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EUROPEIZATION AND THE PROMOTION OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN POLAND

Introduction

This study has considered the impacts of EU accession that have resulted in the promotion of political stability and economic transformation in the Central and Eastern European countries (hereafter CEECs). The main target for the EU's eastern policy after the end of the Cold War is to create a zone of western democracies and liberal economy entities. Given an opportunity to swap the EU's resources for ideal transformation in the CEECs, Brussels is willing to accept.

The ways that Brussels influences the CEECs are hallmarked by two different approaches: transposition and socialization. The former, in terms of international jurisdiction, is the execution of decision-making by the Council of Ministers in Brussels and legislation in the capitals of member states.¹ The promise of eventual accession and EU subsidies help to secure national acceptance of painful reforms; moreover, it also helps to safeguard the reform from the influence of vested interests by increasing the costs of deviating from the path of reform. Cost/benefit calculation is embedded within national policy preferences. The latter approach, socialization, is another important aspect that has a crucial effect on the CEECs' political development. Socialization is best understood as a way of comprehension of the CEECs' willingness to "return to Europe", or, to a greater or lesser extent, a sense of "European identity". This identity is obtained with reference to the structure of relations

¹ E. Bomberg and A. Stubb, *The European Union: How does it Work?*, Oxford 2004, p. 116.





among member states, and all of them cherish the common norms and values.² In the case of Poland and Ukraine, the construction of identities is conditioned by different time-spans and events but with a truly existing common ground. They both accept universal values exerted from Brussels on one hand; they also try to “upload” their own values to the European family on the other. With recourse to transposition and socialization the EU’s rules prevailed over Poland even before 1 May 2004; Poland’s road to the EU also characterizes the importance of Europeanization and its future implications. In the context of European enlargement and the challenge from globalization, the EU is also now trying to disseminate its model to the eastern border. The strategic importance of Ukraine and Belarus privileges geographical concerns after the EU’s fifth enlargement; there are also cooperative interests shared with the US. Whether Ukraine gains EU membership in the near future or casts aside integration with Brussels, the EU’s promise of eventual accession helps to secure social acceptance of painful reforms and to safeguard them from the influence of vested interests by increasing the costs of deviating from the path of reform. In this regard, the case of Poland has provided an illustration by its profound experiences. For Poland’s security, America became the security guarantor that the Poles had craved since the late eighteenth century. It also helped forge Poland’s security policy after the end of Cold War: strict adherence to US hegemonic leadership on one hand, and a more integrated partnership with the European Union on the other.³

Europeanization, Political Development and an Explanatory Model

Europeanization

Europeanization is a common term, but its definition is also often ambiguous to outsiders. Europeanization can be referred to as a concept of rules, norms and values being adopted in countries under a process in a pro-European way. In terms of philosophical usage, Europeanization can be understood as the aggregation of European civilization, which has a profound tradition of modern social development mingled with a capitalist system, social institutions and respect for basic human rights.⁴ On the other side, Europeanization also functions as the intangible effects of the promotion of European standards at the time when new member states apply for admission. And Europeanization can be also regarded as a process of European socialization, educating people and countries the way Europeans did. The basic as-

² F. Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs*, Cambridge 1989, p. 126.

³ R. Kuźniar, *Bezpieczeństwo – realizm oceny, dylematy polityki*, „Polska w Europie” 2002, vol. 41, No. 3, p. 131–159.

⁴ A. Obydenkova, *Democratization, Europeanization and Regionalization beyond the European Union: Search for Empirical Evidence*, “European Integration Online Papers” 2006, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 5.



sumptions for this theory are the application of social learning theory. The changing of the external environment (the end of the Cold War and the promise of EU accession to new members) envisioned the possible advent of a new era. In line with this international development, power structure and knowledge background in the European system evince a tendency toward the reconstruction of norms and ideas in Central and Eastern Europe. As the place where Europeanization prevails, the European Union exerts its influences and a social learning process is identified.⁵

Europeanization is also tied in with visible rule adoption – in European jargon transposition. All members are obliged to adopt Brussels' regulations, notwithstanding the fact that transposition is not always so hard-nosed. By the same token, the other, relatively vague influence on EU members, for example social institutions, techniques, and ways of thinking (such as tolerance, democracy and respect for human rights) are also included.⁶ Poland has a profound tradition advocating the reform of the modern social system. In the 1980s the Polish opposition Solidarity made requests for autonomous status in the Polish political arena and strove for equal treatment for all citizens; those ideas were derived from the practices of Western democracy. The reform of the political system can even trace its history back to 3 May 1791, the advent of the first European constitution in Poland.⁷

Moreover, Europeanization is not only a one-way journey. Although member states were influenced by Brussels, capitals of nation-states also try to “upload” their characteristics to the EU family. To a greater or lesser extent, member states are competing for the dominance of EU governance. Poland's admission to the EU is also a turning point in history from 1795, the year when Poland's territory was partitioned into three parts and the Polish state ceased to exist.⁸ From that time on, the most important part of Polish foreign policy was how to restore Polish culture and the independence of Poland's sovereignty. The Roman Catholic Church and Polish gentry classes were the two most important factors preserving Polish tradition from deterioration or assimilation. Their endeavors paid off at last when the Kremlin's control over Poland's territory loosened. Its identity transformation (from romanticism to positivism and then to ethnonationalism) paved the way for an eventual fully-fledged “return to Europe” and its way of thinking for Poland.⁹ The symbol of this change is joining NATO and the EU after the break-up of the

⁵ To some extent, the emergence of Europeanization resembles the formation of European community – see E. Adler and M. Barnett, *A Framework for the Study of Security Communities*, [in:] *Security Communities*, ed. E. Adler and M. Barnett, Cambridge 1998, p. 20–65.

⁶ F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, Cornell 2005, p. 7–8.

⁷ M. Cirtautas, *The Polish Solidarity Movement: Revolution, Democracy and Natural Rights*, London 1997.

⁸ Prussia annexed the region from Pilica to the Bug and Niemen, Austria incorporated the territory as far as Palica, Vistula and Bug, while the remainder went to Russia, see R. Buczycyk, *A History of Poland*, Lublin 2002, p. 47.

⁹ I. Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy – Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge 1998.

Eastern Bloc. Poland's hard-won sovereignty after the end of the Cold War in the face of EU integration reveals the country's position in an awkward predicament: the preservation of Polish tradition will inevitably collide with Western culture when the Soviet Union starts to retreat from its area of influence. Political reform within the domestic area, with special regard to the agricultural part, for example, is the combination of cost/benefit calculation and a sense of national pride in terms of them/us identity. How much the Warsaw government could benefit from EU admission, and how the Polish western territory can be reserved for future development without purchase of land by foreign capital, are some of the political elite's major concerns. In this regard, striking a balance between acquiring EU membership and maintaining autonomous status within the EU is desirable, despite occasional conflicts between those goals.

The theoretical analysis for Poland joining the EU in 2004 is based on two assumptions. Admission to the EU is driven mainly by EU incentives (external) and the social learning process (internal). The author argues that the intangible effects emanating from Brussels lead to the adjustment of Poland's political development and domestic policy Europeanization. External incentives include conditionality as a way of paying rewards from Brussels in exchange for candidates' domestic reform. Conditionality situates candidate states in a role of keeping upward spiral movement, and those aspiring members render progress in exchange for the EU's favor.¹⁰ Those political elites in aspiring states, for example Poland, have to tackle the problem of obeying Brussels' laws (aiming at direct and indirect benefits) and the loss of votes from vested interests camp with regard to reformation. The adoption of the cost/benefit calculation specifies the importance and guidance of the political elite's behavior. In the agricultural sector, for example, Polish peasants face serious threats in terms of Poland's accession to the EU accompanied with a free and competitive market mechanism. Starting on 12 January 2004, European Commission inspectors have traveled around Poland to see whether EU sanitary standards are applied by Polish businesses, and this action has led to many meat plants ceasing to exist and their sales most likely being shared by other dairy producers.¹¹

Polish Political Development and Europeanization

The many faces of political development are in conjunction with Europeanization, especially in public policies, national identities, minority protection, civil service reform, the advent of civil society and mass political participation. For example,

¹⁰ F. Schimmelfennig, S. Engert, H. Knobel, *Costs, Commitment, and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey*, "Journal of Common Market Studies" 2003, No. 41, p. 495–517.

¹¹ After the accession Polish milk and other food products are subject to strict veterinary controls. "Rzeczpospolita" (Warsaw), 10–11 January 2004, p. A1; "Polish News Bulletin" (Warsaw), 10 December 2002, p. 4.

direct and indirect applicability of international treaties to domestic laws posed a problem to the Polish political environment on the road to the EU before 1997. The constitution of 1952 did not contain any provision on effects of treaties on the internal legal order; but the constitution of 1997 recognizes the effect of ratified treaties as the sources of the laws binding in Poland.¹² The same connection between Europeanization and civil service reform is also highlighted in the transformation of public policies and well-organized bureaucracies.

In line with the cross-pollination between Europeanization and political development, a two-dimension explanatory model can be developed within the interactions of external incentives (cost/benefit calculation)/social learning and domestically-driven/EU-driven forces.¹³ Costs and benefits calculation would be the most striking feature, as Poland applied for its admission to the EU in the 1990s, and will play a major role in the formation of Poland's European policy. Newly independent countries are always preoccupied with survival, power and security; hence policies are sometimes susceptible to national gains and profits. As for the effects of social learning, the impacts of cognition processes and disposition, perception, learning processes or perceptual illusions should be juxtaposed with material interests. The upshot of material and non-material concerns is that both factors are explanatory in bolstering the interpretation of Poland's adaptation to the EU model. In addition to that, domestic and EU-driven factors are analyzed in an endogenous and exogenous-oriented way respectively. Before the start of democratization in the 1990s political dissenters launched their attacks on vested interests from within, and the wave of transformation is relayed by the political parties after the 1990s. The ensuing cohabitation situation also lies in Poland's application to the EU and later EU quests to redecorate the interior. Both factors are instrumental in the explanation of Poland's political transformation.

Tab. Poland's Europeanization

	Late 1980s to mid 1990s Polish Transformation	EU Admission
External Incentives	Mixed effects in this period	Costs and benefits calculation matter on the way to EU
Social Learning Process	The transformative ideas had grassroots and also were derived from the outside world	The socialization of Internalized EU norms

Sources: *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, eds. F. Schimmelfennig, U. Sedelmeier, Cornell 2005, p. 1–28.

¹² A. Wyrozumska, *Direct Application of the Polish Constitution and International Treaties to Private Conduct*, [in:] *Poland's Way to the European Union*, ed. W. Czaplinski, Warsaw 2002, p. 9–34.

¹³ The idea is derived and modified from *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe...*, p. 8.

The Explanatory Model

In the 1980s and at the end of the 1990s the EU's external incentives had mixed effects on Polish political transformation. The EU's Europe Agreement and subsidies like the PHARE program constituted the EU's pre-accession strategy towards the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe.¹⁴ The PHARE (Poland-Hungary Assistance in Restructuring their Economies), SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development) and ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession) co-supported economic transformation, but their objective was political.¹⁵ They helped to establish democratic societies based on individual rights; the total PHARE funds committed in 1990-1995 were 5416.9 ECU million.¹⁶

For Western countries, the recipient countries' reforms in economic and political aspects were crucial for long-term stability and security in Europe. The effects of direct and indirect subsidies are multifold: first, the EU developed conditionality as a prerequisite for the CEECs' way to the West. In 1988-1989 the EU was developing common policies toward the CEECs; instead of political motives, these policies were based on trade and cooperation exchanges. Second, in some sensitive areas such as coal and steel products, the CEECs had a limited volume of trade with the EU. Third, the EU's reluctance to offer the CEECs final membership at that time bred discontent from the beginning, but soon this was replaced by a more intensive claim to their membership status.¹⁷

The EU's external incentives had more influences on the Polish way to the EU. In addition to PHARE, the advent of SAPARD and ISPA in 1999 brought more investments to Poland and other CEECs. Moreover, with the emerging possibility of joining the EU Poland had adopted progressive transition under European Commission's annual report and community *acquis*.

¹⁴ The program "Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies (PHARE)", for example, assisted the reform process in Central and Eastern Europe. It assisted the eight new Member States: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, as well as acceding countries Bulgaria and Romania in a period of massive economic restructuring and political change.

¹⁵ PHARE was created in 1989 as the program to assist in their preparations for joining the EU. It also expanded from Poland and Hungary to currently ten countries. SAPARD is a program for 10 CEECs applying for membership in the European Union. It is aimed at financial support of projects related to the agricultural and rural development. ISPA is for CEECs to co-finance infrastructure projects in the field of environmental protection and transport. Those three programs constitute the EU pre-accession program. SAPARD and ISPA were created in 1999 to advance the EU's concerns over candidates' improvement in domestic areas and PHARE was allowed to focus on its key factors.

¹⁶ In 1989 the EU had a small trade deficit with CEECs; after that period, it realized a growing surplus with CEECs. See European Commission, "The PHARE Programme Annual Report 1995, COM (96) 360 final, 23 July 1996, p. 3.

¹⁷ Commission of the European Communities, External Relations Information no. 1/89, "The European Community's Relations with COMECON and Its East European members," January 1989, p. 4.

The EU took advantage of Poland's intention to gain accession, which put it in a weaker position toward the EU from the outset.¹⁸ Admittedly, the huge imbalance in the incentive structure between the EU and Poland specified how the Polish government had to deal with Brussels' demands. Poland's potential gains from its admission after 1 May 2004 even deepened the structurally lopsided dependence. Polish public opinions were also tied in with Poland's referendum on joining the EU with regard to whether Polish people would benefit more from material gains in the context of EU subsidies.¹⁹

Poland's transformative ideas in the late 1980s had their grassroots and were derived from the outside world. With the collapse of Soviet control and the dismantling of local communist parties, the situation in Poland was further compounded by inability or failure to establish a genuine party system. Lack of experience in organizing parties among former oppositionists and popular distrust of political parties are the legacy of prolonged one-party rule.²⁰ The transition to democratization results from a need for re-adoption of the political system. In terms of adaptability of the political situation, international factors could explain the outcome of Polish democracy. The demonstration effect, whereby we treat states in imitation of human beings, seems relatively applicable to the demise of regime collapse.

Coercion, cost/benefit calculation, and material incentives are factors in the context of rationalism which in part cause political phenomena. But for Poland and the other CEEC candidates, liberation from the Communist Bloc and the acquisition of autonomous national sovereignty designates the importance of exercising power unilaterally. Unlike international interaction within a global framework, Poland's participation in the European continent has profound experiences, which also evince a tendency toward a closer cooperation among European members in the near future. How the EU works and how decisions are made are allocated to those aspiring members. By the same token, complying with EU regulations or defying EU directives are also deemed as part of socialization. Poland needs to, firstly, identify where the national interests are in a totally different international environment after the end of Cold War. National interests might be modified in the course of strategic as well as social learning interaction.²¹

¹⁸ P. Nicolaidis, S. Rajan Boean, F. Bollen and P. Pezaros, *A Guide to the Enlargement of the European Union: A Review of the Process, Negotiations, Policy Reforms and Enforcement Capacity*, Maastricht 1999, p. 33.

¹⁹ D. Husz, "Public Opinion-A Stumbling Block to Enlargement?". *An Analysis of the Relationship between Costs and Benefits of the EU-Enlargement and their Perception in Current EU Member-States*, "Perspectives" 2003, No. 20, p. 5-39.

²⁰ R. A. Remington, *Contradictions on the Road to Democracy and the Market in East Central Europe*, "Midsouth Political Science Journal" 1992, Vol. 13, p. 12-13. Cited from R. D. Markwick, *A Discipline in Transition? From Sovietology to 'Transitology'*, "The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics" 1996, Vol. 12, p. 263-267.

²¹ J. T. Checkel, *Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change*, "International Organization" 2001, Vol. 55, No. 3, p. 553-588.

Polish Road to EU Membership: Domestic Reform through Europeanization

Poland became a full member of the EU on 1 May 2004. Its participation in the EU can be traced back to 16 December 1991, when Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary signed the “*Europe Agreement*” with the European Community. On 3 May 1993 the EU Commission published a report which set the stage for EU implementation of eastward enlargement. On the basis of that report, the EU heads of government decided to invite former Eastern European countries as future members at the Copenhagen European Council, with the so-called “Copenhagen Criteria” on 21-22 June 1993.²² The European Council agreed that the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe should become members of the European Union. Accession would take place as soon as an associated country was able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required. EU membership requires three elements: democracy, market economy and capabilities to carry out obligations resulting from membership in political, economic and monetary union. In July 1997, the European Commission published a set of documents under the common title “Agenda 2000”, including proposals for changes to be brought to principles of functioning of the Union with the aim to ready it for adoption of Poland.²³ On the other side, to be a qualified member in the EU, the requirements are massive, non-negotiable, uniformly applied, and closely enforced. All relational domestic laws and regulations in Poland have to live up to EU standards: these standards include free movement of goods, persons, services and capital; and other specific items such as agriculture, fisheries, transportation and taxation, etc.²⁴

EU membership was crucial in Poland’s grand strategy after the end of the Cold War. It not only can bring visual benefits to a country which is starving for foreign investments and know-how information, but also can be instrumental in bolstering the confidence of national identity, which is the symbol of an independent country after the long alien occupation. For the political elites in Warsaw, the incentives that the EU can present are membership, economic incentives (including Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), know-how and European single market benefits)²⁵ and political gains (an equal treatment of East-West interaction, full participation in all pan-EU organizations, the formation of a Polish voice within EU

²² http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/pdf/historic_opportunity_2003_en.pdf.

²³ J. Borkowski, *Polish Integration Policy in the Context of the European Union’s Accession Strategy*, “Yearbook of Polish European Studies” 2001, Vol. 5, p. 41.

²⁴ *Enlargement of the European Union – Guide to Negotiations Chapter by Chapter*, European Commission, Information and Interinstitutional Relations, June 2003. Or see <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/overview.htm>.

²⁵ Examples include the development of independent regulation of certain market, the telecommunication, energy; strengthening of pro-consumer and anti-monopoly laws. It also involved a huge transfer of know-how and institutional solutions without which Poland’s free market system would have been far more handicapped and less mature.

decision-making mechanisms). For example, legislative and institutional reforms are sometimes important for foreign capital because an institutional and well-functioning system may provide an open market on one side and a fully competitive market on the other. The investors abroad are not passive bystanders in the reform process; rather, FDI is a dynamic force in the forefront of the push for change and an agent for such reform.²⁶

As we mentioned before, Polish political development is in conjunction with Europeanization, especially in the sphere of public policies, national identities, human rights, etc. Poland's foreign and security policies reflect the post-Cold War mentality and are heavily influenced by the EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The strategic goals of Poland's security policy include: guaranteeing national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of its borders; guaranteeing the protection of the democratic order, in particular the full extent of rights and liberties as well as the security of the Polish people; creating the best possible conditions for the country's universal and stable social and economic development and its citizens' prosperity, and also for preserving national heritage and developing national identity; contributing to the construction of a durable, just, and peaceful order in Europe and the world, rooted in democratic values, human rights, law and order and solidarity.²⁷ The Warsaw government had to, on the one hand, maximize its security module through joining NATO and other important international organizations, and, on the other, meet the EU's demands of universal values. In the sphere of domestic economy, privatization was the symbol of Polish economic reform. Several symbolic Polish state-owned corporations, for example the Ciech (chemical corporation), Ruch (newsagents), Polmos Bialystok (brewery), Holding Farmaceutyczny (pharmacy), WSiP (textbook publisher), Bank PKO BP (national bank), Poludniowy Koncern Energetyczny (energy), PGNiG (oil company), and Zelmer (household appliances), were on the list of privatization.²⁸ Some state-owned corporations were transformed into private companies, but others were halfway reformed as joint-stock companies wholly held by the Treasury.

Cost/benefit calculation is hallmarked by the concept that Poland is a developing country, and whether Poland is going to be a net payer or a beneficiary of the EU budget is the subject of fervent discussions.²⁹ In addition to Poland's contribution to the EU, the transition period was also another important feature when Poland joined. According to an independent survey, had Poland received no transition period, Warsaw would have been obligated to offer 40 billion euro for the

²⁶ J. Hewko, *Foreign Direct Investment in Transitional Economies: Does the Rule of Law Matter?*, "East European Constitutional Review" 2001, Vol. 11/12, No. 4, p. 71–79.

²⁷ *Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, 4 January 2000, "The Bases of Poland's Security Policy," see http://www.wp.mil.pl/bezpieczenstwo/3_1_2n.htm. Or see *Poland's Security Policy 1989–2000...*, p. 557.

²⁸ "The Warsaw Voice", 8 February 2004, p. 29.

²⁹ "Rzeczpospolita", 20 February 2003, p. A9.

immediate improvement of work safety and environmental protection.³⁰ Pertinent to the transition period are the issues of administrative efficiency. For example, the budget cuts in Polish domestic affairs were going to affect Poland's ability to handle EU money; and the lack of sufficient executive ability on the Polish bureaucratic side would make it hard to control EU funds.³¹ As a result, not only would Poland's ability to absorb EU aid impair Poland's position in the Union, but the implementation of EU-sponsored infrastructure would also be delayed. If Poland failed to master the EU's labyrinthine farming and food-safety laws by the time it joined, it could allow other member countries to block its farm exports, using what the EU calls "safeguard clauses".

Another benefit on the Polish side is that the process of EU accession also helped overcome the barrier of the state's helplessness in the face of concentrated vested interests. The lack of resolution on the state's part, resulting from the immaturity of domestic mechanisms, was compensated by the influence of an external factor, the EU, which enforced the necessary "toughness". EU integration thus made it possible to raise the general quality of public policies, as well as make them more rational.

EU membership could also bring Poland an intangible change. Poles have a profound tradition in searching for liberalism, even during the communist control of the Cold War. Uprisings in 1956 in Poznan and 1968 in Gdansk illustrated liberal rebellion. This rebellion existed in the gap between people's expectations and the failed governmental responses to the responses.³² With the end of the Cold War, Poland's main target of a "return to Europe" designated the importance of Poland joining the European family. EU membership not only stimulates Poland's economy but also accumulates Polish collective identity. This can be conceptualized as interplay between at least two competing identities: the EU collective identity and Polish national identity respectively.³³ Poland's "return to Europe" designates the willingness of being a full member within the EU family; this membership is helpful for the establishment of national pride. On the other hand, the intactness of Polish national identity cannot be hindered by the EU collective identity – unlike other traditional EU members.

Poland's social learning process benefits in two ways from EU enlargement: Poland's internalizing the EU's norms, and the strategic use of norm-based argument. Norm-internalized factors exist in Poland's adoption of EU laws and regulations; a norm-based argument is the strategy that Poland could win over the membership.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, 10 November 2003, p. B1.

³¹ *Ibidem*, 30 October 2003, p. B3.

³² M. W. Doyle, *Liberalism and the End of the Cold War*, [in:] *International Relations Theory and The End of The Cold War*, eds. R. Ned Lebow and T. Risse-Kappen, New York 1995, p. 85–108.

³³ G. Miniotaitė, *Convergent Geography and Divergent Identities: A Decade of Transformation in the Baltic States*, "Cambridge Review of International Affairs" 2003, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 209–222.

In an institutional environment like the EU, political actors are concerned about their reputation as members and about the legitimacy of their preferences and behaviors. Actors who can justify their interests on the grounds of the community's standard of legitimacy are therefore able to shame their opponents into norm-conforming behavior and to modify the collective outcome that would have resulted from constellations of interests and power alone.³⁴

Poland's Foreign Policy in the context of the EU's external relations

The sources of insecurity in Poland can be divided into internal and external sources, although such a division is fairly arbitrary, since domestic ethnic conflicts or external instability cross-pollination can spread across borders. Internal sources of insecurities may arise from state failures, such as economic and political instabilities, or the failure of economic and political reform.³⁵ If budget reforms failed before accession, for example, it would prevent Poland from benefiting. As a result, not only would Poland's ability to absorb EU aid be impaired, but the implementation of EU-sponsored infrastructure would also be delayed. External sources of instability include concerns about Soviet (and then Russian) foreign policy intentions: Russia could try to re-establish a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Poland is especially wary that its territory could be under the sway of Moscow; these worries could be ethnic minorities, boundaries or other issues ranging from states' military, political or economic interactions.

Poland's participation in the EU, with special regard to Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), has an important effect on new members' future development within the EU.

Poland's admission to the EU and the impacts of enlargement on EU foreign policy

Enlargement will undoubtedly affect the process and substance of EU foreign policy making, though how much so is open to question. The Council of the European Union makes its decisions in three different modes: by unanimity, by common majority of votes, and by qualified majority. The domain of unanimity includes the CFSP area, conclusion of international agreements and revision of treaties and adoption of uniform electoral law to the European Parliament.³⁶

³⁴ F. Schimmelfennig, *The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union*, "International Organization" 2001, Vol. 55, No. 1, p. 47–80.

³⁵ F. Bomsdorf, *Confronting Insecurity in Eastern Europe: Challenges from the European Community*, London 1992, p. 21.

³⁶ B. Lizec, *Do European Security Capacities Have Feet of Clay?*, "Perspectives" 2002/2003 (Prague), Vol. 19, p. 32–51; W. Wessels, *The Millennium IGC in the EU's Evolution*, "Journal of Common Market Studies" 2001, Vol. 39, No. 2, p. 207; Accession Treaty (AA2003/ACT/en 1), Article 11.

The major issue for future EU decision-making process lies in whether the qualified majority voting scheme is going to happen more often in the enlarged EU (with the inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria from January 2007). The unanimity and qualified majority voting schemes evince the different tendencies towards a different developmental model: with more use of unanimity members like Poland could exert their voting weights and maintain their autonomy. If not, with more use of qualified majority voting it seems that the EU will tend towards implementation of supra-national ideas. It is also evidence of the social learning process that Poland's political development is in line with Europeanization.

Poland's number of votes provided in the Treaty of Nice is 27, equal to 8.41%/7.82 % of all (345) votes.³⁷ Under the qualified majority voting scheme, necessary to pass an act adopted upon a motion from the Commission is 232 votes and 62% of the EU's total population. Since Poland has become a decisive factor in the decision-making process, whether it supports EU's joint actions/common positions/declarations or not is vital. Poland will probably join the German coalition in the sphere of energy policy in exchange for the construction of the Yamal gas pipeline from Russia to Europe.³⁸

The EU's relations with its neighborhood will be another pending issue for Brussels and Warsaw, with special regard to its eastern neighbors. The Warsaw government puts emphasis on Ukraine and Belarus' potential accession talks with Brussels "to avoid new dividing lines in Europe". This strategic thinking rests on an enlarged EU which can consolidate the democratization in its eastern part and preserve modernization for the next decades. Admitting new countries to full membership of the organizations and excluding others produces "insiders" and "outsiders".³⁹ The Polish government is trying to create a new EU influential zone and to avoid Poland's territory being the front line. In this regard, Poland supports the inclusion of Ukraine in the EU – not only because the EU's oil imports come mainly from Russia via Ukraine .

Poland's cost/benefit calculation and social learning process in the sphere of foreign policy

On 15 January 2003 the United States formally asked NATO for assistance in its confrontation with Iraq. France vetoed any language implying an automatic use of force and Germany's Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, said later that his country's forces wouldn't participate in any military action against Iraq. Poland took the po-

³⁷ Romania and Bulgaria, upon joining the EU in 2007, are allocated 14 and 10 votes respectively.

³⁸ A. Adamczyk, *Poland in the EU Council: First Experiences Following the Accession*, "Yearbook of Polish European Studies" 2004, Vol. 8, p. 123–135.

³⁹ M. Light, S. White and J. Lowenhardt, *A Wider Europe: The View from Moscow and Kyiv*, "International Affairs" 2000, Vol. 76, No. 1, p. 77.



sition of supporting the US and sent troops to Iraq. Warsaw's foreign policy goal is positive participation in NATO, which is the security basis of European security from the Polish viewpoint.⁴⁰ By the same token, in November 2006 Poland refused to lift a veto on new European Union ties with Russia, casting a dark cloud over the summit between President Vladimir Putin and EU leaders.⁴¹ Polish president Lech Kaczynski called on Russia to lift an embargo on meat and plant products, which led to the Warsaw government's block of talks between the EU and Russia on a new partnership deal. Some theorists believe that the adjustment of ends rather than means characterize new members' learning process within the EU. Before Poland acquired membership the Warsaw government made every endeavor to meet the requirements of Brussels; after it acquired membership, the government reasserted for itself the importance of remaining an active member of the European Union and maintaining good relations with the US.⁴²

Poland's EU membership is instrumental in bolstering confidence in foreign policy. Firstly, as an emerging and unified institution, the EU provides an opportunity to speak in one voice and it would act to the advantage of Poland's foreign policy in the face of potential threats. Secondly, the EU's CFSP decision-making process is designed to co-ordinate members' foreign policies but still adhere to the principle of sovereignty. This decision-making process is mostly on the basis of consensus and the outcome of the decision has not been brought to a wider audience. Thirdly, institutions act as an intermediary. Poland's attitudes toward human rights protection and democracy-building are influenced and transformed within. As a persuadee in the EU group, Poland also plays the role of persuader in promoting human rights and democracy to the eastern border. The focal point of the European Union's external relations is the promotion of political stability in the sphere of its neighborhood area.

Conclusion

The case of Poland has illustrated the importance of EU institutions and the spread of the EU's values. Europeanization is the process whereby member states and Brussels have cross-pollination interaction when bi-polarity confrontation collapsed. The conclusion can be divided into three parts. Firstly, external incentives were of great importance when the Communist Bloc collapsed in the 1990s; the subsidies and benefits of being a full-fledged member of European Union were also instrumental in pushing Poland and other new members into seizing this opportu-

⁴⁰ W. Cimoszewicz, *Should We Have Allowed Saddam to Keep Ridiculing the International Community*, "Gazeta Wyborcza", 29 March 2003, p. 29–30.

⁴¹ Poland took a tough line to pressure Moscow to ratify an international energy charter, which sets the rules for energy trade, and lift its embargoes on Polish meat and plant products, see <http://www.eubusiness.com/Energy/061115112938.5yvk698z>, retrieved on 15 November 2006.

⁴² "Puls Biznesu", online, 7 September 2006; „Polish News Bulletin”, 08 September 2006.



nity. But most candidate states lacked input into the EU body of rules until actual accession was realized. New member states had to worry about whether they can manage to master all the EU's labyrinthine farming and food-safety laws by the time they join, allowing other EU countries to block farm exports, using what the EU calls "safeguard clauses". They might also fail to master enough well-managed projects to claim their full share of EU development funds, leaving them net payers into the EU budget.

Secondly, as a fully-fledged member of the EU, the three elements – democracy, market economy and capabilities to carry out obligations – helped to establish democratic societies based on individual rights in Poland's democratic development. Direct and indirect applicability of international treaties to domestic laws also internalized EU's norms and values into Poland's political environment. These non-material factors evinced the tendency of long term effects: the cooperation of EU members' behavior and foreign policy coordination within the EU framework. In addition to domestic affairs, Poland and other new member states possess clout over the EU's eastern policies in the sphere of external relations. Warsaw realizes the importance of being an active participant in the race for economic success in the group as well as arguing for the establishment of European military forces in order for the EU to be able to participate in the new division of international power. What is more, Poland is not only satisfied with the situation it has now, but asserts the importance of the Union in promoting freedom, democracy and justice to the sphere of influence to its further eastern partner. With the experience of Poland's accession to the EU, Warsaw and Brussels may have more legitimacy in promoting EU norms and values to its eastern partner.

Thirdly, Poland's foreign policies evince a tendency of strict adherence to US leadership in the face of an insecure environment, but the Polish government has also aligned itself to the daily decision-making process in Brussels. Whether Poland will submit itself to influences ranging from internal or external is currently the subject of fervent discussions.