reference and signposts; the man became ultimately uprooted from his environment which ceased to display any semblance of friendliness. This is, however, nothing new: a peak point in a slow process which commenced at the end of the Middle Ages and has gradually been intensifying until the beginning of the 19th century when it found expression in the breakdown of rationalistic optimism.2 The 19th-century Romanticism rebelled against the absolute reign of reason during the Enlightenment and against limiting the human world to things recognised by reason. Still, the end of the 19th century was marked by return to rationalism and cult of science. Science managed to conquer space which had previously been occupied by religion, but in the world created by science the human feels as an alien: a meaningless particle - is incidental, stripped of any dignity, and dispensable. The Western world has faced one of the most profound crises, generated by mushrooming technology, violent economic transformations, and disquieting political phenomena. Wars, following one another, criminal ideologies and economic defeats kindle the awareness of crisis and the sense of disintegration 1 L.B. Jennings, Termin ‘groteska，, tr. by M.B. Fedewicz, „Pamiętnik Literacki”, no. 4, 1979, p. 318. After: L.B. Jennings, The Term ‘Grotesque，, in: L.B. Jennings, The Ludicrous Demon. Aspects of the Grotesque in German Post-Romantic Prose, Berkeley-Los Angeles 1963, pp. 1-27. 2 Ibidem. 120 Izabella Łabędzka of the world that, after the disappearance of common system of values, lacks any consolidating factor. We witness the final breakdown of trust in intellect, common sense, and traditional logic which used to serve as tools for constructing the order of the world and reflecting it in art. Consequently, the seemingly familiar world suddenly becomes strange and frightening - but also tragically funny. Hence, the next step for an artist is to frame reality into the structures of absurd and grotesque. Similar environment gave rise to grotesque tendencies in Chinese art of the end of the 20th century and strengthened them. Symptoms of the crisis appeared much earlier, in mid-19th century and became clearly noticeable when China made contacts with Western civilisation. While facing the technological power of the West, and of Western economic and political expansion, the Confucian ethics, which had continued to consolidate Chinese culture and state organisation for many centuries, was perceived as something anachronistic or even plainly harmful by a large part of the society, particularly by its radical and reform-oriented group. The world which grew on the basis of the political and ethical system of Confucianism, soon had to yield to Maoist totalitarianism which, referring to rationalism, pragmatism and science, brought the horrors of the Cultural Revolution with all its accompanying dangers such as extermination of non-conformists, turning people into objects, destruction of natural human relationships, and limiting contacts with the external world. The movement for cultural, economic, and social revival, which began at the end of the 1970s, also proceeded in the spirit of rationalism and scientism, involving at the same time opening onto the West. This opening, however, had its virtues and vices. On the one hand, it made China aware of its civilisation retardation and strengthened its eagerness for transformation and self-improvement. On the other hand, however, it involved China in the process of cultural globalisation with all its negative aspects. The huge void left by Confucian internal and external order, temporarily filled by the absurd of Communist utopia, has recently been replaced by a huge dumping ground of post-modern world, still haunted by rampant totalitarian demons. This constant devaluation of methods for arranging the world of humans is mirrored in Chinese literature, art, and philosophy while some of the attempts to familiarise horrors of the surrounding reality try to refer to the poetics of absurd and grotesque quite well-known to Chinese artists. This tendency seems to have intensified in the course of the past twenty years. Both Chinese and Western critics mentioned the affinities of Gao Xingjian’s plays to dramatists of the theatre of the absurd, mostly of France, but they never went deep into the nature of these affinities. Contrary to common opinion, this relationship seems to be quite strong; surpassing superficial similarities, Absurd and Grotesque in Plays by Gao Xingjian 121 it has been derived from in-depth knowledge of the aesthetics of the theatre of the absurd. Some plays by Gao Xingjian can be listed among numerous works by playwrights of absurd not only because of similarities in the perception of the relationships between man and the world, but also because of similar methods of dramatic presentation of these relationships. Another important feature is Gao’s attitude to the language as a tool of communication, or rather lack of communication between people, as the playwright concentrates on the inability of language to fulfil this function. Authors of the theatre of the absurd in the West and in the East are united in their awareness that the environment with its diversity, incidental and inexplicable character does not yield to perception and systematisation through rational reasoning. Impotence of logical thinking, its unreliability in finding explanations to things inexplicable leads to strong disharmony between man and the world’s unceasing sense of alienation, lack of internal harmony and eternal anxiety. Immense human need for sensibility and the world’s failure to satisfy this need have been described by Camus in his essays. The sense of alienation, exile, and loneliness is amplified in humans by the world stripped of illusion and even the weakest traces of rationality. Camus defines the concept of absurd as a discrepancy between man an his life, between actor and stage-props. Absurd does not seem to be a feature ascribed exclusively to man or to the world, but is the result of their meeting and mutual contradiction. The world as such cannot be described as rational or irrational. Absurd is born when irrationality meets and clashes with human desire for clarity. Absurd is not only dependent on man but also on the world. Existence in the world without God and Absolute may result in a metaphysical rebellion which - according to Camus is expressed by questioning the world at any moment.3 In a world without God, the theatre of the absurd expresses a search for a way to face, in a dignified way, a world which lacks its centre, goal of existence, and ordering principle - a world which is crushed into pieces and devoid of sense: a world of absurd. Such a concept of theatre becomes a contemporary substitute of religion and “an effort to make man aware of the ultimate realities of his condition, to instil in him again the lost sense of cosmic wonder and primeval anguish, to shock him out of an existence that has become trite, mechanical, complacent and deprived of the dignity that comes of awareness”.4 3 A. Camus, Eseje (Essays), tr. by J. Guze, Warszawa 1974, p. 99, p. 111, p. 137. 4 M. Esslin, The Theatre of the Absurd, London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1962, p. 291. 122 Izabella Łabędzka The theatre of the absurd, focused on basic existential questions, life and death, alienation of man and his desire to communicate with others, seems for Esslin to be the return to primeval religious essence of the theatre, the reinstatement of man into the sphere of myth and sacrum.5 However, unlike in Greek tragedy or medieval mystery plays, the theatre of absurd is not rooted in a common system of values and it does not narrate any consistent and popular stories. It departs for good from traditional rules of the narrative, from the linear plot and from ordering events according to cause and effect. Esslin calls it a theatre of situation and pitches against the tame model of a theatre of events in sequence.6 Rejection of traditional narrative determines the character of language which turns away from its discursive features and begins constructing concrete images. Esslin has explained this phenomenon using the example of Waiting for Godot where the events do not make up a consistent story, because - according to an assumption made by Beckett - no things ever happen in human life. The play reminds of a complex poetic image made of numerous sub-images, intertwined as in a musical piece; however, they do not aim to underline the dynamic character of the plot, but the static character of the situation.7 The Bus Stop (Chezhan, 1982) by Gao Xingjian is an example of an absurd drama constructed of a similar sequence of scenes / images. The name of episodic structure would be equally justified there, as the playwright gives away the division into acts and scenes; one of the methods used to segment the text is a recurrent sound effect of a passing bus which remains invisible. Repetition is one of the basic construction principles of the play. It governs time, space, character’s utterances, manifests itself in recurrent themes and is amplified by preference towards circular, and not spiral movement. Therefore, progression is excluded. The movement is in fact simulated. Everyone treads in place. The history of a group of people who have been waiting for ten years for a bus which never stops at a cancelled bus stop and will never take any one of them to the nearby town, which is the purpose of their trip, begins, continues, and ends at the same place. The Bus Stop, much like Waiting for Godot, is a drama about waiting but also about non-action and inability to break free from a vicious circle of passivity and lack of communication with others, well settled in Chinese reality of the 1980s with all the bothersome problems of that time, such as separation of families, problems with finding a lifetime partner, juvenile delinquency, and backdoorism. 5 Ibidem, p. 292. 6 Ibidem, p. 293. 7 Ibidem, p. 293-294. Absurd and Grotesque in Plays by Gao Xingjian 123 The plot develops at a suburban bus-stop shaped as an asymmetrical cross which, according to Gao, has a symbolic meaning: “This shape is symbolic of a crossroads, or a fork in the road on the journey of life, or a way station in the lives of the characters.”8 Therefore, it is a meeting point for the accidental, would-be passengers, a crossroad for hardly interesting but human fates of those particular wanderers, who travel around the world without as much as making one step. The town has different significance for each of the characters. For Girl, it means a meeting with a yet unknown fiancée, for Mother it is a momentary return to her husband and child, for Old Man it means a game of chess and for Hothead it is a glass of a fashionable drink: kefir, which is associated with foreign culture, and with manners acceptable in a modern world. Each of the dramatis personae perceives the city as a fragment, not as a whole. They themselves are also fragmentary: their lives are made up of bits and pieces, banalities, popular dreams, and petty passions. The Bus Stop, true to the rules of the theatre of absurd, does not evoke particular interest in the complexity of a plot or psychological motives of the characters. The Carpenter keeps worrying that he will not be able to make furniture on time, and Director Ma is anxious about missing the party. Time passes, but neither the characters nor their surrounding can go through any metamorphosis. During a heavy storm, it seems for an instant that the characters are going to establish authentic, reciprocal contact and reach the decision about walking to the town together but the moment passes soon. As Esslin says, to wait is to experience the effect of time, which is a constant change. However, as nothing really happens, the change is illusionary. The more time flows by, the less things change.9 The passage of time might end when a bus stops at the bus stop, or - in Beckett’s drama 一 when Godot comes. In both plays, such event would radically change the situation of the waiting characters. This would lead the dramatis personae through the border between the transitory and the durable, which, in spite of being invisible, yields to human perception. “Then they will no longer be tramps, homeless wanderers, but will have arrived home.”10 They would have reached their destination, which would mean annihilation of time or at least slipping away from its destructive might. 8 Gao Xingjian, The Bus Stop, in: Shiao-Ling S. Yu (ed.), Chinese Drama After the Cultural Revolution, 1979-1989. An Anthology, Lewinson-Queenston-Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1996, p. 233. See also: Gao Xingjian Chezhan, „Shiyue”, no. 3, 1983, p. 119. 9 M. Esslin, The Theatre of the Absurd, pp. 38-39. 10 Ibidem, p. 39. 124 Izabella Łabędzka The Bus Stop presents an image of a static world in which movement is only an illusion. A group of the same characters circle around one place. The time is no more linear but cyclical. The characters, imprisoned in a miniaturised space and immersed in an excess of time transfigured into an overwhelming timelessness, remain within the circle of recurrent personal motives. Unceasing recurrences amplify the impression of permanence. The tragedy of human existence is, paradoxically enough, positioned between the excess and the lack of time and space. The hours of the day, weeks and seasons are in some instances very diligently marked, and in others - just neglected. A simple stage prop, which is there to remind about the passage of time, is the watch owned by Glasses. The precise time measuring device and the miracle of 20th century technology becomes a subject of fervent discussions which, while turning more and more absurd, fail to instigate any changes in the situation of the debaters, concerned with time and the methods of its measurement. The more is said about time, the more grotesque the situation becomes. The Bus Stop is full of definitions of time such as ‘on Saturday afternoon’, ‘a quarter past seven’, and ‘last year’, as well as of popular phrases such as “time is running” and “you are wasting your time here”. Approximations of time in Waiting for Godot were first noted by Ruby Cohn. The time was subject to stretching and flattening which stripped it of its past, present and future aspect and turned it into an eventless continuum. In Beckett’s drama the tense has turned into tension, while the present time thickened and became omnipresent.11 The Bus Stop presents a similar violation of balance between things past, present, and future. Although ‘yesterday’ of the characters and their anxiety about future is much better known that in Beckett’s play, they are nevertheless overwhelmed by the present tense. Attachment to the present time and its familiarity strengthens fear against the unknown tomorrow and against all things sudden and unforeseeable. This fear is well expressed by one of the characters: “Go or wait? Wait or go? That is the question of our existence. Perhaps fate has decreed that we should wait here for the rest of our lives, until we grow old, until we die. Why do people not take their future in their own hands instead of submitting to the dictates of fate? Then, again, what is fate anyway?”12 The future heralds changes which are not always changes for the better, while the present time gives an illusion of security. Imprisonment in a limitless and still growing now means simultaneously the imprisonment in a tiny here. The return to the past is as impossible as the march towards future. Although 11 R. Cohn, Just Play: Beckett’s Theatre, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 42. 12 Gao Xingjian, The Bus Stop, p. 260. Absurd and Grotesque in Plays by Gao Xingjian 125 the last words of the play are ‘Let’s go!’, one is aware that they are nothing more than another simulation of movement: no one actually has enough courage to do it. The characters seem to talk to one another, but in fact none of them bothers about what others have to say. They are self-centred and isolated from one another by an impassable border of alienation, dislike, bias, and internal fears. The claustrophobic space does not bring them closer - just the opposite: it amplifies the impression of their alienation and isolation in their own, micro-world. At times, they seem to be rather puppets than men of flesh and blood. Such strategy of positioning characters originated in the theatre of the absurd. Esslin has noted that both The Endgame and Waiting for Godot lack traditionally understood plot and characters. Generally known convention of plot and characters assumes that events in time and human individuality are real and significant. But Beckett questions this very assumption.13 In Beckett’s plays characters are reduced; the playwright sets them in symmetrical pairs, which fosters perceiving them not as individual persons but as personalised virtues and sins, in accordance with the poetics of medieval mystery plays.14 Old Man, Mother, Hothead, Director Ma and Carpenter are definitely presented as types of characters. The pairs: Girl - Mother, Old Man - Director Ma, and Glasses - Hothead are oppositions which respectively symbolise: youth versus old age, spiritual values versus materialism, and intellectual world versus primitive existence. However, these opposing pairs can be also treated as halves of split personalities. Each of these persons considered separately seems imperfect and incomplete, but also tragic and comical at the same time and hence it possesses a huge potential of grotesque. The playwright writes about them with clearly noticeable sympathy, saying that these beings are human, ridiculous, and pathetic through and through.15 Onimus sees such ‘incomplete’ humans, pariahs, human wrecks, beggars, and sick people the favourite characters of contemporary literature: the true depositories of the tragic. Therefore, Beckett’s plays are crowded with disabled persons and beggars and Antonioni’s world is full of waylaid people who will never reach their destination. They are 20th-century equivalents of court jesters gifted with the ability to see, feel amazed, ascribe question marks to hypocritical reality over-burdened with conventions, and to question incessantly false values 13 M. Esslin, The Theatre of the Absurd, p. 58. 14 Ibidem, p. 58. 15 Gao Xingjian, ’Chezhan，yiwen yiben xu (Introduction to Italian Translation of “The Bus Stop”), in: Gao Xingjian, Dui yizhong xiandai xiju de zhuiqiu (In Search of Contemporary Theatre), Beijing: Zhongguo Xiju Chubanshe, p. 129. 126 Izabella Łabędzka by the power of their naiveté, sensitivity and openness which truly differs to the power accessible to the so-called normal people. These characters, following the footsteps of jesters of the past, destroy seriousness and expose the truth about life to its very core, tragic and absurd.16 Disabled, impotent characters of The Bus Stop, for whom the wheel of fortune never turns the right way and who never experience a stroke of good luck, are aware of the absurd which arises wherever man meets the world: Glasses: Ah, life... Girl: You call this living? Glasses: Sure it is. Despite everything, we are still alive. Girl: We’d be better off dead. Glasses: Why don’t you die, then? Girl: If I die now, I’ve gotten nothing out of life. Glasses: There should be some meaning to life. Girl: But to live like this, how boring!17 The sense of absurdity of existence is born when one becomes aware that the world is nonsense, man’s existence is accidental and the man himself is turned into an object, into a toy tossed by forces which escape definition, his life is oriented towards death and that the world is not man’s home and will never be able to satisfy human need for harmony and order. “Your whole life is wasted in this way”,18 says one of the characters, filled with dramatic resignation. Although the world of the theatre of the absurd seems nonsense, its philosophy is not extremely pessimistic. “For the dignity of man”, recalls Esslin, “lies in his ability to face reality in all its senselessness; to accept it freely, without fear, without illusions 一 and to laugh at it.”19 Such understanding of the absurdity of being seems close to Gao Xingjian as well. Although the atmosphere of The Bus Stop may seem heavy and thick, its subtitle suggesting “A lyrical comedy of manners” suggests that human existence can be perceived as tragic, but it can be familiarised through smiles and poetry. The world of the theatre of the absurd seems disintegrated. The degree of its disintegration can be measured also by language which often loses its communicational functions, breaks down, unable to express things which 16 J. Onimus, Groteskowość a doświadczenie świadomości, tr. by K. Falicka, „Pamiętnik Literacki”, no. 4, 1979, pp. 322-323. After: J. Onimus, Le Grotesque et Vexperience de la ‘Lucidite，, „Revue d’Esthetique”, no. 3-4, 1966, pp. 290-299. 17 Gao Xingjian, The Bus Stop, p. 271. 18 Ibidem, p. 277. 19 M. Esslin, The Theatre of the Absurd, p. 314. Absurd and Grotesque in Plays by Gao Xingjian 127 are inexpressible and is reduced to schematic structures, repetitions, broken sentences, and isolated words which discloses its impotence as a tool for conceptual thinking. In the theatre of the absurd, language is used not for its ability to deliver messages but in order to ridicule it and to show in full its imperfection and inability to cope with significant human problems.20 The Bus Stop, as well as later plays by Gao Xingjian, brim with examples of language which is ridiculed, turned into banality, falls into pieces just as the world, which language is supposed to capture and express. In the theatre of the absurd, language becomes a perfect means for reflecting schematic thinking and communicating banal truth. The fact that characters are rather types than individuals determines their language which is often inlaid with slogans, unable to express deeper sense, and conceals banalities behind the facade of seemingly philosophical reflection. Usage of such language excludes any chances of establishing authentic contact between speakers. Artificial speech leads to reciprocal tension. Sometimes it seems that the characters say things other than what they originally intended. It is language that governs them and not the other way round. For instance, Glasses stubbornly repeats sequences of words: “book, pig, desk, dog, pig, dog, desk, book,” and uses them to build grammatically correct but logically absurd sentence structures: “Open your books! Open your pigs! - not right -Open your dogs! - not right, not right! ”21 It might be possible that Gao Xingjian, following the example of Beckett and Ionesco, falls back on his language studies with their nonsense and outdated methods of teaching foreign languages. Sometimes utterances seem to get detached from characters, as if they expressed someone else’s opinions. In other instances, monologues seem removed from the context. They are directed at the audience, reflecting the internal world of characters, their anxieties, fears and desires. Placed among sequences of worn-out phrases, they ring with a poetic dissonance. Dreams and complaints, rendered in the convention of a confession, add momentary individuality to this curious bunch of human types, professions, social roles and masks. In the theatre of the absurd, which shows time in all its excess and weight, characters invent various activities to kill the time. One of the methods to accelerate its passage are language games, in which words do not even pretend to be related to reality in any way.22 Another, much simpler way is to annihilate 20 S.M. Halloran, Język i absurd, tr. by G. Cendrowska, „Pamiętnik Literacki”, no. 4, 1979, p. 332. After: S.M. Halloran, Language and the Absurd, „Philosophy and Rhetoric”, vol. 6, no. 2, 1973, pp. 97-108. 21 Gao Xingjian, The Bus Stop, p. 248. 22 S.M. Halloran, Language and the Absurd. 128 Izabella Łabędzka time by submerging it in a stream of words. Characters talk incessantly, sometimes wisely, at other times stupidly, as if they thought that talking is the only justification for their existence. Although Gao Xingjian has confirmed that he owes to Waiting for Godot, he thinks that The Bus Stop originated from an entirely different concept of theatre and drama. According to Gao, Beckett’s and Ionesco’s works are anti-theatre. Characters in these plays sit and play with words instead of acting, in contrast to Gao’s characters who at least simulate action.23 Moreover, the vision of the world and the philosophy of creation are different. Gao Xingjian sees modern times as tragicomic, while Beckett - according to Gao - is dominated by the tragic. For Beckett, waiting is categorised as tragedy and aims at reflection on human condition, while Gao leans increasingly towards the comic, which is however lined with the tragic. According to the playwright, The Bus Stop’s main goal is to make people smile and not to force them to perform heavy intellectual work. Gao thinks that The Bus Stop, in contrast to Beckett, discusses everyday experiences instead of philosophical problems.24 However, the complex structure of the play is a reason good enough to question some of the above remarks. On the other hand, the more intellectually and aesthetically sophisticated are his plays, the more Gao Xingjian emphasises his dislike of philosophical considerations, as if he were afraid of slipping into the chasm of abstraction and losing his foothold in reality. Or perhaps, he just expresses his distaste of philosophy based on logic, focused on intellectual games and enclosed in a compact theoretical system, which ultimately leads to annihilation of true thinking which should provide space for order and disorder, contradictions, and variety of meanings.25 氺氺* In Dialogue and Rebuttal (Duihua yiu fanjie, 1992), linguistic experiments adopt a new, even more diversified shape. The very title of the play focuses on linguistic issues, but Gao would probably refuse to call Dialogue and Rebuttal a linguistic play. In his opinion, literature is not subordinated to language science and does not function as its experimental field; hence his dislike to those trends in post-modernism that ascribe absolute meaning to linguistic games which only serve as a cover for intellectual and emotional void. 23 Gao Xingjian, Jinghua yetan (Night Talks in Beijing), in Gao Xingjian, Dui yizhong xiandaixiju de zhuiqiu, p. 168. 24 Ibidem, pp. 185-186, p. 128. 25 Gao Xingjian Bali suibi (Paris Jottings), in: Gao Xingjian, Meiyou zhuyi (Without -isms), Xianggang: Cosmos Books Ltd., 1996, pp. 24-25. Absurd and Grotesque in Plays by Gao Xingjian 129 Gao Xingjian’s attitude towards language seems to be ambiguous. He knows from his own experience that the harder we try to express the essence of things and the human truth through language, the more distant and elusive they become. Language proves to be far from perfection, but it constitutes the very reality faced by a writer. It should be primarily treated as a tool and means of expression and not as a goal in itself. Writing is the unceasing struggle with language, which sometimes leads to its destruction in order to know its limits, to expand its potential, and hence make another effort to approach the truth.26 Dialogue and Rebuttal is a play for two voices: Girl and Man. The third person, Monk, who is present on the stage is not involved in the conversation; he just utters words of prayer or fragments of holy books from time to time. Silence on stage is a trick often used by Western playwrights of absurd; when set against talkativeness of the other character, it proves to be able to embrace all significant things: things which the unceasing hum of words cannot express. When expression through language is unable to satisfy the expectations, the escape into silence seems to be the only solution. In such circumstances, the theatre of the absurd ascribes more importance to the role of visual signs, gestures, movement, and stage props. Monk belongs to the order of the sacred which is opposed to the realm of the profane represented by Girl and Man. He can be seen by the audience and by the couple of characters, but he is not directly involved in their actions, although he can see the two on stage as well. Monk and the couple exist in parallel; their relationship reminds of ties binding an enlightened master and a still unenlightened disciple: seemingly logical questions and doubts of the disciple are solved by the master in a non-logical, surprising manner, questioning conceptual thinking and the very language that serves as its tool. The strange comportment of Monk, his repeated and failed attempts to place an egg on one end of a stick or to stand on one hand are ripostes aiming to undermine the purpose of the couple who make efforts to reach an understanding; however, this goal remains unattained, both on the erotic and the linguistic plane. Still the characters hold tightly to the imperfect, disabled language, by undertaking more or less sophisticated games, typical for antagonistic couples of the theatre of the absurd, involved in reciprocal torture. First, such games take up the shape of well-structured stories with a consistent narrative, such as the tale about the Girl’s erotic and narcotic experiences during her travel 26 Gao Xingjian, Meiyouzhuyi, in: Gao Xingjian, Meiyouzhuyi, pp. 12-13. See also Gao Xingjian, Dui ‘Chezhan，yanchu de jidian jianyi (Some Suggestions on Producing “The Bus Stop”), in Gao Xingjian, Duiyizhongxiandaixiju dezhuiqiu, p. 122. 130 Izabella Łabędzka to India. However, more and more terror, perversion, and chaos slip into the story, as the gradual destruction of language continues. The language slowly discloses its true nature in the first part of the play. It proves to be an unreliable tool for communication from the very beginning, but at that stage it remains reasonably coherent, correct, and seemingly transparent. Girl and Man carry trivial conversations on the differences between sexes, politics, writing, and dreams which invariably result in quarrels, calling each other names, and reciprocal acts of violence. Both characters slip into stereotypes in thinking and drown in the thick pulp of words: their dialogue breaks and transforms itself into recurrent explosions of anger, accusations, and swearwords - until they play their very last game: mutual death by stabbing. The language, which was to enhance understanding, leads to violence and physical annihilation of discussants. Moreover, after the characters have transgressed the border between the worlds and undergone an existential transformation, the erosion of language proceeds until it finally fades away. At first, crippled everyday language lets the characters fill the huge void that separates them after their sexual encounter but is not sufficient to establish an intimate relationship. Each of them lives in a separate world of personal fears, phobias, and stereotypes related to others, and is imprisoned in individual language. The omnipotence of such language is questioned for the first time when Girl wants Man to ask her about her name: Girl: Maria or Anna, which one do you prefer? Man: The question is which one is your real name? Girl: If I told you it’s Maria, then I would surely be Maria? Man: That’s a real problem. But if I called you Anna, you’d still be you and not someone called Anna, therefore, you really shouldn’t worry too much about it. Girl: (dryly) I don’t want to be a stand-in for somebody else! Man: Of course, if name is just a code, what’s important is not the sign itself but the actual person behind that sign. You can call me whatever you like, even if it’s some name you are familiar with, or some name that accidentally slips from you tongue, anything, I don’t think I’d mind.27 Names are just contractual and language is just a means of killing time; by no means it can expose truth about another man or lead to cognition of the sense of existence. Attachment to conceptual thinking, which uses logical language structured by grammatical rules, leads to the failure of Girl and 27 Gao Xingjian, Dialogue and Rebuttal, in: The Other Shore. Plays by Gao Xingjian, tr. by Gilbert C.F. Fong, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2000, p. 95. Absurd and Grotesque in Plays by Gao Xingjian 131 Man. Why do they keep talking? Girl talks because “She says she’s afraid of silence; she can’t stand people not talking when they’re face to face with each other, she finds that suffocating. She is much more afraid of silence than of death, death is more bearable than not talking to each other like this.”28 Man, in fact, talks to himself, seeking relief and peace, and attempting to keep his “I” at his side. As of the moment of mutual stabbing, the link between characters turns even more loose. The language is subject to still new experiments, which turn more and more defiant while its communication role is weakening. In the other world, Man and Girl do not talk with each other but with their split personalities or their heads turned into stage-props separated from the bodies. Language exposes its impotence again, only to convince us after a short while that it is the only way for us to justify our existence. Little by little, syntax disintegrates, to disappear entirely in the end. Sentences turn into unrelated phrases and then into single, senseless words. However, moments of instantaneous illumination and discovery of their condition occur in some of the monologues between Girl and Man: Man: You are you because you’re still talking, that’s all there is to it. Girl: Wind. Man: Actually you don’t know what you are talking about, you talk only because you want to. (Shakes his head) Girl: Hollow. Man: You can’t understand the meaning of your own worlds, you’re just the slave of language, but you can’t stop yourself from talking endlessly. (Shakes his head). Girl: Tin soldier. Man: You can’t free yourself from language’s entanglement, just like a spider. (Shakes his head). No, you are not a spider, but you’re still a spider. (Shakes his head). Girl: Candle. Man: You’re not free to move, being trapped in the web of language of your own making. (Shakes his head).29 The alternative to the world of words is the world of gestures, performed by Monk with utmost precision and diligence. The playwright suggests that they should be derived from strongly conventional forms of Japanese No theatre and Chinese musical drama, with their characteristic precision of stylised movement 28 Ibidem, p. 124. 29 Ibidem, pp. 131-132. 132 Izabella Łabędzka which constitutes a separate sign system able to replace or supplement signs of language. The behaviour of Monk, which is so different, may help to determine his status on stage and beyond it. Monk symbolises a world different from the world of Girl and Man. Both worlds exist independently, as if separated by a transparent glass wall. They can see each other but they have nothing in common.30 Although Gao Xingjian explains that he does not intend to popularise Zen Buddhism, one has to have basic knowledge of it to be able to understand the concept of incorporating famous koans into the dramatic structure, to justify the presence of Monk and finally, to understand the deeper and veiled sense of the play. Monk recites fragments of the sutra which question bivalent logic, the tendency of human mind to split things into categories and forming opposing pairs such as existence 一 non-existence, unity 一 multitude, truth 一 falsity, good 一 evil, life 一 death. Zen is the opposite of logic and dualistic thinking although it includes an intellectual element. Its aim is to exercise the mind to turn it into its own master. This allows for opening the internal eye which allows to reach the essence of things. Zen aims to reach awakening from the state of unawareness. The mind must be ‘killed’ in order to be ‘resurrected’.31 The mind is actually ‘killed’ in Dialogue and Rebuttal through consistent annihilation of its tool, which is language. Finally, the ‘posthumous’ monologues of Girl and Man begin to give voice to things non-logical, irrational, and exceeding the limits of sense: they in turn become translucent enough for a faint trace of truth about man. Such is strategy of Zen, which reminds how unreliable common-sense approach to world and logical interpretation of phenomena are. In the light of Zen, if man wishes to know the truth, he has to develop a new way of looking at everything, which is no more subject to limitations of logic and discursive thinking.32 The presence of Monk reminds that words are nothing more than words, and logic remains reliable only until certain stage. Undue attachment to abstract speculations does not facilitate understanding, disturbs efforts to achieve internal peace, and makes man unhappy. Girl and Man torment each other with words and thoughts; the more words they say and the more foolish their words 30 Gao Xingjian, Duihua yu fanjie，dao biaoyan tan (“Dialogue and Rebuttal” - Talks about its Stage Production), in: Gao Xingjian, Meiyou zhuyi, p. 194. 31 D.T. Suzuki, Wprowadzenie do buddyzmu zen (Introduction to Buddhism), preface by C.G. Jung, tr. by M. Grabowska, A. Grabowski, Warszawa: Czytelnik, 1979, pp. 47-48. 32 Ibidem pp. 74-79. Absurd and Grotesque in Plays by Gao Xingjian 133 are, the longer is their way towards cognising the truth. However, the greater their torment the more desperate are they in holding to words. The hope for their liberation appears at the end of the play when the language is reduced to a single phrase which turns into the word ‘crack’. The crack symbolises the lack of understanding between Girl and Man, but it is also their last word. When this word ceases, there might appear a chance for a different, fuller understanding of the world. Stage directions clearly suggest that the form of dialogues refers to conversations of Zen masters with their disciples, with characteristic delight in paradox and constant questioning of logic which proves to be too one-sided and provides a false vision of things, according to the rule that things seemingly non-logical finally turn different, as irrationality has its own logic, equivalent to the actual state of affairs. This reminds of a statement which Esslin made five decades ago, saying that the essence of mystic Zen philosophy is the experience of nothingness, emptiness, and inability to express things in contact with the world; it also shares with all mystical schools of the East and West a deep experience of joy and liberation resulting from becoming aware of the limitations of language and logical thought, which are therefore replaced with poetic images. Ionesco also pointed to the similarities between methods used by Zen and the theatre of the absurd, namely, in the manner of answering question on the nature of enlightenment and constructing nonsensical problems.33 Hence, plays by Gao Xingjian have become a meeting place for Zen, theatre of the absurd, and psychoanalysis, where the process of self-liberation is accompanied by an insight into one’s own psyche, in the strata of memory, and in the world of fears born from the mind.34 Monk from Dialogue and Rebuttal is similar to Silent Man from The Bus Stop not only because they are silent or almost silent characters, constructed as a certain contrast or convex mirrors which reflect sterile talkativeness of the other party. Both characters, coming from the borderland, from the peripheries, are indifferent, cool observers. One of them is a rebel who crosses limits, distances himself from his surrounding, has a keen sense of criticism, and is driven by his will of cognition. The other is a man of certain faith, open to another reality which reaches far beyond limits drawn by intellect and senses; he can see more and in greater detail, has an in-depth perspective, because he perceives things with his internal, spiritual eye. 33 M. Esslin, The Theatre of the Absurd, pp. 312-313. 34 On the relationships between Zen Buddhism and psychoanalysis see: E. Fromm, D.T. Suzuki, R. De Martino，Buddyzm zen i psychoanaliza (Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis), tr. by M. Macko, Poznań: Dom Wydawniczy Rebis, 2000. 134 Izabella Łabędzka Dialogue and Rebuttal further reduces the elements determining dramatic space. In The Bus Stop, one could recognise its specific Chinese features; now the setting is much more universal. Stage props suggest that the place and time are stripped of any distinctive features: the stage is empty and the paraphernalia are reduced to some clothes and some objects. The only ‘oriental’ traces are the presence of Monk and the India connection. The space in The Bus Stop is the road, much like in Waiting for Godot, while the space of Dialogue and Rebuttal, just as of the Endgame, is limited to an undetermined room. The relationship of characters enclosed in this space with the external world is maintained only through far-away sounds of rain, wind, and dripping water. In the second part of the play, the space grows into an imaginary dark hall or maze, as described by the Man, or to a naked hill or terrifying railway platform - childhood memories of the Girl. The expansion of space is accompanied by reduction of characters who are beginning to lose their human identity; they are wriggling and turning into worms. After the last word is uttered, the Monk ends his sweeping of the floor - reminiscent of an exorcist, and everything is covered in darkness; then he tears down the curtain which has been hiding a blue-and-grey infinity of space, among the growing rustle of the wind. This heralds a new, supra-logical space, different from the one occupied by man trapped by his language. 氺氺* Modern times, with their inherent phenomena of serial and mass production, mechanisation and repetitiveness, bring a new understanding of tragedy and tragic hero. However, while ancient tragedy - according to Domenach - was a clash of ‘fullnesses’ which were values and passions, the modern anti-tragedy has replaced them with ‘emptinesses’, anti-values and senselessness. The modern theatre of entropy does not show the clash of great passions any more. They are replaced by people drowning in time, things, and language.35 Democratisation of the tragic has removed the old-style hero from the stage and replaced him with a crowd of characters which are commonplace, everyday, nondescript, foolish, and disabled. The new source of the tragic is the comic in its ultimately second-rate form of farce and parody which is totally out of tune with the stern character of tragedy.36 35 On the new understanding of the tragic in modern theatre see chapter L’infra-tragedie in: J.-M. Domenach, Le retour du tragique, Paris: ed. du Seuil, 1967. Quoted after: J.-M. Domenach, Powrót tragizmu (Le retour du tmgique), tr. by J. Lalewicz, „Dialog”, no. 6, 1971, p. 124. 36 Ibidem, p. 118. Absurd and Grotesque in Plays by Gao Xingjian 135 The tragic enters plays by Gao Xingjian not impersonated by a golden-haired superhuman being - to use an image of Domenach’s - a puppet man, but by a dummy, a mask and a fool, a jester, a lunatic, a person devoid of identity yet possessing a split personality, a man who might be a mirror image or an illusion woven by himself or by someone else, a creature with many doubles which can undergo reification. In one word, he is a being which does not make decisions about himself but seems to be governed by undefined external forces. Disruption of the real world is mirrored by the structure of the play and its characters. The latter ones disintegrate simultaneously with the atrophy of final axial points, common systems of value, translucent hierarchical structures and clearly determined goals which attract human passions. The characters lack names and individual features and, therefore, are replaceable. However, they would like to be separate and rooted in reality. Therefore, they desperately seek for any footholds in their past and try to make up a whole out of pitiful flotsam and jetsam drifting in their memory and imagination. Their way of existence is also questionable. In fact, it is hard to establish whether they belong to the world of the living or to the world of the dead, and whether they move in the real space or in the realm of fiction. One can never be certain, because the very borders and divisions lines have been shifted or removed. No one knows whether the world is populated by the living or by the dead who imitate the living. Transition from one side to another is smooth, and the principles of ghastly logic functioning on both sides do not allow to see clearly which is the obverse and which is the reverse. In the crowd of illusions, shadows, reflections, multiple versions of one person, and - among the multitude of persons, solitude is the only authentic experience. It often happens that the solitude becomes deeper when the surrounding crowd becomes thicker; sometimes it is experienced in the loneliness, in a closed room separated from the world, sometimes in the company of another person or just a recollection of a person. Dynamics, changeability and speed of modern civilisation are openly contradictory to impotence, lack of activity and mobility of characters in modern theatrical plays. Gao Xingjian’s characters give up acting in aid of talking, following the principle: the less I do the more I talk, and the more I talk the more I exist. The growing sense of loneliness is amplified by self-focusing and encourages an obsessive repetition of the question of “Who am I?” This question conceals the desperate hope that when a reply is found, it will reinstate the internal order of the person who asks, and consequently: the order of his or her world. Discussing the special significance of language in the modern world, Domenach concludes that its unlimited rule is strictly connected with the breakdown of the classical model of a play based on the plot, characters, 136 Izabella Łabędzka meanings, and values. Moreover, the contemporary world uses mass media which serve propaganda and manipulation to turn the language into a monstrous and autonomous being. The domination of language grows stronger as the man becomes more and more degraded. Although words devour man, they still remain the only proof of his existence and guarantee of his identity.37 The speech has definitely lost the characteristics of a tool serving communication and it carries along only an illusionary hope of confirming the existence of the speaker. Words do not have any inherent sense, and eloquence which is related to the constant regrouping of words is just a repetition of nonsense. This, however, is of no significance: “Whether nonsense or not, it’s not important. The important thing is that you’re still saying them. You are you only because you can still say the words.”38 This is the reason of unrestrained talkativeness of some characters in plays by Gao Xingjian. Incessant talking, which is an external manifestation of analytical operations of the mind, does not solve any existential problems nor does it put an end to the eternal hiatus between reality and fiction, truth and invention, good and evil, duration and transition, possession and want, and existence and non-existence. On the contrary, talking leads to exhaustion, total entropy, and atrophy of acting and talking. This, however, is not death because even the reality of death has been questioned. It rather seems to be a ghastly, self-propelling mechanism without beginning and end, where everything is unending return and repetition. When it seems that everything has been said, it proves, that in fact nothing has been said and the monologue makes a circle and returns to the point of departure: “She says she doesn’t know what she was saying, she doesn’t know what she really wants to say, maybe she didn’t say anything, if what she said is useless, then she might as well not say it, she says she doesn’t know what she ought to say, and what else she has not said. But what more can she say?”39 Finally, a person being the creator of an utterance is also questioned, as there arises a suspicion that the person is created through an utterance. It is not known ultimately whether a person rules over words or vice versa, which consequently questions autonomy of this person. If speech is woven of facts and inventions, of something that comes from the very person but also is to a certain extent enforced on this person as a linguistic cliché, common opinion or schematic thinking 一 the authenticity of the speaker remains an open question. 37 Ibidem, p. 123. 38 Gao Xingjian, Nocturnal Wanderer, in: The Other Shore. Plays by Gao Xingjian, p. 183. See also Gao Xingjian, Yeyoushen, „Qingxiang”, no. 7-8, 1996, pp. 242-243. 39 Gao Xingjian, Between Life and Death, in: The Other Shore. Plays by Gao Xingjian, p. 74. See also: Gao Xingjian, Shengsijie, „Jintian”, no. 2, 1991, p. 27. Absurd and Grotesque in Plays by Gao Xingjian 137 In spite of “I speak and therefore I am” the very structure of speech with its combination of truth and false can question the realness of the speaker. In this grand parade of talkers, whose speech is more or less coherent, there appears at times some strange character who is markedly alienated. No one knows where he comes from and where he is going to. He may be a silent man, or a lunatic woman, a prostitute or a monk. None of these characters can be placed within the structure of the so-called normal world. Sometimes, they do not say anything, sometimes their words are mad, or they just perform a surprising gesture. However, their behaviour invariably disturbs the existent order of things, and questions the normality of the world, disclosing pretences, falsity and hypocrisy which are the lining of everyday life; such characters disturb peace of all people who struggle to get rooted in the reality and show us that we live in the world of self-made illusions while the reality always escapes us. Even worse: we do not know whether we really exist, if words are the only proof of our existence. Such characters do not fit in the hierarchic structures of neat everyday life, they violate its dogmatic rules and rebel against petrified standards. They do not belong to this world. They come to us from the other side of the mirror, from the other shore, from a different dimension. Silent or talkative, mad or holy, akin to great jester-sages of the past, they appear among us for a while to call everything into question, to shake us awake from a coma, to remind us that we are obliged to rebel. They are believers in jester philosophy, which according to Kołakowski “in every period exposes things which had seemed to be inflexible as prone to doubt, discovers contradictions in things which had been treated as unquestionable and could seemingly be verified by senses, ridicules the obvious in common sense and seeks reason in absurdities - in other words, takes up everyday toil of a professional jester, with inevitable risk of ridicule involved [...]”40 Jester’s distrust in any stability of world places him in Gao’s plays in the role of a person excluded from the crowd and shifted beyond boundaries of a community. The distance from the others, or finally an escape, is the last chance to retain personal freedom and integrity in the world crumbled into tiny pieces. * * * A mixture of narrative styles, free transition from realistic to surrealistic convention, from poetics of a dream to the stream of consciousness, a shift in 40 L. Kołakowski, Błazen i kapłan (Jester and Priest), in: L. Kołakowski, Pochwala niekonsekwencji. Pisma rozproszone z lat 1955-1968 (A Eulogy of Inconsistency. Dispersed Writings from 1955-1968), Warszawa: Niezależna Oficyna Wydawnicza, 1989, vol. 1, p. 178. 138 Izabella Łabędzka the style of the character’s existence on stage when they are able to talk about themselves from a distance by using second or third person singular are means helping to create an image of reality which suddenly turns alien. The alienated world seen as absurd is a world subject to constant disturbances of balance and proportions between spheres which are perceived as separate, says Kayser in his definition of grotesque.41 In one of his essays, written at the beginning of the 1980s, Gao Xingjian refers to Waiting for Godot by Samuel Beckett as a work in which the effect of strangeness and grotesque is built of elements originating in reality.42 According to Gao, the poetics of strangeness (guaidan) does not clash with realistic poetics, which can be proven by modern Chinese literature, such as The Diary of a Madman (Kuangren riji, 1918) by Lu Xun, where the so-called normal reality is shown as abnormal and the words of truth are spoken by a madman. In its extremity, the poetics of strangeness might be considered irony. “Strangeness is a search for perfection. There can be no strangeness without love of the mind, without passionate desire for truth. Strangeness is a sharp condemnation of the irrationality of the real world, a great exposition and criticism of degraded life; hence it makes man sober and forces him to think.”43 Among the variety of tools used by poetics of the strangeness one can find exaggeration, symbols and lack of logicality. They allow violation of traditional relationships of time and space, cause and effect, two-way metamorphoses of the imagined into the real, and of the common into the exceptional. However, Gao makes the reservation that “strangeness and illogicality are products of the mind, powerful instruments which serve to create symbolic forms of modern art, while they themselves do not constitute the purpose of artistic creation”.44 Elements of the poetics of grotesque are used by the playwright to interfere with the viewer’s automatic perception of reality and to restore his lost sense of freedom through the experience of fear. What is the source of this fear, which is at the same time nagging and liberating? 41 W. Kayser, Próba określenia istoty groteskowości, tr. by R. Handke, „Pamiętnik Literacki”, no. 4, 1979, pp. 277-279. After: W. Kayser, Versuch einer Wesenbestimmung des Grotesken, in W. Kayser, Das Groteske，seine Gestaltung in Malerei und Dichtung, Oldenburg 1957, pp. 193-203. 42 Gao Xingjian, Juligan (The Sense of Distance、, in: Gao Xingjian, Xiandai xiaoshuo jiqiao chutan (Preliminary Remarks on the Techniques of Contemporary Chinese Literature), Guangzhou: Huacheng Chubanshe, 1982, p. 103. 43 Gao Xingjian, Guaidan yu feiluoji (Strangeness and Illogicality), in Gao Xingjian, Xiandai xiaoshuo jiqiao chutan, p. 35. 44 Ibidem, p. 41. Absurd and Grotesque in Plays by Gao Xingjian 139 It is the terror which we feel when we are aware of the illusionary character of our world, and we are afraid of living in it. Grotesque always questions our orientation in the world, and at the same time is an attempt to cast a spell and tame all things demonic.45 Gao Xingjian disarms absurd and terror in many ways: by exposing schematic thinking, destroying language clichés, using humour, irony, and slapstick gags (such as tying the shoelaces which keep untying themselves in Dialogue and Rebuttal), discovering poetic atmosphere where it is least expected, disclosing humans as ridiculous, helpless and cruel. He manages to achieve the effect of grotesque by combining in his characters features which are at the same time terrifying and funny, fearsome and ridiculous, fit for demons as well as for clowns. Grotesque is nothing else than combination of these two elements. It appears when atrocities are treated in a funny way. It is the demonic turned into the trivial.46 Both the former and the latter are sometimes warmed in Gao’s plays by the smile of Monk 一 a benevolent smile of the man who knows. 45 W. Kayser, Próba określenia istoty groteskowości, pp. 277-279. 46 L.B. Jennings, Termin ‘groteska，, pp. 305-307. KENNETH OLENIK The international phase: Deng Yanda's theory and Practice, 1923-1928 Deng Yanda’s generation, born in the late 1890s, was obsessed by the need to integrate theory and practice. A sense of urgency, a feeling that China was in immediate danger of annihilation by powerful Darwinian forces stirred his generation to intense levels of action. (Li: 9) Deng was a product of this activist generation; in his case, an exceptional intellect, tremendous energy, and love for his people and homeland magnified his behaviour. His life was short, but extremely full. Fortunately for Deng, he lived in an age before ideology became frozen into sectarian orthodoxy. The same tragic circumstances that fostered revolution allowed Chinese intellectuals an unprecedented level of freedom: a golden opportunity to explore new frontiers of thought and practice. Deng took to his era with tremendous enthusiasm. He relentlessly sought to understand and explore China’s revolution in the context of domestic and international conditions. He persisted in his search for a theoretical structure in which to organize his ideas; a structure through which he could rationalize his personal activities and the demands he placed on others to sacrifice themselves in revolutionary struggle. He assumed that ideas and actions would evolve in the context of changing circumstances and with the growth and development of his own understanding. He eschewed rigidity and orthodoxy in favour of flexibility. One of the most dramatic and consequential shifts in Deng’s thought occurred in the late 1920s. At that time, he turned from an enthusiastic advocate of socialist internationalism to an outspoken critic; his belief that the world’s socialists would provide China with empathetic support gave way to cynicism. He came to understand China would have to struggle alone. This change did not, however, reduce Deng to pessimism. Instead, it reinforced his confidence in the Chinese people to create their own future. This change in his understanding of socialist internationalism as much as his critique of China’s historically derived conservatism underlay Deng’s efforts to formulate a distinctive Chinese revolutionary ideology. The final years of his life were given to this task along with his efforts to translate ideas into revolutionary practice. This essay reviews Deng’s growing alienation from socialist internationalism and its impact on his thought and practice. 144 Kenneth Olenik In his childhood and youth, Deng was influenced by changes taking place in China. His village, Lujing, Huiyang County in Guangdong province was close to Hong Kong and China’s southern coast. It had been a battleground during the Taiping Rebellion in the 19th century and the revolutionary wars in the 20th. His family were neither wealthy nor poor. Deng’s father was educated, a graduate of the imperial examination system and a respected local teacher, which meant high status gentry. He received both a traditional Confucian education and modern training. Formal education opened Deng’s mind to complex abstract thinking; it prepared the way for his understanding of the world. Deng’s father belonged to an important circle of Hakka (kejia) intellectuals and leaders who were associated with Sun Yatsen and the Tongmenghui (Revolutionary Alliance). As a result, even as a child, Deng participated in revolutionary activities. His father inspired him with intense revolutionary fervour sending him on to a military education under the mentorship of Deng Keng, one of Sun Yatsen’s most loyal military partisans. Deng’s formal education continued in a number of military academies, culminating with his graduation from the famous sixth class of the Baoding Military Academy in 1919. During his military training, Deng came under the influence of instructors who either came from or had been educated abroad. Though he consistently graduated at the head of his class, he was never completely satisfied. In his heart, Deng longed for the life of a modern intellectual. Lack of family resources kept him bound to the military harness, which he compensated by nurturing a desire to study abroad, pursuing nonmilitary subjects on his own, and working on German hoping for an opportunity to study in Germany. As a young man, Deng was already fascinated by the world and felt that he needed to experience life in the West. Through his connection with Deng Keng, Deng Yanda was drawn into the whirlwind of Guangdong military politics. Like his mentor, Deng Yanda demonstrated unfailing loyalty to Sun Yatsen. He was also influenced by two of Sun’s closest political associates, Liao Zhongkai and Zhu Zhixin. Both Liao and Zhu shared a strong faith in the revolutionary potential of the ordinary Chinese, believing that ultimately China’s destiny would be determined by the activation of “mass power” on behalf of revolutionary change. Though Zhu died in 1920, before Sun began to reorganise his followers with the help of the Third International and Chinese communists, Liao survived until 1926. He was one of the most enthusiastic advocates of internationalising China’s revolution through cooperation with the communists. Under these influences faith in mass revolution and the interconnectedness between China’s and the world’s socialist revolutions were embraced by Deng in the early 1920s. The international phase: Deng Yanda's Theory and Practice, 1923-1928 145 During the period of the Guomindang reorganisation (1923-1924) Deng Yanda began to appear more regularly among Sun’s close associates. The same period marked the gradual ascent of military men into the inner circle of political power in the Guomindang. Sun’s major effort to build a reliable party army meant that military men had to be drawn more tightly into the party organisation and that their power would increase. The central element of Sun’s military program was the Whampoa Military Academy, envisioned as a new type of school with a mission to train officers loyal to National Revolutionary Army. Significantly, Deng was chosen by Sun to work with seven others on the Academy preparatory committee; when Chiang Kaishek left the chairmanship of the committee and his substitute, Liao Zhongkai, was distracted by numerous responsibilities, Deng emerged as a key person shaping the organisation and programs of the Academy. He was subsequently appointed vice-Director of Education and Commander of the student brigade. In addition, he was chosen to serve on the crucial student selection committee and played an active role in selecting students for the first class. (Qiu & Guo, p.30) Deng’s initial tenure at Whampoa was brief, lasting from March to August 1924. During these formative months at the Academy, lines were rapidly forming between pro-and anti-communist factions. Deng worked intensely and enthusiastically with the pro-communist faction. He established close relationships with communists and Third International advisors. His “leftwing” associations combined with a sharp, critical tongue and a tinge of arrogance alienated Deng from the Chiang-centred leadership at Whampoa. In his own words, Deng was “forced out by the rightwing.” This departure from the Academy provided Deng with the opportunity to fulfil his long held dream of studying in Germany; he also perceived his foreign journey as an important chance to forge new links between China’s revolutionaries and the world socialist revolution. In a letter to Zhang Nanxian of 24th October 1924, just before his departure, Deng wrote (...) regarding my plans for saving our nation, I intend to join an international revolutionary organisation so as to work toward a world revolution，so that we can jointly root out our common enemies. I made this decision during the past two months (...) as I observed the acute suffering of our people and the massive economic problems confronting our country. (Deng, 1981:2) Deng went to Germany in search of understanding about the relationship between China’s revolution and the world. He was looking for ways to integrate China’s struggle with international socialist organisations. His efforts had a profound influence on his thinking and behaviour. Deng was a well-motivated student. He had a major intellectual talent and the special ability to digest and synthesise large quantities of information. He continued to improve his German language skills, systematically studied economics, politics, society and 146 Kenneth Olenik military affairs, and read works on social and political theory as well as Marxist materials. Moreover, he made close friends with other Chinese in Germany including a number of communists and Guomindang leftists who would become important associates after he returned to China. It is difficult to evaluate Deng’s efforts to link the Guomindang with international socialist organisations in Germany. As we shall see, following his return to China he would act as the most important advocate of international linkage in the Guomindang. For a time he would enthusiastically continue to embrace the idea that China’s destiny could not be separated from global socialist revolutionary forces. Interestingly, while he continued to work closely with Chinese communists and Third International agents, Deng never joined the Chinese communist party nor apparently did he ever fully trust the motives of the Communist International. Throughout his life, he remained loyal to the Guomindang as the only organisation capable of articulating a distinctive Chinese revolutionary vision; he also insisted that the Chinese must be the leaders of their own revolution. When he talked about links to international socialist organisations, Deng assumed that China would be taken in such relationships on a basis of equality, or perhaps due to size and history, in time, China would be expected to take on a leadership role. Finally, Deng assumed that the transforming force in world revolutionary change were the masses of common people and that the ultimate goal of the struggle was liberation of the vast exploited and suffering majority of humankind. The international links he discussed were between the various suffering masses of the world as they struggled for their own liberation. While in Germany, Deng remained in touch with events back home. Having heard of Sun Yatsen’s death on 12th March 1925 and the subsequent acceleration of revolutionary activity, he returned home via the Soviet Union. Deng used this opportunity to observe changes in Russia and meet with Hu Hanmin who was living in Moscow as a “representative” of the Guomindang. Deng arrived in Canton in time for the Second Guomindang Congress, which convened in January 1926. The Second Congress marked the ascent of the Party’s leftwing and communist members; Deng, naturally, benefited from the new political configuration within the party. At the age of thirty-one he was about to begin one of the most dynamic phases in his career. On his return, Deng was brimming with tremendous energy and optimism. Fortunately, there is more information on Deng’s ideas at this stage of his life as well as the first public discussion of his ideology and conceptualisation of revolution. (Deng 1981: 4-18) Following is a general analysis of Deng’s main ideas related to his understanding of the international dimensions of China’s revolution in early 1926. The international phase: Deng Yanda's Theory and Practice, 1923-1928 147 Of these early speeches, Deng’s presentation to assembled members of the Second Congress during his journey to Europe was the most important. He developed two important themes, which defined his ideology at that time. He argued that China’s revolution came from forces deep within the masses of the common people; these forces in turn were caused by the people’s terrible suffering and misery. The Guomindang, since the reorganisation, embraced the outcry and demands of the suffering masses for liberation as its main concern. It had begun to organise these masses as a force that could bring about their own liberation. Thus, the main purpose of the party was to help the masses in their struggle for self-liberation by organising them and providing with leadership. Successes since the First Congress, Deng argued, were the result of activation and release of the energy of the masses. The success of China’s revolutionary struggle depended on how effectively the party built a mass revolutionary base. Directly related to Deng’s first premise was his second argument that China was not alone in the throes of revolutionary struggle. The same forces transforming mass consciousness in China were sweeping the world; events in China were parts of a world revolutionary phenomenon. Deng argued that the Chinese could benefit by linking up with revolutionary organisations throughout the world. Related to Deng’s last point is his important distinction between mass revolutionary forces and governments. His observations in Europe convinced him that while the governments in Europe and Great Britain represented the imperialist interests of the ruling classes, there was a growing mass revolutionary consciousness. The common people in the various nations of the West were sympathetic to the aspirations and struggles of the Chinese. They were potential allies represented for the most part by various socialist parties and organisations. The Soviet Union where the working class had already taken power into there own hands was a special case and, as Deng understood the situation in 1926, a special ally of the Chinese revolution. He felt that it was up to the Chinese to forge links and relationships with those organisations and groups around the world which represented the interests of the working masses as long as China was to be treated with respect and equality. Deng believed that the oppressed masses of the world shared in a common struggle and that their shared interests were creating new trans-national institutions. In fact, he characterised his own role and that of Hu Hanmin as ambassadors of the interests of the Chinese masses to the world. At home, the Guomindang was reaching out to the masses of China; abroad, the party was reaching out to the masses of the world. Summarising Hu’s mission, Deng listed three goals: 1) to propagate the true significance of the Chinese revolution to the masses of the world, 148 Kenneth Olenik 2) to join in the common struggle with the parties and masses of the world who sympathize with China, and 3) to continue propaganda among the Chinese living overseas so that they could come to see through the schemes of China’s imperialist invaders and avoid being deceived by them. Deng’s summary of several additional concerns of Hu reinforced his own insights. For example Deng mentioned that Hu worried that many Guomindang members did not clearly understand the relationship between China’s national revolution and the “revolution” as a world-wide phenomenon and even more serious was the widespread ignorance of the critical role of the “lowest levels of the masses serving as the foundation for the revolution.” Deng’s May Day speech in 1926 rearticulated the positions taken above and expanded them into a more thorough ideological discussion. The following quotations suggest Deng’s main theses at this time: Since the First World War, it can be said that the world revolutionary movement, depending on various countries, has advanced into an actual international phase. During the past ten years this international revolutionary movement, its foundation built on international alliances and actual unions, has been expanding daily. Its foundation is growing more solid while the organisation is being tightened. As a result of this surge, the so-called backward peoples, the colonial and semi-colonial peoples, are being drawn in, and this is bound to have a powerful influence on them. From the time of the European war there has been an awakening of consciousness among people in the colonial and semi-colonial nations which are promoting industrial development. Since the war there has been an increase in the oppression by the Europeans and a corresponding demand for national revolution (minzu de geming). Thus, the colonial revolutionary movement has grown along with the working class movement. It has been stirred by the great winds and waves moving the peoples of the societies of the world. The demands of the working people are not simply for increased salaries, reduced working hours, and an improved quality of life. Rather they are demanding political power. The workers are in alliance with the peoples of the colonial and semi-colonial countries to overthrow the uncrowned emperors of world imperialism because only thus will there be a chance for the oppressed peoples to achieve liberation. For these reasons, the working peoples’ movement advances daily along the path of political struggle. At his point, Deng reminded his audience that due to history, geography, the special leadership of Dr Sun Yatsen and the Guomindang, China was destined to play a leading role in global revolution. The international phase: Deng Yanda's Theory and Practice, 1923-1928 149 (... ) China’s national revolution must take a position of the leader of national revolutions of the oppressed peoples, especially the oppressed peoples of the East. Thus, the fate of China’s national revolution is extremely important. Regarding leadership of the Chinese Revolution, Deng continued as follows: While China remains in the iron cage of imperialism, its few democrats from commercial and intellectual circles are unable to lead the revolution. Thus, China cannot have a revolution like the 19th-century Europe or 20th-century Russia or Japan. China’s revolution cannot be like the democratic revolutions of Europe, which were purely anti-feudal. Likewise, nationalism (guojia zhuyi) has no real foundation in China. Simply phrased, our tiny number of democrats cannot bear responsibility for the destiny of the national revolution; thus the responsibility must fall on the shoulders of our great majority of suffering peasants and workers. (... ) they must take on the task of vanguard and play the key role in the struggle against the warlords and imperialists. During the Second Congress we accepted leadership of the peasants and workers; they should join with us and follow our party principles and along with small merchants, students, and military form a united front for the great struggle. (...) fighters of the world today will now all put on the same uniforms and decide the outcome of human history. We need only to advance energetically, and future victory will certainly be ours. Briefly speaking, Deng, then fresh from his visit to Europe and the Soviet Union understood events in China as part of a fundamental process affecting the people of the entire world. This interconnectedness provided China with the opportunities to transform apparent weaknesses into strengths. China’s lowly masses, mobilised and led by the Guomindang, in alliance with the awakening peoples of the world, was a major force. The Guomindang would serve as the link between a mobilising Chinese working class and its allies throughout the world. Deng apparently felt that the world was on the brink of a major and dramatic transformation. Furthermore, he must have sensed that he was destined to play an important role in this transformational process. In fact, Deng did begin a remarkable ascent in both civilian and military branches of the Guomindang. He was elected an alternate on the Central Executive Committee of the Party and Director of the Education Department at Whampoa Military Academy. In June 1926 Deng was appointed Director of the General Political Department of the National Revolutionary Army. In the latter capacity he was able to influence events of the Chinese revolution significantly. Following the Second Congress, the Guomindang concentrated all resources on the Northern Expedition. For the next year the Expedition consumed its attention and not surprisingly, Deng was called upon to command units of the National Revolutionary Army. As the Director of the General Political 150 Kenneth Olenik Department, he was also responsible for organising popular support for the military and maintaining order in areas brought under its control. He had to direct propaganda, mobilisation and organisation of peasants and workers. He was forced to deal with the problems of the relationships between the party and the masses, and political organisation at the local level. At this point, he had the opportunity to transform his concept of mass mobilisation into actual programs. Deng continued to press on with his efforts to integrate China’s struggle with international organisations.1 He became ever more closely associated with Chinese Communists and Third International advisors. While he undoubtedly took the Third International as an important manifestation of socialist internationalism, Deng never felt comfortable with the Communist International. Deng preferred non-communist organisations. In one instance, during the Second Plenary Meeting of the Guomindang Central Executive Committee on 28th February 1926, he successfully argued for the dispatch of a Guomindang representative to the Anti-Imperialist International Conference sponsored by the International Workers’ Salvation Congress in Berlin. These organisations were associated with the Second International. Significantly, during the discussions related to this issue, Deng was the most important spokesman for internationalising the Guomindang. He drafted the key documents and argued for the need to present the world with an image of the Guomindang as champion of the oppressed masses of China and leader of the peasants and workers of the largest population in the world. (Hankou dangan. Document #15061 & 17403: Dangwuyuebao 6. 5/26 7-8) In the course of the Northern Expedition, with the complete occupation of Wuhan in October 1926, Deng intensified his efforts to engage the Guomindang in mobilising the peasants for two purposes: to support the military struggle and to begin restitution of government at the local level, as a first step toward building a mass-based political system. (Olenik, 141ff) The expansion and transformation of the peasant movement in the wake of the Expedition stirred excitement and hope in Deng who wanted to push the peasant struggle to its limits in fulfilment of the Guomindang commitment to lead the self-liberation of peasants and workers. What stirred hope in Deng and Mao Zedong as well, inspired fear and concern among others in both the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party. Increasing levels of violence tore at the cohesion of the alliance of revolutionary forces, contributing to 1 It is worthwhile to note that anti-imperialism and a certain organic nationalism were always at the core of Deng’s most basic assumptions. The reference to “international concerns” refers to his perception, discussed above, of the formation of new, extra-governmental structures reflecting an awakening of mass consciousness. The international phase: Deng Yanda's Theory and Practice, 1923-1928 151 the collapse of Communist-Guomindang cooperation and a reaction against mass-based revolutionary action. By summer 1927, the first alliance of the Chinese communists and the Guomindang had come apart. Peasant and worker organisations came under attack. Advocates including Deng were attacked. Many were killed, others were biding their time, trying to survive. Since Deng had been a key player, his options were limited. He chose survival, going to exile abroad while waiting for a chance to renew his revolutionary work. Even before he left Wuhan in July 1927, he had been exploring novel solutions to the problem of how to sustain the revolution in the face of reaction. Clearly, he had become concerned with the inconsistent policies advocated by representatives of the Third International. While he was frustrated with the betrayal of revolution by Guomindang luminaries, as e.g. Wang Jingwei, he was equally shocked by the chaos within the Communist Party manifested by positions as diverse as those advocated by Mao, Shi Cuntong, Tan Pingshan and Chen Duxiu. The breakdown of the chain of command between the Communist central and China Youth working in the villages had contributed to the fragmentation of mass movements. At that time Deng’s own direct experiences of the peasant movements, especially during the Henan campaigns in May and June 1927, seriously shook his confidence in the revolutionary consciousness of the peasants. Under the circumstances Deng felt that the Chinese had to rethink revolutionary action in the context of China’s distinctive conditions. While Third International assistance would always be welcome, policy had to be made by the Chinese. He felt that since the Guomindang remained the embodiment of China’s unique revolutionary experience and vision, it should retain and expand its leadership position. The Communist Party, on the other hand, was anachronistic and liable to manipulation by the Comintern. It would be best if the Communist Party disbanded and its members joined a reorganised Guomindang, sharing in a common struggle tailored to China’s unique situation. Needless to say, Deng’s assumption that the Chinese Communist Party would be willing to disband betrayed a profound ignorance of Leninism. While communists to the like of Shi and Tan Pingshan listened to his proposal with interest and sympathy, Chen Duxiu took a more realistic position, expressing doubts about the willingness of the Third International to sanction the demise of the Chinese communist organisation. Deng left Wuhan seriously concerned not only about his own Guomindang, but about the sincerity of the Communists, especially the Third International. Deng soon had opportunities to test his feelings regarding the Third International. He arrived in Moscow in mid-August 1927. Warmly welcomed by crowds and dignitaries, guided on a tour by none other than Michael Borodin, 152 Kenneth Olenik greeted by many of the Chinese students then in Russia, Deng began his visit as a hero of the Chinese revolution. The situation in Moscow was, however, far from settled: Stalin was then engaged in his power struggle with Trotsky and others. The “failure” of the Chinese revolution hung like a dark cloud over the festivities organised to welcome Chinese “heroes”. Deng’s willingness to speak out boldly in defence of his own perception of China’s revolution was even more unsettling. He did not try to mask his feeling that misplaced Third International directives had contributed to the failure of China’s revolution. He insisted that China must be given complete independence. These are the Chinese, and not foreign agents, who must lead the struggle and devise policies that fit the unique local conditions. Needless to say these positions did not please Stalin who apparently decided to humiliate Deng. Chinese students who at first welcomed him drowned out his speeches by stomping, clapping, and hooting. Deng’s welcome turned into isolation. To make matters worse, Deng could not avoid experiencing Russian disdain for the Chinese. His feelings were shared by Ms Sun and Eugene Chen, who accompanied him in Moscow. A cold wind of rejection was felt; Russia was turning inward away from its world-revolutionary schemes. The Chinese in Moscow had become an inconvenience. (Jacobs. 300ff) By December, Deng had left Moscow for Germany. Dishonoured by Stalin, ignored by Borodin, jeered by Chinese students, derided for his ideas on China’s revolution Deng’s long-held attachment to the Bolshevik type of international socialism had been seriously shaken. Needless to say, Deng’s disappointment with Leninism made him rethink his limited knowledge of Marxism and explore new dimensions of Western philosophy. Most of the two following years he spent in Berlin. There he undertook rigorous, disciplined, academic study: he read voraciously in his search for understanding, and carried on long discussions with both Chinese and European intellectuals and activists. Besides these, Deng continued probing and searching for ways to connect China’s ongoing struggle with the world socialist movement. Whenever he travelled, he did extensive personal investigation of village life to try to understand the conditions of peasants in various countries of Europe and the United Kingdom. Returning home in 1930, Deng avoided the Soviet Union and travelled via Turkey, the Middle East, India, and South East Asia. He was looking for models and for contacts, which would allow him and China to connect with the transformational forces sweeping “colonial and semi-colonial countries of the world”. Deng’s two-and-a-half-year exile, his studies and his travels taught him many lessons. Most importantly, he abandoned his faith in internationalism and came to believe that China was alone. His idealism regarding the convergence of international revolutionary forces gave way to a rather stark realism in which The international phase: Deng Yanda's Theory and Practice, 1923-1928 153 the Chinese were fighting a lonely struggle. This change did not dampen Deng’s faith in the revolution, nor did it discourage him from action. In fact, it charged him with renewed energy and released a final, passionate drive to reactivate China’s revolution of the common people; the success of his last efforts led to his arrest and tragic execution, which happened only after he had come close to shaking seriously the foundations of state power in Nanjing. The dimming of Deng’s expectations regarding the Third International has already been discussed. As he was learning more about European socialism, Deng was beginning to understand that national interests transcended the ideal of universal human struggle. He grew cynical about the motivations of so-called socialist international organisations and self-conscious about the immense gap separating China from the West. As Lo Renyi wrote in his memoirs, Deng became aware of the condescension even of the German Social Democrats towards the Chinese and the their revolution. Meetings with representatives of British Labour, who felt that the Chinese Revolution had burned itself out, must have reinforced Deng’s feelings of distance from his Western counterparts. (Lo: 6ff) In addition to Deng’s impression that China could expect little support from official, institutional socialism, his contact with the working classes, the so-called “exploited masses” that made up the foundation and main force of the world revolution, was equally discouraging. Deng used to investigate rural life wherever he travelled. He even made special trips to the country, to study the conditions and thinking of peasants. These trips as well as investigations had an extremely important influence on his thinking. Deng found that even in the most impoverished, far-away provinces of Italy the “quality of life” of European peasants was dramatically higher than anywhere in China. Generally speaking, European farmers, far from embodying a revolutionary consciousness, were, by and large relatively contented with their lot. The extreme poverty of much of rural China, in contrast, reinforced Deng’s conviction that China was a special case in need of its own unique revolution. There was not only little hope for empathetic help from the organised socialist parties in the industrialised centres of Europe: for the most part, the experience of European peasants was so different from their Chinese counterparts that any remaining concept of a universal shared consciousness powering a world revolutionary struggle was seriously shaken. Not that Deng ever completely abandoned his belief in a global revolutionary struggle and in the awakening consciousness of the exploited labouring peoples of the world. His European travels, however, revealed in sharper detail the great complexity of human difference; Deng was humbled and his own predilection for a Chinese way of revolution was reinforced. In a last effort to connect China’s revolution with the world, Deng travelled home in 1930 through “colonial and semi-colonial” countries, parts of the 154 Kenneth Olenik world similar to China struggling against imperialism and the impoverishment born of pre-modern agricultural economies and imperialist exploitation. He passed through Bulgaria, Turkey, Iraq, India, and Indonesia. He searched for potential connections between China and the peoples of these countries. He was impressed by the unique agrarian programs in Bulgaria and recommended that future Chinese students should visit Bulgarian villages and use them as a model for developing China. He praised the modernisation in Turkey comparing China’s failures with Turkish success. He met with Gandhi in India and travelled into remote parts of the country to study its villages. In fact, Deng had expected that India, with its economy similar to China’s and an emerging anti-imperialist consciousness, would be a special ally, with the peoples of China and India constituting natural allies in a common struggle for liberation. Once again, however, Deng’s expectations ran in the face of a different reality. Gandhi rejected Deng’s willingness to advocate military struggle in the cause of liberation; he apparently showed little enthusiasm for Deng’s idea of a new kind of international organisation, a “Nationalist International” (minzu guoji) in which the peoples of “colonial and semi-colonial” countries would join forces while retaining their unique national identities. Unfortunately, Deng’s detailed journals on these travels have been lost. It seems clear, however, that by the time he reached Hong Kong in early May 1930, Deng had given up internationalism. As Lo Renyi noted, when Deng wrote the principles for his new political party, he had “abandoned internationalism.” (Lo:17) Deng’s disillusionment with socialist internationalism influenced his writing and his activities during the last year of his short life. In taking control of the “Third Party” and reorganising it to fit his personal revolutionary vision, Deng found it impossible to continue working with Tan Pingshan. Tan had tried, following the 1927 collapse at Wuhan, to organise ex-communists and Guomindang leftists into a new party. Deng, of course, had been involved in this work. While he was in Germany, Tan assumed major responsibility in China. Among obstacles to continued cooperation lay Tan’s inclination towards the Communist Party and the Third International. Deng had decided that the Third International was merely a tool of Russian interests: the Chinese Communist Party, though in principle a party of the working class, was a puppet and an agent of the Third International. While Deng always hoped to re-establish ties with both the Communists and the Comintern, in 1930 he felt that neither was working for the benefit of the common people, the peasants and working classes of China. Deng’s break with Tan was symptomatic of his disenchantment with socialist internationalism. As Deng’s new party took shape, he was careful to make a distinction between it on the one hand, and the Communists and internationalism on the other. In The international phase: Deng Yanda's Theory and Practice, 1923-1928 155 his own words: “The Communist Party is only international while we are of a nationalist type (dai mizuxing de); for the Communist Party, China’s revolution is nothing more than a tool [to be used by the Third International]. For us, the Chinese Revolution is our sole concern...” (Deng, Wenji : 370) These themes of uniqueness, criticism of the Chinese Communists, Third International and the Second International as well appear regularly in most of Deng’s writings following his return and prior to his death in November 1931. (Wenji and Gemingxingdong). They were key principles in the ideology of the Third Party incorporated into the Principles of the Provisional Action Committee of the Guomindang, the official designation of Deng’s organisation. Following is a paraphrase of section four of the Principles, “Our Revolutionary Methods.” In this section, Deng suggests that the Chinese could accomplish their revolutionary goals on their own, using the power of the common people, peasants, and working classes. International meddling of any sort was clearly rejected: 1. If we would once and for all obliterate the power of imperialism in China, eradicate all the unequal treaties, and bring about the total liberation of China, we absolutely must rouse up and organise the great masses and see that they self-consciously participate in the struggle against imperialism. Only if the great masses self-consciously rise up and get organised will we be able to carry on the struggle against imperialism without fear, and legislate the obliteration of all the unequal treaties directly through our national assembly. To repeat, we believe that: the Chinese revolution may expand and come to have an important influence on the liberation struggle of oppressed peoples (minzu) and classes, and that at the same time the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed peoples and classes of the world can promote the Chinese Revolution and can give vocal support to the Chinese Revolution. However, the Chinese revolution and the so-called world revolution of the Third International are two totally distinct categories (fanchou). This is because China’s revolution has its own unique character. Moreover, a people’s demands be met by the people acting on their own. As for the world revolution, which the Third International talks about, that revolution uses China’s revolution as a tool for its own purposes. It uses the Chinese revolution as the vanguard in its so-called world revolution. Moreover, it assumes that the Chinese revolution must be under its control. Such a situation in fact demeans the demands of the Chinese people. Objectively, all it can do is obstruct the work of Chinese liberation and prolong the suffering of the Chinese people. This is because, if the Chinese revolution is taken as part of a world revolution, it must wait until the world revolution is completed to bring liberation to the Chinese. This kind of scenario is the opposite of the actual needs of the Chinese. 156 Kenneth Olenik China’s various revolutionary forces, in their work of struggling against world imperialism can, in fact ought to form a struggle alliance with the world’s oppressed peoples and classes. As he approached death, Mr Sun [Yatsen] told our comrades to “join up in a common struggle with those peoples in the world who treat us as equals.” We most definitely want to join up with revolutionary forces and peoples who treat us as equals. Yet, we must also throw out and resist those forces and peoples who do not treat us as equals and who demean the needs of the Chinese people. Only in this way can we liberate China. 2. For the common masses to get political power it is necessary to use the masses’ own organisations to form a powerful force to overthrow the traditional bureaucratic government which we have had for more than a thousand years. Past dynastic changes and revolutions were all merely the exchange of new and old feudal governments, new and old gentry classes. They were disconnected from the people and as a result the people could not avoid being cheated. The past dirty politicians and more recent “party yamen” are good examples of this. Nor is the phoney European and American style system of popular representation the kind of system demanded by the great masses. What they want is political power and organisation that is not separated from the interests of the people. 3. As for actually implementing socialism, this can only come about after the establishment of a common people’s government, which has the workers and peasants who are engaged in direct production as its centre. After this kind of government using its political power, expands production, manages production, and brings about the organisation and socialisation of production [only then can socialism actually be implemented.] (Deng: 348-349) As it has been noted, these themes echoed throughout Deng’s final writings and comprised central elements in his and Third Party’s ideology. Generally speaking, Deng had given up on internationalism. In this respect, he was not out of step with the times; Stalin was turning his own energies inward. European socialists had national interests at the top of their agendas. Gandhi suggested that each country needed its own path to liberation. At home, Mao was adapting Bolshevism to Chinese conditions, and the Nationalists were trying to build a new Chinese state in Nanjing. The 1920s vision of the oppressed peoples of the world sharing a common destiny of cooperation and mutual liberation, participating together in the rebuilding of a more just world was receding; attention was directed rather towards the smaller scale of national concerns. Importantly, Deng’s turning away from internationalism did not diminish his basic and unshakable assumption that China’s revolution was of, by, and for the The international phase: Deng Yanda's Theory and Practice, 1923-1928 157 common people, the working masses, which he called the pingmin. In fact, the realisation that China could not really depend on any type of external help, even from the working masses of the world, reinforced his belief that the peasants and working classes of China had to be organised, propagandised and engaged in struggle for their own liberation. His party was merely a facilitator. Its task was to activate and guide the common masses as they grew in consciousness and came to participate in government. Of course, where possible, leadership groups like his party organisation, made up of conscious, idealistic, dedicated members should do everything possible to nudge history onto a path which would help the masses in their struggle. His own final year of life was intensely active as he engaged in organisation, propaganda, education, and military planning. Deng might be said to have been too successful in his final efforts; the seriousness of the threat he posed to the new government in Nanjing can be gauged by the fact that Chiang felt compelled to order his execution in November 1931. This essay is not concerned with the destiny of Deng’s efforts after his execution. The unravelling of his enthusiastic faith in a certain interactive world revolutionary tide began together with his experiences in the Wuhan government and accelerated with his first-hand observations of life outside China. These experiences reinforced Deng’s shifting theoretical positions. What had seemed imminent, a tide of mass revolutionary activity transforming the world, receded into an unknown future as Deng continued to study and observe the world.2 His strength of character and confidence allowed him to reject orthodoxy. He truly despised opportunism and blind conformity to any kind of dogma. His response to a clearer understanding of the world was an increased faith in the ability of the Chinese to solve their own problems in their own way. In this sense, Deng Yanda was an exceptional person of his time. 2 This essay includes no analysis of Deng’s economic writings. He was acutely aware of the impact of the world depression and its implications for the survival of the existing economic structures. His own careful study of the health of capitalist nations led him to the conclusion that the collapse of capitalism and imperialism was not imminent. He would rather envisage transformation somewhere in the unknown, distant future. This conclusion reinforced his belief that the Chinese would have to struggle on their own and for a very long time. (Deng:192ff) 158 Kenneth Olenik References Boorman, Howard L. and Richard C. Howard (1967-1971) Biographical Dictionary of Republican China. New York: Columbia University Press. Dangwu Yuebao (Party Affairs Montly) 1 (May) 1926. Deng Yanda (1891) Deng Yanda wenji (The Collected Works of Deng Yanda). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe. Deng Yanda Di Daolu (The Path of Deng Yanda) (1946). Shanghai: Deng Yanda xiansheng xunnan shiwu zhounian jinianhui. Hankou Dangan (Hankou Files) On file at the Archives of the Chinese Guomindang, Taiwan. Li Boqiu [ed.] (1948) Lun zhongguo geming zhu wenti (Problems of the Chinese Revolution). Hong Kong: Zhonghua luntanshe. Li, Lincoln (1994) Student Nationalism in China 1924-1949. Albany, N.Y., State University of New York Press. Lian Ruiqi (1964) Qingzhu shiwu zhounian guoqing Wo canjia minzhu geming di guocheng (Commemorating the fifteenth national anniversary. A record of my participation in the democratic revolution). NP. NP. Hand-written draft. Lo Renyi (1981) Lo Renyi tongzhi yigao, 1927-1931 shichi (A draft biography of comrade Lo Renyi from the 1927-1931 period). NP. NP. handwritten draft. Nagano, Eishin (1973) “Investigation into the formation of the Mao Zedong line during the Northern Expedition” Shiso 6.588. Olenik, John Kenneth (1973) Left wing radicalism in the Kuomintang: Teng Yen-ta and the Genesis of the Third Party Movement in China. 1924-1931. Ithaca, NY: Doctoral Dissertation, History Department. Olenik, John Kenneth (1992) “Deng Yanda and the Third Party” in Roger B. Jeans [ed.] Roads not Taken: The Struggle of Opposition Parties in Twentieth- Century China. Boulder: Westview Press. Qiu Ting and Guo Xiaochun (1985) Deng Yanda shengping yu sixiang (Deng Yanda, his life and thought), Gansu: Gansu renmin chubanshe. Shi Cuntong (1928) Zhongguo geming ti lilun wenti (Problems regarding the theory of revolution in China),Shanghai: Xiandai zhongguoshe. Shina Jiho (China Times), Tokyo: Shina jihosha. Tan Pingshan (1928) Zhonghuagemingdang xuanyan caoan (Draft Proclamation of the Chinese Revolutionary Party), NP:NP. Handwritten copy in Keio University Library. Wilbur, C.Martin and Julie Lien-Ying How [ed.] (1989) Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisors and Nationalist China. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Yang Yitang [ed.] (1949) Deng Yanda xiansheng yizhu (The legacy of Deng Yanda). Hong Kong: Yungfa yinwu yuxiangongsi. —,Deng Yanda. Guangdong: Guangdong renmen chubanshe 1986. The international phase: Deng Yanda's Theory and Practice, 1923-1928 159 Zeng Guangxing and Wang Quanying (1985) Beifa zhanzheng zai Henan (The northern expedition campaign in Henan). Henan: Henan renmin chubanshe. Zang Bozhun (1951) Zhang Bozhun zai 1951 tan nonggong minzhudang lishi (Zhang Bozhun’s 1951 discussion of the history of the Peasant and Worker’s Democratic Party). NP: NP. Draft copy. Guang Tao [zhang Bozhun] (1932) “Deng Yanda xiansheng yu zhongguo geming” (Mr. Deng Yanda and the Chinese revolution). in Deng Yanda xiansheng jinian wewnji. NP: NP. pp. 10-11. notes that Deng saw the Chinese revolution as a development of both the unique social qualities in China and events sweeping the world. (...) China and the world for him were originally a part of the same conceptualisation. But he forcefully pointed out that internationalists, who felt that the Chinese revolution could be a tool to actualise world revolution, could not escape from a rigid, formalistic, subjective standpoint; the Chinese revolution which Deng advocated was without question built on nationalism.” The reactionary classes, on the other hand, used nationalism falsely to conceal their betrayal of the revolution. Two articles in “International” up to Mao ideas from Kang Yuwei and one on Li Da Zaho’s conepts of ’world history’. Chen Gongbo xiansheng wen ji. Vol I “Jin hou di guomindang” 7th May 1928: pp. 12 Chen argues that the Third Int. has no relevance for China; used as a tool for Russian national purposes: need for a that fits China’s needs, (...) “East Asian national revolutions have their own special needs.” None of the peoples of East Asia can accept Third International’s control “last year in April we made plans for an East Asian International (...) or a San Min Zhuyi International (...) emotional plea for a Guomindang supported East Asian International to lead Asian revolutionaries. The option to this would be violence under the leadership of the Third International. JOLANTA SIERAKOWSKA-DYNDO Dialogue of Cultures: The Polish Commonwealth and the Safavid Persia The term “dialogue” seems to be rediscovered in the world nowadays, as it is used in various languages and referred to by the great world authorities of today. Dialogue is most often mentioned in the context of politics. In my opinion, however, it is not feasible to continue without the dialogue in what is broadly conceived as culture. Dialogue is not the art of negotiating aimed at grasping the weak points of the partner, but rather the art of mutual learning and creative search for the best solutions for each of the parties. Ahmad Jalali, the president of UNESCO stressed this meaning of dialogue in his speech at the conference in Poland held on April 2003.The true dialogue thus requires an attitude of tolerance but most of all acceptance and openness to cultural diversities and differences. In the history of both countries, Poland and Persia, there were periods when religious and cultural tolerance triumphed, when religion was not the only criterion by which the world was evaluated. In Poland such an attitude flourished in the 16th century. This fact was reconfirmed by the latest UNESCO decision. According to this decision the 1573 Act of the General Warsaw Confederation was put on to the list of the most important documents in the history of mankind under the programme “Memory of the World”.1 The Act was among the first European enactments to introduce religious tolerance as one of the principles of the political system. Against a background of Europe’s practices of that time such religious tolerance, guaranteed by the constitution, was an extraordinary phenomenon. The Polish Commonwealth remained the “country without burning at stakes” till the end of its existence although it was inhabited by the peoples of various religions: Roman Catholics, representatives 1 The most valuable items on this list include: Gutenberg’s Bible, the manuscript of the Symphony no. 9 in D Minor by Ludwig van Beethoven, the manuscript of Copernicus’ masterpiece De revolutionisms，the collection of autographs of the works of Frederic Chopin, the underground archives of the Warsaw Ghetto 1939-1943 (Ringelblum Archives), and the latest: tablets containing 21 strike postulates and a collection of archives documenting the emergence of the Independent Self-Governing “Solidarity” Trade Union. 164 Jolanta Sierakowska-Dyndo of Lutheran and Calvinist religious communities, Czech Brethren (Arians), Jews, and Karaims. There were also Armenians who, towards the end of the 15th century, after the collapse of Kaffa, moved en masse from the Crimea to Kamieniec Podolski, Lemberg (Lviv), and other Poland’s south-eastern borderland towns. They spoke Turkish in the so-called Kipchak-Armenian dialect, and often used Persian. The newcomers brought with them the art and culture of the East 一 primarily of Persia 一 which thanks to them permanently entered the Polish art and culture. The easier this mingling of cultures was as the Armenians were Christians. The variety of peoples in the old-time Polish Commonwealth retained their religious and cultural distinctiveness, which is reflected for example in sacral architecture. Churches, Orthodox churches, and Armenian sanctuaries as well as mosques were erected in the lands of the Polish Commonwealth. They preserved traditional architectonic forms and were built in accordance with the exigencies of individual forms of worship. Those distinct features, however, were no longer valid in the realm of art, particularly in the religious painting. To the end of the 16th century, Poland’s Catholic churches frequently housed paintings in the Ruthenian-Byzantine and Armenian style executed by Armenian painters. For contemporary Polish Commonwealth, Muslim countries were neither unknown nor secret nor exotic. Poland was neighbours with the Muslims, and the Muslim Tartars played an important role in Poland’s political life. At the same time, majority of West-European nations found Muslim countries separated by a wall of hostility and indifference. It was not until the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 and the increasing power of the Ottoman Turkey that a change took place in Europe’s political consciousness. Common political interests proved cooperation with the so-called heretics possible. The change in Europe’s attitude stemmed from the tear of Turkey’s increasing power since Turkey threatened not only its age-Iong enemy, that is to say Persia, but also the south-eastern European countries. Therefore, the idea of establishment of an anti-Turkish league enjoyed increasing popularity, as did and a common military effort with Persia. A growing number of diplomatic missions headed for the court of the Persian shahs proposing them to undertake a joint action of Christian countries and Persia against Turkey. Meanwhile, Persia was undergoing momentous political change with profound implications for her future. The Satavid dynasty (1501-1738) was established in power, and a new era in the country’s history began. The long years of political fragmentation came to an end; Persia became a strong, centralised state; during the high point coinciding with the rule of Shah Abbas I (1581-1629), perfectly able to compete with the Ottoman Empire and with Mameluke Egypt on political and military as well as on cultural grounds (chiefly Dialogue of Cultures: The Polish Commonwealth and the Safavid Persia 165 in arts and architecture). Handicrafts, as e.g. weaving and carpet-weaving, reached the highest level. The Safavids underscored their distinctiveness in the Islamic world by imposing Shi’ism as Persia’s state religion. Surrounded by hostile Sunni powers (Turkey to the west and the Uzbek-Shaibanid state in Central Asia) and waging protracted wars with both, the Satavids opened themselves to contacts with the countries of Europe, regarding them as potential allies in their fight against the Ottomans. Commercial initiatives by Western merchants were stepped up, as were diplomatic contacts. Increasing numbers of Western tradesmen, craftsmen, artists, and missionaries were coming to the court. All of them could travel through the Satavid Persia without major problems. Contacts with the West were greatly eased by the policy of tolerance pursued by Abbas I the Great, the most eminent of the Satavid rulers, and continued by his successors with regard to the Jews and Christians living in Persia. It is likely that such accommodating attitudes towards these religions were the result of the Shah’s foreign as well as domestic plans for undermining the position of Turkmenian aristocracy. The ranks of the Persian army were joined by an increasing number of descendants of Christians: Georgians, Armenians, peoples of the Caucasus, former prisoners of war, and people displaced from the conquered territories freshly converted to Islam. Many of them achieved high positions. The atmosphere of tolerance towards Christians resulted in comparatively numerous religious disputes between Christian and Muslim theologists that were often listened to by the Shah Abbas I himself. That religious and political dialogue soon spread to include cultural dialogue, and particularly in the Polish Commonwealth it left its permanent traces in arts and crafts. We owe the knowledge of Persian art of the Satavid period primarily to the Armenian tradesmen who pursued at that time engaged in international commerce. For the most part, they traded in products of artistic manufacture, such as weapons, carpets, expensive textiles, and gold products. Persian art in the Satavid time reached the highest level in many domains. Carpet-weaving, miniature painting, and the arts of weapon embellishment and ornamental decoration of silk textiles were unparalleled. Those goods reached Poland through Armenian trade, and the demand for them was extremely high. The Polish king Sigismund III Vasa (1587-1632), a great lover of art himself, sent an Armenian tradesman Sefer Muratowicz on a long journey to Persia in 1601. The aim of the expedition was the town of Kashan, the centre of carpet-weaving at that time. One of the King’s commissions to Muratowicz was ordering carpets with royal coats of arms from local masters. The merchant reached Kashan after 158 days and noted that “there, I had made for His Majesty the King a 166 Jolanta Sierakowska-Dyndo few carpets with silk and with gold, also a tent and a damascene sabre.” Some of the carpets brought by Muratovitch became a part of the king’s daughter’s dowry when she was married off to a Bavarian elector; they are preserved to this day in the Museum of Residence of Bavarian Electors in Munich. Similarly, a part of the account of Sefer Muratowicz’s journey describing his contacts with the highest Persian officials as well as with the Shah himself has survived to this day. His was the first Polish report to dwell in such detail on the relations prevailing in Persia’s ruling house. The fondness of Persian art in Poland was increasing. At the turn of the 16th century, magnate families possessed many carpets of highest quality imported from Persia, including carpets tied with silk threads. They made precious ornaments of residence interiors, and Prince Czartoryski considered them among the finest works of art in his collection. The silk carpets of the Czartoryski family were exhibited in Paris at the 1878 world exhibition, which was probably the reason why the name of “Polish carpets” came into use. Similarly, silk textiles were brought to Poland in large quantities. They were used for making clothes for both men and women, and also for liturgical garments. Persian tapestries were imported as well, as they were excellent in execution and artistry. Their patterns comprised hidden symbolical meanings. Many textiles have been preserved up to this day in Polish museum collections. Since the road to the East was very long and dangerous, handicraft manufacture developed in Poland. Originally, Eastern patterns were followed but later Polish craftsmen worked out their own original style. The Lemberg manufacture became particularly famous. It associated numerous craftsmen, including saddlers, embroiderers, weavers, and goldsmiths of the highest artistic skill, and who followed and transformed in a masterly way the Persian patterns and designs, retaining the spirit of Persian art: refined and subtle. The contemporary Persian art of ornamenting weapons and shields, decorating khalkhans and saddles, weaving belts and tents, and tying carpets was unparalleled. The local artistic manufacturing originally imitated the Persian style but it gradually worked out its own style enriched with Persian art. The opening of manufactures in Lemberg, which in Polish were called persjarnie and produced textiles, carpets, and handicraft patterned atter Persian textiles caused them to be cheaper than those brought from the East. Consequently, they came to be more available, and the impact of Persian art - its pattern-designing, style, etc. was strong enough to bring about a gradual change of the Polish artistic taste in the direction of Oriental aesthetics. This type of aesthetics shaped the likes and dislikes of the Poles for over 200 years. Persian art, no doubt, influenced also the Orientalisation of Polish garments, which could be observed already as early as in the 15th century. At that time, Dialogue of Cultures: The Polish Commonwealth and the Safavid Persia 167 Polish noblemen, like the Eastern monarchs, were fond of wearing long costumes (żupan and kontusz) and considered long robes most appropriate. Silk sash-belts were adopted from Persia; in the 17th century they replaced metal and leather belts. Originally, they were brought to Poland by the Armenian tradesmen who later on began to manufacture sash-belts (pasy kontuszowe) themselves, a skill that made Armenian artisans famous indeed. Short caftans and coats, ruffs and laces popular in the West were not so much accepted in the Polish Commonwealth. Although the Polish garment also underwent change, it preserved its Oriental character, which often aroused true admiration and astonishment of the foreigners coming to Poland. In the 16th century, a long tunic (żupan) and a silk Persian belt were already established as a symbol of Polish tradition and custom: a Polish national costume. The Poles remained faithful to this model to the end of the 18th century. This fact points not only to the strength of the patterns of Persian aesthetics but also to the changes that occurred in the consciousness of Commonwealth’s inhabitants. Poland’s close contacts with different cultures of the East had, not doubt, spurred the shaping of a strong cultural current called Sarmatism, which overpowered the culture of the Polish nobility (szlachta、,1 It was based on the belief that Poles descended from the ancient Sarmatians, a nomadic people of Iranian descent, inhabiting the lands between the Don and the Volga up to the 3rd century BC. In the first centuries of our era, this people was to settle on the Dnieper and Vistula rivers. Sarmatians, who formed a part of the federation of the Scythian tribes, became famous for their valiant warriors, courage and independence. As the Polish chroniclers wrote, Polish Sarmatians “were never vassals of Alexander the Great or the Roman empire.”3 In the old-time Polish Commonwealth there was a widespread opinion that the Polish knights and nobles (szlachta) were descendants of those bellicose warriors. Researchers have always disputed the reliability of these opinions. The advocates of this idea indicate, among other things, the similarities between the Sarmatian property signs and the oldest Polish coats of arms.4 We do not know whether the information that the traditions of the Scythian peoples are a part of the great Persian tradition, contained in the Ferdowsi’s Shahname, was known in the Polish Commonwealth. All we know is that the Poles did not acquire the information about the Sarmatians from the Persians but from the historians of ancient Rome. The term Sarmatia 2 See: T. Mańkowski, Genealogia sarmatyzmu (Genealogy of Sarmatism) Kraków 1946. 3 Słownik sarmatyzmu (A Dictionary of Sarmatism), ed. by A. Borowski, Kraków 2001. 4 Cf. R. Sulimirski, The Scythians，London 1970. 168 Jolanta Sierakowska-Dyndo appears in the work of Claudius Ptolemy in the 2nd century AD and refers to the territory of today’s Eastern and Central Europe. Ptolemy used the name Sarmatians to denote various peoples inhabiting those lands. Interestingly, there is a well-established belief in Sarmatian roots of the Polish nobility and the acceptance of genealogy deriving it from the steppes of Asia. Thus, in the consciousness of the nobility of the Polish Commonwealth, the notion of the East must have aroused positive associations. No wonder that the Polish Sarmatians tried to refer to the adopted genealogy also through of the garment and appearance. This must have been the reason why the noblemen reached for a grave long Eastern fashion. The garments modelled on Eastern ones, worn by the Polish nobility in the 16th century and later, became nearly “noblemen’s costume,” and later even a manifestation of attachment to the Polish traditions and custom. The presence of Persian aesthetics is unquestioned here.5 This dialogue of cultures occurring in the realm of art expanded and covered also broader domains. Humanism, a great intellectual current which spread through Europe and Poland, increased in the interest in foreign languages and culture and opened them to scientific research. The command of foreign languages, including Oriental ones, was viewed as an attribute of a true humanist. The magnates and nobility of the Commonwealth collected Persian, Arabic, and Turkish manuscripts: many of them were in possession of the Czartoryski family. It is worth noting that Jadwiga Zamoyska, owner of the Kórnik palace, learnt the Persian language and calligraphy. People skilled in languages performed the functions of dragomans, that is to say interpreters at the Polish courts. As the diplomacy developed, their knowledge of Oriental languages became extremely valuable. Among the most outstanding specialists in Oriental languages, including Persian, was Samuel Otwinowski (d. after 1650), a dragoman and secretary of King Sigismund III Vasa and King John Casimir Vasa, who translated into Polish the Gulistan by Sadi of Shiraz. The first translation of the literary masterpiece into Polish might have been one of the first into European languages. Although it is known whether Otwinowski translated the work directly from Persian or through Turkish, he is recognized to have been a great lover of the Oriental culture, Persian poetry in particular, and a forerunner of the dialogue of cultures. Parallel to the richness of ornamentation, variety of decoration, and magnificent colours that among other things the Safavid Persia brought into Polish art, the presence of Polish influences in Persian art of the Satavid time may be observed in the development of painting in Persia. The Muslim 5 Cf. Maria Taszycka, Pasy wschodnie. Pasy kontuszowe (Eastern Belts. Sash-Belts) Katalogi zbiorów MNK 1, vol. IV, Kraków 1990. Dialogue of Cultures: The Polish Commonwealth and the Safavid Persia 169 Persians took great interest in figurative representations of the religious content propounded by the Catholic missions. The Shi’ite Persia did not observe the Koranic injunctions banning the representation of living beings in painting and sculpture, which is why certain Catholic paintings were particularly appreciated. Supposedly, the Madonna from Ostra Brama (The Pointed Gate) in Vilnius was copied many times by Armenian miniaturist in Isfahan.6 In Persia, the paintings of the Virgin with Child were credited with the power of protection against the loss of sight in children suffering from smallpox. The 1619 Lemberg Bible by Lazarrius of Barbet, illustrated with the scenes from The Revelation of St John, was also copied in Isfahan.7 The best symbol of the dialogue of cultures between the Polish Commonwealth and Persia may be a priceless copy of the Bible presented to the Persian Shah by the Cardinal of Kraków, Bernard Maciejowski. It was an illuminated French Bible from mid-13th century. It was not the gift itself that was unusual but the fact that the book was accepted by the Shah with satisfaction, and that by his order captions in the Persian language were placed under the miniatures that the book contained. After the fall of the Safavids, the Bible was taken to England, and today it belongs to the most precious items of the Pierpont-Morgan Library collection in New York. With the development of the diplomatic relations between Poland and Persia, the role and activity of the Polish missionaries,8 Jesuits in particular, increased. By the end of the 16th century, under the missionary activity, Jesuits came to the conclusion that the best method of spreading Christianity was accomodatio, that is to say searching for points that are common with a different culture, as well as the dissemination of the knowledge of mentality, customs, language, and tradition of the given society.9 The method of accommodation, 6 Hadżi Seraja Szapszał, Wyobrażenia świętych muzułmańskich a ikonograficzne katolickie w Persji i stosunkipersko-polskie za Zygmunta III (Pictures of the Muslim Saints vs. Catholic Iconographic Influences in Persia and the Persian-Polish Relations during the Reign of Sigismund III), „Prace i Materiały Sprawozdawcze Sekcji Historii Sztuki Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk w Wilnie”, vol. II, no. 2, Vilnius 1934, pp. 18, 26. 7 T. Mańkowski, Sztuka Ormian lwowskich (The Art of the Lemberg Armenians), op. cit., p. 153. 8 Cf. Zygmunt Pucko, The Activity of Polish Jesuits in Persia and Neighbouring Countries in the 17th and 18th Centuries, in: “Proceedings of the Third European Conference of Iranian Studies”, ed. Charles Melville, part 2, Wiesbaden 1999. 9 R. Skowron, Brożek, Jezuici i Chiny. Polski epizod do dziejów dialogu Zachodu ze Wschodem w XVII wieku (The Jesuits and China. The Polish Episode in the History of the West-East Dialogue in the 17th Century), in: Orient w kulturze polskiej, Warsaw 2000, p. 118. 170 Jolanta Sierakowska-Dyndo based on respect and appreciation of other cultures, opened up the way for dialogue between different cultures. The first Polish Jesuit to organise a mission in Persia (1654-1659) was Tomasz Młodzianowski; a man speaking very good Persian and enjoying a thorough understanding of the customs and rules of the Persian court. With the passage of time, the Jesuits, thanks to this very knowledge of the political situation prevailing in Persia, were included in embassies as advisors, envoys, and ambassadors. In the years 1690-1693, two Polish monks, Jan Gostkowski and Ignacy Franciszek Zapolski, parleyed with Shah Suleiman II in matters concerning a war with Turkey. Upon returning to Poland, they provided their principal with plenty of information about the Shah’s intentions, and the political situation in Persia and the Caucasus. Their competence was corroborated by the fact that King John III Sobieski appointed Zapolski his permanent resident at the court in Isfahan, where he remained until his death in 1703. Particularly noteworthy among the Polish Jesuits in Persia was Tadeusz Krusiński. An accomplished expert on Persia, Krusiński arrived in Persia 1707 and remained there for nearly twenty years10 becoming an eyewitness of the downfall of the Safavid dynasty. Father Krusiński’s Persian activities were not limited to the religious realm as he contributed significantly to the improvement of relations between the two countries. Engaged by the court of Shah Hussein (1694-1722) as a translator, he produced Persian language versions of letters arriving from European monarchs, treaties, and contracts. He also maintained an archive for the use of the Shah, ordering and storing documentation pertaining to religious and diplomatic missions. Held in great esteem and respect by the Shah and his officials, he became, in 1720, the procurator general of the mission. Father Krusiński travelled extensively in the Orient. Accompanying merchant caravans as a physician, he traversed the Caucasus and Siberia, visited Kurdistan and Turkey, Palestine and Arabia, and reached Afghanistan. Adding constantly to his knowledge of the traditions and customs of the East, he gained renown as the first European researcher of Persian history. He wrote a number of interesting works concerning Persia, in which he also described the history of Poland’s impact on the emergence of Catholic missions in Persia. His book describing Dürri Efendi’s mission to Persia in the years 1720-1721, entitled Tragica vertentis Belli Persiei Historia, and comprising the history of missions in Persia, was presented by the Polish government to the Shah Reza Pahlavi on 10 For a short time, from 1712 to 1714, Krusiński came back to Poland, see: Encyklopedia wiedzy o Jezuitach na ziemiach Polski i 1564-1995, ed. Ludwik Grzebień SJ, Kraków 2004. Dialogue of Cultures: The Polish Commonwealth and the Safavid Persia 171 the occasion of his coronation in 1926. Krusiński recorded tragic events he had witnessed, as e.g. the invasion of Afghan tribes who captured Isfahan in 1722 and the overthrowing of the Safavid dynasty in his books, particularly in Relatio de Mutatinibus Memorabilibus Regni Persarum. In 1725, father Krusiński left Persia and travelled to Italy; it is there that he set to paper his work about the Afghan-Persian wars. It is supposed that he himself translated this work into Persian; the Persian language version was produced in Istanbul in 1730 by the first Turkish printing shop, that of Ibrahim Müteferrik. The civil war that raged in Persia and the Afghan invasion in 1720s put an end to the Safavid dynasty; soon, the partitions of Poland put an end to the existence of the Polish Commonwealth too. Culture and art were the only realms that preserved the traces of the old-time close contacts between the Polish Commonwealth and Persia in the times of their grandeur. The history of the two countries shows that the nations which were so distant geographically and culturally might inspire each other in culture and religious tolerance. The openness to other cultures permitted a dialogue which enriched both nations. That dialogue and cooperation was successful because it was based on what both nations mutually respected: their religion and culture. References Brzeziński S., Misjonarze i dyplomaci polscy w Persji w XVII i XVIII wieku, “Annales Missiologicae”, Potulice 1935. Chowaniec C., Z dziejów polityki Jana III na Bliskim Wschodzie 1683-1686, “Kwartalnik Historyczny”, no. XL, 1926. Długosz J., Historia Polonica, Liber XII, vol. V, Przeździecki, A., (ed.), Kraków 1876-1878. Encyklopedia wiedzy o Jezuitach na ziemiach Polski i Lit^^ 1564-1995, Ludwik Grzebień SJ (ed. in cooperation with the Jesuit team), Kraków 2004. Historia dyplomacji polskiej, Biskup M., (ed.), vol. I, Warsaw 1980. Hadżi Seraja Szapszał, Wyobrażenia ś'więt^ch muzułmańskich a wpływy ikonograficzne katolickie w Persji i stosunki persko-polskie za Zygmunta III, “Prace i Materiały Sprawozdawcze Sekcji Historii Sztuki Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk w Wilnie”, vol. II, Vilnius 1934. Józefowicz Z., Z dziejów stosunków polsko-perskich, “Przegląd Orientalistyczny”, no. 4 (44) 1962. Mańkowski T., Sztuka Ormian lwowskich, “Prace Komisji Historii Sztuki PAU”， vol. VI, 1934. Mańkowski T., Orient w polskiej kulturze artystycznej, Wrocław-Kraków, 1959. Mańkowski T., Genealogia sarmatyzmu, Kraków 1946. 172 Jolanta Sierakowska-Dyndo Mańkowski T., Polskie tkaniny i hafty XVI-XVIII wieku, Wrocław 1954. Mańkowski T., Sztuka islamu w Polsce, Warsaw 1956. Ormianie Polscy. Odrębność i asymilacja, National Museum in Krakow, Kraków 1999. Pucko Z., The Activity of Polish Jesuits in Persia and Neighbouring Countries in the 17th and 18th Centuries, in: “Proceedings of the Third European Conference of Iranian Studies”, Ch. Melville (ed.), part 2, Wiesbaden 1999. Relacyja Sefera Muratowicza Ormianina, posłanego króla Jmci do Persyji，z którą wróciwszy się stamtąd, podał na piśmie w te słowa. Anno circiter 1588, in: Trzy relacje polskich podróżników na Wschód muzułmański w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku, A. Walaszek, (ed.), Kraków 1980. Reychman J., Życie polskie w Stambule w XVIII wieku, Warsaw 1959. Sierakowska-Dyndo J., Rzeczpospolita Polska i Persja - wzajemne kontakty, in: Arcydzieła sztuki perskiej ze zbiorów polskich, National Museum in Warsaw, Warsaw 2002. Skowron R., Brożek, Jezuici i Chiny. Polski epizod do dziejów dialogu Zachodu ze Wschodem w XVII wieku, in: Orient w kulturze polskiej, Warsaw 2000. Słownik sarmatyzmu, Borowski A. (ed.), Kraków 2001. Stachoń E., Polska wobec weneckich projektów użycia Persji i Tatarów przeciw Turcji w drugiej połowie XV w. , Lemberg (Lvov) 1929. Sulimirski R., The Scythians, London 1970. Załęski S., Misje w Persji w XVII i XVIII w. pod protektoratem Polski, in: Misje Katolickie, Warsaw 1882. Załęski S., Jezuici w Polsce, vol. III, Kraków 1902. Zakrzewska-Dubasowa M., Ormianie Zamojscy i ich rola w wymianie handlowej i kulturalnej między Polską a wschodem, Lublin 1983. Zakrzewska-Dubasowa M., Rzemiosło ormiańskie w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej. Studia z dziejów kontaktówpolsko-ormiańskich，Lublin 1983. roman sławiński Secret Societies and the taiping Heavenly Kingdom At least since the times of the Han dynasty, Chinese historical annals mention activities of the Chinese anti-world, directed against the existing establishment. Initially, the anti-world took the shape of secret associations that organised numerous peasant uprisings. Later, Taoist religious sects, such as the Sect of the Five Bowls of Rice, or Buddhist ones, such as the White Lotus Sect, took over leadership among the organisers. At the beginning, these were economic associations created by cereal freighting agents, who travelled along the Great Imperial Channel from the south to the north of the country. Thanks to their frequent voyages, they were better oriented than peasants in the backward Chinese countryside. Government repression soon forced them to strengthen the ties of conspiracy. For this purpose, they started to take solemn oaths of keeping their association’s secrecy, whose revealing resulted in bloody punishments. The use of a secret language protected association members against potential denunciators. Moreover, they used recognition signals, such as a particular manner of holding chopsticks or placing rice grains on the table, apparently not willing to eat them, but actually intending to signal one’s presence to the sworn kinsman. They even created a secret writing, by adding to the already existent Chinese characters certain new ones, unknown to the uninitiated and to people who were not acquainted with the symbols of the secret societies*. The information concerning the association’s purposes was hidden in the so-called “precious scrolls” (baojuan), which circulated among its followers. They either recorded the association’s history (like the Bailianjiao yan^i, the history of the White Lotus) and lists of patron divinities, or stated the association’s purposes. Very few such scrolls have been preserved to our days. It is from them that we learnt, however, that the cult of the Buddha Maitreya occupied an important place - the Buddha of the future: the Chinese Messiah, who will ensure the coming of heaven on earth in the near future. The “miraculous” * English transl. Adina Zemanek. The Polish version in: Historia no'wo^^na Chin (The Modern History of China), edited by R. Sławiński, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2005. 176 Roman Sławiński unearthing of a Maitreya statuette served as a signal for the 120 thousand peasants assembled for restoration works at the Great Wall to start in a mutiny that ended in a countrywide rebellion of the Red Turbans, which overthrew Mongol power and paved the way for the establishment of the native, peasant-founded Ming dynasty. The history of secret societies can be traced as an evolution from the phase of socio-economic associations, through anti-dynastic associations that organised peasant uprisings, to supporters of the Republican, and later Communist movements during the first half of the 20th century, and finally to criminal associations very closely resembling Sicilian Mafia. Alliances formed between associations and the establishment against the union movement and extortion of money from entrepreneurs and restaurateurs constitute typical features of the decadent Hong Kong Triad organisation or the Shanghai Red or Green Gangs used by the colonial or Guomindang authorities to attain their own goals. The main difficulties encountered by historians of secret societies when attempting to research the past of those associations include: 1. Official historiography would regard this issue unworthy of attention. It would, at the very most, record laconic mentions of the “disturbances” caused in a certain district by elements connected to “heretic sects” (xiejiao). 2. The few extant original writings were destroyed during pacification campaigns. 3. Secret society members themselvesBeijing would observe strict rules of secrecy. In order to mislead official authorities they would often change the society’s name. It is very difficult for historians to ascertain whether they are dealing with an offshoot (zhiliu) of an already known organization or with an altogether new association. 4. Political leaders, either Republican, such as Sun Yatsen, or Communist, such as marshal Zhu De, had connections with secret societies and obtained their effective help. After the Xinhai revolution of 1911 that resulted in the proclamation of the Republic of China, as well as after the proclamation of the People’s Republic in 1949, they were not eager to admit the past benefits provided by the dark underworld, especially the Triad (Tiandihui) and the Society of Brothers and Elders (Gelaohui). 5. Historians acquainted with this issue have often come upon great difficulties in defining the exact character of the organization, among others due to the camouflage they adopted and to the evolution of secret societies’ (mimi huishe) from heretical sects (jiaomen) into quasi-political parties (huidang) or criminal associations (banghui), called heishehui in Taiwan; hence the terminological chaos. Secret Societies and the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom 177 6. Due to what we can call at the very best the Chinese lack of interest in the history of associations competing with official authorities, modern research in Chinese secret societies first gathered momentum abroad. An international Chinese secret society research program was initiated in the 1960s under the leadership of the Sorbonne professor Jean Chesneaux. The participants’ effort was crowned with publications in Paris (1970) and in California (1972). It was only later that Chinese historians’ interest in the matter increased - they published numerous articles and source material compendia regarding, for instance, the Triad (1980), mafias of old Shanghai (1986), mafias of the Chinese Republic (1993) as well as their present-day counterparts (Falungong), etc. 7. There still are difficulties with classification of certain associations with a distinctive nature as secret societies, for instance the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, whose exceptional - in the Chinese context - connection with Protestantism and their activity ’in the open’ at a relatively early stage. Moreover, although most of the published works, as it seems, deal with this very social movement, the authors’ opinions are highly controversial, because of their tendency to call upon their research for immediate political aims. In our case, Taiping history (1851-1864) was used as a weapon for discrediting the opposition; although Taiping control was held for 14 years over 17 provinces, the whole movement was not considered to be an appropriate past model for the modern revolutionary movement. And furthermore, although the Taiping was the most advanced social movement of the 19th century, having its own programme, state organization, agricultural programme, objective of liberating women from the traditional foot and breast binding, and programme of supporting capitalism as the direction China’s development should take, Maoist historians preferred to emphasise the movement’s shortcomings, the self-indulgence of some of its leaders, etc. For this purpose, they used Li Xiucheng’s doubtful testimony made in a Manchu prison. All this effort seems to have been made to make Mao Zedong emerge the only, unambiguous, and the very best advocate of the peasant cause. Similarly to the Taiping, the activity of Honghuzi (Red Beard) gangs, that intensified at the turn of the 19th century, has an undetermined character in Chinese historiography. Both cases mentioned above, the Taiping and the Honghuzi, were included among secret societies by foreign researchers, as were the initiators of the Boxer rebellion at the turn of the 19th century. In spite of the very remote beginnings of secret societies and their great number, or at least the great diversity of their names, they display several common 178 Roman Sławiński features, which distinguish them from other, legal Chinese social organizations, such as tradesmen’s guilds, martial art schools, poets’ associations, etc. These features include 1) a very strictly guarded secrecy of the association, which each follower solemnly swore to keep, 2) a secret language (body language as well) and writing (or at least certain bizarre characters), which could be understood only by the initiated, 3) worship of divinities belonging to different religions, which confirms the syncretic character of folk belief in China, and 4) opposition against the official authorities. The oath-taking ceremony usually took place at the association’s local headquarters, that is, at the lodge. The headquarters’ decoration resembled those of a miniature imperial throne hall: a throne, guards with unsheathed blades flanking the master, gongs and drums that created a lofty atmosphere and greeted the follower who stood in a humble posture. He was submitted to a question-and-answer session during which he was expected to prove his resolution to enter the association and to keep the secrecy of the association whose members were to be his “brothers till death”, lest he should suffer death punishment; he was to prove his firm resolution by shedding his own blood. Then the master, satisfied with the answers of the member-to-be to the questions meant to shake his reliability, would request him to drink up a bowl of alcohol, which contained drops of blood given by the initiators and the initiated. He would inform him that he was to receive a description of the brotherhood’s rituals and symbols on the following day; in exchange for it he should pay a symbolic fee of a yuan. The secret language resolved itself mainly into meanings of words that differed from the established ones, for example hong (’red’) was to be understood as Hong (the overthrown Ming dynasty), or into artificial composing of odd Chinese characters - in the Triad’s case, the creation of one character out of parts of three others, meaning ’temple of faith to the Hong’, that is to the ruling house of the Ming dynasty overthrown by the Manchu. Aside from the secret writing that was present in the “precious scrolls,” body language also held a prominent position. For example, one would take a teacup held by the edges by the ’inquirer’ from below, or pass chopsticks to a ’stranger’ with outstretched fingers - at that moment, the initiated was to push away his bowl of rice immediately. Should there be an offence that could evolve into a fight, one was first to put up his fist, holding up the thumb - if the rival was a comember of the association, he had to apologize to the offended with a smile. The usage of magical numbers borrowed from folk beliefs had also its own well-defined role: 9, 21, 36, 72, and 108 designated sizes in the secret society’s organizational pattern. So did the five traditional colours present on the flags carried by peasant insurgent troops, or on the Red Pike Society symbols; the Secret Societies and the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom 179 ribbons tied to their primitive weapons had other colours as well. Those colours were, of course, red, yellow, white, black, and green. The pantheon of divinities invoked during the initiation ceremony was -and undoubtedly still is - very heterogeneous. One could find among them Taoist (Laozi) and Buddhist (Guanyin, Maitreya) divinities, the God of War (Guanggong), the Sea Goddess (Mazu), and even Song Jiang, the chivalrous rebel leader from a famous novel about highland robbers, translated into English as All Men Are Brothers/Outlaws of the Marsh. In times of peace, the secret societies’ oppositional character became manifest in the enlisting of fellow brothers under the banner of war against foreign rulers. This was the case during the fight to overthrow Mongol rule in the 13th and 14th centuries, and the Manchu yoke during the long period from the 16th to the 20th century. However, some cases of opposition to native authorities are also known, for instance under the Han dynasty. War was also sworn to local officials. During the Manchu Qing dynasty three slogans emerged and were promoted by every secret society of the time. The most important of these was Fan Qing fu Ming, which means “Resist Qing, Restore Ming!” It meant more of a longing for a native dynasty rather than the actual possibility of restoring it. The second slogan obviously emphasised the social character of secret society activities: Guan bi, min fan, that is “Officials oppress, the people rises up in fight!” From here there was only a step to launching the outlaws’ slogan Da fu, ji pin meaning “Fight the rich, help the poor!” The most controversial issue is the origin of individual secret societies. The difficulty lies in the scarcity of testimonies from the secret societies themselves; those that have been preserved - according to the deeply-rooted Chinese tradition of referring back to ancient precedents - refer to an exaggeratedly remote antiquity. Official records in dynastic chronicles are usually exceedingly brief, not larger in size than mentions of other “natural calamities.” A further obstacle in defining the provenience of rebellious associations is the very frequent change of association names for conspiratorial reasons, which will naturally obscure our view. This feature actually renders impossible any precise definition whether a certain organization is an offshoot (fenzhi) of a known association or merely the same one under a new name (bieming). Despite the above-mentioned obstacles it has been possible to ascertain that one of the oldest societies whose longest activity continued longest is the White Lotus Society (Bailianjiao). It existed at least since the 12th century and was famous for its strife to overthroweMongol rule in China in the 13th and 14th centuries, which finally ended in the victory of 1368. In later times, not only did it not die out, but preserved its strength as a Buddhist sect that worshipped the Buddha of the future, Maitreya, whose expected coming was to 180 Roman Sławiński bring heaven upon earth. It once again played an important part during Manchu rule, especially during the great anti-Manchu rebellions of 1774, 1774-1803, and 1861-1863. The second one shook the very foundation of the Manchu rule in the northern part of the country; however, all efforts proved to be of no avail in the end. The White Lotus sect’s return to a quasi-religious activity allowed it to continue its anti-Manchu activity. It was conducted underground by numerous White Lotus “branches,” which made up the secret society system of Northern China. Aside from the cult of the Goddess of Compassion, Guanyin, very popular in the Chinese society, they also maintained ancient folk beliefs centred around the figure of the Eternal Venerable Mother, WushengLaomu, who had created Heaven and Earth. The White Lotus Society was revived under another name, that of the Society of Torch-Bearing Rebels (Niandang, Nianjun), which organised the 1850-1868 uprisings suppressed by imperial troops. Southern China was controlled by societies belonging to the Triad system (Sandianhui, Sanhehui), also called the Heaven and Earth Society (Tiandihui). It also functioned under many other names, including Hongmen, which referred to the overthrown native dynasty, Ming. The beginnings of this society are traditionally connected to the five founding monks who managed to escape from Shaolin monastery set on fire by Manchu troops. The monastery was famous for the martial arts its Buddhist monks practiced. They founded the Triad in the small town of Muyang and continued the anti-Manchu activity whose troublesomeness was reflected in the Qing Code and met very severe repressions. They are known as the ’five patriarchs’ (wu zu). This is the mythologised version, which thus legitimises the avengers who advocated the necessity of fighting against the Manchu rule, and which makes the five monks founders of the first five lodges of the Society. There is also a version that connects the Society’s origin with the anti-Manchu activity of a hero called Coxinga (Zheng Chenggong), son of a pirate killed by the Manchus. Coxinga offered stiff resistance to the imperial army for two decades, first in mainland China, and later on Taiwan. It was there that the Heaven and Earth Society emerged, and later spread out onto the mainland, beginning with Fujian province. The Society’s origin has been a matter of interest for several generations; Western researchers started their study earlier than Chinese ones, beginning with Dr Milne (1826). He stated that the Triad society that had followers among the Chinese immigrants of Malaysia originated from the Heaven and Earth society, which came into being on the Chinese mainland during emperor Jiaqing’s rule, and had by then taken on the name of the Triad. Among others, Charles Gutzlaff and Gustav Schlegel researched this issue. According to William Stanton (1990), the emergence of the Heaven and Earth society is to be connected to the anti-Manchu activity of Wu Sangui. His name was passed Secret Societies and the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom 181 over in silence because of his ignoble deed of having allowed Manchu troops to come into China by the Shanhaiguan fortress at an earlier date, in 1644. That episode clearly proved the Great Wall’s doubtful military value. The Chinese have also shown interest in the Triad’s origin. Tao Zhengzhang was usually considered to be its precursor; however, nowadays it is known that it was Ou Jijia, Kang Youwei’s disciple. They started their research somewhat later than Europeans, not before 1897. Among the researchers were the eminent scientists, Luo Ergang and Xiao Yishan. The Society’s beginnings continued to be the object of controversies (Wei Jianxian versus Dai Yi, for instance) until 1950s. In 1980, Tiandihui, a valuable two-volume collection of source materials, was published by my Alma Mater, the Renmin University, and the First Historical Record Office. The debate on the origin of the Heaven and Earth Society was resumed in the 1980s; it confirmed the version that circulated within the Society itself, according to which it came into being as early as under emperor Kangxi. The “Resist Qing, Restore Ming!” slogan, however, had not emerged until the turn of the rule of the next two emperors (Qin Baoqi et al.). Taiwanese research, free from any political pressure, emphasises the figure of Dai Xuanzhi, and later - those of Zhuang Jifa and Chen Yonghua. This research points to the end of emperor Kangxi’s rule as to the birth of the Society in question, thus very likely refutes other versions. Published in the mainland, Great Encyclopedia of China, in the volume called History of China (1997), mentions the existence of three different views concerning the beginning of the Heaven and Earth Society: 1) in the 13th year of Kangxi’s rule; 2) during Yongzheng’s rule, and 3) the most recent version: during the 26th or 32nd year of Kangxi’s rule. It does not, however, regard the last date as conclusive. The authors of the Encyclopedia point out that it was precisely during the central years of Kangxi’s rule that numerous rebellions broke out, which resulted in harsh repressions. According to the newest inquiries (1995) made by He Zhiqing, The Heaven and Earth Society existed much earlier, but it was not until the 51st year of emperor Qianlong’s rule (i.e. 1786) that the imperial court had become acquainted with it, namely, when Lin Shuangwen’s anti-Manchu uprising broke out in the Churo county of Taiwan, and was followed by subsequent uprisings in Fujian. Many Chinese historians believe that in course of time, those uprisings spread over many southern provinces, and subsequently re-emerged as the activity of other secret societies such as the Society of Brothers and Elders (Gelaohui) or the Shanghai Society of the Small Sword (Xiaodaohui); they consider these to be offshoots of the Heaven and Earth Society created by the local Tiandihui lodges, which had become independent. Some of them backed the Taiping movement in mid-19th century, and well-known personages from the Triad (Hong Daquan, Luo Dagang) joined the 182 Roman Sławiński Taiping. In Guangxi and Guangdong these leaders even created local state-like formations (Dachengguo, Shengping Tianguo, Tinglingguo). The Triads also supported Sun Yatsen’s revolution of 1911; the revolution received financial support from their overseas branches calling themselves Hongmen, a name that referred to the native Ming dynasty. The Triad’s adherents mainly came from the lower classes, from the urban and rural poor, but also from the educated circles, for example people who had not managed to pass the imperial examinations, that is, in Max Weber’s terms, the “intellectual proletariat”, the creators of slogans and outlines of organisational control over the conquered territories. According to some researchers, the first adherents of secret societies in Southern China were cereal freighting agents, who travelled along the Great Imperial Channel and were better versed in the realities of Qing Empire than peasants. After the sudden demographic boom at the end of the 18th century, towns with a feeble commercial and industrial structure were not able to absorb such large numbers of immigrants searching for jobs. It was from these circles that secret societies recruited their members, as they also had a self-help character. Although any person except “people with no honour” could be a potential adherent of a secret society, some researchers believe that in normal times those who willingly joined secret societies were outlaws or those who wished to gain power by illegal means (Feiling Devis, 1970). This hypothesis seems to be somewhat exaggerated if we take into account the large numbers of secret society members and their principles of equality, righteousness and honour, repeated over and over again in their lodges. However, it is a fact that after taking the proper oath Society members certainly stepped outside the boundaries of law, and there they remained for the rest of their lives, since it was impossible for them to quit the association. The humiliating practices that took place during initiation were meant to make adherents aware of what they may expect in case of breaking their oath of keeping the association’s secrets. Manchu authorities used an entire arsenal of sophisticated methods of execution of the rebels caught and tried. For that reason, the strict internal discipline compensated the relative power of the guardians of law towards the criminal anti-world. Denunciations were extremely rare. This is why I was all the more surprised when I came across a confession in which the accused admitted of being a secret society member; the confession was found in the Nanking Record Office, among judicial documents from 1915. I have no doubt that the unfortunate fellow’s fate was already sealed by both the official authorities and his fellow members of the society whom he mentioned by name. The reason why he confessed might have been sophisticated tortures, like those employed before trial at the court of the governor of the Zhili capital province, Secret Societies and the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom 183 Table. The most important incidents caused by secret societies Date Organizer Event beginning The Triad (the Heaven and Earth incidents in Guangdong, Guangxi, Taiwan, of Kangxi rule Society, (Tiandihui) and later in the remaining southern provinces 1796-1804 The White Lotus Society uprisings in Henan, Hubei, Shaanxi, (Bailianjiao) Sichuan and Gansu 1811-1814 The Eight Trigrams (Baguajiao) rebellions led by Li Wencheng in Zhili, and the Heavenly Order Society attack on the Beijing Palace (1813), (Tianlijiao) activities in Shandong and Henan 1850-1864 The Taiping (Baishangdihui) uprising in Guangxi, Taiping tianguo state with its capital at Nanjing (Tianjin) 1853 The Small Swords (Xiaodaohui) uprising in Shanghai 1853-1868 The Nian Society (Niandang, uprising in Anhui, Jiangsu, Shandong, Nianjun) Hunan, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Zhili 1862-1867 The Black Flags (Heiqijun) uprising led by Liu Yongfu in Guangxi and activity in Northern Vietnam 1898-1901 The Boxers (Yihetuan) anti-Manchu, later anti-foreigner rebellion in Shandong, Zhili and Peking 1860-1910 The Red Beards (Honghuzi) Manchuria 1895-1911 The Triad (Sanhehui), The Hong support for the 10 uprisings led League (Hongmen), The Society by Sun Yatsen, which ended up with of Brothers and Elders (Gelaohui), the 1911 Revolution (xinhai) and the overth¬ (Xinzhonghui), and the Association row of the Qing dynasty League (Tongmenghui) 1926-1929 The Red Pike Society mutinies in Shandong, Henan, Shanxi, (Hongqianghui) Zhili and Jinzhao 1927 The Red and Green Gangs suppression of the worker movement (Hongbang) and (Qingbang) in Shanghai 1927-1935 The Society of Brothers support for Communist forces in Southern and Elders (Gelaohui) China 1911-1950 The Way of Unity (Yiguandao) started in Shandong and Tianjin, repressed by official authorities in 1949-1950; still active in Taiwan 184 Roman Sławiński Li Hongzhang: two torturers stepped on a wooden board that gradually pressed down the kneeling suspect’s calves. This kind of torture was considered to be the most intolerable. Thus it is possible that the poor fellow’s hopeless position, as well as his desire to spite the court, made him prone to denouncing himself, so that at least his descendants should think of him as a brave man and not a social non-entity. In Northern China, one of the most widely spread ’branches’ of the White Lotus was the Eight Trigram sect (Baguajiao). Like in the case of the White Lotus, this heretical sect was only a cover for the true activity of a secret society directed against the establishment, which caused turmoil in the years 1811-1814. During these disturbances, the rebels decided even to attack the imperial palace in Beijing in 1813. The attack did not fulfil its purpose of murdering the ruler, as the emperor was absent from the capital. The sect’s beliefs included numerous Taoist elements, such as the Taoist idea of the cosmos expressed in the eight trigrams, eight fields containing combinations of three lines, continuous or interrupted, and a central field with the yin-yang (the masculine and feminine principles) symbol. They worshipped the Eternal Venerable Mother. They highly emphasised obedience to rules of behaviour and religious devotion, and leading a pure life. These were definitely the repressions against the Eight Trigrams that made another secret society, the Torch-Bearing Rebels (Niandang), retreat to the north of China in mid-19th century. This society existed already in the beginning of the century and was also listed as belonging to the northern White Lotus system. Between 1850 and 1868, it was the Manchu court’s main opponent. Due to lack of cooperation between them and the Taiping rebels’ northern expedition, both rebel armies were finally defeated, in spite of many spectacular military achievements. The opposite of the plebeian Niandang was the Old Bull Society (Laoniuhui), organized by landowners. At the same time, in Southern and Middle China the great peasant Taiping rebellion (1851-1864) convulsed the Manchu rule. The Taiping rebellion burst out as the southern population’s response to oppression from the Qing authorities and to a deepening social crisis. The head of the rebellion in Guangxi was Hong Xiuquan, a neophyte from the Hakka minority. The foundation of the Society of God’s Worshippers is attributed to him, yet only in the version of the Manchu authorities. He did attempt, however, to connect his peculiarly understood ideas of Protestantism with the concept of creating an egalitarian and puritan Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace (Taiping tianguo) - the name he finally coined as a result of the peasant rebellion. Nanking was chosen the capital of the Taiping state, and its name was changed into Tianjin (the Heavenly Capital). The unsuccessful northern expedition that ended with the defeat in Shandong (1855), the rivalry between the leaders who bore the title Secret Societies and the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom 185 of wang, the lack of cooperation with the Nian uprising in the north, and the suppressive actions of the Hunan army lead by Zeng Guofan (1811-1872) and Zuo Zongtang (famous for his subsequent suppression of the Muslim uprising in Xinjiang in 1877) as well as the actions of foreign mercenaries under the command of adventure F.T. Ward put an end to the Taiping, one among the few peasant movements inspired not by Messianic Buddhist ideas or by the classical tradition, but by the Christian faith. Further information concerning the Taiping is included in a separate chapter of this book. The Boxers (1897-1901) were rebels whose activity was first directed against the Shandong officials and governor, later against the Manchu court, and in the end (not without support from the scheming empress dowager Cixi) against foreigners. They continued the anti-missionary activity of the Society of the Great Swords: a society that kept alive the White Lotus traditions in Shandong and Henan throughout the 19th century. The European name of the Boxers comes from the initially secret society Yihequan (Fist for Equity and Peace), which practiced martial arts and, at the end of the century, organised the primitively armed ’squads’ called Yihetuan. After occupation of Tianjin, the rebels set out for Peking, on their way destroying the railways and telegraph, which they believed to be the factors causing disturbance in the order of nature. These prejudiced and backward rioters were easily persuaded by the imperial house to lay siege to the diplomatic quarter. During the siege, two imprudent diplomats who had left the quarter lost their lives: the German ambassador, baron von Ketteler, and the Japanese envoy Sugiyama. This incident was used as a pretext by eight states to undertake a punitive expedition lead by Field Marshal A. von Waldersee. The superiority of firearms over spikes and swords once again proved the necessity for modernization in China. The war ended not with a treaty but with the humiliating Final Protocol of 1901. According to Wang Tianjing (1970), it was in the south of the country that transformation from the numerical superiority of followers of sects such as the Society for Moral Order Zailihui (which spread up to Korea) or the Vegetarian Society Zhaijiao towards the domination of secret societies such as the Society of Brothers and Elders Gelaohui occurred first. The latter gained great influence in the Hunan and Huai Army; this fact facilitated the progress of the 1911 revolution and the overthrowing of monarchy. Gelaohui was particularly popular with the so-called Green Banner (Chinese) troops stationed in the Yangtze valley, while Guangdong and Guangxi provinces were dominated by Tiandihui members after 1860. Around 1885, the Society of the Way of Unity (Yiguandao) spread over the northern provinces and Sichuan. It originated from the Xiantiandao sect, founded by Huang Dehui as early as the 17th century. It was known to worship the 186 Roman Sławiński Eternal Venerable Mother Wusheng laomu and to sacrifice to the God of Light Mingmingshangdi. Later on, this remarkable sect blended together elements from many religions: Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity, Judaism, Islam and also Hinduism, into a single faith. Such blending was possible given the Chinese religious syncretism, though it was criticised by missionaries. The commitment to the landowner cause of the sect’s followers during the land reform that did not spare landowners triggered repressions. As a consequence, Yiguandao was eradicated on the basis of two decrees: one issued on 4th January 1949 for the northern part of the country, and the other, concerning the southern part of the country, issued in May 1950. Yiguandao survived in Taiwan up to the present, where it is one of the 16 official faiths and the third in number of adherents (after Taoism and Buddhism). It has more than 845 thousand followers whose activities include running kindergartens, social welfare institutions, and cheap vegetarian restaurants. The Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) The Taiping rebellion has a twofold character - it can be regarded both a case of activity of Chinese secret society and a peasant anti-Manchu movement. In listing it as a secret society, however, we have to cope with certain difficulties: unlike tens of other traditional secret societies, only the Taiping were influenced by specifically understood Protestant beliefs. Again, unlike other secret societies, they quite soon came out into the open and openly fought for founding their “God’s kingdom,” which they called The Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace, Taiping Tianguo, on Chinese territory. The founders of this unusual millenarian movement (taking into account its connections with the specifically understood Christian faith), Hong Xiuquan and Feng Yunshan, began their activity in 1844, in the Guiping district of the border province Guangxi. They had arrived there from Guangdong province. Charles A. Curwen, an expert in this issue, argues that in every village of Guiping district there existed local Sanhehui societies (Societies of the Three Harmonies), i.e. Triads. It was to such a society that they turned for support as representatives of a religious sect. Having acquired it, they launched an uprising in Xinxu, near Jintian. Their sect bore the appealing name of Baishangdihui (God Worshippers’ Society). The existence of such a name has lately been questioned by some (Yang Zongliang, 1995) but admitted by others (Wu Shangzhong) as rendering the very essence of the Taiping faith. The sect’s founder and leader of the Jintian uprising, launching the catching ideas of brotherhood and justice, declared himself the “brother” of Jesus Christ. Special emphasis was laid on Secret Societies and the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom 187 the ideas of equality, spread out to cover every aspect of social life. A whole group of Chinese researchers confirm, however, that rituals of admission into the Society were strikingly similar to the ceremonies known to be performed in other secret societies, and the rebellious slogan，Dafu jiping，(Beat the rich, help the poor) enjoyed great popularity among Taiping followers. Even though Hong Xiuquan himself had already given up advocating the “Ming restoration” idea and sneered at the barbarous initiation rituals of the Triad, according to his cousin’s report quoted in a booklet on the Taiping written at the time by a missionary, Theodore Hamberg (1854), this did not mean that he did not maintain his relations with them, without which the ravages of the uprising could not have encompassed as many as 17 Chinese provinces for 14 years (1851-1864). ’Liberated’ women played an important part in the uprising: they set up their own troops. During the first years, they camped in female camps (nüguan) strictly separated from male ones. Their active participation in the uprising was certainly caused by the Hakka origin of the adherents of the first Taiping. The Hakkas were known for their dashing manner; their women enjoyed greater freedom and did not bind their feet and breasts. The Taiping did not cut their hair, and their outfit saw a return of the loose Ming gowns: they wore red turbans and disregarded everything that the Manchu had imposed on the Chinese society. There exist reports concerning their destruction of rival cult objects, such as Buddhist temples, the precious Baoan pagoda that dated back to Ming times, etc. Hence certain researchers reached the conclusion that monarchic power was the only thing the superstitious Taiping rebels aimed at (Chen Gonglu 1935). The causes and effects of the outbreak were multiple, hence the historians’ different interpretations. Teng Ssu-yü (1950), for instance, stated that the basic cause of the Taiping rebellion was political corruption, whereas Kuo Tingyi (1946) believed that the character of the rebellion could not be limited to political and ethnic matters alone but comprised religious, economic and social elements as well. Vincent Y. C. Shih (1967), on the contrary, believed that Taiping rebels did not display any real revolutionary spirit nor did they seize the opportunities that lay in borrowing certain Christian ideas, because they regarded them from the viewpoint of traditional beliefs. Hatano Yoshiro (1951) considered the Taiping to be the first example of a real revolution in China, since it aimed at reforming religion as well as social and economic relationships. Jean Chesneaux similarly qualified the Taiping as a basically agrarian movement (1953) and drew a line between it and other secret societies, classifying it among the great mass rebellions of the mid-19th century, such as the Miao, Muslim or Nian uprisings (1970). Nevertheless, at present, Zhou Xinguo (1997) notices 188 Roman Sławiński in Taiping writings numerous occurrences of expressions that originated in the arcane language of the secret Heaven and Earth Society (Tiandihui). It facilitated the maintaining of the society’s secrecy and the members’ bonds with it. Joseph R. Levenson (1962) emphasised the Taiping’s break with Confucianism and rejection of the fundamental idea of the Mandate of Heaven (tianming) which legitimised the ruler of imperial China. During the 1970s, in the context of the notorious critique of Confucianism, efforts were made to present the Taiping anti-Confucian actions as a herald of denial of Confucianism during the May Fourth Movement of 1919. Nowadays, however, it is thought that the anti-Confucian views of Hong Xiuquan originated in his monotheistic beliefs, and were not meant to strengthen the anti-feudal attitude. Wang Qingcheng devoted his attention to this issue; on the basis of Hong Kong sources, he proved that Hong Xiuquan’s individual anti-Confucian attitude found its expression only after the conquest of Nanking, and although they aimed at a future reinterpretation of the Confucian classics rather than at putting them on the Index, this resulted in a lack of an educated elite in their own ranks. Having liberated Southern and Central China from under Manchu rule and having created their own state with the capital at Nanking (renamed as Tianjin, the Heavenly Capital), the Taiping worked out the so-called Heavenly Agricultural System (Tianchao tianmu zhidu). According to its principles, every rural household that had been apportioned land was to raise two pigs and five chickens and to plant two mulberry trees. The surplus in cereals was to be turned over to the common granary, from which in case of need (weddings or funeral banquets, for instance) an appropriate share was distributed. In fact, the functioning of such a system has repeatedly been questioned; nowadays it is believed that it may have existed but was not put into practice in a strict manner (Huang Wei, 1995). A great contribution to the research of the Taiping issue was made by Chinese historians belonging to an older generation Luo Ergang, Jian Youwen, Xiao Yishan, and Guo Tingyi. Among European scholars, one of the most outstanding is the above-mentioned Jean Chesneaux, leader of an international research project in secret societies, in which I had the honour to participate. The outcome of this project was published in Paris (1970) and Stanford (1972). Other leading researchers in this field include Jacques Reclus, author of the book entitled La révolte des Taiping (1851-1864), Prologue de la révolution chinoise (1972), Ch. A Curwen, and the American Teng Ssu-yü. The writings of A. F. Lindley (1866) constitute valuable source material. Some of the issues most disputed by historians are the interpretation of Hong Daquan’s (brother of the Taiping leader) original writings, leaving the capital together with several thousands of his troops by one of the main leaders, Shi Dakai in 1856, Hong Secret Societies and the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom 189 Rengang’s pro-Western and pro-capitalist ideas, and the credibility of the ’faithful’ Liu Xiucheng’s testimony written in a Manchu prison. In it, besides a great deal of valuable information on the Taiping rebellion, he also put forth the idea of fighting against foreigners side by side with the Manchu. It is not entirely clear, however, whether it was he who introduce this idea to save what was left of his troops, or whether it was the commanding staff of the Hunan army fighting on the Manchu side. Notwithstanding the disputes concerning many details of the Taiping rebellion, it appears to be an unusual epos of a peasant uprising that exhibits prospects of raising up from stagnation. The original structure of its leadership, its marches through many provinces, the discipline of the peasant army: all these inspired the contemporary foreigners with respect and filled the Manchus with dread. The determination of the Hunan and Huai armies which protected the interests of rich southern peasantry and which saved the imperial court by subduing the Taipings, attacked at the end by Gordon’s mercenary troops, can be regarded as a standard for the contrasts in the Chinese society of that time. The number of victims of the rebellion amounted to about 20 million. The causes of the final downfall of this specific peasant movement have long been analysed. As early as 1934 the Japanese Nohara Shiro formulated them quite fittingly: 1. The Taipings lacked a leadership class and allies, since there was no bourgeoisie and no proletariat; 2. They were unable to join forces with similar movements (later on, however, on the basis of Manchu documented evidence, they were believed to attempt building a fleet of 600 ships that were to support the Small Sword Rebellion, which had seized Shanghai - Ch. A. Curwen, 1970); 3. In spite of great military achievements, the Taiping were never able to extend their agricultural system beyond Jiangsu province; 4. They committed errors in strategy, such as lack of intense commitment to capture Peking (they actually sent up a mere 20,000 soldiers north - R.S.) and decision not to seize Shanghai when they were sure to encounter no strong resistance from the foreigners; 5. The peasants were not able to appoint competent leaders. (Moreover, there were conflicts among the leaders, and Hong Xiuquan yielded to nepotism and degeneration - R.S.). The attempts at evaluating the Taiping, however, met with as much interest as with controversy. During the Maoist era in China they could not be very favourably appraised, in order not to outdo the unrivalled leader’s achievements; however, it made the object of very detailed research. Today, the evaluations are becoming more and more differentiated. 190 Roman Sławiński An evaluation of these works is undoubtedly quite a difficult matter. Xia Chundao (2000) attempted to divide them into stages, which resulted in a valuable study entitled A History of the Taiping Movement, included in the collection Fifty Years of Research in Modern Chinese History published in Shanghai. According to him, research in Taiping history can be divided into the following stages: • lively development of research (1949-1964), • distortions and regress (1964-1976), • maturity and achievements (1979-1999). Contemporary Chinese authors now continue the rich tradition of Taiping research, whose most famous representatives on the mainland were Jian Youwen and Luo Ergang. The latter repeatedly reconstructed the text of the ’faithful prince’ Liu Xiucheng’s testimonies, altered by his interrogator, Zeng Guofan. The last version of the testimonies improved by Luo Ergang (after the 1951, 1962, and 1982 versions) was published in 1995 by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Recently, detailed research has been conducted into such issues as the appraisal of the form of government specific to the Taiping; in an early stage, during military rule, it displayed elements of peasant democracy. Yet there is no unanimous judgment in this matter: some consider the Taiping rule feudal (Shen Jiarong), others as a revolutionary peasant rule (Sun Kefu, Guan Jie), and still others as a peasant rule that turned feudal (Wang Tianjiang). Prominent figures are still the object of research, such as the ones mentioned above: Hong Xiuquan (Wang Qingcheng, 1979), Shi Dakai (Su Shuangbo, 1986), Hong Rengang (Xia Chuntao, 1999), and even figures of lesser importance who were included in the Biographies of the Leaders of the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace, edited by Chen Baoguang et. al. (1990). This compend contains data concerning 33 wangs. As many as 172 biographies were edited by Luo Ergang. The range of research is widening, and has come to include issues of diplomacy, culture and economy (Wang Guoping, 1985; Guo Yisheng, 1991), regional history (Cai Shide on Suzhou, 1981; Xu Chuanyi on Anhui, 1991), military science, and so forth. They are not based solely on documents handed down by the Taiping themselves but also make use of the views of their rivals, such as the Hunan armies, as Zhang Haipeng does regarding the causes of the Taiping defeat in the battle of Anqing (1988). Even in the field of diplomacy, which is thought to be the least researched, there have appeared studies highly appraised by Chinese historiography, like the ones by Wang Qingcheng (1991) or Mao Jiaqi (1992). They disentangle tangled problems that arise among others from Hong Xiuquan’s friendly treatment of foreign powers while naming himself “the true ruler of all nations.” Secret Societies and the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom 191 The topics regarded relatively recently are those connected to Taiping customs (Li Haiwen, 1989) and, above all, to their faith (Xia Chuntao, 1992), which had previously been considered taboo in China. The productions of a collection of maps of Tianjin (Nanking) and its surrounding area (1986), an album containing 132 illustrations and as many as 104 historical maps (1989), and finally the Great Taiping Dictionary (1995) with four thousand encyclopaedic entries come as novelties. The publication of Luo Ergang’s four-volume History of the Taiping (1991) from 1984 and Mao Jiaqi’s three-volume history are very likely a response to the Chinese readers’ unabated interest in the Taiping matter. Two periodicals dedicated to the matter ceased to appear for financial reasons: the “Taiping Tianguo Xuekan” (Scientific Review on the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace) and the “Taiping Tianguo Shi Yicong” (Collection of Interpretations of Taiping History). Taiping research is looked upon almost as a discipline by itself in Chinese historical milieu. At present, it suffers from the generation gap and insufficiency of continuators. However, according to historiographers, this fact is not caused by an exhaustion of the subject, since many issues require updating. Regional and sociological research still has a wide range to cover. Summing up, it would seem that the Taiping could be best described as a specific social movement with powerful religious and anti-Manchu overtones rather than a traditional peasant uprising or a rebellion of a secret society. It is predominantly so because of its wide scope and its attempt to put an end to stagnation during the Manchu rule of the Qing dynasty and to initiate modernisation of China, which for some time gained the West’s sympathy. One could undoubtedly assume that the egalitarian ideas so much emphasised by Chinese historians could not be brought into practice if they were to confront the actual Chinese way life at the time. All attempts at carrying them into effect were given up relatively early, even in the capital and its immediate vicinity. The social experiment as such, which exploited the traditional secret society ethos and Protestant ideas of brotherhood and equality of men was an unprecedented phenomenon in Chinese history. One could not discard it as a potential source of inspiration for modern-day China, especially during the agrarian reform of the 1950s. Z publikacji Romana Sławińskiego Droga do Chin z lotu ptaka, mai. Roman Sławiński 缺 )Am淼 處勝L El X Wiersz wykaligrafowany w tradycyjnej formie przez Profesora Uniwersytetu Pekińskiego, literaturoznawcę Wu Xiaolinga, dedykowany w 1988 roku Shi Lewenowi，jak nazywano w Chinach Romana Sławińskiego Pod Krakowem, mal. Roman Sławiński, 2007 Pod Krakowem (II), mal. Roman Sławiński, 2009 WOJCIECH SZYMCZYK O sztuce negocjacji z Chińczykami Wiedzieć, że się wie, co się wie i wiedzieć, że się nie wie, czego się nie wie - oto prawdziwa wiedza Konfucjusz Problematyka negocjacji doczekała się już w Polsce wielu opracowań. Jednak wciąż znikoma jest liczba pozycji poświęconych jej specyfice i uwzględniających różnice kulturowe. Przyczyną może być złożoność samego procesu negocjacji. Analizując specyfikę negocjacji między Zachodem a Wschodem -a zwłaszcza liczne niuanse - skoncentrujemy się na Dalekim Wschodzie. Prezentowana w artykule tematyka i jej ujęcie powinny zainspirować nie tylko osoby zajmujące się negocjacjami czy przedsiębiorców myślących o nawiązaniu stosunków gospodarczych z najludniejszym państwem świata. Składowe procesu negocjacyjnego Większość pozycji poświęconych problemowi negocjacji rozpoczyna się od podania jej definicji. Niejako na przekór, poniżej wypunktowane zostały najważniejsze stwierdzenia, które z negocjowaniem związane nie są - a mimo to często są z nim utożsamiane. Według Willema Mastenbroeka najczęstszym błędem jest: mylenie negocjacji z walką o punkty, lekceważenie tzw. otoczki (przejście od razu do interesów); niedostrzeganie tego, że związek z mocodawcami (zarówno nasz, jak również osób siedzących po drugiej stronie stołu) jest czynnikiem wpływającym na negocjacje; uważanie, że impas oznacza fiasko negocjacji; myślenie z zawziętością; brak świadomości własnego systemu negocjowania; nierozpoznawanie własnych ani cudzych prób manipulacji, i w końcu postrzeganie rozejmu jako oznaki słabości1. 1 W. Mastenbroek, Negocjowanie, Warszawa 1996, s. 7-8. 196 Wojciech Szymczyk Zupełnie inną kwestią jest odpowiedź na pytanie, jak należy negocjować, by były to rokowania owocne (satysfakcjonujące). Przywołany już Willem Mastenbroek pisał, że „wraz z rozbudzeniem się mego zainteresowania negocjacjami wyszło na jaw, że nie jest łatwo określić, co to znaczy dobrze negocjować”2. Odpowiedź na powyższe pytanie jest także uzależniona od tego, co może zostać uznane za satysfakcjonujące rozwiązanie. Czy założenie, że negocjowanie jest typowym przykładem gry zero-jedynkowej, gdzie sukces jednej ze stron oznacza automatycznie porażkę drugiej? A może twierdzenie, że możliwe jest osiągnięcie rozwiązania, w którym obie strony są zwycięzcami? Mastenbroek stwierdza, że „stanowią one [negocjacje] alternatywę między zachowaniem kooperatywnym i agresywnym; co więcej, są odrębną umiejętnością współżycia społecznego, całkowicie odmienną od współpracy czy walki”3. Przygotowanie do rokowań Jeśli wyniknęłaby potrzeba podania komuś najprostszej, jednozdaniowej recepty na skuteczne negocjowanie, możnaby się powołać na Williama Ury’e-go, który twiedzi, że „sekret skutecznych negocjacji jest prosty: przygotuj się, przygotuj się, przygotuj się”4. Najczęstszym przypadkiem niepowodzenia w negocjacjach jest właśnie brak owego przyszykowania się do samej fazy właściwych negocjacji. Wydaje się to oczywistą rzeczą, ale jak się okazuje, nie jest. Co to znaczy skutecznie się przygotować? Zdaniem Mastenbroeka, w przygotowaniach wyróżnić można: „diagnozowanie: zbieranie i wymiana informacji na temat treści negocjacji, klimatu, równowagi sił i mocodawców; cel: określenie pożądanego wyniku; procedury: przygotowania taktyczne i strategiczne (m.in. wypracowanie wariantów pozwalających na zachowanie elastyczności)”5. Proces negocjacyjny Sam proces negocjacyjny, poza fazą przygotowania (która jest bardzo istotna i z nieuzasadnionych przyczyn często wyrzucana z procesu negocjacji, jakkol- 2 Ibidem, s. 11. 3 Ibidem, s. 16. 4 W. Ury, Odchodząc od NIE. Od konfrontacji do kooperacji, Warszawa 1995, s. 35. 5 W. Mastenbroek, op. cit., s. 94. O sztuce negocjacji z Chińczykami 197 wiek stanowi jego integralną część), składa się z: przedstawienia stanowisk, poszukiwania rozwiązania satysfakcjonującego obie strony (może przyjmować mniej lub bardziej agresywne formy) oraz zakończenia. Etap przedstawienia stanowisk jest jeszcze częścią niekonfrontacyjną, a przynajmniej powinien taką być - „przewodniczący winien zadbać o to, aby strony wygłosiły swoje oświadczenia bez przerywania przez stronę przeciwną”6. Gary Karrass zwraca uwagę, by „mierzyć wysoko” - „(...) zawsze startuj z wysokiej pozycji - w razie potrzeby będzie dokąd schodzić”7. Poszukiwanie rozwiązania, które zadowoli obie strony, jest kolejnym etapem procesu negocjacji. Na tym etapie widać, kto jak przygotował się do negocjacji, co wie o drugiej stronie, o jej oczekiwaniach, o możliwych płaszczyznach porozumienia. Na wstępie także można śmiało zastosować przygotowane wcześniej procedury. Zdawać sobie jednak należy sprawę, że „nie zawsze porozumienie jest celem negocjacji. Jest ono tylko środkiem, a celem - zaspokojenie Twoich interesów”8. Innymi słowy - miej na uwadze, „czy dzięki porozumieniu możesz zaspokoić twoje interesy lepiej niż dzięki najlepszej z alternatyw negocjowanego porozumienia (BATNA9)10. Ostatnim etapem jest zakończenie - jest ono zazwyczaj wyznaczane przez ostateczny termin jednej ze stron, który mogła ona poświęcić rokowaniom. Zasadniczo możliwe są tu dwa rozwiązania - strony mogły osiągnąć porozumienie lub nie. Dużą rolę w tym etapie odgrywa przewodniczący, który może rozwiązać pewne sprawy przeszkadzające w uzyskaniu kompromisu. Style negocjowania Mastenbroek przedstawia cztery podstawowe style negocjowania11: • walka - najbardziej agresywny ze wszystkich, w którym głównym założeniem jest realizacja swoich celów (bez liczenia się z racjami przeciwnika), • współpraca - istnieje otwarcie na rozwiązania kompromisowe, • unikanie - niepodejmowanie negocjacji (przez różnego rodzaju zabiegi, np. przesunięcie, nieposuwanie spraw naprzód), • poszukiwanie/elastyczność - aktywne poszukiwanie rozwiązania, w jak największym stopniu satysfakcjonujące obie strony. 6 Ibidem. 7 G. Karrass, Dobić targu, Sopot 1990, s. 137. 8 W. Ury, op. cit., s. 41. 9 BATNA - Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement. 10 W. Ury, op. cit., s. 41. 11 W. Mastenbroek, op. cit., s. 120. 198 Wojciech Szymczyk Nie ulega wątpliwości, że najczęściej spotykanym stylem jest ich mieszanka. Dobry negocjator umiejętnie przeplata różnego rodzaju style w zależności od zmieniającej się sytuacji. Przedstawione powyżej style negocjowania są tylko konstrukcją typowo teoretyczną, jako że rzadko można spotkać negocjatorów kurczowo trzymających się jednego stylu. O sztuce negocjacji z Azjatami W informacjach Wydziałów Ekonomiczno-Handlowych polskich placówek dyplomatycznych w Chinach pojawia się, jako bariera utrudniająca wejście polskich firm na rynek chiński, problem bariery językowej i kulturowej. O ile ten pierwszy można - w przypadku posiadania odpowiednich środków - rozwiązać dosyć prosto przez zatrudnienie tłumacza, o tyle drugi - dotyczący bariery kulturowej, nie jest łatwy do wyeliminowania. W wydanym w roku 2002 przez Wydział Ekonomiczno-Handlowy w Hongkongu opracowaniu dotyczącym negocjacji z Chińczykami (i problematyce etykiety w spotkaniach) autorzy zwracają uwagę, iż jest wysoce wskazane, aby posiąść minimalną wiedzę o podstawowych zwyczajach i zachowaniach Chińczyków jeszcze przed nawiązaniem z nimi kontaktów12. Specyfika komunikacji międzykulturowej Dlaczego owo poznanie jest koniecznością? Jak pisze Augustine Ihator13, poznanie pewnych globalnych wzorców kulturowych może prowadzić do zrozumienia tzw. przenośni kulturowych14, utożsamiających pewne zjawiska lub działania kultur narodowych, które uważane są przez większość lub wszystkich uczestników za bardzo ważne (takie, z którymi się identyfikują, np. operę włoską, wino francuskie, balet rosyjski, hiszpańskie walki byków czy futbol amerykański). Ihator zauważa, że każdego rodzaju komunikacja odbywa się na dwóch płaszczyznach: kontekstu społecznego oraz trybu werbalnego i niewerbalnego15. To właśnie kultura implikuje, który z dwóch ostatnich trybów dominuje. 12 Opracowanie Wydziału Ekonomiczno-Handlowego w Hongkongu: Negocjacje w Chinach. Etykieta w spotkaniach z Chińczykami, Hongkong 2002. 13 A. Ihator, Understanding the Cultural Patters of the World: an Imperative in Implementing Strategic International PR Programs, „Public Relations Quarterly”，zima 2000, s. 39. 14 Cyt. za: M.J. Gannon, Understanding Global Cultures - Metaphorical Journeys Through 17 Countries, w: A. Ihator, op. cit., s. 7. 15 A. Ihator, op. cit. , s. 40. O sztuce negocjacji z Chińczykami 199 Zwraca także uwagę, że rozróżnienie to wyodrębnia dwa przeciwstawne modele komunikacji, tzw. high context oraz low context. Autorem owego podziału jest Edward T. Hall, który za komunikację HC (high context) uważa taką, w której większa część informacji jest umiejscowiona w konkretnym kontekście lub osobie16. Innymi słowy - niewielka część jest jasno i precyzyjnie sformułowana. Do takich krajów zaliczyć można Japonię, Chiny czy też kraje arabskie. Częste w tych krajach jest nadużywanie w komunikacji czasowników, metafor czy aforyzmów. Równie zauważalna jest dwuznaczność lub milczenie, które także ma wartość komunikacyjną (a z którą ciężko zmierzyć się ludziom z Zachodu). Warto wobec tego zdawać sobie sprawę z tego, dlaczego w Chinach zazwyczaj nie jest możliwe uzyskanie wprost odpowiedzi negatywnej na zadane pytanie. Wynika to z tego, że kultury HC (high context) mają niejako wpojony zwyczaj udzielania odpowiedzi „nieostrej”, a co więcej, w tych kulturach bezpośrednia odpowiedź negatywna uznana byłaby za niekulturalną. Stąd też odpowiedzi wymijające, jak również komunikaty niewerbalne - jak np. cisza, brak kontaktu wzrokowego, drżenie rąk17. Dodatkowo należy pamiętać, że kraje Dalekiego Wschodu są pod wpływem filozofii konfucjańskiej, która kładzie nacisk na przyjaźń i wzajemność18. Wynika z tego, że negocjatorzy-Azjaci dążyć będą do uzgodnienia wspólnego stanowiska (obopólnie korzystnego). W przeciwieństwie więc do zachodniego myślenia o negocjacjach jako o grze zero-jedynkowej (zwycięzca - pokonany), częste jest myślenie jako o grze, w której obie strony mogą wygrać19. Co więcej - stosunki budowane są z myślą o relacjach długofalowych, . ♦ i ♦ • • • ♦ ^ ♦ ♦ ♦. a co za tym idzie negocjacje wymagają znacznie większej ilości czasu niż te przeprowadzane na Zachodzie. Korzyścią, wynagradzającą ten czas, jest to, że tak zbudowana zależność między dwoma firmami jest trwała; strony stają się przyjaciółmi lub zaprzyjaźnionymi (shou-jen)20. Jest to o tyle istotne, iż przed podjęciem decyzji, gdzie negocjować z myślą o inwestycji w Chinach, ważniejszy od potencjału rynku jest potencjał do zbudowania długofalowych stosunków21. 16 E.T. Hall, Beyond Culture, New York 1976, s. 79. 17 A. Ihator, op. cit., s. 40. 18 Ibidem, s. 349. 19 L.E. Palich, G.R. Carini, L.P. Livingstone, Comparing American and Chinese Negotiating Styles: The Influence of Logic Paradigms, „Thunderbird International Business Review”, 2002, s. 794. 20 Ji Li, C.E. Labig jr., Negotiating with China: Exploratory Study of Relationship Building, „Journal of Managerial Issues: 2001, s. 349. 21 Ibidem, s. 351. 200 Wojciech Szymczyk Przygotowując się do negocjacji z partnerami z Azji, należy zdawać sobie sprawę z wielu różnych aspektów kulturowych. Różnice między myśleniem „azjatyckim” a „europejskim” są na tyle duże, że jest rzeczą nierozsądną za- ♦ y % ♦ ♦ * , * * . ♦ • ♦ wierzać wyłącznie swoim przeczuciom czy też intuicji. Dwoma najważniejszymi elementami, których istnienia należy być świadomym, są: • guanxi (sieć nieformalnych powiązań międzyludzkich), • strategia w wydaniu chińskim (oparta na Sztuce Wojn^ Sun Tzu). Guanxi - sieć nieformalnych powiązań Słowo to składa się z dwóch elementów: ’guan，oraz，xi”. Pierwsze z nich znaczy dosłownie: relacja lub powiązanie, i odnosi się do wyświadczania komuś przysługi; natomiast ’xiJ oznacza przywiązywanie i rozszerzanie wzajemnych stosunków22. Guanxi oznacza więc relacje lub powiązania związane z wymianą przysług, jest jednak czymś więcej niż tylko relacją, która może istnieć pomiędzy dwoma jednostkami czy też grupami (odpowiednik terminu guanxi w Japonii i Korei to odpowiednio: kankei oraz kwankye23). W kulturze zachodniej guanxi często utożsamiane jest z praktykami korupcyjnymi. Jak jednak zauważa Y.H. Wong w swoim opracowaniu The Dynamics of Guanxi in China: „(...) jako że większość literatury na temat studiów poświęconych relacjom ma swoje korzenie w amerykańskiej i europejskiej kulturze, nie jest wskazanym, aby przekładać zachodnie myśli na kontekst chiński bez wydobycia podobieństw i różnic w budowaniu relacji międzyludzkich”24. Podstawowym założeniem koniecznym do zrozumienia przez ludzi Zachodu fenomenu guanxi jest to, iż Chińczycy oczekują, że zapłata za okazaną nam przysługę będzie większa niż wartość samej przysługi. Brak spłaty tak zaciągniętego długu uważany jest za niemoralny, gdyż „Chińczycy oceniają innych poprzez ocenę tego, w jaki sposób dotrzymują danego słowa. Stąd też chińskie powiedzenie: raz wypowiedziane słowo nie może być cofnięte nawet przy pomocy zaprzęgu czterech koni”25. 22 C.A.L. Pearson, S.R. Chatterjee, Gender Variations in Work Goal Priorities: A Si^^tey of Chinese Managers, „International Journal of Management” 2002, s. 535-536. 23 Ji Li, C.E. Labig jr., op. cit., s. 347. 24 Y.H. Wong, The Dynamics of Guanxi in China, „Singapore Management Review”, s. 25. 25 Ibidem, s. 30-31. O sztuce negocjacji z Chińczykami 201 Sztuka wojny Sun Tzu - klucz do zrozumienia strategii negocjacyjnych Chińczyków Jak zauważyli autorzy opracowania Negocjacje w Chinach. Etykieta w spotkaniach z Chińczykami: „o ile my ciągle myślimy o biznesie jako kwestii intuicji, czytając Managera jednej minuty, to w Chinach nawet dzieci są zaznajomione z 36 strategiami lub Sztuką wojny, sformułowanymi przez Sun Tzu, słynnego stratega wojskowego z IV w. p.n.e. Sztukę tę wykorzystują w życiu codziennym”26. Traktat ten został uznany za tak ważny dla negocjacji z Chińczykami, ponieważ nie jest on pracą traktującą tylko i wyłącznie o rzemiośle wojennym; bez większych problemów może być (i jest) stosowany w każdej innej dziedzinie życia - w tym także w negocjacjach. Przewodnią myślą traktatu jest stwierdzenie, że można uniknąć walki pod warunkiem, że wcześniej zostanie przygotowana odpowiednia strategia. Poniżej zaprezentowano, za artykułem Gerarda A. Michaelsona Marketing Wisdom, siedem myśli, które powinny przyświecać każdemu chcącemu negocjować z Azjatami27: • należy ustalić strategię - może się bowiem okazać, że walka będzie wtedy niepotrzebna; często bowiem zdarza się tak, że wynik znany jest jeszcze przed podjęciem działań, i „jakkolwiek nie każdy konflikt może być uniknięty, dobrze zaplanowana strategia może zniwelować większość przeszkód”28; • należy zdobyć jak najwięcej informacji - Sun Tzu pisał: „znaj swego przeciwnika i znaj siebie, a wtedy twoje zwycięstwo nigdy nie będzie zagrożone”29. Trzeba nauczyć się odróżniać informacje przydatne od niepotrzebnych, często bowiem uzyskuje się informacje, które - zdaniem informatora - są poszukiwane; • powinno się skupiać zalety w jedną - należy wziąć po uwagę, że nie zawsze ma się tyle środków, by działać równie efektywnie na wielu płaszczyznach; trzeba skupić się wtedy na tej, na której ma się najsilniejszą pozycję. Przydatna będzie tu wiedza o przeciwniku i o jego słabych stronach (warto pomyśleć o elementach marketing mix: miejscu, cenie, promocji, produkcie, oraz o tym, w którym z tych elementów można uzyskać największą przewagę nad przeciwnikiem); • należy działać tak, aby uzyskać korzyści - jakkolwiek nie zawsze jest to proste, cały czas trzeba mieć na uwadze różne sposoby osiągnięcia 26 Negocjacje w Chinach..,, op. cit, s. 17. 27 G.A. Michaelson, Marketing Wisdom, „Executive Exellence” 1999, s. 19. 28 Ibidem, s. 19. 29 Cytaty ze Sztuki wojny Sun Tzu za: G.A. Michaelson, op. cit., s. 19. 202 Wojciech Szymczyk przewagi - uderzać na tej płaszczyźnie, na której ma się przytłaczającą przewagę (ale uwaga: przeciwnik może prowokować, licząc na to, że nie wiemy o nim dostatecznie dużo); • trzeba skoordynować tempo działań z wyczuciem czasu -Sun Tzu pisał: „Najskuteczniejszy atak osiągany jest przez szybkie zebranie sił (tempo) i uwolnienie ich w najbardziej pożądanej chwili (wyczucie czasu)”. Gerard Michaelson wskazuje na możliwości wprowadzenia licznych zmian (w warunkach gwarancyjnych lub cenie) w trakcie ważnych targów branżowych; • powinno się używać dodatkowych (specjalnych) środków -Sun Tzu pisał: „Użyj zwykłych sił, by nawiązać walkę; by wygrać - użyj dodatkowych”. Zasada ta odnosi się w szczególności do konieczności podejmowania ryzyka. Działając asekuracyjnie, nigdy nie osiągnie się tego, co można osiągnąć, ryzykując; • należy umacniać zyski - Sun Tzu pisał: „Wygrać bitwę, zdobyć kraje i miasta, lecz nie zdołać połączyć tych osiągnięć - jest złowróżbne i może być stratą środków i czasu”. Innymi słowy, nie jest sztuką osiągnąć sukces na rynku, sztuką jest go utrzymać (tym bardziej, że pierwszy sukces zazwyczaj okupiony jest stosunkowo największymi kosztami). Warto wiedzieć, że w początkowej fazie nawiązywania relacji międzyludzkich (zwłaszcza w stosunkach z obcokrajowcami) Chińczycy okazują rezerwę - na tym etapie myśli Sun Tzu są „w cenie”. Pozwalają dogłębnie poznać drugą stronę. Specyfika negocjacji z Chińczykami W celu ułatwienia życia negocjatorom opracowano szereg różnych wskazówek dotyczących specyfiki negocjacji z Chińczykami. Na jedno z ciekawszych opracowań powołują się autorzy opracowania Gender Impact on Chinese Negotiation: Some Key Issues for Western Negotiators, które sprowadza się do ośmiu podstawowych zasad kulturowych, które powinny przyświecać każdemu negocjatorowi30. Są nimi: • status - Chińczycy przywiązują wagę do hierarchii (chociażby w usadowieniu negocjujących) i oczekują, że będzie to traktowane z respektem; • twarz - oznaka godności danej osoby (nie należy stawiać chińskiego partnera w sytuacji, gdy jego „twarz” będzie mogła ucierpieć); 30 Hong Seng Woo, D. Wilson, J. Liu, Gender Impact on Chinese Negotiation: Some Key Issues for Western Negotiators, „Women in Management Review” 2001, s. 352. O sztuce negocjacji z Chińczykami 203 • zaufanie - podstawa negocjacji; Chińczycy negocjują z osobami (i firmami), którym mogą zaufać (w celu ułatwienia sobie negocjacji należy od samego początku budować relacje miedzy obiema stronami, częścią takiej strategii może być tworzenie spójnego zespołu negocjacyjnego przez dopasowanie obu zespołów - pod względem wieku, pozycji i innych cech31); • przyjaźń - wraz z zaufaniem stanowi podstawę relacji między obiema stronami; u Chińczyków częste jest negocjowanie z osobami, do których mają szacunek i z którymi są zapoznane - kultywowanie przyjaźni może być bardzo pomocne w dalszych kontaktach; • wieloznaczność - natura Chińczyków nie pozwala im na bezceremonialne odrzucenie propozycji (lub pytania); zamiast tego usłyszeć można wymijającą (wieloznaczną) odpowiedź; • cierpliwość - Chińczycy patrzą na negocjacje przez pryzmat długofalowej współpracy, a nie tylko najbliższego porozumienia - stąd też negocjacje potrafią zajmować sporo czasu i należy być na to przygotowanym. Dodatkowo czasami może zdarzyć się, że negocjacje będą przeciągane przez stronę chińską tylko dla osiągnięcia przyjemności z targowania się - powinno to być zaakceptowane32; • protokół zachowań - swoista etykieta ukształtowana na przestrzeni kilkutysięcznej historii kultury chińskiej; • guanxi - podstawa w przypadku budowania jakichkolwiek relacji (nie tylko biznesowych). Działania poprzedzające negocjacje i proces negocjacji W opracowaniu Negotiating with China: Exploratory Study of Relationship Building autorzy prezentują szereg działań, o których powinna wiedzieć każda osoba chcąca prowadzić negocjacje z Chińczykami33. Podzielili oni je na dwie grupy: dotyczące działań poprzedzających negocjacje oraz działania w trakcie negocjacji. Do pierwszej grupy należą: • identyfikacja potencjalnych obiektów negocjacyjnych - należy brać pod uwagę te osoby, z którymi istnieją relacje guanxi, jeśli ich brak, należy poszukać pośrednika, który posiada własne guanxi z drugą stroną i który będzie mógł przedstawić sobie partnerów w celu nawiązania długofalowych relacji (nie powinno się zapomnieć o przyniesieniu na pierwsze spotkanie większej ilości wizytówek z imieniem, nazwiskiem, stanowiskiem i nazwą firmy - powinny 31 L.E. Palich, G.R. Carini, L.P. Livingstone, op. cit., s. 794. 32 Ibidem, s. 794. 33 Ji Li, C.E. Labig jr., op. cit., s. 354. 204 Wojciech Szymczyk one być także przetłumaczone na język chiński; wizytówki należy wręczać i odbierać oburącz - jest to część protokołu, którego stosowanie przyniesie nam uznanie w oczach naszego chińskiego partnera. Powinno się także poświęcić chwilę na przeczytanie wręczonej wizytówki - partner, przyjmując wizytówkę, będzie szukał chińskiego tłumaczenia, a po odnalezieniu go, będzie je dokładnie czytał, wciągając przez zęby powietrze na dowód uznania; rytuał ten może zająć chwilę, na co należy być przygotowanym. Należy także • • • • • . ^ i • i ♦ i ^ ♦ wiedzieć, że pierwsze imię na wizytówce odpowiada nazwisku, zaś drugie właściwemu imieniu. Zwracać należy się natomiast po nazwisku34); • zbieranie informacji o potencjalnym celu - należy dowiedzieć się tyle, ile tylko można o potrzebach interesującej strony (najlepiej przez osobę, która będzie wprowadzać/przedstawiać); • zainicjowanie kontaktu - powinno zdać się na pośrednika, który ma przedstawić sobie obie strony; • budowanie wizerunku przed rozpoczęciem negocjacji - należy postarać się budować obraz reprezentowanej firmy, który pomoże w rozwijaniu dalszych stosunków oraz w dalszych negocjacjach. Do działań w trakcie negocjacji autorzy zaliczyli: • wyczucie odpowiedniego momentu do rozpoczęcia negocjacji - należy zadbać w pierwszej kolejności o dobre stosunki z drugą stroną, zanim przejdzie się do omawiania szczegółów; należy także mieć na uwadze, że partner może nie znać języka angielskiego, w związku z tym na spotkanie weźmie tłumacza. Jego rozumienie angielskiego może jednak odbiegać od oczekiwań drugiej strony, lecz nie będzie się jednak do tego przyznawał (chcączachować twarz). Jak poradzić sobie z taką sytuacją? W opracowaniu Wydziału Ekonomiczno-Handlowego w Hongkongu pojawia się kilka sugestii35: -używać należy prostego języka (mówiąc powoli i wyraźnie); w wypadku gdy wydaje się, że komunikat nie został zrozumiany, należy powtórzyć kwestię przy użyciu tych samych słów; 11 • • • ^ ^ • y • -t x i ♦ . -t -wszelkie niejasności powinno wyjaśniać się od razu - szczególnie te dotyczące liczb (najlepiej zapisywać je na kartce); -w wypadku gdy jest taka możliwość, należy zabierać własnego tłumacza, który wcześniej powinien zostać poinformowany o tematyce naszej rozmowy; -należy wykorzystać normy wzajemności w celu uzyskania zachowań ustępujących; poddać się drugiej stronie (zwłaszcza, jeśli znajduje się w lepszej 34 Negocjacje w Chinach..., op. cit., s. 5. 35 Ibidem, s. 7-8. O sztuce negocjacji z Chińczykami 205 pozycji) w celu zbudowania takiej relacji, w której będzie obowiązywać zasada wzajemności; -jeżeli pojawiają się rozbieżności, należy poszukać pomocy u pośrednika, który maguanxi z drugą stroną (jednocześnie powinno się zdawać sprawę z tego, że mogą pojawić się w ostatniej chwili niespodzianki, np. odnośnie ceny36). Najważniejsze wskazówki dotyczące negocjacji O czym należy pamiętać, zasiadając do negocjacji z Chińczykami? Po pierwsze, potrzebują oni więcej czasu niż Europejczycy, aby odpowiedzieć na przedstawione propozycje, a co za tym idzie negocjacje wymagają większej interakcji niż gdziekolwiek indziej, zanim w pełni zawierzą drugiej stronie37. Firmy, które są przez nich charakteryzowane jako niecierpliwe (w procesie uzgadniania kontraktu), są uważane za przedsiębiorstwa, które nie sprostają warunkom chińskim38. Po drugie, chcąc robić interesy w Chinach, należy mieć (w ramach guanxi) osobę wpływową w danej społeczności (jak również firmie), bardzo często będącą także osobą na stanowisku publicznym39. Równie ważne jest, aby nie oczekiwać zbyt wiele od kontraktu. Należy pamiętać, że w kulturach typu HC (high conte:xt), w których relacje budowane są na wzajemnym zaufaniu, kontrakty nie są najważniejsze40, co więcej - również prawa (zasady) ulegają zmianie (tzn. nie są stałe, lecz zmieniają się niejako w zależności od okoliczności); pozytywnym aspektem jest możliwość szybkiego reagowania na zmieniające się warunki, negatywnym zaś łapownictwo - wręczanie prezentów, które w zachodniej kulturze może być potraktowane jako metoda niedopuszczalna, podczas gdy w Azji jest ona czymś naturalnym41. Nie wszystkie prezenty będą właściwe; nie należy np. wręczać zegarów (ze względu na podobną wymowę kwestii: „dać zegar” i „odwiedzać umierające- 36 L.E. Palich, G.R. Carini, L.P. Livingstone, op. cit., s. 794. 37 J.A. Brunner, G.M. Taoka, Marketing and Negotiating in the People’s Republic of China: Perceptions of American Businesmen Who Attended the 1975 Canton Fair, „Journal of International Business Studies” 1977, vol. 8, p. 69-82. 38 J. Willev, Joint Ventures with China: American Executives，Perception, „The International Executive” 1991, s. 44. 39 Hong Seng Woo, D. Wilson, J. Liu, op. cit., s. 351. 40 L.E. Palich, G.R. Carini, L.P. Livingstone, op. cit., s. 794. 41 Y.H. Wong, The Dynamics of Guanxi in China, „Singapore Management Review”, s. 38. 206 Wojciech Szymczyk go rodzica”) lub dawać mężczyznom nakrycia głowy w kolorze zielonym (są symbolem zdradzanego męża). Prezentów nie należy natomiast otwierać przy wręczającym (pozwala to na ewentualne zachowanie twarzy, gdyby prezenty nie odpowiadały oczekiwaniom - stąd sugestia, by wcześniej poinformować niższego rangą członka zespołu negocjacyjnego naszego partnera, że zamierzamy wręczyć prezent), chyba że taka sugestia zostanie jasno wyrażona42. Powinno się także być świadomym tego, że prawnicy (często włączani do zachodnich zespołów negocjacyjnych) w Chinach odgrywają zupełnie inną rolę, i powinno się unikać angażowania ich do zespołu negocjacyjnego. Co więcej, Chińczycy wychodzą z założenia, że wszelkiego rodzaju niejasności powinno się wyjaśniać na drodze dyskusji, a nie za pomocą prawników. Jeśli konieczne okaże odwołanie się do prawnika, najlepiej zorganizować spotkanie między prawnikami obu stron. Wiedząc już, jak wyglądają (w przybliżeniu) negocjacje, gdy drugą stroną są Chińczycy, warto przedstawić trzy strategie stosowane przez Azjatów w trakcie negocjacji wraz z krótkim opisem działań, jakie należy podjąć w celu obrony się przed nimi43. • Skrywane tożsamości - jakkolwiek każde spotkanie biznesowe rozpoczyna się od wymiany wizytówek, nie można być do końca pewnym, czy osoby, z którymi prowadzone są rozmowy, są tymi, za które je uważamy. Nie można • y ^ • i • * 1 • • mieć pewności, czy osoba najwyższa rangą w zespole negocjacyjnym ma w rzeczywistości największy wpływ na podejmowane decyzje. Uzyskanie pełnego obrazu może być utrudnione, bowiem może się zdarzyć, że zespół negocjacyjny drugiej strony będzie ulegał zmianie: pewne osoby mogą w którymś momencie negocjacji „zniknąć”. Jak temu zaradzić? Przed rozpoczęciem negocjacji należy dowiedzieć się jak najwięcej o zespole negocjacyjnym strony chińskiej: o poprzednich negocjacjach prowadzonych z zagranicznymi inwestorami: kto brał w nich udział, kto podejmował decyzje. Powinno się wyszukać jak najwięcej informacji o firmie, z którą przyjdzie toczyć rozmowy - nie wolno ograniczać się tylko do ogólnie dostępnych informacji finansowych. • Gra o zaufanie - Azjaci początkowo nie ufają inwestorom zachodnim, nie rozumiejąc, że ów brak zaufania może działać w obie strony (stąd też na ja- 42 Negocjacje w Chinach, op. cit., s. 13. 43 Zob.: Ch. Engholm, Asian Bargaining Tactics: Counterstrategies for Survival, „East Asian Executive Reports” 1992, s. 10-12. O sztuce negocjacji z Chińczykami 207 kiekolwiek sugestie jednej ze stron podważające wiarygodność drugiej strony reagują bardzo negatywnie). Pamiętać jednak należy, że zaufanie powinno działać w obie strony. Szczególnie niewdzięczną rolę odgrywają pośrednicy, którzy często są odsuwani na ubocze, gdy tylko zostanie podpisana umowa. Zdarzyć się może również, że strona chińska może zechcieć skontaktować się bezpośrednio z inwestorem zachodnim (wytwórcą) bez udziału pośrednika (wynika to z chęci nawiązania bliższego kontaktu z wytwórcą w celu nawiązania wzajemnych stosunków). Jak temu zaradzić? Przede wszystkim należy dokładnie określić, na jakim jesteśmy etapie stosunków z partnerem chińskim (nie dajmy się zwieść tendencji do określania nas mianem starych, dobrych przyjaciół już na drugim spotkaniu). Nie wolno się spoufalać - należy trzymać odpowiedni dystans (celniejsze może byłoby określenie: trzeźwy osąd sytuacji). Trzeba mieć na uwadze, że bycie inwestorem zachodnim jest zaletą. Czyni odrobinę „innym”, wymusza na drugiej stronie szacunek do takiej osoby. Równie istotne jest podpisanie szczegółowego kontraktu (należy pamiętać, że zakładając długofalową współpracę, trzeba liczyć się z tym, że w ciągu dłuższego okresu jest duża szansa na zmianę warunków, w jakich przyszło podpisywać umowę). • Poświęcenie czegoś małego w zamian za coś większego - prosta taktyka, w której partner próbuje namówić nas do wymiany czegoś istotnego (i cennego z naszego punktu widzenia) za coś małowartościowego. Może to być np. zapewnienie o dostępie do niewyobrażalnie dużego rynku lub zaoferowanie nieskończonej liczby taniej siły roboczej w zamian za pieniądze, technologie lub know-how. Metoda ta może być zastosowana np. przez firmę znajdującą się w słabej kondycji finansowej - zachodni inwestor jest dla niej bez wątpienia wybawieniem (po raz kolejny kłania się Sztuka wojny Sun Tzu, w której radzi on słabszym zawiązanie sojuszu z silniejszym partnerem w celu obrony przed wrogami). Jak temu zaradzić? Należy poznać dokładnie partnera, dowiedzieć się, czy rozmawia on tylko dlatego, że potrzebuje nowej technologii (którą posiada druga strona) lub chce wejść na rynek zagraniczny, na którym jest obecny jego partner. Występując z pozycji siły, można na wstępie wyłożyć wszystkie żądania. Jeśli partner nie będzie w stanie ich zrealizować, nie warto tracić czasu i należy poszukać innego. Bez wątpienia owych strategii negocjacyjnych prezentowanych przez stronę chińską można wyróżnić jeszcze więcej. Christopher Engholm, z którego arty- 208 Wojciech Szymczyk kułu zaczerpnięto powyższe strategie, wymienia osiem najbardziej charakterystycznych. W niniejszym tekście ograniczono się do powyższych trzech, które są spotykane najczęściej. Kończąc niniejszy artykuł, zauważyć należy, iż ze względu na wzrastającą pozycję Chin na arenie międzynarodowej, nie ograniczającą się tylko do płaszczyzny gospodarczej, wzrastać będzie zapotrzebowanie na informacje dotyczące tego obszaru. Przedsiębiorcy polscy, zainteresowani prowadzeniem interesów z partnerami chińskimi, staną przed koniecznością pogłębiania swej wiedzy zarówno o kulturze chińskiej, tradycji, jak i mentalności mieszkańców Chin. Bibliografia Pozycje książkowe Hall E.T., Beyond Culture, New York 1976. Karrass G., Dobić targu, Sopot 1990. Mastenbroek W., Negocjowanie, Warszawa 1996. Ury W., Odchodząc od NIE. Od konfrontacji do kooperacji, Warszawa 1995. Artykuły, opracowania, strony internetowe Brunner J.A., Taoka G.M., Marketing and Negotiating in the People’s Republic of China: Perceptions of American Businesmen Who Attended the 1975 Canton Fair, „Journal of International Business Studies” 1977, vol. 8. Engholm C., Asian Bargaining Tactics: Counterstrategies for Survival, „East Asian Executive Reports” 1992. Hong Seng Woo, Wilson D., Liu J., Gender Impact on Chinese Negotiation: Some Key Issues for Western Negotiators, , „Women in Management Review” 2001. Ihator A., Understanding the cultural patters of the world: An Imperative in implementing Strategic International PR Programs, „Public Relations Quarterly”, zima 2000. Ji Li, Labig jr. C.E., Negotiating with China: Exploratoiy Study Of Relationship Building, „Journal of Managerial Issues” 2001. Michaelson G.A., Marketing Wisdom, „Executive Exellence” 1999. Negocjacje w Chinach. Etykieta w spotkaniach z Chińczykami, opracowanie Wydziału Ekonomiczno-Handlowego w Hongkongu, Hongkong 2002. Palich L.E., Carini G.R., Livingstone L.P., Comparing American and Chinese Negotiating Styles: The Influence of Logic Paradigms, „Thunderbird International Business Review” 2002. Pearson C.A.L., Chatterjee S.R., Gender Variations in Work Goal Priorities: A Survey of Chinese Managers, „International Journal of Management” 2002. O sztuce negocjacji z Chińczykami 209 Willev J., Joint Ventures with China: American Executives，Perception, „The International Executive” 1991. Wong Y.H., The Dynamics of Guanxi in China, „Singapore Management Review”. http:Wsztukawojny.republika.pl - strona J. Zawadzkiego poświęcona Sztuce wojny Sun Tzu. STANISŁAW TOKARSKI Tygrys i smok. Mit Szaolinu w tradycji i symbolice chińskiej Labirynt i Chiński Mur Stwierdzenie, że środek Państwa Środka znajduje się dziś poza Chinami zakrawa na paradoks. Takie koncepcje konstruowano jednak już w dawnych czasach, co prawda nie wprost, wiążąc legendy sztuk walki z exodusem zbuntowanych przeciw wszechwładzy Manżurów mistrzów Szaolinu - ich wędrówką na krańce znanego wówczas świata w celu legitymizacji swojego prestiżu w nowej sytuacji polityczno-kulturowej. Ich echa jawią się w jakimś aspekcie jako konstytutywny czynnik nowej świadomości Tajwanu1, w jakiejś części opartej na stwierdzeniu, że w czasach przymusowej wielkiej emigracji w ucieczce przed komunizacją jądro sędziwej cywilizacji przemieściło się wraz arystokracją, skarbami kultury, księgami, uczonymi konfucjańskimi na wschód, za Morze Żółte, a serce nadal żywej tradycji wciąż bije, nie na kontynencie, ale na Wyspie, gdzie uniknęło marksistowskiej wersji przymusowej westernizacji à la ZSRR, maoizmu, wtórnego analfabetyzmu i rewolucji kulturowej. W tym spektakularnym, ale karkołomnym odwróceniu chiński mur nie strzeże już bogactwa starochińskiej tradycji przed barbarzyńcami, ale jest symbolem, świadectwem dawnej orientacji, której siła objawia się nadal w peryferyjnych wobec Centrum2 produktach kulturowych, kryje się w kamuflażach, w wymiarze legendy, mitu, baśni, w kryptycznym wymiarze starochińskiej literatury i sztuki, w tradycyjnych stylach życia, teatrach, praktykach ruchowych. Przede wszystkim odnajduje się jednak w mentalności Chińczyków3, przejawiającej się w skomplikowanym charakterze myślenia i działania, ujętym w piśmie budzącym podziw specjalistów zarówno w wymiarze konkretu, jak i abstrakcji. 1 Por. R. Sławiński, Historia Tajwanu，Warszawa 2002. 2 Por. M. Eliade, Historia wierzeń i idei religijnych，przeł. S. Tokarski, Warszawa 1988. 3 Por. H. Nakamura, Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India，China，Japan, Tibet, Honolulu 1966. 214 Stanisław Tokarski Rozumowanie to łatwo sprowadzić do absurdu. W tym przewrotnym sposobie widzenia Wielkimi Strażnikami tradycji są wszelkiego rodzaju chińscy emigranci, z uporem rekonstruujący świat dawno przebrzmiały, niby-Ziemię Obiecaną, której koherencja i logika jest natury emocjonalnej, a symbolem wiodącym staje się odtwarzany w różnych skalach, poziomach i usytuowaniach labirynt. Jawi się on w konstrukcjach literackich - tak w dziełach klasycznych, jak i w formie szkatułkowych w konstrukcji literackich zagadek4，w fascynacji dawną architekturą, w strukturze starochińskiej samoobrony, w opowieściach o początkach Krainy Środka. Sztuka filmowa czerpie z owej psychograwitacji pełnymi garściami. Wzorcowy jest obraz The Hero - zrealizowany w australijskiej koprodukcji, łączący legendy i fakty w labirynt narracyjny. To patriotyczna opowieść o twórcy Państwa Środka i jego Wielkim Przeciwniku, który stworzył misterną intrygę „labiryntu kroków”, by zbliżyć się do władcy na odległość sztychu miecza (10 m), a gdy mógł dokonać zemsty, poniechał zamiaru porażony wielkością wizji przyszłych zjednoczonych Chin. W tej przewrotnej konstukcji starochińska strategia splata się z praktykami wu szu, poezja wspiera kaligrafię, a ta z kolei sztuki walki i taktykę rządzenia. Patriotyczny wymiar owego filmu jest oczywisty, choć produkt powstał z zagranicznych funduszy. Jego artystyczny wyraz jest niezwykły, muzyka, obraz i cywilizacyjne przesłanie budzi podziw nawet tych, którzy z Chinami zetknęli się tylko pośrednio. Film jest zarazem rodzajem klucza do zrozumienia tajników duszy Chińczyka i wkładem do umacniania jego nowej tożsamości. W labiryncie nowoczesności. Trudności orientacji w nowej czasoprzestrzeni kulturowej W wymiarze geograficznym Chiny stanowią ogromną część Dalekiego Wschodu, zwartą przestrzeń na południowo-wschodnich krańcach Eurazji oddzieloną od reszty świata barierami pustyni i mórz, górami i Wielkim Murem. To jeden z pięciu krajów naszego globu rozciągający się na ponad 3 miliony mil kwadratowych i będący największym obszarem w wymiarze demograficznym, bo liczba mieszkańców wraz z zagranicznymi diasporami przekracza 1,5 miliarda. Żyzne tereny przecinają potężne rzeki i sieć kanałów, a ogromne urwiska górskie i urodzajne doliny różnicują krajobraz. Takie usytuowanie z pewnością usprawiedliwia nazwę, którą całemu obszarowi nadali sami Chińczycy - Państwo Środka. Jej sens wykracza poza konotacje czysto geograficzne. W psychologicznym wymiarze uzupełnia ją koherencja „grawitacji psychicznej”, stwierdzająca ogromne 4 Por. Sprawiedliwe wyroki sędziego Pao-Kunga (XVI w.), Warszawa 1960. Tygrys i smok. Mit Szaolinu w tradycji i symbolice chińskiej 215 przywiązanie mieszkańców owych terenów do ojczystej tradycji5. Na przekór rewolucji kulturowej, której aktywiści niszczyli wielkie świadectwa przeszłości, palili księgi, burzyli klasztory, prześladowali konfucjanistów i buddystów, wbrew ukierunkowaniom westernizacji, komunizacji i globalizacji nawet ci, ktorych ojcowie urodzili się za oceanem i kraju przodków nie znają, kultywują tradycje Państwa Środka. Samo określenie „Chińczycy zamorscy” (hua ciao) kwestionuje podział na mieszkańców ChRL i emigrantów. Choć czysto geograficzny opis nie pozwala wysnuć wniosku co do unikal- • i• i • • • i • • • •• i '^ i j • i t z, nej roli sędziwej i szokującej ogromem cywilizacji chińskiej, to jednorodność chińskiej czasoprzestrzeni kulturowej wydaje się punktem wyjścia perspektywy badawczej Kraju Środka. Taki sposob widzenia eksponuje w skali uniwersalnej amerykański kulturolog Jonathan Smith w klasycznej już pracy Map is not a Territory6, a przestrzega przed jego łatwą generalizacją Andrew March; w książce The Idea of China - Myth and Territory in Geographic Thought1 stwierdza: „Na Zachodzie koncepcja Chin ma silny kontekst geograficzny - wielki rozmiar, rozległe równiny, Żółta Rzeka, co zbyt łatwo pozwala przyjąć pogląd o charakterze chińskich rządów, organizacji społecznej i narodowej psychologii”. Psychologia miesza się w owym sposobie widzenia ze stereotypami europo-centryzmu, a kwestie tożsamości kulturowej z tradycyjnym sposobem uprawiania geografii, która jednak ostatnio się zmienia, budując kulturowe mapy globu, gdzie położenie geograficzne to tylko część procesu identyfikacyjnego jego mieszkańców. Pisze o tym Charles Westin w pracy Temporal and Spatial Aspects of Multiculturalitys. Mitologię recepcji Państwa Środka utrwala w ostatnim półwieczu nowy sposób komunikacji multimedialnej, a film jest tego najlepszym przykładem. Komercjalizacja tej sfery powoduje, że w bajkowym obrazie przeszłości Chin zanurzeni są zarówno cudzoziemcy, emigranci chińscy na Zachodzie, jak i Chińczycy z kontynentu. Wizja krainy nieskażonej konsumeryzmem, odciętej od reszty świata chińskim murem z jednej strony, a Morzem Chińskim z drugiej, skutecznie opierającej się procesom westernizacji, a szybko się modernizującej, stanowi istotny element turystyki tożsamościowej, pociągającej swą atrakcją nie tylko cudzoziemców, ale i samych Chińczyków, szukających cywilizacyjnych 5 Por. Psychology of Chinese People, pod red. M. H. Bonda, Hong Kong- Oxford- New York 1986. 6 J. Smith, Map is not a Territory, Leiden 1978. 7 A. March, The Idea of China - Myth and Territory in Geographic Thought, London 1970, s. 11. 8 Ch. Westin, Temporal and Spatial Aspects of Multiculturality, CEIFO, Stockholm University 1998. 216 Stanisław Tokarski korzeni w tradycyjnych identyfikacjach. Symbolem jest wycieczka statkiem z prądem Żółtej Rzeki, wspinaczka na świętą górę, będącą przedmiotem kultu taoistów, czy wizyta w jaskiniach Stu Buddów. Dobrym materiałem ilustracyjnym jest tu księga słynnego w Chinach (tak, jak w Szwecji autorka Cudownej podróży - laureatka literackiej Nagrody Nobla Selma Lagerlof) bajkopisarza o imieniu Wu Czeng-en. Jego praca Wędrówka na Zachód9 to cykl fantastycznych narracji, w których chiński mnich buddyjski szuka tożsamości swej praktyki duchowej w drodze do Indii. Realizacja owego zamiaru zależy od mitycznej Małpy (tytuł angielskiej wersji powieści brzmi Monkey) - będącej w gruncie rzeczy mitycznym obrazem mistrza kung-fu, a więc eksperta praktyki ruchowej, od stuleci traktowanej jako konstytutywny czynnik chińskiej tożsamości bez względu na ideologiczne podziały. Małpa broni świętego Prostaczka przed zbójami i rabusiami, wiedźmami i demonami czyhającymi na drodze do dalekiego klasztoru w Indiach, gdzie mnisi kultywują umiłowanie pierwotnej i nieskażonej prawdy o posłaniu Buddy, zapisując ją w księgach. Wędrując na kartach owej powieści przez różne krainy, Chińczyk uczy się jej mitycznej geografii, poznaje lokalny koloryt, wczuwa się w geograficzny kontekst baśni. W tym procesie autoafirmacji istotna jest wędrówka symboli, których sens chroni od zapomnienia literatura, zabytki architektury, odradzający się w ChRL klimat religijny, tradycyjny styl życia, teatr i praktyki ruchowe, a także coraz to nowsze reinterpretacje dawnych legend i baśni. Ich symbolikę przejmuje nowy gatunek filmowy sensacyjnych chińskich easternów, filmów przygodowych opartych na sztukach walki. W poszukiwaniu nowej tożsamości kulturowej Chińczyk zwraca się ku symbolom i mitom, których wiek liczy się w tysiącleciach. W filmowym przekazie odradza się przesłanie godności i honoru, a skryty sens narracji przygodowej oddają najlepiej w wymiarze kultury masowej produkowane seryjnie w połowie XX wieku filmy kung-fu/wu szu. Kilka realizacji filmowych jest w sferze restauracji chińskiej tożsamości wyjątkowych: Przyczajony tygrys, ukryty smok, Szaolin, Wejście Smoka to kamienie milowe na drodze do jej odbudowy. O innych pisze Wojciech Cynarski w książce Budo w kulturze Zachodu10, konstatując ich istotną rolę w ekspansji praktyk wu szu na Zachodzie. Jak filmowe sagi samurajskie stworzyły po sukcesie w Wenecji (Złoty Lew dla Akiro Kurosawy za film Rashomon) sprzyjającą aurę dla produktów tradycji japońskiej w nowoczesnym opakowaniu (lub odwrotnie), tak najbardziej udane filmy z gatunku kung-fu otworzyły drogę do eksportu produktów chińskiej cywilizacji, wspierając nową modę kulturową. W jej centrum znalazły się nie tylko chińskie sztuki walki, ale stojąca za nimi prakseologia, wierzenia 9 Wu Czeng-en, Wędrówka na Zachód, Warszawa 1969. 10 W. Cynarski, Budo w kulturze Zachodu，Rzeszów 2000. Tygrys i smok. Mit Szaolinu w tradycji i symbolice chińskiej 217 religijne, myśl filozoficzna, psychologia, kaligrafia, medycyna, poezja. Stworzono nawet nowy gatunek muzyczny, który wylansował amerykański przebój I gotta kung-fu fighting, a muzyczni idole epoki buntu młodzieży Zachodu zaczęli praktykować kung-fu i taijiquan, by zwiększyć ekspresję ciała na scenie11. Mityczny wymiar chińskiego procesu nowej autoidentyfikacji charakteryzującej się odwołaniami do praktyk wu szu starałem się zarysować już dawno w pracy Ruchowe formy ekspresji filozofii Wschodu12. Odwołuje się do niej w najnowszych kontekstach kulturowych Wojciech Cynarski w artykule Martial Arts Films13. We wszystkich znanych mi omówieniach istotny jest wątek trudności reorientacji w nowej czasoprzestrzeni kulturowej, najbardziej spoiście eksponowany w książce Westina. Istotna w tym względzie kwestia odniesienia symboliki Środka do motywów mitycznych labiryntu jawi w szeroko znanych pracach M. Eliadego Images and Symbols, Historia wierzeń i idei religijnych. Labirynt a symbolika Środka U progu ostatniego ćwierćwiecza millenium, kończącego się pod znakiem dominacji Zachodu, światem badaczy odwiecznych tajemnic sędziwych cywilizacji Wschodu wstrząsnęła wielka sensacja. Kopiąc studnię przy wzgórzu Li, na głębokości pięciu metrów chińscy chłopi ujrzeli wyłaniającą się z ziemi naturalnej wielkości głowę rzeźbioną w terakocie. Przybyli wiosną roku 1974 archeolodzy zostali zaskoczeni ogromem odkrycia, bo kopiąc dalej, natrafili na podziemny korytarz, którego wejścia bronił rząd stojących w szyku postaci. Każdy z odkopywanych „wojowników z zaświatów”, których liczba wciąż wzrastała wraz z postępem robót, był wielkim dziełem sztuki, a całość stanowiła niepowtarzalną kompozycję usytuowaną w podziemnym, bajkowym krajobrazie złożonym z wielu szlaków labiryntu, w którym skumulowano wiedzę o początkach cesarstwa chińskiego. Tysiąclecia nie zatarły rysów i wyrazu twarzy żołnierzy zastygłych w pogotowiu, trzymających w dłoniach resztki zbutwiałych drzewców włóczni i łuków. Pożary i obsunięcia ziemi nie zniszczyły śladów wymyślnych pułapek (automatyczne kusze, samostrzelne łuki), czyhających na nieproszonych gości, którzy ośmieliliby się zakłócić spokój tej podziemnej krainy. Żołnierze czujnie wypatrują owych śmiałków w mroku. Rozstawieni w jedenastu identycznych korytarzach co kilka metrów, piesi i jeźdźcy mieszają się z rydwanami. Broń z brązu jest nadal ostra, 11 Por. S. Tokarski, Orient i kontrkultury，War:szawa 1984. 12 Idem, Ruchowe formy ekspresji filozofii Wschodu, Szczecin 1989. 13 „Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia’’，2004. 218 Stanisław Tokarski nieznany stop pomieszano z jakimś środkiem antykorozyjnym. Pieczołowicie odtworzono każdy detal wyposażenia niemal ośmiotysięcznej straży przybocznej odchodzacego do wieczności cesarza. Był to bowiem kurhan wielkiego Chenga, który w roku 221 zjednoczył Chiny, dając początek cesarskiej dynastii. Gdy władca zmarł w podróży, poszukując krainy wiecznej szczęśliwości, wiadomość o jego śmierci długo trzymano w tajemnicy, knując misterne intrygi. Państwo Środka wciąż wykonywało jego rzekome rozkazy. Potem tego, który przeżył własną śmierć, długo opłakiwano, a ciało złożono we wspaniałym grobowcu, zbudowanym w nieznanym miejscu. Olbrzymi sarokofag obity miedzią zamknięto, tajne wejścia opieczętowano i zasypano czterdziestometrowym kopcem, a świadków operacji zlikwidowano, by pamięć o miejscu pochówku rozpłynęła się w mrokach zapomnienia. Armia „wojowników z zaświatów” budzi zdumienie i podziw jako dzieło sztuki i zamysł wielkiej wyobraźni. Większe wrażenie wywołała jednak wizja lokalna, możliwa do zrealizowania dzięki ogromowi pracy archeologów, odsłoniła bowiem nie tylko tajniki chińskiej strategii bojowej i prastary kunszt sztuk walki, ale i fundamenty cywilizacji ceniącej długie życie i sędziwy wiek. Za ową ludzką barierą odkryto olbrzymie podziemne pomieszczenia o wymiarach sięgających kilkuset metrów wszerz i ponad sześćdziesięciu wzdłuż, odnaleziono rtęciowe rzeki, domy i pałace. Odtwarzając państwo, nie zapomniano o dystynkcjach dworskich i szarżach, co podkreślał ubiór, miejsce w szyku i rodzaj asysty. Całość stanowi ogromny labirynt znany tylko z podważanej przez sceptyków legendy o cesarzu, który palił księgi i żywcem zakopał 460 uczonych, konfucjańskich historyków, bo chciał pokonać śmierć, a ostatnie lata życia spędził na poszukiwaniu wrót do krainy nieśmiertelności. To wszystko nadało nowy impet archeologii chińskiej, weryfikującej legendarne przekazy o innych wielkich labiryntach, w których zadziwia rozmach, wyobraźnia i pomysłowość genialnych konstruktorów. Wędrowna wystawa „wojowników z zaświatów” wzbudziła też sensację na Zachodzie, wzmagając tendencje do badań mitycznych nekropolis, zasypanych piaskami pustyń Afryki, pochłoniętych przez dżungle Azji i Ameryki. Dla Chin owe odkrycia były, wbrew intencjom pierwszego cesarza, wielkim świadectwem identyfikacyjnym, elementem potwierdzającym tożsamość Państwa Środka przez historię, którą uciekinier z czasoprzestrzeni historycznej mimo woli zamienił w wieczność. Ta tendencja bywa eksponowana jako tradycyjna orientacja charakterystyczna dla całej myśli staroazjatyckiej14. Choć historię w dawnych Chinach uprawiano jako rodzaj wiedzy, w sferze aksjologii akcentowane na Zachodzie kategorie postępu w chińskiej tradycji ustępują trwałości, sędziwemu trwaniu, szacunkowi 14 Por. H. Nakamura, op. cit. Tygrys i smok. Mit Szaolinu w tradycji i symbolice chińskiej 219 dla wieku i starości. W obrębie sąsiadującej z Chinami cywilizacji indyjskiej tę orientację podkreślano pogardą dla historii (itihasa), odgórnie bojkotowano dzieła historyczne, prześladowano historyków. Zmienność uznawano za pozory, kosmiczną złudę (maya), promując przez tysiąclecia dharma jako kategorię wiodącą religii i filozofii, której etymologia wiąże się z niezmiennością, trwaniem, trwałością15. W owym sposobie widzenia linearyzm ustępuje cyklicznej powtarzalności światów, a labirynt bez wyjścia nabiera rangi nadzywyczajnej, stając się symbolem wiecznego życia16. Motyw labiryntu stanowi temat mitów w całej niemal kulturze świata. Podania, legendy, baśnie przywiązują do tej tematyki wielką wagę, wiążąc ją z poszukiwaniem tożsamości, wiarygodności, legitymizacji statusu i władzy, dążeniem do absolutnej wiedzy, potwierdzaniem mistrzostwa. Wyobraźnię ludów żyjących przed tysiącami lat poruszały tajemnicze groty, niezbadane jaskinie, wijące się pod ziemią rzeki, tajemnicze korytarze. Czyhające tam na śmiałków niebezpieczeństwa stanowiły konstrukcje systemów inicjacyjnych, znanych greckim, egipskim czy irańskim misteriom. Kulty związane z labiryntami miejskimi Amonopolis czy Persepolis, miastami bez mieszkańców oddanym rytuałom, katakumby, masońskie loże, dające początek i inspiracje dzisiejszym metropoliom (metropolis), kamienne nekropolis - miasta dla zmarłych kontrastujące z szałasami żyjących wokół nich nomadów - ich budowniczych, wielka sztuka budowania labiryntów chińskich, labiryntowy charakter egipskich skarbców, pełniący niegdyś identyczną funkcję jak dzisiejsze systemy elektronicznych zabezpieczeń, to wszystko ma swe odniesienie do systemu kroków, ciosów i chwytów w systemach sztuk walki i związanych z nimi tanecznych choreografii. Zastanawiając się nad etymologią słowa labirynt, wyrażenia o rozmaitych znaczeniach, od zejścia do podziemi poczynając, na drodze ku niebu kończąc, antropolodzy przypominają, że owe gmatwaniny korytarzy, wiodących niewtajemniczonych donikąd, w których orientację ułatwia system znaków i klucz do nich - przysłowiowa „nić Ariadny”, stanowią istotę praktyk ruchowych, splecionych z tradycyjnymi systemami samoobrony. Początkowo labirynty były tworami natury, które nieco modyfikowano, a potem naśladowano w koncepcjach architektury: obronnych twierdzach, klasztorach, pałacach, świątyniach, górskich i leśnych kryjówkach. Etymologia labiryntu na Krecie wywodzona jest od słowa labrys (topór), bo w pałacu w Knossos obosieczny topór był królewskim godłem. Mircea Eliade przypomina jednak, że topór zazwyczaj określano słowempelakku, a rodowód labiryntu wiąże się ze słowem labros (grota). Znany antropolog wywodzi magicz- 15 Por. M. Kudelska, Karman i dharma, Kraków 2002. 16 Por. M. Eliade, Próba labiryntu,Warszawa 1978. 220 Stanisław Tokarski ną aurę labiryntu od kultu niedźwiedzi. Od najdawniejszych czasów w grotach zamieszkiwanych niegdyś przez jaskiniowców i potężne drapieżniki odbywały się inicjacje zorientowane na psychofizyczną przemianę. Tajne ryty przejęły potem alchemie, misteria, czary. Określała je symbolika dojrzewania - adept przebywał w mroku jak w łonie matki. By narodzić się po raz wtóry z Matki Ziemi, nie wystarczyła ślepa agresja. Liczba płonących pochodni odstraszających dzikiego zwierza szybko się zmniejszała. By przechytrzyć niedźwiedzia, człowiek musiał zyskać wiedzę i moc, zrozumieć malowane na ścianach symbole, a owa iluminacja pozwalała mu znaleźć wyjście z mroku ku światłu. Dyskutuje się często nad kwestią, dlaczego właśnie labirynt zawładnął wyobraźnią człowieka współczesnego, zyskując przewagę nad innymi tworami mitu. Choć odpowiedź nie jest prosta, logika podpowiada rozwiązanie. Ponieważ labirynt ma w sobie potwora lub jest potworem, z którym należy się zmierzyć, staje się on wielkim nauczycielem, bo mrok i strach przyspiesza dojrzewanie. Mądrość jest w tym procesie produktem owej ludzkiej alchemii, odbywającej się w warunkach, które dziś można by nazwać „propozycją nie do odrzucenia”. Sytuacja wyklucza kompromisy i alternatywne rozwiązania, żądając totalnej mobilizacji wszystkich potęg ludzkiego istnienia. Trafna decyzja wyklucza śmierć straszliwą, nagłą, nieznanego powodu. W takim pojmowaniu labirynt to model optymalnej, choć groźnej dla śmiałków edukacji. Wiara w możliwość uszlachetnienia umysłu ludzkiego w powiązaniu z próbami ciała staje się w tym kontekście przesłaniem, które wędruje przez tysiąclecia ku współczesności. W sensie ogólnym labirynty to twory nieznanego przeznaczenia. Nauka prowadzona jest systemem gry bez reguł, wszelkie środki są dozwolone. Choć skonstruowane przed tysiącami lat, labirynty zaskakują pomysłowością: pułapki są do dziś niespodziankami. Pewne partie labiryntu mają wkomponowane strategie samolikwidacji. W tych wszystkich względach przypominają ludzkie umysły. Współczesna rola labiryntów wiąże się często z funkcją kryptyczną. Niegdyś wiązane z prehistorią i legendami o smokach, przesłanie labiryntu ucieka w konteksty przyszłości. By nie stracić mitycznego statusu, labirynt kryje się pod postacią statków kosmicznych (wzorcowe w tym względzie są Gwiezdne wojny pełne rycerzy jedi, których nauczycielem jest orientalny mistrz tao), drapaczy chmur i wielkich biurowców, a symbolami centralnymi stają się sejfy i szyfry. Zło i dobro łączy się w tych tworach z baśniowymi sztukami walki, a schemat wielkiej przemiany pozostaje nienaruszony, tak jak nieznane przeznaczenie labiryntu. Wystarczy sięgnąć do tłumaczonej na wiele języków świata książki Stanisława Lema Solaris, w której uczeni ze stacji kosmicznej stają przed kluczową dla przetrwania zagadką. Przed nimi rozpościera się niemy ocean. Okazuje się, że jest to zbiornik żywej plazmy, spełniający najskrytsze Tygrys i smok. Mit Szaolinu w tradycji i symbolice chińskiej 221 marzenia każdego, kto stanie u jego brzegu. Owa materializacja staje się dla przybyszów z ziemi wielkim wyzwaniem; rodzi potwory, prowadząc psychikę w mrok labiryntu, któremu nie sposób sprostać. Labirynt w starochińskiej prakseologii walki Rewelacje związane z odkryciem podziemnego labiryntu, wiodącego do grobowca pierwszego cesarza Chin, przyczyniły się w znacznym stopniu do rozkwitu archeologii w tym rejonie Azji. Efektem poszukiwań grobów cesarskich było rozkopanie wielkich kurhanów, które legendy łączyły w władcami i najeźdźcami Państwa Środka. W serii wielkich sukcesów niemal umknęło uwadze mediów wydarzenie o doniosłych konsekwencjach dla rozumienia przeszłości i teraźniejszości chińskiej cywilizacji, poprzedzające o kilka lat spotkanie z „wojownikami z zaświatów”. Z chronionego gąszczem tuneli grobowca dynastii Han wydobyto w roku 1972 najstarszy tekst słynnej rozprawy starochińskiego filozofa Sun Tzu, uważanego za największego prakseologa starożytności. Odnaleziony w prowincji Shandong w pobliżu miasta Linyi tekst Księgi znanej w języku angielskim pod tytułem The Art of War17 nie zachował się w całości, stało się jednak pewne, że napisano go przed 139 rokiem p.n.e. Jego wzorcem była niewątpliwie rozprawa Sunzi bingfa przypisywana Sun Wu ze Szkoły Strategów, który był doradcą władcy Hi Ku, rządzącego w latach 506-496 państwem Wu. Z pewnością nie stworzył on całego dzieła, kilka rozdziałów dopisano później, wpłynął jednak na jego zasadnicze przesłanie w sposób tak istotny, że cytowano je już w wiekach walczących królestw jako fundament teorii rządzącej walką. Począwszy od szóstego wieku naszej ery, obszerne fragmenty Księgi znalazły się w najbardziej znanych pracach encyklopedycznych. Skompletowaną metodą porównawczą całość odtworzono już w XI-XII stuleciach. Stanowiła ona fundament chińskich strategii, podstawę dyplomacji i sztuki wojennej. Wraz z moralną nauką Konfuzi była inspiracją w sferze prakseologii. Szukał w niej natchnienia Sun Yat-sen i Mao Zedong. Angielskie przekłady weszły do klasyki strategii sztuki wojennej, zarządzania, biznesu. Wielkokrotnie wznawiana, zdobi dziś na Zachodzie biblioteki generałów i menedżerów. Tradycyjnie dzieło Sun Tzu odnoszono w popularnej recepcji euroamery-kańskiej przede wszystkim do logistyki i strategii wojennej. Przyczynił się do tego klasyczny podział dorobku chińskiej literatury. W epoce Songów, w końcu pierwszego tysiąclecia Księgę wpisano w tradycję militarną (wu), odzielając ją 17 The Art of War, London 1965. 222 Stanisław Tokarski od literatury naukowej (wen). Nasuwa się tu porównanie z losami traktatów 0 sztuce wojennej w Japonii, do czasu gdy kolejny siogun nie ogłosił, że bu (to, co bojowe) i bun (studia literatury i sztuki) to jedno. Nowoczesne studia poglądów Sun Tzu z tak wąską recepcją Księgi zerwały. Przyczyniły się do tego konferencyjne debaty w Pekinie; w październiku roku 1990 odbyła się tam międzynarodowe sympozjum o Sztuce Wojennej Sun Ziy rezultaty opublikowano w pracy zbiorowej Sun Zi ksin lun w dwa lata później. Wstęp i przedstawione prace wskazują na wkład Sun Zi w całokształt chińskiej nauki i myśli filozoficznej. Podstawą jego orientacji było radykalne zerwanie z widzeniem świata jako pola gry nadziemskich mocy. Pozostaje na placu człowiek i przyroda; racjonalizm 1 antropologizm stanowią tego konsekwencję. Najbardziej istotne w tym zakresie jest powiązanie wspomnianej orientacji z teorią informacji: trzeba znać prawa przyrody i jej wpływ na grupy ludzkie, z którymi się stykamy w działaniu. ” Co pozwala mądremu wodzowi i oświeconemu władcy wyrastającemu poza przeciętność - pisze Sun Zi - wyruszyć na wroga w przekonaniu zwycięstwa: uprzednia wiedza. Nie płynie ona od duchów i bóstw, nie przejawia się poprzez przepowiednie, ani nie wywodzi się z analizy podobnych sytuacji w historii przeszłości. Ona pochodzi od ludzi.”(r. 10) Polecając zbieranie informacji tajnym agentom, Sun Tsu radzi obserwować ludzkie zachowania, ale i badać przyrodę. Zwierzęta ciągnące do opuszczonych obozów w poszukiwaniu jadła, ptaki siadające bez lęku na pustych namiotach. Choć wiele wysiłku włożono, by zwieść wroga, uważny obserwator szybko dowie się prawdy. Bałagan w obozie świadczy o braku autorytetu, opieranie się na drzewcach włóczni mówi o zmęczeniu. Manewry bojowe stanowią sekret zwycięstwa, a ich powiązanie z ukształtowaniem terenu należy gruntownie studiować w aspekcie logistycznym i psychologicznym. Sporządza nawet klasyfikację form (xing) krajobrazu w odniesieniu do psychologii walki, wiążąc racjonalną decyzję z teoriami przepływu energii, refleksją o pięciu elementach i topografią feng shui. Różni się jednak Sun Tzu w swych poglądach od większości chińskich myślicieli, którzy walkę człowieka uznawali za powszechny aspekt przyrody żywej i wiązali ją z emocjami. „Ciąć kłami, bóść rogami, uderzać pazurami z przodu, wierzgać tyłem, uderzając kopytami, łączyć się razem, gdy brak takiej broni, atakować w gniewie, to naturalny sposób walki nie dający się kwestionować. Jednakże człowiek nie ma naturalnej broni, musi ją sam wytworzyć, a to jest zadanie mędrców”18. 18 Cyt. za: Zhang Zhenze, Sun bin fa jiaoli，Beijing Zhung Hua Shuju 1984, s. 79. Tygrys i smok. Mit Szaolinu w tradycji i symbolice chińskiej 223 Sekret Szaolinu. Motyw labiryntu w kontekstach historii wu szu Temat labiryntu pojawia się w chińskich dziełach literackich od niepamiętnych czasów. W najprostszych formach to zwykła zagadka ubrana w kontekst baśniowy, w najbardziej rozbudowanych konstrukcjach przypomina porównywalne z Szeherezadą szkatułkowe struktury, za otwartymi drzwiami są setki innych, a sens całości odkrywa się dopiero po wysłuchaniu wszystkich opowieści - po otwarciu wszystkich drzwi. Odnosi się to również do praktyk ruchowych chińskich sztuk bojowych. Choreografie wu szu, kung-fu, taijiquan stanowią w pewnym sensie zagadki-paradoksy, których przesłanie można odczytać dopiero po przyswojeniu ich znaczenia w wymiarze medytacyjnym, intelektualnym, samorealizacyjnym, samoobronnym, ekspresyjnym. Są to niejako ruchowe koany, stanowiące istotę drogi zen Ich rosnącą popularność wykorzystano w wymiarze edukacyjnym. W animacji badań, programów naukowych, grantów, działalności wydawniczej, promującej na Zachodzie osiągnięcia chińskiej cywilizacji, przodowały Stany Zjednoczone. Solidnym fundamentem takiej orientacji widocznej w obszarach naukowych badań, ale także w różnych sferach kultury masowej generujacej zmienne mody kulturowe była fascynacja tradycją chińską, mająca pragmatyczne podstawy w koncepcji Pacific shift (Zwrot ku Pacyfikowi), przez lata promująca priorytety zainteresowań Dalekim Wschodem w każdej niemal dyscyplinie badawczej, w działalności politycznej, rozrywce i reklamie, w humanistyce i naukach ścisłych. Wykreowana w tym nurcie moda na Chiny mieszała wprawdzie fakty i mity19, ale stanowiła gwarancję opłacalności wydawnictw o tematyce chińskiej, bo kreowała popyt. W wymiarze popularyzacji najbardziej spektakularne sukcesy święciły chińskie sztuki walki - do tego stopnia, że laureaci nagrody Nobla w dziedzinie fizyki szukali sukcesu wydawniczego w syntezie koncepcji chińskich z najnowszą fizyką. F. Capra opublikował pracę Physics of Tao20, Gary Zukov wydał książkę pt. Dancing with Wu Li Masters2'. Odwołanie się do klimatów chińskich praktyk bojowych (wu szu, taijiquan) przyczyniło się do ich wielokrotnego wznawiania. Wśród tworów kulturowych wędrujących na Zachód w najściślejszym powiązaniu z praktykami wu szu wyjątkową funkcję ma buddyzm zen (chińskie ch，an). Jest to splot praktyk medytacyjnych z technikami ruchu i bezruchu, będący efektem spotkania trzech wielkich cywilizacji Wschodu: Indii, Chin 19 Por. Andrew L. March, op. cit. 20 F. Capra, Physics of Tao, New York 1985. 21 G. Zukov, Dancing with Wu Li Masters, New York 1979; w^ li znaczy fizyka. 224 Stanisław Tokarski i Japonii. Z Indiami związany gentycznie przez nazwę (chińskie ch，an wywodzi się od indyjskiej sekty buddyjskiej dhyana, co znaczy ’uwaga，,’skupienie’）i postać założyciela. Za twórcę ch，an uznaje się zazwyczaj czczonego w Chinach mnicha Tamo, łącząc go z legendą świątyni Szaolin i narodzinami kung-fu. W Japonii znany jest on pod imieniem Bodai Daruma, pochodzącym od indyjskiej wersji (Bodhidharma). Sprzedawane na jarmarkach japońskich laleczki z montowanym wewnątrz ołowiem przypominają rosyjskie wańki-wstańki, przewrócone natychmiast odzyskują równowagę, powracając do pierwotnej pozycji. Ma to się wiązać z legendą zbudowanego na fundamentach wu szu stylu walki shorinji kempo, który swe korzenie wywodzi z praktyk świątyni Szaolin: pierwszy mistrz kung-fu nigdy nie tracił równowagi psychofizycznej. By inni go mogli naśladować, kazał podobno zbudować podziemny labirynt do nauki sztuki wygrywania. Zamontowany tam program nad programy, świadectwo wbudowanej przez traumatyczne doświadczenia walki strategii zwyciężania, poznanie jego istoty było poświadczane niezwykłą pieczęcią: wymykając się z pułapek, goniony przez demony mistrz odnajdywał zbawcze wyjście zablokowane rozżarzonymi dzbanami. Nie miał wyboru, chcąc ratować życie. By dzbany odsunąć musiał je objąć, a wtedy na przedramionach gorące żelazo wypalało wizerunki smoka i tygrysa. Znaki nie do podrobienia, legitymizujące wcieloną w życie zasadę: maksymalną efektywność. Ten symbol Szaolinu wiąże się z labiryntem w sposób wieloraki. Nie wdając się w szczegóły dramaturgii filmów Bruce’a Lee, odnajdujemy go w każdej wielkiej realizacji - jako wyspę, z której nie ma ucieczki, jako wrogie miasto z rezerwą witające emigranta, jako świątynię, której pięter broni kapłan o sprawności demona, jako wyzwanie obcej kultury. Bezpośrednie odwołania do wizji labiryntu Szaolin widoczne są w amerykańskim serialu Kung-fu (łączącym chiński wątek „wędrówki na Zachód” z pejzażem westernowym) oraz w wielkiej realizacji filmowej ChRL - Shaolin. O innych obrazach labiryntu pisze autorka pracy doktorskiej Martial Arts Films22. Jednakże historycy poddają w wątpliwość jednoznaczność wizerunku Szaolinu, pytając, czy nazwa „zielony las” (shao lin) nie była terminem ogólnym, nie odnosiła się do nowego rodzaju praktyki medytacyjnej uprawianej przez nową generację mnichów buddyjskich w kilku ośrodkach. W takim razie świątyń Szaolin mogło być wiele, a sens ich istnienia jako sposobu moralnej, umysłowej i fizycznej odnowy mógł być podobny do etosu naszego harcerstwa. Pierwszy Szaolin nie był najsławniejszym. Równie wątpliwe wydają się opisy labiryntów jako miejsca próby, bo nigdzie nie znaleziono śladu takiego „świętego poligonu”. 22 A. Vincent, Vermont and Tokyo 1986. Tygrys i smok. Mit Szaolinu w tradycji i symbolice chińskiej 225 Szukając mostu łączącego pragmatykę chińskich sztuk walki - wu szu czy kung-fu - z prakseologią wielkiego Sun Tzu zwracamy się z nadzieją ku pedagogice buddyzmu zen, która w intencji Tamo (Bodhidharma) ściśle się splata z psychogenezą Szaolinu. Praktyki medytacyjne zazen połączono tam z zagad-kami-paradoksami. Owe pytania bez odpowiedzi, zwane koanami, stanowią tajemnicze systemy ważne dla drogi buddyjskiej samorealizacji. W Japonii owe koany przetrwały do dziś jako żywe świadectwa buddyjskiego sposobu życia. W okresach potęgowania doświadczenia medytacyjnego, zwanych seshin, praktykujący zen wierzą w możliwość nagłego olśnienia (satori), co ma nieodwracalne konsekwencje w sferze poznawczej, zdrowotnej, psychicznej. Kto dozna satori jest zrealizowany, wyzwolony, doskonały. W praktykach bojowych odpowiada to mistrzostwu implikującemu w sposób jednoznaczny niezwyciężoność23. Podobno w czasach Tamo mnisi Szaolinu praktykowali w pewnych okresach nieprzerwaną medytację siedzącą zazen. Trwało to kilka tygodni bez nocnej przerwy. Od czasu do czasu wstawali i biegali wokół miejsca medytacji (dojo), pili też zieloną herbatę, by kontynuować czuwanie. Miał ją według legendy zasadzić sam Tamo; krzak herbaty wyrósł z obciętych powiek mnicha, co miało zapobiec zaśnięciu. Innym sposobem wspomagania uwagi były ruchy naśladujące „kroki zwierząt”, skomplikowane choreografie walki zwane potem przez Japończyków kata (są w karate i judo). Długotrwałe ich powtarzanie ma pomóc we wniknięciu w ich prawdziwą naturę, pojąć czasoprzestrzenie drapieżników, odnaleźć utraconą harmonię ruchu człowieka prehistorycznego dzieloną z otaczającymi je bestiami. Owe kroki i ciosy nie tylko stanowią podstawę egzaminów dla mistrzów w różnych sztukach walki, ale są również sposobami zdobycia wielkiej samokontroli w sferze psychofizycznej równowagi. Te praktyki, oparte pozornie na paradoksie (stanowią „krok wstecz”), utożsamienie się w sytuacji ewolucyjnego regresu z człowieczeństwem dawno przebrzmiałym w celu odkrycia tajników walki o bardzo nowocześnie ocenianej strukturze ruchu, nazwałem niegdyś „koanami ruchowymi”24. Należy się z nimi oswajać jak z koanami słownymi, praktykuje się każdą choreografię około roku, by ją zrozumieć. Rozpoczęcie nowej choreografii jest warunkowane zakończeniem nauki poprzedniej. Po egzaminie pod okiem mistrza rozpoczyna się inne kroki, kontemplując nowe, trudniejsze aspekty ruchu, oddechu, skupienia. Koany sensu stricto to zazwyczaj pozorne pytania, bo nie chodzi o znalezienie odpowiedzi, ale o zrozumienie ich przeznaczenia. Mają podwójne zastosowanie w procesie samorealizacji. Porównywano je z kamieniami wrzuconymi do stawu; 23 Por. T. Leggett, Warrior Koans. 24 Por. Budo. Japońskie sztuki walki, Szczecin 1988. 226 Stanisław Tokarski rozchodzące się kręgi dają pojęcie o głębi zbiornika. Dla pytającego są sposobem pomiaru stopnia zaawansowania adepta na drodze samodoskonalenia. Dla pytanego są szczeblami postępu - kamieniami milowymi psychofizycznego dojrzewania. Tak pojęte stają się rodzajami „luster”, w których się przegląda, przy czym każde zwierciadło jest innego rodzaju. Opisywany w pracy Paula Repsa Zen Flesh，Zen Body sposób działania koanów inauguruje stwierdzenie, że wplatane są one zazwyczaj w intensywną sesję medytacyjną (seshin). Wokół czuwających w postawie zazen adeptów chodzi starszy mnich z „Błogosławieństwem Buddy” (keisaku), bambusowym kijem orzeźwiającym amatorów mimowolnej drzemki. Od czasu do czasu słychać dźwięk staromodnego dzwonka i wywołany medytant idzie do mistrza zen (sensei) siedzącego w odległym zakamarku wielkiej sali. Pierwszy koan brzmi „Jaka jest twoja prawdziwa twarz?”. Przybyły z Europy adept nie zawsze orientuje się w poetyckiej metaforyce zen. Może próbować opisywać swe życie, podawać istotne w innej sytuacji fakty, konstruować racjonalność wywodu. Mistrz go odsyła zniecierpliwiony werbalnym popisem. Gdy po kolejnej dawce medytacji, za dzień lub dwa pada to samo pytanie, adept usiłuje się upozować, robi miny, eksponuje swą prawdziwą twarz grymasem. Odesłany, powraca po raz trzeci zupełnie zdezorientowany. Staje bezradny, nie mając pomysłu ni strategii, by znaleźć się właściwie, zgodnie z oczekiwaniem. I w nagłym przebłysku zrozumienia pojmuje, że pozbył się kamuflaży, a maska z niego opadła, pokazał prawdziwą twarz. Mistrz go chwali i zadaje mu następny koan. Każe mu powtarzać słowo „nie” (mu), co kończy się deprecjacją werbalizacji. Potem rozwiązuje sens innych koanów. Działanie owej psychotechniki zgłębiania kolejnych zagadek-paradoksów, studiowanie pytań bez odpowiedzi Reps porównuje do przeglądania się w lustrach. Małpa widzi się w lustrze, obraz pokazuje okazałe zwierzę, które stanowi niespodzianą groźbę. Między oryginałem i odbiciem zachodzi korespondencja, im bardziej jedno się jeży, wyszczerza kły i robi groźne miny, tym bardziej drugie staje się przerażające. Wystraszona małpa postanawia oszukać „intruza”, zajść go od tyłu. Gdy w końcu manewr się udaje, małpa pojmuje naturę lustra. Bała się siebie samej. Każdy koan byłby w tej konwencji „lustrem”, a każde z owych zwierciadeł byłoby innej natury. Pojmując naturę paradoksu-zagadki, adept przekracza pewien poziom rozumienia siebie i świata, postawiony przed nim problem przestaje być problemem. Jednocześnie spotkanie z kolejnymi koanami w sposób traumatyczny przyspiesza dojrzewanie psychofizyczne, rodzi nowy poziom mądrości. Stosowany zaś system koanów, ich sens i kolejność adeptowi z góry nie są znane, a przez mistrzów zen nigdy do końca mewyjasmane, przypomina konstrukcje labiryntów, ich pułapki, nieznane przeznaczenie, sekrety. Tygrys i smok. Mit Szaolinu w tradycji i symbolice chińskiej 227 Między owymi sposobami myślenia wyrosłymi z chińskiej gleby a mentalnością praktykującego sztuki walki może istnieć nie do końca doceniana korespondencja. Z tego względu odwołanie się do symboliki Szaolinu może uzupełnić praktykę wu szu, pozwalając zarazem w sposób pełniejszy kontemplować sposób myślenia charakterystyczny dla prakseologii w wydaniu Sun Tsu. Studiowane kroki walki dzieją się w czasoprzestrzeni przypominającej labirynt tybetańskich psychokosmogramów (mandala). Te same struktury odkrył w rysunkach chorych psychicznie C. G. Jung25, co łatwo wytłumaczyć „sytuacją regresu”. Odwołujący się do niej praktyk wu szu ćwiczy „święte kroki” w sytuacji człowieka z labiryntu, nie zna bowiem początkowo ich sensu i przeznaczenia. Oswojenie się z zadaną choreografią, a potem z kolejnymi wersjami takiej nauki doprowadza do mistrzostwa, które nie ulęknie się ostatecznej realnej próby. Koany wu szu są echem sekretnego systemu przygotowania do wyzwania przekraczajacego wyobraźnię, zaskakującego wszystko, co znane. Badanie legendy Szaolin nie wydaje się z tego punktu widzenia stratą czasu, choć staje się „niepoważnym tematem naukowym” w dobie komercjalizacji symbolu i mitu. Bo przecież solidny uczony z łatwością odróżni wishful thinking od skąpej faktografii obecnej w spektakularnych konstrukcjach „historii Szaolinu”. Okaże się wówczas, że „kroki dzikich bestii” stosował w gimnastyce chiński lekarz-taoista na długo przed przybyciem Bodhidharmy do Krainy Środka. Sama nazwa Szaolin powstała również wcześniej i z innym klasztorem była początkowo wiązana. Weryfikacji podlegają również kojarzone z Szaolinem techniki: prymat wiodły strategie walki kijem, jedyną bronią dozwoloną dla mnichów. Nie była to przecież broń dzikich zwierząt. Jak to zwykle bywa z przemyślnym gatunkiem człowieczym, pod przepis podciągnięto ciężki drąg okuty żelazem. Niezwykle trwały mit labiryntu Szaolinu również nie oparł się konfrontacji z rzeczywistością. Choć do dziś na salach wu szu umieszcza się archaiczne przyrządy do treningu „rodem z labiryntu ”, śladów takiej konstrucji nie odnaleziono w najbliższej okolicy świątyni ani pod nią. Karkołomne spekulacje mnożą wyjaśnienie zagadki. Jedna z nich wydała mi się najbardziej spektakularna, swą spoistość zawdzięczając charakterystycznemu dla struktury mitu odwróceniu. W tej wersji labirynt ukazany jest „do góry nogami” - nie kryje się w mroku podziemnych jaskiń, ale w mgłach podniebnych szczytów. Gdy mnich ćwiczący kung-fu nie ma już godnych przeciwników zdolnych sprostać jego sztuce, poddany jest „ostatecznemu wyzwaniu ”. Ubrany w skóry, stopy owinięte łykiem, rusza wraz z swym nauczycielem w rejon wiecznych śniegów, by poddać się „próbie góry”. Boso, bez sprzętu wysokogórskiego i technicznego zabezpieczenia, idzie ku najwyższym szczytom Himalajów. 25 C.G. Jung, Archetypy i symbole, przeł. J. Prokopiuk, Warszawa 1976. 228 Stanisław Tokarski Alpiniści widzą czasem jego spowitą w skóry postać, badają ślady, kojarząc go z „tajemniczym yeti”, ale zabobonni Szerpowie nie chcą iść tym tropem. Bo stary mistrz gdzieś się kryje u podnóża góry, czekając na powrót ucznia i przeszkadzających w teście natury nie lubi. Choć odległe od siebie, filozofie wu szu i prakseologia Sun Wu mają pewne punkty wspólne, a w kilku aspektach się uzupełniają. Sun Wu operuje kategoriami takimi jak energia (shi), akcja bezpośrednia (zheng), manewr (qi), które mają zastosowanie w taktyce wu szu. Jej filozofia streszcza się w stwierdzeniu Sun Wu, że „najwyższą formą jest brak formy”26, co koresponduje z wu^'wei (działania nie-działaniem), a zarazem ukazuje wartość ostatecznego wyzwolenia się w walce od schematów. Specyfika pisma i języka chińskiego powoduje jednak wieloznaczność wspomnianych terminów, które można stosować jako konkretne nazwy pozycji i ruchów, a zarazem abstrakcyjne terminy szeroko pojętej strategii. Ponieważ jednak chińskie filozofie sztuk walki często odwołują się do sztuki kaligrafii, prakseologia Sun Wu otwarta jest na nowoczesne aplikacje tak w wymiarze abstrakcyjnym, jak i konkretnym. Odniesiona do zachodniej prakseologii, zestawiana była z pracami Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego we fragmentach poświęconych działaniu w walce27. Jarosław Rudniański z pewnością ową konfrontację przemyślał, tworząc pracę Kompromis i walka，a wcześniej Elementy prakseologicznej teorii walki28. Inspirował się wprawdzie bardziej przesłaniem staroindyjskiego eposu wojennego (Mahabharata), a szczególnie psychologicznymi implikacjami sytuacji konfliktu zbrojnego metaforycznie przedstawionymi w ewangelii Bhagavadgity, ale jej wnioski są zbieżne z konkluzjami Sun Wu, u którego sytuacja bitewna splata się z chaosem informacyjnym, a zasada naczelna sprowadza sią do manipulacji informacją: trzeba „wywieść w pole” przeciwnika. Pisze o tym w swych pracach o prakseologiach sztuk walki Roman Kalina. Właściwe rozumienie możliwości manewru zapewnia studiowanie ksiąg, w których taka racjonalność prakseologii zderza się z etykietą konfucjańską (np. Hong lou meng, A Dream of Red Mansions) czy postulatami taoizmu w wydaniu Zhuangzi (Prawdziwa Księga Pomarańczowego Kwiatu). W tym kontekście przeciwieństwa Drogi Prawdy i Honoru i Drogi Kłamstwa i Zwodzenia wydają się do pogodzenia, a konfucjanizm i prakseologie chińskie dzieli głęboka przepaść. Jeśli jednak sięgniemy do kontekstu spowijającej tradycję legendy, której symbolem jest labirynt, wówczas owa kontradykcja staje się pozorna. 26 K. Gawlikowski, Sun Wu as the Founder of Chinese Praxiology，Theory of Struggle and Science, „Hemispheres” 1994, no 9, p. 9-22. 27 T. Kotarbiński, Z zagadnień poświęconych ogólnej teorii walki, w: Wybór pism, Warszawa 1957, t. 1. 28 J. Rudniański, Elementy prakseologicznej teorii walki, Warszawa 1983. Tygrys i smok. Mit Szaolinu w tradycji i symbolice chińskiej 229 Ta refleksja na temat labiryntu Szaolinu wydaje się może powierzchowna i fragmentaryczna dla specjalistów badających rolę chińskiej tradycji w procesach reorientacji tożsamości Chińczyków. Wędrówka symboli jest jednak faktem. W drodze na Zachód są one zawłaszczane, a ich sens w trakcie komercjalizacji bywa zmieniany. Dostosowanie się do owej tendencji nie omija i ChRL. Klasztor Szaolin odbudowano, pogłębiając i akcentując wgłębienia w podwórkowym bruku, by zachować rzekomo odwieczne ślady stóp pokoleń mnichów praktykujących kung-fu. W imię kultu złotego cielca zgromadzono na małym obszarze wiele staroci, co w sposób niepomierny wzmogło na tym obszarze turystykę. Każdy może poćwiczyć z upozowanymi na mnichów instruktorami wu szu, których liczba niepomiernie wzrosła wraz atrakcją obiektu. Zazwyczaj owe ekspresowe kursy trwają kilka dni lub tydzień. Świat objeżdża cyrkowa grupa „mnichów z Szaolinu” zwerbowana z całego obszaru Kraju Środka. Wydaje się mnóstwo broszur o „tajemnicy Szaolinu”, a resztę dopowiadają kasety filmowe. To tryumf mitu labiryntu. Bibliografia Amer R. T., The Art Of War, London 1983. Cao Xueqin, Hong lou meng, Bejing 1962. Gui Huaruo, Sunziyizho (Księga Mistrza Sun z Komentarzami), Sznaghai 1962. Kotarbiński T., Traktat o dobrej robocie, Wrocław 1965. Kotarbiński T., Sprawność i błąd, Wrocław 1957. Konrad N.I., Sun Czy. Traktat o wojennom isskustwie, Moskwa 1950. Griffith S. B., Sun Tzu the Art of War, London 1963. Li Yuri, Sunzi bingfa zhi zongheyanjiu, Szanghai 1938. Łabędzka I., Obrzędowy teatr Dalekiego Wschodu, Poznań 1999. Miyamoto M., The Book of Five Rings, New York 2001. Napier A. D., Masks, Transformation and Paradox, Berkeley 1986. Needham J., Science and Civilization in China, Cambridge 1980. Pernet H., Ritual Masks, Deceptions and Revelations, Columbia 1992. Wu Rusong, Sunzi binfa xin lun, Bejing 1989. Sławiński R., Historia Tajwanu, Warszawa 2002. Żbikowski T., Legendy i pradzieje Kraju Środka, Warszawa 1978. KARIN TOMALA Diskurs über eine „gute Gesellschaft” in der Welt - Menschenbild in der chinesischen Zivilisation Für Roman Sławiński zu Ehren seiner 50jahrigen wissenschaftlichen Arbeit und Beschaftigung mit China. Wahrend jahrelanger Zusammenarbeit ist er für mich zum Lehrer, Meister und zum Freund geworden. Hier ist ein guter Anlass, ihm dafür herzlich zu danken. Einführung Seit uralten Zeiten streiten sich die Gelehrten in der Welt um das wahr-haftige Menschenbild, um Gesellschaften zu gesunden. Von unterschiedlichen Einflüssen wird das Leben eines Menschen bestimmt. Nicht das Angeborene, sondern die Daseinsbedingungen und die in einer Gesellschaft erworbenen und gelebten Werte machen ein Menschenleben aus. So wurden je nach Zeit und Raum auch die verschiedenen Gesellschafts- und Lebensformen und Menschenbilder geschaffen, um dem einzelnen in der Gemeinschaft Orien-tierung zu verleihen. Doch wie uns die Geistesgeschichte lehrt, halt sich jedes neue Zeitalter für weiser und besser. Heute, so scheint es, stehen wir jedoch vor einer besonderen Zeitenwende. Da durch den sich vertiefenden Prozess der Globalisierung traditionelle Wertsysteme im Aufbrechen sind, stehen die groBen Zivilisationen, die die Menschheit hervorgebracht hat, vor der Herausforderung, über Wege in eine zukunftsfahige Gemeinsamkeit nachzudenken. Grundlegende ethische Fragen müssen im 21. Jahrhundert global neu beantwortet werden Obgleich es an strittigen Anschauungen und Lehren nicht mangelt, wie eine „gute Gesellschaft”, eine menschliche Gesellschaft, im 21. Jahrhundert aussehen sollte, beunruhigen freilich erneut Entwicklungstendenzen, wenn wieder aus eigener zivilisatorischer Perspektive vom „Kampf des Guten” gegen 234 Karin Tomala das „Bose” gesprochen wird, was an Propagandaslogans unterschiedlicher psychologischer Kampfführung erinnert. Wenn mit dem „Guten” die westliche Zivilisation gemeint ist, muB man fragen, was sind denn die Werte, die es zu verteidigen gilt? Die Antwort scheint im ersten Augenblick ganz einfach zu sein. Sie lautet, es sind die Demokratie und die Freiheit, die in der unantastbaren Würde des Menschen begründet liegt, die elementaren Grundlagen für das Gemeinwohl, die Sicherung einer sozialen Ordnung und ein humanes Zusammenleben garantieren. Doch wenn wir den Zustand westlicher Gesellschaften genauer betrachten, so sehen wir, dass unzahlige neue Faktoren die Gesellschaft verandern, die im Widerspruch zu elementaren Grundsatzen der Demokratie stehen. Obgleich in der westlichen Welt der Gedanke des Menschenrechtes als angeborenes, unverauBerliches und unantastbares Recht des Menschen als moralische Grundlage staatlicher und rechtlicher Ordnung gilt, bedeutet das nicht, dass die gesellschaftliche Entwicklung in einer für immer festgeschriebenen Eigendynamik im Selbstlauf verlauft. Angesichts der neuen Herausforderungen müssen die grundlegenden ethischen Fragen auch global neu beantwortet werden. Beobachtungen, die Karl Jaspers bereits vor Jahrzehnten formulierte, dass infolge der Modernisierung und Fragmentierung der Gesellschaft eine noch nie dagewesene Lebensangst zum unheimlichen Begleiter des heutigen Menschen geworden ist, haben nichts an Aktualitat verloren. In unserer beschleunigten Zeit bildet sich ein neues Lebensmodell gegenseitiger Wandlungszwange heraus, in der alte Denkansatze kritischer als bisher reflektiert werden müBten. Hier denke ich vor allem an den viel besungenen Begriff der Freiheit, der ein Menschenleben doch nicht in die Unfreiheit und Zwangsjacke führen kann. Sollten wir uns nicht wieder auf Philosophen wie Immanuel Kant besinnen, für den Freiheit bedeutete, die Freiheit des eigenen Willens ohne die Freiheit des anderen zu zerstoren. Auch im 21. Jahrhundert bleibt diese Interpretation eine Vision, die jedoch Philosophen und Denker nicht aufgeben wollen. interkultureller Dialog wird zur dringenden Herausforderung Die Globalisierung fordert alle Nationen heraus, sich in einer Lerngemeinschaft zu verbinden. So ist es wahrlich hoffnungsvoll, dass das Jahr 2001 von der UNO zum Jahr des Dialogs der Kulturen bestimmt wurde. Jedes Land wurde damit aufgerufen, der fremden Kultur mit ihren essentiellen Werten offener zu begegnen. Ist doch das Kennenlernen des Anderen und damit sich selbst die Voraussetzung für eine solide Grundlage besseren Zusammenlebens in allen Bereichen menschlicher Existenz? Man kann nicht bei der Erkenntnis Diskurs über eine „gute Gesellschaft” in der Welt - Menschenbild. 235 bleiben, dass interkulturelle und interphilosophische Dialoge über die Erhellung der Wirklichkeit, über Wahrheitsansprüche und universelle Menschenrechte mehr denn je gefragt sind, sondern es ist Zeit, diese Erkenntnis umzusetzen und konkret zu handeln. Dialog mit China Die chinesische Elite definiert sich immer noch durch ihre Kultur. Obgleich die chinesische Zivilisation schon nicht mehr wie zu Zeiten des Kaiserreiches den Anspruch erhebt, als „Reich der Mitte” die „nicht zivilisierten Volker” zu zivilisieren, ist der Wunsch nicht zu übersehen, den gemeinsamen Weg der Weltgemeinschaft in eine menschenwürdige Zukunft mitzugestalten. Die chinesischen Utopien vom Menschsein in der „GroBen Gemeinschaft” sind auch im „Reich der Mitte” langst gestorben. Dies vollzog sich vor dem Hintergrund der Entzauberung des Sozialismus, der Offnungspolitik und der Einbindung in die internationale Volkerfamilie. Im interkulturellen Dialog wird zweifellos der Dialog mit China (folgend auch Volksrepublik China, VRCh, Festland) von besonderer Bedeutung sein. China ist nicht nur ein groBes Land mit der groBten Bevolkerung auf der Erde, sondern auch eine stolze Kulturnation mit einer jahrtausenden alten Zivilisation, die noch heute die Gesellschaft im Lande, wie aber auch die in weiten Teilen der Region Ostasiens pragt. Die Volksrepublik China, obgleich noch immer ein autoritares Staatswesen, hat sich seit Beginn des groBen Modernisierungsprogramms Ende der 70er Jahre selbstbewuBt dem Dialog mit anderen Kulturen und Wertsystemen, insbesondere jedoch dem Westen gegenüber, geoffnet. Dabei wird die Hoffnung zum Ausdruck gebracht, nicht nur „den Frieden zu sichern”, sondern auch eine „neue gerechtere Weltordnung”, zu deren Anwalt sich die Chinesen selbst ernannt haben, zu errichten. Damit werden von chinesischer Seite, von einer ostlichen Kultur, Signale für die zukünftige Vision vom Menschsein in der globalisierten Welt gesetzt. Wenn die politische Elite in China heute dem interkulturellen Dialog über essentielle Fragen des zukünftigen Menschseins offen gegenübersteht, bedeutet das wahrlich eine Herausforderung für das „christliche Abendland„, mit dessen Ideen sich die „westliche Zivilisation” identifiziert. Obwohl im Westen die meisten Menschen von der Überlegenheit der eigenen Kultur überzeugt sind, ihre Zivilisation als den Haupttrend in der Geschichte sehen, wird die westliche Zivilisation damit noch nicht zur universalen Weltkultur. In Erinnerung sei gerufen, dass doch alle groBen Zivilisationen von dem Anspruch ausgehen, dass ihre Kultur letzt endlich die Beste sei. 236 Karin Tomala Gesellschaft und Menschenbild in der chinesischen Zivilisation Zweifellos hat die chinesische Zivilisation mit den Ideengebauden von Konfuzianismus, Daoismus und Buddhismus - China und die gesamte Region Ostasien kulturell nachhaltig gepragt. Trotz dem gesellschaftlichen Aufbruch und Umbruch in die Moderne sind die Spuren eines eigenstandigen ethischen Wertesystems noch langst nicht verblaBt. So bemerkt Gan Shaoping in seiner Studie „Die chinesische Philosophie”, dass viele Ideen in der chinesischen Gesellschaft auch gegenwartig noch „groBe Vitalitat besitzen”1. Glück auf Erden Fremd war diesem Denken das Jammertal auf Erden und die Hoffnung auf das Glück im Jenseits. Auf der Suche nach dem Glück für den Menschen, der Beseitigung der Ursachen allen Übels, der Besserung alles Schlechten stand die Gemeinschaft und das Glück auf Erden im Vordergrund. Dabei lieB man sich von der traditionellen Erkenntnis leiten, daB das Glück des einzelnen Menschen sich nur im Glück der Gemeinschaft als Ganzes erfüllen konne. Nach den traditionellen Werten konnte das Glück jeder erfahren, der vermochte, sich selbst nach den vorgeschriebenen Normen zu kultivieren. Im Konfuzianismus wie auch im Daoismus hing das individuelle Glück nicht von materiellen Gütern ab, sondern von der Fahigkeit, den eigenen Geist und Charakter nach vorgeschriebenen ethischen Normen zu vervollkommnen. Je naher eine Person dem Dao, dem Himmelsprinzip, dem richtigen Weg, dem himmlischen Sittengesetz gelangt, desto groBeres Glück vermag er zu empfinden. So wurden in der chinesischen Philosophie auch drei Stufen von menschlichem Glück unterschieden. Das Glück der Sinne, nach dem die meisten Menschen streben, sollte stets gemaBigt und in Grenzen gehalten werden, sei es beim GenuB von Nahrung, der Tone, der Farben oder des berauschenden Reichtums, mit dem man sich alle Sinnesfreuden erkaufen kann. Für Zhuangzi, einem bedeutenden konfuzianischen Philosophen, liegt das Glück nicht in den Dingen, auch nicht darin, was die Welt jeweils für Glück halt.2 Der Mensch sollte danach streben, das Glück aus der eigenen Innenwelt zu erfahren. Das ist nur moglich, wenn man die angeborenen Tugenden wie Menschlichkeit und Gerechtigkeit weiterentwickelt und nach auBen wirken laBt, damit man etwas zum Glück des anderen und der Gemeinschaft beizutragen vermag. 1 Shaoping Gan, Die chinesische Philosophie, Darmstadt 1997, s. 109. 2 Dschuang Dsi, Das wahre Buch vom südlichen Blütenland, München 1988, s. 194-195. Diskurs über eine „gute Gesellschaft” in der Welt - Menschenbild. 237 Moral und Ethik lebt nicht von sich selbst, sondern nur im Bezug des einzelnen auf die Gemeinschaft und das Gemeinwohl der Gesellschaft. Die grenzenlose Entfesselung menschlicher Begierden führt zum Hedonismus. So lehrt insbesondere der Daoismus ein einfaches Leben, weil alle materiellen Begierden zum Kampf zwischen den Menschen um Macht und Gewinn führten. Im Konfuzianismus gehort die menschliche Begierde zwar zum Menschsein. Doch man muBte sie beherrschen, in der Lage sein, sie dem Sittengesetz unterzuordnen und sich nach dem Gesetz „MaB und Mitte” zu verhalten. Erst in der spateren sogenannten Ideen-Schule des Neokonfuzianismus der Song-Dynastie andert sich das Menschenbild, und das himmlische Sittengesetz wird über alle Begierden gestellt. Das führte dazu, dass in den spateren Zeiten menschliche Begierden als unsittlich galten und unterdrückt werden muBten. Mit dem Eindringen abendlandischer Ideen über die menschliche Natur bekennt sich Kang Youwei zum Recht auf das Glück jedes Menschen, da die Begierde genau so zur menschlichen Natur gehore, wie der Wunsch, nach Glück zu streben.3 Für Shaoping Gan ist die Maxime des Philosophen Fei Mi (1623-1699) recht plausibel, wenn er bemerkt: Trinken und Essen, Mann und Frau, das ist der groBe natürliche Trieb des Menschen. Das gilt für alle gewohnlichen Menschen und auch die Weisen. Wichtig ist, dass MaB und Mitte eingehalten werden. Was das Glück in der Gemeinschaft betraf, so war das Glück in einer verklarten Vergangenheit einst goldener Zeiten angesiedelt. Die Vergangenheit sollte die Gegenwart bestimmen. Bei der Suche nach dem Glück für die Menschen und die Gesellschaft spielten unbekannte neue Visionen kaum eine Rolle. So sahen die meisten chinesischen Denker ihre Aufgabe darin, das Neue so zu gestalten, daB es dem Alten, den einstigen Visionen, ahnlich werde. Wolfgang Bauer, der sich mit Paradiesen und Idealvorstellungen in der chinesischen Ideengeschichte beschaftigt hat, bezeichnet dieses Denken als eine grundsatzliche Trennung von Vergangenheit und Zukunft. So schreibt er: „Das Glück, mag es auch in der entferntesten Vergangenheit lokalisiert sein, ist dadurch trotzdem nicht aus dem Bereich menschlichen Bemühens hinaus gerückt, es ist nur nicht gerade hier, aber man kann es gleichsam ’erwandern’.”4 Dieses Verstandnis von Glück, daB es irgendwann zu haben sei, und man nicht nur darauf warten müBte, führte, wie immer wieder bemerkt wurde, zur emsigen Betriebsamkeit der Menschen, die bis heute für das Tun und Handeln der Chinesen so charakteristisch ist. In der chinesischen Ideengeschichte gab es für den Menschen auch kein Warten auf eine Erlosung durch eine plotzliche überirdische Wandlung in ein 3 Ibidem, s. 25. 4 W. Bauer, China und die Hoffnung auf Glück, München 1974, s. 14. 238 Karin Tomala Paradies, wie die Heilserwartungen religioser Glaubensgemeinschaften in anderen Zivilisationen. Im Unterschied zu anderen Kulturen bestand das Ziel allen menschlichen Strebens darin, das Paradies für den Menschen in einer Gemeinschaft auf Erden zu schaffen, in dem dem einzelnen seine Grenzen aufgezeigt waren. Konfuzianismus -Moralgebâude der chinesischen Zivilisation Konfuzius (551-479 v. Chr.), der als einer der Begründer groBer ethischer Konzeptionen für das Menschsein und die Gemeinschaft gilt, ist der erste überlieferte Denker, wie Heiner Roetz bemerkt, der das Thema Moral mit dem Ziel der Losung der normativen Krise der chinesischen Gesellschaft zu seinem Hauptgegenstand macht, wobei in der so entstehenden normativen Ordnung Werte nicht gegeneinander ausgespielt werden sollen. Die Grundidee besteht in der Einhaltung der Mitte (zhong), den Ausgleich, zwischen den verschiedenen Forderungen der Ethik zu finden. Konfuzius, so heiBt es heute noch, wurde zum „Lehrer von zehntausend Generationen”. Doch seine Lehre ist auch voller Widersprüche, wenn einerseits alle Menschen innerhalb der vier Meere als Brüder gepriesen werden, andererseits aber Unterordnung und Gehorsam zu den Kardinaltugenden erhoben wurden. Richtige Gestaltung des Lebens 一 Lehre von der Menschenliebe und Menschlichkeit (ren) Obwohl der Konfuzianismus als ein Konglomerat von der Sozialethik, dem rituellen Regelwerk und der Staatspolitik zu betrachten ist, andert das nichts an der Tatsache, dass er sich zur allgemeinen Moralphilosophie der chinesischen Kultur verselbststandigte. In dieser Moralphilosophie ist Gott der Himmel, der als Himmelsgott über die Natur und die Menschen waltet. Der Himmels-gott wurde zur universellen Begründungsinstanz für moralisches Handeln des Menschen. So ist auch die konfuzianische Ethik universalistisch angelegt, weil sie für alle Menschen, alle menschlichen Beziehungen und Gemeinschaften gelten sollte.5 5 Duan Lin, Konfuzianische Ethik und Legitimation der Herrschaft im alten China, Berlin 1997, s. 19. Diskurs über eine „gute Gesellschaft” in der Welt - Menschenbild. 239 Die verschiedenen Schulen der chinesischen Philosophie konzentrieren sich auf das menschliche Leben und auf die richtige Gestaltung des Lebens in einer Gemeinschaft. Die Quintessenz ist eine Ethik vom richtigen Handeln des einzelnen gegenüber den anderen. Der ethisch oder richtig handelnde Mensch konnte nur ein vollkommener Mensch sein, der über die moralisch - sittliche Selbstkultivierung letztendlich zur angestrebten Menschlichkeit des einzelnen führte. Über die sittliche Bildung werde der Mensch befahigt, den Himmelsweg der Menschenliebe, den „richtigen Weg” (dao), zu gehen. So wird im „Lunyu” - Gesprache des Konfuzius, im Buch der Bücher der chinesischen Zivilisation, vergleichbar mit der Bibel im Christentum, der Begriff Menschenliebe, auch als Menschlichkeit übersetzt, am haufigsten analysiert. Er wird abgegrenzt durch den Begriff Unmenschlichkeit. Um das zu verdeutlichen, heiBt es, es konne im Leben in einer Gemeinschaft nur zwei Wege geben, den der Menschlichkeit und den der Unmenschlichkeit. Menschlichkeit liegt in einer Moral begründet, die nicht zweckgebunden sein kann. Es wurde eine Lehre vom Menschen geschaffen, die das chinesische Denken bis heute entscheidend mitpragte. Darin gebührt der allgemeinen Menschenliebe in den zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen, im Leben der Gemeinschaft die hochste Prioritat. Zum Prinzip der Menschlichkeit gehoren solche Verhaltensweisen wie: Ergebenheit, Rechtschaffenheit, Gerechtigkeit, Redlichkeit, Anstandigkeit, Hilfsbereitschaft, Treue, Zuverlassigkeit, Loyalitat oder auch Toleranz. Die Urwurzel für Menschlichkeit sah man in der Pietat (xiao) begründet, auch als Zuneigung, Ehrfurcht und Liebe der Kinder gegenüber ihren Eltern übersetzt. Kindespietat bedeutete aber auch Kindesgehorsam und grenzenlose Kindesliebe. So setzt sich das Zeichen für Pietat aus den Zeichen Erde und Sohn zusammen. Es soll die Wurzeln für „ren” Menschlichkeit symbolisieren.6 Respektlosigkeit, Kinderlosigkeit und Verletzung des eigenen Korpers, den man von Mutter und Vater empfangen habe, galten als VerstoBe gegen die Pietat. Dem Konfuzianismus nach erfolgte der erste Schritt zur „Menschlichkeit” in der Familie durch die Ehrerbietung der Kinder gegenüber den Eltern und die Liebe gegenüber den Geschwistern. Kern der Idee von der Menschlichkeit bedeutete damit, auch im Alter für den Unterhalt der Eltern zu sorgen. Modern ausgedrückt konnte man es als einen Generationsvertrag bezeichnen, über den heute im Westen so heftig debattiert wird und in China im allgemeinen immer noch seine Bedeutung besitzt. Mit der Kategorie Menschlichkeit wird auf die elementare Bedeutung der Familie in der Gemeinschaft verwiesen. Die Familie gilt nicht nur als kleinste die Zelle der Gesellschaft, sondern auch als die Grundstruktur des menschlichen 6 Lunyu, Übersetzung James Legge, Buch II, Kapitel 23. 240 Karin Tomala Zusammenlebens. Interessant ist die Maxime, die daraus abgeleitet wird. So heiBt es, wenn die Familie in Ordnung ist, ist der Staat in Ordnung, wenn der Staat in Ordnung ist, ist die Welt in Ordnung. Das chinesische Schriftzeichen Staat symbolisiert dieses Denken. Es besteht aus zwei Zeichen, namlich aus dem Zeichen Land, in dem sich das Zeichen Familie befindet. Die Familie, die nach diesem Denkansatz die Grundstruktur eines gesundes Gemeinwesens ausmacht, ist vertikal angeordnet zwischen Eltern und Kindern und horizontal zwischen Mann und Frau. Dieses angeborene Verhaltnis zwischen Eltern und Kindern soll die Grundstrukturen der Gesellschaft bestimmen. Die Tugend der Ehr-furcht gegenüber den Eltern gilt als Grundstein allen moralischen Verhaltens. In dieser Tugend werde für die Balance zwischen Himmel und Erde, die Quelle des Lebens ist, widergespiegelt.7 Mit anderen Worten bedeutet die Liebe und Ehrfurcht der Kinder zu den Eltern die Brücke zur Gemeinschaft. Die „Fünf zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen” zwischen 1. Herrscher und Untertan; 2. Vater und Sohn; 3. alterem Bruder und jüngerem Bruder; 4. Freund und Freund; 5. Ehemann und Ehefrau galten als Ordnungskodex zur Regelung der Beziehungen in der Familie, in der Gesellschaft und im Staat. Nur wenn man sich die Liebe schenkt und sich zu gegenseitiger Fürsorge verpflichtet fühlt, wir würden es heute mit intakter Familie und Solidaritat bezeichnen, konne Harmonie in der Gemeinschaft und in der Gesellschaft bestehen. So heiBt es in der „GroBen Lehre”, dass man, bevor man die Welt ordnen kann, erst den Staat ordnen muB. Doch bevor man den Staat in Ordnung bringen kann, muB gewahrleistet sein, dass die Familie im Frieden lebt. Doch bevor man in der Familie im Frieden leben kann, muB sich die einzelne Person moralisch vervollkommnen. Dieses Kardinalprinzip verdeutlicht, dass der einzelne groBe Verantwortung für die Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft tragt, und gefordert ist, bei sich selbst zu beginnen. Als menschlich konne jedoch nur derjenige bezeichnet werden, der sich selbst diszipliniert und weise und klug geworden ist. Diese Tugend wird also gleichzeitig mit einem kognitiven Aspekt verbunden. Für die konfuzianischen Denker ist nicht der Mensch als Mensch das Übel der Welt, sondern das Fehlen eines menschlichen Ethos. Nach Konfuzius sollte ein Staatswesen einzig und allein der Glückseligkeit seiner Menschen dienen. Dabei wurde das personliche Beispiel des Herrschers als wirksamste Art, Moral zu vermitteln, betrachtet. Nur die menschlichen Menschen sollten berechtigt sein, ein hochstes Amt im Staat zu übernehmen. Damit wurde der Erziehungsweg, dem einzelnen über einen Moralkodex Orientierung zu verleihen, zu dem wichtigsten Instrument zur Gestaltung einer menschenwürdigen Gesellschaft. 7 Shaoping Gan, op. cit., s. 51. Diskurs über eine „gute Gesellschaft” in der Welt - Menschenbild. 241 Das Schriftzeichen „ren”, Menschlichkeit, besteht auch aus zwei Elementen, die auf die sozialethische Dimension des Begriffs Menschlichkeit verweisen. Es bezieht sich auf die wechselseitige Beziehung von Menschen. Diese Dimension wird als Essenz der chinesischen traditionellen Kultur betrachtet. Über Menschenliebe erreicht der einzelne Mensch die hochste Stufe des Menschseins. Danach besitzt nur derjenige Menschlichkeit, der die Sitten beherrscht und eine ethische Beziehungen zu einem anderen Menschen, sprich Gemeinschaft, einzugehen vermag. Was das Prinzip Mitleid betrifft, so gehorte es bei Konfuzius noch nicht in den Kanon von Menschlichkeit. Im Gegensatz zu Konfuzius legte jedoch Menzius groBen Wert auf die Tugend Mitleid. Er sah in der Empathie, im Mitleid mit anderen, den Ursprung von Menschlichkeit. Er ging davon aus, dass alle Menschen als gute Menschen geboren werden im Gegensatz zu dem konfuzianischen Theoretiker Xun Zi, der verkündete, dass alle Menschen ihrem Wesen nach ursprünglich schlecht seien, und das Gute anerzogen werden müsse und die Menschen sittliche Orientierung benotigen. Traditionelles chinesisches Ordnungsprinzip -Funktion für menschliches Verhalten Die so verstandene Menschlichkeit liegt in der Gegenseitigkeit begründet. Der einzelne vermag nicht für sich allein menschlich handeln. Menschlichkeit wird damit zu einer Tugend der Reziprozitat. Einer der Kernsatze im „Lunyu” heiBt deshalb auch: „Was du nicht willst, das man dir tu, füge auch keinem anderen zu”. Diese Maxime ist eine freudige Erhellung, weil es in allen Kulturen diese ethische Grundaussage gibt, namlich das Grundsatzliche nicht zu relativieren. In der chinesischen Geistesgeschichte ging es um eine sozialverantwortliche Ethik, um das Prinzip der Gegenseitigkeit, wobei der einzelne immer das rechte MaB bedenken und bereit sein, sich in das Ganze einzuordnen. Diese Idee hat in der aktuellen Erziehungspropaganda nichts an Aktualitat verloren, obwohl immer weniger Chinesen bereit sind, sich einzuordnen und das rechte MaB zu bedenken. Doch neben dieser Interpretation der Menschlichkeit gab es noch andere. Bei Mo Di z.B., einem Kritiker Konfuzius, stehen Menschlichkeit und Gerechtigkeit in einem engen Wechselverhaltnis, weil der einzelne wie auch die anderen daraus ihren Nutzen haben sollten. Die Reduktion der Moral auf das Zweckgebunde schafft einen Freiraum fûr unterschiedliche Interpretationen des Beziehungsgeflechts nach der Maxime, wer anderen Nutzen bringt, dem werden sich gewiB auch die anderen nützlich erweisen. Mo Di geht es nicht nur um die 242 Karin Tomala Gruppe, sondern um den Nutzen als Handlung in den zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen. Damit wird Moral verfügbar. Der Himmel belohnt die Guten und bestraft die Schlechten. Obwohl der Kampf gegen die Selbstsucht und Selbstgerechtigkeit, die den einzelnen aus dem Ganzen trennten, als Anfang allen Übels galten, war die chinesische Gesellschaft weit von einer idealen Gesellschaft entfernt. Im Gegensatz zum ethischen Grundgedanken des Konfuzianismus diente letzten Endes die Beamtenlaufbahn nach einem erfolgreich abgelegten Staatsexamen haufig auch nur zur Absicherung der eigennützigen materiellen Interessen. Der ideelle Anspruch, dass der Edle, der sich vervollkommnet, erst einmal moralisch und somit veredelnd auf die Mitglieder seiner Gemeinschaft einwirken sollte, blieb zwar moralischer Anspruch, in der Praxis aber eher eine Ausnahme. Besondere Bedeutung kam dem Substantiellen, den Riten (li) zu, das Menschsein von der Geburt an bis zum Tode nach festgelegten Verhaltens-und Anstandsregeln je nach Rang und gesellschaftlicher Stellung, Alter und Geschlecht zu ordnen. Wer dagegen verstieB, verlor sein Gesicht und wurde von Scham gepeinigt. Dem Menschen wurden damit in allen Lebensfragen Verhaltensweisen vorgeschrieben, die er nicht selbst bestimmen konnte, sei es z.B. bei der Geburt, der Heirat, der Kleidung, dem Tod, des Ahnenkulte oder der Kriegsführung. Chinesische Sozialutopien Wie in allen anderen Kulturen wurde auch in der chinesischen Geistesgeschichte versucht, essentielle Fragen von Menschsein und Gemeinschaft zu hinterfragen und Anworten dazu zu formulieren. Zu den zentralen Fragen gehoren solche, wie: Was ist ein Mensch, wie wird man zu einem Menschen, in welcher Relation steht der Mensch zum Ganzen, wie gestalten sich die Beziehungen des einzelnen zur Gemeinschaft, was macht den Sinn des Menschseins aus, und was bedeutet Menschenwürde? So haben chinesischen Denker eine Fülle von Sozialutopien hervorgebracht. Dabei ging es stets um die ideale Gesellschaftsform, in der, wie man meinte, der Mensch am glücklichsten sei, wenn er sich nur als ausschlieBlichen Bestandteil einer Gemeinschaft fühlt. Diese ethischen Ideale haben die Entwicklung von Menschenbildern in der gesellschaftlichen Struktur in China bis in die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, als der schmerzhafte Aufbruch in die Moderne begann, maBgebend bestimmt. Das traditionelle Ideal, das auch die Neuzeit immer wieder beflügeln sollte, bestand in der „GroBen Gleichheit”, der „GroBen Gemeinschaft” (datong), die auf konfuzianische Moralvorstellungen zurückging. Obgleich diese Lehre im konfuzianischen Klassiker der Riten, der Diskurs über eine „gute Gesellschaft” in der Welt - Menschenbild. 243 Sitten, (Liji) aufgenommen wurde8, wird die Ideenlehre Mo Di, einem Reformer der konfuzianischen Lehre, zugeschrieben. Wenn man die Klagen vernimmt, konnte man meinen, es hat sich bis in die Gegenwart hinein wenig verandert. Die Bevolkerung sei unmoralisch und der Fürst verschwenderisch geworden. Fürsten würden sich mit ihren Günstlingen umgeben und Verwandte in hohe Àmter einsetzen. Die Ursachen für den Zustand wurde in der MaBlosigkeit gesehen, die, wie betont, nur in den Untergang führe. Auf die Frage, warum wohl die Oberen die Unteren nicht regieren konnen, lautet die Antwort, weil es ihnen an Menschenliebe fehle. Mangel an Menschenliebe führe zu Chaos. Das Prinzip Menschenliebe gilt im Konfuzianismus als universal, als zeitlos und allgemeingültig, es existiert, weil man überzeugt war, dass es das „Gute” verkorpert. Ablehnung subjektiver Freiheitsideale Vor allem jedoch für den Weisen und den Fürsten, für die Verantwortungs-trager würden wir heute sagen, galt es als oberstes Handlungsprinzip. Verant-wortlich handeln bedeutete danach, menschlich zu handeln. Menschliches Handeln müsse auf das Glück aller gerichtet werden. Subjektive Freiheitsideale wurden in der traditionellen Ideengeschichte als etwas Negatives, als Wunsch zum Privaten abgelehnt. Auch der groBe chinesische Reformer und Denker Kang Youwei (1858-1927) griff Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts auf die traditionellen utopischen Ideen zur Rettung der chinesischen Gesellschaft und der Welt zurück. Damit wurde er zum Sprecher einer neuen Utopie, deren Elemente spater von Sun Yatsen, dem Gründer der chinesischen Republik und Mao Zedong (1895-1976), dem utopischen Revolutionar und Staatsgründer der VRCh, übernommen worden waren. Kang Youwei projizierte Zukunftsvisionen, die auch in der düsteren Zeit des Maoismus den Menschen „beglücken” sollten. So schrieb er, wenn die Welt einmal dem Gemeinsinn folgen werde, dann wird man die Weisesten aussuchen, um die Welt zu regieren. In dieser neuen Welt, dem Weltstaat, sollten die Produktionsmittel nicht nur einer Familie zur Verfügung stehen, sondern in die gemeinsame Produktion übergeführt werden. Dann würden die Alten und Armen liebevoll behandelt und die Jüngeren ohne Selbstsucht erzogen werden. Der Fortschritt werde sich in einem idealen Weltstaat, ohne Staat, Klasse und Familie nach moralischen Gesetzen vollziehen. Alle Aufgaben der Familie wollte Kang Youwei offentlichen Einrichtungen übertragen. Der 8 Li Gi, Das Buch der Sitte, übersetzt von Richard Wilhelm, Düsseldorf, Koln 1958. 244 Karin Tomala Weltstaat sollte den Menschen beglücken. Für schwangere Frauen sollten „Menschen-Wurzelanstalten” zur Verfügung stehen. Hier sollte bereits mit der Erziehung des Embryos begonnen werden. Nach der Geburt sollten die Kinder in Bewahrungsanstalten und ab dritten Lebensjahr in die offentlichen Kindergarten kommen.9 Die Wurzelanstalten sollten zur Vorbereitung des Lebens einer Weltgesellschaft dienen, ohne Familie, ohne gesellschaftliche Gruppen und Klassen, eben in der „GroBen Gemeinschaft”. Sun Yatsen war wahrend seiner Reisen nach Amerika und Europa mit westlichen Ideen über Demokratie und Freiheit in Berührung gekommen. Dennoch traumte er nicht von solchen Werten wie Freiheit, die er für China als unangebracht hielt. Seine Visionen waren auf darauf gerichtet, ein starkes, moralisches Staatswesen zur Rettung der Welt zu schaffen. Mit seinen Vorstellungen von Demokratie, die eher einer Erziehungsdiktatur entsprachen, wollte er den chinesischen Bedingungen Rechnung tragen. So strebte er eine Fünf-Gewalten-Verfassung an, in er neben den drei klassischen europaischen Gewalten zwei traditionelle chinesische Institutionen treten sollten, und zwar das Zensorat zur Kontrolle der Verwaltung und der Erziehungsrat, der an das traditionelle Prüfungssystem zur Auswahl der Beamten anknüpfte10. Für die Realisierung der Reformen war der einzelne nicht gefragt. Sun Yatsen ging in seiner Ablehnung westlicher Werte so weit, daB er in der Gewahrung personlicher Freiheiten eine Gefahr witterte, die die Gesellschaft in einen „Haufen losen Sandes” verwandeln würde. So betonte er immer wieder, der einzelne dürfe nicht zu viel Freiheit besitzen, aber die Nation müsse frei sein11. Die Forderung nach einer formellen Mitbestimmung des Volkes wurde damit nicht gestellt, sondern eine Herrschaftselite sollte das Volk regieren. So heiBt „Republik” (gong he guo ) - in der wortlichen Übertragung „Staat der gemeinsamen Eintracht”. Diese Wortwahl hatte nichts mit dem republikanischen Staatsverstandnis gemein. Wandel der Kulturen Zwiespaltig steht man in China der abendlandischen Kultur gegenüber. Man fühlt sich hingerissen zwischen Bewunderung und Ablehnung. Bewundert werden nicht die rechtlichen und zum Teil noch immer vorhandenen 9 L. Thomson, Ta Tung Shu (Das Buch von der Grofien Gleichheit), The one World Philosophy of Kang Yo^^e^, London 1958, s. 185-186. 10 Die Lehre des Sun Wen (1918), in: B. Scheibner, H. Schemer, Sun Ya^-sen. Reden und Shriften, Leipzig 1974, s. 163. 11 Vgl. A. Nathan, Chinese Democracy. The individual and the State in twientieth centuiy China, London 1986. Diskurs über eine „gute Gesellschaft” in der Welt - Menschenbild. 245 humanitaren Formen des Zusammenlebens von Menschen in der Gesellschaft, sondern die technisch - wissenschaftliche Entwicklung, die einen hohen Lebensstandard für die Gesellschaft hervorgebracht hat. Heute bringt die Internationalisierung der modernen Entwicklung jedoch nicht nur die Technik und das Kapital nach China, sondern auch Ideen, die nicht unreflektiert bleiben. So sind die Menschenrechte zu einem positiven Begriff geworden, obgleich sie kulturspezifisch interpretiert werden12. Chinesen sehnen sich nach mehr personlichen Freiheiten im Leben und vor allem nach Reichtum. Auch die westliche Wertekultur ist heute im Wandel begriffen. Überspitzt konnte man formulieren, sie ist auf dem besten Wege, sich immer mehr in eine Waren- und Dienstleistungskultur zu verwandeln. Recht selektiv und selbstgerecht wird der Wertekodex gehandelt. Wenn sich jedoch Orientierungen in einer Gesellschaft, in der zunehmende Bindungslosigkeit und Autoritatsverluste zu beobachten sind, nach den eigenen Wünschen richten, hat das wenig mit der ursprünglichen abendlandischen Tradition gemeinsam. Was bedeutet so eine Entwicklung konkret für eine Gesellschaft? Ich mochte es ohne Umschweife formulieren. Wenn die Grundlage westlicher Werte nicht mehr die Gemeinschaft ist, sondern der einzelne Mensch, der autonome, der über sich selbst bestimmt, geht Sozialverhalten in einer Gesellschaft verloren. Ein das demokratischer Rechtsstaat kann jedoch nur vom Gemeinsinn der Bürger getragen werden, d.h., wenn bürgerliche Mitverantwortung für das Gemeinwesen übernommen wird. Wenn wir nach China schauen, so entwickelte sich hier eine andere Tradition als im Westen. Es gab kaum Entwicklungsansatze, die mit der Aufklarung im Abendland vergleichbar waren. Obwohl sie auch wage Ansatze über die unverauBerliche Würde des Menschen und seine Abwehrrechte hervorbrachte, wurden diese Ideen zu keiner Zeit Grundlage des Herrschaftssystems. Damit wurden auch keine Werte geschaffen, die zur Sicherung individueller Freiheiten geführt hatten. Sun Yatsen (1866-1925), der Vater der chinesischen Republik, vertrat Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts noch die Auffassung, dass Rechte nicht als naturgegeben angesehen werden konnen, sondern nur Ergebnis historischer Entwicklungen sind. Bis auf den heutigen Tag wird Herrschaft aufgrund von Ethik definiert. Auch die Würde des Menschen interpretiert man nach den traditionellen Mustern. Die chinesischen Traditionalisten, die in gewisser Weise die geistige Debatte über das zukünftige Menschenbild im Lande immer noch beherrschen, waren lange dem Irrglauben verhaftet, dass aufgrund des Stellenwertes der Ethik in der chinesischen Kultur diese hoherwertig als die abendlandische Zivilisation 12 Chang Jian, Renquan de lixiang, beilun, xianshi (Theorie，Widersprüche und Praxis der Menschenrechte), Chengdu 1992, s. 132-136. 246 Karin Tomala zu werten sei. In der westlichen Kultur, so wird es betont, sei der Mensch zum okonomischen Subjekt erniedrigt worden13. Aus der Geschichte wissen wir gut, dass die groBen Utopien der Menschheit, sich aus der Herrschaft des materiellen Daseins zu befreien, in Kriegen und unzahligen Versprechungen untergegangen sind. Wie verschieden auch die Wertung des Anderen sein mag, so wird in den Kulturen jedoch weiterhin der Wunschtraum vom neuen Menschsein in einer menschlichen Gesellschaft getraumt. Doch auf die uralte Frage, in wieweit eine oder andere Idee dem menschlichen Dasein zu Gute kommt, gibt es unterschiedliche Antworten. Im Kern bleibt sie jedoch unbeantwortet, weil die Folgen von Handeln, gleich nach welcher Handlungsidentitat nicht vorher, sondern immer erst spater überprüfbar sind. Neue Menschenbilder Wir leben in einer Zeit, wo Mythen wieder einmal entzaubert wurden, Mythen von vollkommenen Menschenbildern im Sozialismus. Doch viele Menschen, sei es in China oder auch in den osteuropaischen Staaten, die auf eine Rettung durch die freie Marktwirtschaft gewartet haben, zeigen sich heute schon wieder enttauscht. Ein Wirtschaftssystem allein, ohne einem Wertekodex verpflichtet zu sein, ist nicht im Stande, die unverbesserliche Welt zu verbessern. Die neuen Menschenbilder heiBen heute Erfolg, und nochmals Erfolg, Wohlstand, SpaB, GenuB, Komfort und grenzenlose, personliche Freizügigkeit. Zwar gibt es keine Mangelwirtschaft und auch keinen Terror mehr, dafür haufen sich aber Erscheinungen von Ausgrenzung. GewiB, der Glaube an das Gute im Menschen ist so alt wie die Menschheitsgeschichte, doch er ging einher mit standigen Warnungen vor moralischem Verfall und den Drohungen vor einer bevorstehenden Apokalypse. Auch heute fehlt es nicht an Stimmen, die nach einer ethischen goldenen Regel für gutes Menschsein suchen, die für alle Menschen Gültigkeit besaBe. So ein Suchen kann nicht in der Studierstube, sondern nur im offenen Streitgesprach über den Zustand der Gesellschaften erfolgen. Da der Mensch in Ost und West die Welt in einem atemberaubenden Tempo verandert, so dass er die Folgen kaum mehr absehen kann, muB wohl die bange Frage lauter in der Offentlichkeit gestellt werden, ob unsere Welt durch Menschenhand im Dickicht des sogenannten Fortschritts unterzugehen 13 W. MeiBner, Intellektuelle im Zwiespalt, in: K.H. Pohl, G. Wacker, Liu Huiru (Hrsg.), Chinesische Intellektuelle im 20. Jahrhundert zwischen Tradition und Moderne, Hamburg 1993, s. 126 -127. Diskurs über eine „gute Gesellschaft” in der Welt - Menschenbild. 247 droht, weil unvorhersehbare Wandlungen des menschlichen Umfelds ihre eigene Dynamik entwickeln und nicht mehr umkehrbar sind? Wurzel allen Übels Da konnte man meinen, wie einfach doch alles sein konnte, wenn da nicht die menschlichen Begierden waren. Menschliche Begierden gehoren zum Menschsein. Schon John Locke hatte dieses menschliche Laster erkannt, als er vor den verbrecherischen Begierden nach grenzenlosem Besitztum warnte. Auch in der konfuzianischen und buddhistischen Lehre wird die Wurzel allen menschlichen Elends im maBlosen Streben des Individuums nach Befriedigung seiner Begierden gesehen. Es mag bitter klingen, wenn heute die grenzenlose Jagd zur Befriedigung unterschiedlicher Begierden doch mehr oder weniger der westlichen Welt mit ihrem expandierenden Wirtschaftssystem des unbegrenzten Wachstums zuzuschreiben gilt. So wird standig die Bedeutung des Produktionsfaktors beschworen, der heute das stets neu zu erwerbende Wissen darstellt. Dagegen sind Werte kaum noch gefragt. So verwundert es nicht, wenn der einzelne als Mensch in einer Gesellschaft mit seinen ideellen Bedürfnissen in den Hintergrund rückt und die Befriedigung der materiellen Bedürfnisse zum Motor der Entwicklung und eines menschenwürdiges Daseins erklart wird. Wir sind Zeugen in Ost und West, wie das menschliche Dasein zunehmend durch den Konsumterror kommerzialisiert wird. Doch das Paradoxe besteht darin, dass die heutigen Kassandrarufe über die Gefahren eines moralischen Verfalls und des Niedergangs gemeinschaftlicher Bande kaum noch gehort werden und wie in einem Echo der Versprechungen verhallen. Auch die chinesische Tradition hat zahlreiche Ideengebaude vom „guten Menschsein” hervorgebracht, die heute noch zu Reflexionen anregen. Traditionelle geistesgeschichtliche Ideen chinesischer Kultur über Menschsein und Gesellschaft sind in China immer noch von gewisser Bedeutung. Dabei darf man nicht übersehen, dass es Chinas Traum bleibt, auf dem steinigen Weg zwischen Tradition und Moderne Weltmacht zu werden14. Einige Schlussbemerkungen Unterschiedlich verlauft die Wahrnehmung des anderen, des fremden Menschenbildes. Wahrgenommen wird nur das, womit man konfrontiert wird. 14 K. Tomala, Zhongguo „Reich der Mitte”. China auf dem steinigen Weg in die Welt, Warszawa 2000, s. 11. 248 Karin Tomala Bewertet wird es haufig nach den Pramissen des eigenen Weltbilds. Das Fremde kann man jedoch nur vor dem Hintergrund der jeweils komplizierten sozialen und kulturellen Prozesse, die ein Teil dieses Fremden sind, bewuBt wahrnehmen. Die Einordnung dieser Prozesse ist im allgemeinen ein schwieriges Unterfangen. Das betrifft nicht nur die chinesischen und westlichen Menschenbilder. Über das zukünftige Menschsein entstanden die vielfaltigsten Utopien und Lehren. Zukünftiges Menschsein ist jedoch eng verbunden mit den Raumen der Erfahrungen, wie sich Menschen in ihren Kulturen und in ihrer Gesellschaft wahrnehmen. Doch wie bekannt, gibt es aufgrund traditioneller Erfahrungen vielfaltige Wahrnehmungen, die in sich zersplittert und widerspruchsvoll sind. Wie wir wissen, gestalteten sich die Beziehungen zwischen China und dem Abendland auBerst wechselvoll. Versucht man sie, in der Retrospektive zu beleuchten, so waren sie ein kompliziertes Wechselspiel chinesischer wie auch westlicher Selbsttauschungen.15 Es gehort heute zu den wichtigen Erkenntnissen, dass bilaterale, insbesondere interkulturelle oder interphilosophische Beziehungen, nur in langwierigen gegenseitigen Erkenntnis- und Lernprozessen aufgebaut werden konnen. Mit einem der moglichen Szenarien unseres 21. Jahrhunderts wurde am 11. September 2001 die Weltoffentlichkeit aus ihrem Schlaf gerissen. Für Hans Magnus Enzenberger lassen sich die morderischen Energien der Gegenwart jedoch nicht auf irgendeine Tradition zurückführen, sondern er sieht es als „Reaktionsbildungen auf den gegenwartigen Zustand der Weltgesellschaft”, wo eine Gesellschaft andere nicht mehr versteht, namlich in der Negation der Moderne. Bedauerlicherweise muss man feststellen, dass es leider in der Politik, in der Wirtschaft wie auch in der Wissenschaft zu oft an Visionen und Geisteskompetenz fehlt zur menschenwürdigen Gestaltung unseres Jahrhundert. Staaten und Politikern sind an Macht gelegen, Wirtschaftskreisen an Profitmaximierung und intellektuelle Kreise erfüllen haufig nur einen Auftrag ihres Auftraggebers, ohne nach dem eigenen Gewissen, ihrer Freiheit, zu handeln. Zur Selbsterneuerung ist es notwendig, den Gemeinsinn wieder als einen wichtigen Wert zu erkennen.16 Kann es ein Gebot geben, was Menschsein auf dem Wege in die Gemeinsamkeit ausmacht oder einen Befehl, der vorschreibt, was Glück und Zufriedenheit für eine Gesellschaft sein soll und wie man dieses Glück in der 15 W. Franke, China und das Abendland, Gottingen 1962, s. 35-40. 16 L. Kühnhard, Gemeinschaft und Gemeinsinn als Voraussetzung des Rechts, in: W. Schweidler (Hrsg), Menschenrechte und Gemeinsinn - westlicher und ôstlicher Weg, Sankt Augustin 1996, s. 345. Diskurs über eine „gute Gesellschaft” in der Welt - Menschenbild. 249 Endlichkeit des Lebens erreichen kann? So ein Gebot kann es nicht geben. Seit der Aufklarung gilt im Abendland, dass man Glück in die eigene Hande nehmen kann, wenn man es vernünftig anstellt. Damit sollte Glück für den Menschen und die Gemeinschaft planbar werden. An solchen Ideen, die in Form von Ratschlagen heute die Menschen in Ost und West von allen Seiten befluten, fehlt es wahrlich nicht. Die Menschen in Ost und West unterwerfen sich der Werbung, die Glück verspricht, wenn man ihr folgt. Entstanden sind neue Zwange, wie Gesundheitsfanatismus, Schonheitszwange, spirituelle VerheiBungen oder auch den verheiBenden Internetkult. Der moderne Mensch in China oder in einem anderen europaischen Land ist dem modernen Glück, der modernen Freiheit, ausgesetzt. Dazu gehoren viele Zwange der Modernitat, denen der Mensch jedoch eher kritisch gegenüberstehen sollte, um wirklich frei zu werden. Das zu vermitteln, gehort zu den groBen neuen Aufgaben in unserem Jahrhundert, um den Wandel zu einer antisozialen Gesellschaft zu verhindern. JERZY ZDANOWSKI The 1933 and 1937 Rebellions in Sinkiang This article aims at presenting certain British documents kept at the India Office Library and Records under the notation L/P&S/10 Political and Secret Subject Files and L/P&S/12 Political and Secret Collections. They contain reports from local level, especially from Kashgar, and describe the political situation in Sinkiang in the 1930s. They prove that situation was at that time extremely chaotic, and that Chinese authorities used ethnic conflicts in Sinkiang to keep the region under their influence. Sinkiang, Hsin-kiang or Xinjiang, in Chinese means “new dominion” or “recently pacified territory”. The name refers to the land commonly known in the 19th century as Eastern Turkestan and later as Uighur Autonomous Region. Geographically, it is divided by the Tianshan range into two main regions: the Tarim Basin in the South and Dzungar basin in the North. The Turfan Depression in the East is closely linked with Gansu province and China proper. In the past, Sinkiang was the crossroads of Chinese and Central Asian cultures. From Han period (206 BC - 220 AD) to the mid-17th century, Chinese sources used to mention it as a part of Xiyu (the Western Territory), intermittently under Chinese control or sovereignty. Historical evidence proves that Buddhism from Central Asia travelled along the Silk Road and entered China via Sinkiang. During the Tang period (618-906 AD) Turkish nomadic peoples such as the Uighurs, Kirghiz, Karluks entered the country from the northern steppe of Inner Asia. Around 750 AD, Islam was introduced to the region and during the Karakhanid reign (992-1211) spread widely becoming, in 1026, state religion in Sinkiang. From the 17th century onwards, the history of Sinkiang became more complicated as various peoples such as the Uighurs, Mongols, Tibetans, and Sino-Manchu were contending for domination over the region. By the early 17th century a theocratic state had been formed in Kashgaria by the Khoudja family originating from the mystical order of Naqshbandiyya. In 1757, Dzungharia was annexed to the Chinese territory and so was Kashgaria 2 years later. As a result of these victories, 80% of at least 600,000 Dzungarians 254 Jerzy Zdanowski were destroyed by disease and war, while the remaining fled to Russia or were captured1. In the life of Eastern Turkestan, periods of tranquillity were rare. Sufficient to say that during the 19th century alone, there were about ten risings. The last one, which started in 1861, interrupted the connection between the Eastern Turkestan Government with China for 16 years. Of those 16 years, more than 12 were spent under the rule of Yaqub Beg, with whom, as with the head of “Kashgaria” - an independent state, Russia (1872) and England (1874) entered into the so-called “Thomas Douglas Forsyth Agreements”2. The Islamic Emirate of Yaqub Beg existed from 1864 to 1877. In 1862, two years before it was established, Chinese Moslems of the provinces of Shaanxi and Gansu rebelled against the Manchu policy. Their movement was suppressed by the authorities in 1878. In 1932, Khoja Niaz Haji led a rebellion, which was, however, put down in 1934 with the support of Soviet intervention, and it was followed by a cruel campaign of massacres. In 1937, a new rebellion under Abd Allah al-Niaz took place and it lasted until 1943. The cause of these risings was always the same: the methods applied by the Chinese government, and in particularly heavy taxes, unlawful conscription, bribery, and oppression by the Chinese and the Begs who were appointed by them. Wen-Djang Chu, the author of The Mœlem Rebellion in Northwest China 1862-1878, considers that Moslem rebellions have undoubtedly been greatly underestimated in most history books. Some writers devoted a short paragraph to the subject, others dismissed them with a single sentence. “This is hardly justifiable, because the aforesaid rebellion lasted more than 15 years, spread from Shaanxi to Sinkiang, covering almost one fourth of China’s territory, and directly disturbed the life of more than 10,000,000 people,”3 we read in Wen-Djang Chu’s book. 1 See: W. Bartold Turkestan dawn to the Mongol Invasion, Oxford University Press, Oxford and London, 1928, pp. 386-387; Wen-Djan Chu The Moslem Rebellion in Northwest China 1862-1878, Mouton, The Hague, Paris, 1966, pp. 1-3; Jonathan N. LipmanFamiliar Strangers. A History of Muslims in Northwest China, University of Washington Press, Seattle and London, 1997, pp. XXIII, 3-5; J. Chen The Sinkiang Story, Macmillan, New York, London, 1977, pp. 3-7; R. Israeli Muslims in China. A Study in Cultural Confrontation, Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies, Curzon Press, 1980, pp. 107-116; Michael Dillon China’s Muslm. Hui Community, Curzon Press, 2000, pp. 102-103; and also R. Sławiński “Chinese Historiography of the 20th C: Research on Xinjiang”, Asia Asiatica Varsoviensia, no. 14, 2001, pp. 83-94. 2 “Foreign Office to India Office, 3rd August, 1934”，in L/P&S/12/2363 Chinese Turkestan. Sinkiang Rebellion 21 Jan 1934-1935 Jan. 17. 3 Wen-Djan Chu, op. cit., p. 1. Linda Benson in her excellent book entitled The IÜ Rebellion. The Modern Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang 1944-1949 (An The 1933 and 1937 Rebellions in Sinkiang 255 At the beginning of the 20th century, Sinkiang was inhabited by various ethnical groups. Dzungharia, after the nearly total destruction of the Dzungarians in the 18th century, was inhabited by the Chinese and Chinese Moslems known as Tungans from the provinces of Gansu and Shaanxi. Uighurs from southern Turkestan were also moved by the government into the Ili area. Manchus from Peking, from the region of Amur, Mongols from the Jehol region, as well as Chahars and Oirats were sent to Ili as garrison forces4. The Tungans were believed to be descendants of the ancient Uighurs who entered China during Tang dynasty (618-907), and possibly had mixed blood of Xiongnu, Di, Qiang, Persian, Arab and Chinese ancestors. With the exception of their religion, the Tungans had long since been assimilated by the Chinese people in language, costume, and in many other ways. They were known to the Chinese as Han Hui, or “Chinese Moslems”. To distinguish the “Chinese Moslems” from the Uighurs in Chinese Turkestan, the latter were called Chan Hui or “turban-wearing Moslems”5. The population of Southern Sinkiang was of Turkish origin and it was not so varied as in the North. The reason for this was chiefly ascribed to differences in geographical character between the North and the South. The freedom of movement for nomadic people in the North historically encouraged mixture of migration and conquest. Conquest of the isolate oases of the South, on the other hand, resulted simply in “administrative conquest”, the oasis people being subdued and placed under Chinese rule but not overwhelmed racially by the admixture of new blood. The native Moslem population was agricultural and Chinese in Southern oasis were officials and traders6. The racial differences the peoples, in conjunction with the geographical fact of their distribution into oases separated by wide desert, brought about the result that the settled population of Kashgaria had no knowledge of national unity, but regarded themselves members of various tribes which corresponded with these oases inhabited by them, e.g. Kashgaris, Yarkandis, Khotanis, etc.7 East Gate Book, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, London 1990) only mentions the 1935 year rebellion. Surprisingly, J. Cheng in his The Sinkiang Story does not even mention these events. 4 Wen-Djan Chu, op. cit., pp. 2-3. 5 Ibidem, p. 3 6 “From Captain J. Pope-Hennesy, War Office to India Office, White Hall, 14 September, 1943”，in L/P&S/12/2392 Chinese Thrkestan. Sinkiang. Who’s Who in Sinkiang. 7 L/P&S/20/169 “Military Report on Kashgaria prepared in the Division of the Chief of the Staff Intelligence Branch”, Simla, Printed at the Government Monotype Press, 1907 (compiled by Major S. Geoghegan and revised by Mr. Macartney, the British Agent in Kashgar), p. 90. 256 Jerzy Zdanowski The total population of the Southern Sinkiang was estimated in 1907 by the British Intelligence Branch in Simla at around 1,626,000 persons of both sexes, out of almost 6,000,000 people living in Sinkiang as a whole. The most populated cities in the South were Kashgar with 319,700 people, Yengisar -228,500, Yarkand - 205,500, Aksu - 190,000, Khotan - 180,000, and Karghalik - 155,000. Turkomans, or Turkis represented the overwhelming majority - 1.456.000 persons or 89.5 per cent of the whole population. There were also 43.000 Kara-Kirghizes (2.6%), 45,000 Mongols (2.8%), 30,000 Tajiks (1.8%), 25.000 Tungans (1.5%), 6,000 Chinese (0.4%), 5,000 Indians (0.3%), 3,000 Andijans or Uzbeks (0.2%) and 1,000 Gypsies (0.1%)8. The turbulent events of the thirties started in 1932 with the establishment of an independent government in Khotan by Muhammad Niaz, a local religious leader. It was at his instigation that the Khotanis took up arms against the Chinese authorities. Muhammad Niaz established his own army and began issuing own paper currency which circulated along with Chinese paper money, gold, and silver. The Chinese authorities sent troops of Tungans to Khotan. While they were approaching the city, Muhammad Amin, commander-in-chief of the Khotani government, plundered the Khotan treasury, and escaped with his loot, leaving the army and people without a leader. This let Tungans enter the city. Finding himself unable to obtain any army assistance from the neighbouring powers, Muhammad Niaz threw himself at the mercy of Tungans whom he recognised as the paramount power in that part of Asia. The Tungans reaffirmed his title of Jalalat-ul-mulk, which had previously been bestowed on him by the Khotanis, but dissolved the local council9. The revolt in Khotan was a minor one compared to the 1933 events in Kashgar . In October and November, the Kashgari Turki leaders attempted to organise an “Independent Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan” under a local leader Khoja Niaz Haji. As a result, a local government in Kashgar was established. It was, however, divided into two camps. There were, on the one hand, those, such as Khoja Niaz himself, who favoured close relations with Russia (chiefly as a means of obtaining arms) as well as relations with Nanking. On the other hand, the extreme Islam party favoured complete independence from Russia as well as from Nanking. Very soon, the Kashgarians managed to control the whole Southern Sinkiang but the situation changed in December 8 Ibidem, p. 86. 9 “From L.E. Lang, The Residency, Kashmir, 28th Nov. 1936 to Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, New Delhi”, and “From H.A.F. Rumbold, India Office, London, 28th June, 1937”，in L/P&S/12/2385 Chinese Turkestan. Establishment of an uInde^enden^ Republic of Khotan”. The 1933 and 1937 Rebellions in Sinkiang 257 1933 with the arrival of Tungans troops from Northern Sinkiang. The troops under General Ma Zhongying, who controlled the Turfan and Hami regions, were badly defeated by the Chinese troops of General Sheng Shicai from Urumchi in December 1933. As a result, Ma he was compelled to hand over Turfan, and withdrew along the road towards Southern Sinkiang10. Late in December 1933, Ma Zhongying’s Tungan advance forces reached Aksu and on 13th January he defeated the troops of Khoja Niaz Haji, who retreated and reached Kashgar. He brought about 500 men to Kashgar, with another 2,000 under the command of Ahmad Tuan Chang coming in a few days. His men were well-armed. On his arrival at Kashgar, he ordered an immediate attack on the New City occupied by the Chinese troops. The fight continued lasted for three successive days and was so severe that the New City suffered unprecedented casualties. Understanding the approaching of the Aksu Tungans, Khoja and his troops gave up besieging the New City and withdrew on 4th February. On 6th February, Tungan force of about 1,000 soldiers entered the Old and New Cities: the siege of the New City was immediately raised. The new Tungan officer, Ma Fuyuan assured Ma Shaowu, who was the head of Chinese administration in the city that he had specially come to Kashgar to save the New City, and asked Ma Shaowu to take over civil and military control in the Kashgar Administration. Ma Shaowu formally assumed charge on 12th February, and announced that he was working on behalf of the Chinese Republic. The Tungans slaughtered the Turkish indiscriminately in the Old City on 14th and 15th February. The justification for this action was that they knew how the Chinese were killed by the Turki Rebels, and the treachery which led to the slaughter of many at Yarkand and other places when the Chinese and governmental troops were unarmed and proceeding under safe guard11. During the fighting, the British Consulate General was fired at by the Tungans, causing several casualties, including the wife of the Consul General. Besides this incident, the British Consul General reported that known losses to British subjects in lives and property during the disorders of 1933 and 1934 amounted to fourteen killed, two missing, four wounded, and loss goods valued at 267,055 rupees. The British consulate received full apologies from Mao Shaowu and from Ma Zhongying12. Furthermore, Ma Zhongying explained 10 F 326/14/10 “Memorandum respecting the Situation in Sinkiang during the year 1934”, Foreign Office, December 24, 1934, in L/P&S/12/2364 Chinese Turkestan: Sinkiang Internal Situation 15 Nov. 1933-1936 Nov. 12. 11 “Copy of a private letter from Mr Chen, Chinese writer at the Kashgar Consulate-General to Mr Fitzmaurice, of the China Consulate Service, on leave, Kashgar, 28th Feb. 1934”，in L/P&S/12/2364 Chinese Turkestan. Sinkiang Internal Situation 15 Nov. 1933-1936 Nov. 12. 258 Jerzy Zdanowski that his policy was adherence to Nanking and opposition to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. To summarise the situation at the beginning of 1934: in Southern Sinkiang Chinese authorities completely disappeared and the local Turki leaders, of whom Khoja Niaz Haji was the most influential, were generally in control of the various oases, with the exception of Kashgar, which was still held by Ma Zhongying and the Tungans. In Northern Sinkiang, General Sheng Shicai at Urumchi and General Zhang Beiyuan in Ili maintained some sort of nominal Chinese administration, but were carrying on intermittent hostilities with the Tungan leaders in the Turfan and Hami regions. The Tungan control of Kashgar was, however, scarcely long lived. Sheng Shicai’s troops gradually followed up their victories in Northern Sinkiang by defeating Ma Zhongying’s troops at Karashar early in 1934, then in April near Aksu. Early in July, Maralbashi, approx. 150 miles from Kashgar, was occupied. Having withdrawn to Khotan, General Ma Zhongying, crossed the Soviet frontier to Irkishtan with a few followers on 10th July, and was interned13. Mao Shaowu was thus left once again in charge at Kashgar. During the week ending on 26th July, General Kong Zhenghan of the Urumchi Government arrived with 400 Chinese and 2,000 Muslim troops, and Mao Shaowu was informed that the Urumchi Government wished him to remain in charge. Chinese troops were also posted in the force of a garrison at Yengisar and at other stages on the Yarkand route. On 7th August, General Liu Bin, Commander-in-Chief and Commissioner for defence of Kashgar, arrived there by air from Urumchi and took over charge of the military situation. General Kung left Kashgar on 12th August, whereupon General Liu Bin assumed charge and publicly declared the Government’s policy14. These developments created an entirely new situation. General Sheng Shicai, the Urumchi commander, had the full recognition and support of the Nanking Central Government and regained complete control of the province. The remaining month of 1934 passed in comparative calmness and tranquillity. The victories of Sheng Shicai’s provincial forces were largely due to the arms and aeroplanes which were obtained from the USSR. The Soviet influence in Sinkiang was quite strong at that time because of the fact that nine tenths 12 Ibidem. 13 F 326/14/10 “Memorandum respecting the Situation in Sinkiang during the Year 1934”，Foreign Office, December 24, 1934, in L/P&S/12/2364 Chinese Thrkestan: Sinkiang Internal Situation 15 Nov. 1933-1936 Nov. 12. 14 Ibidem The 1933 and 1937 Rebellions in Sinkiang 259 of the whole foreign trade of Eastern Turkestan was with Soviet Russia. The gradual domination of provincial trade by Moscow began in 1925. While in the years 1923-1924 Soviet imports from Sinkiang were valued at 3,015,000 roubles, and exports to Sinkiang at 418,000 roubles, in 1932 imports amounted to 12,305,000 roubles and exports to 15,698,000 roubles.The cause of the trouble was, however, not to be found in statistics. The actual trouble was in the character and the methods of this trade. According to Lieutenant-Colonel J.W. Thompson, the British Consul General in Kashgar, who arrived in the region in October 1933, the country was flooded with cheap Soviet goods, and had Soviet agents installed in every trade, causing decline of local industries and seriously damaging trade with India. Paying for the raw products not with money but almost exclusively with products of their own manufacture, the Bolsheviks were able to exert the greatest influence on the home market. The local industries: silk products, carpets, pottery, etc., declined due to lack of consumers, as the Bolsheviks bought only raw products. Moreover, this Russian dominance was not ephemeral, for Russian advantage was made permanent by the completion of the Turkestan-Siberian Railway in 1930, running past the western boundary of Sinkiang within a few score miles, whereas the trade route to India crossed the Himalayas, and the nearest rail-head in China was 1,600 miles away. Before the outbreak of the war in Sinkiang, the USSR came to a trade agreement with the then head of the province, Jin Shuren. The Soviets became the main provider of arms and ammunition, which were practically unobtainable from other sources, to a few likely contestants for power. In fact, the troops of Sheng Shicai were supplied by the Soviet Union with munitions and aeroplanes. It is doubtful whether, without this Soviet aid, the Tungans could have been defeated, for they were the most “virile element”15. The Soviet propaganda construed the causes of events in Sinkiang and the meaning of the national movement in Eastern Turkestan as the result of English intrigue in the first place. England was apparently to be striving to disintegrate China through the separation of Tibet and the creation - in Eastern Turkestan - of a separate Islamic state under its protectorate.16 The reason for these constructions was to keep the former order of things, under which Eastern Turkestan, whilst nominally remaining a Chinese province, was almost entirely under the economic domination of the Soviet Russia. 15 F 326/14/10 “Memorandum respecting the Situation in Sinkiang during the Year 1934”，Foreign Office, December 24, 1934, op. cit. ; “Foreign Office to India Office, 3rd August, 1934”，in L/P&S/12/2363 Chinese Turkestan. Sinkiang Rebellion 21 Jan 19341935 Jan. 17. “Foreign Office to India Office, 3rd August, 1934”，in L/P&S/12/2363 Chinese Turkestan. Sinkiang Rebellion 21 Jan 1934-1935 Jan. 17. 16 “Foreign Office to India Office, 3rd August, 1934”, op. cit. 260 Jerzy Zdanowski The fact that General Sheng Shicai’s success was a matter of help from the Soviet Union put the Chinese Government in a sensitive position. Officially, it was announced that the action of Sheng Shicai was necessary and that he had full support of the Chinese authorities. Unofficially, the Chinese authorities acknowledged that it was at that time impossible for them to intervene with an armed force in the Sinkiang civil war, and that they were grateful to see anyone in power who was ready, even nominally, to recognise them17. There is an interesting document which describes the position of the Turkomans in these events. It is a letter prepared by Khoja Niaz Haji in October 1933 in Kashgar and sent to the British Consul General in this city. The leader of the Turkis entitled his letter a petition to the British King and the British Parliament with a request for a reply. The letter describes the situation in Sinkiang from the point of view of the Turkomans and is full of fears of the influence of Bolshevism and of the tyranny of the Chinese. It reads: History proves the fact that for more than a thousand years the yoke of this country was on the shoulders of Muslim kings. It is now fifty-eight years since the Chinese Government treacherously took away our Independence, and with cruelty brought us under heir subjugation. During the fifty-eight years of most oppressive tyrannical rule, the proud atrocious Chinese by showering incessant hardships and cruelties reduced us to our present pitiable state. The proud Chinese officials looked down at us with disdain. Our creed and religion were contemptible objects to their sight. The Chinese deprived us of citizenship rights. The Chinese did not acquaint us with the sciences, art, industry, and trade. The Chinese went so far that they closed the only one press which we brought for our religious books to be printed. On account of the mismanagement by the Chinese, eighty per cent of the population were out of employment. The tyranny of the Chinese kept us uncultured, uncivilised and brought evil days on us, which is well known to the world. The oppressed Muslims of the Eastern Turkestan bore with patience all the tyrannies and cruelties of the Chinese up to the present time and did not create any fuss nor did they complain to any foreign power. Not satisfied with the infliction of all the miseries mentioned above, they intended to take away our daughters. The Chinese sold our trade to the Bolsheviks. From all sides Bolshevik agents began to pour in. They started Communist propaganda. We heard about the tragic fate of the Muslims of Western Turkestan (Qafkas, Dagesthan, Qarem, Tatarestan). The Bolsheviks slaughtered a large number of Muslims in Western Turkestan, the remaining were turned into atheists by dint of force and cruelty, thus was the religion of 17 F 326/14/10 “Memorandum respecting the Situation in Sinkiang during the Year 1934”, Foreign Office, December 24, 1934, op. cit. The 1933 and 1937 Rebellions in Sinkiang 261 Islam trampled. We, fearing the fatal infection of Bolshevism, and secondly unable to hear any longer the tyranny of the Chinese, rose and fought without arms against the Chinese. The All Merciful Lord placed the crown of victory on our heads, and we came into possession of numerous arms from the conquered Chinese. The Chinese becoming helpless in avenging themselves on us, gave vent to their anger on the Muslims of Turfan, by slaughtering and burning their houses. The Muslims of other places becoming aware of this barbaric deed of the Chinese raised the banner of revolt from Altai to Khotan”18. After the military victory of 1934 General Sheng Shicai was de facto ruler of the whole Sinkiang. The nominal head of the Provincial Government was Li Jung and Khoja Niaz Hajji was given the post of Vice-Chairman. At the beginning, the Government was occupied with the Tungan rebellion, which affected the South Sinkiang from Maralbashi through Kashgar to Cherchen. More attention was devoted to education - both through schools and through lectures and theatres - road-widening and other improvements were resumed within the towns and the main Urumchi-Kashgar and Kashgar-Khotan roads were improved. An attempt was made to abolish several oppressive taxes, such as consumption tax and transport tax, and to replace them by single business tax, loosely based on regulations promulgated by the Central Government. A system of secret police, vested with wide powers and largely based on the Soviet model, similar to what had been in existence in the North for some years, was introduced into South Sinkiang. According to the British reports, even despite the Secret Police, the people of South Sinkiang were more secure under the Provincial Government than they had been under the Tungan administration19. The over-centralisation of the Provincial Administration was evident. Nothing of any importance could be settled by a Magistrate without reference to his Administrative Commissioner or by the Administrative Commissioner without reference to Urumchi. And it was a significant fact that the Russian Consulate General in Urumchi was the most important post in the Province. The Relations between the Sinkiang Government and the Central Government were more tenuous than they had ever been since the Chinese Revolution. The Provincial Government paid nominal allegiance to the Central Government, and accepted such of the Central Government’s rulings as might prove helpful 18 “Letter from HM Consul-General, Kashgar no. 107-C, dated 19th October 1933”, Enclosure II “From Khoja Niaz Haji, to H.B.M.’s Consul-General, Kashgar”, in LP&S/12/2364 Chinese Turkestan, Sinkiang Internal Situation 15 Nov. 1933-1936，Nov. 12. 19 “Letter from His Britannic Majesty’s Acting Consul-General”, Kashgar, no. F.-12-C./38, the 11th July, 1938, Enclosure in India Foreign Secretary’s Letter, no. 193, in L/P&S/12/2357 Chinese Turkestan, Sinkiang. Internal Situation, 1937-1938 (1937 Rebellion). 262 Jerzy Zdanowski to the Provincial Government. But the Provincial authorities keenly resented any attempt at interference in the Administration of Sinkiang by the Central Government. Soviet Russia at last regained in full the influence in the Province. Most of the important posts in the province were filled by Russophile officials (often Russian-trained and speaking Russian), and both provincial and local authorities frequently sought the advice and assistance of the Russian Consular establishments in the province20. Khoja Niaz Haji was given the position of Vice-Chairman in the Provincial Government as a reward but was kept in Urumchi, where he was rendered completely ineffective. His chief lieutenant, Mahmud by name, a wealthy but intriguing and unreliable ex-merchant from Turfan, was given the rank of General, and was made Divisional Commander, subordinated to the Commander-in-Chief in Kashgar, with around 2,000 Turki troops under him (stationed roughly as follows: 700 in the Old City of Kashgar, 600 in Yengisar, and 700 in Yarkand). Mahmud was keenly apprehensive of the increase in Russian influence in Sinkiang. Making use of his position as the leading Turki official in South Sinkiang, he soon started plotting against the Provincial Government and forming around himself a party, ostensibly for the protection of Islam but actually in the hope of controlling the increase of Russian influence in the Kashgar area. He found the conservative Turkish a fruitful ground. Some disliked the many, often ill-considered reforms enforced by the Provincial Government, moreover, they feared the increasing importance of the police force who largely employed Kirghiz and copied from a Russian model. The Provincial Government took a remarkably lenient view of Mahmud’s activities and contented themselves with limiting his power by the appointment of Russian-trained officers to hold important posts in Mahmud’s division21. By the end of 1936, Mahmud was thoroughly nervous concerning the attitude of the Provincial Government towards himself and started making secret preparations to a flight to India, which soon became common knowledge throughout Sinkiang. On 20th January 1937, an aeroplane carrying General Dudkin, who had been appointed by the Provincial Government as adviser to General Mahmud to limit his power, arrived at Kashgar. At the same time arrangements were made to abolish the Consolidated tax at Kashgar and, under instructions from the Central Government, to introduce a Business Tax instead22. 20 Ibidem. 21 Ibidem 22 “Consul-General, Kashgar, to the Foreign Secretary, Government of India”, New Delhi, the 28th January 1937, in L/P&S/12/2357 Chinese Turkestan，Sinkiang. Internal Situation, 1937-1938 (1937Rebellion). The 1933 and 1937 Rebellions in Sinkiang 263 When General Mahmud was summoned to attend the 12th April celebrations (in connection with the establishment of the Provincial Government) in Urumchi, his nervousness reached a state bordering on panic, but he managed to organise a demonstration in Kashgar to make the Urumchi Government cancel their orders. A large number of leading Turkish citizens sent petitions to Urumchi protesting against General Mahmud’s “removal” from Kashgar. As a result, some of them, including Hajji Beg Haji who held the official appointment of Chief Merchant of Kashgar Old City, were arrested23. Mahmud’s fears reached their peak when Colonel Qurban Niyaz was sent from Urumchi to Kashgar and it was rumoured that his objective was to arrest Mahmud. Therefore, on 2nd April, he fled to India via Yengisar, Yarkand, and the Yangi pass. On his flight, he was accompanied by his brother and a few troops from the Kashgar garrison. At Yengisar he was joined by the whole of the garrison there, who accompanied him to Yarkand, where they merged with the Yarkand garrison and remained to cover the flight of Mahmud, his brother and a few selected men to India. Under the command of Abdul Niyaz and his assistant Kichik Akhun, the Yangi Hissar and Yarkand garrisons set up an independent administration in the Yarkand area and proceeded to execute all officials who were either Russian-trained or suspected of having pro-Russian sympathies, and loot the Yarkand branch of the Provincial Bank24. The oases of Karghalik, Guma, Khotan, Keria and Cherchen, eastwards of Yarkand, were in the hands of remnants of the Tungans, who, under General Ma Zhongying, were a menace to the Provincial Government in 1933, and who were under the command of Ma Hushan - half-brother to Ma Zhongying -incorporated into the Chinese Army as the 36th Division. They set up a largely independent administration. Although in the years 1933-1934 the Provincial Government could eliminate all Tungans, it decided to leave some in the control of the above-mentioned oases to give the province a badly needed breathing-space and also in the hope that it might eventually prove possible to secure their co-operation. This hope was subsequently proved vain. The Tungans were plenty and completely lacking in administrative ability. During the four years of their occupation, they succeeded in exhausting completely the taxable capacity of the oases under their control. The Tungan attitude towards the Provincial Government was always extremely doubtful, and the exhaustion of the area they controlled forced on them the necessity of expansion and need to extend their 23 Ibidem. 24 “Annual Confidential Report, 30th June 1937 to 30th June 1938 (Major K.C. Packman, Consul-General from the 30th June 1937 to the 29th June, 1938, when he handed over charge to Mr. M.C. Gillet)”, in L/P&S/12/2357 Chinese Tkrkestan, Sinkiang. Internal Situation, 1937-1938 (1937Rebellion). 264 Jerzy Zdanowski influence to the northern area. Furthermore, early in 1937, the 36th Division, with at least 7,000 rifles, was the largest armed force in the province25. Under these conditions General Liu Bin, the Manchurian Commander-in-Chief of the Kashgar district, who had only around 700 troops at his disposal, and who could not be readily reinforced from Urumchi owing to the distance and the fact that a rebellion under Yulbaz Beg also started in Kami, was not able to take the initiative against Mahmud’s troops and had to content himself with securing the eastern approaches to the Kashgar oasis. Although short of troops, General Liu Bin had six bombers and three other aeroplanes at his disposal. He made use of these machines first for dropping leaflets on Yarkand, urging Mahmud’s rebellious troops to submit, and then for bombing Yengisar and Yarkand. But, although the bombs did more damage than the leaflets, both methods proved ineffective against the rebels. The rebels, however, were sufficiently worried by these air-raids to send a force of 150 men to attack the aerodrome outside the New City soon after the first raid on Yengisar. This attack was held back. In Kashgar, the authorities took prompt and effective steps to control Mahmud’s troops and there was no serious unrest following Mahmud’s flight. The situation remained seemingly normal, but there was an under-current of uneasiness. Yarkand presented a scene of considerable activity, with a continual coming and going of representatives between the Tungans and the rebel Turki troops26. Ma Hushan was at first unwilling to move, and took no action for the best part of two months. But eventually the arguments of Bai Zili, his Chief of Staff, and Ma Rulong, commanding the 1st Tungan Brigade stationed at Karghalik, combined with the insistence of Abdul Niaz, who greatly exaggerated the strength of Mahmud’s faction in Kashgar, and a request for assistance from the Provincial Government persuaded him that the time was ripe for rebellion. On 29th May 1937, a body of 1,500 men composed of 1,000 of Mahmud’s men, reinforced by about 500 Tungans, under the command of Kichik Akhun attacked Kashgar Old City and occupied the greater part of it having encountered little resistance as, although local authorities expected the attack, it came at an unexpected time27. On 20th May 1937, the rebels made an unsuccessful attack on the Chinese aerodrome to the east of Kashgar New City. This was followed on the 30th 25 Ibidem. 26 Ibidem 27 “Annual Confidential Report, 30th June 1937 to 30th June 1938 (Major K.C. Packman, Consul-General from the 30th June 1937 to the 29th June, 1938, when he handed over charge to Mr. M.C. Gillet)”, op. cit. The 1933 and 1937 Rebellions in Sinkiang 265 May by another attack on Kashgar Old City by 12 battalions composed of 1,000 Turki mutineers and 500 Tungans under the command of Kichik Akhun, reinforced by 1,500 peasants. The City fell after relatively little resistance, and rebels were welcomed by the local population. On the night of 1st June, a fresh factor was introduced into the rebellion by the arrival of the 1st Brigade of the 36th Division (Tungans) under Brigadier Ma Rulong from Karghalik at Kashgar. On 3rd June, Ma Hushan, Commander of the 36th Division himself arrived in Kashgar. The avowed object of the Tungans was to act in the interests of the Provincial Government and to drive the Turki rebels from Kashgar. The Turkis under Kichik Akhun, however, made common cause with the Tungans and eventually left for Maralbashi and Aksu on 3rd June, leaving Ma Hushan in control of Kashgar Old City. After some days of fighting, Maralbashi which was being held by Urumchi troops, was captured by the Turkis who then moved on to Aksu leaving the Tungans to take over Maralbashi. No real attempt was made to capture Kashgar New City, which remained in the hands of the Manchurians throughout the rebellion28. On 1st July, the Tungans controlled South Sinkiang from Cherchen to beyond Maralbashi, with the exception of Sarikol - which they found of little interest - and Kashgar New City. They had attacked the city, yet their raid was so fiercely resisted that they did not dare repeat it. They claimed to be acting in concert with the Turkis with a view to overthrowing the Provincial Government and replacing it by an Islamic Government offering strict allegiance to Nanking. The Provincial Government was far from popular in South Sinkiang and as the Tungans, during the early days of the rebellion, behaved with strict moderation, they still retained a large measure of popular support. Yet, even then, there were signs that the Tungans were returning to their old habits of pillaging, extortion, and rape, which were alienating the sympathy of the local population. Parallel to these, there was a rebellion in Hami, and at that time it seemed in Kashgar that there was no reason why the Tungans should not obtain control of the whole province. They were, however, badly in need of more arms and ammunition. Matters remained unchanged till the end of August, with the Turki troops fighting before Aksu and the Tungans doing no fighting, but peaceably besieging the Kashgar New City. Although the Tungans left the Provincially appointed Kashgar District Administrative Commissioner in office, they filled most of the lesser civil posts with their own nominees, yet left the civil authorities with 28 “Government of India, External Affairs Department, New Delhi, to His majesty’s Consul-General, Kashgar”, 17th December 1937, in “Memorandum on Events Connected with the 1937 Rebellion in Sinkiang”, in L/P&S/12/2357 Chinese Turkestan, Sinkiang. Internal Situation, 1937-1938 (1937Rebellion). 266 Jerzy Zdanowski no real powers. As time went on, the low quality of the Tungan administration became more and more apparent. The poorly controlled behaviour of the troops coupled with the increasing and irregular taxation and the steady demand for more soldiers succeeded in losing the sympathies of the local inhabitants almost completely. Towards the end of August, events moved rapidly, and all in favour of the Provincial Government. The rebel Turki troops were decisively defeated near Aksu, and the led by Abdul Niaz and Kichik Akhun who escaped fled to the Yengisar-Merket-Yarkand triangle. Dissatisfaction among the 2nd Tungan Brigade, stationed at Eizabad, from where they controlled Maralbashi: the strategic key to South Sinkiang, came to a head. Probably encouraged by provincial bribes, Brigadier Ma Shungui commanding the 2nd Brigade, threw in lot with the Provincial Government and retired on Kashgar, where he arrived with his brigade late on 1st September. The 1st Brigade retreated without any fighting towards Karghalik, and on the 7th September the Tungan leaders of the rebellion deserted their troops and fled to India, whereupon the leaderless troops relapsed into a state of petty banditry29. With the arrival of the 2nd Tungan brigade in Kashgar, the siege of the New City, which had lasted since the end of May, was lifted and provincial reinforcements soon reached General Qiang, who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief. With these reinforcements, and assisted by aeroplanes, some of which were working from a base in Russia, General Qiang launched an attack on the now disorganised rebels. At the same time, another provincial column was converging on Yarkand from Maralbashi and by 9th September they had taken the city. By the end of September the effective control of the Southern oasis as far as Khotan had been secured. On 12th October the 2nd Tungan Brigade was successfully disarmed in the barracks in the Old City. This move marked the end of the rebellion in South Sinkiang and the elimination of the Tungans as political and military force in Sinkiang30. The Provincial Government of Sinkiang very soon re-established its authority in most areas. The road from Urumchi to Kashgar was opened, and in November thirty lorries carrying Chinese officials arrived in Kashgar from Urumchi. On 9th November 1937, thirty Russian and sixty Kirghiz military officers arrived in Kashgar from Russian territory via Turgat and left for Khotan two days later. Those Tungans who were not executed or arrested were 29 Ibidem; “Government of India, External Affairs Department, New Delhi, to His majesty’s Consul-General, Kashgar”, 17th December 1937, in “Memorandum on Events Connected with the 1937 Rebellion in Sinkiang”, in L/P&S/12/2357 Chinese Turkestan, Sinkiang. Internal Situation，1937-1938 (1937Rebellion). 30 Ibidem. The 1933 and 1937 Rebellions in Sinkiang 267 reported to fled to Tkhan (in Gansu). The Provincial Government took a strong anti-Japanese attitude and blamed the Japanese for the recent Tungan-Turki rebellion. Kwaja Niaz and 11 other prominent Muslim and Tungan leaders were arrested in Urumchi and charged with treacherous dealings with Japan. The propaganda also alleged that the rebels were assisted by “the dogs of British Imperialism”. 4,000 persons were arrested in Kashgar in September, October, and the first half of November31. With the resumption of Provincial control in South Sinkiang, the powers of the Russian-style police force were greatly increased and quasi martial law was established as the real authority was kept in the hands of the military and police. But despite this, and despite a policy of ruthless elimination of all persons suspected of any connection with the rebellion, the resumption of control by the Provincial Government led to a greatly increased feeling of confidence among the local population in Kashgar32. During the winter of 1937-1938, most of the provincial forces were concentrated in South Sinkiang. With the exception of a fairly small garrison in Urumchi and some troops dealing with noncompliant Kirghiz in the mountains above Kuchar, the north of the province was almost free of troops. The peak figures for this military concentration in South were as follows: Kashgar: 3,000 (about 2,500 in the New City, and 500 in the Old City including Kirghiz gendarmeries under control of Old City Chief of Police); Sarikol: around 3,000; Yarkand: not less than 2,000; Khotan: 3,000, and Keria: about 500. These troops were composed of Manchurian troops, a large number of Kirghiz, 2,000 “White” Russian conscripts, and a few Turkis. They were almost entirely mounted infantry and, compared with Sinkiang troops of the earlier days, well trained and moderately well equipped. The Provincial Government had also a few pieces of Russian-made artillery, including anti-aircraft guns, some armoured cars, and a few aeroplanes. By January 1938, a withdrawal of troops from the South had commenced and the strength of garrisons other than Kashgar was reduced by over a third33. After the rebellion had been suppressed, many persons belonging to the less reputable sections of the population were appointed to responsible posts 31 P.Z. 902/1938 “Extract from Weekly Intelligence Summary”, no. 2, Peshawar, 10th January 1938, in L/P&S/12/2357 Chinese Tkrkestan, Sinkiang. Internal Situation, 1937-1938 (1937Rebellion). 32 “Annual Confidential Report”, 30th June 1937 to 30th June 1938 (Major K.C. Packman, Consul-General from the 30th June 1937 to the 29th June, 1938, when he handed over charge to Mr. M.C. Gillet, in L/P&S/12/2357 Chinese Tkrkestan, Sinkiang. Internal Situation, 1937-1938 (1937Rebellion). 33 Ibidem. 268 Jerzy Zdanowski in both civil departments and the army. Many of them had formerly been either Soviet agents or servants in the Soviet consulate34. Many officials were relieved of their duties, and new officers from Urumchi took up their duties in the administration. The province was divided into 5 districts: Kashgar, Karashahr, Aksu, Yarkand, and Khotan. At the Headquarters of each of these districts there was an Administrative Commissioner who was also in some cases the Military Commander35. General Qiang Yufen, the Kashgar Garrison Commander, was appointed Acting Kashgar District Administrative Commissioner on 15th January 1938 . Ma Shaowu, formerly Administrative Commissioner in Kashgar, was executed, and Khoja Niaz Haji, the former Vice-Chairman, was also “liquidated”36. Although seemingly normal, the conditions in Kashgar were rather bad. There was a sharp division between officials in the Old and New Cities. The real authority in South Sinkiang was concentrated in the hands of General Qiang Yufen, formerly Chief-of Staff to general Liu Bin, with a certain amount in the hands of Qadir Haji, Chief of the Old City Police. These two were pursuing a course of vindictive terrorism in their efforts to ensure that there would be no recurrence of rebellion in these parts of the region. The civil authorities did not agree with this policy but, owing to the fact that the only method of rapid communication with Urumchi was through the wireless station in the New City, they were powerless to change it37. About 18,000 men including around 3,000 leading traders were arrested between Khotan and Kashgar after the Provincial Government re-established its control over those areas. The Provincial Government proclaimed that no Chinese subject was allowed to apply for a passport to India. All Chinese subjects who returned from India to Sinkiang were reported to be taken into custody at Tashkurghan, and then sent to Kashgar under escort. A large number of Russian troops with large quantities of ammunition were brought to Urumchi from Ili side. Around 17,000 men between from 16 to 28 years of age were enrolled in the Ili area and were trained by Russian officers. In January 1938, a party of 34 P.Z. 2334/1938 “Extract from Weekly Summary Intelligence no. 10”，Peshawar, the 7th March 1938, in L/P&S/12/2357 Chinese Tkrkestan, Sinkiang. Internal Situation, 1937-1938 (1937Rebellion). 35 “From Captain J. Pope-Hennesy, War Office to India Office, White Hall”, 14 September, 1943 in L/P&S/12/2392 Chinese Tkrkestan. Sinkiang. Who’s Who in Sinkiang. 36 “Letter from His Britannic Majesty’s Consul General, Kashgar, no. F.3-C/38”, 10th February 1938, in L/P&S/12/2357 Chinese Turkestan, Sinkiang. Internal Situation, 1937-1938 (1937Rebellion). 37 “Consulate General, Kashgar, to India Office”，20th November, 1937, in L/P&S/12/2357 Chinese Turkestan, Sinkiang. Internal Situation, 1937-1938 (1937Rebellion). The 1933 and 1937 Rebellions in Sinkiang 269 Kirghiz troops, some from Russia, arrived at Tashkurghan to help Chinese officials to suppress certain Tungans who were said to have been committing offences in Sarikol38. Russian propaganda was gaining ground rapidly. A large number of schools were opened in the Khotan-Kashgar-Aksu area. Education was compulsory for young men between 18 and 28. One hour of military instruction was included in the daily timetable39. There was no sign of any improvement in the situation of British subjects throughout the region. They were all left without local servants, no one was allowed to trade with them, and they were refused travel permits. Heavy import duties were imposed on foreign goods. As much as 86 per cent tax was charged on British goods sent from India, and 163 per cent on Japanese goods. The British Consul at Kashgar reported that, as a part of an explicit policy of the local authorities, whose unfriendly attitude was commonly attributed to their suspicions that Tungans had been encouraged by Government of India, there was a recrudescence of police persecution against British subjects and the Consulate General40. The number of troops in the Kashgar-Yarkand-Khotan was steadily increasing. The troops were mostly Russian and Kirghiz. There was a considerable concentration of military aeroplanes and a number of anti-craft guns in the area. Some troops were stationed along the Urumchi road, which was regularly patrolled by aeroplanes. The distribution of troops was as follows: Yengisar: 500, Yarkand: between 1,000 and 1,200, Karghalik: 2,500, Kukyal: 800, Khotan: between 3,000 and 4,000, and Keria: 2,000 (including 500 Chinese). The Russians started to construct a railway line from Bashi to Kashgar via Artish, and around 6,000 labourers, most of whom were inhabitants of Sinkiang, were employed on this project41. Provincial troops were stationed throughout the whole region was as follows: Uch Turfan: 2 officers and 200 soldiers, Aksu New City: a few officers and 400 soldiers, Aksu Old City: a few officers and 800 men, Maralbashi: 50 38 P.Z. 1031/1938 Extract from Weekly Summary Intelligence”, no. 3, Peshawar, the 17th January 1938，in L/P&S/12/2357 Chinese Thrkestan，Sinkiang. Internal Situation, 1937-1938 (1937Rebellion). 39 P.Z. 1725/1938 “Extract from Weekly Summary Intelligence”, no. 7, Peshawar, 14th March 1938, in L/P&S/12/2357 Chinese Turkestan, Sinkiang. Internal Situation, 1937-1938 (1937Rebellion). 40 P.Z. 2776/1938 “Extract from Weekly Summary Intelligence no. 11”, Peshawar, 14th March 1938, and “Sir A. Clark Kerr, Shanghai, to India Office”, March 1938 (no day), in L/P&S/12/2357 Chinese Turkestan, Sinkiang. Internal Situation, 1937-1938 (1937 Rebellion). 41 Ibidem. 270 Jerzy Zdanowski officers and 400 soldiers, Faizabad: a few officers and 400 soldiers, Kashgar New City: 50 officers and 1,000 soldiers, and Kashgar Old City: 20 officers and 400 soldiers. Many soldiers were Kirghiz and Uzbeks trained in Karakol and Osh, and were said to be Russian subjects and communists. All the Russians all called themselves Tartars42. Conclusions Throughout the period, the Chinese Central Government was unable to control the province and it was the Provincial Government who tried to secure the Chinese influence in the region. The rebellions of 1933 and 1937 began with Turkis mutinies, and were provoked by a range of factors: series of ill-considered reforms, some of which appeared to be aimed directly against the Muslim religion; the unfortunate posting of certain officials; discontent of the Kashgar populace caused by the ostensible employment of Kirghiz in police force, yet with power extending over many branches of administration. Finally, an important reason of the rebellion of 1937 was the desire of the Tungans to expand and extend their influence in Sinkiang, while the Tungans presented the most serious danger for the Chinese authorities. They were well-armed and their rebellion affected the whole South Sinkiang from Maralbashi through Kashgar to Cherchen. Chinese authorities secured the influence in Sinkiang in the course of dramatic developments, and thanks to disagreements between the Turkis and the Tungans. The rebellions resulted in the breaking of the Tungan political and military force in the Province. The British position in Sinkiang, largely acquired accidentally as a result of the Russian revolution, was seriously undermined when the Provincial Government was constituted. The final blow to the British position and prestige in Sinkiang was the virulent anti-British boycott commenced in the winter of 1937-1938 instigated by the Provincial Government who have reasserted their authority throughout the province. Another result of the rebellions was a considerable increase in Russian influence throughout the Province, and particularly in Kashgar. 42 P.Z. 1725/1938 “Extract from Weekly Summary Intelligence no. 7”, Peshawar, 14th March 1938, in L/P&S/12/2357 Chinese Turkestan, Sinkiang. Internal Situation, 1937-1938 (1937Rebellion). ADINA ZEMANEK Confucianism, Communism and Liberal Democratic Values in China. Continuity and Change During the last few decades, China has undergone tremendous transformations, which have been closely followed by the West with hope and anxiety. With hope, because after more than two decades of totalitarianism since the establishment of the PRC, the coming to power of Deng Xiaoping started an era of reforms meant to lead China onto a path of quick development and great opening to the West it had previously avoided. With anxiety, because Western expectations toward the process of reforms initiated in the late 1970s seem to have been thwarted. Not only has China failed to join the ranks of democratic countries, but the significant year 1989, which in Europe marked the disintegration of Communism marked a turn in the opposite direction in China. Nowadays, in spite of more and more visible signs of a CCP legitimisation crisis, the Chinese official discourse maintains the country’s image as a bastion of Communism. The favourite subject for speculation nowadays in academic and press circles is whether China will or will not head toward liberal democracy. In analysing China’s present-day situation, three forces should be accounted for. One of them is the traditional cultural heritage which can be referred to broadly as Confucian. The second is the Communist heritage continuing since mid-20th century. The third is the Western democratic community that, since the 1990s, has been exerting pressure on China to liberalise and to improve its human rights record. Given China’s ambitions to become a world power, the state cannot just ignore this pressure. On the other hand, given its century-long feeling of cultural superiority to other countries and its emphasis of self-sufficiency, China cannot simply give in. This is why China has chosen the middle way: while many democratic values have entered the official discourse, which may seem a step forward on the road to liberalisation, a closer look discloses the fact that the way China understands these values is quite different from what we are familiar with in the West. On the whole, it seems that China is unable to come to terms both with its past and with its present. It has retained many elements of the Confucian tradition, although not always consciously and may not always be willing 274 Adina Zemanek to acknowledge it openly. After decades of denial before and after the establishment of the PRC, tradition has gone back to favour. However, nowadays it is not used as an individual path leading to a world consensus, but rather as a path which leads away from it. Moreover, China has proved unable to close a final door upon its Maoist legacy. With one hand, it stubbornly clings to an ideology which has become empty talk, and with the other, to its program of economic reform. With a rapidly changing society, more and more difficult to control, under the circumstances of quickly progressing globalisation which brings democratic values closer to its citizens (by the growing popularity of the Internet, for instance), and with the CCP legitimisation crisis, the Chinese government seems to be walking on thin ice. The present paper discusses China’s political situation since the 1980s, first by pointing out those elements of the Confucian tradition which have been preserved until today and then by describing the way they have been adapted under the influence of Communist elements. It also analyses China’s own specific approaches to such burning topics as democracy, liberty, and human rights. The Confucian tradition Under the Han dynasty (206 BC - AD 220), Confucianism, which at that time had already had a considerable tradition, was adopted as official ideology. The thought of Confucius (551-479 BC) was developed by Meng Ke (ca. 371-289 BC), author of the book Mengzi, and Xun Qing/Kuang (ca. 310-230 BC), in his book calledXunzi. Feng Youlan1 respectively calls the two authors representatives of the idealistic and realistic wings of Confucianism. The “final touch” to Confucianism as Han orthodox ideology was added by Dong Zhongshu, who worked out a cosmological and a political theory, based on the idea of the harmony between Heaven and man, guaranteed by the ruler invested with the Heaven’s mandate (天命 tian ming). To the development of Confucian thought and political philosophy later thinkers made their own contributions as well, such as the neo-Confucianist Zhu Xi (1130-1200)2. The Chinese empire was ruled according to Confucian principles for most of its long history thereafter, until its fall in 1911. Many of these principles, attitudes, and values are still alive in present-day China and underlie people’s lives in general and political life in particular. 1 Feng 1966: 68. 2 For further details on the historical development of Confucianism see Feng 1966. Confucianism, Communism and Liberal Democratic Values in China. Continuity and Change 275 Before going on to the Confucian tradition proper, one key feature of the Chinese culture should be mentioned. During the Spring and Autumn period (770-476 BC) of the Zhou dynasty (ca. 1066-221 BC), a concept that was to become a fundamental component of Chinese national identity originated. The concept has to a very high degree determined Chinese foreign policy and continues to play an important role in the way the Chinese think about themselves and distinguish themselves from the external “barbarians”. As early as in the aforementioned period, a group of states emerged calling themselves the “Middle Kingdoms” (中国 Zhongguo: the name was preserved, and now designates China) and saw themselves as an isle of most refined civilisation surrounded by more or less barbarian tribes or state-like formations. Considering these states’ historical and geographical situation, it is no wonder that such a concept came into being, as the Chinese civilisation was indeed by far the most advanced in that part of the world. Yet, the concept outlived and outgrew the context of its formation. In imperial China, when civilisation had come to mean adherence to Confucian principles, it provided legitimisation for China’s political and cultural domination. It lay at the basis of the state policy of “peace and colligation” and the tribute system initiated during the Han dynasty. Instead of armed fight, early Han emperors preferred to win over “barbarians” by offering them generous gifts and Chinese princesses as wives, entrusted with the honourable mission of propagating their own culture among barbarians. This policy was continued within the tribute system: the Chinese state granted other states or tribes the status of vassals. The duties of vassals included acknowledging Chinese suzerainty, sending princes to the imperial capital, where they received Confucian education, and sending missions with tribute to the throne, which usually came back with even more valuable gifts. In this way, the Chinese state strengthened its belief that it was culturally superior and that its reign indeed extended over “all under heaven” (天下 tiamia、. The “barbarians”, on the other hand, paid lip service at the Chinese court and gained more merchandise than they could have obtained by sending trade missions, as the Chinese state was never favourable to trade. It is essential to see that the most important criterion in distinguishing between “civilised” and “barbarian” was of cultural nature: one was civilised to the extent one adopted the Chinese way of life, that is, the mainstream Confucian values. The concept of the Chinese state as “all under heaven” was shattered in the confrontation with European powers at the end of the 19th century, which culminated in the opium wars, and left China with a deep feeling of humiliation she has not overcome until the present day. The Chinese empire was an authoritarian state grounded on morals. The emperor was “son of Heaven” (天子 tian zi), an impersonal force that guaranteed 276 Adina Zemanek natural order and granted the so-called “heavenly mandate”,天命 tian ming, on the basis of which the emperor was to reign. Although throughout Chinese history dynasty changes were surrounded by an aura of legitimating myths concerning the heavenly signs that accompanied them and pointing at the dynasty founders as the rightful successors, the emperor was not regarded as an embodiment of the divine. His authority was not religious; ideally, the basis for its maintenance was to be neither legal nor physical coercion; it was ensured by outstanding moral virtues of which the ruler was the supreme example and model to be followed. The Confucian idea of authority held the ruler to be the guarantor of order and harmony both in the natural and the human world, modelled after the legendary emperors of the past, who regulated natural phenomena and social relations by means of the virtue they emanated. His moral virtue granted him absolute power over the whole of the known world (the above-mentioned “all under heaven”); he could decide over issues related to the life and death of his subjects. By the efficiency of his virtue, the ruler regulated above all the work of the scholar-officials who surrounded him and constituted the ruling class, organised under the form of the imperial bureaucratic system in charge of the practical affairs of the empire. Their position and indeed their life depended on the good will of the emperor, which alone was enough to deprive them of both; his decisions were sanctioned by general acceptance, as there were no laws or court of appeals to protect the rights of individual human beings. There were, however, certain factors that set limits to the power of the emperor. One of them is the fact that Chinese scholar-officials were the ones who could evaluate the ruler’s rectitude and benevolence and reprimand him if they deemed his conduct wrong, by submitting respectful memorials to the throne, though often at the risk of their own lives. Another was the theory of the above-mentioned “heavenly mandate”. There was, of course, no popular vote that could decide on who was worthiest of all and choose him as ruler. The decision on who would receive the mandate could be made by Heaven only, by means of appropriate omens under the form of natural phenomena. The decision on what exactly were the good or bad omens, belonged, however, to imperial subjects; ever since Han times, a body of imperial astronomers, members of the ruling elite, conducted observations on celestial bodies and were in charge of the calendar. As stated above, the ruler, a human being, was responsible for natural and social harmony. Discrepancies in the harmony of nature brought about by unusual celestial and other natural phenomena did not cause adjustment or correction of scientific theory, but were interpreted as human interference, as Heaven’s warnings against the conduct of emperors3. Social chaos could be taken 3 For details see W. Eberhard 1973. Confucianism, Communism and Liberal Democratic Values in China. Continuity and Change 277 for the same kind of omen foretelling the end of the “Heaven’s mandate”. This liking for order and deep fear of disorder has been one of the most important factors that guided political practice in China. The Chinese government system was a paternalistic one. The emperor stood at the top of a well-established hierarchy modelled after the basic unit of society: the family. According to the Confucian tradition, the value of an individual was not guaranteed by his existence alone. He was seen as a social being, involved in a complex network of duties and responsibilities, in which he occupied a well-defined place that he took for granted. The essence of humanity was not defined by human nature, but was a function of social relations4. Confucian thought sanctioned the established hierarchy; it only referred to people’s moral obligations, but did not mention any rights whatsoever. Order within the empire was ensured by everyone’s fulfilling their own obligations at all levels of the social pyramid. At the core of social structure stood the five basic relations: between father and son, ruler and minister, husband and wife, elder and younger brother, and between friends; it should be noted that four of them involve hierarchy and three are family relations. Social relations were regulated by rules of proper conduct, or ritual (礼 li), applied according to rank and righteousness (义 yi), that is, the right moral qualities were to be applied according to the requirements of each particular situation. The prototypical Chinese family did not consist of husband, wife and children only, but was a larger unit, ideally made up of four generations living in the same compound under the eye of the head of the family, usually its oldest male member. It was he who decided upon important matters of the family and made important choices that involved the lives of individual family members, concerning for instance their marriages. This unit was a part of larger paradigms: it assured its historical continuity by performing the different duties associated with ancestor worship (hence the importance of male offspring), and conducted intercourse with other such units within the clan. Clans were very powerful institutions whose activities included mutual support between members and deciding upon punishment of certain crimes committed by their members. Relations between family members were regulated by the virtues of filial piety (孝 xiao) and obeisance to one’s elders, self-restraint and modesty; the father was supposed to show benevolence (慈 ci) to an obedient son. The same model of conduct applied to higher levels; the same kind of obeisance and loyalty (忠 zhong) was expected by the ruler from his subjects; in turn, he was supposed to exert humane (仁 ren) government. This meant that he, as 4 G.K. Becker, Etyczne problemy modernizacji Chin, in Tomala & Gawlikowski 2002, p. 86-87. 278 Adina Zemanek a person endowed with great moral virtues, was the representative of his subjects, the best to understand their will, and in the name of their interests was to guarantee them a decent life, the basic living needs5. This benevolent government by morality and ritual in the Confucian fashion was not founded on law. As a matter of fact, Confucianists were opposed to government by strict laws and punishments, advocated by their rival school, Legalism. Legalism became state ideology at the founding of the empire (the Qin dynasty, 221-206 BC), but did not keep this position for a long time, as the establishment of Han dynasty brought about an ideological change in favour of Confucianism, although it kept the legalist political institutions in place. However, not even with Legalism was the Chinese concept of law similar to its European (Roman) counterpart. It did not suppose the rule of law, but rather rule by law, as dictates backed up by punishments, used by the ruler, who was above the law, to control the people. Although China had a fully developed law code ever since Qin times, law in China was understood as regulating penal rather than civil matters, and that only as a last-resort measure. Many issues were regulated by clan elders and never went to court. Moreover, legal prescriptions looked more like vague instructions rather than sets of particular steps to be taken according to particular situations. Their execution was made difficult by a high degree of arbitrariness enhanced by corruption at the local level, beyond control of the central government. Although the Confucian tradition favoured government by virtue and opposed tyranny6 and emphasised the people’s consent as a key factor for successful government7, this did not imply taking into consideration what the people themselves actually had to say. The common people’s ability to understand was limited8; moreover, it was not their task to become involved with government matters. The social class that evaluated the exercise of power and whether it was or not in accordance with the fundamental objectives of society were the scholar-officials, and they did so by comparing actual situations of their times with historical records, where they would find similar situations9. Tradition thus played an enormous role in the essentially conservative Chinese culture. Nostalgia for a past “golden age” seen as the times of the legendary emperors, founders of the 5 K. Tomala, Prawa człowieka w Chińskiej Republice Ludowej, in: Tomala 2001, p. 150. 6 Both types of government were distinguished in the Mengzi as 仁政 ren zheng and 霸政 ba zheng respectively. 7 See Confucius, The Analects 8.10 and 12.7 and Mengzi 7.2 and the rest of chapter 7 - Li Lou I. 8 See for instance Confucius, The Analects 8.9. 9 Li 2000: 54. Confucianism, Communism and Liberal Democratic Values in China. Continuity and Change 279 Chinese civilisation, is present throughout ancient Chinese thought. Confucius himself laments the loss of the perfect virtue that characterised the government of the Duke of Zhou (prince regent of the third Zhou emperor, 11th century BC), and Mencius praises the times of the legendary emperors Yao and Shun. Tradition was quoted to legitimate any new ideas10. The Chinese education system and imperial examination system were instrumental in establishing tradition as fossilised orthodoxy. They were based on the Confucian classics; the number and titles listed as canonical works varied according to historical period and authority. A corpus of thirteen canonical works was established during the Tang (618-907) and was acknowledged as such by the Qing dynasty (1644-1911); all classics date back from before the Christian era. For centuries afterwards, these ancient books formed the official ideology and the basis of the education and examination systems; they were deemed to contain essential knowledge for the state system and the conduct at home and were referred to in order to legitimise situations that occurred whole centuries later. The education system emphasized moral development over intellectual: its aim was to inculcate moral values, which worked to preserve the already established hierarchy and social relations11. Learning mostly consisted of memorising classical texts while at the same time learning to write. Later on, the students interpreted those texts, under surveillance of instructors who took care that interpretation stayed within the limits of established orthodoxy. Apart from excessive reliance on received values and reproduced formulae, the traditional education system perpetuated a huge prestige of the written and officially acknowledged word. The imperial examination system had a similar function. Initiated in Han times, it was not actually introduced until the Sui (581-618) and Tang dynasties, and flourished during the Song (960-1279), Ming (1368-1644) and Qing. It consisted of several stages, from the local to the court one, and the titles obtained at the various stages entitled their holders to occupy more or less important official posts. It checked the candidates’ knowledge of the classics and their literary and calligraphic talent. Knowledge of the classics meant completing a given quotation and the ability to compose essays containing the candidate’s interpretation of one classic. Since Yuan dynasty (1271-1368), the only permitted interpretation of the classics was that of Zhu Xi’s; since the Ming, the essays were to stay within the established form of the “eight-legged essay” (八股文 baguwen); thus creativity was reduced to a minimum12. 10 This trend was initiated by Confucius, see The Analects 8.1 and 2.11. 11 Harrison 2001: 13-14. 12 For details on the examination system see Pimpaneau 2001 and Harrison 2001. 280 Adina Zemanek According to Confucian thought, one of the prerequisites of good government, of maintaining order within society, was the so-called “rectification of names” (正名 zheng ming)13. Early Chinese philosophical thought was not concerned with a representational theory of how language operates, but treated reference as a matter of historical convention, as conformity to the practice of the legendary sage kings who were language inventors as well as moral examples. The typically Chinese approach to language was pragmatic; it did not emphasize the descriptive, fact-stating role of the language, but its pragmatic role of coordinating social behaviour14. In line with this trend, Confucius proposed the concept of the “rectification of names”, which sprang from the belief in the possibility of language to express ritualised social relations15. Each “name” in language implies the essence of the category of things it refers to16, and names referring to social relations imply a whole set of responsibilities and duties that are the essence of certain social positions. The rectification of names consisted both in the adequate employment of names and in making reality suit the ideal essence implied by names17. The concept of the rectification of names was further developed in the Xunzi (chapter 22), where the political function of language is emphasised. Appropriate name usage entails good functioning of the government: it serves to maintain the proper social hierarchy, by which the communication between ruler and subjects becomes efficient, and social order is achieved. Names do not reflect reality by their innate properties, but are the product of convention, established by a historical tradition whose ultimate source were the legendary sage kings. Correct language use is determined by appeal to this tradition as interpreted by Confucian scholar-gentlemen, who by the use of names are able to express their feelings sincerely according to the rules of ritual. Regulation of the public guiding language is the task of the ruler, who is the only guardian of standard terminology. It is he who decides on the distinctions to be made (though he cannot alter the conventional value distinctions of the sage kings’ guide), the names to be used and the creation of new ones. Under menace of social instability, he should ban usage of language regulatory instruments (such as definitions, explanations, and debates) by non-authorised agents. Thus Confucian philosophy legitimates state monopoly over discourse. 13 See Analects 13:3. 14 C. Hansen, at http://www.hku.hk/philodep/ch/lang.htm. 15 Cheng 2001: 61-62. 16 Feng 1966: 41. 17 Analects 12:11. Confucianism, Communism and Liberal Democratic Values in China. Continuity and Change 281 At the end of this section on the Confucian tradition, a further useful concept should be mentioned. In an analysis of the factors that helped maintain cultural unity in China, with reference to the late imperial period (ca. 1500-1940), Watson (1995) remarks that the principal means of attaining and maintaining this unity was orthopraxy (correct practice), rather than orthodoxy (correct belief). What made one a (Han) Chinese and distinguished him from other, uncivilised peoples, was the possession of 文 wen: civilisation, learning (also see the remarks on barbarians above). To have wen meant to perform correctly certain key rituals; the correctness of performance was subject to social judgment and acknowledgement by relevant authorities. The importance of orthopraxy can be dated back to the Confucian Analects, which stress harmony in thought and action and according to which correct ideas follow from proper behaviour. The precedence of practice over belief was also obvious in the state policy toward religion. Heterodox, sectarian religions were not the object of concern of state officials, as long as beliefs were not translated into political action. Similarly, official efforts to control local cults were limited to surveillance of worship practices: as long as everyone was worshipping the approved deities in approved temples, they were free to believe anything they wished. What counted was appropriate performance of rites, and not their significance; heresy was not judged by doctrinal, but by behavioural standards. Contemporary China 20th-century China witnessed political upheaval, which had strong repercussions in the social and cultural fields. A new political order was established to wipe off traditional practices and rebuild everything anew. Although countless material traces of feudal times were indeed wiped off, numerous continuities between old and new China can nevertheless be found at a closer look. Generally speaking, many of the former political and social frameworks have been preserved, albeit filled with different contents. By saying this, I do not mean to argue that today’s China is indeed Confucian, or that after a temporary Communist shock the Chinese civilisation is coming back to its old course. My point is rather that China’s Communist transformation, painful as it was during the first decades of the People’s Republic and especially during the Cultural Revolution, took place not by uprooting, but by reinforcing certain key traditional elements. The China of our days testifies to its Confucian heritage just as Europe testifies to its Christian one. I mean to indicate such points of continuity, fully aware that it is difficult to trace the exact source of today’s ideas and practices. Nor am I making a point that it was the Confucian 282 Adina Zemanek tradition that kept the Chinese from developing liberal democracy: Taiwan is a living example of the contrary. China’s road to or away from liberalisation has been rather a matter of certain elements of this tradition, combined with or reinforced by Communism and, above all, conscious political decisions. As T. Heberer points out18, China traced its own, specific path toward modernisation and development, of which it is perfectly (and loudly!) aware. The activity of the Communist Party since its founding in 1921 until the establishment of the PRC in 1949 was conducted outside direct influence from the USSR, and even against Soviet will - the Soviet Union rather favoured its opponent, the Kuomintang. However, what China knew of Communist ideology was imported from the Soviet Union: Marxism in its version filtered by Lenin and Stalin19. China’s great Communist theoretician was Mao Zedong; the Chinese official version of Communist ideology known as Mao Zedong Thought was proclaimed as such in 1945, and took up its place in the Marxist theoretical canon alongside Marxism-Leninism. At the moment of its founding, China had its own national government and (what it perceived as) its own ideology. This made up for the great humiliations of the late 19th and early 20th centuries and allowed it to restore national pride. The Communists established a regime which until the end of the Cultural Revolution (late 1970s) had the characteristics of totalitarianism: politicisation of all aspects of life, construction and mass propagation of a highly mythologised life view which constituted the only acceptable line of conduct and contained references to the infallibility of the party, its ideology, its leader who was the object of a personality cult, the construction of a new man (which implied strong collectivism and denial of any individual rights and interests) and a new society, as well as to ubiquitous class and other kinds of enemies against whom numerous campaigns were directed. Compliance to this life view was ensured by means of institutionalised terror20. The party was the only judge of what was right and what was wrong: a progressive elite with unquestioned leadership over the masses, who perfectly understood their needs and helped them develop political consciousness and attain political maturity. The end of the Cultural Revolution was also the end of hard-core totalitarianism; hitherto China stepped upon the path of strong authoritarianism, inaugurated by the opening and economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping during the 1980s. Significantly departing from Mao Zedong Thought, Deng insisted 18 Pomiędzy kryzysem a szansą; nowe społeczne w^:^^wan^a ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem wiejskich Chin, Tomala 2001: 70-71. 19 For details on Marxism in China see Ladany 1988. 20 See Choinicka and Kozub-Ciembroniewicz 2000: 333. Confucianism, Communism and Liberal Democratic Values in China. Continuity and Change 283 that economic development was to become the centre of party work. His plan brought about phenomena unheard of before: enormous economic growth and development, the rise of a consumer society, as well as the recognition of limits to state control translated into the extensive depoliticisation of social and cultural life. However, it also had undesirable consequences that may eventually affect stability and undermine the Party’s efforts to maintain unquestioned rule. On the whole, it seems that the reform process has got out of control. Its negative consequences - the great disparity between rich and poor, city and countryside; the weakening of interest in ideology and the moral void experienced by the Chinese society, especially the younger generations; the all-pervasive cult of material goods have made it visible that the CCP has lost its very raison d’être - its socialist goals and its role of the vanguard of the proletariat in favour of economic growth. The discrepancies between the Party’s words and its action, its inability to provide a nation-unifying ideology are all the more evident. The strategy adopted by the government during the last few years in order to cope with the legitimisation crisis consists in blowing up national pride as a means to gather the nation together again. The people’s anxiety and discontent caused by the contradictions that have occurred in the modernisation process are channelled upon the fight to safeguard national dignity and traditional values in face of foreign, especially Western, influence and alleged meddling with Chinese affairs by some evil, subversive Western forces. The anti-Japanese outbreak of protests in several Chinese cities in April this year, motivated by Japan’s issuing of new history textbooks that whitewashed Japanese atrocities committed in China in the 1930s and 1940s, and the disputes concerning the islands in the East China Sea, tolerated by the otherwise quick-to-react Chinese government, is a proof of the scale of nationalist feelings in today’s China and warns against the possible dangers of the strong nationalist drive. K. Misra (1998) signals the paradox that underlies Chinese authoritarianism: while authoritarian regimes are usually based on mass legitimacy, this element is lacking in today’s China; legitimacy of the regime declines in a period when its performance, which brought about economic growth and an increase in living standards, has actually surpassed expectations. Misra motivates the legitimacy crisis by the regime’s failure in developing a theoretically consistent ideological basis that would justify the dramatic change of course in its policies, which are neither consistent nor coherent. She sees the fundamental weakness of ideological reorientation in the inability to set aside the Maoist legacy satisfactorily and conclusively. China’s Communist regime has been unable to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by the leadership and goal succession after Mao’s 284 Adina Zemanek death, when revolution had been won, political and class enemies had been eliminated, and economic development was perceived as a pressing necessity. Dickson (1999) analyses the circumstances surrounding the adaptation of the CCP to environment changes, where adaptation is understood as a movement of transition away from totalitarianism towards (liberal) democracy. As in the case of each complex organisation, there are factors that favour the CCP’s organisational inertia. First, the failure to understand that its initial structure, which was efficient for the revolutionary transformation, may not be so efficient when it comes to economic or cultural development. Secondly, the CCP’s strong ideology and interests contrary to reform. Finally, the lack of competition and the potential immediate risks and losses accompanying reform, which outweigh long-term benefits. Dickson states that the adaptability of Leninist parties such as the CCP is determined by choices made by elites under pressure from the environment. In adapting to changes in the environment, the elites may choose to ignore the changes, to alter the environment or to adapt to it. Adaptation may lead to greater efficiency, when organisational reforms are undertaken to correspond to the changed goals of the party. It may also lead a step further, to greater responsiveness to external pressures, in which the party is changed by the environment. Although the post-Mao period was favourable to reform, the reforms conducted by Deng were limited to the efficiency kind of adaptation, and the CCP responded to recurring instances of internal pressure in the shape of demands for liberalisation mostly by altering the environment by means of propaganda and repression. The Party lacks elected representatives and thus any institutionalised mechanism of feedback on its performance. The elites have not reached a consensus on the necessity of political reform and lack sufficient motivation for complying with social demands that contradict the Party’s and their own interests. It is true that the regime undertook certain adaptive moves. It has institutionalised the policy process: more rigorous methods for analysing policy choices were introduced by increasing professionalism and the quality of data on the basis of which decisions are made, by introducing feasibility studies, and so on; vertical and horizontal communication within the bureaucracy was improved and the decision-making process was decentralised. The party and state bureaucracy were reorganised in order to increase efficiency in economic work. Village elections for various local officials were introduced in 1987 in many areas. On the other hand, however, public demands for more democracy met with persecution of protestors, rejection of both form and content of demands and the Party’s retreat from the policies that made those protests possible. This was the fate of the Democracy Wall movement of 1978-1979: when the movement reached the stage of criticising Deng Xiaoping’s abuse of power Confucianism, Communism and Liberal Democratic Values in China. Continuity and Change 285 and questioning the CCP legitimacy, the government reacted by imprisoning participants, suggesting that those who demanded democracy actually meant to sow the seeds of chaos, and by deleting from the Constitution the people’s right to write the so-called “big-character posters”, which since Maoist times were a form of political protest. The early 1980s discussion on alienation in China’s socialist society, centred on Wang Ruoshui, was denounced by the government, the all-powerful discursive authority, as “spiritual pollution”. A campaign was initiated to fight the concept of alienation and other instances of bourgeois liberalisation such as the degenerate Western ideas of modernism, individualism etc. and to bring back ideological orthodoxy. The 1987 campaign against “bourgeois liberalisation”, several purges and the ban on the famous TV series River Elegy put an end to the discussions on Liu Binyan’s “second kind of loyalty” (loyalty to the country, society, and party as distinguished from loyalty to the party leadership)21 and the “culture fever” movement that criticised traditional Chinese culture and national character seen as the roots of China’s problems22. Repression was especially severe during the Tiananmen incident of June 1989. The government repression of the Falungong movement since 1999 is only the most recent event in this whole series. Resistance to change and clinging to a seemingly outdated moral rhetoric can also be explained by the fact that in China the essentially moral character of the regime so deeply rooted in tradition has survived imperial times. The Chinese moral regime is characterised by Shih23 as one in which leaders are perceived as moral beings possessing limitless power. They have monopoly over moral rhetoric and are supposed to know what is good and just for society, so any request they make in the name of the state is necessarily legitimate. As fear of moral chaos and lack of toleration for nonconformity and pluralism are deeply imprinted in the Chinese psychoculture, citizens are supposed to obey the leaders’ wishes. Defying them would prove lack of morality, as being told what is morally right but not complying is perceived a sin. The power of the regime is based on the integrity of moral pretension; this is why rhetoric is very significant in expressing the moral character of the regime, apart from ritualistic, dramatic actions. Although the moral regime has shown enough flexibility and ability of realistic adjustment to be able to prevail throughout most of Chinese 21 The distinction between the loyalty to the country and the state as opposed to the loyalty towards the ruler was conceived in 17th century England and became a standard in Western countries since then. In China it has yet to be accepted. 22 For details on intellectual movements during the Deng era, see Goldman, Link & Su: 1995. 23 1993: 31. 286 Adina Zemanek history, it has done so while at the same time paying rhetorical respect to moral pretension. Here the Chinese notion of face is at work. One’s identity is acquired by enacting a certain role that is confirmed by other members of society; therefore, one should act in such a way that would suit his status within the social hierarchy, otherwise he would be denied recognition of his identity. Hence the need to maintain and save face in crisis situations. The desire to achieve moral order, to monopolize moral judgment, to receive rhetorical respect from others and to engage in rhetorical confrontation in order to counter perceived threats have led Chinese politics to consolidate by means of moral rhetoric a fictitious political system whose sole end is protecting the regime’s moral integrity. When discussing China’s approach to democracy, liberty, and human rights, what stands out most is the issue of the relativity of values. As C. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca (2000) pointed out, the possibility to attain consensus grows with the degree of generality of the values invoked. A closer look, however, is prone to reveal the superficiality of the basis for consensus, as each side of the debate may have different notions in mind while calling them by the same name. Many Western researchers have reflected whether it is justified to discuss the presence or absence of democracy, liberty or human rights in China by applying their Western standards to Chinese realities. China, who still sees herself as the paragon of civilisation and emphasises its independence and selfsufficiency, echoes and amplifies this argument while opposing Western cultural imperialism. Thus in the absence of a universally recognised, precise definition of what true democracy actually is, no one may contest China’s righteousness in proclaiming its adherence to democratic principles. What Deng Xiaoping proposed was “socialist democracy”. He meant it as a means to soothe China’s ails in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution -to make sure that such nightmares as the past revolution would never happen again, to fulfil the “greater interests” of the Chinese people, to repair the shattered legitimisation of Communist Party rule, to establish China as a world power and to solve the problem of corruption. Baogang He (1996) takes over D. Held’s concept of models of democracy and the existence of three such models in the West: direct or participatory, representative/liberal, and Marxist one-party democracy. He applies these concepts to China, where he identifies a populist or mass democracy model, a liberal model of democracy, and paternalistic democracy respectively24. He sees Deng’s “socialist democracy” as the embodiment of the latter, and terms it “a combination of democracy 24 He 1996: 7-8. 25 He 1996: 8. Confucianism, Communism and Liberal Democratic Values in China. Continuity and Change 287 without liberalism with Chinese traditional paternalism”25. It is a kind of democracy bestowed to the people from above by a regime that sought to combine formal elements of Western democracy used pragmatically, as means rather than end, with centralism and authority, characterised by collectivism and limitations on individual liberty. Paternalism as a key feature of Chinese politics was defined by L. Pye26 as the concern with unity, stability and holding together the national community as well as a demand for conformity within the community: everyone should be willing to make sacrifices for the collective good. In political terms, the demands for unity and conformity are translated into unquestioning patriotism. Far from implying political liberalisation, Deng Xiaoping’s concept of socialist democracy strongly emphasises the leadership and guiding role of the Party. Deng made it clear that in the process of reforms the old ideological framework was still valid - in March 1979 he introduced the Four Basic Principles as prerequisites for China’s modernisation, which were later included in the preamble to the Constitution ratified in 1982: upholding the socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat (changed in 1982 to “people’s democratic dictatorship”), the leadership of the Communist Party and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. Deng thus emphasised that it was the Party who stood behind the reform process and controlled it in order to safeguard unity and stability within the country as well as the well being of the people as a whole. The role of the Party was restated later by Jiang Zemin in his theory of the “Three Represents” included in the Constitution in March 2003: the Party was to represent the requirements in the development of advanced socialist productive forces in China, the orientation of advanced Chinese culture, and the fundamental interests of the broadest masses of the Chinese people27. In the context of the ideological crisis of nowadays’ China, Jiang’s “Three Represents” are but an attempt at replacing ideology with loyalty to the Party. The constant need to reformulate already existing concepts and to provide legitimisation for new theories by referring back to the ideological canon brings to mind the Confucian tradition of emulating the way of the ancients and quoting Confucian classics - the practice has remained the same, although its object has changed. A further element of tradition is to be noticed in the field of law. Since 1997, efforts have been made in order to implement the so-called “government on the basis of law”（依法治国 y/ fa zhi guo; this formula was added to the CCP 26 Quoted by He 1996: 41. 27 Jiang’s principle of the “Three Represents” has been the object of mass media campaigns ever since June 2003. 288 Adina Zemanek program in 1997 and to the Constitution in 1999), meant to transform China into a “socialist law-abiding state”. One of the main goals of increasing the efficiency of the state legal apparatus is fighting corruption, China’s Achilles’ heel ever since imperial times. Nevertheless, these efforts overlook the necessity to limit power at the highest level. The legal reforms are not aimed at limiting government itself by means of civil rights, but at establishing and strengthening public rules and limiting officials’ arbitrary behaviour28. This may be read either as a Communist feature, given the little concern with law of totalitarian Communist regimes (such as that of Stalinist Russia or Maoist China), but also as a Confucian one, given the Confucian assumption that the government regulates itself by self-discipline inculcated by moral education, rather than being regulated through institutions of external control. Moreover, as in today’s China the century-old pursuit of unity and stability, and deep fear of social chaos is still present, the state still holds the right to intervene in the life of individuals in the name of collective interests. It does so, for instance, by implementing the one-child policy, in which the interests of individual members of the population are restricted to benefit the population as a whole. Such practices illustrate the Chinese view of liberty, as well as the characteristic traits of the Chinese paternalistic democracy: collectivism and limitations on political freedom. The Chinese government acknowledges individual interests, rights and freedom only as long as they do not encroach upon what it calls the “greater interests” of the people, values deemed more important than freedom, among which are national interests: national independence, state security, or the above-mentioned stability and unity. Those collective interests in the name of which conformity and sacrifice of individual interests and rights are demanded are stated by enlightened state elites. These elites hold it to be their duty to guide people in their achievement and enjoyment of the positive consequences of reforms while helping them avoid negative ones. There are, however, no established or functional social mechanisms that would ensure that the elites’ decisions do indeed represent and aggregate the interests of the majority of actual individuals. Freedom of speech is limited; the media are under strict governmental control, from newspapers to the Internet. Political information is conveyed only by officially acknowledged sources, and there is no place in the public discourse for voices that speak against the correct ideological line. Communication that passes through such a bottleneck is essentially one-sided; therefore the political discourse is hardly flexible and the massive political campaigns initiated by the government are 28 He 1996: 42. Confucianism, Communism and Liberal Democratic Values in China. Continuity and Change 289 little in keeping with the prevalent social moods. The lack of enthusiasm for thorough political reforms is also obvious in the discussions concerning human rights. The Chinese government did acknowledge in the 1990s the universality of human rights, but it has always emphasised that the way they are applied should be judged with the particular cultural situation of each country taken into consideration. They have also emphasised that China as a sovereign state intends to deal with human rights in its own way, on the basis of its own millennium-long cultural tradition; the Confucian tradition was chosen as an ally in its approach of this issue29. As mentioned before, given its social approach to the concept of man, Confucianism does not mention individual rights, but only duties and hierarchy within family and society. The duty of the ruler, who governs according to moral principles, is to ensure social stability and harmony by guaranteeing his subjects fulfilment of their basic life needs. Thus the Chinese government regards human rights as subject to state jurisdiction exclusively and claims that sovereign state authority should be the basis for their provision. The three white books on the situation of human rights in China (of which the latest was issued in 2000) depict human rights as social rather than individual and state that, given China’s status as a developing country, the right to live (that is, fulfilment of basic life needs) and development should be considered above all, as the basis for enjoyment of any other rights. From among other rights, the freedom of religious belief, the ethnic minorities’ autonomy and family planning were also mentioned. Given China’s large population and its present historical context, political rights are subservient to the right to life and development. Individual freedom is inviolable only as long as the citizens do not encroach upon state interests (which means they involve in counterrevolutionary activities that include supporting territorial division, subverting state authority, instigating armed revolts, etc.30). The Chinese government is still to a great extent an all-powerful authority that regulates public language. As Wang (2001) argues, the depoliticisation of social and cultural life does not mean that the state has entirely given up its control over popular culture in favour of market determinism. On the contrary, it is conscious of the importance of culture as the mainstay of the socialist platform and therefore still sets the agenda of popular culture. To this purpose, since the 1990s the Chinese state has been busy formulating a new common sense to suit its own concept of a new Chinese citizen, in which the key points are “culture”, “civilisation” and “leisure”, the main ingredients of a new way of 29 See G.H. Becker, Wypełnianie moralnej pustki. Konfucjanizm a kwestie e^c^ne modernizacji Chin, in Tomala, 2001: 114-130. 30 See K. Tomala, Prawa człowieka w Chińskiej Republice Ludowej, in: Tomala, 2001: 155. 290 Adina Zemanek life. It has been doing so by promoting in the media new discursive categories -slogans such as “consumerism”, “commercial ethics”, “legalising economy” or the 1996 campaign for the “double leisure day” as a result of introducing the 40-hour working week in May 1995. The government had twofold motivation for so doing. On the one hand, while naming and administering leisure consumption, the state also controls production by stimulating consumer demand. On the other hand, by controlling social discourse so inconspicuously that the presence of state and ideology is dissolving into commercial culture, the Chinese government shifts the people’s attention away from civil and political rights and toward social rights. The former are substituted with concepts such as opportunity, equal rights for common enjoyment, the citizens’ entitlement to leisure and authentic brand names granted by their consumer rights, and so on. This shows that Western hopes that the Chinese state will give in to its enemy, the capital, are not entirely justified. Not all the means employed by the Chinese state to counter the evil aspects of rampant consumerism and commercialism and the potential influence of liberal ideas have been so subtle as those described above. The government has retained a bastion for propagating official ideology in the shape of the education system. The moral concern of the Chinese education system has remained unchanged since imperial times; however, it is socialist ethics that has taken the place of Confucian ethics. This concern makes the Chinese education system stand in stark contrast with education in Western liberal democracies, whose task it is to prepare citizens for active participation in democratic procedures. Education has been perceived as instrumental in building the new socialist country ever since the establishment of the Communist regime. In the post-Mao era, the moral and political character of education remained unchanged; the need for accompanying the efforts for modernising the country with efforts for inculcating to the citizens Communist ideals and virtues since childhood was emphasised by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. The 1985 reform of education did not change anything in this respect either. The so-called “shaping moral character and thought” (思想品德教育 sixiangpinde jiaoyu) which emphasises patriotism and civilised behaviour is included in the elementary school curriculum, and is continued throughout secondary education with emphasis on politics and ideology31. The task of such moral education is developing in individuals a spirit of compliance with the state’s demands, which implies sacrificing oneself for the benefit of the community, and of patriotism, actually politicised nationalism, where the nation is identified with the CCP as the leading patriotic force of the country. The “five loves” which according to the Constitution should be 31 G.K. Becker, Etyczne problemy modernizacji Chin, in Tomala, Gawlikowski, 2002: 69-70. Confucianism, Communism and Liberal Democratic Values in China. Continuity and Change 291 inculcated to elementary and secondary school students are: love for the country, love for the people, love for work, love for science, and love for social property32. Formal socialist spiritual education is reinforced by numerous campaigns in support of spiritual civilisation33. The above considerations may have created a rather grim view of contemporary China. As a matter of fact, however, China is much less politically correct in practice than it is in theory. Neither is the policy-making apparatus a homogeneous body, nor do policies and campaigns have a direct impact, and if they do have impact, it is often out of tune with the initial intentions. There are many decision centres and interests at the local level which may cause that the central input becomes corrupted at the output - the saying “上有政策，下有对策，， (shangyou zhengce, xia you duice - there are policies above and counter-policies below) is famous. Social and cultural life is indeed to a great extent depoliticised, and the media, although under government control, do convey a certain amount of critical opinions at the local level. It is becoming more and more difficult for the government to rein in the unleashed forces of modern technology and a less and less unified society. Although, for instance, the Internet is heavily censored, no means for doing so are infallible, and Internet users are always one step ahead of censors. Moreover, China’s state regulations are often rather rhetorical than consequential. After several decades of orthodoxy in Maoist China, the primacy of correct behaviour over correct belief is back in its place. A great deal of unorthodox belief and behaviour is tolerated as long as they do not touch sensitive points, causing violent response from state authorities. Final remarks Given the considerations above, it does not seem likely that the Chinese government will undertake thorough political reform in the near future. In spite of certain tentative steps that have been made toward liberalisation and of the emphasis on orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy, elements from both the Confucian and the Communist legacy remain influential, to the detriment of liberal democratic values. Political moves are made by constantly referring to China’s Marxist canon, by reformulating rather than by inventing. The Chinese government still retains the right to act as the people’s consciousness, by articulating their needs and supreme values. It is still the only authority entitled 32 G.K. Becker, ibidem: 68. 33 For the Internet campaign, see the official site dedicated to socialist spiritual civilisation: www.godpp.gov.cn. 292 Adina Zemanek to shape public discourse. The people are not regarded as individual entities, but are seen in a complex network of social responsibilities that legitimate state intervention and confinement of individual liberties for the benefit of society as a whole. State interference with individual lives is not done on the basis of a well-established legal corpus binding for all members of society; the government itself remains to a great extent above the law, according to the century-long Confucian tradition of moral rule. Moreover, certain elements essential for the exercise of democracy are absent in China. Freedom of press and of expression is seriously limited, and it is orthodox ideology that is inculcated throughout the education system. Although China has introduced concepts such as democracy, freedom, and human rights in its official discourse in order to comply with Western demands, such compliance is only superficial. At a closer look, it turns out that what China understands by these concepts is radically different from what the West does. In accordance with the most recent tendencies toward emphasising China’s sovereignty and national values while rejecting any external interference, the government claims the right to interpret these concepts in a way that would best suit Chinese circumstances and the Chinese cultural traditions. References Cheng A., Istoria gîndirii chineze (History of Chinese Thought), transl. by F. Vi§an, V. Vi§an, Ia§i: Polirom, 2001. Chojnicka K., Kozub-Ciembroniewicz W. (ed.), 2000 - Doktryny polityczne XIX i XX wieku, Kraków 2000. Confucius, Analecte (The Analects), transl. and notes by F. Vi§an, Bucure§ti: Humanitas, 1995. Dickson B.J., 1999 - Leninist Adaptability in China and Taiwan, in: Winckler E.A. (ed.) - Transition from Communism in China. Institutional and Comparative Analyses. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, pp. 49-77. Eberhard W., The Political Function of Astronomy and Astronomers in Han China, in J.K. Fairbank (ed.), Chinese Thought and Institutions, The University of Chicago Press, 1973, pp. 33-70. Fung Yu-lan (Feng Youlan), A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, New York 1966. Goldman M., Link P., Su Wei, China’s Intellectuals in the Deng Era: Loss of Identity within the State, L. Dittmer, S.S. Kim (eds.), China’s Quest for National Identity, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, (2nd printing), 1995, pp. 125153. Hansen C. (Chen Hansheng), Zhongguo gudai deyuyan he luoji (Language and Logic in Ancient China), transl. by Zhou Yunzhi, Zhang Qingyu, Cui Qingtian, Beijing: Confucianism, Communism and Liberal Democratic Values in China. Continuity and Change 293 Shehui kexue wenxian, 1998. Harrison H., China. Inventing the nation. Arnold, New York: London and Oxford University Press, 1998. He Baogang, The Democratisation of China, London & New York: Routledge, 1996. Ladany L., The Communist Party of China and Marxism 1921-1985. A Self-Portrait, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1988. Li Ma, A Comparison of the Legitimacy of Power Between the Confucianist and Legalist Philosophies, Asian Philosophy, vol. 10, no. 1, Taylor & Francis, 2000. Meng Zi, The Works of Mencius, transl. by J. Legge, Changsha: Hunan 1992. Misra K., From Post-Maoism to Post-Marxism. The Erosion of Official Ideology in Deng’s China. New York & London: Routledge, 1998. Perelman C., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., Traité de l’argumentation. La nouvelle rhétorique, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles (5th edition), 2000. Pimpaneau J., Chiny. Kultura i tradycje, Warsaw: Dialog, 2001. Shi Chih-yu, China’s Just World. The Morality of Chinese Foreign Policy, Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993. Tomala K. (red.), Chiny. Przemiany państwa i społeczeństwa w okresie reform 1978-2000, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Trio, 2001. Tomala K., Gawlikowski K. (red.), Chiny. Rozwój społeczeństwa i państwa na przełomie XX i XXI wieku, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Trio, 2002. Wang Jing, The State Question in Chinese Popular Cultural Studies, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies: Movements, no. 4, London & New York: Routledge, 2001. Watson J.L., Rites or Beliefs? The Construction of a Unified Culture in Late Imperial China, L. Dittmer, S.S. Kim (eds.), China’s Quest for National Identity, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, (2nd printing), 1995, pp. 80-103. Xun Zi, Calea guvernarii ideale (The Way of Ideal Government), transl. and notes by L. Balan, Ia§i: Polirom, 2004. BODAN ZEMANEK The Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism in the Light of E. Gellner's Theory Taiwanese nationalism is an interesting case, since it has developed in a modernising Asian country with a colonial past and large, but specific, ethnic divergence among the population, in conditions not quite fitting older concepts of Third World nationalism development. Although Taiwan was a Japanese colony for 50 years, the nationalistic feelings did not develop in reaction to the occupants. Indeed, they exploded only after the “Chinese brethren” took over rule over the island, and was at first directed against them. Later on, since the 1970s, Taiwanese nationalism developed mainly in opposition to the Guomindang (Kuomintang). Starting as a movement led by Taiwan’s largest ethnic group, it recreated itself to include all inhabitants of the island under a common “cultural and political umbrella”. This paper acknowledges the specificity of Taiwanese nationalism and tries to examine it in the terms of Gellner’s hypothesis of close relations between culture, education, political power, and nationalism. Historical background The history of Taiwan, as that of any other place in the world, starts in the pre-nationalistic era of tribe organisation. The first people who settled there, of Austronesian stock, lived since 10 000 BC in loosely organised tribes, occupying themselves with a mixture of hunting and extensive agriculture. In 1624, the Dutch established their colony in today’s Tainan, only to be driven away in 1661 by Zheng Chenggong, a Ming dynasty loyalist whose descendants governed Taiwan until 1683 when the island became a part of the Chinese Empire ruled by the Manchu Qing dynasty. How very provincial this province was may be illustrated by the fact that except the last 7 out of the 212 years of Manchu rule, Taiwan was only a part of a larger administrative unit also consisting of the mainland Fujian province. In 1895, in result of the lost Sino-Japanese war and the subsequent treaty of 298 Bogdan Zemanek Shimonoseki, Taiwan became a Japanese province1. The 10 day-long existence of the Taiwan Democratic Republic between those two periods had a merely symbolic value. The Japanese governed Taiwan for 50 years. Their rule was harsh, but they developed the island into one of the most economically and industrially advanced places in Asia, in many aspects second only to Japan itself. Following Japan’s defeat in the Second World War, the island was returned to the Chinese government, at the time ruled by the National Party (Guomindang2, Kuomintang; afterwards: GMD). Although welcomed as liberators, due to taking over Japanese possessions and industries and draining Taiwan’s resources to continue civil war on the continent, GMD rulers began to be perceived by many Taiwanese as new occupants. The dissatisfaction erupted in 1947 in the large-scale riots known as the “2-28 Incident” (as it began on the 28th February). Its bloody suppression and the subsequent “white terror” alienated GMD from the locals; it also caused a rift between the earlier settlers, or benshengren (Locals) and waishengren, recent immigrants from the continent who escaped to the island in the late 1940s after the GMD government, lost the civil war to the communists. Since the GMD did not permit any instance of questioning its authority and imposed strict rule (the martial law lasting for 38 years was a world record!), the first real opposition developed only in the late 1970s; the power of the GMD was then declining, which was manifested in huge losses on the international stage. It lost the seat in the UN, and later most countries, following the US, severed their diplomatic ties with the Republic of China (ROC; in Taiwan) and established them with People’s Republic of China (PRC), recognising its government as the sole government of China. At the same time, thanks to Taiwan’s economic development, the Taiwanese opposition found a stronger economical basis among native business people. Many young people were able to go abroad to study and on returning home brought new ideas about the desired shape of state and society. Their influence on the opposition forces was also noticeable. Started in the 1980s, the process had all the characteristics of a nationalistic movement. They included the demand to create an independent Taiwanese state which should protect Taiwanese culture. This culture was defined mainly on the basis of language and history as different from Chinese culture. Although 1 R. Sławiński, Historia Tajwanu (The History of Taiwan), Warszawa 2000. 2 All the Chinese words are written according to hanyupinyin standard, including names of the places in Taiwan, often spelled differently. In case of better known names, the most popular variant is given. The only exception are the personal names, spelled according to the bearers’ wish. The Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism in the Light of E. Gellner's Theory 299 not entirely successful, due to international constraints, this movement had nevertheless achieved a great deal both in political and educational realms, and its main actors, grouped under the banner of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), took over government of the island. The DPP leader Chen Shuibian became the President of the Republic of China (ROC; for the first time in 2000 and again in 2004), which consists of Taiwan and the neighbouring islets. After this brief historical introduction, let us analyse what the situation of the Taiwanese society looked like in the terms of Gellner’s theory of nationalism. Three main factors will be considered below: culture, power, and education. The distribution of these factors in the Imperial era (before 1895), the Japanese period (1895-1945), and the Republic of China times (since 1945) will be examined. The paper provides insight into who had power, which culture was dominating, and who was educated at each stage of Taiwanese history. Gellner's theory of nationalism Gellner (1991)3 defines nationalism as an ideology demanding for each distinct culture a sovereign state, which protects it. Such a demand is of course impossible to fulfil, as the number of possible culturally distinct groups is simply too large for each of them to create its own organism as complicated as the modern state. Therefore, for each existing nationalism we have several dormant, possible ones. Under certain circumstances they can “wake up” or rather “be woken up” by a group of people decided to establish their own political unit. Historically speaking, the national state is a relatively new phenomenon. Hunter and gatherer societies did not create any such formation. Agrarian societies could create such states, but only industrial, modern societies must have national states. According to Gellner, the typical social organisation of an agrarian society does not demand that the elites and the commoners participate in the same culture. The elites (clerks, warriors) have their own higher (written) culture; it may be common for the elites of more than one country (e.g.: the Latin culture of medieval Europe). The illiterate plebs pass on their culture orally - the area where such a culture exists is fairly small, and there is little exchange between neighbouring communities and therefore they are alien to each other and have no community feelings for members other than their own. Industrialisation, with its fast flow of capital and fast changing production, demands a new type of society: mobile and uniformly educated. Each member of such a society must be easy to train into any new role, which may be necessary at 3 E. Gellner, Narody i Nacjonalizm (Nations and Nationalism), Warszawa 1991. 300 Bogdan Zemanek a given moment. He must be literate in order to be able to learn fast - in fact he must know as much as a former-time clerk. He must often go to new places, facing alienation resulting from the lack of community support. Fortunately, his new skill -literacy - which provides him with a larger view of the world, also provides him with a new, larger community. This community consists of “fellow schoolmates”, who went through a similar educational process and share similar cultural values4. Because all society members are similarly educated, they share a common cultural background as members of a new, large community: the nation. The culture of the nation fulfils the same role as the local cultures of smaller communities - it allows its bearers to understand and manipulate the world. Usually, this culture derives from older, smaller cultures combining, transforming and popularising their various elements, bringing them together into a new entity. The most distinct cultural feature is the existence of a standard language employed in formal education, which often differs from other languages of still existing local communities. Those communities may in turn aspire to become higher cultures themselves, especially when they are dominated by an ethnically (and/or culturally) different group. Gellner refers to such a model (in which one group has access to power, education, and higher culture, and another has not) as “Habsburgian nationalism”, from the multicultural Austro-Hungarian Empire, which consisted of many nationalities under the common umbrella of Germanic culture. Most of those nationalities created their own nationalistic movements, which effectively split the old empire; as a result, several countries appeared, each with its own higher culture. Nationalistic movements are usually led by the elites, who, although assimilated to the dominant culture through the process of formal schooling, decide that full assimilation is undesirable and they will profit more from developing their own culture and providing it with a political representation5. In discussing Taiwanese nationalism, I understand it as an attempt to create a separate state on Taiwan island, a state which would have as its citizens all the people living there. This is an important point, because given the great ethnic variety on the island, some other kind of nationalism could possibly have emerged there, such as a Hakka or Minnan (Hokkien) nationalism6. I am going to show that the nationalist movement did not appear before Gellner’s requirements concerning the existence of a modern, industrial and generally educated society were fulfilled. 4 To some extent it can be said that small community members used to see the same events; the new, large community members read the same books... 5 In Gellner’s own words: better to be a master of something small than of nothing. 6 Which could demand e.g. partitioning the island into ethnically clean units or creating a common state with their brethren living on the other side of Taiwan Straits. The Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism in the Light of E. Gellner's Theory 301 Late imperial China When Taiwan became part of the Chinese empire (1683), China had already been a state with a long history and remarkable cultural uniformity, given the huge area it governed. At that time, it was a classical agricultural empire. Its social organisation was very similar to the schema presented in Nations and Nationalisms7 as typical for agrarian societies. There were isolated, local, rural communities, centred on themselves, each with its own social hierarchy. Their contact with the outside world was limited and they had little communal feelings for their neighbours. Each such community was a world on its own, with its orally reproduced culture. „Above them” (as far as social strata are concerned) there were “horizontal” layers of the ruling class, relatively mobile and - thanks to their partaking in the common, high (namely written) culture - feeling that they have more in common with persons of equal rank from the other end of the empire, than with their own peasant-tenant from the same village. In Europe - according to Gellner - such elites often transgressed the borders of political units and there existed e.g. a “knight community”, with the views on honour or religion shared with their counterparts in neighbouring kingdoms. In China, the elites could not, due to the size of the empire, cross the borders of the realm, yet they used to move between the provinces. Their mobility was further facilitated by the imperial practice of rotating the officials between posts in different places. The Confucian ideology, regulating in details all social relations, from family life to the political system, was not explicitly nationalistic. Yet as, for most of its history, China was by far the most advanced in the area and its elites did not have contact with other equally developed societies, they formed a view that the Chinese were a civilised people surrounded by a sea of barbarians. The barbarians could join the civilised (i.e. Chinese) world, by accepting Confucian values; the culture could be learnt and Chinese officials often set up schools for promoting their world-view. They, however, did not accept the existence of other, competitive ideologies, as they could be disruptive for the society8. Therefore, their view of the world was very sinocentric9. The most prominent representatives of the ruling class were scholar- 7 E. Gellner, op. cit., p. 19. 8 And since the organisation of society mirrored the organisation of the universe, the disruption of the first order might - or even had to - cause disruption of the second, with natural cataclysms as the effect. For details on the doctrine of the heavenly mandate see Feng Youlan, Short History of Chinese Philosophy, New York: 1966. 9 Such ideology is often called “culturalism” as different from “nationalism”. See H. Harrison, China. Inventing the nation. London 2001. 302 Bogdan Zemanek bureaucrats, who adhered to and promoted the Confucian ideology. The ability to read and write in wenyan, classical Chinese, the language of the ancient classics was their marker. They often occupied both civil and military posts; they were recruited mostly from land-owning gentry, but merchants’ sons were not excluded from entering their ranks, if they proved their knowledge of the official lore. This knowledge was in theory open to everybody - provided that the person had resources for spending several years solely on studying the ancient classics and classical Chinese, as perfect knowledge of these was the basic requirement of the imperial examination system, which led to office and power. Because of its great size the Chinese empire encompassed many ethnic groups, Sinicised to a different extent. Similarly to Ottoman Turks, the Chinese tolerated a rather large ethnic, cultural and religious variety within the borders of their empire, as long as its inhabitants obeyed the general rules provided by the Confucian ideology. Even among the people who called themselves Han („ethnic” Chinese), the diversity was huge, which was (and is) very easily seen at the linguistic level, with south-eastern Han speaking a variety of languages belonging to six mutually unintelligible groups, also unintelligible to speakers of the northern variety10. The huge number of Hans spread over an immense territory poses the question of the cultural continuity between their different groups. To avoid misunderstandings some authors11 call them “sub-ethnic”, to differentiate from non-Hans. Many groups of Han Chinese, e.g. the Hakka, had objective markers12 of an ethnic group, like a common culture (with a very distinct language), a common territory, economy and history. They were also quite often accused by their neighbours of not being Chinese, but although they had strong feeling towards their own people, they always stated that they are Hans, and referred to themselves as a subgroup. Although in the 20th century Dr Sun Yatsen despaired over the lack of communal feelings between the Chinese people, saying that they did not constitute a nation in modern terms and were like a “loose heap of sand”, the Han had some 10 See M.J. Künstler, Języki chińskie (The Chinese Languages) Warszawa 2000; R.S. Ramsey, The Languages of China. Princeton 1989. 11 E.g. H.J. Lamley, Subethnic Rivalry in the Ch’ing Taiwan, [in:] E.M. Ahern, H. Gates (edit.), The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society, Stanford 1981, pp. 218-319; J.R. Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier 1600-1800, Stanford 1993. 12 The following features are those used by Chinese ethnographers, derived from Stalin’s definition of a nationality. See: S. Harrell, Wa^s of Being Ethnic in Southwest China, Seattle 2001. The Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism in the Light of E. Gellner's Theory 303 awareness of the cultural community across their many varied groups. The concept of such community is certainly very ancient, dating at least to the Warring States (6th-3rd century BC), when the term Tianxia, “[all] under Heaven” (the whole civilised, i.e. the Chinese world) originated. Certainly throughout the Chinese history it was the bearers of the high, written, imperial culture (scholar-officials, members of the gentry, richer merchants) who had such awareness13. It was due to their unificatory efforts that the Chinese stayed together, although many parts of China had the history of sovereignty, either from the pre-unification era or from the periods, when China was divided into parts. If we follow Gellner’s concept of language as the most important cultural marker, we could expect southern groups of Hans like Wu, Hakka or Minnan to attempt to create their own nation states. Even less linguistically distinct groups like the Sichuanese, speaking a variety of northern (Mandarin) Chinese, given their history and geographical location, could attempt to do so. All these groups are potential nations. Why did the unificatory power of imperial, Confucian culture prevail? First of all, Gellner’s basic conditions for the rise of nationalism, namely industrialisation and subsequent social changes, had not been fulfilled. In the late 19th century modernisation of China (also Taiwan) was only beginning; most of the population still lived in a very traditional way. Secondly, there existed the “buffer” of the local gentry. The highest officials sent to southern regions often hailed from different areas; although these sub-ethnically alien Chinese officials or the even more alien Manchu envoys of the imperial court acted as sources of power, the actual rule was in fact exercised by lower-level magistrates, translators etc., recruited from among the local gentry. Those petty bureaucrats stood with one leg in the local cultural community, partaking in its culture and using its language, and with the other one in the elite camp of the wenyan-writing officials. They had no interest in actively supporting local cultures14 against the mainstream culture; however, there was nobody else apart from these people who could act as spokesmen for the local cultures. The road to power led through the Imperial (Confucian) culture - the Hakkas, the most impoverished Chinese group, were noted for their participation in Confucian 13 It is highly possible that such a notion was hardly known at all in rural communities; that the villager from Miaoli did not think of himself as “Chinese” any more than any Hucul thought about himself as “European” (or even “Ukrainian”). 14 They could support “their people” on the client-patron basis; but such alliances were rather turned against other groups of the same level, not against the government. The documents, in which the ethnic origins of the officials sent to Taiwan are being discussed, prove the imperial government was aware of such problems. See: R.J. Shepherd, op.cit. 304 Bogdan Zemanek studies; a large number of officials came from among them. The third factor was a degree of cultural continuity between the rulers and the ruled, which lessened potential ethnic tension. This continuity came from the fact that they were all “Han”15. The sub-ethnic origins of the elites were not very important. What mattered was their ability to read and write - in wen^an, classical Chinese, the language of the Confucian classics. With the modernisation and industrialisation of China, one could expect the rise of modern, unifying nationalism. At the same time, several other groups could attempt to create their own states. Among those groups were non-Chinese minorities and sub-groups of Han. In the course of the stormy history of late 19th and first half of 20th century, both of those trends showed, although in varying degree. Chinese nationalism, with specific political and cultural programs, was promoted both by the Nationalist Party (GMD) and the Communist Party of China (CPC)16. They both promoted unified Chinese culture and aimed at unifying the state under their rule. Separatist movements were present mainly among non-Hans, with a short-lived Tibetan independent state and a Mongolian Republic17. None of the Chinese subgroups tried to establish their own state, be it Cantonese, Wu or Minnan. In the chaos and war which plagued China since 1911, the dream of an unified, stable country had more allure. The lengthy war with Japan had also a great unifying impact, as it mobilised all the Chinese to repel the invader. Taiwan in the imperial period Taiwanese Aborigines never created any developed society, neither of the character of agrarian kingdom, nor of industrialised empire. They lived in an array of villages, which were their principal political unit, with people of (usually) different tribes, speaking different languages18 occasionally uniting 15 With the exception of Manchu envoys, but even they were almost completely culturally sinified. 16 It should be noted that Chinese Communists, after several abortive attempts, gave up on following Marxist prescription about revolution in cities and turned to the countryside; not only did they create their own, very sinified version of communist doctrine, but also for a long time their main target was the war with the Japanese, nationalistic in principle, and getting rid of foreign colonists. See: H. Harrison, op. cit. , chapter 9. 17 Although the latter was created more by the grace of Russia than by the Mongolians’ own efforts. 18 There is a great diversity among the Austronesian languages in Taiwan; they also greatly differ from other languages of the same group. The Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism in the Light of E. Gellner's Theory 305 against common enemies. But none of the groups was strong enough to control the others, nor did it attempt to do so; they also did not try to create their own high (written) culture. Their tribal organisation was not able to stem the tide of Chinese immigration and they were pushed into the mountains, or became Sinified. The coming of Chinese settlers did not change much at the beginning, except for the fact that the newcomers were better organised politically and more effective economically. The waves of immigration caused a fair amount of fighting, trading and intermarrying between the settlers and the original inhabitants. There was no nationalistic movement among the Aborigines: there was no reason for it19. In Gellner’s terms this was a typical pre-nationalistic situation. The brief (and localised) periods of Spanish and Dutch colonisation did not spark any nationalism either, although in today’s Taiwan the Chinese pirate-turned-admiral Zheng Chenggong’s driving out of the Dutch in 1661 is often regarded as one who made an important step in the formation of the Taiwanese state20. The situation in Taiwan was similar to other border regions of the empire. The Chinese settlers were immigrating into territories inhabited by non-Chinese groups and partly by force, partly by intermarrying, subjugated and incorporated them. From the 17th century onwards, the number of Chinese immigrants to Taiwan steadily increased. The Dutch brought over 25,000 workers for their sugar plantations and Zheng Chenggong, when he expelled the colonisers, brought over 100,000 followers with him. Most of them were from Fujian and Guangdong provinces. They spoke varieties of southern Min (Minnan, also known as Fujianese) or Hakka language groups21, but they had no writing systems for their tongues. Throughout Manchurian rule, the steady flow of immigrants completely changed the population balance: at its end, the number of Aborigines amounted to less than few percent of the island’s population, the rest being Han Chinese, divided between Minnan and Hakka at a ca. 6:1 ratio. The Minnan (Fujianese) and Hakka tended to settle separately and were further differentiated, as they preserved the traditions of the counties and 19 Even in what Gellner calls the “old”, pre-industrial style. The political and cultural diversity was just too great, and the political/cultural units too small. 20 Ironically, this Taiwanese national hero was half-Fujianese and half-Japanese and was fighting for the cause of Ming dynasty emperors, who ruled the whole Chinese empire, with the exception of - Taiwan, which was not a part of the state. 21 The names of the groups in Mandarin (northern Chinese language), Fulao and Kejia and in their own terms, Hoklo (Holo) and Hakka respectively, can serve as an example of linguistic (and cultural) differences. As the name Fulao is sometimes considered derogatory, I opted for Minnan, derived from the name of the language they use. 306 Bogdan Zemanek villages they or their forefathers originated from. Particularly the Minnans were split into two large subgroups according to the place they came from: the districts of Zhangzhou and Quanzhou in their home province. The relations between them were far from friendly: semi-constant warfare would be the best term to describe them. The strife between communities led to their further closing up and to the formation of discrete, almost “ethnically clean” populations22. Shepherd’s map compiled on the basis of data collected in 1926 gives a striking picture of the ethnic mosaic on the island, which had survived although the fighting had ceased about 60 years earlier23. None of these small units attempted to create its own high culture - they all fell under the wide umbrella of Confucian culture24, propagated by the educated elites. Taiwan as Japanese colony 1895-1945 The situation changed after the Japanese took over rule of the island in 1895. The rulers were now really different, spoke a completely different language, which displaced classical Chinese as the language of the elites, and had their own culture. There had been no moderating continuity between the rulers and the ruled25. At the time of the takeover, the Japanese were technologically and educationally superior to the Chinese. Under their rule the island underwent rapid economical development. Although the Japanese planned to turn Taiwan into a food base for the Japanese archipelago and they mainly supported the development of agriculture, this development was accompanied by quite a large advance in small industry. Heavy industry was also developing, with coal and gold mines in northern Taiwan, large food (mainly sugar) processing sector and other works as e.g. paper and cement mills, railway-building, and harbour 22 H.J. Lamley. op. cit. 23 J.R. Shepherd, op. cit. See especially the map on p. 315. 24 That is the reason why both authors quoted above label the fights of the period “subethnic”. They try differentiate the “ethnic conflict” (between Han and the Aborigines) and “sub-ethnic” - within the large Han group. Such differentiation is useful in the context of their works, yet we may call competing Han groups “ethnic groups”, since they had enough ethnic markers and in-group feelings to earn such name. 25 To be more precise: to a small extent such continuity existed in the cultural sphere, as the basic Confucian values were also known in Japan. However, after the period of shogunate and during Meiji restoration other, feudal and later Western values were more prevalent. The social buffer of the gentry, belonging both to the world of higher and lower culture ceased to exist. The Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism in the Light of E. Gellner's Theory 307 development. Advanced infrastructure, including electricity26, waterworks and sewers, was also introduced, mainly for the Japanese community, but Chinese city dwellers were not excluded from enjoying them. To run all these industries, the Japanese recruited and schooled local work-force. The most important contribution that the Japanese made to the development of Taiwan was the establishment of the programme of common education. State-run schools were replacing traditional home learning or small Confucian schools among the Chinese (Fujianese or Hakka) populations. At first, the Japanese sought to reconcile traditional Confucian values with Japanese ones; later on they introduced segregation in schools in order to protect their interests. However, the rules were relaxed in 1913, with schools built for Taiwanese children, in effect of which enrolment raised to 25% in 192027. The ratio between children who attended traditional Confucian schools and those who attended regular schools dropped from 2.5:1 in 1899 through 0.93:1 in 1904 to 0.08:1 in 191728. Although Confucian schools did not cease to exist, their influence became insignificant. Even though the number of Japanese children going to school was always significantly higher than the number of school-attending Taiwanese children, in the later years of the colonial period mass education was present also among local populations. In 1926, almost one third of Taiwanese children attended school. Since the main language of instruction was Japanese, the percent of Japanese-speaking (bilingual) islanders steadily increased, from 12.3% in 1937 to 71.1% in 194429. The number of Taiwanese students in higher education institutions also increased, both in Japanese-founded schools in Taiwan, as in the Taihoku (Taipei) Imperial University (now National Taiwan University) established in 1928 and in Japanese universities. One could expect that those new elites would form a “nationalistic vanguard” struggling for local interests and promoting local culture: and that was exactly what happened. These very elites established the New People’s Society in Tokyo in 1921 and published the journal Taiwan Seinen (Formosan 26 Taipei was the second, after Tokyo, electrified city in Eastern Asia. See J.F. Copper, Taiwan. Nation-state or Province? Boulder: 1996. 27 Komagome Takeshi and J.A. Mangan, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan 1895-1919; Precepts and Practices of Control. “History of Education”, vol. 26 no. 3, pp. 307-322. 28 Source: table VIII on p.79 in: R. Sławiński, op. cit 29 R. Sławiński, op.cit. 30 Edward I-te Chen, Formosan Political Movements under Japanese Rule 1914-37. “The Journal of Asian Studies”, 31(3), May 1972, pp. 472-497. 308 Bogdan Zemanek Youth)30. This bilingual journal, renamed Taiwan Minbao in 1923 was printed in Japan and distributed31 in Taiwan. In 1926, it had already a circulation of 10,000 copies (only a step behind the main Japanese newspapers) and became the most important Chinese newspaper on the island32. In 1923, the League for Establishing Formosan Parliament was founded; the League organised petition-writing to urge the central government to establish autonomy and self government for the island. Its main rationale was that the cultural differences between Japan and Taiwan were too great, and that they should be taken into account for more effective rule - therefore people should be allowed to organise themselves according to their own habits. The Japanese, aware that the “one man = one vote” principle promoted by the League would give a great advantage to the numerically superior Taiwanese, effectively blocked the proposals in the Diet (Japanese parliament). The League cooperated with the Taiwanese Cultural Association (TCA) organising lectures in local languages to gather mass support. The Association (Taiwan Bunka Kyokai, established by Chiang Wei-shui in 1921) became one of the most important societies promoting local culture and national awareness. It organised summer and night schools, courses, and lectures on various subjects, notably Chinese culture, history, and literature33. The TCA did much more than promote Chinese culture, as it sponsored the establishment of many farmers’ and workers’ unions and associations. Especially active in this field was the Taiwanese Popular Party (in Japanese: Taiwan Minsyuto; in Chinese: Taiwan Minzhongdang; established also by Chiang Wei-shui in 1927), which developed out of the Association in 1927. Its orientation was leftist, aiming to combine anti-colonial activity with class struggle along the lines stipulated by Sun Yatsen for the Guomindang. Later (1930), more moderate members founded the League for Attainment of Local Autonomy. The islanders were obviously not fully decided whether they should follow the route of Chinese or Taiwanese nationalism. The birth of the Republic of China in 1911 and the revolutionary ideas circulated in students’ circles were turning the Taiwanese towards future unification with China34. Since 1926, the “Cultural Bookstore” in Taipei sold Chinese publications, including the works 31 Publishing in Japan was a way to circumnavigate the Taiwan governor’s ban on local paper founding. 32 C. Lee, A Light in the Political Darkness: Nationalist Pioneer Chiang Wei-shui, “Sinorama”, 28.03.2005., URL= http://www.sinorama.com.tw/en/print_issue.php37id =2003129212094e.txt&mag=past. 33 Edward I-te Chen, op. cit 34 The cooperation with Guomindang was one of the aims of New People’s Society. See A-chin Hsiau, Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism, London 2000. The Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism in the Light of E. Gellner's Theory 309 of Sun Yatsen and Hu Shi35. Chinese inclinations were strong, even though there was no effective communication with the mainland. Such a disposition was the effect of the Chinese consciousness of the Taiwanese people and not of any activity of the Chinese government, who at the time did not pay any attention to Taiwan. Much discussed among Taiwanese activists was the matter of the language they should use in their publications, especially in the xiangtu (“home-soil”) literature, dealing with local matters and problems. Their common goal was to prevent Japanese acculturation. Using the vernacular was the matter they agreed upon - all these young, future-oriented people wanted to do away with classical Chinese (wenyan ), favoured by Confucianists, a mark of Imperial China. Taiwan Minbao was published in vernacular Chinese. Its supporters deemed Minnan language as unsuitable, inferior and impossible to write, while the other, more Taiwanese-conscious, considered the local languages (mostly Minnan, but also Hakka) as the best tool for expression and worked on creating a writing system for it. The former warned against alienating the island from China and against the problems posed by the linguistic differences - not only between the Minnans and the Hakkas, but also within the Minnan group. The latter considered “putting down” of “what was really spoken” the best way to solve the illiteracy problem and to counter effectively Japanese plans for language and cultural assimilation. In short, the first group wanted to bring Taiwan within the sphere of the new Chinese higher culture; they had Chinese cultural consciousness. The other one wished to raise the status of local culture, which shows their Taiwanese cultural consciousness. The promoters of developing a writing system for the Minnan faced the additional problem of choosing the “proper” system: adopting Chinese characters was seen as surrendering to the traditional Chinese (Confucian) culture; using the Latin alphabet would mean giving in to the Europeans (as such a script was created and promoted by missionaries)36. In the late 1930s, all these organisations were disbanded because of the tightening of the Japanese rule37. The campaign for cultural assimilation of islanders (the kominka movement), launched by the colonisers in the 1940s, bore good results, especially in what concerns the degree of knowledge of the Japanese language. 35 C. Lee, op. cit. 36 A-chin Hsiau, op. cit. 37 All these organisations were liquidated when Sino-Japanese war started in 1937, and the colonists tightened their grip on the island. TPP was disbanded earlier, after its open conflict with the authorities in 1931. 310 Bogdan Zemanek An important feature of these organisations was the common background of their founders, almost entirely Japanese-educated members of Taiwanese elites (doctors, students, merchants, lawyers, etc.). Another important matter was their devotion to the cultural cause. The effects of their efforts were limited and they were not able to stem the advance of Japanese culture - in Gellner’s terms, the promotion of the local culture was not the best way to secure the interests of the elites, who often preferred assimilation. The higher (Japanese) culture, backed by a powerful state, had too great an advantage. Therefore, the main legacy of the Taiwanese (para)nationalistic movements of the 1920s and 1930s was experience of self-organisation and the intellectual heritage of xiangtu literature and plans for language reform. Chinese victory? The defeat of the Japanese in 1945 could have been the moment of victory for Chinese nationalists in Taiwan. The colonisers were gone, the new government was both in name and in nature nationalistic, and the people in Taiwan were happy about the unification. However, the suspicious attitude of the GMD towards the Taiwanese, its taking over Japanese possessions, the corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy, and the lack of understanding towards the feelings and skills of the islanders, soon turned joy into resentment. The situation of the Taiwanese did not turn any better with the end of the colonial era. On the contrary, it turned worse, with economy collapsing and many people laid off by the authorities looking for savings. Bureaucrats insisted onguo^u (Standard Chinese, Mandarin) as the sole means of communication. It was the third time in Taiwanese history when a minority language was imposed as the official one (first time it was classical Chinese and second - Japanese). Since hardly anybody on the island was able to speak it, the locals found all higher official posts closed to them. The Taiwanese started to perceive the newcomers as new occupants and their dissatisfaction led to riots which started on the 28th February 1947. The subsequent massacre opened a rift between the Locals (benshengren) and the Newcomers, Mainlanders (waishengren). This rift has not yet been closed, even though four generations have passed since the events. Speaking again in Gellner’s terms, there was a large disparity of power and culture between the Locals and Newcomers. There was a language barrier - the number ofguoyu speakers on the island was tiny and the number of Minnan and Hakka speakers among the Newcomers was not much larger. Could this barrier have been overcome? It would have been hard to accomplish in a short time and would require much attention from the government. GMD would need to select The Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism in the Light of E. Gellner's Theory 311 special staff (e.g. from Fujian, were most of the people also speak the Minnan language, the most popular language on the island), look for translators, and -most importantly - refrain from cutting off Japanese as a secondary means of communication. GMD people did it, because the Japanese language was the symbol of their hateful enemy, whom they had fought for eight years38. Taiwanese, on the contrary, regarded Japanese as a language of the elites and of education (especially higher education). This difference in historical experience is often brought up as one of the explanations for the 1947 conflict39. It should be noted that historical experience undoubtedly constitutes a part of culture. To sum up, the local, lower cultures of Taiwan (Hakka/Minnan/Aborigine) were caught in the conflict between two higher cultures (Chinese and Japanese), both connected with quite mature nationalisms. The bearers of Chinese higher culture (the GMD) were determined to get rid of the other higher culture (Japanese); in the process they trampled on the lower one, deemed unimportant. It is true that Taiwanese culture could be regarded as a variant of the Chinese40; let to its own devices it would have probably joined the mainstream, as it exhibited tendencies to do so. But when alienated and attacked, it solidified. The different groups united, creating a higher-level entity of benshengren, encompassing all former enemies (e.g. Quanzhou or Zhangzhou people), more or less openly voicing their “new” identity. A similar process occurred among waishengren, originally coming from all over China and some of them even not being Chinese (Han), who made a coherent unit, unified by their language (guoyu, Standard Mandarin) and occupation characteristics41. In the years to follow, Chinese culture in Taiwan was under special protection of the government, who maintained that its rule on the island was only temporary and in fact it represented the whole China. Children in schools had to learn the history of China and Chinese geography, which included the special produce of every province, as well as Chinese culture. Any special characteristics Taiwanese culture might have possessed were dismissed and local languages downgraded. The system of language schooling was that of limiting monolingualism, which 38 The most remarkable example is the first governor of Taiwan, Chen Yi who, although fluent in Japanese, swore he would not utter a word in it. See: Tse-han Lai, Ramon W. Myers, and Wou Wei. A tragic beginning. The Taiwan uprising of February 28,1947, Stanford 1991. 39 E.g.: T. Lai, R. W. Myers, W. Wei, op. cit. 40 Naturally, with the exception of Aborigine minority. 41 Mau-kuei Chang, Towards an Understanding of the Sheng-chi Wen-ti in Taiwan. Focusing on Changes after Political Liberalisation, [in:] Chen Chung-min, Chuang Ying-chang, Huang Shu-min [ed.], Ethnicity in Taiwan Social，Historical, and Cultural Perspectives, Taipei 1994, pp. 93-151. 312 Bogdan Zemanek further strengthened the division between groups42. The orientation towards Chinese culture was especially visible in the 1970s, when in response to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, president Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) initiated a cultural revitalisation movement in Taiwan. From the very beginning, the GMD regarded education as crucial for maintaining its rule. “Three Principles of the People”, “The Thought of the Founding Father” (Sun Yatsen) and other political courses were taught throughout the whole schooling period43. College life was politicised with presidents usually being party functionaries; military officers and military training were also present. The Ministry of Education tightly controlled even the curricula as well as budgetary and administration matters of non-state educational institutions until the 1980s. The rapid industrialisation and economical development of the island, together with the necessary development of the education turned the Taiwan of the 1970s and 1980s into a model example of Gellner’s “Habsburgian nationalism”. All the necessary conditions of industrialisation and education had been fulfilled. The ruling group had access to and control of power, education and culture. The majority had none of these44. Although the ruling minority of waishengren was too small (ca. 13% of the entire population) to occupy all posts, it was however strongly over-represented in the key areas: political power (namely party, administration and army), education and cultural institutions. The Guomindang, as every Leninist party worthy of its name, mirrored all state institutions, which had their twin copies in party structures; all the key posts were held by party members; domination in the party meant domination in the state. To see how much early GMD was Mainlander-dominated, it is enough to look at Central Committee membership: during its 7th session (1952-1957) only one of 32 members was Taiwanese-born; the percentage had grown to 6% by 1970 and to 16.7 by 198145. In 1968, 6.9% of the entire island’s population 42 Even if benshegren children learn Mandarin, waishengren children usually did not learn any majority languages, so their social contacts were limited to their own group or to the more acculturated benshengren. See: R.L. Cheng, Language Unification in Taiwan: Present and Future, [in:] M.A. Rubinstein (ed.), The Other Taiwan. 1945 to the Present, New York, 1994, pp. 357-392. 43 Yang Yi-Rong, Education and National Development: the Case of Taiwan, “Chinese Education & Society”, Nov/Dec 1994, vol. 27, Issue 6, pp. 7-23. 44 The benshengren majority had obviously access to culture and education, but it was not “their” indigenous culture, and education was in a “foreign” language. 45 Nai-the Wu, Convergence or Polarisation. Ethnic Political Support in the Post-Liberalisation State, [in:] Chen Chung-min, Chuang Ying-chang, Huang Shu-min [ed.], op. cit., pp. 151-168. The Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism in the Light of E. Gellner's Theory 313 were party members, out of which 60% were officials and military officers. The waishengren amounted to 61%46. Only in 1981, Taiwanese natives formed one third of the GMD Standing Committee; in 1993 they finally held the majority, but only of 18 to 13 votes, whereas they constituted over 80% of the society. A similar pattern was to be found in other high-ranking offices: in 1985, when the so-called “Taiwanisation” of the GMD had already been being implemented for some time, ca. 26% of the highest party posts were held by benshengren, but only 15.9% when functional posts are included. At the same time, the Taiwanese gained majority on county and district level, but the waishengren were still heavily over-represented with 46.1% and 26.7% of seats respectively, the smaller number being more than double of their population share47. In the military and police forces, the Taiwanese were also a minority: the numbers of generals rose from 1.3% in 1960s to 7.4% in 1970s and 16.8% in late 1980s. Among the colonels 9.6%, 18.8%, and 32.6% were benshengren in the respective periods. For the sake of comparison, the numbers for lowest ranks were: 52.8%, 68.4%, and 78.7% respectively. Just before 1990 only a third of police force city or county commanders were Taiwanese48. Similarly, the number of waishengren among the teachers amounted to 39% (in 1962), three times more than their population share49. Worth attention is the fact that the problem of provincial background as a criterion for personal and political decisions was denied by the GMD government and the very discussion of it was prohibited50. This can clearly be seen as an attempt to enforce a single common “ethnicity” upon all the groups. The “great lie” of unified Chinese culture As said before, almost all people in Taiwan are Han and are speakers of Sinitic languages, but their tongues and customs vary greatly. To some extent they all shared the notion of “Chineseness”（be it “the sons of the Yellow Emperor” 46 Ping-Lung Jiang, Wen-Cheng Wu, The Changing Role of the KMT in Taiwan’s Political System, [in:] Tun-jen Cheng, Stephan Haggard [ed.], Political Change in Taiwan, London 1992. 47 B.J. Dickson, Democratisation in China and Taiwan. The Adaptability of Leninist Parties, Oxford 1997. 48 Nai-the Wu, op. cit. 49 H. Gates, Ethnicity and Social Class, [in:] E.M. Ahern, H. Gates [ed.], The Anthropology of Taiwanese Society, Stanford 1981, pp. 241-283. 50 Mau-kuei Chang, op. cit. 314 Bogdan Zemanek or “people under Heaven”), so GMD attempts to nullify the differences and mould the islanders into “Chinese” should be comparatively easy. It would be so, if it were not for two reasons. The first was the above-mentioned rift between benshengren and waishengren. The second was the very nature of modern society and modern nationalism. Modern nationalism is based on shared culture (propagated mainly through education, but not only); in this culture experiences, memories and evaluations of historical events and “culture” in the narrow sense (literature, drama, etc.) are all shared and common throughout the nation. The members of the nation are roughly alike. Yet, the situation of the people in Taiwan and people in the rest of China was not the same. They lived in two states: Republic of China (in Taiwan) and People’s Republic of China (on the mainland), whose claims to sovereignty over the counterpart was a legal fiction, supported for political reasons. The people in these states differed in all points important for national unity. Their historical experience was not the same. The benshengren had enjoyed peace and prosperity under Japanese rule, while mainland people had suffered from several decades of wars. The waishengren, who in Taiwan constituted the link with the mainland, shared with mainlanders the experience of the civil war, between the Guomindang and Communists - but they were on the opposite sides of the barricade. Therefore, waishengren evaluation of the events was diametrically different from the one upheld by the people from mainland. What one called “victory”, the other called “defeat”, the “leading forces” of one were “communist bandits” for the other, revolution was rebellion and so on. Both ROC and PRC maintained the vision of one Chinese culture, but their cultural programs varied greatly. Before the 1990s, there had been no cultural exchange whatsoever across the Taiwan Strait. Both sides, fearing each other’s propaganda, banned publications from the other side. When the communists “modernised” literature according to the principles of socialist realism, destroyed temples, and tried to eliminate old habits, the GMD tried to strengthen the old values and criticised any works by Taiwanese authors that displayed the faintest traces of socialist realism51. Upholding Confucian values in Taiwan sharply contrasted with mainland “campaigns to criticize Confucius”. These two societies chose different roads and the claims of being “one nation” were, for the time being, empty talk. As time went by, the Taiwanese population was becoming increasingly uniform because of the shared experiences and - on the more personal level - family ties. In a modern, therefore mobile society, intermarriage between 51 A-chin Hsiau, op.cit. The Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism in the Light of E. Gellner's Theory 315 benshengren and waishengren was common52. Even “pure-blood” second- and later-generation Mainlanders had spent their whole life on the island, so they had no personal ties with the mainland. This blending is going on, but the process is still unfinished and there is no one “uniform Taiwanese identity” that we can talk about53. “The great lie of national unity” was further proven in the 1970s, when following the American example most of the world cut off its ties with ROC and established diplomatic relations with PRC. Since the 1980s, together with its economical reforms and development, the PRC became more active in foreign policy, with the ultimate goal of establishing itself first as a local and then as a global power. Its quite aggressive attitude towards Taiwan culminated with rocket tests just off the island’s waters during the 1996 presidential elections - however, the effect was contrary to what had been expected. The people of Taiwan, instead of voting for the pro-unification candidate, elected Lee Teng-hui, known for his pro-independence views. At the same time, there was a significant rise in the number of people who thought that ROC identity covered only people living in Taiwan and on neighbouring islands and that the territory of the ROC is limited to the same area (from 40.7% to 51.4% and from 44.2% to 57.5% respectively54). Because China put itself in the position of the “other”, repeatedly assessing its right to use force to coerce Taiwan into unity, the number of people claiming Chinese identity started to drop, as even the strongest China-loyalists did not expect to be safe, shall the bombs start falling. The rise of Taiwanese culture In the 1980s, the situation became fully ripe for potential nationalism to become manifest. All Gellner’s conditions - the existence of literate and educated people, a mobile industrialised society, internally differentiated from the ethnical (cultural) point of view - had been fulfilled. However, Gellner stipulated that such conditions were sufficient, but that actual nationalist movement would emerge only if the elites of an underprivileged group could 52 For how certain patterns of intermarriage did not immediately lead to dissolving of the Mainlander group see: H. Gates, op. cit. 53 A. M. Wachman, Taiwan. National Identity and Democratisation, New York-London 1994. 54 Yun-han Chu and Chia-lung Lin, The Construction of Taiwanese Identity and CrossStrait Relations, paper presented at conference “The Development of Contemporary Taiwan”, Taipei, 16th-17th December 1998. 316 Bogdan Zemanek conceive of their interests in this way. Otherwise, they may prefer to assimilate, as it happened many times in Europe and other places55. Clearly, Minnan and Hakka elites could gain something by promoting a Taiwanese, not Chinese, identity - especially because of the reasons described above, promoting a Chinese identity was not profitable any longer. Local leaders could appeal to benshengrens' sympathies for all things local, especially for language. The group which could gain the most were the Minnan, as they constitute the majority of the population56. Minnan, the major group, were not able to promote their own culture and attempt to create their own state. The group is divided between Taiwan, Fujian and Hainan, and so this would mean challenging not only GMD rule on Taiwan, but also CPC rule on the mainland. Such a proposition would be dubbed ridiculous. The plausible course of action was to change minority-dominated (waishengrens) Republic of China into majority-ruled (benshengrens) Republic of Taiwan. Although Minnans were dominant in the independence movement, they did not pursue a Minnan state, as it meant alienating immediately a third of the population. They rather resorted to benshengrens - early activists appealed to them during mass rallies, using local languages, defying this way the ban of TV and other mass media, imposed on them by the then-ruling GMD. Since the grip of the GMD on politics (especially foreign policy) was tight and there were not many economic issues worth fighting for, cultural issues became one of the central points of political activities. The campaign for larger representation of benshengren (especially Minnan) culture and language was long and went through several stages. In his article57, Shih identified five such stages. The first took place in the 1970s, when the GMD tried to ban Presbyterian Church publications, printed in Romanised Minnan language and in 1975 seized the New Testament published in this way. It is interesting to note that religion itself was not at stake: religion never played a strong role in shaping Chinese identity; nor it did in shaping Taiwanese identity, either. This was a fight over “Chinese culture” symbolised by Chinese characters, the only writing allowed by the government and the Taiwanese (in this case, Minnan) culture, symbolised by the Romanised Minnan script. It is 55 And to some extent in Taiwan, both in Japanese and post-war period. 56 This clearly resembles the situation from the Japanese period, when autonomy promoting Taiwanese were aware of their superior numbers and therefore supported the “one man = one vote” rule. 57 Cheng-Feng Shih, Language and Ethnic Politics in Taiwan, Paper presented at the “International Conference on Globalisation, Education and Language”, Tamkang University, Tamsui, 15th-16th November 2002. The Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism in the Light of E. Gellner's Theory 317 hard to find a better example to prove Gellner’s thesis of the importance of written (higher) culture. The second stage was the so-called Nativist (bentu, sometimes also calledxiangtu) literature, which incorporated the expressions and elements of style from Minnan and Hakka languages in its works and dealing with local themes (the authors followed the route of xiangtu literature writers from the Japanese period). Two important groups centred around Li Poetry Magazine (Li shikan) and Taiwanese Literature (Taiwan Wenyi; both founded in 1964) were particularly active in creating a “Taiwanese literature for the Taiwanese people”58. In the latter half of the 1980s, the Taiwanese Language Movement flourished; its promoters compiled dictionaries, worked on the most effective systems of writing and created literature in Minnan and Hakka. Clubs, literary societies, and other language-related organisations often closely cooperated with benshengren politicians who at that time were beginning their march to power. Connections between Minnan writing and pro-Taiwanese party allegiances are still visible: texts written in Minnan are more likely to be attributed to the Democratic Progressive Party members than to any other59. At the same time, namely since the 1980s, the amount of literature published about and in the local languages grew enormously: while in the 1970s 345 different works concerning the Hakka were published, in the 1990s their number reached 3,41960. The fourth stage was introduction of a new Romanisation system, suitable both for Mandarin and for local languages, as the officially used Zhuyin Fuhao and Wade-Giles systems fitted neither Minnan nor Hakka. Taiwanese Phonetic Movement supporters and opponents turned the seemingly uncomplicated matter of finding the most appropriate writing system into a protracted political battle, involving the Ministry of Education, several scientific and political committees, the Taipei Mayor’s office and even groups from outside Taiwan. Romanisation became a tug of war; street name signs were changed repeatedly, and the ensuing chaos can still be noticed. Not only Mainlanders competed with Locals, but also tensions were observed within the benshengren group, when 58 See A-chin Hsiau, op. cit. 59 Such texts, however, are not connected with church membership, which proves that although the Presbyterian Church played an important role in creating Taiwanese identity, this identity is not religion-based. See Wi-vun Taiffalo Chiang, Language attitudes towards written Taiwanese. “Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development”, 22 (6), pp. 502-523. 60 Fuchang Wang. Dangdai Taiwan shehui de zuqun sixiang (Ethnic Imagination in Contemporary Taiwan). Taipei 2003, table 7, p. 143. 61 For details see: Shih, op. cit. 318 Bogdan Zemanek Hakkas became afraid of Minnan nationalism61. The fifth stage, still ongoing, is the movement to introduce Local languages as official ones. The first successes in this field had to wait for the DPP (largely connected with Minnans) to become the ruling party in 2000. Both languages (albeit in a very limited number of hours) were introduced as compulsory in primary (six-grade) school curricula, but as optional in junior high schools62. Institutes of Taiwanese languages and literature were established in several universities, as e.g. the Chenggong University in Tainan and the private Providence University in Taizhong. The Museum of Taiwanese Literature was opened in Tainan in 2003, interestingly enough in a former Japanese governmental building. The date of opening was chosen significantly to commemorate the 82nd anniversary of establishing the Taiwan Cultural Association. Apart from language issues, the emergence of Taiwanese popular culture must be noted. It encompasses both local traditions, as Taiwanese opera (one of the versions of traditional Chinese opera), Hakka song-duels, local cults (especially the cult of Mazu) as well as the whole realm of pop-singers63. Taiwanese film industry reached a very high level with directors of international renown like Hou Hsiao-hsien and Lee Ang. Many authors also became famous (the first well known abroad was San Mao). Culture and politics were closely connected. With the rise of the opposition throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the GMD government was softening its position towards local cults, traditions, literature, and arts. The so-called Taiwanisation of the GMD turned this officially pro-China party into almost Taiwanese nationalists in the era of president Lee Teng-Hui. After his split with the party64, the GMD returned to their former positions, but was definitely more centralist and less Chinese-conservative than before. This can be regarded as a victory of “creeping nationalism”, Taiwanese nationalism, encompassing all the islanders. All of them started to demand more participation and even the most underprivileged group of Aborigines managed to exert some successful pressure, especially in cultural matters (e.g. eliminating the contents they considered offensive from textbooks65). 62 The pupils can also choose one of the Aboriginal languages instead of Minnan or Hakka. See: ROC information website URL: http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/P269.htm#1. 63 J. Bosco, The Emergence of a Taiwanese Popular Culture, [in:] M.A. Rubinstein (ed.), op. cit, pp. 392-404. 64 Afterwards Lee became a “spiritual father” of the current most pro-independence party, the Taiwan Solidarity Union. 65 Shih-Chung Hsieh, From Shanbao to Yuanzhumin: Ta^^anese Aborigines in Transition, in: M. A. Rubinstein (ed.), op. cit., pp. 404-421. The Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism in the Light of E. Gellner's Theory 319 The “cultural explosion” in recent years in Taiwan is a subject for a separate book (as Joseph Bosco says: “From a peripheral backwater, Taiwan has become the trendsetter for the PRC”66). Two important features of this phenomenon are worth noting here; though contradictory on the surface, they are not so when examined closer. The first one is the tendency of uplifting elements of local culture: Hou’s most famous movie, The City of Sadness, is a classical example, as it not only deals with local history (notably the 2-28 incident), but also mixes guoyu, local languages and even Japanese in a way so typical for the island. At the same time writers, singers and other artists write, sing, and perform mainly in standard Mandarin, less in the local language. Personally I believe the use of “Taiwanised Mandarin” (Taiwan guoyu) is worth particular attention, as in the light of Gellner’s claim that the new “high culture” is created by transforming and accommodating chosen elements of “low”, local cultures, such usage marks the emergence of Taiwanese culture. Taiwanese and not Minnan, Hakka or other. This “new Taiwanese” culture is marked by its inclusiveness of all cultural elements which have existed for “long enough” on the island, regardless of their origins67. The increasing bi- or even trilingualism and lack of focus on any single language is a mark of this culture. The Taiwanese, including local writers, see the Taiwanese version of Mandarin Chinese (guoyu), whose vocabulary and pronunciation have been affected by local languages, as “theirs” and different from mainland putonghua68. At the same time, by using Mandarin they can ensure wider readership, not only among waishengren, but also on the mainland, where their works are growing increasingly popular69. The same applies to pop singers, who alternate between guoyu and local languages. There is no contradiction in printing such pro-independence books as Taiwan is not a Part of China70, in Mandarin, in most traditional way, vertical columns going from right to left71. Usage of Mandarin Chinese has ceased to be a symbol of “otherness”. One does not have to forego guoyu, but is also expected to know some Minnan 66 J. Bosco, op. cit. , p. 398. 67 E.g.: classical and folk Chinese, Japanese, Minnan, Aborigine, pre- and post-war Taiwanese and mainland literature, Hakka, etc. See A-Chin Hsiau, op. cit. 68 The PRC official language, basically identical with guoyu. 69 Jim Hwang, Publishing Across the Taiwan Straits, “Taiwan Review”, June 2003, pp. 12-20. 70 Shi Ming, Taiwan bu shi Zhonguoyi bu fen, Taipei 1998. 71 After all, there are many different states and cultures, using the same language, English being the most wide-spread example. 320 Bogdan Zemanek or Hakka. No politician can now afford not campaigning in local language, even such waishengren and pro-unificationist like James Soong. None can even afford speaking straight about the unification, as this would endanger one’s popular support. This is again a sign of “creeping nationalism” - the Taiwanese are used to having their own state and most of them do not want to give it up, although they do not necessarily want to declare it officially, not to enrage the PRC. Yet this notion of having their own state is now common and important for the Taiwanese, and contradicting it directly is deemed suicidal for the politician. Conclusion The peculiar political history of Taiwan made the largest group (Minnan) never hold the power until the year 2000. For this reason, they did not at first create a political or cultural core, to which groups coming later would have to adapt72. They were divided at the local level and under the control first of the Chinese, and afterwards of the Japanese empire. When the modern era started, first Japanese and later Guomindang Nationalists used the military-supported political power to try to transform (to some extent successfully, as the popularity of Japanese and later standard Mandarin attests) the Locals. The local (Minnan and Hakka) elites had to work out new forms of culture and politics and gained broad support for their ideas73. Taiwanese nationalism is a case of a culture which demands a state and has a chance to transform the already existing state; the culture must shape itself in such a way as to fit the political frame of this pre-existing state and substitute the culture which was related to it. To have an opportunity to acquire “its” state, Minnan culture must turn into Taiwanese culture, absorbing elements from other groups. Helpful is the already mentioned degree of ethnic continuity between different Chinese groups. Although they are different and may be called (sub) ethnic groups, yet it is much easier for a main group to adopt some elements of other Han Chinese traditions than of non-Chinese, completely different cultures. In doing so, Taiwanese nationalists used all the tools of modern society: education, legal and political procedures, and the mass-media. 72 As it was the case of other emigrant-born nation, Americans, as described in H.Kubiak, Rodowód narodu amerykańskiego (The Origins of the American Naüon), Kraków:1975. 73 Such process is sometimes called vernacular mobilisation. See: A.D. Smith, Theories of nationalism, in: M. Leifer (ed.), Asian Nationalism, Routledge 2000, pp. 1-19. The Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism in the Light of E. Gellner's Theory 321 In such a modern and mobile society, as Gellner predicted, one set of cultural values must be set as the leading one. So when the conditions allowed, the major group attempted (with partial success, so far) to impose their set of values, as better fitting the local circumstances. For this, they developed the local, “lower” culture, introduced it in the media and education, and merged its elements with the culture which predominated earlier (pan-Chinese culture with its roots in imperial times, promoted by GMD). In doing so, they are creating a new kind of culture. This process is still in its early stages. It is quite possible that the external political factors will suppress this growing culture, together with the state it wants to form. Wybrane publikacje prof. dr. hab. Romana Sławińskiego Książki* Sû Huai-czung, Opowieść tybetańska, (przekład z chińskiego), Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1960. Aj Wu, Zajazd niewidomych, (przekład z chińskiego R. Sławiński i Hu Peifang), Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1967. La Société des Piques Rouges et le movement paysan en Chine en 1926~1927, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 1975. Geneza Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej, Warszawa: Instytut Krajów Socjalistycznych PAN, 1987. Wasilij Sidichmienow, Ostatni cesarze Chin, (przekład z rosyjskiego J. Abkowicz i R. Sławiński), Katowice: Śląsk, 1990. Historia Tajwanu, Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, 2001. Historia Chin i Tajwanu, Seria: Historia Krajów i Regionów Azji, Wyższa Szkoła Handlu i Finansów Międzynarodowych, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Askon, 2002. Historia nowożytna Chin, R. Sławiński (red.), Zakład Krajów Pozaeuropejskich PAN, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2005. Juan Ch’ang-rue, Tradycyjne wierzenia ludowe Tajwanu, przekład z języka chińskiego, wstęp, mapa, indeks Roman Sławiński, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2007. The Modern History of China, (Edited by Roman Sławiński), Kraków: Centre for Studies on Non-European Countries, Polish Academy of Sciences, Księgarnia Akademicka 2006. Chwasty, album I, Obrazy olejne Romana Sławińskiego, z wystaw w Krakowskiej Szkole Wyższej w 2005 i 2008 roku), Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka 2008. Pod Krakowem, album II, Obrazy olejne Romana Sławińskiego, z wystaw w Krakowskiej Szkole Wyższej w 2005 i 2008 roku), Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka 2008. * Bibliografia została zestawiona w układzie chronologicznym, z pominięciem niesygno-wanych haseł encyklopedycznych, prac z innych dziedzin, np. tłumaczeń na chiński dokumentacji leków i umów handlowych. 326 Wybrane publikacje prof. dr. hab. Romana Sławińskiego Orchidee, album III, Obrazy olejne Romana Sławińskiego, z wystawy w Krakowskiej Szkole Wyższej w 2008 roku, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka 2008. Góry św. Jacentego, album IV, Obrazy olejne Romana Sławińskiego, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka 2009. Pod Krakowem (II), album V, Obrazy olejne Romana Sławińskiego, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka 2009. Kraje konfucjańskie, R. Sławiński (red.), Kraków: Krakowskie Towarzystwo Edukacyjne -Oficyna Wydawnicza AFM, 2011 (w druku). Redakcja czasopism „Chiny”，miesięcznik, Warszawa 1959-1963; redaktor działu historycznego. „Problemy Dalekiego Wschodu”, Kwartalnik Instytutu Krajów Socjalistycznych PAN, Warszawa 1983-1985; redaktor naczelny. „Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia”, Rocznik Zakładu Krajów Pozaeuropejskich PAN, Warszawa 1988-; redaktor naczelny. Artykuły i rozdziały w pracach zbiorowych Przed czterdziestu laty, „Chiny” 1959, nr 1, s. 8. Taipingowie, 1959, nr 2, s. 20-21. Było ich 57-miu, „Chiny” 1959, nr 3, s. 7. Sun Yatsen - rewolucjonista i mąż stanu (1866-1925), „Przegląd Orientalistyczny” 1966, nr 4 (60), s. 289-294. Generał Jang C’ing-jü, „Chiny” 1963, nr 4, s. 8. Akademia Wojskowa Huangp’u, „Chiny” 1963, nr 6, s. 25. Chiny, w: Ruchy wyzwoleńcze w krajach Azji (1850-1914), oprac. W. Michowicz, R. Sławiński, Warszawa: Państwowe Zakłady Wydawnictw Szkolnych, 1960, s. 23-36. Rozwój szkolnictwa wyższego w Chińskiej Republice Ludowej, „Życie Szkoły Wyższej” 1966, nr 7-8, s. 170-175. Les Piques Rouges et la révolution chinoise de 1925-1927, w: Mouvement populaires et sociétés secrètes en Chine aux XIXe et XXe siècles, Paryż: François Maspero, 1970, s. 394-406. The Red Spears in the Late 1920，s, w: Popular Movements and Secret Societies in China 1840-1950, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972, s. 201-211. La Société des Piques Rouges et le movement paysan en Chine en 1926-1927, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 1975. Z problematyki sinologicznej w piśmiennictwie polskim, „Przegląd Orientalistyczny” 1976, nr 4 (100), s. 421-427. Wybrane publikacje prof. dr. hab. Romana Sławińskiego 327 (Huitu bailianjiao yanyiy récit populaire sur le Lotus Blanc”, w: Understanding Modern China, Problems and methods. Proceedings, Association Européenne d’Etudes Chinoises, t. XXVI, Conference of Chinese Studies, Ortisei-St Ulrich, Italy, September 3-9, 1978, Duplemento N. 2 „Cina”，Rzym: IsMEO 1979, s. 183-186. Nekotorye osobennosti sovremennoj kitajskojpropagandy, w: Maoizm bez Mao, Moskwa 1979, s. 299-307. Wang Wei et son poème sur les principes du paysage monochromatique, w: China: Continuity and Change, Papers of the XXVIIth Congress of Chinese Studies 31.08-05.09 1980, R. P. Kramers (ed.) Zurich 1982, s. 273-280. Z badań nad dziejami chińskich tajnych sto^ar^szeń, „Problemy Dalekiego Wschodu” 1983, nr 1-2, s. 3-10. Państwo a społeczeństwo w Chinach (W związku z dyskusją historyków chińskich o kontynuacji feudalizmu), „Problemy Dalekiego Wschodu” 1983, nr 3-4, s. 7-18. Chiński głos w kwestii marksistowskiej koncepcji azjatyckiego sposobu produkcji, „Problemy Dalekiego Wschodu” 1984, nr 1 (5), s. 7-15. Niektóre aspekty dyskusji wokół marksistowskiej koncepcji azjatyckiego sposobu produkcji, w: Marksizm a ruchy narodowo-wyzwoleńcze, Warszawa 1985, s. 87-106. O pejzażu, „Przegląd Orientalistyczny” 1987, nr 3 (143), s. 325-331. The Latest Trends in Historiography in the People’s Republic of China, „Hemispheres, Studies on Cultures and Societies” 1988, no 4, s. 119-128. Historia militarna Chin, „Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia” 1989, nr 2, s. 11-86. Tradycja w krajach Orientu, „Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia” 1993, nr 7, s. 65-72. Najnowsza historiografia chińska, „Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia” 1994, nr 8, s. 81-92. Współczesna historiografia chińska, „Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia” 1995, nr 9, s. 15-26. Współczesna historiografia chińska, „Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia” 1996, nr 10, s. 61-72. Teoria i praktyka reformy gospodarczej w ocenie ekonomistów chińskich, „Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia” 1997, nr 11, s. 111-123. Chińczycy a inni, w: Między konfrontacją a tolerancją, A. Mrozek-Dumanowska (red.), Warszawa: Askon, 1997, s. 31-38. Ocena Sun Yatsena: wczoraj i dziś, w: Spotkania, konflikty，dialogi. Kraje pozaeuropejskie w konfrontacji kultur, S. Tokarski (red.), Łódź: Wydawnictwo WSHE, 1997, s. 17-22. Rola jednostki w społeczeństwie konfucjańskim, w: F. E. Stiftung, Uniwersalizm praw człowieka. Idea a rzeczywistość w krajach kultur pozaeuropejskich, Warszawa: Askon, 1998, s. 19-36. Współczesna historiografia chińska: tajwańskie badania nowszej historii Chin, „Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia” 1999, nr 12, s. 147-167. Polish-Chinese Relations in 19th and 20th Centuries, „Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia” 2000, nr 13, s. 63-74. 328 Wybrane publikacje prof. dr. hab. Romana Sławińskiego Bolan shehui yundongjia Bisusiji yu Zhongshan - yi feng xinhande lishi yiyi (Piłsudski a Sun Yatsen - znaczenie historyczne pewnego listu), „Zhongguo Jindaishi” („Historia Nowożytna”) 2000, nr 136, s. 94-96. Westernizacja kultury chińskiej - blaski i cienie, w: Kultury pozaeuropejskie i globalizacja. Zderzenia, J. Zdanowski (red.), Warszawa: Elipsa, 2000, s. 115-127. Chinese Historiography of the 20th Centuries: Research on Xinjiang, „Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia” 2001, nr 14, s. 83-94. Współczesna historiografia chińska, w: Chiny, Przemiany państwa i społeczeństwa w okresie reform 1978-2000, K. Tomala (red.), Warszawa: Trio, 2001, s. 333-352. Historia Chin do 1949 roku, w: Encyklopedia Historyczna ^^wiata, t. X: Azja, cz. 1, Kraków: Opres, 2002, s. 92-139. Tajwan, w: Encyklopedia Historyczna ^^wiata, t. X: Azja, cz. 1, Kraków: Opres, 2002, s. 159-168. Chinese Historiography of the 20th C: Research on Xinjiang”, „Acta Asiatica Varso-viensia” 2001, nr 14, s. 83-94. Migracje na Tajwan a tożsamość kulturowa Tajwańczyków, w: Globalizacja a tożsamość, J. Zdanowski (red.), Warszawa: Askon, 2002, s. 213-221. Bolan yu Zhonghuaminguo de guanxi (Polska a Republika Chińska), Zbiór materiałów z Międzynarodowego Sympozjum Historia Republiki Chińskiej (1912-1949), Pekin 08. 2002. Poland and Republican China, (wersja rozszerzona wyżej wymienionej pozycji w języku japońskim), w: Chikaki Ni Arite, (Being Nearby - Discussions on Modern China), Kioto 2002, s. 70-79. Cultural Identity of the Taiwanese People in the Globalisation Era, „Hemispheres, Studies on Cultures and Societies” 2002, s. 69-78. Posłowie do: J. K. Fairbank, Historia Chin, Nowe spojrzenie, wyd. 2, Gdańsk: Marabut, 2003, s. 408-426. The Last Decade in China, „Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia” 2003, nr 17, s. 61-76. Controversial Issues in the Modern History of China, „Hemispheres, Studies on Cultures and Societies” 2003, nr 18, s. 95-100. New Religious Movement in Taiwan, „Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia”, Warsaw: Askon Publishers, 2004, nr 17, s. 19-29. (J. Bzdyl, R. Sławiński), Nowe wierzenia tajwańskie, „Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe” 2005, nr 4, s. 1-13. Wstęp do: Nowożytna historia Chin, R. Sławiński (red.), Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2005. Działalność tajnych stowarzyszeń - Powstanie Tajpingów, w: Nowożytna historia Chin, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2005. Zagospodarowanie i utrata Tajwanu, w: Nowo办tna historia Chin, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2005. Yuan Shikai i rządy militarystów - Wyprana Północna i zjednoczenie kraju, w: Nowożytna historia Chin, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2005 Wybrane publikacje prof. dr. hab. Romana Sławińskiego 329 Powrót Tajwanu do Chin, w: Nowożytna historia Chin, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2005. Contemporary Chinese Historiography, with Special Emphasis on Taiwanese Historiography. Part I, w: „Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe”, Azja wczoraj i dziś, Roman Sławiński (red.), 2006, s. 97-118. Introduction, w: The Modern History of China, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2006, s. 7-12. Secret Societies and the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, w: The Modern History of China, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2006, s. 55-70. The settlement and loss of Taiwan, w: The Modern History of China, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2006, s. 71-84. Yuan Shikai and the Warlords’ rule - the Nothem Expedition and the country’s unification, w: The Modern History of China, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2006, s. 119-132. Taiwan under Japanese rule and its restoration to China (Guangfu), w: The Modern History of China, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2006, s. 209-222. Chinese historiography of the 20th century: Research on Sinkiang (Xinjiang) , w: The Modern History of China, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2006, s. 333-346. Chronology of most significant events in modern Chinese history, w: The Modern History of China, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2006, s. 365-371. The legacy of Li Hongzhang, w: The Modern History of China, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2006, s. 93. The Polish diaspora in China, w: The Modern History of China, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2006, s. 117-118. The Washington Conference, w: The Modern History of China, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2006, s. 149. China’s casualties during the Anti-Japanese War, w: The Modern History of China, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2006, s. 200. The thought of Mao Zedong and its fate, w: The Modern History of China, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2006, s. 244. Museums, libraries, bookstores, and others institution connected with the modern history of China, w: The Modern History of China, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2006, s. 361. Tradycyjne wierzenia tajwańskie, w: „Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe”, 2007, nr 1 (IV) 2007, s. 199-210. Chuantongyu xiandai xinyang (Wierzenia tradycyjne i współczesne), tekst w języku chińskim, w: Commemorative Edition for the 70th Anniversary of Prof. Zhang Ha-ipeng’s Birth, Social Sciences Academic Press (China), Beijing 2008, s. 71-79. Wang Wei - chiński poeta ” malarski w poezji; poetycki w malarstwie”, w: J. Sierakowska-Dyndo, S. Surdykowska (red.) Posłuchaj fletu trzcinowego..., Warszawa: Wydawn. Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2009, s. 293-304. 330 Wybrane publikacje prof. dr. hab. Romana Sławińskiego O zachowaniu tradycyjnych wierzeń i z^czajó^ na Tajwanie, w: Afryka - Azja - Z(a-chód, J. Zdanowski (red.), „Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe”, 2009, nr 1 (VI), s. 133- 150. The Traditional Customs of the Taiwanese, w: „Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia”, Warszawa: 2009, nr 22, s. 75-87. Wstęp, w: Kraje konfucjańskie, R. Sławiński (red.), Kraków: Krakowskie Towarzystwo Edukacyjne - Oficyna Wydawnicza AFM, 2010 (w druku). Nowożytne dzieje Chin w wieku XIX, w: Kraje konfucjańskie, R. Sławiński (red.), Kraków: Krakowskie Towarzystwo Edukacyjne - Oficyna Wydawnicza AFM, 2010 (w druku). Konfucjanizm i neokonfucjanizm, w: Kraje konfucjańskie, R. Sławiński (red.), Kraków: Krakowskie Towarzystwo Edukacyjne - Oficyna Wydawnicza AFM, 2010 (w druku). Posłowie, w: Kraje konfucjańskie, R. Sławiński (red.), Kraków: Krakowskie Towarzystwo Edukacyjne - Oficyna Wydawnicza AFM, 2010 (w druku). „Nowy” konfucjanizm w krajach Azji Wschodniej, w: „Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe”, VII: 2010, nr 1, s. 135-156. Bolan yu Zhonghua minguo de guanxi, (Stosunki Polski z Republiką Chińską), w: Zhonghua minguo shi yanjiu sanshi nian, (1972- 2002), (Trzydzieści lat badań dziejów Republiki Chińskiej 1972-2002), Instytut Historii Nowożytnej Chińskiej Akademii Nauk Społecznych, t. I -III, Pekin 2008, t. II, s. 757- 765. Chuantong yu xiandai xinyang (Wierzenia tradycyjne i współczesne), tekst w języku chińskim w: Commemorative Edition for the 7th Anniversary of Prof. Zhang Haipeng’s Birth, Social Sciences Academic Press (China), Beijing 2008, s. 71-79. Przekłady artykułów i rozdziałów w pracach zbiorowych Fan Wenlan, Zagadnienia periodyzacji no^oż^tnej historii Chin, „Kwartalnik Historyczny, Przekłady”，(przekład z chińskiego), Warszawa: PWN, 1956, s. 99-134. Od społeczeństwa pierwotnego do założenia cesarstwa Ts，in; Odczasó^ najdawniejszych do 207 r. p.n.e., w: Szang Jûe, Dzieje Chin, (tyt. oryg. Zhongguo lishi gang^ao, przekład zbiorowy z j. chińskiego pod red. W. Rodzińskiego), Warszawa: PWN, 1960, rozdz. I-V, s. 13-61. Rozwój feudalny i upadek społeczno-gospodarczy Chin pod panowaniem Dżurdżenów i Mongołów. Dynastie Sung, Liao, Kin i Jüan (960-1368), w: Szang Jûe, Dzieje Chin, (tyt. oryg. Zhongguo lishi gangyao, przekład zbiorowy z j. chińskiego pod red. W. Rodzińskiego), Warszawa: PWN, 1960, rozdz. I- IX, s. 279-398. Końcowy okres ustroju feudalnego i jego przedłużenie. Dynastia Ming i dynastia Ts’ing przed wojną opiumową (1368-1840). w: Szang Jue, Dzieje Chin (tyt. oryg. Zhongguo lishi gangyao, przekład zbiorowy z chińskiego pod red. W. Rodzińskiego), Warszawa: PWN, 1960, rozdz. I-V, s. 399-592. Sun Li, Kryjówka, „Chiny”, 1963, nr 10, s. 25, 30-32 (przekład z chińskiego). Wybrane publikacje prof. dr. hab. Romana Sławińskiego 331 Tian Juyuan, Długotrwałość feudalizmu w Chinach, „Prezentacje” 1982, nr 5, s. 4-12 (przekład z chińskiego). Wang Wei, Du paysage, w: China: Continuity and Change, Zurich 1982, s. 275-280 (przekład z chińskiego na francuski). Wang Wei, Shanshui lun (O pejzażu), „Przegląd Orientalistyczny” 1987, nr 3 (143), s. 327-310 (przekład z chińskiego na polski). Hu Qiaomu, Liao Lili, Panorama myśli współczesnej, „Miesięcznik Literacki” 1984, nr 8-9 (214-215), s. 186-203 (przekład z chińskiego). Teng Siao-ping, Chińska droga do socjalizmu. Wybór prac z lat 1956-1987, z j. chińskiego przeł. Z. Góralczyk, J. Rowiński, R. Sławiński, B. Zakrzewski, Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1988. Fan Daren, Badania komparatystyczne ”pierwiastków religijnych” wojen chłopskich, „Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia” 1989, nr 2, s. 209-228 (przekład z chińskiego). Li Zezhong, Stosunki własności w Chinach, Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1989 (przekład z chińskiego). Liu Guoguang, Wybrane zagadnienia strategii rozwoju gospodarczego Chin, „Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia”, 1990, nr 3, s. 11-54. Li Jingwen, Gospodarka chińska, Warszawa 1998, (przekład z chińskiego). Zhang Haipeng, Badania nowożytnej historii Chin wXXwieku (przekład z chińskiego), w: Nowożytna historia Chin, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2005. Zhang Haipeng, Sun Yatsen i Huang Xing a Rewolucja Xinhajska (przekład z chińskiego), w: Nowożytna historia Chin, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2005. Zhang Haipeng, Sporne problemy w ujęciu historyków zajmujących się nowożytną historią Chin (przekład z chińskiego), w: Nowożytna historia Chin, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2005. Wei-fen Chen, Konfucjanizm w Japonii, (przekład z chińskiego tradycyjnego), w: Kraje konfucjańskie, R. Sławiński (red.), Kraków: Krakowskie Towarzystwo Edukacyjne -Oficyna Wydawnicza AFM, 2011 (w druku). Wei-fen Chen, Dzieje konfucjanizmu tajwańskiego，(przekład z chińskiego tradycyjnego), w: Kraje konfucjańskie, R. Sławiński (red.), Kraków: Krakowskie Towarzystwo Edukacyjne - Oficyna Wydawnicza AFM, 2011 (w druku). Wystąpienia zagranicą Wang Wei et son poeme sur les principes du paysage monochromatique, XXVIIth Congres of Chinese Studies, Zurich, sierpień-wrzesień 1980. Manche Besonderheiten der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung Chinas, Berlin 1983 (tekst niemiecki referatu wygłoszonego w języku francuskim w Uniwersytecie Humboldta). K izuczeniu voprosa o dlitiel’nom gospodstve feodalizma v Kitae, Ułan Bator 1983 (referat wygłoszony w Mongolskiej Akademii Nauk). 332 Wybrane publikacje prof. dr. hab. Romana Sławińskiego J. Piłsudski a Sun Yatsen, Międzynarodowe Sympozjum Naukowe z okazji 150. rocznicy zapoczątkowania nowożytnej historii Chin, Kanton, grudzień 1990 (referat w języku chińskim). Stosunki polsko-chińskie w XIX i XX wieku, Sympozjum Międzynarodowe: Dzieje Republiki Chińskiej do 1949 r., Pekin, sierpień 1999 (referat w języku chińskim). IIRzeczpospolita a Republika Chińska, Sympozjum Międzynarodowe: Dzieje Republiki Chińskiej 1912-1949, Pekin 20-24. 09. 2002 (referat w języku chińskim). Miejsce Polski w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej, Uniwersytet Tamkang, Tajwan, luty 2002 (wykład w języku chińskim). Polska po II wojnie światowej, Uniwersytet Tamkang, Tajwan: luty 2002 (wykład w języku chińskim). Pierwsza w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej historia Tajwanu, Instytut Historii Tajwanu, Academia Sinica, Tajpej, sierpień 2004 (referat w języku chińskim). Periodyzacja nowożytnej historii Chin, Instytut Historii Nowożytnej Chińskiej Akademii Nauk Społecznych, Pekin, grudzień 2004 (referat w języku chińskim). Recenzje J. Fass, Revolutionnary Activity in the Province Hu-pei and Wu-ch，ang uprising of 1911, Archiv Orientalni, 28, s. 127-149, w: „Revue Bibliographique de Sinologie” 1960, nr 6, s. 145-146. A.I. Èehutov, Nologovoe ograblenie krest'anstvav Gomindanovskom Kitae (19271949), „Problemy Vostokovedenija” 1961, nr 4, s. 106-121, w: „Revue Bibliographique de Sinologie” 1960, nr 6, s. 152. Pisma wojskowe Mao Tse-tunga, „Nowe Książki” 1960, nr 16 (246), s. 965-967. Ju.M. Garusjanc,Publikacija vKNR istoènikovpo istorii revoljicii 1911 goda, „Narody Azii i Afryki” 1961, nr 4, s. 106-121, w: „Revue Bibliographique de Sinologie” 1961, nr 7, s. 173. V.I. Glunin, Sorok let Kommunistièeskoj Partii Kitaja, „Narody Azii i Afriki” 1961, nr 3, s. 3-10, w: „Revue Bibliographique de Sinologie” 1961, nr 7, s. 176. Ju.M. Garusjanc, Bor’ba kitajskih marksistov za sozdanie Kommunistièeskoj Partii Kitaja (K sorokaletiju I s'ezda KPK), „Narody Azii i Afryki” 1961, nr 3, s. 81-96, w: „Revue Bibliographique de Sinologie” 1961, nr 7, s. 176-177. K’ung Ching-wei, 1931 chih 1945 nien-chien Jih-pen ti-kuo-chu-i i-min wo-kuo Tung-peiti ch，in-lüeh huo-tung, „Li-shih Yen-chiu” 1961, nr 3, s. 97- 107, w: „Revue Bibliographique de Sinologie” 1961, nr 7, s. 180-181. J. Peck, Kolonialismus ohne Kolonien: Der deutsche Imperialismus und China 1937, Studien zur Kolonialgeschichte und Geschichte der nationalen und kolonialen Befrieiungsbewegung, t. 3, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1961, w: „Revue Bibliographique de Sinologie” 1961, nr 7, s. 181-182. L.P. Deljusin, Agrarnaja politika Kommunistièeskoj Partii Kitaja v gody narodno-osvoboditel’noj vojny (1946-1949). „Narody Azii i Afriki” 1961, nr 5, s. 124-139, w: „Revue Bibliographique de Sinologie” 1961, nr 7, s. 185. Wybrane publikacje prof. dr. hab. Romana Sławińskiego 333 M.E. Snejder, Perevody trudovpo marksistkoj estetike v Kitae v 20-40-e god^, „Narody Azii i Afryki” 1961, nr 5, s. 188-194, w: „Revue Bibliographique de Sinologie” 1961, nr 7, s. 273. Ting Ching-t’ang, Ch’û Kuang-hsi, Tso-lien w^ lie-shihyen-chiu tzu-liaopien-mu, (Bibliografia prac na temat pięciu męczenników z Le^ico^ej Ligi Pisarzy、Changhai: Shang-hai wen-i ch’u-pan-she, 1961, w: „Revue Bibliographique de Sinologie” 1961, nr 7, s. 273. Paul A. Cohen, The anti-Christian tradition in China, „Journal of Asian Studiem” nr 20, s. 169-180, w: „Revue Bibliographique de Sinologie” 1961, nr 7, s. 365. Tybet - Dach Świata, recenzja książek J. Lobmana Tybet i B. Trońskiego Na dachu świata, w: „Nowe Książki” 1961, nr 13 (269), s. 814-815. S. Leonidoè Tihvinskij (red.), Sin’hajskaja reljucija v Kitae, Sbornik statej, Moscou: Izdatel’stvo Vostoènoj Literatury, 1962, w: „Revue Bibliographique de Sinologie” 1962, nr 8, s. 170-171. Chang Ti, Lun T，ai-p，ing tyien-kuo ho Nien-chün ch，i-i ti kuan-hsi, Li-shi Yen-chiu 1963, s. 64-86, w: „Revue Bibliographique de Sinologie” 1963, nr 9, s. 160-161. J.V. Èudodeev, Bor’ba gruppirovok vnutri gospodsvujWèego klassa Kitaja nakanune revoljucii 1911 g.: K voprosu o krizise，verhov，. Kratkie soobsèenia Instituta Na-rodov Azii, 66, s. 105-116, w: „Revue Bibliographique de Sinologie” 1963, nr 9, s. 178-179. Liao Chung-k，ai, Pékin: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1963, w: „Revue Bibliographique de Sinologie” 1963, nr 9, s. 185-186. A. A. Monina, Kampanija bojkota japonskih to^a^o^ v 1915 g., Kratkie soobsèenia Instituta Narodov Azii, 66, s. 117-125, w: „Revue Bibliographique de Sinologie” 1963, nr 9, s. 185-186. S.S. Huseinov, K istorii sovetssko-kitajskih otnosenij v 1918 g., Kratkie soobsèenia Instituta Narodov Azii, 56, s. 107-118, w: „Revue Bibliographique de Sinologie” 1963, nr 9, s. 190. YüMing-hsia, Kuan-yü Li Hsiu-ch，eng ti chan-chi chip，ing-chia wen-t，i, Li-shi Yen-chiu” 1965, nr 2, s. 21-42, w: „Revue Bibliographique de Sinologie” 1965, nr 11, s. 135-136. Feng Yü-k’uei, Li Mao-kao, Shen Wei-pin, Lun ’Fan kueifan hsien，:po Li Hsiu-ch，eng wen-tyIt，ao-lun chungti chi-chunglun-tiao, „Li-shih Yen-chiu” 1965, nr 5, s. 47-52, w: „Revue Bibliographique de Sinologie” 1965, nr 11, s. 136. K. Dębnicki, Ewolucja polityczna Nepalu w latach 1950-1977, Warszawa 06.12.1983 (recenzja rozprawy doktorskiej obronionej na Wydziale Neofilologii UW). J. Bratkiewicz, Teoria „azjatyckiej” formacji społecznej. Interpretacja badań i polemik, Warszawa 24.06.1986; (recenzja rozprawy doktorskiej obronionej na Wydziale Dziennikarstwa UW). L. Kasarełło, Rola i miejsce Tian Hana w procesie narodzin nowoczesnego dramatu i teatru chińskiego, Warszawa 31.10.1989 (recenzja rozprawy doktorskiej obronionej w Instytucie Orientalistycznym UW). 334 Wybrane publikacje prof. dr. hab. Romana Sławińskiego I. Łabędzka, Chiny Ezry Pounda, Poznań 1998, (ocena dorobku naukowego i rozprawy habilitacyjnej). I. Łabędzka, Obrzędowy teatr Dalekiego Wschodu, Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 1999. L. Kasarełło, Totemy życia…Chińska literatura poszukiwania korceni, Warszawa: Dialog, 2000 (ocena dorobku naukowego i rozprawy habilitacyjnej). T. Bodio (red.), Uzbekistan. Historia-Społeczeństwo-Polityka, Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, 2001 (fragment recenzji na czwartej stronie okładki). I. Kałużyńska, Contemporary Chinese Places Names, Names of Administrative Divisions at County and City Level, Warszawa 1998 (ocena rozprawy doktorskiej obronionej w UW; rozprawa opublikowana w Peter Lang AG, European Academic Publishers, Berno 2002. W. Olszewski, Zarys kultury chińskiej, Poznań: Wydawnictwo UAM, 2002 (fragment recenzji na okładce). Tadżykistan, Historia - Społeczeństwo - Polityka, „Przegląd Europejski” 2002, nr 2 (5), s. 225-228. Tadżykistan, Historia - Społeczeństwo - Polityka, T. Bodio (red.), Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, 2002 (fragment recenzji na czwartej stronie okładki, całość przewidziana do druku w języku tadżyckim). Książka o Tadżykistanie, „Sprawy Polityczne” 2002, nr 10 (22), s. 64-67 (recenzja książki Tadżykistan. Historia -Społeczeństwo - Polityka) J. Majerski, Natura ludzka w filozofii taoistycznej i zachodniej, Kraków 2002 (ocena rozprawy doktorskiej w języku chińskim obronionej w Uniwersytecie Nankińskim, nostryfikowanej na Wydziale Filozofii UJ). I. Łabędzka, Teatr niepokorny, Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 2003. Huei-Li, Żywot Hûan-tsanga, przeł. M. J. Kûnstler, Warszawa: Dialog, 2004 (recenzja wydawnicza). R. Jakimowicz, Stosunki japońsko-chińskie w latach 1949-2002, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Akademii Ekonomicznej, 2004, (recenzja dorobku naukowego i pracy habilitacyjnej dla Wydziału Studiów Międzynarodowych i Politycznych UJ). Turkmenistan, Historia - Społeczeństwo - Polityka, T. Bodio (red.), Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, 2005 (fragment recenzji na czwartej stronie okładki). Ocena rozprawy doktorskiej mgra Józefa Pawłowskiego pt. Kształtowanie się idei 'państwa' we wczesnym piśmiennictwie konfucjańskim, 20.05.2007 r. obroniona w Uniwersytecie Warszawskim 20.05.2007. Recenzja wydawnicza pracy Łukasza Gacka Chińskie elity polityczne wobec procesu modernizacji 1921-2000, promotor R. Sławiński, obroniona w Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim 16.07.2007. Recenzja wydawnicza pracy Bogdana Zemanka Obraz grupy własnej Tajwańczyków w pro-niepodległościowej publicystyce prasowej podczas kampanii prezydenckiej 2004 r, promotor R. Sławiński, obroniona w Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim 21.08.2007. Lin Kai-yu, Katarzyna Pawlak, Mówimy po chińsku, Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna t. I-II, 2009 (fragment recenzji na czwartej stronie okładki). Noty o autorach Marianne Bastid-Brugière, profesor Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, członek de l'Institut Français. bastid@canoe.ens.fr Wilja Gdaliwicz Gielbras, profesor Instytutu Azji i Afryki Państwowego Uniwersytetu Moskiewskiego i Rosyjskiej Akademii Nauk. vilya@iaas.msu.ru [Władysław Góralski, | profesor, dr hab., Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, em. profesor Instytutu Orientalistycznego Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego 阮昌栽 Ch’ang-rue Juan, Professor of Etnology, Institute of Traditional Art, National Taipei University of Art. yuan_changrue@yahoo.com.tw [Andrzej Kapiszewski, | profesor, dr hab. Kierownik Katedry Bliskiego i Dalekiego Wschodu, Instytut Studiów Regionalnych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, b. rektor Krakowskiej Szkoły Wyższej im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego. 張力 Li Chang, Wicedyrektor Instytutu Historii Nowożytnej, Academia Sinica, Tajpej, profesor Wydziału Historycznego Uniwersytetu Chin Wschodnich, Tajwan. mhcli@gate.sinica.edu.tw; mhcli@ccvax.sinica.edu.tw 力]祖薛 Liu Zuxi, profesor Wydziału Historycznego Uniwersytetu Pekińskiego. cliu@kmg.com Wiesław Kozub-Ciembroniewicz, profesor, dr hab., Dziekan Wydziału Stosunków Międzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. kozub@ciembroniewicz.pl Izabella Łabędzka, profesor, dr hab., Kierownik Zakładu Literatury i Kultury Chińskiej, Uniwersytet Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu. izalab@amu.edu.pl Jerzy Malec, profesor, dr hab., Rektor Krakowskiej Akademii im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego. jmalec@afm.edu.pl J. Kenneth Olenik, profesor, History Department, Montclaire State University, Upper Montclaire, NJ, USA. Olenikk@mail.montclair.edu Henryk Samsonowicz, profesor zwyczajny, dr hab. Przewodniczący Wydziału Pierwszego Nauk Społecznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, członek rzeczywisty PAN, b. rektor Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Jolanta Sierakowska-Dyndo, profesor, dr hab., Dziekan Wydziału Orientalistycznego UW. j.sierakowska-dyndo@uw.edu.pl Roman Sławiński, profesor, dr hab., Krakowska Akademia im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego; Instytut Kultur Śródziemnomorskich i Orientalnych PAN, Warszawa. mrslawinski@gmail.com Wojciech Szymczyk, redaktor strony internetowej „Zapiski z Państwa Środka”. wojciech.szymczyk@gmail.com Stanisław Tokarski, profesor, dr hab., Kierownik Zakładu Azji Wschodniej i Południowej Instytutu Bliskiego i Dalekiego Wschodu WSMiP UJ; Instytut Kultur Śródziemnomorskich i Orientalnych PAN, Warszawa. s.tokarski@o2.pl Karin Tomala, profesor, dr hab. Instytut Kultur Śródziemnomorskich i Orientalnych PAN, Warszawa, Zakład Azji Wschodniej i Południowej Instytutu Bliskiego i Dalekiego Wschodu WSMiP UJ. karin.tomala@sokp.pl Adina Zemanek, dr, Instytut Bliskiego i Dalekiego Wschodu Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Centrum Języka i Kultury Chińskiej „Instytut Konfucjusza w Krakowie”. adina.zemanek@uj.edu.pl Bogdan Zemanek, dr, Instytut Bliskiego i Dalekiego Wschodu Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. bogdan.zemanek@uj.edu.pl Jerzy Zdanowski, profesor, dr hab., Dyrektor Instytutu Kultur Śródziemnomorskich i Orientalnych PAN, Warszawa, Krakowska Akademia im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego. jerzyzda@gmail.com Rada Wydawnicza Klemens Budzowski, Maria Kapiszewska, Zbigniew Maciąg, Jacek M. Majchrowski Projekt okładki i stron tytułowych Igor Stanisławski Fotografia Romana Sławińskiego Igor Stanisławski Redaktor prowadzący Halina Baszak-Jaroń Korekta Oleg Aleksejczuk (j. ros.), Uta Hrehorowicz (j. franc.), Piotr Krasnowolski (j. ang.), Agata Justyna Krawiec (j. niem.), Mariusz Warchoł (j. polski) Copyright© by Krakowska Akademia im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego, Kraków 2005, uzupełniona wersja elektroniczna Kraków 2011 ISBN 83-89823-181-3 Żadna część tej publikacji nie może być powielana ani magazynowana w sposób umożliwiający ponowne wykorzystanie, ani też rozpowszechniana w jakiejkolwiek formie za pomocą środków elektronicznych, mechanicznych, kopiujących, nagrywających i innych, bez uprzedniej pisemnej zgody właściciela praw autorskich Na zlecenie Krakowskiej Akademii im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego www.ka.edu.pl Wydawca Krakowskie Towarzystwo Edukacyjne sp. z o. o. - Oficyna Wydawnicza AFM, Kraków 2011 Skład i łamanie (2005) Wojciech Prażuch Przygotowanie wersji elektronicznej książki (2011) Joanna Sroka Zdjęcia i reprodukcje ze zbiorów Autora Motto zamieszczone na s. 5 Cyt. za: Thomas Merton, Droga Chuang Tzu, przeł. M. Godyń, Wydawnictwo WAM, Kraków 2005, s. 109.