Is the Lie Detector an American Obsession?
A Response to K. Alder

This is an important book. It is the best work that has appeared in the field in a long, long while. It’s a fascinating, terribly overdue historical assessment, a semi-supplement to Trovillo’s (1939; 1940) early history and a personality-focused extension of Bunn’s (1998) dissertation on the history of the ‘lie detector’. Alder’s book is an account of “...the lie detector [which] promised to redeem the innocent, scarify the guilty, and ensure political loyalty...” from an examination of persons and personalities of primary historical forefathers, Leonarde Keeler, Dr. John Larson, Dr. William Moulton Marston and, in a limited and terribly understated way, Fred E. Inbau, J.D.

I wish to note that I heard no mention of this book in any of the sessions I attended at the APA seminar in New Orleans, August 19–25, 2007. Nor was there any comment on this book at another polygraphy-related workshop that I attended after the APA meeting. There were no casual conversations

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I heard about the book at either seminar. This, even though the book has been available since March, 2007. It has been widely discussed in the printed media and has been prominently featured on some internet sites. Reviews of the book have appeared in leading newspapers and magazines. Yet, those most active and directly involved in the field aren’t talking about it. Why? I don’t know. But, that’s a shame. A better understanding of what the field is about, how it got to where it is, and how those who were instrumental in its early development, especially Marston, Keeler, Larson and Inbau, are promising points of discussion; had they been attended to earlier, the field may well have headed off some of the difficulties it has faced. All is not lost though; careful attention to the instructional points this book has to offer could serve as a useful guide for the field in the future. I wonder if anyone will take heed.

Perhaps, many in the field are aware of this book; maybe some have even read it. It is possible that they have simply ignored it because the author is, or appears to be, in this case at least, as much a polemicist as an historian. He tends to disregard the positive and to focus on the negative. He takes some ‘facts’ at face value and ignores others. For instance, he doesn’t seem to have truly appreciated the fact that in the science related to the field there are equally sound arguments pro and con regarding issues such as accuracy, utility and so forth. There are also equally credible scientists on both sides of the arguments. The author, a distinguished academic historian, has for whatever reason ignored these facts, the two sides of the science. At various times and in various ways he offers his personal views – which he presents as if they are fully supported by science – in order to mislead or, if not that, to appeal to an audience more widely interested in the topic than those in the polygraph examiner community.

It has become a cliché to say that history repeats itself. I repeat it here because the fact that there was no mention of this book at the APA conference is strongly suggestive of the truism in that aphorism. We have learned little from our history, though it is fair to say not many have taken the time to organize that history in a coherent way. Alder has done that. But bear in mind that he is not and was not, other than having an historical interest, affiliated in any way with the field of polygraphy. Why someone with such an affiliation did not broach this topic before this time is a terrible omission. (It is within my knowledge that several prominent persons in the field, with a personal knowledge of its history, were specifically invited to take on this task in years past. They declined.)
The polemical nature of this work aside, this book still provides a fascinating account of the early history of the field. The snide, unnecessary insertions of personal bias need to be overlooked; all examiners ought to read this book. Historical analysis is by its nature interpretive and gives the author an entitlement to express his view; but he does not seem to understand the historical development beyond what his narrow focus was. That's too bad, because it has led to two serious errors in presentation. Each of these is an important prong of the author's position. And, in each case, the author is on the wrong side of the facts. However, it is possible that Alder was not and perhaps still is not aware of the importance of these errors. It's also possible that many examiners are not aware of them. I'll discuss them here in some detail before I get to a more substantive review of this book.

Alder's Major Premises

When I first entered this field I observed that one of the major points of disagreement amongst examiners was that some believed that only the testing examiner was capable of 'interpreting' the data, of reaching a valid conclusion of truthfulness and deception. This was said to be the case because only that examiner had actually discussed the case with the examinee; only that examiner knew what were the circumstances when the physiological data were collected; only that examiner interacted with the examinee and could understand the real meaning of the physiological data.

On the other hand, there was another school of examiners who believed that it was possible for one examiner to interpret 'blindly' another examiner's 'charts' in a particular case. A reviewing evaluator could take a decision regarding truthfulness and could provide feedback and advice regarding the examination outcome. In fact, in the office where I worked, in which there were about 10 to 15 examiners at any one time, it was customary for one examiner to review another's work in a case. In important cases such a review might involve multiple evaluators, almost always including John Reid.

It is of interest to note at this point that persons holding these two schools of thought strongly believed in the correctness of their respective positions; yet neither school had actually sought to test their views empirically. Fortunately, that situation has changed, but discussion of that change is not the point here. The immediate issue is that my observations about these two schools of thought separate, historically, the focus of Alder's work from more
contemporary developments. That is, Alder’s coverage ends close to where Polygraphy, as I came to understand it, begins.

In my early experience, the first school of thought was represented by the Keeler Polygraph (school) Institute; the second by the Reid Polygraph School. I need to note here, however, that while each of these institutions is mentioned specifically, my intent is not to single them out, but merely to use them for convenience’s sake as clear representatives of the two opposing viewpoints about polygraph testing.

It is fair to say that at the time I attended and then worked at the Reid school a less than positive relationship existed between John Reid and the person who headed the Keeler school; the two schools were located only a few miles apart in Chicago. This schism was based in large part on the divergence of views on how polygraphy and interrogation are, or are not, to be blended together in a properly conducted polygraph examination. Reid was of the view that interrogation followed polygraph testing once the examination revealed ‘deception’. The head of the Keeler School held that interrogation and polygraph testing were essentially undifferentiated; the two were to be combined in some way, as determined by the examiner, to arrive at whatever the ‘truth’ was.

My observations about these two schools of thought were confirmed in a conversation I had with Lynn Marcy, one of the premier examiners in the field. He was employed at the Keeler school for some time, and he understands well the principles of the teaching offered at that institution. He also understands well the position of the Reid School. He has confirmed that the Keeler school, and especially Leonarde Keeler and his direct disciples, strongly held to the conviction that polygraph testing and interrogation were inseparable arts; the polygraph testing and the charts produced during an examination took on meaning in a particular case as the examiner and the examinee interacted throughout the entire process. One could not know (infer) from access only to the charts whether a response was produced by a ‘lie’; to know that one had to interrogate. (A point on which I and the late Raymond Weir, another premier polygraph examiner for whom I had and have the greatest respect, strongly disagreed, even though we spent many long nights and early morning hours discussing it without either of us ever changing or rearranging our positions in the slightest.)
The difference between these two schools of thought, at least as they are represented in my experience, is key to understanding one of the serious shortcomings in Alder’s book. He fails to note and does not seem to understand the difference between the “old school” (Keeler) and the “new school” (Reid). He reports, for example, “Keeler’s style of lie detection succeeded at its principal task — extracting confessions and intimidating subjects — only if the operators consistently refused to be bound by even the most basic norms and standards. If polygraphers have thrived, it is because they are consummate antiprofessionals... Indeed, the lie detector is a placebo science, in that it works to the extent the popular culture has been convinced it works — even though it works best when its operators lie” and “a whiff of hokum has always trailed after the device [lie detector] since its early days in Berkeley... But, there always remains a residual skepticism about skepticism — the sort of self-doubt that P.T. Barnum knew how to exploit so well... There is always a lingering suspicion that the damn machine just might possibly work... The one major technical innovation in the polygraph since the 1930s actually confirms the power of this ruse. In the 1990s new computer algorithms were developed that could analyze the subject’s physiological responses with mechanical neutrality. But because the algorithms might preclude operators from accusing subjects of lying (whatever the machine said), the nation’s top examiners at the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute report that most operators turn the computer off.” “In sum, Keeler and his followers operated his lie detector according to the same logic as judicial torture. This explains why the police... ultimately welcomed the device.” So Keeler’s lie detector in a ‘box’ provided for almost anyone who was “less interested in the polygraph record per se than in using it to screen suspects, intimidate detainees, and extract confessions.”

The other school of thought, represented by the Reid School, is not, as I have said, directly discussed or even alluded to in Alder’s book. Alder either doesn’t know about or has deliberately ignored the six decades of history following that which was the focus of his interest. To him ‘lie detection’ following Keeler’s era is the same as that in and before that period of time. Keeler’s approach, however, is not what Reid advocated. While it is true that Reid’s approach, the use of a carefully structured testing process that permits independent review of collected physiological data, is still not universally adhered to in the field, there is little doubt that such an approach is a significant departure from the idiosyncratic methods of Keeler. Though Alder ignores this fact, it is of historical note that Keeler’s contemporary and mentor and a prominent figure in this volume, Dr. John Larson, viewed what
Keeler did with the ‘lie detector’ with great skepticism. He was, in some sense, an early representative of what J. Reid advocated, as these quotes from Alder make clear. “Unlike Keeler...he [Larson] had always published his results in journals of criminology and psychology, as it was priority that mattered in science... He feared that Keeler would sell machines ‘to every Tom, Dick and Harry,’ allowing poorly trained operators to ruin the reputation of the new science.” “Larson obliquely condemned Keeler for ‘interrogation’ akin to torture... But the device ought not be called a ‘lie detector,’” and “Larson was adamant that exams be conducted only by a fully trained psychiatric expert, working in conjunction with experts in psychology, criminology, social work and police procedure” ... “For Keeler... police units using his polygraph technique [demonstrated that] ... [of the] one-third of subjects labeled ‘deceptive,’ an impressive average of 60 percent were persuaded to confess” ... “This survey... may offer the best picture we will ever have of how the police deploy the polygraph when they think no outsider is watching” .... “The operator with the Indiana state police achieved a confession rate of only 6 percent... Why the huge difference? The operator in Indiana was the only one trained not by Leonarde Keeler but by John Larson...” John Larson, the nation’s first cop with a Ph.D., “wanted to transform the ...lie detector. He was concerned about Keeler as his ‘first pupil’ and his interest in ‘training unethical interrogators.’ Larson was much more of a scientific bent and his efforts in ‘lie detection’ were, at core, “part of the division between early statistical approaches to psychology and sociology and those who saw an individualistic approach to problems as being the more viable method.” “Larson tried to work with Marston to denounce Keeler’s false claims about the lie detector and his training scheme ‘a racket that had ruined the field with ‘quacks’. Behind the Taylorism and intelligence testing”, [and] “Behind the public façade, the polygraph, depending on how it was operated, did not necessarily restrict the discretion of examiners. Indeed, as Keeler conceived it, the lie detector might even enhance the power of the police, by becoming a psychological third degree. And it was here that Larson and Keeler would part company.”

In summary of this point, Alder is correct in stating that the split between Larson and Keeler “would be two distinct lie detectors”. but, as history shows, it was not Larson, but Reid, who turned out to endure on the opposite side of Keeler.

The other major prong of Alder’s thesis is that the ‘lie detector’ is a peculiarly American device. Americans, and Americans alone, Alder declares, have
been obsessed with the ‘lie detector’. “Keeler sold only one machine outside the United States, to Selfridges in England. Even in Canada the American instrument was spurned by both the police and business.” “Only in America was the lie detector used to interrogate criminals and vet employees. Abroad, it was disparaged as a typical American gimmick.” “Yet no country other than the United States has made use of the technique to any significant degree” ...

“Why, despite the avalanche of scientific denunciations, does the United States — and only the United States — continue to make significant use of the lie detector?”

Alder answers the question he raises, in accord with his thesis, by stating that: “The lie detector has thrived in America because the instrument played into one of the great projects of the twentieth century: the effort to transform the central moral question of our collective life — how to fashion a just society — into a legal problem.” “...the proponents of lie detection have packaged their technique as a mechanical oracle that can read the body’s hidden signs for evidence of deceit — while they sidestep the skeptical interpretive labor that scientists ordinarily demand of such claims. The lie detector and its progeny have been repeatedly denounced by respectable science... In the end, though. We believe in the lie detector because—no matter what respectable science says — we are tempted.”

Alder’s position on ‘lie detection’ being a peculiarly American phenomenon might well have been true in the formative years of its history. But it is disappointing to realize that Alder’s research did not reveal the growing use of Polygraphy outside of the United States from at least the 1950s. It is true, as Alder states in his penultimate chapter titled “Pinkos”, that: “In reality, neither the Soviet Union nor Nazi Germany before it saw any need for the lie detector — as the CIA secretly acknowledged. Totalitarian governments brook no impediment to their control...” However, in today’s world the situation is dramatically different from what one might conclude from a reading of Alder’s book. The polygraph was used in Europe, Poland in particular, since at least the 1950s, possibly earlier (Pasko-Porys 2007; Widacki 2007; Widacki 2007a). In Russia, as well as in many other former Soviet Union states, polygraph testing is now widely used. When I first visited there with a delegation of polygraph examiners and police officials in 1991, there may have been, as was acknowledged by local scientists, fewer than ten examiners in Russia. Today, by all accounts there are many hundreds, and according to some perhaps close to 1,000. There are several companies in Russia who today manufacture their own brand name polygraph instruments. Similarly, when
I first led a delegation to China in the mid-1990s there were few examiners there, most using instruments illegally obtained from the U.S. Today there may be as many as five or six, perhaps more, different Chinese manufactured instruments in use. The total number of examiners in China is not certain but it may well be in the hundreds. And, aside from China, Russia and other former Soviet Union states, polygraph testing is widely used in many countries in Europe, Africa, Asia, and Central and South America, including, among others, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, Hungary, Israel, Japan, Lithuania, Mexico, Romania, Singapore, South Africa and Thailand.

Any astute observer of Polygraphy today would surely realize that the field has been and is expanding dramatically, more so outside of the U.S. than within. This is not because American gimmickery is easy to pass on to naive audiences. And it is not because other countries wish to be foolishly, to defy the ostensible wisdom of American criminal courts and scientific opinion in what Alder points out is the case in the U.S. where he states: “And even in America, the lie detector has been consistently banned from criminal courts and discredited by panels of illustrious scientists, from the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment to the National Academy of Sciences.” The truth is that in spite of what Alder and like-minded observers state, Polygraphy is an invaluable technique that contributes to criminal and other investigations in ways that, as yet, are not possible with any other method. This is a lesson that Americans have learned and one that has been and is being learned in many countries across the world. Polygraphy, in contrast to what Alder speculates, is not an American phenomenon that was fashioned in the sociology of societal transformation; there is clearly something more going on here. It is simply undeniable that in spite of its many flaws and limitations, the field of Polygraphy is growing around the world. Those with a serious interest in history and science ought to be more honest about this.

Now, aside from being based on faulty premises, what is it that Alder has to say about ‘lie detection’; about its history and those who pioneered the field? Well, there is plenty of material in this book, some never before available. That ought to be of interest to persons in the field as well as those with a special interest in policing, police science and even the broader forensic sciences.
On the Composition of the Field

In the U.S. the field of Polygraphy is male-dominated, police-affiliated, and short of persons holding advanced academic credentials (Horvath 2007; Weber & Horvath, in press). It is of interest to note, however, that in policing today it is relatively easy to find sworn officers with Ph.D.s; but that is not so in Polygraphy. Of even more interest is the fact that the very first police officer in the nation with a Ph.D. was John Larson, one of the principal figures in this book and, of course, one of the first contributors to Polygraphy. It was Larson, as pointed out in this book, who emphasized “science” as opposed to “interrogation” in his approach to ‘lie detection’. Though not meeting the educational standard set by Larson, examiners today do overwhelmingly represent policing, with over 80% of them being directly affiliated with law enforcement in some way (Horvath 1995, 2007). Today, about 10% of the polygraph examiner population is female; that has not changed dramatically in the past ten years and, considering that in “…1939 Keeler set himself up as Keeler, Inc., …and “trained Jane Wilson – Katherine’s [Keeler’s wife] friend and the wife of his partner Charlie Wilson – as the nation’s first female polygraph operator” females in the field are clearly underrepresented. Why hasn’t the field organized in such a way as to try to remedy this imbalance?

On Courtroom Admissibility

With respect to courtroom admissibility almost every examiner can trace back to the Frye case in 1923. Some are even aware that that case involved the work of Dr. William Moulton Marston, not Larson or Keeler. Most may not know, however, that Keeler, a relatively uneducated but very popularized practitioner, believed that courtroom admissibility was key to the conditional success of the field. In the courtroom Keeler recognized that: “Without a college degree, …[he] would have been an easy mark on the stand. So he immediately got on the horn and ‘shouted loudly for John L. [Larson] with his experience and many degrees.” Alder explains: “Then, a year later, Keeler achieved the breakthrough so far denied him: he formally presented results from his lie detector to a jury.” “According to the judge’s private survey, the jurors found the lie detector offered “corroborative evidence in connection with other facts proved”, and they voted to convict. “The case did, however, set a legal precedent: prior stipulation remains the sole basis for the polygraph tests in most criminal courts.” During this same period, however, the judiciary invoked the same Frye rule to admit many other forensic sciences treated
with considerable skepticism outside the immediate circle of practitioners: handwriting analysis, ballistic identification, and forensic psychology, to name a few. The lie detector alone has been banned. As several judges have hinted, the courts rejected the lie detector not for its failings but for its power — what one called its ‘aura of near infallibility, akin to the ancient oracle of Delphi.’ “the judiciary kept the polygraph out of their criminal courts — while, of course, allowing it to play a role in the invisible 90 percent of criminal cases where it functioned as just another chip in a game of plea bargaining.” One can see that in spite of Keeler’s efforts, and in spite of the many years that have intervened between those efforts and today’s world, the judicial view on Polygraphy has not changed much. Why is it that the field has not addressed this issue with greater energy and directness?

On the ‘Guilty Knowledge Test’

Many observers credit the late David Lykken (1959) with the development and dissemination of information about what he termed the Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT). Though his GKT is unique in important ways, Ansley (1992) reviewed the literature on this topic and found that variations of the GKT were used early in the history of the field, long before Lykken published on the topic. These uses were not, strictly speaking, only dealing with the GKT-related Peak of Tension Test (POT). The GKT, which in my view is more properly termed Information Recognition Test (IRT), seems to have been initially used by Keeler in what was known in 1935 as the Valier Mine case. Here Keeler was called to investigate an explosion at a labor-related event. He went to the crime scene and “picked out evidence of guilty knowledge”, “a half-shattered alarm clock, which he assumed was the bomb’s timer because of its copper leads and adhesive tape.” With this knowledge in mind Keeler examined two suspects, McDonald and Robertson. His examinations led to “a physiological reaction from McDonald and Robertson after an eighteen-hour interrogation on the lie detector that was so intense that Robertson had ended it by smashing the machine with his fist.” McDonald and Robertson didn’t confess but their trial was a presentation of scientific evidence, based on Keeler’s crime scene findings, ‘Res ipsa loquitur’ — the thing speaks for itself — that led to widespread recognition of Keeler’s laboratory and colleagues in forensic science.

In another early use of a similar examination Keeler examined a person named Anderson who was a suspect in a homicide. “He asked if Anderson
had killed her with a stone, with a stick, with a fist, with a shoe, with an iron pipe. And every time Keeler mentioned the iron pipe, the ‘delicate needles of the detector... waivered violently.’ Anderson, the examinee, went out to get some air... he was overheard to say, ‘This is just as good a time as any.’ just before he dived headfirst through the... window and landed... four floors below.”

What is most interesting regarding the reference to the IRT use by Keeler (I assume but don’t know with certainty that he was the first to do what is described in this book.) is that he did what is now standard procedure in some locations. He actually visited a crime scene, collected evidence and information of value to polygraph testing, and then designed his testing approach based on such data. Though such a process is not widely practiced in the United States, the one country where the use of the IRT in this way is common is Japan, where the CQT is seldom emphasized (Mizutani, 2005). Some examiners in Slovenia reportedly also do this.

On Training

Keeler’s, after the war, “was still the only place in the nation to go for training in lie detection: either a two-week orientation course for $30 a week, or the more extensive six-week courses for certificate as a graduate of ‘Leonarde Keeler, Incorporated’ – though Keeler always pointed out that it took at least a year of supervised casework to become a proficient examiner.” Keeler’s approach greatly concerned Larson. “Unlike Keeler... he had always published his results in journals of criminology and psychology, as it was priority that mattered in science... He feared that Keeler would sell machines ‘to every Tom, Dick and Harry,’ allowing poorly trained operators to ruin the reputation of the new science.” It was Reid, however, not Larson, who challenged Keeler’s training model. Reid’s approach required a six-month training program involving academic study and a strong, closely supervised internship with ‘real-life’ testing carried out under the tutelage of an experienced examiner. In the U.S. the only training program that is active today with a program similar to what Reid implemented and which Larson advocated is that connected with the federal government. The Defense Academy of Credibility Assessment (DACA) program is much shorter than the Reid program, but it does include an emphasis on closely monitored testing experience.
On the Court of Last Resort

In Chapter 17, Deus Ex Machina, Alder describes, in part, how Keeler was sought out to exonerate those who were or claimed to be wrongly accused and those who he could absolve of guilt, nameless or otherwise, for a real or perceived offense. Importantly, though, in a more formal effort, Keeler did, along with the help of Earle Stanley Gardner and Raymond Schindler, bestselling author and famous detective, found the Court of Last Resort. There was a time when the APA actively promoted the ‘Court’ and sought to carry on its purposes. Sadly, that activity has ceased or, at the least, does not appear to be a vital part of the APA’s agenda.

Examiners will have to read this chapter with a bit of caution – perhaps restraint is a better term. Alder’s perspective on Keeler, and, more generally, on the field of Polygraphy, is revealed in his concluding commentary. He says: Quaesalid did not become a great shaman because he cured his patients; he cured his patients because he became a great shaman.” “Leonard (sic) Keeler was such a shaman.” No doubt, Alder believes this to be the case for all in Polygraphy.

On the Development of the ‘Lie Detector’

Who really invented the ‘lie detector?’ Well, as we all know no one did; there is not now and never has been a Lie Detector. In the early years of the field there was, however, the media. It was... “the newspapers [who] baptized the lie detector; they named the device, launched its career, gave it its purpose. The machine made great copy, great pictures, great drama.”

In developing his ‘lie detector’ Keeler had at least three problems to solve: “how to register blood pressure fluctuations in quantitative terms, how to combine physiological measures on a single scale, and how to make the device portable...” He surmounted those problems, of course. And, in chapter 18, titled, “Frankenstein lives!” we learn that rightly or wrongly, deserved or not: “LeonardeKeeler got much of the credit for ‘lie detection’ in the popular media.” But his mentor, John Larson, believed “he had created a monster: a ‘salesman,’ an ‘exploiter,’ a ‘showman’...” “Lee, Keeler and many others had allowed the ‘so-called lie detector’ to be turned into a ‘psychological third degree.’ But ‘If Larson had not invented the lie detector, someone else would have’... all of the
men formerly famous for having ‘invented’ the lie detector have been forgotten, except one. Only William Moulton Marston... has endured” ... “He was proud of his creation, and never seemed to suffer for it.”

On Alternatives to the Keeler Polygraph

In the years covered by Alder, Polygraphy was a high-profile media topic and, as already noted, Keeler was at the forefront of this public attention. With that as a backdrop it is perhaps no surprise that some persons tried to capitalize on this new ‘science’. For instance, as Alder points out there was Dr. Orlando Scott, a Chicago surgeon, who developed and “out-grandstanded” the lab where Keeler worked in order to promote his “own 100-percent-effective ‘Thought-Wave-Detector’, which tapped, he said, the electrical currents of the brain.” Scott proudly advertised his National Detection of Deception Laboratories with the motto, “Diogenes searched for them... We find them.” Then there was “Darrow’s Stoelting device and Lee’s Berkeley Psychograph.” Each promoter claimed, of course, to have developed a better ‘lie detector’, more accurate, faster and easier than what Keeler was offering. Sound familiar? Maybe something like what so-called voice-stress proponents today are offering to those naïve enough to believe the promotional materials?

In Conclusion

In chapter 19 – Vox Populi – the last chapter, Alder states: “Over the course of the past eighty years, lie detection has been perhaps the most investigated forensic technique.” This is, in my view, probably true. It is also one of the most often unstated and unrecognized facts about this field. Why?

The conclusion according to Alder is: “the techniques of lie detection, as used in investigative work by polygraphers, do not pass scientific muster. Yet lie detection lives on.” “The lie detector cannot be killed by science, because it is not born of science.” “The one constant is the machinery’s role in political theater. For the past several decades nary a public scandal has gone by without its polygraph moment.” It should be obvious that I disagree with Alder’s perspective here. In resolving such scandals as well as in many other situations involving human affairs and social conflict is there, despite the limitations in Polygraphy, a better, fairer, more accurate alternative to ‘lie detection’? Not yet; at least that is my view and the view of the National Academy of Sciences (2003).
There is a lot more in this book than what I have been able to cover. And, as I have stated, the historical record of this field is only partially set out by what can be found in this volume. If there is among the readers of this review one who would like to take the opportunity to update the history of the field, that would be a most welcome event. And, I might add, among those who would welcome it are many persons still available who have lived the history and are willing to share it.\footnote{2}

Finally, Alder states: “...polygraph experts have urged their colleagues to set rigorous protocols for interrogation and to establish licensed training schools. In fact, only cursory standards have been adopted, and the reason is simple enough. Keeler’s style of Polygraphy works best when the examiners are not constrained by norms.” Alder’s point notwithstanding, we have, of course, made some inroads here, and we are continuing to work at this. The history of the field, though, tells us there is a still a lot to do, and maybe there are better ways to do this than what is now being done. Isn’t it time to use the lessons of history to guide us into the future?

Notes

1. Alder, K. (2007), The lie detectors: The history of an American Obsession, New York: Free Press, p. 336. [A personal note: Be forewarned — The footnoting/reference system in this book is, to say the least, disconcerting. It takes considerable effort to try to determine the source of attribution for the author’s commentary and even with that it is not always possible to be certain that the correct source has been identified.]

2. During certain periods of the APA’s history, there was a formal attempt to record organized interviews with prominent examiners and others in order to document recollections of events in the field. I believe that some of these recordings are still available. The idea, however, is a good one and ought to be vigorously pursued on a more frequent and regular basis.

References


Horvath, F. (2007, August), *Polygraphy and Polygraphists: A Decade of Change or Only a Change in Decades,* Paper presented at the meeting of the American Polygraph Association, New Orleans, LA.


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